The six bookes of a common-wealeJean BodinRichard KnollesTufts Innovates!Ioannis D. Evrigenis
Tufts University, Department of Political SciencePublished original versions of the electronic textsBridget AlmasTufts University, Perseus Digital LibraryTechnical ConsultantWilliam DonovanTufts UniversityDigital editing and proofreadingMichael HawleyTufts UniversityDigital editing and proofreadingAlexander TrubowitzTufts UniversityDigital editing and proofreadingTrustees of Tufts UniversityPerseus Digital LibraryMedford, MAbodin.livrep.perseus-eng1.xmlThe six bookes of a common-weale Written by I. Bodin a Famous Lawyer, and a
Man of Great Experience in Matters of StateJean BodinRichard Knolles[Printed by Adam Islip] impensis G. BishopLondon1606Tufts Digital LibraryThis TEI-XML edition made use of the text found within Early English Books Online
edition available here: https://www.proquest.com/docview/2240863097/99842793?
This pointer pattern extracts book and poem
This pointer pattern extracts book
Updated to Capitains GuidelinesFinalized - finalize for publication to masterVote - Approve - Approving for publication to master repo.Finalized - finalize for publication to master repoVote - Approve - Approving for publication to master repo.Alignment of Book I, Chapter IFinalized - finalizing for publication to master repo.Vote - Approve - voting to approve to move to finalizationUpdatedUpdated versionFinalized - Finalizing.Vote - Approve - YesCorrections to the FrenchAligned I.1 of the French with Knolles, and fixed several issues with the French OCR, as well as note 5 on the French, which was in the wrong place.Converted from EEBO format to TEI-A
THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE.
Written by I. BODIN a famous Lawyer, and a man of great Experience in matters
of State.
Out of the French and Latine Copies, done into English,
by RICHARD KNOLLES.
LONDON Impensis G. Bishop. 1606.
Rex & Lex.
A SUMMARIE TABLE OF ALL THE CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THE SIX BOOKES OF I.
BODIN.
The Contents of the first Booke.
WHat the principall end is of a well ordered
Commonweale. Chap. 1Of a Familie, and what difference there is betweene a Familie and a
Commonweale. Chap. 2.Of the power of an Husband over his Wife, as also of the mutuall duties betwixt
them: and whether it be expedient to renew the law of Divorcement or not. Chap.
3.Of the power of a Father, and whether it be meet for the Father to have power
of life and death over his children, as had the auntient Romans. Chap. 4.Of the power of a Lord or Maister over his Slaves, and whether Slaves are to
bee suffered in a well ordered Commonweale. Chap. 5.What a Citisen is, and how much Citisens differ from Citisens, and how much
from straungers: what also is to be understood by the name of a Towne, a Citie,
and of a Commonweale. Chap. 6.Of them that are under protection, and the difference betwixt Allies,
Straungers, and Subjects. Chap. 7.Of Soveraigntie. Chap. 8.Of a Prince tributarie or feudatarie: and whether hee bee a Soveraigne Prince:
and of the prerogative of honour amongst Soveraigne Princes. Chap. 9.Of the markes of Soveraigntie. Chap. 10
The Contents of the second Booke.
OF all sorts of Commonweales in generall, and whether there bee any mo than
three. Chap. 1.Of a Lordly Monarchy, or of the sole government of one. Chap. 2.Of a Royall Monarchy. Chap. 3.Of a Tyrannicall Monarchy. Chap. 4.Whether it bee lawfull to lay violent hand uppon a Tyrant; and after his death
to disanull all his acts, decrees, and lawes. Chap. 5.Of an Aristocratie. Chap. 6.Of a Popular Estate. Chap. 7.
The Contents of the third Booke.
OF a Senat, or Councell of Estate, and also of the power thereof. Chap.
1.Of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweale. Chap. 2.Of Magistrats. Chap. 3.Of the obedience that the Magistrat oweth unto the Lawes and Soveraigne Prince.
Chap. 4Of the power and authoritie of a Magistrat over particular and privat men, and
of his office and duetie. Chap. 5.Of the mutuall duties of Magistrats among themselves, and of the power that one
of them hath over another. Chap. 6.Of Corporations, and Colledges, Estates and Communities, and what profits or
inconveniences ensue thereof unto the Commonweale. Chap. 7.Of the orders and degrees of Citisens. Chap. 8.
The Contents of the fourth Booke.
Of the rising, encreasing, flourishing estate, declining, and ruine of
Commonweales. Chap. 1.Whether there be any meane to know the chaunges and ruines, which are to
chaunce unto commonweales. Chap. 2.That it is a most daungerous thing at one and the selfe same time to
chaunge the Forme, Lawes, and Customes of a Commonweale. Chap. 3.Whether it be better in a Commonweale to have the Magistrats changeable, or
else perpetuall. Chap. 4.Whether the unitie and concord of Magistrats amongst themselves bee good and
wholesome for the Commonweale, or not. Chap. 5.Whether it be convenient or expedient for the Maiestie of a Soveraigne Prince
to judge his subjects himselfe, or to be much conversant with them. Chap.
6.Whether a Prince in civill factions ought to joyne himselfe to one of the
parties, and whether a good subiect ought to bee constrained to take part with the
one or the other faction: with the meanes to remedie seditions. Chap. 7.
The Contents of the fift Booke.
WHat order and course is to be taken, to apply the forme of a Commonweale to
the diversitie of mens humors, and the meanes how to discover the nature and
disposition of the people. Chap. 1.The meanes to prevent the changes of Commonweales, which happen through the
great riches of some, and exceeding povertie of of others Chap. 2.Whether the goods of men condemned should bee applied unto the common treasure,
or to the church, or els left unto the heires. Chap. 3.Of reward and punishment. Chap. 4Whether it be more convenient to trayne up the subiects in armes, and to
fortifie their townes or not. Chap. 5.Of the suretie of alliances and treaties betwixt Princes and Commonweales, and
of the lawes of armes. Chap. 6.
The Contents of the Sixt Booke.
OF Censuring or Reformation, and whether it be expedient to inroll and number
the subiects, and to force them to make a declaration, or giue a certificat of
their privat estates. Chap. 1.Of Treasure. Chap. 2Of Coynes, and the meanes how to prevent that they bee not altered. Chap
3.A Comparison of the three lawfull Commonweales, that is, a Popular Estate, an
Aristocraticall, and a Royall, and that a Royall Monarchy is the best. Chap.
4.That a well ordered Commonweale dependeth not either of lot, either of choyce,
and much lesse of women; but by discent to be derived from a most honourable
stocke: and that it ought to bee given but to one alone, without partition. Chap.
5.Of the three kinds of Justice, Distributive, Commutative, and Harmonicall: and
what proportion they have unto an Estate Royall, Aristocratique, and Popular.
Chap. 6.FINIS.
THE FIRST BOOKE OF A COMMONWEALE.
CHAP. I ¶ What the principall end is of a well ordered
Commonweale.
A Commonweale is a lawfull government of many
families,The definition of a Commonweale. and of
that which unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soveraigntie. This
definition omitted by them which have written of a Commonweale, wee have placed
in the first place: for that in all arts
and actions, it behoveth us first to behold the end, and afterward the meanes
to attaine therunto. For a definition is nothing else than the very end and
scope of the matter propounded, which if it be not well and surely grounded,
whatsoever you build thereupon must together and in a moment fall. And yet
oftentimes it falleth out with many, that having propounded unto themselves
certaine ends, yet can they not attaine unto the end by them desired; no more
than the unskilfull archer who shooteth farre and wide from the marke he aimed
at, whereas he which shooteth markeman like, although he misse somewhat the
marke, yet shall he shoot neerer than he, neither shall
he want the commendation of a good archer, having performed
what a skilfull archer should have done. But he which knoweth not the end of
the matter he hath in hand, is as farre from the hope of attaining thereunto,
as he is from hitting the marke, which shooteth at randon, not knowing whereat.
Wherefore let us well examine the end, and every part of the definition by us
before propounded. First we said that a Commonweale ought to be a lawfull or
rightfull government: for that the name of a Commonweale is holy, as also to
put a difference betwixt the same, and the great assemblies of robbers and
pirats, with whome we ought not to have any part, commercement, societie, or
alliance, but utter enmitie. And therefore in all wise and well ordered
Commonweales,That a commonweale ought to be a lawfull
government. whether question be of the publike faith for the more
safetie to bee given; of leagues offensive or
defensive to bee made; of warre to bee denounced, or undertaken, either for the
defending of the frontiers of the kingdom, or for the composing of the
controversies and differences of Princes amongst themselves; robbers and pirats
are still excluded from all the benefit of the law of Armes. For why? Princes
which governe their States by their owne lawes, and the lawes of nations, have
alwayes divided their just and lawfull enemies, from these disordered, which
seeke for nothing but the utter ruine and subvertion of Commonweales, and of
all civill societie. For which cause, if ransome promised unto robbers for a
mans redemption, bee not unto them accordingly payed,
there is no wrong done: for that the lawes of Armes ought neither
to be communicated unto them, neither are they to
enjoy the benefit of those lawes, which lawfull enemies being taken prisoners,
or free men enjoy. Yea the lawes do permit him that is taken of robbers, not
therby to loose his libertie; but that he may neverthelesse make his will, and
do all other lawfull actes: which for all that was not in former time lawfull
for them to doe, which were taken by their just enemies. For that he which was
fallen into the hands of his lawfull enemies, by the law of nations did
together with his libertie loose also all such power as he had over his owne
things. Now if a man should say, that the law commaundeth to restore unto the
robber his pawne, his things committed unto thee upon trust, or what thou hast
of him borrowed; or to repossesse him, beeing by force thrust out of a
possession, never so unjustly by him obtained;
there is thereof a double reason: the one, for that the robber in submitting
himselfe unto the Magistrat, and shewing his obedience unto the lawes, in
demaunding justice, deserveth to be therein regarded: the other, for that this
is not so much done in favour of the theefe or robber, as in hatred of him
which would unconscionably detaine the sacred thing left to his trust, or by
way of force proceed to the gaining of that which he might by course of justice
have otherwise obtained. Of the first whereof weA notable
example of favour, extended unto an offender, submitting himself unto his
Prince. have examples enow, but none more memorable than that of
Augustus the Emperour, who caused it to be proclaimed by
the sound of the Trumpet, that he would give ten Sestertiees
unto him which should bring unto him Coracotas, the ring
leader of the theeves and outlawes in Spaine: which thing Coracotas
understanding, of his owne accord presented himselfe
unto the Emperour, and demaunded of him the promised reward: which Augustus
caused to be paid unto him, and so received him into his
favour, to the intent that men should not thinke, that hee would take from him
his life, to deceive him of the reward promised; or yet violate the publike
faith and securitie with him, who of himselfe offered himselfe unto the triall
of justice: albeit hee might have justly proceeded against the fellon, and so
have executed him. But he that should use such common right towards pirats
& robbers, as is to be used against just enemies,Pirats
and robbers are not to have the favour of just enemies. should open
a dangerous gap to all vagabonds, to joyne themselves unto robbers and theeves;
and assure their capitall actions and confederacie, under the vaile of justice.
Not for that it is impossible to make a good Prince of a robber, or a good King
of a rover: yea, such a pirat there hath
beene, who hath better deserved to be called a King, than many of them which
have carried the regall scepters and diadems, who have no true or probable
excuse of the robberies and cruelties which they cause their subiects to
endure. As Demetrius the pirat by way of reproach said
to Alexander the great,The notable
answere of Demetrius a pirat, unto Alexander the
great. That he had learned of his father no other occupation than
piracie, neither from him received any other inheritance than two small
frigots: whereas he which blamed him of piracie, roamed about neverthelesse,
and with two great armies robbed the world without controlment, albeit that he
had left him by his father the great and flourishing kingdome of Macedon. Which
frank speech so moved Alexander, not to the revenge of
the just reproach given him, but unto commiseration, with a certaine remorse of
conscience: in so much that he pardoned
Demetrius, & made him general over one of his
legions. And not to go further for examples, in our age Solyman
the great Sultan of the Turks, with great rewards allured unto
him Hariadenus Aenobarbus, Dragut Reis, &
Occhial, three of the most famous pirats of our memory;
whom he made his Admirals, and great commaunders at Sea; by their strength to
confirme his owne power, and to keepe under the other pirats, then roaming all
about the seas, and so to assure his traffique.How arch
pirats may in some sort be favoured. Truly by such allurements to
draw arch pirats into good order, is, and shal be alwaies commendable: not
onely to the end, not to make such people through dispaire
to invade the State of other princes, but also by their meanes to ruinate and
bring to naught other pirats, as enemies to
mankind: who although they seeme to live in never so much amitie and friendship
together, and with great equalitie to divide the spoile, (as it is reported of
Bargulus and Vitriatus, the
arch pirats) yet for al that they ought not to be of right called societies and
amities, or partnerships; but conspiracies, robberies, & pillages: neither
is that their equal parting of the spoile, to be tearmed a lawful division, but
a meere robberie: for that the principall point wherein consisteth the true
marke and cognisance of amitie in them wanteth, that is to wit, right
government, according to the lawes of nature. And that is it, for which the
auncient writers have called Commonweals, Societies of men assembled to live
well and happily together. Which as it may serve for a description of a Citie,
so can it not stand for a true definition The auncient definition of a Commonweale defective.
of a Commonweale, as having in the one part thereof too much, and in the other too little:
three principall things especially to bee required in every Commonwealth, wanting in this
description, that is to say, the family, the soveraigntie, and those things
which are common to a Citie, or commonweale: joyning hereunto also, that this
word, Happily, as they understand it, is not necessarie: for otherwise vertue
should have no prize, if the favourable wind of prosperitie still blew not in
the poope thereof, which a good man will never consent unto. For a Commonweale
may be right well governed, and yet neverthelesse afflicted with povertie,
forsaken of friends, besieged by enemies, and overwhelmed with many calamities:
unto which estate Cicero himselfe confesseth him to have
seene the Commonweale of Marseils in Province to have
fallen, at such time as it was by Caius Caesar
triumphed upon: which he saith to have bene the best ordered and most accomplished
that ever was in the world, without exception. And so contrariwise it should come
to passe, that a Citie, or Commonweale, fruitfull by situation, abounding in riches,
flourishing, and well stored with people, reverenced of friends, feared of enemies, invincible in
arms, strong in fortification, prowd in buildings, triumphant in glorie, should
therefore be rightly governed, albeit, that it were surcharged with all
villanies, and grounded in all maner of vices. And yet neverthelesse most
certaine it is, that vertue hath not a more capitall enemie, than such a
perpetual successe as they cal most happy; which to joine together with
honesty, is no lesse difficultie, than to combine things by nature most
contrarie. Wherfore sith that we may without
reproach want other things; as also without praise abound therein: but that
vertues we cannot without great imputation want; or be with vices polluted
without infamie: it must needs follow, that those things which are thought to
make the life of man more blessed, that is to say, riches, wealth, large
territories and possessions, not to be of necessitie required unto well ordered
Cities, and commonweals: so that he which will looke further into the matter,
must as little as hee may decline from the best or most perfect state of a
Commonweale. For as much as by the goodnes of the end we measure the worth and
excellencie, as well of Cities and Commonweals, as of all other things: so that
by how much the end of every Citie or Commonweale is better or more
heaven-like, so much is it to be deemed worthily to excell the rest. Yet
is it not our intent or purpose to figure
out the onely imaginary forme and Idea of a Commonweale, without effect, or
substance, as have Plato, and Sir Thomas More
Chauncelor of England, vainely imagined: but so neere as we possibly
can precisely to follow the best lawes and rules of the most flourishing cities
and Commonweals. In which doing, a man is not bee justly blamed, although hee
fully attaine not unto the end hee aimeth at, no more than the good Pilot, by
force of tempest driven out of his course; or the skilfull Physitian overcome
with the force of the maladie, are the lesse esteemed: provided, that the one
hath yet in the cure well governed his sicke patient; and
the other in his course, his ship.
Now if the greatest felicitie and happinesse of one citisen, and of a whole
Citie,The chief fellcitie of one citisen and of a Citie
or commonweale all one; and wherein it consisteth. be all one and
the selfe same, and the chiefe good of both consisteth in those vertues which
are proper unto the mind, and are onely conversant in contemplation (as they
which in wisedome are said to have farre excelled the rest, have with great
agreement affirmed) it must needs follow also, those citisens and people to
enjoy true felicitie, which exercising themselves in the sweet knowledge of
things naturall, humane, and divine, referre all the fruits of their
contemplation unto the almightie God, and great Prince of nature. If we then
confesse this to be the principall end of the most blessed and happy life of
every one in particular, we conclude, that this is the felicitie and end also
of a Commonweale. But for as much as men of affaires, and Princes, are not in
this point agreed, every man measuring his
good by the foot of his pleasures and contentments; and that those which have
had the same opinion of the chiefe felicitie of a man in particular, have not
alwayes agreed, That a good man and a good citisen are not all one; neither
that the felicitie of one man, and of a whole Commonweale are both alike: this
hath made that we have alwaies had varietie of lawes, customs, and decrees,
according to the divers humors and passions of Princes and governours. Most men
thinking the life of man to be but base, if his endevours should bee onely
directed unto necessitie, and not also unto pleasure, and ornament: they would
(I say) account it a miserable thing to dwell in poore cottages covered with
turfe, or in strait cabins and lodges to shrowd themselves from the injury of
the weather. But for as much as the wise man
is in a sort the measure of right and wrong, of truth and falshood; or as it
were an inflexible rule: and they which are thought to excell all others in
justice and wisdom, with one consent affirme the chiefe good of every one in
particular, and of all in common, to be but one, and the same; we also putting
no difference betwixt a good man, and a good citisen, measure the chiefe
felicitie and happinesse of every particular man, and of all men in general, by
that most beautifull and and sweet contemplation of high matters, which we
before spoke of. Albeit that Aristotle sometimes
followingAristotle blamed the vulgar opinion,
seemeth doubtfull in setting downe the chiefe good thing, and not well to agree
in opinion with himselfe; as thinking it necessarie unto vertuous actions to
joyne also wealth and power: yet when he reasoneth more subtilly thereof,
placing the chiefe good and felicitie of man,
in Contemplation. Which seemeth to have given occasion unto Marcus Varro
to say, That the felicitie of man consisteth in a mixture
of action and contemplation together: whereof this may seeme to have bene the
reason, For that as of one simple thing, the felicitie is simple; so of things
double or compound, the felicitie is also double and compound. For the
goodnesse of the bodie consisteth in the health, strength, agilitie,
comlinesse, and beautie thereof: but the goodnesse of the mind, that is to say,
of that facultie or power which is the true bond of the bodie and understanding
together, consisteth in the due obedience of our desires unto reason, that is
to say, in the action of morall vertues: whereas the chiefe goodnes and
felicitie of the understanding and mind it selfe, consisteth in the
intellectuall vertues, that is to say, Wisedom,
Knowledge, and true Religion: Wisedome, concerning worldly affairs; Knowledge,
concerning the searching out of the secrets of nature; and Religion, the
knowledge of things divine. Of which three vertues, the first seeth the
difference betwixt good and evill, the second betwixt truth and falshood, and
the third betwixt true holinesse and impietie: and so altogether containe what
is to be desired, or to be fled from. In which three vertues, true wisedome
consisteth, better than which God hath not given any thing unto man: For that
it cannot be taken from us by theft, consumed by fire, or lost by shipwrack;
but is of it selfe sufficient to make men, otherwise
destitute and bare of all other things, happie; and that not every one in
particular onely, but even altogether also.
Yet for all that shall a citie be much more blessed and fortunate, which
encreased by these vertues, shal have also sufficient territorie, and place
capable for the inhabitants; a fertill soyle to plant in, with beasts and
cattell sufficient to feed and cloath the people with; and for the maintenance
of their health, the sweet disposition of the heavens, temperate and fresh
ayre, plentifull and wholsome water, also matter fit for building and
fortification, if the countrey of it selfe bee not safe and strong enough
against the injuries both of the weather and the enemy. These are the first
beginnings of a growing commonweale, viz. That those
things be first providedThings requisit for the first
beginning of a growing commonweale. for, without which people can in
no wise live; and then after that, such other things as wherewith men live the
more commodiously and better, as medicines to cure diseases, mettals wherwith convenient tools may be made for workmen,
& armes for souldiers, not onely to repulse, but also to take revenge upon
the enemie and robber. And for as much as the desires of men are insatiable,
after that those things are provided for which are necessarie, as also those
which are profitable; it lusteth us also to seeke after, and to abound with
vaine delights and pleasures, that so we may more sweetly & pleasantly
live. And as we have no care of nurturing our children, before that they by
convenient education being growne, become capable both of speech and reason; no
more regard have cities also for the conforming of manners, or searching after
the knowledge of naturall and divine things, before they have gotten such
things as must needs be had to feed and defend their citisens; but are with
meane wisedome content to repulse their
enemies, and defend their people from injurie. But the man that hath got all
things needfull for him to lead a safe and happy life withall, if he be well by
nature,A notable discourse of the course that men hold
for the attaining of felicitie. and better by education instructed,
abhorreth the companie of loose and wicked men, sorteth himselfe with the good,
and seeketh after their friendship: and afterwards when he feeleth himself
cleane & free from those perturbations and passions which trouble and
molest the mind; and hath not set his whole hope upon his vaine pelfe, hee at
great ease beholdeth the chaunges and chances of the world, the unstaidnesse
and diversitie of mens maners, their divers ages, and conditions; some in the
height of power and soveraigntie; others in the bottome of calamitie and woe:
he then studiously beholdeth the mutations, risings, and downfals of
Commonweals; and wisely joyneth things
forepast, unto those that are to come. After that, turning himselfe from mens
affaires unto the beautie of nature, he delighteth himselfe in beholding the
varietie of natures worke in plants, living creatures, and minerals, hee
considereth of every one of them, their forme, their strength, and excellencie:
yea he seeth the successive transmutations of the elements themselves one into
another, the singular Antipathie and contagiousnesse of things, the wonderfull
order and consent of causes; whereby the things lowest, are ioyned unto the
highest, they in the middle unto both, and so in briefe all to all: as also
whereof every thing tooke beginning, whether it returneth againe, when and how
it shall take end; what in things is mortall and transitory, what immortall and
eternall: and so by little and little, as it were with the swift wings of
contemplation carried up into heaven, wondreth
at the brightnesse of the notable starres; the power, placing, distance, and
unequall course of the heavenly bodies; and so the good agreement and as it
were most sweet harmonie of the whole world, and of every part thereof: so
ravished with a wonderfull pleasure, accompanied with a perpetuall desire to
see the causes of all things, he is still caried on, untill hee bee brought
unto God, the first cause, and governour of all this most faire and beautifull
worke: whither when hee is once come, he staieth to search further, seeing that
he is of an infinite and incomprehensible essence, greatnesse, power, wisedome,
and beautie, such as cannot either by tongue be expressed,
or by any mind of man conceived: yet so much as in him is hee
prayseth, extolleth, and with
great devotion honoureth, that so great brightnes of the divine Maiestie, which
by such heavenly contemplation draweth him unto the true glorie, and chiefe end
of all goodnesse. For by these meanes men seeme in a manner to have obtained
the most goodly knowledge of things naturall, civill, and divine, and the very
summe of humane felicitie and blisse.
If therefore we judge such a man wise and happie, as hath not gotten store of
commonwealth and pelfe, but the knowledge and understanding of most excellent
things, and remote from the rude capacitie of the vulgar people: how much more
happie ought we to judge a commonweale, abounding with a multitude of such
citisens, althoughA small commonweale may yet be
happie. it contented with strait bounds, contemne the proud wealth
and pleasures of the greatest cities, which
measure their greatest felicitie, by their greatest delights, or by their
aboundant wealth and store, or by the vanitie of their glory? Neither yet for
all that doe we make that chiefe good of a man, or of a commonweale, to be a
thing confused, or mixt: For albeit that man be composed of a bodie which is
fraile and mortall, and of a soule which is eternall and immortall; yet must it
needs be confessed the cheiefe goodnesse of man to rest and be in that part
which is more excellent than the rest, that is to say, the Mind. For if it be
true (as true it is) that this our bodie is compact and framed of flesh and
bones, to serve the soule; and our desires to obey reason: who can doubt the
chiefe felicitie of man wholy to depend of the most excellent vertue thereof,
which men call the action of the mind? For although Aristotle,
according to the opinion
of the Stoiks, had placed the chiefe goodnes of man in the action of vertue;
yet he the same man was of opinion, that the same action was still to bee
referred unto the end of contemplation: otherwise (saith hee) the life of man
should bee more blessed than that of the Gods, who not troubled with any
actions or businesse, enioy the sweet fruit of eternall contemplation, with a
most assured repose and rest. And yet not willing to follow the doctrine of his
maister Plato, and also accounting it
Aristotle blamed. a shame to depart
from the opinion by himselfe once received and set downe; for as much as he at
the first had put the blessed life in action; he afterward with great ambiguitie
of words, hath placed the chiefe felicitie of man, in the action of the mind,
which is nothing else but contemplation: to the intent he might not seeme to have
put the chief good, both of men and commonweals, in things
most contrary unto themselves; motion (I say) and rest, action and
contemplation. And yet hee neverthelesse seeing men and commonweals to be still
subject unto motion, and troubled with their necessary affaires, would not
plainly put that chiefe good or happinesse which we seeke after, in
contemplation onely; which for all that he must of necessitie confesse. For all
beit that the actions whereby mans life is maintained, as to eat, to drinke, to
sleepe, and such like, are so necessarie, as that a man cannot long want them:
yet is no man so simple, as in them to put mans chiefe good or felicitie. The
moral vertues also are of much more worth and dignitie than they: for that the
mind by them (or by the vertue divine) purged from all perturbations, and
affections, may bee filled with the most sweet
fruit and cleare light of contemplation. Whereby it is to be understood, the
morall vertues to be referred unto the intellectuall, as unto their end. Now
that can in no wise be called the chiefe good or happinesse, which is referred
unto a farther thing, better and more excellent than it selfe: as the bodie
unto the soule, appetite unto reason, motion unto quiet rest, action unto
contemplation. And therefore I suppose that Marcus
Varro, who deemed man his chiefe good to bee mixt, of action and
contemplation; might (in mine opinion) have more aptly and better said mans
life to have need of both; yet the chiefe good and felicitie thereof to consist
in contemplation: which the Academicks called the sweet,
and the Hebrews the pretious death; for that
it doth in a sort ravish the mind of man from out of this fraile and vile
bodie, and carrieth the same up into heaven. Yet nevertheles true it is, that a
commonweale cannot long stand if it be quite or long time destitute of those
ordinary actions which concerne the preservation of the peoples welfare, as the
administration and execution of iustice, the providing of victuals, and such
other things necessary for the life of man; no more than can a man long live
whose mind is so strongly ravished with the contemplation of high things, that
he forgetteth to eate or drinke, and so suffereth the bodie with hunger and
thirst to perish, or for lacke of rest to die.
But as in this fabrick of the world (which we may cal the true image of a
perfect andA notable comparison. most absolute
commonweale) the Moone, as the soule of the world, comming neerer
unto the Sunne, seemeth to forsake this perspirall and
elementarie region; and yet afterwards by the conjunction of the Sunne, filled
with a divine vertue, wonderfully imparteth the same unto these inferiour
bodies: so also the soule of this little world, by theA man
is called the little world. force of contemplation ravished out of
the bodie, and in some sort as it were united unto the great
GOD. Sun of understanding, the life of the whole world,
wonderfully lightned with divine vertue, with that celestiall force marvelously
strengtheneth the bodie, with all the naturall powers thereof. Yet if the same,
become too carefull of the bodie, or too much drowned in the sensuall pleasures
thereof, shall forsake this divine Sunne; it shall befall it even as it doth
unto the Moone, which shunning the sight of the Sun, and masked with the the
shadow of the earth, looseth her brightnesse and light, by
which defect many fowle monsters are engendred, and the
whole course of nature troubled: and yet if the Moone should never be seperated
from the conjunction of the Sunne, it is most certaine that the whole frame of
this elementarie world should in right short time be dissolved and perish. The
same judgement we are to have of a well ordered commonweale; the chiefe end and
felicitie wherof consisteth in the contemplative vertues: albeit that publick
and politicall actions of lesse worth, be first and the fore-runners of the
same, as the provision of things necessarie for the maintenance and
preservation of the state and people; all which for all that we account farre
inferiour unto the morall vertues, as are also they unto the vertues
intellectuall; the end of which, is the divine contemplation of the fairest and
most excellent object that can possibly be
thought of or imagined. And therefore we see that Almightie God who with great
wisdome disposed all things, but that especially, for that he appointed only
six dayes for us to travell and to do our businesse in, but the seventh day he
consecrated unto contemplation and most holy rest, which onely day of all
others hee blessedGen. cap. 2. Deut. Exod. cap. 20.
as the holy day of repose and rest, to the intent we should imploy the same in
contemplation of his works, in meditation of his law, and giving of him
praises. And thus much concerning the principall end and chiefe good of every
man in particular, as also of all men in generall, and of every well ordered
commonweale: the neerer unto which end they approach, by so much they are the
more happie. For as we see in particulerA fit
comparison. men, many degrees of worldly calamitie or blisse,
according to the divers ends of good or bad
that they have unto themselves propounded; so have also commonweals in a sort
their degrees of felicitie and miserie, some more, some lesse, according to the
divers ends they have in their government aimed at.
The Lacedemonians are reported to have alwayes bene valiant and couragious
Plato, Plutarch in the lives of Lysander, Agesilaus, and
Lycurgus. men; but in the rest of their actions injust and
perfidious, if question once were of the common good: for that their education,
their lawes, customs, and manners, had no other scope or end than to make their
people couragious to undertake all dangers, and painfull to endure all manner
of labour and toyle; contemning all such pleasures and
delights, as commonly effeminate the minds of men, and weaken their strength,
referring all their thoughts & deeds, to
the encreasing of their state. But the Romane commonweale having flourished in
justice, farre passed the Lacedemonians; for that the Romans, besides that they
were passing couragious, had propounded also unto themselvesDionis Halicar. li. pri. true iustice, whereunto, as to a marke they
addressed all their actions. Wherefore we must so much as in us lyeth endevour
our selves to find the meanes to attaine or at least wise to come so neere as
we possibly can, unto that felicitie wee have before spoken of, and to that
definition of a Commonweale by us before set downe. Wherfore prosecuting every
part of the said definition, let us first speake of a Familie.
CHAP. II. ¶ Of a Familie, and What Difference There is
betweene a Familie and a Commonweale.
A Familie is the right government of many subjects
or personsThe definition of a familie. under the
obedience of one and the same head of the family; and of such things as are
unto them proper. The second part of the definition of a Commonweale by us set
downe, concerneth a Familie, which is the true seminarie and beginning of every
Commonweale, as also a principall member thereof. So that Aristotle following Xenophon,
seemeth to me without any probable cause, to have divided the Oeconomicall
government from the Politicall, and a Citie from a Familie: which can no
otherwise be done, than if wee should pull the members from the bodie; or go
about to build a Citie without houses. Or by the same reason he should have set
downe by it selfe a treatise of Colleges, and Corporations; which being neither
families nor cities, are yet parts of a Commonweal. Wheras we see the Lawyers,
and law makers (whome we ought as guides to follow in reasoning of a
Commonweale) to have in the same treatise comprehended the lawes and ordinances
of a commonweale, corporations, colleges, and families; howbeit that they have
otherwise taken the Oeconomicall government than did Aristotle;
who defineth it to be a
knowledge for the getting of goods: a thing common unto corporations and
Colleges, as unto Cities also. Whereas we under the name of a Familie, do
comprehend the right government of an house or familie; as also the power and
authoritie the maister of the house hath over his people, and the obedience to
him due: things not touched in the treatise of Aristotle
and Xenophon. Wherefore as a familie well and wisely
ordered, is the true image of a Citie, and the domesticall government,
The good government of a familie the true modell for the
government of a Commonweale. in sort like unto the soveraigntie in a
Commonweale: so also is the manner of the government of an house or familie,
the true modell for the government of a Commonweale. And as whilest every
particular member of the bodie doth his dutie, wee live in good and perfect
health; so also where every family is kept in order, the whole citie
shall be well and peaceably governed. But if a man
shall be crosse and froward unto his wife, if the wife shall be about to take
upon her the office of her husband, and not shew her selfe obedient unto him;
if both of them shall account of their children as of servants, and of their
servants as of beasts, and so tyrannise over them; if children shall refuse the
commands of their parents, and the servants of their maisters; who seeth not no
concord to be in that house, no agreement of minds and wils, but all full of
strife, brawling and contention? Seeing therfore the way to order wel a citie,
leaneth & resteth in the good government of families, as it were upon
certain proper foundations: it behoveth us first to have
an especiall regard and care for the good ordering and government of families.
Wee said a Commonweale to bee a lawfull government of many families, and of
such things as unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soveraigntie. By
the word, Many, you may not in this case understand two, as for most part we
do; for seeing that the law requireth at the least three persons to make a
College, we according to the Lawyers opinion account three persons also,
besides the maister of the house, necessary to make a familie; be they
children, or slaves, or men enfranchised, or free borne men which have
voluntarily submitted themselves unto the maister of the house or family, who
maketh up the fourth, and is yet neverthelesse a member of the family. But for
as much as Families, Colleges, Companies, Cities, and
Commonweals, yea, and mankind it selfe would
perish and come to end, were it not by marriages (as by certaine Seminaries, or
nurseries) preserved and continued, it followeth well that a family cannot be
in all points perfect and accomplished without a wife. So that by this
accountNo perfect familie without a wife. it
commeth to passe, there must be five persons at least to make up an whole and
entire familie. If therefore there must needs bee three persons, and no fewer,
to make aHow many persons be requisite to make up an whole
and entire familie, and how many families make a Citie. College, and
as many to make a familie, beside the maister of the houshold and his wife; wee
for the same reason say three families and no fewer to bee necessarie for the
making of a Citie, or Commonweale, which should be three times five, for three
perfect families. Whereupon (in mine opinion) the auncient writers have called
fifteene a people, as saith Appuleius, referring the
number of fifteene unto three entire families.
For albeit that the maister of the family have three hundred wives, as had
Salomon King of the Hebrews; and sixe hundred children,
as had Hermotimus king of theIustin.
lib. 4. Parthians by his multitude of wives; or five hundred slaves,
as had Crassus; if they bee all under the commaund of
one and the same head of the familie, they are neither to be called a people
nor a citie, but by the name of a family onely: Yea although hee have many
children, or servants maried, having themselves children also; provided
alwaies, that they be under the authoritie of one head, whome the law calleth
father of the family, although he yet crie in his cradle. And for this cause
the Hebrews, who alwayes show the proprietie of things by their names, have
called a family אלף, not
for that a family containeth a thousand persons, as saith one Rabbin,
but of the word אלוף, which
signifieth an head, a Prince, or Lord, naming the familie by the chief therof:
better as I suppose than did the Greeks, of οἴκω, or the Latines of Famulis.
But what should let (may some man say) three Colleges, or
many other particular assemblies without a familie to make a Citie, or Commonweale,
if they be governed by one soveraigne commaund? Truly it maketh a good
show, and yet for all that is it no Commonweale: for that no Colledge, nor
bodie politique can long stand without a familie, but must of it selfe perish
and come to nought.
Now the law saith, that the people never dieth, but a thousand yeare hence to
be the same that it was before: although the use and profit of any thing
granted unto a commonweale be after an hundred yeare extinguished, and againe
reunited unto the proprietie, which proprietie
should otherwise be unto the Lord thereof vaine and unprofitable: for it is to
be presumed, that all they which now live wil in the course of an hundred
yeares be dead, albeit that by successive propagation they be immortal; no
otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were
an hundred times changed, by putting in of new plancks, yet still retained the
old name. But as a ship, if the keele (which strongly beareth up the prow, the
poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an evil
favoured houp of wood: even so a Commonweale without a soveraintie of power,
which uniteth in one body all the members and families of the
same is no more a commonweale, neither can by any meanes long
endure. And not It is not the greatnes of the number that maketh the
Commonweale, but the union of the people under one soveraigne
commaund. to depart from our similitude: as a ship may be quite
broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people be into
divers places dispersed, or els be utterly destroyed, the Citie or state yet
standing whole; for it is neither the wals, neither the persons, that maketh
the citie, but the union of the people under the same soveraigntie of
government, albeit that there be in all but three families. For as an Emot is
as well to be called a living creature, as an Elephant: so the lawfull
government of three families, with a soveraigntie of power maketh as well a
commonweale, as a great signiorie. So Rhaguse one of the least signeuries in
all Europe, is no lesse a commonweale, than are those of the Turkes, the
Tartars, or Spanyards, whose Empires are bounded with the same bounds that the
course of the Sun is. And as a little familie shut up in a small
cottage, is no lesse to be accounted a familie, than
that which dwelleth in the greatest and richest house in the citie: so a little
king is as well a Soveraigne as the greatest Monarch in the world.
So Ulisses, whose kingdome was contained within the rock of
Ithaca, is of Homer as well
called a King, as Agamemnon: for a great kingdome (as
saith Cassiodorus) is no other thing than a great
Commonweale, under the government of one chiefe soveraigne: wherefore if of
three families, one of the chiefe of the families hath soveraigne power over
the other two, or two of them together over the third, or all three joyntly and
at once exercise power and authoritie over the people of the three families; it
shall as well be called a Commonweale, as if it in it selfe comprehended an
infinite multitude of citisens. And by this meanes it may chaunce, that one
familie Sometimes one familie may be greater than some Commonweale.
may sometimes be greater and better peopled then a commonweale: as was wel said of the familie of Aemilius
Tubero, who was head of a family of sixteene of his owne children, all
maried, whome he had all under his power, together with their children and
servants, dwelling in the same house with him. And on the contrary part, the
greatestPlut. in Emili. The greatest & best peopled citie
no more a commonweale than the least. Citie or Monarchie, and the
best peopled that is upon the face of the earth, is no more a commonweale or
citie, than the least. Albeit that Aristotle saith, the
citie of Babylon (whose circuit in a square forme was so great, that it could
scarce on foot bee gone about in three dayes) was to bee called rather a
nation, than a commonweale, which ought not, as he saith, to have more than
ten thousand citisens in it at the most: as if it were any absurditie to call
an infinite number of nations, and dwelling in divers
places, governed by one soveraigne commaund, by the name of
a Commonweale. By which meanes the citie of Rome (more famous than which was
never any) should notThe multitude of people no hinderance
to the unitie of a commonweale, so that they be under one soveraigne
command. deserve the name of a Commonweale, which at the foundation
thereof had not above 3000 citisens; but in the time of Tiberius
the Emperor, had cessed in it fifteene millions, besides an
hundred and ten thousand others dispersed almost throughout the world: not
accounting the slaves, the number of whom was ten times greater: and yet in
this number were not comprised they of the Provinces subject unto the Empire of
Rome, neither the confederat cities, or free nations, who had their Commonweals
in soveraigntie divided from the Roman Empire. Which soveraigntie of government
is the true foundation and hinge whereupon the state of a citie turneth:
whereof all the magistrats, lawes, and
ordinances dependeth; and by whose force and power, all colleges, corporations,
families, and citisens are brought as it were into one perfect bodie of a
Commonweale: albeit that all the subiects thereof be enclosed in one little
towne, or in some strait territorie, as the commonweale of Schwitz, one of the
least of the confederat Cantons of Suisers; not so large as many farms of this
Fraunce. kingdom, nor of greater revenue: or
els that the Commonweale hath many large provinces and countries, as
Ester. cap. 1 had the Persians, which Herodotus, Plutar. in Artax. is reported to have had an hundred twentie
seven provinces from the uttermost part of India, unto the sea of Hellespontus:
or as is now also the
commonweale of the Aethiopians, wherein are fiftie provinces, which Pau. Iovius without reason calleth kingdomes; albeit that
they have not but one king, one kingdome, one Monarch, one Commonweale, under
the puissant soveraigntie of one and the same Prince whome they call Negus.
But beside that soveraigntie of government thus by us set downe, as the strong
foundation of the whole Commonweale; many other things besides are of citisens
to be had in common among themselves, as their markets, their churches, their
walks,Many things common unto
citisens among themselves. wayes, lawes, decrees, judgements, voyces,
customs, theaters, wals, publick buildings, common pastures, lands, and
treasure; and in briefe, rewards, punishments, sutes, and contracts: all which
I say are common unto all the citisens together, or by use and profit: or
publick for every man to use, or both together. That is also a great communitie
which ariseth of colleges and corporations
of companies, as also of benefits both given and received. For otherwise a
Commonweale cannot be so much as imagined,No commonweale
where nothing is common which hath in it nothing at all publick or
common. Although it may so be, that the greatest part of their lands be common
unto the citisens in generall, and the least part unto every one of them in
particular: as by the law of Romulus, called Agraria, all the lands of Rome, at that time containing
eighteene thousand acres, was divided intoDionisius Halycarnasseus lib. 2. three equall parts,
whereof the first part was assigned for the maintaining of the sacrifices; the
second for the defraying of the necessarie charges of the commonweale; and the
third was equally divided among the citisens; who being in number but three
thousand, had to everie one of them allotted two acres: which equal partage
long time after continued with great
indifferencie, for Cincinnatus the Dictator himself 260
yeres after had no more but two acres of land, which hee with his owne hands
husbanded. But howsoever lands may be divided, it cannot possibly bee, that all
things should bee common amongst citisens; which unto Plato
seemed so notable a thing, and so muchPlato
his opinion for the communitie of all things in a commonweale,
refuted. to be wished for, as that in his Commonweale he would have
all mens wives and children common also: for so he deemed it would come to
passe that these two words, Mine and Thine, should never more be heard amongst
his citisens, being in his opinion the cause of all the discord and evils in a
Commonweale. But he understood not that by making all things thus common, a
Commonweale must needs perish: for nothing can be publike, where nothing is
privat: neither can it be imagined there to bee
any thing had in common, if there be nothing to be kept in particular; no
more than if al the citisens were kings, they should at al have no king;
neither any harmonie, if the diversitie and dissimilitude of voyces cunningly
mixed together, which maketh the sweet harmony, were al brought unto one and
the same tune. Albeit that such a Commonweale should be also against the law of
God and nature, which detest not onely incests, adulteries, and inevitable
murders, if all women should bee common; but also expresly forbids us to
steale, or so much as to desire any thing that another mans is. Whereby it
evidently appeareth this opinion for the communitie of all things to bee
erroneous, seeing Commonweals to have bene to that end founded and appointed by
God, to give unto them that which is common; and unto every man in privat, that
which unto him in privat belongeth. Besides
that also such a communitie of al things is impossible, and incompassible with
the right of families: for if in the familie and the citie, that which is
proper, and that which is common, that which is publick, and that which is
privat, be confounded; we shall have neither familie nor yet Commonweale. In so
much that Plato himselfe (in all other things most
excellent) after he had seene the notable inconveniences & absurdities
which such a confused communitie of all things drew after it, wisely of
himselfe departed from that so absurd an opinion, and easily suffered that
Commonweale which he had attributed unto Socrates to be
abolished; that so he might more moderatly defend his
owne. But some will say, that the Massagets
had all things in common: yet they which so say, confesse also every one of
them to have had his pot, his sword unto himselfe, as also must they needs have
their privat apparell and garments also; for otherwise the weaker should bee
still spoiled of the stronger, having his garments still taken from him.
Wherefore as a Commonweale is a lawfull government of many families, and of
those things which unto them in common belongeth, with a puissant soveraigntie:
so is a Familie the right government of many subiects or persons, and of such
things as are unto them proper, under the rule and commaund of one and the same
head of the familie. For in that especially consisteth the difference betwixt a
Commonweale and a Familie:The chief difference betwixt a
Familie and a Commonweale. for that the maister of a familie hath the
government of domesticall things, and so of
his whole familie with that which is unto it proper; albeit that every house or
family be bound to give something unto the Commonweale, whether it be by the
name of a subsidie, taxe, tribute, or other extraordinarie imposition. And it
may bee that all the subiects of a Commonweale may live together in common, in
manner of Colleges, or companies, as did in auncient time the Lacedemonians,
where the men apart from their wives and families, used to eat and sleep
together by fifteene and twentie in a company: As also in auntient time in
Creet, all the citisens of all sorts men and women, young and old, rich and
poore, alwaies eat and dranke together; and yet for all that, everie man had
his owne proper goods apart, every one of them still contributing what was
thought expedient for the defraying of the common charge. Which
thing the Anabaptists in our time began to practise in
the towne of Munster, hauing commaunded all things to be
Sleidan. common, excepting their wives (of whom they
might have many) and their apparell, thinking thereby the better to mainteine
mutuall love and concord among them: in which their account they found
themselves farre deceived. For they which admit this communitie of all things,
are so farre from this good agreement of citisens among themselves, which they
hope thus to maintaine, as that thereby the mutuall love betwixt man and wife,
the tender care of parents towards their children, and their dutifulnesse
againe towards them, and in briefe the mutuall love of neighbours and kinsmen
among themselves, is quite extinquished; all the kind bond of bloud and kindred
(than which none stronger can be imagined for the friendship
and good agreement of citisens) being by this meanes taken
away. For that which thou shouldest dearely love must be thine owne, and that
also all thine: whereas communitie is of the Lawyers justly called of it selfe,
the mother of contention and discord. Neither are they lesse deceived, which
think greater care to bee had of things that bee common, than of things that be
privat; for wee ordinarily see things in common and publick to be of every man
smally regarded and neglected, except it be to draw some
Things common smally regarded privat and particular profit thereout
of. Besides that, the nature of love and friendship is such, that the more
common it is, or unto moe divided, the lesse force it is of: not unlike to
great rivers, which carry great vessels, but being divided into small branches,
serveth neither so keep back the enemie, neither for burthen: in which maner
love also divided unto many persons or things,
looseth his force and vertue. So the lawfull and certaine government of a
familie, divideth every privat mans wives and children, servants and goods,
from all other mens families; as also that which is unto every particular man
proper, from that which is to them all common in generall, that is to say, from
a Commonweale. And withall in every well governed Commonweale we see the
publick magistrat to have a certaine especiall care and regard of the privat
goods of orphans, of mad men, and of the prodigall: for that it concerneth the
Commonweale to have their goods preserved unto them to whome they belong, and
that they be not embeseled. As in like case the lawes
oftentimes forbiddeth a man to procure, to alienat,
or to pawne his own goods or things, except upon certain
conditions, as also unto certaine persons; for that the preservation of every
privat mans goods in particular, is the preservation of the Commonweale in
generall. And yet neverthelesse althoughParticular families
may have also their particular lawes: and how. lawes be common to al,
it is not inconvenient, but that families may have their certaine particular
statutes for themselves and their successors, made by the auntient heads of
their families, and confirmed unto them by their soveraigne Princes. As we have
example in the most honourable nation of the Saxons, amongst whome are many
families, which use certaine their owne privat lawes, quite differing both from
the lawes of the Empire, and from the common lawes and customs of Saxonie. And
betwixt the dukes of Bavaria, and the Counties Palatines there are also their
particular lawes, as well for the lawfull
succession in the inheritance of their houses, as in the right of the
Electorship, which is in these two honourable houses, alternative, by the
auntient decrees of their predecessors: which laws & customs the duke of
Bavaria, with great instance required to have renewed at the diet of the Empire
at Auspurge, in the yere 1555 which is not so in the other families of the
Electors. Betwixt the houses also of Saxonie and Hess, are their domesticall
and proper laws Anno 1370. and
1431. confirmed unto them by the Emperour Charles
the fourth, and Sigismund. In like
maner it was decreed betwixt the houses of Austria, and Bohemia, that for lack
of heirs male, the one of them should succeed into the inheritance of the
other, as we see it is now come to passe. And not to go further than this
Fraunce. Realme, I have seene a charter of the
house of Laval granted by the King, and
confirmed by the Parliament of Paris, directly contrarie to the customes of
Anjou, Britagne, and Mayne, wherein the most part of their inheritance lie: by
which Charter the first inheritor (able to succeed) is to enioy all, being not
bound to give any thing unto his coheirs, more than the moveables; with charge,
that the heire male shall beare the name of Guy de
Laval; or of Guionne, if she bee an inheritrix,
and the armes plaine. In like manner in the houses of Baume, Albret, and
Rhodez, the daughters by the auntient lawes of their auncestors, were excluded
both in direct and collaterall line from inheriting, so long as there were any
males in what degree soever; deriving as it were into their families, the law
Salique, usual unto the Princes of Savoy. Such lawes of families, which the
Latines had also, and called them Ius familiare, were
made by their auncestors and chiefe of their
families, for the mutuall preservation of their inheritance, name, and auntient
armes; which may in some sort well be suffered in some great and honourable
families: which privat lawes and customs by us thus spoken of, have oftentimes
preserved from destruction, not onely families, but whole commonweals; which
was the cause that in the diet at Auspurge in the yeare 1555, the Princes
The great benefit which oftentimes commeth unto a Commonweale,
by certain privat lawes and customs granted unto some great and honourable
houses & families. of the Empire after long civill warre, wisely
renewed the auntient lawes of great houses and families, as having well
perceived that by that meane the Empire was to be preserved from ruine, and the
state of Almaigne from a generall destruction. Which for all that, is not to
take place in other obscure and particular base families, to the intent that
the publick lawes, so much as is possible, should be unto all men common and
the selfe same. For it is not without great
cause to bee suffered, that the lawes of privat families should derogat from
the customes of the countrey, and so, much lesse from the generall lawes and
ordinances. Neither are they which come after, by this law of families by their
grand-fathers, & great grand-fathers made, contrarie to the common customs
and lawes, further bound than they themselves shall thereunto give their
consent. For which cause the successors of the house of Albret, of Laval, and
of Montmorency obtained decrees from the Parliament of Paris, contrarie to the
auntient charters of their predecessors; for that they were contrary unto the
customes of those places, when question was of the
successions of Laval, of the Countie of Dreux, and of Montmorency,
which they would make indivisible, contrarie to the
custom of the Viscomptie of Paris: For it beseemeth that the customes of
families should bee subiect unto the lawes, in like maner as the heads of
families are subject unto their soveraigne Princes. Much lesse are the lawes of
families and kindreds, allowed by the decrees of the Romans, to be be suffered,
least for the privat the publick should be neglected: as
Camillus complained with Livie,Livius lib. 5 What (saith he) if the sacred
rites of families may not in time of warre be intermitted, pleaseth it you that
the publick sacrifices and Roman gods should even in time of peace be forsaken?
For it was a law of the twelve tables conceived in these words,
Sacred privat Rites, firme be they for ever: which M.
Tullius translated into his lawes. And thus much in
generall, concerning the similitude and
difference of a Commonweale and Familie: now let us discourse also of the
singular parts of a Familie.
CHAP. III. ¶ Of the power of an Husband over his Wife,
as also of the mutuall duties betwixt them: and whether it be expedient to
renew the law of divorcement or not.
ALL assemblies of men lawfully joyned together,
whether they be Families, Colledges, Universities, or Commonweals, are kept
together and preserved by the mutuall duties of commanding
and obeying: for as much as that libertie which nature hath
given unto every one to live at his owne pleasure, bound within no lawes, is
yet subject unto the rule and power of some other. All which power to commaund
over others, is eitherThe division of power and
commaund. publick or privat: The power publick, is either free from
law, as is theirs which hold the chiefest place of soveraigntie; or els
restrained by law, as is the power of the Magistrats, who although they
commaund over privat men, are yet themselves subject unto the commaunds and
laws of others their superiours. The power privat, consisteth either in the
heads of families, or in corporations, or colledges, where all by a generall
consent, or the greater part, commaundeth over the rest. But the domesticall
Domesticall power of foure sorts. power is of foure
sorts: viz. The power of the Husband over his Wife, the
power of the Father over his children, the power of the Lord over his slaves,
and the power of the head of a Familie over his mercenarie servants. And for as
much as the right and lawfull government of everie Commonweale, Corporation,
Colledge, Societie, and Familie dependeth of the due knowledge of commaunding
and obeying; let us now speake of every part of commaunding in such order as is
by us before set downe. For naturall libertie is such, as for a man next unto
God not to be subiect to any man living, neither to suffer the commaund of any
other than of himselfe; that is to say, of Reason, which is alwaies conformable
unto the will of God. This naturall commaundementThe first
& greatest commaund is the commaund of Reason over our affections, &
so over our selves. of Reason over our affections and desires, is the
first, the greatest and most antient that is:
for before that one can well commaund over others, hee must first learne to
commaund himselfe, giving unto Reason the soveraigntie of commaund; and unto
his affections obedience: so shall it come to passe that everie one shall have
that which of right unto him belongeth, which is the first and fairest justice
that is; and that where of the common Hebrew proverb grew, That every mans
charitie should first begin of himselfe: which is no other thing than to keepe
our affections obedient unto Reason. This is the first law of naturall
commaund, which God by his expresse commaundement Gen.
cap. 2. established, as we see in the speech which God had both unto
her that was the first Gen.
cap. 3 mother of us all; as also against him who first defiled
himself with his brothers bloud
Gen. cap. 4. For that commaund which he had before given
the Husband and his Wife, is two wayes to be understood; first literally for
the power the Husband hath over his Wife, and then morally for the commaund the
soule hath over the bodie, and reason over affection. For that reasonable part
of understanding, is in man as the Husband; and Affection, as the Woman: For
before God had created Eva, it was said of Adam,
Male and female created he them Gen. cap. 1..
Wherefore the woman in holy writ is oftentimes taken for affection: but never more than with
Salomon, who so lived as a man unto women most kind; but so writ, as
if he had bene unto them a sworne enemie, whereas he thought nothing lesse, all
that his speech being to bee understood of mans unreasonable desires, as well
declareth the wise and grave Rabbin MaymonRabbi Maymon. lib. x. nemore..
But leave we the morall discourse unto Philosophers and
Divines to dispute of, and let us take that which belongeth unto civill
policie, and speake of the power the Husband hath over the Wife, as proper unto
this our question. By the name of a Wife I understand a just and lawfull Wife,
and not concubine, which is not in the power of him that keepeth her; albeit
that the Roman lawes call it mariage, and not concubinage,A
man hath no power over his Concubine, or her that is but unto him
betrothed. if the concubine be franke and free: which all nations
have of good right rejected, and as it were by secret consent abrogated, as a
thing dishonest and of evill example. Neither doth this power that the Husband
hath over his Wife extend unto her that is but betrothed, upon whome the
betrothed man may not lay his hand; which hath ever bene lawful unto the
Husband, both by the Civil and Canon law: yea if the betrothed
man shall lay violent hand, or force her that is to him
affianced or betrothed, he shall therefore by right suffer capitall punishment.
But what if by consent of the man and of the woman, contract of mariage be made
by words of the present time, before they know one another; for that, the law
calleth just marriage: I am for all that of opinion the power of an Husband not
to be yet gotten by such a contract, except the Wife have followed her Husband:
for as much as by the decrees of the Divines and Canonists (whose authoritie is
in this matter the greatest) as often as question is made of the right of
mariages, scarce any regard is had of such mariages betwixt man and wife,
except it be of fact consumat, by the mutuall conjunction of their bodies;
which by the consent of many nations is expresly received, as often as question
is made of enjoying of such commodities as are
to be gained by mariage. But after that lawful conjunction
How the Husband sometimes hath not of right power over his Wife, and
why. of man and wife (which we have spoken of) the Wife is in the
power of her Husband, except he be a slave, or the sonne of the maister of the
Familie, who have no authoritie over their wives, & much lesse over their
children; which although their married father were manumised, should yet fall
into the power of their grandfather. The reason whereof is, for that a Familie
should have but one head, one maister, and one Lord: whereas otherwise if it
should have many heads, their commaunds would be contrarie, one forbidding what
another commandeth, to the continuall disturbance of the whole familie. And
therefore the woman by condition free, marrying her selfe unto the maister of
the families sonne, is in the power of her father in law, as is also the
free man marrying himselfe unto the maister
of the families daughter, in the power of another man if he go to dwell in the
house of his Father in law: albeit that in all other things he enioy his right
and libertie. Neither seemeth it a thing reasonable, that is by the Roman laws
ordained, That the married daughter, except she be before by her Father set at
libertie, although she have forsaken his house and dwell with her Husband,
shall not yet for all that be in the power of her Husband, but of her father: A
thing contrary unto the law of nature, which willeth, That every man shuld be
maister of his owne house, (as saith Homer) to the end
that he may be a law unto his familie: and repugnant
also unto the law of God, which commaundeth the Wife to forsake father
and mother to follow her Husband; and also
giveth power unto the Husband to confirme or breake the vowes of his Wife.
Wherefore that law of the Romans is* Numeri. 3.
worthily abrogated, and especially with us: for that the custome generally
exempteth the married woman out of the power of her father; as was likewise in
the Lacedemonian Commonweale, as Plutarch writeth, where
the married woman saith thus; When I was a daughter I did the commaund of my
father, but since that I am married, it is my Husband to whome I owe mine
obeysance: for otherwise the wife might tread under foot the commaundement of
her Husband, and acquit her selfe when shee saw good under the guard of her
father. Now the interpretors of this Roman law have used many cautions to avoid
the absurdities and inconveniences following, if the
wife should not be subiect to her husband, untill she were
set at libertie by her father. Yet in that point the lawes of all people agree
with the lawes of God and nature, ThatThe wife by all the
lawes of God and man bound to obey her husband. the wife ought to be
obedient unto her husband, and not to refuse his commaunds not repugnant unto
honestie. One Italian Doctor there is of opinion, That the wife is not in the
power of her husband: but for that of his assertion so singuler and absurd, hee
hath brought neither reason nor authoritie, there hath bene none so fond to
follow the same. For it is certaine by the law of Romulus,
that the husband had not onely the commaund of his wife, but
also power of life and death over her, in foure cases, without
Foure cases wherin a man by Romulus his law had power of
life and death over his wife. any forme of judiciall processe against
her: that is to wit, for Adulterie, for suborning of a child, for
counterfeiting of false keyes, and for drinking of wine. Howbeit the rigor
of those lawes were by the kindnesse of
husbands by little and little moderated, and the punishment of adulterie
committed to the discretion of the parents of the wife: which began to be
renewed & again put in practise in the time of Tiberius
the Emperour; for that the husband putting away his wife for
adulterie, or himselfe attainted* Tacitus lib. 2 with
the same crime, the offence remained unpunished, not without the great reproach
of their kindred, who in auncient time (after the manner of the Romans)
punished the adulterous women with death, or with exile. And albeit that the
power of the husband over his wife was much diminished, yet neverthelesse by
the oration Livi. lib. 33.
which Marcus Cato the Censor made unto the people in defence of
the law Oppia (which tooke from women their habilliments
of collours, and forbad them to weare above
one ounce of gold) it appeareth that the women were al their lives in the
government of their fathers, their brethren, their husbands, & next
kinsmen, in such sort, as that without their leave or authoritie, they could
make no contract, or yet doe any lawfull act. This Cato
the Censor flourished about 550 yeares after the lawes of Romulus:
and 200 years after, Ulpian the Lawyer
writeth, That Tutors and Governers were wont to be given to women and orphans;
but when they were married, that then they were in the hand of the man, that is
to say in the power of the husband. And if any should say That he divided the
title of persons that are in the power of others, from them that are in the
power of others; it followeth not thereof that wives were in the power of their
husbands, but was by him so done, to show the difference of power the husband
hath over his wife, the father over his
children, and the lord over his slaves. And what doubt is there but that this
word Hand, signifieth oftentimes power and authoritie?
the Hebrews, Greeks, & Latines, having alwaies so used it, as when they
say, The hand of the King; and, To come into the hand of
the enemie. And Festus Pompeius, speaking of the husband
bringing home his wife, useth the word Mancipare, a word
proper unto slaves: which word we yet use in many our customes and lawes, where
question is of the emancipating of women. But to make it plaine, this power of
husbands over their wives to have bene common unto all people, we will by two
or three examples declare the same. Olorus
King of Thracia compelled the Dacians overcome by their
Justin. lib. 32. enemies, to serve their wives, in
token of extreame servitude, & of the greatest reproach that he could
devise to doe them. We read also that by the lawes of the Lombards the woman
was in the same subjection that the auntient Romans were, and that the husbands
had all power of life and death over their wives, which they yet used in the
time of Baldus, not yet 260. yeares ago. And not to
seeke farther, what people had ever so great power over their wives as had our
auncestors? The French men (saith Lib. 6. Belli
Gallici.Caesar) have power of life and death over their wives
and children, in like manner as over their slaves: and beeing never so little
suspected to have wrought their husbands death, are to be tortured by their
owne kinsmen, and being found guiltie are by them to be cruelly executed,
without any further authoritie from the Magistrat. But for That it was lawfull for a man to kill his wife for drinking
of wine drinking of wine it was much more manifest that it was cause
sufficient by the Roman lawes for the husband to put his wife to death; wherein
all the Dion. Halic. lib. 2. Plin. li. 14 cap. 13.
Valer. de instit. antiq. auntient writers agree; which was not only
the custome of the Romans, but also (as Theophrastus
writeth) of the auntient inhabitants of Marseiles in Province, and the Milesians,
who used the same law against their wives that had drunke wine, judging that the disordered
desires of the woman subject to wine, would also make her drunke, and so
afterwardsCicero de nat. lib. 3. & de Repub. lib. 1.
Plu. in Problem. Rom. cap. 6. Arnob. lib. 2. adversus gentes. Tertul in Apolog. cap. 6. Gellius lib. 10 cap. 23. &
Alcimus Siculus apud Athenaeum. an
adultresse. We also find that the power given unto the husband by the law of
Romulus, To put his wife to
death for adulterie, without the authoritie of the
Magistrat was common to all Greece, as well as to the Romans. For the law of
Julia which gave leave onely unto the father to kill
his daughter together with the adulterer, being taken in the deed doing, and not otherwise, was made by Augustus the Emperour above seven hundred yeares after
the law of Romulus: And yet by the same law it was
permitted unto certaine persons to do the same that the father might, against
their adulterous wives: a right small punishment being appointed for the
husband, who besides the persons in the law excepted, had killed the
adulterours taken in the fact. But the publick punishment of adulterie
derogateth nothing from the power of the husband, in other
The punishment of wives for adulterie.
sorts of corrections over his wife, not extending unto death, which is unto husbands forbidden.
After that Theodora the Empresse having got the maisterie over Iustinian the Emperour her husband, a blockish and
unlearned Prince, when she had made al the lawes she could for the advantage of
women against their husbands; she amongst
others also changed the paine of death for adulterie, into the note of infamie:
as did also in auntient time the Athenians, excommunicating the adulterors, with the note also of infamie, as we read in the
Pleas of Demosthenes: which seemeth but a thing ridiculous,
considering that the note of infamie cannot take any honour from
her which hath already lost the same, and is altogether defamed: for that upon the matter she remaineth altogether unpunished, &
that for such a crime as the law of God Levit. 20. Daniel 12. Deu 24
punisheth with the most rigorous death that then was, (that is to say with stoning)
and which the auntient Ægyptians punished at the least with cutting off the nose of
the woman, and the mans privities. But in other crimes which more concerned the
husband than the publicke state, and deserved not death, power is by the consent of all men given unto the husband to
chastice his wife, so that it be sparingly done, and within measure. And to the
end that husbands should not abuse the power the law
gave them over their wives, they had an action against their husbands, in case of evill entreatment,
or froward usage; which was afterward by the law of Iustinian
taken away, and a penaltie decreed against them that
had given the cause of the seperation: which were especially grounded upon adulterie; and poisoning attempted, but not
having taken effect. Yet notwithstanding the decree of Iustinian,
it is by our custome permitted unto the wife wronged or
evill entreated by her husband, to require seperation. And yet for all
that is no action of iniurie to be suffered betwixt the husband and the wife (as some No action of injurie to be admitted
betwixt a man & his wife, and why. would have it) and that for
the honour and dignitie of marriage; which the law hath had in so great regard,
that it permitteth not the husband, or any third man to have an action of felonie
against the wife, although she have embeseled or purloyned all her
The hatred betwixt
man and wife of all others most deadly. husbands moveables. But as no
love is greater than that of marriage, (as saith Artemidorus)
so is the hatred of all others most deadly, if it once take root betwixt man and wife;
as was well declared by Leo Embassadour from them of Bizance unto the Athenians,
whome when they in a great assembly had laughed to scorne for his small
stature, Why (said he) do you laugh at me a dwarfe, seeing my wife is much
lesse than my selfe, and scarce so high as my knee; who pleased, although wee
lie in a verie little bed, yet falling out the one with the other, the great
Citie of Constantinople is too little for us
two? Which his pleasant speech served wel to the matter he had in hand, which
was to persuade the Athenians unto peace; which is not easie to doe betwixt the
husband and the wife, especially if one of them hath once sought after the life
of the other. And for that cause the law of God concerning divorcement (which
was afterwardsDivorcement by the law of God allowed.
common to all people, and yet at this present is used in Affrick, and in all
the east) gave leave to the husband to put away his wife, if she pleased him
not, with charge that he might never take her againe, and yet might well marrie
another; which was a meane to keepe the insolent wives in subjection, as also
to represse the anger of the wayward husbands; for what woman (except she were
an arrant whore) would bee so desirous of a man, as to marry an husband that
without any just or probable cause had put
away his wife. Now if it shall seeme to any an unreasonable thing, to bee
lawfull for a man to put away his wife, for no other cause but for that hee
liketh her not, I will not greatly strive, either therefore depart from the law
now with us in use. Yet nothing seemeth unto me more pernitious, than to
constraine the parties so in dislike to live together (except they will) to
declare the cause of the divorcement they desire,Whether in
divorcement it be better to expressethe cause thereof, or to have the
same concealed. & also wel prove the same before
the Judge: For in so doing, the honor of the one or of both the parties is
hazarded, which should not so be if neither of them were enforced to prove
the cause of the divorce unto the Judge. As did in auncient time the Hebrews,
and yet do at this present also, as we see in their Pandects, where is
described the lawful act of divorcement, & the bil of divorcement
which Rabi Ieïel of Paris gave unto
his wife the xxix. of Octob. in the yere
from the creation of the world 5018In the yeare of Christ 1240.. Another
example thereof is also extant in the Epitome of the Hebrew Pandects, collected
by the Lawyer Moyses de Maymon in Chaldea, where the
Judge of the place having seene the special procuration, & the act of him
that had put away his wife in the presence of three witnesses, adjoyneth
thereunto these words, That he did purely and simply divorce her, and without
any cause showing, giving them both leave to marry whome they should see good.
In which doing the woman was not dishonoured, but might with safe reputation
marrie with another sortable to her owne qualitie. And
albeit that the Athenians admitted no divorcement, except the cause were first
proved before the Judges, yet seemed it to all good men to be a thing of great
daunger, insomuch that Plut. in Alci.Alcibiades fearing the publick scandall tooke his wife
openly complaining before the Judges, and carried her away home upon his
shoulders. More indifferently delt the auncient Romans, in joyning no cause at
all unto the bill of divorcement: as is to be seene when
Paulus Æmilius put away his wife, whome he confessed to be very
wise,* Plut. in Aemi. honest; and nobly descended;
and by whom he had also many faire children: but when his wives friends
complaining unto him, would needs know of him the cause of the divorce, he
showed them his shoo, which was very handsomly and well made; and yet said he,
none of you but my selfe feeleth where this shoo wringeth mee.
But what if the cause seeme not sufficient unto the Judge? or be not
well proved? is it therefore meet to enforce
the parties to live together, in that societie which is of all other the
straitest, having alwaies the one the other the obiect of their griefs stil
before their eies. Truly I am not of that opinion: for seeing themselves
brought into extreame servitude,Divorcement
necessarie. feare, and perpetuall discord, hereof ensue adulteries,
and oftentimes murthers and poysonings, for the most part to men unknowne; as
it was discovered in Rome, before the law of divorcement (first made by
Spurius Carvilius, about 500. yeares after the foundation
of the citie) a woman being apprehended and convicted for poysoning her
husband, accused other her companions in the fact, who afterward by mutuall
accusations appeached seventie others of the same crime for poysoning their
husbands, who were all therefore executed: which how much the more is it to bee
feared where divorcements are altogether
forbidden? For both the Greek and the Roman Emperours, willing to take away the
often use and easinesse of divorcements, and to amend the auncient custome,
ordained no other penaltie than the losse of the dowry, or of the other
matrimonial conventions, unto the partie that shuld be the cause of the
divorce. Anastasius also suffered divorcement, by
consent of both parties, to bee made without any penaltie or punishment: which
was by Justinian the Emperour, or rather
Theodora his wife forbidden. Now of that which we have
alreadie said, every man as I suppose, may of himselfe judge which is most
expedient for a Commonweale.
But what change or varietie of lawes soever in such diversitie of Commonweals,
there was never law or custome that exempted the wife from the obeysance, and
not onely from the obeysance, but also from
the reverence that shee oweth unto her husband; in such sort that the law
permitteth not the wife to sue her husband without the leave of the Magistrat.
But as nothing is greater, better, or more necessarie for the preservation not
of Families only, but of Commonweals also, than the honest obedience of wives
towards their husbands, as saith Euripides: so beseemeth
it not the husband under the shadow of this power, to make a slave of his wife.
And wheras Marcus VarroWives to be corrected rather with words then with
stripes. is of opinion that slaves ought rather to be corrected with
words than with stripes; much more ought the wife to be, whom both God and mans
law doth call his housefellow. So Homer bringing in
Iupiter reproving his wife Iuno,
and seeing her rebellions, useth great threats, but proceedeth unto no further
extremities. And Cato commonly
reputed to be a sworne enemie unto women, did never beat his
wife, reputing that to be as it were a sacrilege; but used so to maintaine the
power and dignitie of a husband, as that he had his wife alwaies at commaund:
which he shal never do which of a maister is become her companion, &
afterward her servant, & of a servant her very slave. As was of old
obiected unto the Lacedemonians, who called their wives their
Plut. in Laconicis. Ladies
and Mistresses: which the Romans did also, not the privat men only, but even
Arist. lib. 2. Politic. their
Emperors themselves, in the declination of their Empire; who at length
together with their domesticall government lost also their publick soveraigntie.
Albeit thatTranquillus in Claudio.
such women as take pleasure in commaunding their effeminat
husbands, are like unto them that had rather to guide the blind, than to follow
the wise and cleere sighted.
Now the law of God, and the holy tongue, which hath named all things
accordingThe authoritie and power of the husband over his wife.
to the true nature and proprietie thereof, calleth the husband
Bahal, that is to say, Lord and maister;
to show that unto him belongeth the soveraigntie to commaund. The lawes also
of all nations, to abate the pride of women, and to make men know that
they ought to excell their wives in wisedome and vertue,
have ordained that the honor and glorie of the wife should depend of her
husband, as of the Sunne: in such sort that if the husband be noble, he
enobleth his base wife; but if the wife beeing nobly borne marry a man of base
degree, shee looseth her nobilitie, albeit that of auncient time
there have bene many and yet are, which take their nobilitie and
gentrie from their mothers, and not from their
fathers; as the Lycians, the Delphiens, the Xanthiques, the Ilienses, and the
Capadocians: whether it were for the uncertaintie of their fathers, or for that
they had lost all their nobilitie in the warres; as in Campagne; where the
wives (for the cause aforesaid) ennoble their base husbands and their children;
as also among the Indians in Calecut, the kings even yet, and the Nobilitie
which they call Naires have scarce at any time their
owne children inheritors of their kingdome or goods, but the children of noble
women although they be bastards: yet for all that the interpretors of the law
hold, that it ought not so to be done either by custome or decrees; for the
generall agreement of almost all people to the contrarie, as Herodotus
hath long ago written. And therefore it is most right that
the wife should follow the Condition,
Countrie, Familie, Dwelling, and beginning of her husband: and in case that her
husband be an exiled or banished man, yet is the wife bound to follow him,
wherein all the interpretors both of the Canon and Civill law agree. All lawes
and customes also have made the husband maister of his wives actions, and to
take the profit of all the lands and goods that to her befall: and suffer not
the wife to stand in judgement either as plaintive or defendant, without the
authoritie of her husband; or at least without the authoritie of the Judge who
may give her authoritie so to do in the absence of her husband, or he refusing
so to doe. All undoubtfull arguments to shew the authoritie, power, and
commaund that the husband hath over his wife, by the lawes both of God and man:
as also of the subjection, reverence, and obedience which
the woman oweth unto her husband, in all honour and things
lawfull. Yet I doubt not, but that women in their matrimoniall contracts have
sometimes used to covenant not to be in any thing subject unto their husbands:
but for as much as such covenants and agreements are contrarie to the lawes
both of God and man, as also unto publick honestie, they are not to bee
observed and kept, in such sort, as that no man can thereunto to be bound by
oath.
CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of the power of a Father, and whether it
be meet for the Father to have power of life
and death over his children▪ as had the auntient Romans.
THe right government of the Father and the
children, consisteth in the good vse of the power which God (himselfe▪ the
Father of nature) hath giuen to the Father over his owne children: or the law
over them whom any man adopteth for children unto himselfe: and in the
obedience, loue, and reuerence of the children towards their Fathers. This word
Power, is common unto all such as have power to commaund over others; either
publickly or priuatly. So the Prince (saith Seneca) hath
power over his subiects, the Magistrat over priuat men▪ the Father over his
children, the Maister over his schollers, the Captaine over his souldiers, and
the Lord over The power of the Father over his children is the onely
naturall power. his slaues. But of all these the right and power to
commaund, is not by nature giuen to any beside the Father, who is the true
Image of the great and Almightie God the Father of all things, as saith Proclus the Academick. Plato also
hauing first in certaine chapters set downe lawes concerning the honour of God▪
saith them to bee as a Preface to the reuerence which the child oweth unto the
Father, unto whome next unto God he is beholden for his life, and for
whatsoeuer thing els he hath in this world. And as the Father is by nature
bound to nourish his children according to his abilitie▪ and to instruct them
in all ciuilitie and vertue: so the children also when they are once grown up are bound, but with a much more straiter bond, to
loue, reuerence, serue, and nourish The dutie of parents towards their children: and their great
dutie againe towards them. their Father, and in all things to shew
themselves dutifull and obedient unto them, and by all meanes to hide and couer
their infirmities and imperfections, if they see any in them, and neuer to
spare their lives and goods to saue the life of them by whome they themselves
tooke breath. The which bond, albeit it bee sealed with the seale of nature,
and engrafted in every one of our minds, and carrieth with it a readie
execution: yet so it is neuerthelesse, that to show the greatnes thereof there
can be no greater argument, than the first commaundement of the second table,
which alone of all theExod. 22. Deut. 5. ten
Commaundements propoundeth a reward unto children which honour their parents:
although no reward be unto him due that doth but his dutie: and so much the
lesse, for that there is no more religious a decree in all the lawes both of
God and man; neither any curse greater in holy
writ, than against him who wickedly laughed at the naked priuities of his
Father. Neither is it maruell if wee in holy Scripture readGen 27. 28.Valer. Max. lib. 2. of the contentions and
strife of the sonnes among themselves, for the getting and foregaining their
Fathers blessing; as they which feared more their curse than death: As young
Torquatus who cast off by his Father, slew himselfe
for sorrow. And that is it why Plato saith, that aboue
all things we must have care of the cursings and blessings that the Fathers
giue unto their children: for that there is no prayer that God doth more
readily heare, than that of the Father towards his children. If children then
bee so straitly bound to obey and reuerence their parents? what punishment then
deserue they that are unto them disobedient, irreuerent, or iniurious? what
punishment can be great enough for him which
shall presume to lay violent hand upon his Father or Mother? for against him
that shal murder either of them, there was neuer yet Iudge or law maker that
could deuise torment sufficient for a fact so execrable: although that by the
law Pompeia, a punishment be appointed rather new and
strange, than fit for such a crime. And albeit that we have seene one in our
memorie (who had caused his Father to be slaine) torne with hot yron tongs,
afterwards broken upon the wheele, and so at last (being yet alive) burnt: yet
was there no man which did not more abhorre the wickednesse of his villanie,
than the horror of his punishment, and which said not that he had deserued more
than he had yet suffered. Also the wise Solon; when hee
had made lawes for the Athenians, being asked why he had appointed no
punishment against him which had killed his
Father; answered, That he thought there was no man so wicked as to commit so
horrible a fact: which was grauely answered: for the wise law maker should
neuer make mention of an offence which is not at all, or but very little
knowne, for feare he should not seeme so much to forbid the fact, as to put the
wicked in remembrance thereof. But if the crime be great and execrable, he must
neither colour it by sufferance, as forgotten, neither point it out unto the
eye with his finger; but by circumstances and propounding of the punishments of
like facts, deterre the wicked from such hainous offences. As we see the law of
God hath not appointed any punishment against him that murdereth his Father or
his Mother, neither against him that beateth either the one or the other (as
doth the law Seruia, which condemneth them to death for such a crime) yet giueth it full power and
authoritie unto the Father and Mother to stone the disobedient child, so that
it be done in the presence of the magistrat, to whome for all that it belongeth
not to enquire of the truth thereof, or to examine the matter: which was so
decreed least the Father should in his anger secretly kill his sonne. As was
one in hunting slaine by his Father, whose wife he had defiled: which thing
when Adrian the Emperour had vnderstood, said, That so
to kill was not the part of a Father, but of a theefe or murtheret: for that
the greatest profit of punishment is, that it be exemplarie unto all. Another
part of the law of God Leui. 20▪ willeth,Deu. 17. Exo. 21 That the child which reuileth his Father or mother
should die the death: the examination whereof
is not left unto the parents, but to the Iudges themselves, to the intent that
the offence should not remaine vnpunished. For so great is the loue of the
fatherParents how vnwilling to have their children
publickly punished. and of the mother towards their children, that
they would neuer (if they might) permit the Iudges to determine of the life of
their children, although they had bene of them mortally wounded. As not long
agoe it happened with vs, that a Father hauing receiued a deadly wound of his
sonne, whome he would have lightly corrected; and fearing least his sonne
apprehended by the magistrat should die for it, ceased not euen to his last
gaspe to crie out unto his son, by speedie flight to saue his life: whom for
all that being afterward taken, and confessing the fact, the Iudges condemned
to be hanged from an high beame for a time by the feet, with a great stone
about his neck, and so afterwards to be burnt
quicke. We have also another example of our time, of a Mother who would rather
endure to be reuiled, wronged, beaten, and troden under foot by her owne sonne,
than to complaine of him unto the Iudge; vntill that at length he in most
beastly manner discharged his bellie into her pottage: with which fowle fact
the Iudge moued, condemned him to make her an honorable amends, and to aske her
forgiuenesse: from which sentence hee appealed unto the parlement of Toulouze,
where the former sentence was reuersed as not iust, and the sonne condemned to
be burnt quick; the most wretched mother in vaine complaining and cryingGood iustice done upon a disobedient child. out against
the rigor of the lawes and seueritie of the Iudges, protesting that she did
pardon him, and that she had not of him receiued any iniurie at all. And Seneca speaking of a
Father who but thrust his sonne out of his house; O with what griefe (saith
hee) doth the Father cut off his owne limmes! what sighes doth he fetch in the
cutting! how often doth he mourne for those limmes cut off! and how often doth
hee wish to have them againe!
All this that I have said, and the examples of fresh memorie by me produced,
serueThat parents should have power of life and death
over their children. to show that it is needful in a well ordered
Commonweale, to restore unto parents the power of life and death over their
children, which by the law of God and nature is giuen them, the most auntient
law that euer was common unto the Persians, unto the people of the upper Asia,
as also unto the Romans, the Hebrews, the Celtes, and in vse in all the West
Indies, vntill they were conquered by the Spaniards: otherwise wee must neuer hope to see the good orders, honour,
vertue, or antient glorie of Commonweals reestablished. For Iustinian the Emperour deceiueth vs in saying that no people had such
power over their children as had the Romans: For we have the law of God, which
ought to be holy and inuiolat among all people; wee have the testimonies
ofDeut. 21. the Histories both Greeke and Latine,
whereby it is sufficiently to be vnderstood, the Hebrews, Celtes, and Persians
to have had the same power over their children that the Romans had. The French
men (saith Caesar) Caesar lib.
6. Comment. have power of life and death over their wiues and
children, as well as over their slaues. And although that by the law of Romulus power was giuen unto the husband, for foure
causes onely to kill his wife: yet neuerthelesse by the same law, full power
was giuen unto the Father to dispose of the
life and death of his children, without condition or exception thereunto
adioyned; and that whatsoeuer they got, was not theirs, but their Fathers:
Which power the Romans had not only over their own children, but also over the
children of other men by them adopted. Which power was about 260 yeares after
ratified and amplified by the lawes of the xij Tables, which gaue power also
unto the Father to sell his children: and in case they had afterward redeemed
themselves, or were set at libertie by such as had bought them, they might yet
sell them againe, and so the third time. The like whereof in all points is to
be found in the Westerne islands, as we read in the Historie of the Indies. And yet at this present amongst the Moscouits and
Tartars (whom the auncient Historiographers
called the Asian Scythians) it is lawfull for the Father to sell his sonne
foure times, after which if he shall redeeme himselfe he is for euer free. By
meanes of this fatherly power the Romans long flourished in all honour and
vertue; and oftentimes was their Commonwealth therby delivered from most
imminent destruction, when the fathers drew out of the Consistories their owne
sonnes being Tribunes, publishing laws tending to sedition. As amongst others
Cassius threw his sonneAnotable
example of a fathers seueritie against his sonne, being a great
officer. headlong out of the Consistorie, publishing the law Agraria (for the diuision of lands) in the behoofe of the
people, and afterward by his owne priuat iudgement put him to death, the
magistrats, Sergeants, & people standing thereat astonied, & not daring
to withstand his fatherly authoritie, althogh they wold with al their power
have had that law for the diuision of lands.
Which is sufficient proofe, this power of the father not onely to have bene
sacred and inuiolable, but also to have bene lawfull for him either by right or
wrong to dispose of the life and death of his children, euen contrarie to the
will of the magistrats and people. Also when Valer.
Maxi▪ lib. 4.Pomponius the Tribune of the people, had for diuers
causes accused Torquatus unto the people, and amongst
other things had charged him that he too much oppressed his sonne with countrey
labour: so it fell out that the sonne himselfe going unto the Tribune, and
finding him in bed, setting his dagger unto his throat, caused him to sweare to
desist from further prosecuting of the accusation against his father. So the
Tribune comming againe into the Consistorie least he might seeme to vse
collusion with Torquatus, whome he had before
accused, now excused himselfe unto the
people for not presenting his accusation, by the oath extorted from him: which
the people understanding, would not suffer him to proceed therein any further.
By which two examples a man may iudge that the Romans in their estate, made
greater reckoning of the power of the father, than of the lawes themselves,
which they called Sacred: by which the head of him was vowed to Iupiter, who had onely attempted in offensiue manner, but
to touch the Dion. Halycar. lib. 7. & Liuius lib.
3. most holy Tribunes bodie. For they were of opinion that
domesticall iustice and power of fathers, were the most sure and firme
foundation of lawes, honour, vertue, pietie, wherewith a Commonweale ought to
flourish. Neither was it maruell if in the Roman Commonwealth we see such rare
examples of reuerend dutie of children towards their parents, as are not els where to be read of: one I haue
amongst a thousand alreadieThe rare pietie of a daughter
toward her father. spoken of; and another such there is, as that
Painters euen unto these times vse therewith to embellish their Tables: that is
to wit, of the daughter which secretly gaue sucke unto her father condemned to
be pined to death (which neuer suffereth the healthfull man to live past the
seuenth day) which act of piety the Gaoler hauing perceiued, gaue the
magistrats to vnderstand thereof; which by them reported unto the people, not
onely obtained her fathers pardon, but also found such grace as that in the
selfe same place in perpetuall remembrance of the fact, they built a Temple
dedicated unto Pietie. Yea the very vnreasonable beasts
have a naturall feeling of this kind dutie, and are seene to feed their parents
now growne weake with age: but especially the Storke, which the holy tongue Leuit 11.
iob. 38. (which nameth things according to their secret proprieties)
calleth Chasida, that is to say, dutifull and
charitable; for so much as shee nourisheth her father and mother in their age.
And albeit that the father be in dutie bound to instruct his children in all
vertues, but especially in the feare of God: yet if hee shall forget his dutie,
are not the children therefore excused of theirs: albeit that Solon the lawmaker contrarie unto reason, hath by his lawes acquited
the sonne from the nourishing of his father, if he have taught him no trade or
occupation whereby to get his liuing. But the right instruction of children
(than which nothing can be deuised more profitable or
better in a Commonweale) dependeth of that fatherly power which I have before
spoken of. For publick iustice taketh no
knowledge of the disobedientnesse & vnreuerentnesse of children toward
their parents, neither of their other vices, which disordered libertie bringeth
their young years vnto, as dicing, drunkennesse, whoredome: and albeit that
punishment be appointed against such offences, yet neuerthelesse the poore
parents carefull of their reputation and credit, neuer are to complaine of
their children unto the Magistrat, neither accuse them; and yet the power to
punish them is taken from them: so that children now standing in no feare of
their parents, and much lesse of God doe for most part escape the iudgement of
the magistrat, who commonly punisheth but slaues and such others of base
condition.
But impossible it is that the foundation of a Commonweale being euill laid,
(that is The power of fathers over their children much profitable to
the Commonweale: and the want thereof much hurtfull. to say, the
bringing up of children nd families) any thing that
is firme and sure should be thereupon built. Besides that, the contention,
strife, and discord, which we daily see amongst brethren and sisters, were
easily appeased and extinguished whilest the father yet lived, their marriages
not taking from him this power over them: and albeit that he had set at
libertie them that were maried, & departed out of his house, to keep house
by themselves, (which they easily did not) yet neuerthelesse the remembrance of
the reuerend duty they ought unto their parents for euer remained fast
imprinted in the harts and minds of the children. Wherefore should wee then
maruell the magistrat to be troubled with so many sutes, and those for most
part betwixt the husband and the wife, betwixt brethren and sisters; yea and
that more, is betwixt parents and their children? but that the wife, the children, and seruants, are all loased from the
domesticall power of their ancestors. So the fatherly power being by little
& little diminished upon the declination of the Roman Empire; so also
shortly after vanished away their antient vertue, & al the glorie of their
Commonweal: and so in place of pietie & ciuilitie, ensued a million of
vices and villanies. The first staine, and beginning of taking awayHow the power of life and death over their children was in Rome
first taken from their parents. the power of life and death from
parents, proceed from the ambition of the Magistrats, who seeking to encrease
their iurisdiction, & by little and little drawing unto them the deciding
of all matters, extinguished all domesticall powers: which happened especially
after the death of Augustus Caesar; at which time wee
read the magistrats to have bene almost alwayes occupied in punishing of such
as had murthered their parents. As we read in
Seneca, who directing his speech unto Nero, saith, We have seene more murtherers of their
parents executed in five yeares of thy father, than were euer in all ages
accused since the foundation of Rome. Now to him that will looke neerer into
the matter, it is no doubt, but that if one or two that have murthered their
fathers have bene executed, ten others have escaped mans punishment; the health
and life of parents being subiect to a thousand daungers, except their children
either by the feare of God, or the goodnesse of their owne nature, be kept
within the bounds of their dutie; neither ought it seeme straunge unto any man,
that Nero made no conscience to kill his mother, neither
repented him to have killed her, for that it was a thing common: the cause
whereof Seneca giueth not, which was, for that the
father to chastice his son must then go to the
magistrat to accuse him, which the auntient Romans could neuer endure. For Quintus Fuluius the Senator in the time of Cicero, of his owne authority put to death his sonne, for
taking part in the conspiracie of Cateline. And in the
time of Augustus, Tatius the Senator being about to
proceed against his sonne in a capitall crime, requested Augustus home to his house, who being come thither, tooke not upon him
the place of a Iudge (as saith Seneca) but of a priuat
man, as come onely to giue counsell. We see also that by the law Pompeia, made against parricides, all they which are next
of kinne are bound to the penaltie of the law, except the father. Yet it
sufficiently appeareth, that in the time of Vlpian and Paul the Lawyers, the
power that fathers had of life and death ouer
their children lay then in a sort buried and forgotten: for that one of them
saith, The father must accuse his sonne before the Iudge: and the other, That
the children are not of right to complaine, if they be by their fathers
disinherited, considering that in auncient time (saith he) they might put them
to death. Both of them flourished in the time of Alexander
Seuerus. And yet is there no expresse law to be found which hath taken
from parents the power of life and death, before the time of Constantine the great: neither did that law of Constantine directly in expresse tearmes abrogat the old lawes: Dioclesian the Emperour but a little before Constantine hauing decreed that the Iudge ought to giue
such sentence against the sonne as the father was willing vnto. Now it is
manifest by the law, that a positiue law cannot bee Note. abrogated by any custome, be it neuer so old;
except it be repealed by a contrary law, carrying expresse derogation with it:
otherwise being in force and readie to be againe put in vse: insomuch that it
was necessarie that certaine lawes of the xij. tables by long custome out of
vse, yet for all that should by a new law bee abrogated: which was done at the
motion of Aebutius, in whose time the fathers power of
life and death, yet kept their children with in the compasse of their dutie.
But when the children in the time of Constantine had by
the sufferance of their fathers by little and little shaken off that power and
authoritie of their fathers, they obtained also of the same Emperour, That of
their mothers inheritance their fathers should have but the vse and profit, and
they themselves the proprietie, which their fathers might not alienate. And
afterwards they likewise obtained of Theodosius the yonger, That the proprietie of all manner
of goods in generall howsoever they came by them, should belong unto the
sonnes, the vse and profit thereof onely being left unto the fathers; so that
they could not alienat the proprietie, neither in any sort dispose thereof: yea
and with vs not onely the vse and profit of such goods, but not so much as the
bare vse is left unto the father, which hath so puffed up the hearts of the
children, as that they oftentimes commaund their parents, by necessitie
constrained to obey them, or to die for hunger.
Iustinian also would not that children should be set at
libertie by their parents withoutHow parents were woont to
emancipat their children. their owne consent, that is to say, without
some bountie which the father ought to giue unto his sonne: when as yet for all
that in old time emancipation or setting at libertie, was the reward of the childs kindnesse and dutifulnes
towards his parents. Hereof proceeded that filthie buying and selling of
emancipation betwixt fathers and their children: insomuch that such things as
the father had giuen unto the sonne in reward of his emancipation, remained
unto him for gaine; neither was he bound to communicat the same with his
brethren, or to have any whit the lesse therefore of his fathers inheritance,
except the same were expressely comprehended in the lawfull act of
emancipation: which they also yet vse amongst vs, which have the Roman decrees
for lawes. But if the sonne hath learned any gainefull trade, or is by
trafficke in marchandise become rich, and giueth something unto his father that
setteth him at libertie, it is counted unto the father for the right he should
have in the goods of his son dying before him,
so that he can claime no part therein, although it be not at all expressed in
the act of the sonnes emancipation; or yet be expressed that such gift unto the
father yet liuing, should be not let wherefore he should the lesse have the
whole right of the lawfull inheritance, his sonne dying before him. For why?
that whatsoeuer it is that is giuen to the father, is accounted as giuen him
for his lawfull part: so that by this means the father is in worse state than
the sonne, who for all that both by the lawes of God and man is bound to
nourish his parents so long as they live, the father not being bound by the law
of Romulus to nourish his sonne, but vntill he be seuen
yeares old. And although Lawyers goe farther,
neuerthelesse to make it plaine that parents are not bound to feed their children, it was neuer by any law
permitted for children to sueWhether parents be bound to
nourish their children: and how long. their parents for their food,
but by the leaue of the magistrat by humble request before obtained. Besides
all these indignities, Iustinian hath exempted all
Senators, Bishops, & Consuls from the power of their fathers: as in like
case them also which enter into houses of Religion. And in countries also where
we vse Statute laws, besides those we have spoken of, they have also exempted
out of their fathers powers them that are married, or have beene out of their
fathers houses by the space of ten yeares: which hath caused the Italian
Lawyers to write that the French men are not in the power of their fathers: as
in truth there remaineth nothing thereof, but the imaginarie shadow, when as
the father authoriseth his children unto lawfull acts, as to redeeme lands of inheritance, which the father himselfe hath
sold, or to take a possession doubtfull, or for the trade or traffique of
marchandise: in which case the Iudge without the kings letters royall at the
request of the father may set at libertie his sonne. And albeit that Philip of Valois set at libertie his sonne Iohn, to giue unto him the dutchie of Normandie: yet such
his emancipation serued to no purpose, no more than those which were ordinarily
made; seeing that neither the giuer, neither he to whome the thing was giuen,
neither the thing it selfe giuen, were subiect unto the Roman civill law: nor
that the fathers (in countries gouerned by customs) had any thing to do with
the goods of their children.
But the fathers thus dispoiled of their power, and of the goods got by their
children,Whether the sonne may resist his father offering him
violēcei or for any cause kill his father. Souldiors in antient times were
beaten with vines. it is yet by many demanded, If the sonne may of
right defend himselfe, or withstand his father, offering him violence? Neither
have there wanted some which were of opinion, That the sonne might of right so
do: as if in that there were no difference whether the father or any other
should offer him violence. But if it be so that the souldior which had onely
broken the vine trunchion of his Captaine, beating him by right or wrong, was
by the law of armes to be put to death: then what punishment deserueth the
sonne which layeth hand upon his father? Yea some have passed further, and
written that the sonne might kill his father, if he were an enemie unto the
Commonweale.Plin. lib. 12. But in mine opinion
that is not vnlawfull onely for any man to doe, but impietie also for any man
so to write: for these men in so doing propound not onely pardon vnto
parricides, but giue leaue also unto others
to presume to do the like, secretly encouraging them to commit so detestable a
fact, under the color of the publick profit: wheras an antient author saith,
That no fault so great canby the father be committed, as that the same should
with his murther be revenged. O what a number of fathers should be found
enemies unto the Commonwealth, if these resolutions should take place? And what
father is there which in the time of civill warre could escape the hands of his
murtherous child? For men know well that in such warres the weakest goeth to
the wals, and they that get the upper hand make all traitors whom they list.
And in other wars not onely they are iudged traitors which have giuen vnto
their enemies help and counsell, but also they which have sold them armour,
corne, or other victuals. As by the laws of
England, to aid the enemie in any sort whatsoeuer, is accounted high treason.
Which points of treason I see not to be distinguished by these interpretos of
the Roman law. But by these resolutions, that is come to passe which posteritie
will notA strange exam ple of a most vnnaturall
sonne. beleeue: as that a banished man of Venice, hauing brought to
Venice his owne fathers head, who was banished as well as himselfe, demaunded
and obtained also in reward of his so exectable a murther, the honours and
rewards by the Venetian lawes due; viz. His returne into
his countrey, his goods, his children, and the liberties of the citie, before
taken from him. But happily it had beene better that the citie of Venice had bene swallowed up with the sea, than to have giuen a
reward unto so great and detestable a
villanie. Henrie the second the French king, tooke in
good part the excuse of Maximilian king of Bohemia in
the yere 1557, in that he had refused to giue safe conduct unto the duke of
Wittemberg, ambassadour for the French; confessing that it was indeed against
the law of nations, but that yet neuerthelesse he durst do no other for
disobeying of his father. Now if it be lawfull to violat the lawes of nations
rather than to disobey our father in so small a matter; what iust excuse can
there bee, or reason giuen for the killing of ones father? Wherefore I thus
resolue, That there can be no iust cause for which a man may lawfully lay
violent hand upon his father. And albeit that such killing of ones father be in
it selfe a fowle fact, yet fowler is the reward thereof; but of all other
things most fowle and pernitious it is to allow reward for the same, for that by prounding such rewards for killing of a
mans father, neither brethren can be in safetie from being murthered by their
brethren; neither the nighest kinsmen for being slaine one by another. As
indeed it chaunced in the yeare 1567 that Sampetre Corse
was slaine by his owne cosin germaine; for which he had giuen him in reward ten
thousand crownes, which the Senat and people of Genua had caused to be leuied
for him. But how much better were it to follow the example of Cicero, who thought it better as it were in silence to passe over the
selfe same questions moued by the two auncient Philosophers Antiochus and Antipater, as a place too
slipperie and daungerous. Ioyning hereunto also, that the law of the Romans it
selfe forbiddeth any reward to be propounded unto banished men for the killing
of theeves: howbeit that Adrian the Emperour would have him pardoned that had
killed a theefe. Wherefore I thus conclude, That princes and law makers should
measure the power and authoritie of parents, according to the law of God;
whether they be their lawful, or naturall children, or both together; so that
they be not conceiued in incest, for such the lawes both of God and man haue
alwaies had in detestation.
Now if some shall obiect it to be a thing dangerous, least some furious or
prodigallObiections against the power of fathers ouer
their children. fathers should abuse the goods or lives of their
children, under colour of their fatherly power: to him I aunswere, that the
lawes have for such men prouided guardians, and taken from them that power ouer
another man, considering that they have not power over themselves. And if the
father be not sencelesse or mad, hee will neuer without cause kill his sonne, seeing that he willingly chastiseth
him not though he deserue the same. For so great is the loue and affection of
parents towards their children, that the law neuer presumed that they would do
any thing to their disgrace, but all to their honour and profit. Wherefore the
parents are euer thought to be free from all fraud in their childrens affaires,
whome to encrease with riches and honor, they doubt not oftentimes to forget
the lawes both of God and man. And for this cause the Father hauing slaine his
sonne, is not by the law Pompeia subiect to the paine of
parricides: for why? the law presumeth that he would not without good and iust
cause so doe; and hath priuatly giuen power unto him to kill the adulterer and
his daughter found in the fact together. All most certaine and vndoubted
arguments, whereby it is to be vnderstood, that
parents cannot abuse the power of life and death over their children; neither
that if they could, yet would they. But haply some man will say, there haue
bene many which have abused the same to the vnworthy death of their children;
yet bring no example therof: Let vs grant some such to have bene: should
therefore a good law giuer leaue a good law vnmade for the inconueniences which
some few times ensue thereof? It being a common saying in the law, That of such
things as seldome happen the lawmaker ought to take no care. And where euer was
there a law so iust, so natural, or so necessarie, that was not subiect vnto
many inconueniences? So that he which would abrogat al
laws for some few absurdities ensuing of them, should not leaue one of them, as Cato the greater
wisely reasoned. In briefe (I say) that the natural loue of fathers and mothers
toward their children, is impossible and incompatible with so great cruekie, as
is the vniust killing of their children: and that the greatest torment that a
father can endute, is, to have either by right or wrong killed his sonne. As in
fact it chaunced in our memorie, in the countrey of Aniou, that a father
desiring to chastice his sonne, whome running from him he could not ouertake,
hauing by chaunce without any such purpose slaine him with a blow upon the
head, with an hard clod of earth which he threw after him, forthwith for griefe
hung himselfe, although no man knew any thing therof. Which things the antient
Aegyptian law giuers wel understanding, appointed no other punishment against
him that had wrongfully or without cause
slaine his sonne, but for the space of three daies after to bee shut up
together with the dead bodie of his sonne so by▪ him slaine: For they thought
it a thing detestable, for the death of the sonne to take away the life of the
father, from whome he had receiued his. Yet might one say, that if fathers had
the power of life and death over their children, they might constraine them to
do something hurtfull unto the Commonweale: Whereunto I aunswere first, that
that is not to be presumed; and then that although it were so, yet that the
lawes had therefore wisely prouided, hauing at all times exempted the children
out of the power of their fathers, in that which concerned the publick State.
As also Fabius Gurges gaue vs well to vnderstand, who
being Consull, and seeing his father a priuat man mounted on horseback comming
towards him, commaunded him by one of his
sergeants to alight, which he did, doing honour unto his sonne, and bidding him
in such sort to proceed to defend the Consuls dignitie. And so farre hath it
bene from wise fathers to commaund their children any thing that might be
hurtfull to the Commonweale, as that there have bene some of them found to haue
put them to death for transgressing the publick lawes: as first did Brutus his two sonnes, and after him L.
Torquatus the Consul, who hauing caused his sonne to triumph in his
campe for vanquishing his enemie in combat, presently after caused his head to
be struck off, for that he had fought with him contrarie to his commandement
and contrarie to the law of armes. There is yet one obiection concerning the
childrens goods, which if they should be in the full disposition of the
fathers, they might without cause disinherit
some, and enrich others: whereunto mine aunswere is, That the lawes haue
therefore also prouided, by offering iustice unto children disinherited; and
propounding the causes of lawfull disinheriting. Howbeit that the auntient law
of the Romans is more commendable, which neuer permitted the child by way of
action to impugne his fathers will and testament; but onely by the way of
request, and speaking of his dead father in all humilitie all honour and
reuerence, leauing all the matter unto the discretion and conscience of the
Iudge. But after that the Pretors, who could not make any man heire unto his
father, yet by their decrees gaue possession of the goods (the force of which
possession, was almost the same that it was to be appointed heire,) & that
the magistrats had bound certain definit portions unto the children; then forthwith began the parents by little and little
to be contemned of their children, & their death by them longed for. Which
thing was the cause that one of the Ephori of the Lacedemonians made a law *
concerning the making of Testaments, wherebyPlu. in
Lycurg. it was lawfull for every man to bequeath his goods as he
pleased▪ (when as before, the libertie of making of Wils was by long custome
taken away) alledging that the pride and insolencie of children against their
parents was so by the feare of disinheriting to be restrayned. But if any man
shall account it better for inheritances to be conferred by the appointment of
the lawes than by Testament, I will not striue with him
therefore, seeing it is by the law of God Numer.
23. set downe that children should not by assentation and flatterie rather than by their kind duties
preuenting their fathers inheritances, spoyle themselves of their mutuall and
brotherly loue: but yet why vse we not the same diuine law Deut. 21. which giueth unto the father the power of life
and death over his children.
We have before said▪ fathers to have had that power of life and death ouer
themAdoptiue children as well in the power of their
adoptiue fathers, as were the children begot in lawfull matrimonie.
also whome they had adopted: in like manner as they had over them whom they had
in lawfull matrimonie begotten: and although the lawes of adoption were by the
new lawes of Iustinian almost abrogated; yet I thinke no
man doubteth but that the law of adoption was of so auntient right, & so
common also almost unto all people, as that it deserueth to be againe called
into vse. Wee see the most auntient people to have had it in singuler estimation: as we read Iacob himselfe to have adopted Ephraim and ManassesGen. cap. vl. his
nephewes, (albeit he had twelue children yet liuing, who had diuers others
also) and gaue them part of the land which hee had by force of armes conquered.
Which to have hene before also in vse with the Aegyptians, is manifest by Moyses, whome the kings daughter▪ Exod. 1. adopted for her owne. Wee see also Theseus to have bene solemnly adopted by Aegeus king of Athens, who made him his successor in the
State, albeit that he was but his base sonne: After which time all the
Athenians which had base children by Athenian women, were constrained to adopt
them, and to cause them to be registred as their lawfull children, and to leaue
them their part and portion of their goods as they did unto the rest of their
children. For why? they accounted none a
bastard but him that was begotten of a father or a mother, being a straunger▪
albeit she were a woman of neuer so great honour. As also all the people of the
East made little no difference betwixt the children
that they had by their wiues and their handmaids. For Iacob the Patriarch made like reckoning of those which hee had by his
wiues, and of those which he had by his handmaids: although that Sara had driuen out of his fathers house the child
begotten by the handmaid, * least he should have had part in the lawfull
inheritance. And DiodorusLib. 2. cap. 3 also writeth, The children of
the Aegyptians begotten of their bondwomen, to have had as great prerogative as
the rest that were begot in lawfull marriage. For why? it was lawfull for them
to have as many wiues as they would; as it was also unto the Persians & all
the people of Asta and almost onely the Germans of all the barbarous nations (as saith Tacitus) had every oneTacit. lib. de
moribus Germanorum. of them but one wife. Thus hauing confirmed the
matter by course of historie, it followeth by consequence all the children of
one and the same father to have bene in his power, were they adoptiue or not.
But the Romans of auntient time made no more account of their base children
than of meere straungers▪ neither were they compelled to adopt them, as were
the Athenians, neither to bequeath them any thing by their will, neither had
they any power over them. Which seueritie of the lawes was yet moderated in the
raigne of Theodosius and Arcadius. And afterward it was ordained by the Emperor Zeno, that such base children should be accounted for
legitimat, by the marriage of their father afterwards ensuing with their
mother. And that more is Anastasius decreed that all bastards should by adoption
be reputed legitimat▪ but first Iustinus, and after him
Iustinian abrogated that decree, and shut the gate
against bastards, to the end that euerie man should desire to have lawfull
wiues and children; and that auntient houses, and the rights of successions and
inheritances should not bee altered and troubled by the adoption of bastards:
the rights of adoption neuerthelesse yet still remaining, which had bene
receiued to supplie the defect of nature; and whereof the auntient Romans had
had so great esteeme, as that the adoptiue fathers had the same power of life
and death over their adoptiue children, that they had over their owne: which was the true cause that women could not adopt
children before the edict published by Dioclesian, considering that they themselves were in the
perpetuall power of their parents, husbands, or neere kinsmen: as also in
Greece it was not lawful for them to adopt, as writeth the Orator Isaeus. So then the right of adoptions, ennobled by the
Romans (and especially after that they had extended the frontiers of their
Empire more than euer before) other people also had it so much the more in
regard: the Gothes, (I say) the Germans, the French, the Saliens; as we see in
the lawes of the Ripuaires, where they vse the word Adfatinir for adopter: holding their adoptiue children in the same
degree that they did their owne naturall and lawfull children, in the right of
their succession into their inheritance: For by the auntient custome of the
Romans they were both indifferently called unto their fathers inheritances as
his heirs. For so we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoric king of the Gothes,
adopted the king of the Herules: and that Luitpr and
king of the Lombards adopted the sonne of Charles prince
of Fraunce, by cutting his haire, although he had sonnes of his owne in lawfull
marriage begotten: as did in auntient time Micipsa king
of the Numidians, adopting Iugurtha his base sonne,
albeit he had two lawfull children of his owne, and leauing his kingdome
equally divided amongst them three: when as yet the first and chiefe cause of
adoptions was to supplie the defect of nature; that he to whome nature had
altogether denied children, or at leastwise male children, might by the
authoritie of the law have that defect supplied. As Scipio
Africanus hauing no more children but Cornelia
the mother of the Gracchi, adopted the sonne of Paulus
Aemilius, afterwards called Africanus the younger, whome he left the inheritor not of
his name only, but of his goods also. And so also Caefar
the Dictator, hauing no children of his foure wiues, more than Iulia, which was married to Pompeius, adopted Octauius his sisters sonne,
whom by his will he made heire of three parts, with charge that he should beare
his name; whereby his owne fathers name was taken away, and hee knowne by the
name of his adoptiue father. And he againe hauing no children but Iulia (whome he called the Impostume of his house)
adopted Caius and Lucius his
sisters sonnes bought at home of their father Agrippa,
according to the auntient manner: who afterward dead also without issue, he
adopted Tiberius, who adopted Caligula: so did Claudius adopt Nero, unto whome Galba succeeding
without children, Tranquil in Galba. adopted
Piso before his
armie, which custome was afterwards kept in the adoption of * AurelianusVopiscus in Aureliano. the Emperour; as would Iustinian the Emperour have adopted Cosroe king of Persia, which he refused; supposing (though yet falsly)
the way unto the Empire to bee by that meane shut up. Procopius. We read also that the Emperour Nerua for lacke of children adopted Traian;
& he Adrian; who afterward adopted Antoninus Pius; and not contented to have adopted so good a man,
charged him also whilest he yet lived, to adopt Aelius
Verus, and Marcus Aurelius, surnamed the
Philosopher, to the intent the Empire should not want the most vertuous
Emperours that euer were. But this last hauing begot Commodus heire apparant to the Empire, (but the most vitious man that
might be) was about to have adopted another more worthie of the Empire, had hee
not bene otherwise persuaded by his
friends. For that almost no man used to adopt others, if he had legitimat
children of his owne. For which cause Claudius the
Emperour was euil spoken of, for being persuaded by the inticement of Agrippina his second wife, he had adopted Nero her sonne, hauing sonnes and one daughter by his
former bed, who were afterwards slaine by Nero. But to
leaue straungers which are infinite, and to come to our owne domesticall
examples: Lewes duke of Aniou and brother to king Charles, was for want of heire adopted by Ioane (who of her incontinencie was in reproach called
Lupa) who in the right of that adoption left unto him
the kingdome of Naples, hauing reiected her nephew Alphonsus king of Aragon, whom she had before by consent of, the Martinus.
V. Pope adopted. Afterwards also Rene of
Aniou, Lewes his nephew, was adopted by Ioane the yonger queene of Naples for want of children.
And at the same time as it were, that is to say, in the yere 1408, Henry duke of Pomeran was adopted by Margaret D'wolmar queen of Denmark, Sweden, & Norway, to succeed
her in the same kingdoms. And not long after, Henry the
fift king of England was adopted, not by Charles the
sixt then distracted of his wits, but by his wife: who by her new son in law,
caused Charles her owne sonne to be denounced incapable
of the Crowne, albeit that he were a right wise and vertuous Prince. But Iustinian the Emperour willing to remedie such abuses,
ordained that adoptiue children should neuerthelesse not faile to enioy the
inheritance of their owne naturall or lawfull fathers; for that their adoptiue
fathers would oftentimes upon small
occasion cast them off againe, whereby it came to passe that they went without
the inheritance of both their fathers: yet did he wrongfully take away the
right of the fathers power, which was the onely marke of adoption, which taken
away, nothing more remained. Now it were much better to prohibit adoptions to
them, which had sonnes either naturall or legitimat: & in case they had
none, that the adoptiue children should succeed in all the right of their owne
naturall and lawfull children. Truely by our custome it is lawfull for euerie
man to adopt: yet no preiudice is thereby made unto the next of kin, or them
which should lawfully inherite: for that more cannot be giuen or bequeathed
unto the adoptiue sonne, than to him that is a meere straunger: and yet that
the father might for all that receiue the
profit of the adoption; whereof Scipio Africanus the
Great, in his time complained in the Oration which he had unto the people of
his Censureship: as also after the publication of the law Iulia Pappia, which gaue great priueledges unto them which had
children: they which had none adopted some (to have the benefit of the lawas,
to be capable of some Magistracie or office) and in short time after they had
once gained that they sought for, cast off those their adoptiue children
againe, so abusing the law. As contrariwise Clodius
beeing a noble man borne, caused himselfe to be adopted by a man of base
condition, that so discharged of his Nobilitie, hee might bee made Tribune of
the * people; but hauing got that office, caused himselfe presently toCicero pro domo. be set at libertie by his adoptiue
father: Which the Senat understanding, decreed that from thenceforth they which were adopted should not enioy
the priuiledge of any publick office: neither that any man should under the
colour of such children as hee had adopted obtaine any magistracie or honour
unto himselfe; neither hinder substitution made for want of children; neither
to have the benefit of any conditionall legacies, or couenants made or
conceiued in hope of children; nor that for such adoptiue children, such
donations should be void, as were by the law it selfe to be reuoked when the
donatour had any children, either naturall or legitimat; nor that by the
adoption of male children, women should be kept from their lawfull inheritance,
from which they by the law are wont by the male children to bee excluded;
neither that the word Sonne added unto the lawes,
testaments, or other lawfull acts was to be extended unto them whome we adopt: all which deceits it is good to cut
off, and yet not to extinguish the right of adoptions; and at the least to
leaue unto the adoptiue father his fatherly power, to keepe in obedience his
adoptiue sonne. And thus much of the second part of a Familie, concerning the
power of a father over his children, and of their mutuall duties. Now let vs
likewise speake of the third part also.
CHAP. V. Of the power of a Lord or Maister over his
Slaues, and whether Slaues are to be suffred in a well ordered
Commonweale.
THe third part of the government of a Familie
dependeth of the power of the Lord oues his Slaues, and of the Maister over his
seruants; and in their mutuall duties one toward another. For theWhereof a Familie tooke name. very name of a Familie,
came of Famulus and Famulatio,
for that it had in it a great number of Slaues: and so of the greatest part of
them that are in subiection in the Familie, men call all the whole houshold a
Familie; or els for that there was no greater meanes to gather wealth than by
slaues and seruants, which the Latines call
Famuli, the auntients not without cause have called
this multitude of Slaues and seruants a Familie. And Seneca willing to show of what moderation a Master ought to be toward
his Slaues, saith our ancestors to have called the head of a Familie, Father of
the Familie, and not Lord. And for that the whole world is full of Slaues,
excepting certaine countries in Europe (which since also by little and little
receiue them) it is needfull here to reason of the power of Lords and Maisters
over their Slaues, and of the profits and disprofits which may redound unto a
Commonweale, if slauery should againe be called into vse: a question of great
moment not for Families and societies onely, but for all Commonweals also in
generall.
Now every Slaue is either naturall, that is to wit, begotten of a woman Slaue,
or made a Slaue by law of armes; or by some
crime committed (whome men call a slaueThe diuision of
Slaues. to punishment) or one which hath for money departed with his
libertie, or hath plaid away his libertie, as did in auntient time the Almans:
or else such an one as hath voluntarily vowed himselfe to be a perpetuall Slaue
unto another man; as was the manner of the Hebrewes. The prisoner in warre was
Slaue unto the vanquisher, who was not bound to put him to his ransome, if it
were not otherwise agreed upon; as it was in auntient time in Greece, that the
Barbarian prisoner taken in warre, might bee put to the chayne, and kept as a
Slaue; but as for the Greeke, that he should be set at libertie in paying for
himselfe a pound of gold. The like law almost was made amongst the Polonians,
Cromer in hist. Polon. & in statutis
Pol. where it was decreed by the States, That all enemies taken
prisoners in iust wars, should remaine Slaues
unto the vanquishers, except the king would pay two Florins for every head. But
he that had paid the ransome of any prisoner, was bound to set him at liberue,
hauing againe receiued his money: otherwise he might keepe him, not as his
Slaue▪ but as his prisoner; according to the most auntient law of the Greeks,
which from them deriued unto the Romans▪ was afterward in vse with all nations.
As for debtors, prisoners unto their creditors, although it were lawfull by the
law of the twelue Tables, to diuide them in peeces amongst their creditors,
giuing to some more, some lesse, according to the proportion of every mans
debt, if they were not able toA cruell law against
debters. pay: yet for all that so it was, that if he had one
creditour, he could not take from him his life, and much lesse his libertie, a
thing much dearer than life. For the father might well sell, chop, and chaunge his children, yea and take away
their lives also, but yet could not take away their liberue: for the good and
noble hart would alwaies rather chuse to dye honestly, than vnworthly to serue
as a base Slaue. And that is it wherfore the law of the twelue Tables (which
adiudged the debtor not able to pay, unto the creditor) was shortly after at
the request of Petilian Tribune of the people, taken
away, and a decree made, That from that time forward the debtor should no more
bee adiudged unto his creditor, or divided in peeces among his creditours,
neither by them for his debt be detained; yet reseruing unto the creditor power
to ceise upon his goods, or by other way of iustice to
come by his debt, so as he saw he might by reason: which law continued firme and inuiolat 700 yeares, unto the time
of Dioclesian, who caused the same law afterward to be
published upon paine of death.
And thus much concerning all sorts of slaues: for as for them which are taken
by theeves or pirats, or by false titles are sold for slaues, they continue
neuerthelesse free, and in tearms of right may do all lawfull acts. As for
other domestical seruants, which for wages or without wages do their seruice,
they cannot by contract or agreementDomestical seruants
cannot make themselves slaues by any contract that they make with their
macters. whatsoeuer, doe any thing preiudiciall to their libertie:
neither in receiuing any legacie upon condition be it neuer so little seruile:
neither can the slaue himselfe when hee is manumised, promise unto his lord
that hath set him at libertie, any thing preiudiciall unto his libertie, other
than the seruices ordinarie & agreeable unto all such as are
enfranchised. And this is it for which the
Arrests of the Parlement of Paris have oftentimes disanulled the contracts of
seruants free borne, which have bound themselves upon a paine to serue certaine
yeres: which neuertheles they yet do in England & Scotland, where the
maisters after the terme of seruice expired, comming before the IudgesPrentises of England by couenant, for a time slaues. of
the places, enfranchise their seruants, & giue them power to weare their
caps; which was the auntient marke of a slaue newly enfranchised, to cover his
shauen head vntill his haire were growne: which gaue occasion unto Brutus after that Caesar was
slaine, to cause certaine money to be coined * with the impression of a cap
upon it; as hauing setPlutar in vita Caesaris. at
libertie the people of Rome. And after the death of Nero, the common people went up and downe the streets with caps upon
their heads, in signe of their libertie. And
king Eumenes after the death of Mithridates, comming to Rome, and with his cap on his head entring the
Senat, acknowledged himselfe to hold his libertie by the people of Rome. Now
albeit that domesticall seruants be not slaues, and that they may do such acts
of libertie as free men may, bee it in iudgement or out of iudgement; yet are
they not as simple mercinarie men which labour for their daies wages, ouer
whomeMercinarie labourers no slaues he that hath
hired them hath neither power nor commaund, nor any manner of correction, as
the maister hath over his domesticall seruants, who owe seruice, honor, and
obedience unto their maisters, so long as they are in his house, and may with
moderat discretion chastice and correct them. For domesticall seruants ought to
reuerence their maister, and do them all honest seruice and duties: wherof, for
that they have a mutuall comportment one of
them towards the other, and belong unto morall discipline, we will not in this
place reason.
But as concerning Slaues, there are two great difficulties, not yet resolued
upon: theTwo notable questions concerning slauerie.
one, Whether slauerie be naturall & profitable to a Commonweale, or
contrarie unto nature, and vnprofitable? the other, What power the lord of
right ought to have over his slaue. Concerning the first point, Aristotle is of opinion that the seruitudeSlauerie in the opinion of Aristo tle, a thing naturall, but
not so in the iudgement of the Lawyers. of slaues is of right
naturall: and to proue the same, We see (saith he) some naturally made to serue
and obey, and others to commaund and gouerne. But Lawyers, who measure the law
not by the discourses or decrees of Philosophers, but according to the common
sense and capacitie of the people, hold seruitude to be directly contrarie vnto
nature; and do what they can to maintaine
libertie, still interpreting such things as are obscure and doubtfull (whether
it be in the lawes, or in testaments, in couenants, or iudgements) so in favour
of libertie, as that they giue no way either to lawes or to testaments: And if
so be that the force of the lawes be so great and so plaine as that they may
not swarue from them▪ yet do they protest that bitternesse of the lawes to
displease them, calling it hard and cruell. But of these two opinions wee must
chuse the better. Now many reasons there bee to proue that seruitude is
profitable unto the Commonweale, and also agreeable unto nature: For every
thing that is contrarie unto nature, is of no long
continuance: and if you would force it against nature, yet will Reasons to proue that seruitude or slauery is profitable
unto a Commonweale: as also agreeable unto nature. it of it selfe
againe returne unto the naturall course thereof; as is plainly seene in all
naturall things. But seruitude seemeth to have taken the beginning thereof
immediatly after the generall deluge; and euen so soone as any forme of a
Commonweale was to be seene, and so hath alwaies euer since continued: and
although seruitude in these latter times was left off, for about three or foure
hundred yeares, yet is it now againe approued, by the great agreement and
consent of almost all nations; yea the people of the West Indies, which are
three times greater than all Europe, who neuer heard speech of the lawes of God
or man, have alwaies bene full of slaues; neither hath there bene any
Commonweale in the world, which hath not had slaues in it: yea the holiest men
that euer lived have used them: yea and that more is, in every Commonweale
the lord had power over the goods, the life
and death of his slaue, except some few, where the Princes and lawmakers haue
something moderated this power. Now like it is not, that all people and nations
in euerie place, so many kings and princes, so many lawmakers (men for their
vertue and experience most famous) would with so great consent, and so many
worlds of yeares, have receiued slaues, if it had bene a thing repugnant vnto
reason and nature. And what can be more agreeing unto curtesie and naturall
reason, than after victorie obtained, to saue them whome thou hast taken
prisoners in iust warre, to giue them meat, drinke, and cloathing, & with
great charitie to releeue them? & for so great benefits to exact of them
only their seruice & labor? is it not much better than in cold bloud to
kill them? And this was the first beginning of
slaues. Now whereas it agreeth also with the lawes of God and man, that he that
hath not wherewith to pay for the fault by him committed, should be punished in
his bodie; is it not better and more curtesie to have him kept to labour in the
publicke works? whereof such were also called seruants to paine, another kind
of seruitude. In like sort, he that shall vniustly lie in wait for another mans
goods, life, or state; what doubt is there but that he is a verie theefe and
robber▪ and deserueth death? Then is it not contrarie unto nature, to saue him
for labour, in stead of putting him to death: for the word Seruant, commeth of
sauing, albeit that some vnskilfull Grammarians reprehend Iustinian in so saying. Now if it were contrarie unto nature, that one
man should have power of life and death over another, there should be neither
kingdoms nor seignories, which were not
contrarie unto nature, seeing that kings and monarches have the same power ouer
their subiects, be they lords or slaues, if they once fall into any capitall
crime.
These arguments have some good show to proue that seruitude is naturall,
profitable,How seruitude i
agreeable unto nature: and how not. and honest, but it may well be
answered. I confesse that seruitude is well agreeing unto nature, when a strong
man, rich and ignorant, yeeldeth his obedience and seruice unto a wise,
discreet and feeble poore man: but for wise men to serue fools, men of
understanding to serue the ignorant, and the good to serue the bad; what can
bee more contrarie unto nature? except a man should thinke it reasonable for a
wise counsellour to be ouertuled by his foolish Prince; or a sober and temperat
seruant to bee gouerned by his bedlem and
riotous Maister. As for them that thinke it a charitable courtesie, inThe former reason answered: and
slauerie proued not to bee a thing agreeable unto nature: vniust
warres to have saued the lives of their prisoners whome they might have killed,
it is the charitie of theeves and pirats, who brag themselves to have giuen
life unto them whome they have not depriued of life. For oftentimes it commeth
to passe in vniust warres, (as are for most part those that are made by the
mightie) that good men are most miserably and shamefully enforced to serue the
wicked. And if the vanquished have wrongfully and without cause (as theeves)
made warre, why then put they them not to death? why take they not of them
exemplarie punishment? why take they them then vnto
mercie, seeing that they are theeves. As for that which is said, That
seruitude could not have continued so long
if it had bene contrarie unto nature: true it is in things meerely naturall,
which according to their naturall proprietie follow the immutable ordinance of
God: but hauing giuen unto man the choice of good & euill, it chaunceth
oftentimes to the contrarie; him to chuse the worse, contrarie to the law both
of God and nature: in whom his corrupt opinion hath so great power, that it
passeth in force of a law, of greater power than nature it selfe; in such sort,
that there was neuer so great impietie or wickednesse, which hath not bene
esteemed for vertue and godlinesse. Let one example serue for many. We know
right well that there can be no more cruell or detestable a thing than to
sacrifice men, and yet there are almost no people which have not used so to
doe, who all for many ages couered the same with the vaile of pietie and religion: as yet unto this our age they of Peru and
Brasiles doe, and certaine other people upon the riuer of Plat; unto which so
prophane sacrifices our auncestors for all that with great deuotion resorted.
With like pietie and deuotion the Thracians also used to kill their fathers and
mothers, growne weake with age, and so afterwards did eat them, to the end they
should not languish with sicknes, nor being dead become meat for wormes; as
they aunswered the Persian king. Neither must we say that there were none but
the auntient Gauls that sacrificed men; which indeed they did unto the time of
Tiberius the Emperour: for long time before, the* Caes. lib. 6. Belli Gallici. Amorits and Ammonits vsed
to sacrifice their children: neither was it a solemnitie among the Barbarians
onely, as generally among the Scythes (as Plutarch
writeth) but also among the Greeks (in whome
ciuilitie nor onely rested, but euen from whome it was unto all other nations
deriued): for Achilles (as Homer
reporteth) sacrificed unto his dead friend Patroclus
with the slaughtar of men Plut. in Themist. &
Artax.Themistocles also in the Persian warre, sacrificed three
men; as did the Persian king at the same time twelue: neither could Iupiter Licius (as is reported) be otherwise appeased but
by the slaughter of man, led by the ambiguitie of an old Oracle, and of the
Greeke word , which
without accent signifieth either Light, or a Man. M.
Tullius detesteth our auncestors, for that they sacrificed with mans
blood: but that he spoke as an Orator, and as best serued his cause: for M. Varro attributeth it to all the people of Italie: as also the manner of vowing in the sacred spring time to haue
bene, that whatsoeuer man or beast was thatyere first borne should be sacrificed. A man might also
bring for example Iud. 11.Iephte general of the armie of the Israelites, who is
reported to have sacrificed his daughter unto almightie God, much about the
same time that Agamemnon king of the Greeks sacrificed
his daughter IphigeniaEuripides. (whereof some well learned men haue
made Tragedies) although that he sacrificed nothing unto God but the virginitie
of his daughter; as the Hebrew text plainly declareth; and as Rabbi Leui, and the other Hebrew interpetors all agree. How beit other
people did the like with great pietie and deuotion: which proueth well that we
must not measure the law of nature by mens actions, bee they neuer so old and
inueterat: neither thereof conclude, that the seruile estate of slaues is of
right naturall: as also much lesse to attribute it to charitie, or to
courtesie, that the people in auntient time
saued their prisoners, taken in warres, whome they might have slaine; to draw a
greater gaine and profit from them as from beasts. For who is hee that would
spate the life of his vanquished enemie, if he could get a greater profit by
his death than by sparing his life? Of a thousand examples I will produce but
one. At the siege of Ierusalem under the conduct of Vespasian, a Roman souldier hauing found gold in the entrails of a Iew
that was slain, made his companions therwith acquainted, who forthwith cut the
throats of their prisoners, to see if they had also swallowed any of their
crownes; so that in a moment there were slaine Ieseph▪
in bello Iudaico. aboue twentie thousand of
those Iewes. O faire example of charitie towards captiues! But say some, they
are nourished, they are well entreated for
their seruice: but how I pray you are they nourished? and for what seruice
doing? Cato the Censor (reputed the best and wisest man
of his time) after that he had drawne all the seruice and profit he could from
his slaues, euen vntill they were growne crooked with age, so that he could
wring nothing more from them, set them then to sale to such as would giue most
for them, to draw yet from them the verie price of their blood which yet
remained in them, least he should be enforced to nourish them for nought, now
growne impotent with age, or else bee faine to kill them, or to set them at
libertie; in such sort that the poore slaues in recompence of all their seruice
made, were drawne to the gallows by their new masters: not yet so happie as Pallas her mule in Athens, which growne old went about
whither she list vnhalted, no man daring in her old age to load or charge her.
And whereas there is nothing more holy or more naturall giuen by God vnto
mankind, than mariage; yet so it is, that it was not permitted unto slaues: yea
in case that a free man taken captiue had a child lawfully begot by his wife;
if the father died in the hands of the enemie, although the mother returned
into her libertie, yet neuerthelesse was the child reputed illegitimat.
What should I rehearse the execrable and profuse filthinesse of both sexes,
whichThe miserable estate and condition of slauer.
the poore slaues heretofore were and yet are enforced to endure and suffer? But
as for crueltie showed upon them, it is incredible that we read, and that a man
might speake of, if but the thousand part thereof were written: for Authors
would thereof say nothing, if good occasion
were not giuen; and we have not but the histories of the most civill people
that euer were in the world. For they were enforced to till the ground in Colum. lib. 1 chaines (as yet they do in
Barbarie,) and to lie in dungeons, the ladders being drawn up from them, as
they yet do in all the East▪ for feare they should be lost, or that they should
set fire on the house, or otherwise kill their maisters. Now as for euerie
light offence of the slaue, except he were of great price, it was so rigorously
punished, as that to have broken a glasse was unto him death: as for example,
the Emperour Augustus being at supper in the house of
Vedius Pollio, it chaunced one of the slaues to
breake a glasse; who hauing done no other fault but that (as saithLib. tertio de fra.Seneca) was forthwith drawn unto a pond of Lampreis,
which were fed with mans flesh: whereat the poore slaue crying out, fled unto the feet of Agustus, entreating him, not for his life, but that hee might not
after he was put to death be eaten up of those fishes, for hee found himselfe
worthie of death for the glasse he had broken: but the common opinion was, that
the soule of the drowned neuer passed over into theVir. 6. Aeneid Elysian fields; or els that it died together with the
body: as Synesius writ of his companions sailing to
Alexandria, who in a tempest sodainly risen, seeing the outragious violence of
the Sea, drew their swords to cut their owne throats, so to giue way unto the
soule, which they thought otherwise to be in daunger to be drowned together
with the bodie: so much the poore slaue feared to be eaten up of the fishes.
But Augustus moued with compassion (as saith Seneca) pardoned the slaue, causing all the rest of the
glasses to be broken, and the pond to bee
filled up. Yet Dion the Historiographer, reporting the
same historie, saith that Augustus could not obtaine
pardon of Pollio for his slaue, neither to haue
commaunded the pond of Lampries to have bene filled up, than which nothing was
more pretious amongst the Remans: which for all that seemeth to have bene more
probable, seeing that Seneca confesseth Augustus to have bene therwith contented, neither to haue
bene therefore angrie with his friend Pollio. And to
shew that this was no new matter more than two hundred yeares before,Plut. in▪ vita Titi Flaminii.Quintus Flaminius a Senator of Rome, caused one of his
slaues to be slaine, for no other cause but to gratifie and please his Bardache, which said that he had neuer seene a man slaine. Now if
it chaunced the maister to be flame in his
house, by whomsoeuer that it was, all the slaues that at the same time were
under the same roofe, were put to death euerie mothers son. As chanced at the
murther of Pedanius great Pretor of Rome▪ when question
was made of putting to death al his slaues, following (as saith Tacitus) the auntient custome, the common people being
for* Lib. 14. the most part men enfranchised, fell
in mutinie, for that they knew well the murtherer was but one, & yet
neuerthelesse there must be put to death 400 of his slaues, all innocent of the
fact: neuerthelesse the matter being debated in the Senat, it was there
resolued, That the antient custome shuld be kept, & so accordingly al the
slaues were put to death. Her passe the murthering of slaues, enforced to kill
one another in the lists, or to be torne with wild beasts, so to giue pleasure
unto the people, and to breed in them a
contempt of death. And although the law Petronia had
forbidden slaues without cause to be cast unto the wild beasts: yet was it
neuer obserued, no more than the edict of the emperour Nero, who was the first that appointed commissioners to heare the
complaints* Sene. lib. 3. de Benefic. of slaues:
and after him the emperour Adrian ordained that
inquisition should be made against such as had maliciously without cause slaine
their slaues: how beit that long time before they were culpable as murtherers,
by the law Cornelia: but that was holden in no regard,
and all that the poore slaues could do to saue themselves from the fury of
their maisters, was to flie unto the images of the gods, or of the emperours.
For neither the temple of Diana in Rome, which king Seruius (himselfe the sonne of a slaue) had appointed as
a sanctuarie for slaues; neither the image of Romulus,
which the Senat had of long time appointed for
the selfe same purpose; neither the Sepulcher of Theseus
at Athens; neither the image of Ptolemee at Cyrene;
neither the temple of* Plu. in Thes.Diana at Ephesus, could defend the slaues from the furie
of their angrie lords and masters. Howbeit that by the law of the Ephesians the
slaue which without iust cause had fled unto the temple of Diana, was againe restored unto his master, being before sworne not
therefore to entreat him euill: but if the cause of his flight were iust, then
was he taken from his master and made seruant to Diana:
except women, who might not enter into her temple. But Tiberius of all other tyrants that euer were, the most craftie in his
old age, appointed his image for a sanctuarie, propounding capitall punishment
unto all such as should by violence draw any slaue from the same; to the intent
that by that meane the slaues might for the
least occasion come to accuse their masters, yea euen of high treason. Insomuch
that as Seneca writeth, a certaine Senator fearing to
bee bewraied of his slaue, craued pardon of Tiberius for
that he had but bene about to touch his chamber pot with a ring upon his
finger, wherein the image of Tiberius was engrauen. In
such sort, that the images of the emperours, but especially of tyrants were as
snares to entangle the magistrats in, who oftentimes secretly murthered their
slaues, for hauing recourse unto the images, so soone as they were returned
thence. But the law of God had therefore much better prouided, appointing
euerie mans house for a sanctuarie unto the slaue flying from his master,
forbidding to restore him againe unto his maister whilest he was yet in
choller. For all masters are not of like discretion to Plato, which said to his slaue, That he would sharply
have corrected him, but that hee was angrie: whereas the Germans (as Tacitus saith) neuer punish their seruants or children
but in their rage, and that as if they were their enemies. Thus we see the
lives of masters not well assured against their slaues; and the lives of slaues
much lesse against their masters. For who could assure himselfe of his life, or
of his goods in the time of the tyrannie of Sylla, who
had proposed thirtie Sesterties unto free men, and unto bond men liberty, as a
reward if they should discover their masters, or bring in the head of any one
of them that were by him proscribed? In which feare the citisens were, vntill
that threescore thousand of them being slaine, and so
the state in a manner againe appeased, a
certaine slaue yet presented unto Sylla the head of his
lord & master, whom Sylla for so doing according to
his promise set at liberty, but by and by after caused him to be cast headlong
from the rocke Tarpeia. At such time also as persecution grew hot against the
Christians, there was no Christian master but was in daunger of his life, or
els glad to set at libertie his slaues. But the feare of persecution once
ceasing, the lords and masters themselves became tyrants over their slaues.
So the state of Families and Commonweals is alwaies in daunger of trouble and
ruine,To great a multitude of slaues daungerous in a
Commonweale. by the conspiracie of slaues combining themselves
together: all Histories being full of seruile rebellions and warres. And albeit
that the Romans were right great and mightie, yet so it was that they could not
let the slaues to rise against the state in al the townes of Italie except Messana: and afterwards for all the
lawes they could make, they could not preuent but that threescore thousand
slaues rise in rebellion under the conduct of Spartacus,
who in set battaile ouerthrew three armies of the Romans. For it is most
certaine, that in euerie country whatsoeuer, there was at least ten slaues for
one free man: as it is easie to iudge by the musters taken in Athens, where for
twentie thousand citisens were found ten thousand strangers, and foure hundred
thousand slaues. And Italie (victorious over all nations) had many moe, as a
man may perceiue by the Oration of Cassius the Senator,
whereby he persuaded the Senat for the confirming of Sylla his decree: We have at home (said he) whole nations of slaues
much differing among themselves in manners, fashions, language, and religion.
And namely M.Crassus alone had five hundred slaues, who daily brought
in unto him the profit of their gainfull arts and trades; besides them whome he
imployed in his ordinarie and domesticall seruice. Milo
also in one day set at libertie 300 slaues, least they should have bene put to
torture to depose concerning the death of Clodius
Tribune of the people. And that multitude of slaues was it for which the Roman
Senate, desirous to put a difference in the habit of slaues, to the intent to
have them knowne from free men: one of the grauest Senators dissuaded the same,
showing the daunger like to ensue thereof, if the slaues should begin to enter
into the number of themselves; for that so they might easily dispatch
themselves of their maisters, for the easinesse of their rising into rebellion,
and the difference of their habits. unto which daunger Africke & some
part of Spaine should be subiect, if there
were such a multitude of slaue as in times past: for that they marked their
slaues in the face, which they did not in auntient time, except such of them as
were villanous and sturdie knaues, who were thereof called Stigmatic; who at any time beeing manumised, could for all that neuer
enioy the full fruit of their libertie or the priuelege of citisens: marking
the rest upon their armes. And this was it for which the Lacedemonians seeing
their slaues to multiply exceedingly aboue the citisens (for the hope their
masters gaue them of libertie which could get most children, and for the profit
every man drew out of them in particuler) made a decree that three thousand of
them such as had the most able bodies should bee taken up for the warres: whome
so pressed out, they forthwith caused to be all in one night slaine, and that so sodainly and secretly, as that no man knew
what was become of them, more than they which had the doing of the matter.
Now this feare that Cities and Commonweals had of their slaues, was the
causeWhy slaues were not suffred to beare armes.
that they neuer durst suffer them to beare armes, or to be enrolled in their
musters, and that upon paine of death: and if by necessitie they were
constrained to take their slaues, they at the same time freely set them at
libertie. As did Scipio Africanus the Greater, who after
the great ouerthrow of Cannas manumised 300 of his slaues, al able bodies.
Howbeit that Florus writeth, That arms were giuento 8000
slaues; which we also read to have bene done in the
confederat warre. But Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia
finding himselfe vnable to withstand the
multitude of his enemies, as also of his slaues, his citisens being for the
most part slaine; in his so great necessitie proclaimed libertie to al such
slaues as were able to pay fiftie crownes for their heads: in which doing he
prouided himselfe both of souldiors and money. Yea not so much as the effeminat
people of Asia used their slaues in warres, except the Parthians, who might not
by their lawes manumise their slaues, whom they made almost as much of as of
their children: wherby they grew into such a multitude▪ that in their armie
wherwith▪ they put to flight the power of M. Antonius,
consisting of fiftie thousand men, there was but 4500 free men, as we read in
Iustin: yet had they no cause to rebell, being of
their masters so well entreated. But as for other people they were so
mistrustfull of their slaues, as that sometimes they would not have them to serue in their gallies before they were
enfranchised: as did Augustus, who at one time set at
libertie twenty thousand to serue him in his gallies. And for feare they had▪
least they should conspire together against the state, to keepe them alwaies
busied in other mechanicall arts, Lycurgus amongst the
Lacedemonians, and Numa Pompilius in Rome, forbad their
owne citisens to vse any manuall occupation. And yet they could not so well
prouide, but that euer there was some one or other desperat man, who
propounding libertie unto slaues, still robbed the State. As Viriatus the Pirat, who made himselfe king of Portugall: Cinna, Spartacus, Tacfarinas,* Appian. in bellis ciuilib. * Ios. in bello Iudaico.
and Simon the son of Gerson,
captaine of the Iewes, who all of base companions made themselves great lords,
by giuing libertie unto the slaues that followed them. And the civill warres yet continuing betwixt Augustus and M. Antonius, was not to be seene
but fugitiue slaues stil on the one side or the other: in such sort, as that
after the discomfiture of Sex. Pompeius, there were
found thirtie thousand slaues which had taken part with him, whome Augustus caused to be apprehended through his dominions,
and by a prefixed day to be againe restored unto their masters, commaunding the
rest to bee hanged that had no masters to lay claime unto them; as we read in
Appian. And in truth the power of the Arabians grew
by no other meanes. For as soone as Homar one of Mahomets licutenants, had begun to raise warre in Arabia,
and promised libertie unto the slaues that should follow him, he drew such a
number after him, that in few yeares they made themselves lords of all the
East. The fame of which libertie, and the
conquests made by those slaues, so encouraged the slaues of Europe, that they
began to take up armes, first in Spaine in the yeare 781, and afterward in
Fraunce in the time of Charlemaigne, and of Lewes the godly; as is to bee seene by their Edicts then
made against the conspiracie of slaues. And after that also Lothaire the sonne of Lewes, hauing lost two
battels against his brethren, called the slaues unto his aid with promise of
libertie: who afterwards gaue the ouerthrow unto their masters in the yere 852.
When sodainly this fire took such hold in Germanie, where the slaues hauing
taken up armes, so troubled the state of the German princes and cities, that
Lewes king of the Almans was constrained to raise all
his forces to subdue them.
And this was the cause that the Christian princes by little and little released
their The cause why Christian princes by little and little
released their slaues. seruitude, and enfranchised their slaues,
reseruing onely unto themselves certaine seruices, and the auntient right of
succession, if their enfranchised slaues should chance to die without issue: a
custome yet in vse in all the lower Germanie; as in many places in Fraunce, and
England also. For as yet many remembrances of bondage remaine in the Christian
Commonweale: as is to be seene in the lawes of the Lombards & Ripuaires
whereby slaues could not have their iust libertie, or alienat their goods,
vntill they had bene twice manumised: and oftentimes the lord or master ioyned
unto the act of infranchisment, That it was done for the health of his soule.
For they which first laid the foundation of the
Christian Commonweale, had nothing in more regard, than to find the means how Christian slaues might be set at liberty:
so that in hope therof many of them oftentimes became Christians; & their
masters for the health of their souls were content so to enfranchise them. Wee
also read in the Histories of Africk, how that Paulinus
bishop of Nolo, after hee had sold all his goods to redeeme Christian slaues,
at last (which a man would wonder at) sold himselfe also unto the Vandales for
his brethren. And hereof came the manumission of slaues made in churches before
the bishops. Whereof, in the raigne of Constantine the
Great, ensued such a multitude of poore and needie men, who had nothing but
their libertie to live upon (of whome the most part would do nothing, and the
rest could do nothing) as that cities were with nothing more charged than with
them. Hereof, began the almes-houses, and The beginning of ames houses and
hospital. hospitals, for the reliefe of
little children, of the aged, of the sicke, and of them that could not labour,
to be erected and endowed by the Christian princes, at the requests of the
bishops. Hereof S. Basil in his sermons complaineth,
that the cries and gronings of the poore and weake were in the Churches
confounded and mingled with the songs and prayers of the Priests. Much about
which time Iulian the Apostata in despite of the
ChristiansNicephorus. exhorted the Pagan
bishops by the example of the Christians to the building and endowing of
almes-houses and hospitals for the reliefe of their poore. And for that poore
men set at libertie, did oftentimes lay forth their children to bee brought up
of the charitie and liberalitie of the Christians: Gratian made a law, That the children so exposed and left unto the
world, should be slaues unto them that had so
nourished and brought them up. And not long after, Valens the Emperour by an Edict gaue power to euerie man to take up
the vagrant and idle persons, and to cause them to serue them as slaues;
forbidding also and that upon paine of death, any to goe into the woods or
deserts there to live as Herts; of whome he caused a
great number which had contrarie to his Edict so gone out, to be executed; to
the intent to cut off idlenesse, and to draw euerie man unto labour. But after
that Idolatrie began to decay, and the Christian religion to encrease, the
multitude of slaues began also to diminish; and yet much more after the
publishing of the law of Mahomet, who set at libertie
all them of his religion. To the imitation of whome, the Christians also so
frankly set at libertie their slaues, as that all seruitude and slauerie seemed
in that age to have bene shut up with the West
Indians, wherein the Christians had shaken off from their necks all bondage,
about the yere 1250: yet for all that, that there were slaues in Italie in the
yeare 1212, it is euident, as well by the lawes of William king of Sicilie, and Frederick the
second Emperour; as also by the decrees of the bishops of Rome, Alexander (I say) the third, Vrban
the third, and Innocentius the third, concerning the
marriages of slaues, which the Lawyers call Contabernia,
or keeping of companie together: which Alexander was
chosen Pope in the yeare 1158, Vrban in the yeare 1185,
and Innocentius in the yeare 1188. Whereby it is
euident, the Christian Common▪ weale to have bene cleere of slaues since the
yeare 1250, or there about. For BartholusA time wherein there were no in the
Christian Commonweale. who flourished in the yeare 1300, writeth that
there were no slaues in his time; and that by
Christian lawes men might no more sell themselves, understanding the Edicts
made by the Christian princes: which when Nicholas the
Sicilian, otherwise called the Abbot of Panormo had learned of Bartholus, he thought it a thing well worth the noting.
Neuerthelesse we read in the Historie of Polonia, that euerie prisoner taken in
good warre, was then and long time after slaue unto him that had taken him, if
the king would not pay two Florins for his head, as I have before said: and yet
at this present the subiects bound unto the soyle whereon they were borne,
which they call Kmetos, are in the power of their lords,
who may at their pleasure kill them, and not bee called
into question therefore: and if so be that they kill another mans subiect, then
are they acquited by paying ten crownes; the
one moitie to the lord, and the other moitie unto the heires: so as we read in
the lawes of Polonia; which are the like in the kingdoms of Denmarke, Sweden,
and Norway. But it is more than 400 yeares agoe, since that Fraunce suffered in
it any true slaues. For as for that which we read in our histories, that Lewes Hutin, who came to the crowne in the yeare 1313
(the selfe same time that Bartholus lived) set at
libertie all slaues for money▪ to defray the charges of his warres;When slaues ceased in France that is, as I take it, to
be vnderstood of manumised men, which we call Mort-maines, whome we euen yet at
this present see to be set at libertie by the kings royall letters patents,
from that bond of seruitude wherby they are prohibited to marrie a wife, or to
alienat their goods out of the territories of their Patron. So also we are to
vnderstand the edict of Charls the fift the French king, wherin in cities every 70 families,
in country villages euerie hundred families, and every 200 heads of slaues,
were be charged with a man at armes; which they should not have done if they
had bene in the possession of another man, & accounted as another mans
goods. So it is also to be vnderstood that is written of Humbert Dauphin, who at the same time by one edict enfranchised all
the slaues of Dauphine, and commaunded the same to be enrolled in the publick
acts and lawes of the countrey. The same curtesie used Theobald countie d'Blois towards his slaues, in
the yeare 1245. To this also belongeth that which wee read of Sugerius abbot of the couent of S. Dionyse, who
set at libertie his manumised slaues, so that they chaunged their dwelling. And
also the auntient decree of the Parliament of Paris, whereby it was permitted to the bishop of Chalons, by the
consent of his Chapiter, to enfranchise his slaues. Charles the seuenth also comming to the crowne in the yeare 1430
enfranchised diuers persons of seruile condition. And in our memorie king Henry the second by his letters pattents enfranchised
them of Burbonnois, in the yere 1549. By whose example
also the duke of Sauoy did the like in all his countries, in the yeare 1561.
All which we see done in the great favour of libertie. Whereas otherwise the
Prince, of his owne lawfull power could not enfranchise another mans slaue, and
much lesse the magistrat, what intercession soeuer the people should make:
neither could he so much as giue unto him that was by another man enfranchised,
so much as leaue to weare a ring of gold, without the consent of his patron.
For Commodus the Emperour by his edict tooke from all them their rings of gold, who had obtained that
priueledge of the prince without leaue of their Patron: neither would he haue
it any thing preiudiciall unto the Patron, that his enfranchised slaue had
obtained of the prince this priueledge, albeit that the prince had restored him
to the state of a free borne man: which was a far greater matter than to haue
obtained the priueledge to weare a ring of gold: which albeit that it belonged
unto the prince onely to grant, yet so it was neuerthelesse in the time of Tertullian, that the patrons had in a manner got that
power unto themselves,* Tertul. in de resurrection.
giuing unto their enfranchised slaues a ring of gold and a white gowne, in
stead of yron giues and whips, causing them so attired to sit downe at the
table with them, and to beare their name. And at last Iustinian himselfe by a generall edict restored all them that had bene slaues enfranchised unto the state of
free borne men; so that for the confirmation thereof they needed not afterwards
any the princes charter. Which law for all that we vse not: for inviz. France. this realme he must of necessitie obtaine the prince his letters
patents, which have alwaies used to restore unto manumised men and of seruile
condition, the state of free borne men, and to blot out all the staine of their
old slauerie; which letters were woont to be both requested and obtained
without the leaue of the patron: who for all that may lay hands upon such goods
of his enfranchised slaue as were got before he was set at libertie wheresoeuer
they be; as not long since was adiudged by the court of
Paris: as for such things as they get afterwards they may hold them to themselves; and hauing no children, by their
testaments bestow them upon whome they please. I have seene the lord of the
White Rocke in Gascongue claime to have not onely a right over his manumised
subiects, and also that they were bound to trimme his vines, to till his
grounds, to mow his meddows, to reape and thresh his corne, to carrie &
recarrie whatsoeuer he should command them, to repaire his decayed house, to
pay his ransome, and also the foure accustomed payments used in this realme;
but also that if without his leaue they should chaunge their dwelling places
wherein they were borne, or depart out of his land, hee might lead them home
againe in an halter: unto all which the aforesaid seruices his manumised people
yeelded, sauing unto the last, which by a decree of the Parlement of Tholouze
was cut off, as preiudiciall unto the right of
libertie. Truly they whome the Polonians call Kmetons, are not compelled to do
their patrons so great seruice; but yet suffer things much grieuous: for that
any man may kill them for the small paiment of ten crownes, and their lord may
so doe for nothing. And in former time it was lawfull amongst the Indians by
all meanes to tyrannise upon their seruants, which were in number infinit, yea
and to kill them also; vntill that Charles the fift by a
law which he made commanded then all to be free. But in Fraunce, although there
be some remembrance of old seruitude, yet is it not lawfull there to make any
slaue, or to buy any of others: Insomuch that the slaues of strangers so soone
as they set their foot within Fraunce becomeSlaues by
comming into France become free. franke & free; as was by an old
decree of the court of Paris determined against an ambassador of Spain, who had broght a slaue with him into France. And I
remember that of late a Genua marchant hauing brought with him unto Tholouze a
slaue whome he had bought in Spaine, the hoast of the house understanding the
matter, persuaded the slaue to appeale unto his libertie. The matter being
brought before the magistrats, the marchant was called for; the Atturney
general out of the records showed certaine auntient priueledges giuen (as is
said) unto them of Tholouze by Theodosius the Great,
wherein he had granted, That slaues so soone as they came into Tholouze should
be free. The marchant alledging for himselfe that he had truly bought his slaue
in Spaine, and so was afterward come to Tholouze, from thence to goe home to
Genua, and so not to be bound to the lawes of Fraunce. In the end hee requested
that if they would needs deale so hardly
with him, as to set at libertie another mans slaue, yet they should at least
restore unto him the money hee cost him: whereunto the Iudges aunswered, That
it was a matter to be considered of. In the meane time the marchant fearing
least he shoud loose both his dutifull slaue and his
money also, of himselfe set him at libertie, yet couenanting with him that he
should serue him so long as he lived. Yet for all that, those priueledges which
they of Tholouze boast to have bene granted them by Theodosius, seeme not to have bene so, seeing that Narbona a true
Colonie of the Romans, and the most auntient that was in Fraunce, Lectore,
Nysmes, Vienne, Lyons, Arles, Romans, and many others, which were also Roman
Collonies, no nor Rome itselfe the verie seat of the Empire, had not any such
priueledge. And thus much concerning the
enfranchising of slaues.
But now here might a man say, If it be so that the Mahometans have enfranchised
all the slaues of their religion, which hath course in all Asia, and almost in
all Africke,Now it commeth to paste thaes be so many in the world. with a good part of Europe also;
and the Christians have semblably done the like (as we have before showed:) how
commeth it to passe that yet the world is so full of slaues and slauerie? For
the Iewes may not by their lawes have any slaue of their own nation, neither by
the lawes of the Christians may they have any Christian. Truely all in that
swerue from the law of God: For the law of God forbiddeth any slaue to be made by the order of the Israelites amongst
themselves, except that any of them shall of
his owne accord giue himselfe in bondage to another, and suffer▪ his eare to
be* Exod. 2. bored
through to a post with an aule: truely it adiudgeth the debtors vntoDeut. 5. the creditors, and
suffereth the Iewes to bee sold for pouertie: yet the same law commaundeth them
at the seuenth yeare to be set at libertie. And although a man have enthraled
himselfe, and suffered himselfe to be thrust through the eare with an aule,
insomuch that he be bound to perpetuall seruitude: yet neuerthelesse all the
interpretors of the law affirme, That in the yeare of Iubiley he shall againe
recover his libertie, except he had rather againe serue than become free. But
such bondslaues as were borne of those kind of slaues which had of their owne
accord giuen themselves into bondage, they were in the fiftith yeare to be set
free: at which time the law byLeuit. 2. Herom. 32. Num. 13. the sound of trumpet denounceth libertie unto all manner of slaues.
Yet doth the law permit them to have straungers, of another nation and religion
than their owne, in perpetuall bondage; and that their posteritie and nephews
might vse the same right against straungers, that straungers might against the
Isiaelites: than which kind of slaues Iulian the
Emperour writeth none to have bene better. You see (saith he) how willingly the
Syrians serue other nations: and contrariwise what a loue of libertie is in the
people of the Celtes. But the Iewes when they had bought any straunge
bond▪slaues of the Christians, or of the Pagans, they instructed them in their
owne religion, and so circumcised them: which thing Traian by a speciall law forbad: and albeit that they had yeelded vnto
their lords or maisters religion, yet neuerthelesse they enforced them
still to serue: Whereas byExod. 12. Numer. 49. the law it was prouided, that such
straungers as being circumcised had receiued the law of God, should enioy the
same priuiledges and benefits that the natural citisēs did. The same law
(saith it) shal be unto the stranger & the citisen. That is it that God by
the Prophet IeremieHier. 34. complaineth of, Slaues not to be set
at libertie according to the law: and therefore a most heauie bondage to hang
over the maisters heads from their enemies. Hereupon also Philip the French king draue the Iewes out of his kingdome, conficating their goods, for that contrarie unto the law
they circumcised Christians, and tooke them unto themselves into bondage for
slaues. The like deceit we see the Mahometans to vse, whose manner is to
circumcise and to instruct in their religion such Christians as they have taken
in warre, or bought of pirats, or at leastwise
their children, whome neuerthelesse they compell to serue with all their
children and posteritie. Whose example the Portingals following, compell the
bondmen whome they have bought out of Africke, to abiure the Mahometan
religion, and instructing them in the Christian religion, cause them
neuerthelesse with their children and ofspring to serue them in perpetuall
slauerie: so that now whole droues of slaues are sold and that openly in all
parts of Portugall, as if they were beasts. In like manner the Spaniards hauing
brought the Neigros unto the Christian religion, keepe them neuerthelesse and
all their posteritie for slaues. And albeit that Charles
the fift had by a generall edict made in the yeare 1540 set at libertie all the
slaues of the West Indies, neuerthelesse a sedition there rising through the
couetousnesse and insolencie of them that were
in greatest power, Gonsales Pizzare gouernor of that
prouince reuolted from Charles: whose power when Lagasca had discomfited, and for publike example had
caused him to be beheaded together with the chiefe men of that rebellion, hee
according to the edict, set at libertie all the slaues; yet with condition,
that they should still serue their patrons. And yet for all that it could not
be brought to passe, but that Lagasca returning into
Spaine, these late enfranchised men fell againe into their slauerie: and
especially for the profit which their lords and masters were▪in hope to have by
the selling of them: to the imitation of the Portugals, who first called in
againe Seruitude, now for many worlds of yeares buried
in forgetfulnesse in Europe; and are in The Portugals the first that called in slauery againe into
Europe. short time like enough to disperse the same over all Europe,
as it is now alreadie begun in Italie. For now a good while ago Africa and
Asia, and the Easterne part of Europ also have accustomed to nourish and bring
up in every citie, stocks of slaues, in like maner as if they were beasts, and
of them to make a great marchandise and gaine. For within this hundred yere the
Tartars (a kind of Scythian people) in great number with fire and sword entring
into the borders of Moscouia, Lituania, and Polonia, carried away with them
three hundred thousand Christians into captiuitie. And not long ago euen in our
memorie, Sinan Bassa hauing taken the Ifle of Gozo neere
unto Malta, led away with him 6300 Christians, and all the inhabitants of
Tripolis in Barbarie, which he sold in Graecia. So that it is not to be
maruelled that the captaine of the Turkes
Ianizaries, and either of his Chauncellors (whome they call Cadelesquiers) vse
euerie one of them at their entrance into their office to receiue of the prince
three hundred slaues. For as concerning the Turkes Pretorian souldiors, and
those youths which are taken from the Christians as tribute, and are called
tribute children, I neuer accounted them for slaues; seeing that they are
enrolled in the princes familie, and that they alone enioy the great offices,
honours, priesthoods, authoritie and honour; which nobilitie extendeth also
unto their nephewes in the fourth degree, and all their posteritie afterward
beeing accounted base, except by their vertue and noble acts they maintaine the
honour of their grandfathers: For the Turkes almost alone of all other people
measure true nobilitie by vertue, and not by discent or the antiquitie of
No man noble among the Turkes but for his valor or his
vertue. their stocke; so that the farther a man is from vertue, so
much the farther hee is (with them) from nobilitie.
Wherefore seeing it is proued by the examples of so many worlds of years, so
many inconueniences of rebellions, seruile warres, conspiracies euersions and
chaunges to have happened unto Commonweals by slaues; so many murthers,
cruelties, and detestable villanies to have bene committed upon the persons of
slaues by their lords and masters: who can doubt to affirme it to be a thing
most pernitious and daungerous to have brought them into a Commonweale; or
hauing cast them off, to receiue them againe? Now if any man shall say, That
the rigour of the lawes may by forbidding, and seuere punishment moderat the
cruelty of maisters over their slaues: What law
can there be more iust, more strong, and indifferent, or better than the
lawsReasons for the bringing in againe of slauery
answered. of God, which hath so wisely prouided as to forbid to
chastise slaues with whips (which the Roman lawes permitted) and willeth the
slaue to be enfranchised, if his maister shal breake any lim of him? which law
Constantine the Emperour afterward approued. But who
shall prosecute the suite against the lord for the death of the slaue? who
shall heare the complaint? who shall exact due punishment therefore? shall hee
that hath nothing to do therwith? considering that tyrants hold it for a rule
in policie, That one cannot be too seuere unto his subiects, so to keepe them
low and obedient. But the Spaniards (some will say) entreat their slaues
courteously, teach them, and bring them up, yea and that much more kindly than
they do their hired seruans: and they againe
on their part serue their lords and masters with all chearefulnes and loue
incredible. But concerning the Spaniards it is a common saying, That there are
no maisters more courtious than they at the first; as generally all beginnings
are pleasing: so also it is most certaine, That there is no greater loue, than
the loue of a good slaue towards his lord: prouided that it meet with an humor
agreeing with it selfe. For which cause the law of God (in mine opinion) hath
so wisely prouided that no man should serue a perpetuall seruitude, but he
which hauing serued seuen yeres, and so well tasted the humor and disposition
of his master or creditor, had consented to bee his slaue for euer. But sith there are so few men one like unto anothe and contrariwise the varietie and naturall disposition of them infinit, what law giuer can
unto them all prescribe one generall edict, law, or rule. The auntient prouerb,
which saith, So many slaues, so many enemies in a mans
house, showeth right well what friendship, faith and loyaltie a man may
looke for of his slaues. Of a thousand examples of antiquitie I will recite but
one, which happened in the time of Iulius Pontanu, who reporteth, That a slaue seeingAn horrible example of the crueltie of a faithlesse
slaue. his lord absent, barred the gates, and hauing shamefully
abused his mistresse, bound her, tooke his maisters three children, and so
going up to the highest place of the house, seeing his maister comming home,
first cast downe unto him upon the pauement one of his children, and after that
another: the wofull father all dismaid, and fearing least hee should throw
downe the third likewise, with prayers and teares besought the slaue to
spare him that was yet left, promising him
forgiuenesse for that hee had alreadie done, and libertie also if he would but
saue that third. Which his request the slaue yeelded vnto, upon condition that
he should cut off his owne nose: which he chose rather to doe; than to loose
his child. But this done, the slaue neuerthelesse cast downe the third child
also; and so at last to take that revenge of himself, which his lord thought to
have done, cast headlong downe himselfe also. And not to be tedious, I omit
poysonings, murders, burnings, and many other mischiefes oftentimes euerie
where done by slaues. But these inconueniences, you will say, are counteruailed
and recompensed with other mutuall profits; for that by receiuing in of slaues
we cut off the infinit number of vagabonds and bankrupts, who after they haue
deuoured al, would pay their creditors with Reasons for th maintaining of
slauerie in a Commonweale. bils: & that by that means might be
driuen away such a multitude of rogues & naughtie doers, which eat up whole
townes, and as drones sucke the hony from the bees: ioyne also unto this, that
of such idle mates, theeves and pirats furnish themselves; besides that, famine
and euil prouision for the poore, draw into townes all populer diseases; for
the poore we must nourish and not kill, although it be in a sort to kill them,
to refuse to nourish them (as saith S. Ambrose.) These
reasons beare some show of truth.The same reasons
answered. For as concerning debtors, if they be not able to pay, God
his law commaundeth them to be adiudged to their creditors for seuen yeares,
but yet not into perpetuall bondage▪ howbeit that the law of the twelue tables,
practised in all the West Indies, and in the greatest part of Africke, will
that they remaine still prisoners unto the creditors, vntill they be fully satisfied. For they which have taken away from
debtors in ciuil cases the benefit, to leaue unto their creditors all such
goods as they had, and command them to be committed not to their creditors, but
to prisons, as the Turkes do; seeme to mee to take away not onely from the
creditors, but also from the debtors, all power to keepe themselves, yea and
their lives also, as taking from them the meane for them to trauell, and to
gaine to acquit themselves. But as for theeves and pirats, there was neuer in
any time moe than when the multitude of slaues was encreased: For that the
slaue not able to endure slauerie, and at length breaking from his maister, was
alwaies constrained to be a theefe or a pirat, not being able to endure his
maister, neither to show himself being marked, nor to live hauing nothing to
live upon. A better example whereof cannot be
than that of Spartacus the fensor, who at one time
assembled out of the verie bowels of Italie three score thousand slaues; when
as at the same time aboue fourescore thousand pirats with nine hundred saile of
ships were rouing over all the Mediterannean, and had with so great forces
taken 400 cities upon the sea coast; as that the Roman Empire was both by land
and sea as it were beset with theeves and robbers. But the wise law giuer is
not hee that driueth robbers out of the Commonwealth, but he that suffereth
them not therein to enter: which may easily bee done without that direfull
slauerie, so dreadfull unto states and cities; by erecting in every towne and
citie publick houses for poore children, where they may
learne diuers trades and occupations, as they
do Paris, hios, and Venice,
and other well gouerned towns, where Seminaries of Artiz are brought upto the great benefit of the Commonweale.
But in such places as wherein slaues are now alreadie receiued, I am not of
opinion to have them altogether and pone time set at
libertie, as Charles the Emperour did at Peru: for that
so they hauing nothing to live upon, nor occupation to gaine by, and delighted
with the sweetnesse of idlenesse and libertie, would take no paines: in such
sort that the most part of them died for hunger: but the best way is, by little
and little to enfranchise them, hauing before their enfranchisement taught them
some occupation whereby to releeue themselves. Now if some shall say, That no
man is a good master, but he that hath before bene a good seruant: I say that
to be an opinion euill The old saying, That no man can be a good master, but he
which hath before bene a good , refuted.
grounded, although it be right auntient: for there is nothing that doth more
discourage and ouerthrow, (and if I may so say) a bastardise a good and noble
mind, than seruitude; or that doth more abate the naturall maiestie of good
natures to commaund over others, than to have bene once a slaue. Salomon also the maister of wisedom saith in his
Prouerbs, That there is nothing more intollerable, than when a slaue is become
a maister, or a handmaid a mistresse: which he referreth not only unto a more
misticall sence; as when our intemperat desires beare rule over our reason: but
unto him also which so dainly passeth from one extremitie to another; as from
seruitude to commaund. But if it be true that reason and the law of God is
alwaies and euerie where to take place, and that it was not shut up only within
the bounds of Palestine: why should not that
law so profitably & so wisely made by God himselfe, concerning slauerie
& libertie, stand in force, rather than that which was by mans wisedom
deuised? Howbeit that the Tartars (which are by many thought to bee descended
from the ten tribes of Israel) have alwaies enfranchised their slaues at the
end of seuen yeres: yet with condition that they should depart out of their
country: which condition was first by Papinian (the
great lawyer) reiected, but afterwards by him againe receiued; but beeing
ioyned unto enfranchisments; is accounted as if it were not written at all. And
thus much concerning the power of a maister over his slaue, and whether slaues
are to be suffered in a well ordered Commonweal. But now that we haue
sufficiently, & yet also as briefly as was unto vs possible, entreated of a
Familie, & of all the parts therof, which is the foundation of the whole cōmonweale; let vs now likewise also
speak of a Citisen & a City.
CHAP. VI. ¶ What a Citisen is, and how much Citisens
differ from Citisens, and how much from strangers: what also is to be
vnderstood by the name of a Towne, a Citie, and of a Commonweale.
WHat we have before said concerning a whole
Familie, and every part thereof, containeth in it the beginning of all
Commonweals. And as foundations can of themselves stand without the forme of an
house, before the walles be built higher, or
any roofe laid upon them: so also a Familie can of it selfe be without a Citie
or a Commonweale: and so can also the maister of a Familie vse his power and
command over his houshold without depending of the power of any other man: as
they say there are many such families in the frontiers of the kingdomes of Fes
and of Marocco, and in the West Indies: but a Commonweale can no more be
without a Familie, than a Citie without houses, or an house without a
foundation. Now when the maister of the Familie goeth out of his owne house
where he commaundeth, to entreat and trafficke with other heads of Families, of that concerneth them all in generall, he then
loaseth the title of maister, head, and lord,
to be a companion, equall and fellow like with others, leauing his familie to
enter into a Citie, and his domesticall affaires to entreat of publick; and in
stead of a lord calleth himselfe a Citisen, which is no other in proper tearmes
than A freeThe definition of a Citisen.subiect holding of the soueraigntie of another man. For
before there was either Citie or citisen, or any forme of a Commonweale amongst
men, euerie master of a familie was a maister in his owne house, hauing power
of life and death over his wife and children: but after that force, violence,
ambition, couetousnesse, and desire of revenge had armed one against another,
the issues of warres and combats giuing victorie unto the one side, made the
other to become unto them slaues: and amongst them that ouercame, he that was
chosen cheefe and captaine, under whose conduct and leading they had obtained the victorie, kept them also in his power
and commaund as his faithfull and obedient subiects, and the other as his
slaues. Then that full and entire libertie by nature giuen to every man, to
live as himselfe best pleased, was altogether taken from the vanquished, and in
the vanquishers themselves in some measure also diminished, in regard of the
conquerour; for that now it concerned euerie man in priuat to yeeld his
obedience unto his chiefe soueraigne; and he that would not abate any thing of
his libertie, to live under the lawes and commaundement of another, lost all.
So the word of Lord and Seruant,
of Prince and Subiect, before
vnknowne unto the world, were first brought into vse. Yea Reason, and the verie
light of nature, leadeth vs to beleeue veryThat violence and
oppression gaue the beginning unto Commonweals. force and violence to
have giuen course and beginning unto Commonweals. And albeit that there were no reason therefore, it shal be hereafter
declared by the vndoubted▪ testimonies of the most credible historiographers,
that is to say, of Thucydides, Plutarch, Caesar, &
also by the laws of Solon, That the first men that bare
rule, had no greater honour and vertue, than to kill, massacre and rob men, or
to bring them in slauerie. These be the words of Plutarch. Yet have we more also the witnesse of the sacred history,
where it is said, that Nimroth the nephew of Cham, was the first that by force and violence brought
men into his subiection, establishing his kingdome in the countrey▪ of Assyria: and for this cause they called him the Mightie hunter, which the Hebrews interpret to be a
theefe and robb. Which thing also Philo the Iew, and Iosephus by their
testimonies confirme, viz. by his wealth and power to have first exercised tyrannie. Wherein it appear Demosthenes, Aristotle, and Cicero, to have mistakenThat kings were not first
chosen for their iustice and vertue. themselves, in following the
errour of Herodotus, who saith, That the first kings
were chosen for their iustice and vertue; and have hereof faigned unto vs I wot
not what heroicall and golden worlds: an opinion by me by most certaine
arguments and testimonies elswhere refelled; seeing that the first Cities and
Commonweals, long before the time of Abraham were full
of slaues: as also not long agoe the Westerne islands did swarme with them at
such time as the Spaniards subdued them: a thing that could not possibly be,
but by extreame violent forcing the free lawes of nature. And it is not yet
past seuentie yeares that the people of Gaoga in Africke had neuer felt or
heard of any king or lord whatsoeuer, vntill that one amongst them a trauell or
had in his trauell seene and noted the
maiestie of the king of Tombut: and thereupon conceiuing a desire to make
himselfe a king also in his owne countrie, hee at first to begin withall,
killed a rich marchant; and so possessed of his horses armes and marchandise,
divided them amongst his nie kinsfolks and friends, acquainted with his
purpose; by whose aid he by force and violence subdued now some, and after
others, killing the richest, and ceasing upon their goods: in such sort that
his sonne became rich with the robberies of his father, made himselfe king,
whose successor hath so continued after him in great power, as we read in Leo of Africke. This was the beginning of the kings of Gaoga, which in short time greatly
encreased.
And thus much concerning the beginning of Commonweals, which may serue to
manifest the definition of a Citisen, by vs before set down, to be true, which
is no other thing to say, but A free subiect holding of the
soueraignitie of another man. A free subiectA Citisen must be a free subiect. I say, for albeit
that a slaue be much more subiect unto the commaund of the highest authoritie
than a free man; yet so it is, that al people have alwayes with their common
consent agreed, That a slaue is no Citisen, and in questions of right is
accounted noSlaues not to bee accounted Citisens.
bodie; which cannot truely be said of mens wiues and children, who are free
from all seruitude and bondage; albeit that their rights and liberties, and the
power to dispose of their owne goods, be from them in some sort cut off by the
domesticall power: in sort that a man may say, that euerie Citisen is a
subiect, some small part of his libertie being
diminished by the maiestie of him to whome he oweth obeysance. But euerie
subiect is not a Citisen, as we have said of a slaue; and may also so say of a
stranger, who comming into an other mans segniorie, is not receiued for a
Citisen, hauing not any part in the rights and priueledges of the Citie;
neither is to bee accounted in the number of friends, allies, or coallies, who
are not altogether straungers, (as the Lawyer saith) neither enemies also.
Howbeit that the Greeks of old called straungers enemies, as also did the
Latines, which Cicero hath noted out of the law of the
twelue tables;* Cice. officiorum. lib. 1. The
mildnesse of the word (saith he) mitigating the hardnesse of the thing: and
they were called enemies which had conspired against the state. And it may well
bee also that those whom we yet by a common word cal Hotes, or Hostes, were in antient time
nothing els but straungers. But men haue
since corrected the proprietie of words, the forme of speech still remaining:
for the Greeks have called their enemies , as men making warre upon them; and
straungers , which
signifieth not pilgrims (as saith Acursius) but
straungers, be they another mans subiects, or themselves soueraignes in their
owne countrey.
Now amongst them whome we said to be subiects unto publick empires and
soueraigne power; some are naturall, some are naturallised; and of them which
are naturallThe diuision of subiects. some are free
borne, some are slaues, and these slaues being set at libertie, in an instant
become Citisens, whereas straunger slaues be not so. Yet true it is that the
enfranchised slaues in Greece were not admitted to be Citisens, although that
they were of the same countrie, and naturall
subiects. For the request of Demosthenes the Orator,
which he made unto the people after the great ouerthrow at Cherronaea, That all
the inhabitants of Athens, as well the enfranchised as others, might be
accounted Citisens; was reiected and denied, for feare least the enfranchised
men (of whom there was a great multitude) should become lords of their estate,
and with the number of voyces exclude the naturall Citisens from all honours
and promotions; which the greatest number still carried away: which thing the
Romans at the first not regarding, had almost before they were aware fallen
into the power of the enfranchised men, had not Fabius
Maximus in good time foreseene the matter, and thrust the multitude of
the enfranchised men, before dispersed amongst all the tribes, into foure
tribes apart by themselves; to the intent that
one and thirtie tribes of the free borne men and auntient Citisens, might stil
with the number of voices preuaile: for they counted not in Rome their voices
by the poll, as in auntient time they did at Athens, and now doe also at
Venice; but by degrees and centuries, in the assemblies of their great estates;
and by lines or tribes, in their lesse estates. And for that it so great a
matter was without sedition done by the onely wisedome of Fabius the Censor, he tooke the surname of Maximus (or of the Greatest:) in which doing he amended the errors of
Appius the Censor▪Why Fabius was
called Maximus. who had dispersed the enfranchised and naturallised
Citisens (the issue of slaues and straungers) amongst
all the tribes of the free borne men: yet afterwards (notwithstanding
the order taken by Fabius) it was granted unto the Citisens enfranchised, that they might
enroll one of their sonnes beeing five yeares olde or more in the tribe or line
of their patron: But when those foure tribes of the enfranchised Citisens
seemed yet too puissant and strong, it was decreed, That there should by lot
one tribe bee drawne out, wherein all the enfranchised Citisens should giue
their voyces. And this was the state of the enfranchised Citisens, vntill the
civill warre betwixt Marius and Sylla, at which time the people at the motion of Pub. Sulpitius made a law, That the enfranchised Citisens should from
that time forward be againe divided amongst all the tribes, which was the first
and principall cause of the ruine of that Commonweale. Wherefore as of slaues
some are borne, some are made; so also of Citisens some are made, some are
borne: the naturall Citisen, is he that is
free of that wherein he is borne; whether he be borne but of one of his parents
a Citisen, or of both of them Citisens. True it is that ofThe naturall citisen. auntient time (and yet at this present also in
diuers Commonweals) to bee a Citisen it was needfull to have both father and
mother Citisens, as in Greece, otherwise they called them Bastards, or
Mungrels, which were but Citisens on the one side, and could not themselves
neither their children be partakers of the greatest benefits or offices in the
Commonweale, which they called Archontes, as saith Demosthenes in his Oration against Neaera,
albeit that many (as Themistocles himselfe) were
thereinto secretly entered. But in the time of Pericles
five thousand of them were sold slaues, who had born* Plut.
in Peri. the countenance of Citisens. And Pericles himselfe hauing lost his children that were right Citisens, made request unto the people, That his sonne
might be enrolled among the Citisens, which sonne he had begot at Athens of his
wife being a straunger. Wee also read that the Romans made a Collonie of foure
thousand Spaniards, whome the Romans had begot of Spanish women, for that they
were not true Citisens. But afterward it tooke place that he should be a
Citisen whose father was a citisen: and in many places it is sufficient for the
making of a citisen, that his mother was a citisen. For the place maketh not
the child of a straunger (man or woman) to be a citisen: and hee that was borne
in Africk of two Roman citisens is no lesse a citisen, than if hee had bene
borne in Rome. Now the made or naturallised citisen is he who hath submitted
himselfe unto the soueraigntie of another, and is so receiued into the number
of citisens.The naturalised citisen. For the citisen of honour
onely, who for his merits towards the Commonweale, or ofThe
citisen of honour properly no citisen. speciall favour hath obtained
the right and priueledge of a citisen, cannot of right bee called a citisen,
for that hee hath not put himselfe under the power of of anothers commaund.
Wherfore of many citisens, be they naturals, or naturallised, or els slaues
enfranchised (which are the three meanes that the law giueth to become a
citisen by) is made a Commonweale, when they are gouerned by the puissant
soueraigntie of one or many rulers: albeit that they differ among themselves in
lawes, language, customes, religions, and diuersitie of nations. But if all the
citisens be gouerned by the selfesame lawes and customes, it is not onely one
Commonweale, but also one very citie, albeit that The enclosure of wals make not a citie, but the government
of the citisens under the self same lawes: although they dwell in uers townes or prouinces dispersed. the
citisens be divided in many villages, townes, or prouinces. For the enclosure
of wals make not a citie, (as many have written) no more than the wals of an
house make a familie, which may consist of many slaues or children, although
they bee farre distant one from another, or in diuers countries, prouided that
they bee all subiect unto the commaund of one head of the familie: So say we of
a Citie, which may have many townes and villages, which vse the same customes
and fashions, as are the Bailiwicks, or Stewardships of this realme: And so the
Commonweale may have many cities and prouinces which may have diuers customes,
and yet are neuerthelesse subiect unto the* viz. France. command of their soueraigne lords, and unto their edicts
and ordinances. And it may also be that every
towne and citie may have certaine priuileges in particuler, which are not
common unto them of the suburbes; and the suburbs also may have certaine
prerogatives which are not common unto the villages, nor to the inhabitants of
the open countrie; who are yet neuerthelesse subiects of the same Commonweale,
and citisens of their citie; yet are they not for all that burgesses: for the
word citisen hath I know not how a more speciall signification with vs, than
hath the word Burgesse: and is properly the naturall subiect, who hath the
right of a corporation, or colledge, orThe difference
betwixt a citisen and a burgesse. certaine other priueledges, which
are not common also unto the burgesses. I have said the naturall subiect, for
that the subiect naturallised although hee dwell in the towne, and enioy the
right of a burgesse, is yet called in many places a burgesse: & the
other is called a citisen, who enioyeth a
certaine particular priueledge proper unto free borne citisens. As in Paris
there is none but naturall citisens, and borne in Paris, that can be Prouost of
the marchants. And in Geneua a burgesse cannot be Syndic, or Senator of the
priuie counsell of xxv, which a citisen may well be: which is also used amongst
the Swissers, and all the townes of Germanie.
And thus much briefly concerning the difference of subiects, citisens,
burgesses, and straungers; as also concerning a Commonweale, a Citie, and a
Towne. But for as much as there is neither Greeke nor Latine, nor any other
writer that I have seene, which have used these definitions, it is needfull by
lawes and by examples to make plaine that which I have before said, being
otherwise of it selfe obscure. For we oftentimes see great quarrels and controuersies to arise as well betwixt princes, as
citisens of the same towne or citie amongst themselves. For not understanding
the difference of these words, yea they from whome wee ought to expect the true
resolutions of these things, are themselves oftentimes farre wide, mistaking a
citie for a towne, a Commonweale for a citie, and straungers for citisens. But
they which write of a Commonweale without knowledge of the law, and of the
common right, are like unto them which go about to build faire high houses,
without any foundations at all. Aristotle hath
defined* Arist. Politic. lib. 3. cap. 6. unto vs;
A citie to be a multitude of citisens, hauing all things needfull for them to
live well and happily withall: making no difference betweene a Commonweale and
a citie: saying also, That it is not a citie if all the citisens dwell not in
one and the selfe same place: which is
absurditie in matter of a Commonweale; as Iulius Caesar
in his Commentaries well declareth, saying, That euerie citie of the Heluetians
had foure villages, or cantons. Where it appeareth that the word Citie, is a
word of right or iurisdiction, which signifieth not one place or region, as the
word Towne, or Citie; which the Latines call Vrbem of
Vrbo, that is to say of aratio, or plowing: for that as Varro saith,
the compasse and circuit of cities was marked out with the plough. It is also
certaine in question of right, That he which hath caried out of the citie, that
which was by the law forbidden to be carried out, and hath carried the same
into another citie or towne of the same prouince; is neither to be said to haue
caried the thing out of the citie, neither to have offended against the law.
Yea the doctors go farther, saying, That hee hath not done contrarie unto the law, that hath transported the
thing forbidden into any other citie or towne subiect unto the same prince. And
albeit that writers oftentimes confound both, taking sometimes the one for the
other, as the greeks oftentimes vse the word , and the Latines the word Ciuitas for a towne, a citie, or the right of citisens,
for that the generall which is the citie, comprehendeth in it the particular,
which is the town: yet so it is, that they abused not the word , as we see that Cicero hath well kept the proprietie both of the one and
of the other: for the word* Cice ad Aticum. lib. 4. signifieth properly a
towne, wherof came the word astuti, which with the
Greeks signifieth as much as doth with the Latines Vrbani, for that the inhabitants of townes are commonly in their behauiour more civill and
gratious, than are the pesants or rude countrey men: for the word Ciuilis, which we call civill, was not of the auntient
Latines receiued for Vrbanas, that is to say courteous,
or after the manner of the citie. And least any man should thinke them to be
rashly confounded, and to be but a question of words, and not of matter: it may
be that a towne may be well built and walled, and that more is well stored also
with people, and furnished with plentie of all things nececessarie to live
withal, & yet for all that be no citie, if it have not laws and magistrats
for to establish therin a right government (as we have said in the first
chapter) but is more truely to be called an Anarchie than a citie. And so
contrariwise it may be, that a towne may be in all points accomplished and haue
the right of a citie, and of an vniuersitie,
and well ruled also with lawes and magistrats; and yet neuerthelesse shall it
not bee a Commonwealth: as we see the townes and cities subiect unto the
seignorie of Venice, which are no Commonweals no more than the townes in the
prouinces subiect and tributarie unto the citie of Rome were of auntient time
no Commonweals, neither enioyed the right or priuiledge of Commonweals; but the
citie of Rome it selfe onely, which had great priueledges and prerogatives
against them all in generall, and against every one of them in particuler:
albeit that the lawes speaking, of the other townes, doe oftentimes vse this
word (Citie) but that also vnproperly, for Traian the
emperour writing to Plinie the yonger, Proconsul of
Asia, denieth the citie of the Bithynians to have the right of a Commonweale,
in being preferred before other priuat
creditos in the right of a pledge, and that truely. For why? that was proper
unto the citie of Rome, and to them to whome they had especially giuen this
prerogative, as was onely the citie of Antioch in all the Roman Empire. So wee
see that a towneThat the citisens, and not the wals or
buildings of a citie, make a citie. may be without a citie, and a
citie without a towne, and neither the one nor the other of necessitie a
Commonweale: and that more is, one and the same citie may still bee kept in the
whole and entire state of a citie, the wals thereof being laid flat with the
ground, or it quite abandoned by the citisens; as did the Athenians at the
comming of the Persian king, unto whome they left their towne, putting all
themselves upon the sea, after they had put their wiues and children in safetie
amongst the Trezenians; following therein the counsell of the Oracle, which had
aunswered them, That their citie could not be
saued but by woodden wals: which Themistocles
interpreted, That the citie (which consisteth in the lawfull bodie of citisens)
could not be saued but by ships. In like manner it happened also unto the
inhabitants of Megalopolis, who understanding of the comming of Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, all voyded their towne,
which for all that was no lesse a towne than before; yet was it then neither
citie nor Commonweale: in sort that a man might say, That the citie was gone
out of the towne. So spake Pompey the Great, after he
had drawne out of Rome two hundred Senators, and the better part of the
citisens, and so leauing the towne unto Caesar, said
thus, Non est in parietibus respublica, The Commonweale
is not in the wals. But forasmuch as it had in it two sorts of partakers, and
that the citisens divided into two parts had
put themselves under the protection of two diuers heads, they now seeme of one
Commonweale to have made two. Wherfore by these words Citie, Towne,
Commonweale, Colledge, Court, Parish, Familie, are signified the right of these
things. And as oftentimes it hath bene iudged that the church being without the
wals of the citie, and the parishioners within the citie, that they should
enioy the right of citisens, as if the parish were within the compasse of the
wals: so also is it to bee iudged of a citie. Neither let it seeme unto any man
straunge, that I stand something the longer uppon this matter; if he but
remember what importance the lacke of knowledge of these
things was long ago unto the Carthaginensians. For at such time as question was
made in the Senat of Rome, for the rasing
of Carthage: the report thereof being bruited abroad, the Carthaginensians sent
their ambassadors to Rome, to yeeld themselves unto the mercie of the Romans,
and to request the Senat not vnworthily to rase that their citie one of the
fairest of the world, famous for the noble acts therof, an ornament of Rome it
selfe, and a monument of their most glorious victories. Neuerthelesse the
matter being long and throughly debated in the Senat, it was at last resolued
upon, That for the safetie of the Roman empire Carthage should bee destroied,
as well for the oportunitie of the place, as for the naturall persidiousnesse
of the Carthaginensians themselves, who had now alreadie made warre upon the
allies of the Romans, rigged up a number of ships contrarie to the agreement of
peace, and secretly stirred up their neighbour
people unto rebellion. The matter thus resolued upon, the Carthaginensian
ambassadors were sent for into the Senat, unto whome aunswere was giuen by the
Consull, That they should continue in their faith and fidelitie unto the Senat
and the people of Rome, and in pawne thereof to deliver unto the people of Rome
three hundred hostages and their ships: in which doing they should have their
citie safe, with all their rights, priueledges and liberties, that euer before
they had enioyed. With this answere the ambassadors returned merily home. But
by and by after commissionThe Carthaginensian ambassadors
deceiued for not well understanding what a citie in uth is. was giuen unto Scipio Africanus the
yonger, To go in all hast with a fleet to Carthage, and with fire and sword to
destroy the towne, sauing the citisens and all other things else that they
could carrie out of the towne. Scipio ariuing in Africke
with his armie, sent Censorinus his lieutenant to Carthage, who after he had receiued the
promised hostages together with the Carthaginensian ships, commaunded all the
people of Carthage to depart out of the towne, yet with free leaue to carrie
out with them what they would, and to build them a citie further off from the
sea, or elswhere to their best liking. With this strait commaund of the
lieutenant the Carthaginensians astonished, appealed unto the faith of the
Senat, & of the people of Rome, saying, That they had promised them that
their citie should not be rased: to whome it was aunswered, That the faith
giuen unto them by the Senat should in all points be kept; but yet that the
citie was not tied unto the place, neither unto the wals of Carthage. So the
poore inhabitants were constrained to depart and abandon the towne unto the
fire, which was set upon it by the Romans, who
had not had it so good cheape, had the ambassadors before vnderstood the
difference betweene a towne and a citie. As oftentimes it chanceth that many
embassadors ignorant of the law of armes, and of that which right is, do euen
in matters of state commit many grosse faults. Although that Modestinus writeth, That Carthage was no more a citie after it was
rased, and that the vse and profit left unto the citie, was in this case
extinct aboue an hundred yeares before: but hee was in the same errour wherein
the ambassadours of the Carthaginensians were, unto whome all their rights,
prerogatives, and priueledges were reserued. The like errour was committed in
the agreement made betwixt the Cantons of Berne and Friburg, in the yeare 1505,
wherein it was agreed, That the amitie and alliance betwixt those two
Commonweals should be for euer, and so long
to endure as the wals of both the cities should stand. Neither are we to stay
upon the abuse which is ordinarily committed, or upon the acts of greatest
importance of them, which call one and the same thing a towne, a citie, and an
vniuersitie: as some say of Paris, and certaine other places, calling that the
citie which is contained in the Isle, and the vniuersitie the place wherein the
colledges stand, and all the rest the towne, when as the towne it selfe is
contained within the compasse of the wals and suburbs: howbeit that wee herein
follow not the proprietie of the law, calling it the towne and suburbs, for the
diuers priuiledges graunted unto them by diuers kings;
and the vniuersitie the bodie of all the burgesses of Paris together: but the citie the coniunction or ioyning together
of the towne it selfe and the liberties, as also of the men vsing the same
lawes and customes, that is to say the coniunction of the prouostship and of
the countie of Paris together: which abuse is growne, for that of auntient time
all the towne was not but the isle inuironed with wals, and the riuer about the
wals, so as we read in the Epistle of Iulian, gouernour
of the West empire, who made his ordinarie residence in Paris; the rest of the
citie that now is being then in gardens and arable land.
But the fault is much more, to say, That he is not a citisen, which is not
partaker of the offices of government, of giuing of voices in the consultations
of the people, whetherAristotle his definition of a Citisen
impugned. it be in matters of iudgement, or affaires of the state.
This is the definition of a citisen, which Aristotle hath left unto vs by writing, which he
afterward correcting himself,* Lib. 3. cap. 1. & cap. 4.
Polit. * Topi. lib. 6. * Pol. li. 3. ca. 1 sayeth it not to haue
place put in the popular state only. Now he in another place himselfe
confesseth that definition not to be good which is not generall. Small
apparance also is there in that he saith in another place, The noble to be more
a citisen than the base, and the inhabitant of the towne rather than the plaine
country peasant; and that as for the yong citisens, they as yet but grow as
nouices, whilest the elder citisens decay; and that they of the middle age are
the entire citisens, and the other but in part. Now the nature of a definition
neuer receiueth diuision; neitheir containeth in it any thing more or lesse
than is in the thing defined. And yet neuerthelesse that description of a
citisen that Aristotle hath giuen unto vs, is defectiue
and lame, not being aptly to be applied euen
unto the popular estate, seeing that in the Athenian estate it selfe which had
no peere for the libertie and authoritie of the people, the fourth ranke or
degree of citisens being more than three times as great as all the rest of the
people, had no part in the offices of government, or in iudgements. So that if
we will receiue the definition of Aristotle, we must
needs confesse, that the greater part of the naturall burgesses of Athens, were
in their owne Commonweales strangers, vntill the time of Pericles. And as for that which he saith, The noble to be alwaies more
citisens than the base and vnnoble, is vntrue, not onely in the popular estate
of the Athenians, but also in the popular Commonweals of the Swissers, and
namely in Strasbourg, where the nobles (in the qualitie of nobles) have no part
in the offices of state and government.
Wherefore it is better and more truly said of Plutarch,
That they are to bee calledWho indeed be citisens.
citisens that enioy the rights and priueledges of a citie. Which is to be
vnderstood according to the condition and qualitie of euerie one; the nobles as
nobles, the commonets as commoners; the women and children in like case,
according unto the age, sex, condition, and deserts of every one of them. For
should the members of mans bodie complaine of their estate? Should the foot say
to the eye, Why am not I set aloft in the highest place of the bodie? or is the
foot therefore not to be accounted amongst the members of the bodie? Now if Aristotles definition of a citisen should take place, how
many seditions, how many civill warres, what slaughters of citisens would arise
euen in the middest of cities? Truly the
people of Rome, for no other cause departed from the Senators, than for that
they enioyed not the same authoritie and priueledges that the nobilitie did;
neither could it otherwise be appeased than by the meane of the fable of the
members of mans bodie, whereby the graue and wise Senator Agrippae reconciled the people unto the Senators. For Romulus the founder of the citie of Rome, excluded the
people from the great offices of commaund, from the offices of priesthood, and
from the augureships; commaunding the same to be bestowed upon such onely as
were descended from them whome he himselfe had chosen into the Senat, or els from them whome he had afterwards ioyned vnto
them. And this new people hauing vanquished
their neighbours, enforced many of them to abandon their owne countrey and
customes, to become inhabitants and citisens of Rome, as they did the Sabines.
Afterwards hauing vanquished the Tusculans, the Volscians, and Herniques, they
agreed together that the vanquished should have part in their offices, and
voices also in the assemblies of their estates, without any other chaunge
either in their law or customes; who for that cause were not called citisens,
but municipes (as who should say, Men made partakers of their immunities) yet
indeed lesse esteemed and honoured than the Romans themselves, albeit that
their estate were vnited unto that of the Romans. As we see that Cateline descended of the auntient familie of the Sergians in Rome, and so a naturall Roman, by way of
disgrace obiected to M.Tullius Cicero, That he was but a new upstart of
Arpinas. And that was the cause that many municipiall townes chose rather to
vse the Roman lawes than their owne, to become true citisens of Rome, vntil the
time of Tiberius the emperor, who vtterly took away the
verie shadow of the popular libertie which Augustus the
emperour had yet left; hauing remoued the popular assemblies from the people
unto the Senat: at which time the municipiall townes of Italie refused the
priueledges of the citie of Rome, whereat the emperour Adrian maruelled (as saith Aul. Gellius) but
without cause, for that they seeing the popular honours and offices to be all
in one mans bestowing, they thought it now better to vse their owne lawes than
others.
Thus we see two sorts of citisens differing in priueledges, that is to wit, the
Roman The diuers sorts of citisens in Rome. citisen, and
the municipiall or countrey citisen. Now the third sort were the Latines, who
had at the beginning threescore townes, but were afterward augmented with
twelue Latine Colonies, who after long warres made peace with the Romans uppon
condition, That they should live after their own maners and customes, and yet
should be made citisens of Rome, whosoeuer of them should remoue his dwelling
into the citie, hauing yet left behind him some lawfull issue at home in the
countrey. Yet when many of them fraudulently abused this agreement, & gaue
their children unto the citisens of Rome in adoption, or under the colour of
seruitude, to the intent that by them forthwith againe set at libertie, they
might in a moment enioy the liberties and priueleges of the citie; order was
taken by the law Claudia, confirmed by a decree of the
Senat, and edict of the Consuls, That all
the Latines which had so by craft obtained the freedome of the citie, should be
constrained againe to returne into the Latine cities: which thing was done at
the request of the Latine cities themselves. And so is that to be vnderstood
that Boetius writeth, The Romans sent into the Latin
Colonies, to have lost the liberties of the citie: as also that which Titus Liuius saith, The Roman Colonies sent to Puteoli
and Salerne by the decree of the Senat, to have bene no more citisens: which is
not further to be vnderstood or extended, but to their right for giuing of
voices, by that meanes now taken from them. So were they of Reims, of Langres,
of Saintonges, of Bourges, of Meaux, and of Autun, free people of Fraunce,
allies of the Romans, and citisens also, but without voice (as saith Tacitus) before that it was permitted unto them to have states and honourable offices in Rome. And
those of Autun were the first that had the priueledge to bee Senators of Rome,
and therefore called themselves Brethren unto the Romans: howbeit that the
Auuergnats tooke unto them the same priueledge & title, as descended from
the Troians (as saith Lucan.) Now it is not to be
doubted, but that that the Roman Colonies were true and natural citisens of
Rome, drawne out of the Roman blood, vsing the same lawes, magistrats, and
customes; the true markes of a true citisen. But the further that these
Colonies were distant from the citie of Rome, the lesse they felt of the glorie
and brightnesse of the sunne, and of the honours and
offices which were divided among the citisens and inhabitants of Rome: insomuch that the inhabitants of the
Roman Colonies at Lyon, Vienne, and Narbone, thought themselves verie happie to
have gained but the priueledges of the Italians, who were of auntient time the
allies and confederats of the Romans, enioying the honourable freedome of
citisens, and yet without chaunging either of their owne lawes or customes, or
loosing any point of their liberties. And forasmuch as the Romans, holpen by
the strength & power of their friends and allies, had subdued diuers other
nations, and yet suffered not those their friends and companionsThe cause of the confederat warre in Italle against the
Romans. to be admitted to sue for the honours and honourable offices
in the citie; thereof rise the confederats warre in all Italie against the
Romans, which neuer tooke end vntill that after much harme on both sides both
done and receiued, the libertie of the citie
of Rome was by the law Iulia graunted unto Plu. in Syl all Italians, some few onely excepted. For the cities of Italie were
called some Colonies, some Allies, some of them of the Latines, and some of the
Italian iurisdiction, and all of them different. And that is it for which Titus Liuius saith, I am inde morem
Romanis Colendi socios, ex quibus alios in* Liui. lib. 26.ciuitatem, at que aequum ius accepissent: alios in ea fortuna
haberent, vt socij esse quam ciues mallent. viz. Now since that time
the manner of the Romans was to honour their fellowes, of whome some they tooke
into the citie, and into like freedome with themselves: othersome they had in
that estate, as that they had rather to have them their fellowes, than citisens
with them. And hereof proceeded that speech of Tiberius
the emperour, in the Oration which he had in the Senat, which is yet seene
engrauen in brasse in Lyon. Quidergo? Num Italicus Senator prouinciali potior est? What then? Is
an Italian Senator better than the prouinciall Senator? As if he would haue
said them both to have bene Senators alike. And yet the same emperour excluded
the Frenchmen which had obtained the freedome of the citie of Rome, from suing
for the honours or offices thereof. Whereby is better to be vnderstood that
which Plinie writeth, Spaine to have in it 470 townes;
that is to wit, 12 Colonies: 3 of citisens of Rome, 47 of them which had the
freedome of the Latines: 4 of Allies, 6 of them that were enfranchised, and 260
tributaries. And albeit that the Latines were so straitly allied unto the
Romans, as that they seemed to be verie citisens; yet neuerthelesse that they
were not so, it is to be well gathered by that saying of Cicero: Nihil acerbius Latinosferre solitos esse, quam id, quod perrarò accidit, a
Consulibus iuberi ex vrbe exire. viz. The Latines used to take nothing
more heauily, than that which but verie seldome times happened, To be
commaunded by the Consuls to void the citie: for as for other straungers we
read, them to have oftentimes bene driuen out of the citie. In briefe, such was
the varietie of priueledges and prerogatives amongst them which were contained
within the Roman empire, besides their confederat and free people, as that
almost no one thing was so proper unto the Roman citisens in generall, as that
the magistrats and gouernours might not proceed in iudgement against them in
matters concerningNo one priueledge more common unto the
Roman citisens in generall, than that the magistrat might not proceed
against them in cases concerning life or libertie, ithout the peoples leaue. their life and libertie, without the
peoples leaue. Which prerogative was by the tribunitiall law Iunia graunted to all the citisens of Rome, after that the people had
expulsed their kings, and was called, The
holy Law, being oftentimes after reuiued and confirmed by the Valerian Consull laws, at diuers times made by the Consuls Publius, Marcus, and Lucius, of
the honourable familie of the Valerians: and last of all
by the Tribunitiall law Sempronia, and Portia, where to meet with the proceedings of the magistrats and
gouernours, who encroached upon the iurisdiction of the people, and proceeded
oftentimes against the people, without yeelding thereunto, there was the
penaltie of treason annexed unto the law; for that those lawes were oftentimes
broken by the magistrats. And at such time as Cicero was
about to have commaunded the Roman citisens priuie to
the conspiracie of Cateline to be strangled in prison:
Caesar desiring to dissuade the matter in the Senat,
said, Our auncestors imitating the maner of the Grecians, did punish and
correct their citisens with stripes; and of men condemned tooke the extreamest
punishment: but after that the Commonwealth was growne strong, the law Portia and other lawes were prouided, whereby for men
condemned banishment was appointed. Which law Cicero
hauing transgressed, was therefore not onely driuen into exile, but also
proscribed, his goods confiscated, his house (esteemed to be worth fiftie
thousand crownes) burnt, and a temple built in the plot thereof, which the
people at the motion of Clodius their Tribune,
commaunded to be consecrated to Libertie: wherewith the magistrats terrified,
durst not but from that time forward with lesse seueritie proceed against the
Roman citisens, yea euen after that the
popular state was chaunged. And that is it for which Plinie the younger, Proconsull of Asia, writing to Traian the emperour, concerning the assemblies made by the Christians
in the night, to the disquiet of his iurisdiction: I have (saith he) many in
prison, amongst whome there are certaine citisens of Rome, whom I have put
apart for to send them unto Rome. And S. Paul at such
time as he was drawne into question, as a seditious person, and a troubler of
the common quiet; so soone as he perceiued that Felix
the gouernor would proceed to the triall of his cause, he required to bee sent
unto the emperour; saying, That he was a citisen of Rome, for that his father
being of the tribe of Beniamin, and borne at Tharsis in
Caramania, had obtained the right of a Roman citisen: Which so soone as the
gouernour vnderstood, hee surceased to proceed
any further in the matter; and sent him to Rome, saying, This man might haue
bene set at libertie, if he had not appealed unto Caesar. Whereas otherwise if hee had not bene a citisen of Rome, the
gouernour would have proceeded in the matter, seeing the countrey of Palestine
was before brought into the forme of a prouince. As in like case Pontius Pilat, gouernour of the same countrey, was
constrained to condemne Christ Iesus as a tributarie subiect of his prouince,
whome for all that hee seemed to have bene willing to have delivered out of the
hands of his enemies, and from all punishment, if he could well in so doing
have auoided high treason, which the people threatned him with: Which the
gouernour fearing, least he should seeme to have any thing therein offended,
sent the whole processe of the matter unto Tiberius the
emperour (as saith Tertullian.) For if the municipiall magistrats of the Iewes had had
soueraigne power and iurisdiction, they would not have sent him back againe
unto the gouernour, crying That he had deserued the death, but that they had
not the power to proceed thereunto against him. For the municipiall magistrats
of prouinces had not any iurisdiction, more than to commit the offendors into
safe keeping, for feare of the present daunger, and to receiue cautions, or to
giue possession, and sometimes to appoint tutors unto poore orphans: but in
criminall causes, had no power or authoritie, neither over the citisen of Rome,
neither over the straunger or prouinciall subiect, or over others that were
enfranchised; but onely over their flaues, whome they might at the vttermost
but with stripes correct. For as for the iurisdiction giuen to them that
had the defence of townes, they were
established by Valentinian three hundred and fiftie
yeares after. Whereby it is to be gathered, all power and authoritie for the
execution of iustice to have bene giuen to the Roman gouernours, and their
lieutenants in their prouinces, and taken from the rest. For they but deceiue
vs, which thinke the Iewes priests, for the qualitie of their priesthood to
have made conscience to condemne to death our Sauiour Christ Iesus, as if by
their religion they had bene hindred so to do; and hereupon have concluded,
That churchmen ought not to giue iudgement that carried with it the execution
of blood: which proceeded of the ignorance of
fantiquitie: For it is euident that before the land of Palestine was brought
into the forme of a prouince, it had but the
Senat of the Iewes, consisting of 71 persons, composed in part of priests and
Leuites, who had the power of condemning offendors to death, as the Chaldean
interpretor plainly sheweth, and the Hebrew Pandects more plainely than he.
Wherefore this was the greatest and chiefest priueledge proper to the citisens
ofThe greatest & chiefest priuelege proper unto the
citisens of Rome. Rome, That they could not by the magistrats be
punished either with death or exile, but that they might still from them
appeale; which libertie all the citisens of Rome enioyed. The other Roman
subiects which had not this priueledge, were not called citisens: yet thereof
it followeth not, that to speake properly they were not indeed citisens, and
according to the true signification of a citisen: for they must needes be
citisens, or straungers, allies, or enemies,
seeing that they were not slaues; for so much as they were contained within the
bounds of the Roman empire. But we cannot say that they were allies, for that
onely free people which defended the maiestie of their estate, were called the
fellowes or allies of the Romans: neither could it bee said that they were
enemies or straungers, seeing that they were obedient subiects, and that more
is, paid tribute unto the Roman empire: wee must then conclude that they were
citisens; for it were a verie absurd thing to say, That the naturall subiect in
his owne countrey, and under the obeysance of his soueraigne prince, were a
straunger. And that is it for which we have said, That the citisen is a franke
subiect, holding of the soueraigntie of another man. But the prerogatives and
priueledges that some have more than others,
maketh vs to call some of them citisens, and others tributaries. Yet we read
that the emperour Augustus was so iealous of these
priueledges, that hee would neuer giue the right of a Roman citisen unto French
men, for any request that his wife Liuia could make vnto
him; yet for all that, not refusing to ease them from paying of tributes:
neither liked he well of it, that his vncle Caesar had
together & at once giuen the freedome of the citie, unto that legion which
he had raised of Frenchmen, and in generall to all the inhabitants of Nouocome:
and blamed also M. Antonius, for that he had for money
sold the freedome of the citie unto the Sicilians. Neuerthelesse the succeeding
princes kept not with so great deuotion the rights and priueledges of the Roman
citisens. Antonius Pius by a generall edict gaue the
freedome of the citie of Rome unto all the
citisens of the Roman empire (slaues alwaies excepted) that so the citie of
Rome might be the commmon countrey of all nations. Wherein hee seemed in a sort
to imitat the example of Plut. in Alexandro.Alexander the Great, who called the whole world but one
citie, and his campe the chiefe fortresse thereof. But Antoninus contented himselfe with the Roman world. And albeit that the
citie, or rather the grant of the immunities of the citie seemed so to be
communicated unto all, yet were the priueledges of citisens diuers, some
alwaies enioying more than others; as is to bee seene not onely in the
Commentaries and answeres of the great lawyers, which flourished after AntoninusThe greatnes of the priueleges and immunities which a man
enioyeth, maketh him neuer a whit the more therefore a citisen.Pius, but also in the edicts of other princes. For Seuerus more than fiftie yeres after Antoninus was the first that gaue the priueledge to them of
Alexandria, that they might be made Senators
of Rome: but the other Aegyptians could not be made citisens of Rome, except
they had before obtained the freedome of the citie of Alexandria. Which well
sheweth, that the greatnesse of the priueledges make not the subiect therefore
the more or lesse a citisen. For there is no Commonwealth where the citisen
hath so great freedome, but that he is also subiect unto some charge: as also
the nobilitie, although with vs exempted from taxes and tallages, are yet bound
to take up armes for the defence of the Commonweale and others: and that upon
paine of their goods, their blood, and life. For otherwise if the largenesse of
prerogatives and priuileges should make a citisen, then
verely straungers and allies were to bee called citisens, seeing that oftentimes greater and larger priueledges are
giuen unto strangers or allies, than to citisens themselves: For why? the
freedome of the citie is oftentimes for an honour giuen unto straungers, who
yet for all that are bound unto no commaund or necessarie duties. As the
Swissars gaue the freedome of their citie first to Lewes
the eleuenth,Honourable citisens. and so afterwards
unto the rest of the French kings. So Artaxerxes king of
Persia, gaue the freedome of the citie unto Pelopidas
(and all his posteritie) entreating of alliance with him. So the Athenians made
free of their citie Euagor as king of Cyprus, Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie, and Antigonus and Demetrius kings of Asia. Yea that
more is, the Athenians gaue unto all them of the Rhodes the freedome of their
citie: and the Rhodians with like courtesie upon the agreement of the league,
made all the Athenians citisens of their
citie, as we read in Liuie: which league was called, The
treatise of Comburgeosie. What manner of league that was
made betwixt the Valesians, and the five little Cantons in the yeare 1528; and
betwixt the Cantons of Berne and them of Friburg, in the yeare 1505; and againe
betwixt them of Geneua & them of Berne in the yeare 1558: the force of
which leagues was such, as that there should be a mutuall communication betwixt
them both of their citie and amitie: and in case that any of the confederats
forsaking his owne citie, had rather to goe unto the citie of his fellowes and
confederats, he should presently become a citisen and subiect of the other
citie, without any new choyce or speciall letters of his naturalisation or
enfranchising. But the freedome of any citie giuen for honour sake unto any,
bindeth no man unto the commaund thereof; but
him which forsaketh the dwelling place of his natiuitie or citie, that so he
may come into the power of another prince: For neither were those kings whom we
have spoken of; neither Hercules, or Alexander the Great, when they were made honourable citisens of the
Corinthians, subiect or bound unto their commaunds; in such sort as that the
right of a free citisen was unto them but as a title of honour. Wherefore
seeing it impossible for one and the same person to bee a citisen, a stranger,
and an allie; it may well be said that the priueleges make not a citisen, but
the mutuall obligation of the soueraigne to the subiect, to whome for the faith
and obeisance he receiueth, he oweth iustice, counsell, aid, and protection,
which is not due unto strangers.
But some may say, How can it then bee, that the allies of the Romans, and other
people gouerning their estate, were citisens of Rome (as those of Marseilles
and of Austun?) Or what is that which M. Tullius crieth
out: O the notable lawes, and of our auncestors by diuine inspiration made and
set downe, euen from the beginning of the Roman name, That none of vs can be
the citisen of more than one citie: (for dissimilitude of cities must also
needs have diuersities of lawes) nor that any citisen can against his will be
thrust out, or against his will be detained in the citie. For these are the
surest foundations of our libertie, every man to bee master both of keeping and
of leauing of his right and libertie in the citie. And yet he the same man,
before had said it to be a thing granted unto all other people, that euerie man
might be a citisen of many cities: with which
errour (saith he) I my selfe have seene many of our citisens, ignorant men,
led; to have at Athens bene in the number of the judges, and of the Areopagi,
in certaine tribe, and certaine number, when as they were yet ignorant whether
they had obtained the libertie of that citie; and to have lost this, except
they had by the law made for the recouerie of things lost, againe recouered the
same. Thus much hee.
But first to that which he writeth concerning the Athenians; that law of Solons was long before abolished, which admitted not a
straunger to the freedome of a citisen of Athens, except
he were banished out of his owne countrey: at which law Plutarch wondreth aboue measure; not foreseeing that to
have bene done of Solon, to the end (as it is like) That
no man should enioy the immunitie and priueleges of a citisen of Athens, and
that popular prerogative which the people had, except he were bound unto the
commaund and lawes of the Athenians. But he which is against his will detained
under the commaund of a straunge citie, hath without doubt lost the right of
his owne citie: which can in no wise be applied unto those kings whome wee haue
before spoken of, or yet to the Rhodians which had ordained the freedome of the
Athenians. Wherefore this is it, as I suppose, that M.
Tullius meant (for why, hee well agreeth not with himselfe) That he
which was indeed a true citisen of Rome, that is to say, which was bound vnto
the Senat and the lawes of the people of Rome, could not be bound unto the commaund of another citie. As Pomponius Atticus borne in the citie of Rome, being a
Roman citisen, and of the honourable order of the knights, who for his loue
towards the Athenians, was thereof called Atticus (and
unto whome three of the Roman emperours referred the beginning of their
discent) refused the freedome of the citie of Athens offered him by the
Athenians; least (as saith Cornelius Nepos) he should
have lost the freedome of the citie of Rome: which is true in regard of the
true subiects and citisens; but not in the citisens of honour, which are not
indeed subiects: neither in respect of them which are citisens of diuers
cities, under the power of one and the same prince, a thing lawfull unto all
euen by the Roman law. For although one may be the slaue or vassall of many
maisters or lords, yet can no man be the subiect of diuers soueraigne princes, but by the mutuall consent of the
princes; because that these are under no mans commaund, as are they unto whome
seruice is by turne done by slaues, who may by the magistrats be enforced to
sell their slaue, except the seruile labours, which cannot at once be done to
them all, be by turnes done by the slaue. And this is the point for which we
oftentimes see warres betwixt neighbour princes, for the subiects of their
frontiers, who not well knowing whome to obey, submit themselves sometimes to
the one and sometimes to the other: and oftentimes exempting themselves from
the obeisance of both two, are ordinarily inuaded and preyed upon by both the
one and the other. As the countrey of Walachie hauing exempted it self from the
obeisance of the Polonians, hath become subiect unto the Turks; and afterwards
submitting it selfe unto the kings of Polonia,
paied tribute neuerthelesse unto the Turke, as I have learned by the letters of
Stanislaus Rasdrazetoski sent to the cnstable of France, bearing date the 17 of August 1553.
Neuerthelesse there are many people upon the frontiers, which have set
themselves at libertie, during the quarrels of princes, as it is come to passe
in the low countrey of Leige, of Lorraine, & of Burgundie: where there are
more than twelue subiects of the French king, or of the empire, or of Spaine,
who have taken upon them the soueraigntie. Amongst whome Charles the fist reckoned the duke of Bouillon, whome he called his
vassall: and for that he was his prisoner in the yeare 1556, at the treatie
made for the deliverance of prisoners, hee demaunded an hundred thousand pound
for ransome; for that he called himselfe a soueraigne prince. But there are well also others beside the duke of Bouillon:
& to go no further than the marchesse of Burgundie (which is called, The
forbidden countrey) six princes have soueraigne power over their subiects,
which the mutual wars betwixt the French and the Burgundians have by long
prescription of time brought forth. And in the borders of Lorraine, the
counties of Lume & of Aspremont have taken upon them the right and
authoritie of soueraigntie. Which hath also happened upon the borders of
England and Scotland, where some particular men have made themselves great
commaunders within this twenty or thirty yeres, against the antient agreements.
For, for to meet with such enterprises, the English and
the Scots had of auntient time agreed, That the Batable ground, (that is to say a certaine part of the countrey so called,
upon the frontiers of both realmes, being five miles long, and two miles broad)
should neither be tilled, built, or dwelt upon; howbeit that it was lawfull for
both people there to feed their cattell: with charge that if after the sunne
setting, or before the sunne rising, any of their beasts were there found, they
should be his that so found them: which was one of the articles agreed upon by
the states of Scotland, in the yere 1550, and sent to Henrie the second the French king, as was by him prouided. But where
the soueraigne lords are good friends, as the Swissers of the countrey of
Lugan, and the other territories which belong in common to all the lords of the
league, whither they send their officers euerie Canton by turne: there the
subiects are not reputed to bee the subiects of diuers soueraignes, but of one onely, which commaundeth in his order; in
such sort as that one of them seeke not to encroach upon the others. Whereof
rise a sedition betweene the seuen Cantons Catholick, and the foure
Protestants, in the yeare 1554, the Catholicks desiting to chastice the
inhabitants of Lugan and Louerts, who had seperated them from the church
Catholike: and the Protestants hindring them so to do, and were now upon the
point to have taken up armes the one against the other, if the Cantons of
Glaris, and Appenzell, who allow of both religions, had not together with the
ambassadour of the French king, interposed themselves, and so pacified the
matter. Now therefore the full and entire citisen or subiect of a soueraigne
prince, can bee no more but a citisen of honour of another seignorie. For so
when as we read that king Edward the first gaue the freedome of citisens unto all
the inhabitants of base Britaine; that is to be vnderstood for them to enioy
the liberties, exemptions and freedoms, that they of the countrey enioyed. So
say we also of the Bernois, and the inhabitants of Geneua, who call themselves
by their treaties of alliance, Equall, and by their letters Combourgeses. For
as for that which Cicero saith, That the citisens of
Rome mightA citisen of Rome might at his pleasure giue up
his freedome. at their pleasure leaue their freedome of citisens, to
become citisens of another citie: nothing was unto them therein more lawfull,
than that was in like case unto all other people lawfull also: and that
especiallie in a popular estate, where euerie citisen is in a manner partaker
of the maiestie of the state, and doe not easily admit strangers unto the
freedome of citisens. As in Athens, where to make a straunger free of their
citie, there must of necessitie 6000
citisens, by their voices in secret giuen consent therunto. But in such places
and countries as wherein tyrants rule, or which for the barrennesseNot citisens only but euen strangers also in some places
prohibited to depart. of the soile, or intemperature of the ayre are
forsaken by the inhabitants; not onely the citisens, but euen the strangers
also are oftentimes by the princes of such places prohibited to depart, as in
Moscouia, Tartaria, and Aethiopia; and that so much the more, if they perceiue
the stranger to be ingenious and of a good spirit, whome they detaine by good
deserts, or els by force, if he would depart: in stead whereof hee must buy it
deare, or right well deserue of the Commonweale, that shall get his freedome of
a citisen amongst the Venetians or Ragusians, or such other free states. And
although that by the Roman law euerie man might giue up his freedome; and that
in Spaine it is free for every man to remoue
elswhere, and to be enrolled into another citie, so that it be done by
protestation to the prince: yet hath it and shall bee alwayes lawfull to all
princes and cities, by the right of their maiestie and power to keepe their
citisens at home. And therefore princes in making of their leagues, protest
that they will not receiue any the subiects or vassals of their confederats
into their protection, freedome, or priueleges, without their expresse consent.
Which is conformable unto the auntient clause of the Gaditane confederation
reported by Cice. in orat▪ pro Corn Bal.Cicero: Ne quis faederatorum a populo Romano ciuis
reciperetur, nisi is populus fundus factus esset; id est auctor. viz.
That none of the confederats▪ should of the people of
Rome be receiued for a citisen, except that
people so confederat had bene the ground, (that is to say, the author thereof.)
For therein lieth the state of that cause: for that Cornelius
Balbus was a citisen of a confederat citie, & therfore could not
contrarie to the league, by Pompeius be made a citisen
of Rome without the consent of the confederats. The same Cicero writeth also in the leagues of the French with the Romans to
have bene excepted, That none of them should of the Romans be receiued for a
citisen. The same laws we yet at this present vse. For althogh that the
Swissers are with vs ioined in a most strait bond of amity & frendship: yet
neuerthelesse is the same clause conceiued in that league, which was with them
made in the yeare 1520. And againe at such time as the five lesser Cantons of
the Swissers made a league of alliance and amitie amongst themselves, it was
excepted that no citisens of the confederats
should be receiued; or if they should desire the freedome of another citie,
they should not otherwise obtaine it, except they would dwellThe subiect may not depart out of his countrey without the leaue of his
prince. in the countrey, their land and goods remaining as before.
And besides these leagues, there is no prince which hath not taken the like
order. So that oftentimes the subiect dare not so much as to depart out of the
countrey without leaue, as in England, Scotland, Denmarke, and Sweden, the
noble men dare not to goe out of their countrey without leaue of the prince,
except they would therefore loose their goods: which is also obserued in the
realme of Naples, by the custome of the countrey. As also it was forbidden by
the emperour Augustus to all Senators to goe out of
Italie without his leaue, which was alwaies right straitly looked vnto. And by
the ordinances of Spaine it is forbidden the
Spaniards to passe over into the West Indies, without the leaue of the king of
Spaine: which was also of auntient time forbidden in Carthage, when Hanno their great captaine had first discouered the
islands of the Hesperides. And by theThe Canaries.
decrees of Milan, it is not lawfull for any subiect to receiue the freedome of
any other citie; or to enter into alliance or league with any other princes or
Commonweales, without the expresse leaue of the Senat of Milan. And that more
is, we see oftentimes that it is not permitted unto the subiect, so much as to
change his dwelling place, albeit that he depart not out of the seignorie and
obeysance of his soueraigne prince: as in the dutchie of Milan, the subiect
comming to dwell in the citie of Milan, or within a certaine circuit of Milan,
must first have leaue so to doe; and also pay unto his prince three duckets. We also find that it was in auntient time
forbidden the Bithynians (subiects unto the Romans) to receiue any other
subiects into their towne, or to giue unto them the freedome of a citisen, as
they oft times did, to decline the iurisdiction of others, or to ease them of
paying of customes and tributes due: in which case the law commaundeth, That he
which hath so chaunged his dwelling should beare the charges of both places;
which was also decreed by the kings, Philip the faire,
Iohn, Charles the fift, and Charles the seuenth. Howbeit that the decree of Philip the long would, That the Prouost or bailiefe of the place,
assisted with three burgesses, should receiue into the freedome of their citie,
whosoeuer of the kings subiects as would, prouided, That within a yeare and a
day he should in the same citie into which hee remoued, buy an house of the price of 60 soulz Paris at the least;
and to signifie the same by a sergeant, unto the lord unto whome the
iurisdiction of the place wherein he dwelled belonged; and after that, that he
should dwell in the same citie whereinto he was receiued for a citisen, from
the first of Nouember, unto the 24 of Iune; and yet paying the like tax or
tribute that he did before he remoued, so long as hee dwelleth in that new
freedome; and without declining the iurisdiction for any suit commenced against
him three months before.
And albeit that it be lawfull for euerie subiect to chaunge the place of his
dwelling, yet is it lawfull for no man to forsake his
natiue countrie; and much lesse for them Not lawfull for any man to forsake his natiue
countrey. which are enrolled and tied to the soyle, whome we call
Mort-maines, who of auntient time might not chaunge their dwelling place
without speciall leaue. And so generally a man may say in tearmes of right,
That the freedome of a citisen is not lost, neither the power of a prince ouer
his subiect, for chaunging of the place or countrey; no more than the vassall
can exempt himselfe from the faith and obedience hee oweth unto his lord; or
the lord without iust cause refuse to protect and defend his vassall, without
the consent of one to the other, the bond betwixt them being mutuall &
reciprocall. But if the one or the other have giuen their expresse or secret
consent; or that the subiect forsaking his prince, hath yeelded himselfe vnto
the protection of another prince, by the sufferance of the first, without
contradiction, he is no more bound unto the
obeisance that he oweth him: neither can otherwise than as a stranger
afterwards returne into the former citie. For princes oftentimes by large gifts
or priueleges drawWhy princes oftentimes by large gifts and
priueleges draw into their countries ingenious strangers. into their
countries ingenious straungers; whether it be so to weaken their neighbour
princes, or for the better instruction of their owne people, or so to encrease
their wealth and power, or els for their immortall fame and glorie which they
hope to get in making the towns and cities by them built, more renowned with
the multitude of citisens and plentie of all things. So Theseus by proposing the libertie of the citie to all strangers, made
the citie of Athens most famous of all the cities of Greece. So Alexander the Great by granting of great priueleges,
least the city by him built at the mouth of the riuer Nilus (which he after his
owne name called Alexandria) the greatest, and best traded of all the cities of Aegypt. So king Lewes the eleuenth gaue the priueleges of the citie of Burdeaux to all
straungers whether they were friends or enemies (except the English) so that
they dwelt within the towne. So Frauncis the Great,
founder of the citie by him built at the mouth of the riuer Sequana, which they
call The Port of Grace, proponing immunitie from all tributes, to all them that
should dwell therein, in short time made it a most populos citie. Neither
should the citie of London abound with so great wealth, nor such a multitude of
citisens, had not Richard king of England proposed vnto
straungers all the immunities graunted unto the citisens: so that they had
dwelt ten yeares in the citie: which space of time for the obtaining of the
libertie of the citie, most part of the Swissers and Germans, indifferently
propounded to al strangers: a thing well
agreeing with the Roman lawes. True it is that more or lesse time is required
in one place then in another, according to the commodiousnesse of the place, or
the greatnesse of the priueleges. As in Venice to obtaine the grant and
priueledges of a simple citisen (without hauing any other interest in the
state, except in certain meane offices) a man must have dwelt foureteene yeares
within the citie. They of Ferrara were content with ten yeares, so that the
inhabitants had all the meane while borne the same burthen with the citisens.
And yet it sufficeth not to have dwelt in another mans countrey the time
prefined in the customes, to obtaine the freedome of a citisen; if theTo have dwelt long in another princes countrey maketh him neuer
a whit the more the strange princes subiect. straunger do not demaund
the citisens right and freedome, and be thereinto also receiued: for it may bee
that the straunger would not for any thing chaunge his prince, howbeit that his affaires hold him out of his owne countrey.
For howbeit that many be of opinion, that a man hauing staid the prefixed time
in another mans countrey, without hauing obtained letters of naturalising, is
yet capable of testamentary legacies: they in that agree in favour of
testaments, and especially of charitable legacies giuen unto poore straungers,
who are alwaies as much to be favoured as the widdowes and orphans. But to
obtaine the full right and priueledge of a citisen, it sufficeth not to haue
dwelt the time appointed by the decrees and ordinances of the place, if a man
have not both demaunded and obtained the same. For as a gift is to no purpose,
except that both he which giueth, and he to whome it is
giuen agree, the one in giuing and the other
in receiuing: so neither is he made a citisen that would not; neither if he
would could he so be, either of the princes interposing themselves. For which
cause those Consuls, of whome the one was by an heald
at armes yeelded unto the Numantines; and the other to the Samnites, for that
they had without the commaundement of the people made peace with the enemies▪
left not therefore to bee citisens of Rome: because they were not receiued by
the enemies. Which question for all that could not yet be fully decided, for
the different opinions of Brutus & Scaeuöla betwixt themselves. For when the Consull yeelded to the
Samnites, returning to Rome was come into the Senat, the Tribune of the people
compelled him to go out of the Senat: howbeit in fine the Senat by decree
declared, That hee had not lost the right of a citisen of Rome, being refused by the enemie: howbeit that in truth he
was not onely depriued of the right of a citisen, but also made a slaue of the
enemies, by the decree of the people, for hauing without their leaue
capitulated and treated of peace with the enemies: and ought to have bene
againe restored by the people. Neuerthelesse the milder opinion of the Senat
interpreted that the depriuing of him of his freedome was conditionall, as in
case that he were of the enemie receiued. But if so be that a straunger doth
enen against his will retaine the rights of his owne citie, when as hee yeelded
himselfe unto the power of another prince, by whom he is refused: much more
doth he retaine the same when he requireth not the right of a straunge citie:
and then when it hath bene offered him, hath refused the same: and much lesse
if he have not bene presented unto the strange
prince, neither hath of him required letters of his naturalising, but onely to
stay in his countrey as a straunger the time prefixed by the decrees. Whereby
is decided the difficultie and doubt which the Senat of Naples made, and therin
resolued nothing; that is to wit, If he that had dwelt all his life in a
strange countrey should enioy the right and freedome of a citisen in his owne
countrey. And many there be, that thinke he ought not to enioy the same;
saying, That regard is to be had to the place of his long dwelling: but I am of
opinion (if mine opinion may take place) That hee ought neuerthelesse to enioy
the priueledge of a free citisen, if he have not by consent of his prince
expresly renounced it, or els done some fact contrarie to the dutie of a
naturall subiect. Neither am I alone of this opinion. For the the court of
parliament of Paris, by decree made the xiiij
of Iune, in the yeare 1554 adiudged that a French man hauing dwelt fiftie
yeares in Venice, continued yet still subiect to the French king, and was
receiued unto the succession of his next kinsmen: hee hauing in the meane time
done no harme against his countrey, neither committed any crime for which he
ought to loose his libertie, neither hauing refused to come being called home
by his prince; nor yet requested the freedome of the citie of Venice to haue
bene giuen him. For as for secret consent it ought to hurt no man, being
esteemed as no consent in things preiudiciall, except it be by word or deed
plainly expressed: especially when wee may otherwise interpret the mind of him
that hath not declared the same. Whereby it is to be vnderstood what is to be
iudged of the question propounded: which the court of Burdeaux all the judges being assembled together could not
determine. As whether a Spaniard borne and brought up in Spaine, and yet the
sonne of a French man (which French man had alwaies dwelt in Spaine, &
expresly renounced the place of his birth) being come into Fraunce there to
make his perpetuall residence, ought to enioy the priueleges of a citisen,
without letters of his naturalizing? Neuerthelesse I am of opinion that he is a
straunger, for the reasons before alleged, and that he ought not to enioy the
priuelege of a citisen; sauing unto the prince to reforme it if it shall so
seeme good unto him. And if a straunger which hath obtained letters of his
naturalising out of his owne countrey, and yet will not
there dwell, he looseth the right he there pretendeth: for that the lawes suffer not a double fiction. And for this
cause Lewes the xij. the French king thrust out from the
right of free citisens all straungers, who had obtained of him letters of their
naturalising, and were retired out of his realme home. For by our customes he
that will get the freedome of a citisen, must obtaine the princes letters to
that purpose, and hauing obtained them, pay his fine unto maisters of the
receipt.
These reasons show not onely the difference that is betwixt a citisen and him
that is none, but also of citisens amongst themselves; and that if we follow
the varietie of priueleges to iudge of the definition of a citisen, there shall
bee five hundred thousand of definitions of citisens, for the infinit
diuersitie of the prerogatives that citisens
have one against another, and also over straungers: seeing that it is oft times
better inBetter sometimes to be a straunger than a naturall
citisen. the same citie to be a straunger, then a citisen, especially
in such cities as are oppressed with the crueltie and insolencie of Tyrants. As
in Florence many citisens requested Cosmus the new duke
to be reputed and esteemed as straungers, by reason of the libertie of
straungers, and thraldome of the citisens, which they obtained not: and yet hee
allured fiftie straungers to sue for the freedome of the citie, putting them in
hope of the great offices and commaunds: whereby it was brought to passe, that
from those fiftie citisens so made, he extorted fiftie thousand crownes,
confirmed the authoritie of the new citisens gotten by deceit, and thereby
brake the power of the conspirators against him. So in auntient time the
Venetians empouerished and brought low by the
warres against the Genowayes, and fearing the rebellion of many subiects, with
a few of the great states, sold the right and priueledge of a gentleman of
Venice unto three hundred citisens, so to strengthen themselves with their
goods, their force, and counsell, against the power of the people. It is then
the acknowledgement and obedienceThe true difference betuixt
a citisen and a stranger. of the free subiect towards his soueraigne
prince, and the tuition, iustice, and defence of the prince towards the
subiect, which maketh the citisen: which is the essentiall difference of a
citisen from a straunger, as for other differences they are casuall and
accidentarie; as to have part in all or certaine offices or benefices; from
which the straunger is debarred as it were in euerie Commonweale. As for
offices it is cleere. And although the Bishops of Rome have of long time
attempted to giue all benefices to all men as
of right: yet have princes oftentimes reiected those ambitious decrees of the
Popes. I except the kings of Spaine, of all others the most obedient seruants
of the Bishops of Rome, who not without great reward obtained by the decree of
Sixtus Bishop of Rome, That beuefices should not be
bestowed upon straungers. And so in Boulongne la Grace, where the Pope is
soueraigne lord, the offices and benefices are not giuen but to the naturall
inhabitants and subiects. The like whereof is done also in all the seignorie of
Venice. But the Swissers have farre otherwise proceeded than by way of
agreement, who by a law made in the yeare 1520, decreed the Popes Buls and
Mandats, whereby he had not doubted to giue benefices unto straungers, to bee
publickly torne, and they that used them to be cast in prison. And by the lawes
of the Polonians also euen from the time of
Casimire the Great, unto the raigne of Sigismundus Augustus, straungers were kept farre from all
benefices; which thing also the Germans by couenants, of late wrested from the
Popes: in which couenants they of Mets were also comprised, and so iustly by
their letters complained unto Charles the ix the French
king, those couenants to bee broken by the craft of the Bishops of Rome.
Another priueledge there is also graunted more unto citisens than to
straungers, in that they are exempted from many charges and payments, which the
straunger is constrained to beare: as in auntient time in Athens the straungers
payed a certaine speciall tribute for the right of their
dwelling place, which they called : whereas the citisens were free from all impositions. But the most notable
priueledge that the citisen had aboue the straunger, is, that he had power to
make his will, and to dispose of hisThe greatest priueledge
that a naturall citisen had in auntiens time aboue a straunger.
goods, according to the customes; or leaue his neerest kinsmen his heires;
whereas the straunger could do neither the one nor the other, but his goods
fell unto the lord of the place where he died. Which is no new law in Fraunce,
as the Italians complaine, but a thing common also unto the kingdome of Naples,
of Sicilie, and all the East, where the Grand Signior is not onely heire vnto
the straungers, but also to his Timariots, for their immouables; and to his
other subiects for the tenth. As in auntient time in Athens, the common
treasure receiued the sixt part of the inheritance of straungers, and al their
slaues borne in the citie: wheras in Rome the rigour was much greater (the common treasure swallowing up all the
inheritance of straungers.) And albeit that where Diodorus saith, The Aegyptians and Romans to have suffered the heires
of straungers to succeed them: he spoke therein like a straunger himselfe
without regard; for it is most certaine, that it was no way permitted for a
straunger to dispose of his goods, neither to receiue any thing by the
testament of a citisen of Rome, the common treasure carrying away the
succession: whereof our laws are ful. Which we may also iudge by the oration of
Cicero, who to show that Archias was a citisen of Rome, saith amongst other things, That he had
by his testament disposed of his goods. And himself in his own cause to giue
men to vnderstand that the decree of banishment made against him at the sute of
Clodius the Tribune, was of none effect: What Roman
citisen is there (saith he) that hath made
any doubt to leaue me what hee pleased by his testament, without regard to the
decree of my banishment. The selfe same argument used also Demosthenes, to proue that Euxithenés was a
citisen of Athens: have not his next of kinne (saith he) recouered the
inheritance of their father that suruiued? And like as in Fraunce, and in
England, particular lords take unto them the inheritance of straungers which
die within their iurisdiction: so the Romans also after the manner of their
auncestors, tooke unto them the heredetarie goods of straungers, whome they had
receiued into their protection, being left at Rome, which they called, The
right of application. And that is it for which they said in Rome, That the
right to make a will and testament was onely granted to a citisen of Rome.
Whereby it is plaine that right of
application, or of Albinage (as some call it) to have beene most auntient, and
common as well to the Greeks and Romans, as to other people also, vntill that
Frederick the second had derogated from the same by
his edict, which was but euill kept: For he gaue leaue to all straungers dying
within the compasse of his empire, by their testament to dispose of their
goods; or if they dyed intestat, to leaue their next of kin their heires. But
the force of that law is euen in Germanie it selfe nothing, and much lesse in
Italie, where straungers are much worse dealt withall than in Fraunce. For by
our customes it is permitted unto the straunger to get in this * realme all the
goodsviz. France. mouable and immouable that he can, and them whilest he yet liveth, to
sell, giue, exchaunge, or dispose of by contracts made with men yet liuing,
according to his owne pleasure; and for a
small sum of money, as for some twentie or thirtie crownes paid into the common
treasure, to obtaine letters of naturalisation, and the right of a citisen; so
that he may by his will giue legacies, or appoint such an heire as himselfe
pleaseth. But in many countries of Germanie, and by the generall custome of
Bohemia, it is not suffered straungers to have one foot of land. As in like
case in Italie it is forbidden allStrāgers in many places
hardly del withall. straungers to get any
immouables in proprietie, as in the duchie of Ferrara it is a formall custome.
And that more is, by the custome of Perouze, it is forbidden to transfer unto a
straunger not onely the proprietie, but euen the possession of any immouable.
And by the custome of Milan it is not permitted vnto
the straunger, so much as to have the vse and
profit of any thing immouable, and that upon paine of confiscating the reuenew
with the inheritance; forbidding inheritours also to marrie with straungers,
upon like paine of confiscating their goods. And that which more vniust is, it
is not lawfull for the creditor being a straunger, to take his debtors
immouables or land, for default of paiment assigned unto him, but that he must
within the yere againe cleere his hands thereof; which causeth the creditor
oftentimes to sell his land vnderfoot, or for little, especially if the
naturall inhabitants feare or loue the debtour. And not long since, by the
ordinance of the emperour Charles the fift, all
straungers are embarred from the succession of the subiects of Milan. By the
custome of Venice also it is lawfull to bind a citisen to a stranger, yet by
that bond are not the heirs bound, more than
for so much profit as came unto them thereby; quite contrarie unto the Roman
civill law. And by the custome of Brixia in Italie, a woman married unto a
straunger cannot transferre her immouables unto straungers, neither the value
thereof, neither directly, or indirectly. See now the good entertainment that
straungers have in Italie; whereof they have no occasion to complaine of
Fraunce, seeing that in England the subiects cannot pawne their lands vnto
their creditors being straungers: whereof the ambassadors of forraine nations
have oftentimes complained to have reason of their debtors: yet suffer they the
next of kinne to enioy the goods and money of the straunger. The contrarie
whereof is done in Lituania, Moscouia, Tartaria, and all the Turkish empire: in
which place the goods of straungers dying there, are confiseat in like
manner as in Fraunce: where neuerthelesse
it is permitted to straungers if they die out of Fraunce, to make a will, and
to appoint his children borne in Fraunce his heires, so that their mother be
not a stranger. And as for the clause commonly ioyned unto the letters of their
naturalisation: Modo haeredes sint Regnicolae, the
judges have so interpreted it of straungers dwelling in Fraunce, who are
preferred before them that are neerer of kinne dwelling out of the realme, in
the succession of the naturalised straunger: for otherwise it is requisit to
make the straungers children to succeed, for that they were borne in France,
and of a free citisen, or naturall subiect. But the children of strangers borne
in Fraunce, enioy their fathers inheritance, not by will (which is not lawfull
for strangers to make) but as from him dying intestat, if their mother be a
free woman when the inheritance descendeth.
And more than this, it is graunted by our kings of an extraordinarie bountie
unto such marchant strangers as frequent the fairs of Champagne and Lyon, That
none of their goods, if they die in the meane time shall be confiscated: which
right the English marchants enioy also in Guienne. But as for them of the low
country of Henault & Artois, of the townes of Amiens, Cambray, &
Turnay, they are in the same state that citisens be, for so much as concerneth
the right of succession: and that the edicts of our princes, and iudgements
giuen, have oft times proued yet so as that the same should also be lawfull for
vs, that was for them. The companies also of marchants of those cities which
stand upon the Baltique sea, have obtained the same, or greater priueledges,
now euer since the time of Lewes the younger, and more
solemnly confirmed by king Charles the eight: which a few yeares agoe were sent to
king Charles the ninth (by Danezay the French ambassadour, unto the king of Denmarke) to be by
him renewed. And yet this priueledge granted unto those marchants, extendeth
not unto other strange marchants, which have obtained the right of citisens, as
hath bene adiudged by the priuie counsell. Of which so many and so great
priueleges, by our kings graunted unto straungers, our marchants could obtaine
none in all Graecia, Asia, or Africa. For in our time when as Crozile a rich marchant of Tours, diing, had left behind him almost
two hundred thousand crownes, nothing thereof came vnto
his neerest kindred, all the same being by the Turkish emperor giuen unto Abraham the chiefe of the Visier Bassaes.
There is yet another difference (besides those we have alreadie spoke of)
betwixt citisens and strangers; for that citisens by the auntient law Paetilia and Iulia, may
forsakeOther differences betwixt a citisen and a
straunger. their goods, leauing them in satisfaction unto their
creditors, which the straunger may not doe: for otherwise it should bee lawfull
for strangers, for their aduantage to sucke the blood and iuice of the
subiects, and afterward to pay them with papers, although there be not fewer of
these bankrups than of them that forsake their goods. This also a citisen
differeth from a straunger, that the straunger in euerie place before he can
plead in action, either reall or personall, must put in caution for the paiment
of that which shall bee adiudged. Which caution our citisens, except they haue
before plaid bankrupt, or forsaken their
goods, are not bound to performe. But in a personall action, whether the
defendant be a citisen or a straunger, he is not bound to put in caution to pay
the thing that is adiudged, as was in auntient time determined, as well in the
court of Rome, as in the court of Paris. But the same court hath departed from
the opinion of our auncestors, and adiudged it to be a thing reasonable, that
the straunger whether he be plaintife or defendant, should put in caution to
pay the thing that is adiudged. But there is one difference which is and hath
alwaies bene common to al people, that is to wit, the right of marque against
strangers, which hath no place against the subiects: for which cause the
emperour Frederick the second, sent backe unto the
states of the empire, those which demaunded the right of reprisall against the
subiects of the empire. And in briefe the
straunger might be driuen out of the countrey, not onely in time of warre (for
then we dismisse the ambassadours themselves) but also in time of peace; least
the naturall subiects manners should by the euill companie of straungers be
corrupted: for which onely cause Lycurgus seemeth to
have forbidden the LacedemoniansPlu. in Lycurg. his
subiects without leaue to depart out of his kingdome, or to have the vse of
gold or siluer; as the East Indians of China forbid their subiects upon paine
of death from receiuing of straungers: so to meet with the enterprises that the
straunger might make against another mans estate. Wherefore Cicero well foresaw not what harmes hang (as it were) over our heads
from straungers, when as he writ, They do euil which forbid straungers their
cities, and cast them out, as with our auncestors Penuu, and of late
Papius: For by such straungers, who for the most part
are banished men, the good manners of the naturall subiects are corrupted. But
if warre be proclaimed against the prince, the straunger may be detained as an
enemie, according to the law of armes: whereas otherwise he might not be
staied, if he had not otherwise bound himselfe by contract, or by some offence
by him committed.
Now if the straunger shall against the will, or without the consent of his owne
prince▪ submit himselfe unto the power of another prince, and be of him also
receiuedA stranger submitting himself unto the power of
another prince, is yet the subiect of his naturall prince. for his
subiect; yet hath his owne prince still for euer power over him, and authoritie
to lay hands upon him as upon his fugitiue seruant; yea although he come as an
ambassadour sent from his new prince. For so the emperour Theodosius the Great pronounced Danus the tyrant to be a rebell unto his maiestie, and
cast in prison his ambassadours, being subiect to his power. So the emperour
Charles the fift did the like against the
ambassadours of the duke of Millan his subiect, whom he detained prisoner, at
such time as he vnderstood the duke his maister to have entred into league with
the other princes, and to have proclaimed warre against him. And howbeit that
the news thereof being come into Fraunce, Granuellan,
Charles his ambassador, was by the kings commaundement there likewise
imprisoned, yet was hee forthwith againe delivered, so soone as it was
vnderstood that the ambassadors and heralds of Fraunce, England, and Venice, were with safe conduct sent out of Spaie. Neither seemeth Charles in so
doing to have violated the law of nations, or
to have done any thing against the law: seethat the Romans did with greater
seueritie punish the fugitiue subiect, than they did the verie enemie. And the
best excuse that the Imperials could find to excuse the murther done upon the
persons of Rincon and Fregosis the French ambassadors toward the Turke, was,
That the one of them was a Spaniard, a naturall subiect of the emperours, and
the other a Genoway under his protection, both sent in the seruice of his
enemie; the bruit being giuen out, that they went to raise new warres against
him: how beit that the emperour would not auouch the murther, but promised to
do iustice upon them that had done the same, if they should fall into his
power. But doe the subiect what he can, yet can he not exempt himselfe from the
power of his naturall soueraigne,No subiect can exempt himselfe from the poer of his naturall prince. albeit that he
become a soueraigne prince in another mans countrey: no more than Philip Barbarius a slaue, who being for his vertue become
Pretor of Rome, being pursued and chalenged by his maister, was yet glad to
agree with him for his libertie. For in that the lawyers all agree, That the
subiect in what place soeuer he bee become soueraigne, may by his prince be
called home. As not long since Elizabeth queene of
England called home againe unto her the earle of Lineux, together with his son,
who but a little before had maried the queene of Scots; for not obeying of
which her command, she confiscated their goods, for that contrarie to the
custome of that realme, they had without leaue departed out of England, and
maried contrarie to the queenes commaundement. For the subiect wheresoeuer he
be, is bound to the lawes of his prince
conceiued, concerning his person; in such sort, as that if the subiect be
forbidden to contract or to alienat, the alienations are void, albeit that he
make them in a forren country, and of such goods as he hath without the
territorie of his owne prince: and if the husband being out of his owne
countrie, giue any thing unto his wife, contrarie to the commaundement of his
prince, or the customes of his countrey, such a donation is nothing worth: for
that the power to tie and bind a subiect, is not tied unto places. And for this
cause princes have accustomed to vse mutuall requests one towards another,
either to call home their subiects, or to enforce them to obey, in such places
as wherein they have not power to commaund: or els by mutuall denouncing of
their griefes themselves to lay hand upon straungers, vntill that they doe obey
them. For when the marquesse of Rotelin, who
had the tuition of the duke of Longueuille, was sued unto to suffer the
controuersie of Neuchastel to be decided before the
judges of the courtNeu Castell. of Requests at Paris:
the lords of Berne reuoked the cause, for that iudgement was to be giuen by
them, of lands contained within the precinct of their country. See here the
principal differences of subiects and citisens, from strangers; leauing the
particular differences of euerie countrey, which are in number infinit. As for
the differences of subiects amongst themselves▪ there are in many places no
fewer, or happely moe than▪ betwixt the subiects and the straungers (whereof we
have much spoken before) as not onely of the difference of the nobilitie among
themselves, but of the difference betwixt the nobilitie and the vulgar people
also. But particularly to prosecute how much the vulgar people differ among themselves, with such other things as
appertaine unto the sex, age or state of euerie man, were a thing almost
infinit.
Now to make the matter short, it may be that of right among citisens, some be
exempted from all charges, taxes, and imposts, whereunto others are subiect:
whereof wee have infinit examples in our lawes. As also the societie is good
and auailable,The diuision of citisens or subiects into
three estates▪ thing obserued in all
Commonweale. where some of the associats have part in the profit, and
yet beare no part of the losse. And that is it for which we see the diuision of
citisens or subiects into three estates, that is to say▪ the Spiritualtie, the
Nobilitie, and Commonaltie, which is obserued almost in
all Europe. And beside this so generall a diuision, there bee other more
speciall in many Commonweales, as in Venice
the gentlemen, the citisens, and the common people: in Florence before it was
brought under one prince, they had the great ones, the common people, and the
reseall menie. And our auntient Gauls had their Druides, their Chiualie▪ and the vulgar people. In Aegypt the priests, the
souldiers, and the aans; as we read in Diodorus. Also the aunent law
giuer Hippodamus, divided the citisens into souldiors,
handie crafts men, and labourers; & hath without cause bene blamed by Aristotle; as we read in the Fragments of his ordinances.
And albe▪* Lib. a. Polit. it that Plato enforced himselfe to make all the citisens of his Commonwealth
equall in all rights and prerogariues; yet so it is, that he divided them into
three states; that is to wit, into Gouernours, Souldiors, and Laborers: which
is to show that there was neuer Commonweale,
were it true, or but imaginarie, or the most popular that a man could thinke
of; where the the citisens were equall in all rights and prerogatives; but that
alwaies some of them have had more or lesse than others.
CHAP. VII. ¶ Of them that are under protection, and the
difference betwixt Allies, Strangers, and Subiects.
WE have now alreadie told what difference there is
betwixt Subiects, Citisens, and Straungers: let vs now also speake of Allies,
and first of them which are in protection; for
that there is not one of them which have written of a Commonweale, which haue
rouched this string; which for all that is the most necessary for the
understanding of the states of Commonweales. The word of protection in generall
extendeth unto all subiects which areProtection.
under the obeysance of one soueraigne prince or seignorie; as we have said▪
That the prince is bound by force of armes, and of his lawes, to maintaine his
subiects in suretie of their persons, their goods, and families: for which the
Subiects by a reciproall obligation owe unto their
prince, faith, subiection, obeysance, aid, and succour. This is the first and
the strongest protection that is. For the protection of maisters towards their
slaues, of patrons towards their enfranchised, of lords towards their vassals,
is much lesse than that of princes towards
their Subiects: insomuch that the slaue, the enfranchised, the vassall, oweth
faith, homage, and succour, unto his lord; but yet that is after his owne
soueraigne prince, to whome he is a bound Subiect▪ the souldior also oweth
obeysance and succour unto his captaine▪ and by the law deserueth death, if hee
defend him not at his need. Yet in all treaties and actions of peace betwixt
princes & peopleHow in of peace
prin are said to be on of them in the protection of another. in amitie and friendship ioyned together: the word of
Protection is special, importing not any subiection of him that is in
protection, neither commaund of the protecture towards his adherents, but onely
an honourable and reuerent respect of the adherents towards their protector,
who hath taken upon him their defence and protection, without any other
impeachment of the maiestie of the adherents over whome the Protector
hath no power at all. So that the right of
protection is well deemed to bee the greatest, fairest, and most honourable of
all others that are amongst princes. For theTo protect
others is a thing most honourable. soueraigne prince, the maister,
the lord, the patron, draw unto themselves great profit and obedience, for the
defence of their subiects, their slaues, their enfranchised, and vassals: but
the Protector is to content himselfe with the honour and acknowledgement of his
adherent, seeing that of all duties of courtesie, none is greater, than as
euerie man standeth in most need of helpe, so to giue him the greatest
relief; neither of so great kindnesse to accept
any other reward than thanks: for if hee couenant for any thing farther, he looseth the name of a Protector. For as he which lendeth
unto anoman part of his goods or trauell, if
he receiue any gaine or profit thereby, he is no more to be called a lender, or
that his doing to be tearmed a lending or pleasuring, but a meere mercinatie
gaining: so he which hath liberally promised to doe any thing for another man,
is without any hire by the law bound to accomplish his promise: and the reason
is, for that unto dutie no hire is due. Neither is there any band of promise
stronger, or more effectuall, than that which is made to defend the goods, the
life, the honor of the weake against the stronger, of the poore against the
rich, of the good distressed against the violence of the wicked. And that is it
for which Romulus, founder of the citie of Rome, setting
in order the state of his subiects, to keepe them all at peace and unitie among
themselves, assigned unto every one of the hundred gentlemen, or Senators
that he had chosen to be of his priuie
counsell, a certaine number of his other meaner subiects, to be by them
maintained under their protection and safegard; holding him accursed and
execrable, who should leaue the defence of any his adherents. And the Censors
marked them with the note of infamie, that had forsaken their adherents. The
law also of the xij tables in that case carrieth with it the paine of
excommunication, as in these words: If the Patron deceiue his
Client let him be accursed. Yet Plutarch
writeth, The clients to have giuen money to the bestowing of their patrons
daughters: which I remember not to have bene elswhere written; for in so doing
they should have cosened their clients: but it may bee that he mistooke
clients, for men enfranchised; who albeit that they be both called clients or
adherents, yet is the bond of the enfranchised
greater towards their patrons that set them at libertie; than is that of the
free borne clients, who had no patrons but aduocats, who defended the causes of
their clients. How beit with vs the patrons exact money of their enfranchised
clients, the better to bestow their daughters, which is like enough to haue
come from the Romans unto vs. Now when that forren people saw the Roman clients
or adherents to be safe from the iniurie and oppression of the more mightie,
not onely every particular man, but men euen generally, yea whole cities and
prouinces yeelded themselves intoHow whole cities sometimes
put themselves into the protection of some one honourable house of the Roman
Senators. the protection of the Senators. For so the house of the Marcelles had in their protection the citie of Syracusa,
the Antonies had likewise the citie of Boulongne la
Grasse: and so others afterwards tooke upon them the protection and defence of
others also. Yea the straungers in like case,
that frequented the citie of Rome, had also their protectors, who by the law of
application or patronage, tooke unto hem whatsoeuer
the straunger dying in the citie possessed. And of these same Romans that
filled Fraunce with the multitude of their Colonies, it is like this law of
protection, which of the aduocats and not of the clients, they cal the law of
Auoison, or Auouerie to haue
taken▪ beginning. But the enfranchised clients differ much from the free borne
clients, albeitGreat difference betwixt the free borne
clients and the clients enfranchised. that they be both called
clients, for the likenesse that is betwixt the one and the other) but
especially in this, that the enfranchised clients may from their libertie be
againe reduced into slauerie, if they shall be proued to have bene vngratefull
unto their patrons whereas the free borne clients cannot so be. The
enfranchised clients are constrained also to
helpe their patrons with their labours: wheras the free borne clients are bound
to reuerence their protectors or aduocats, and to do them mutuall kindnesse,
but not seruile seruice or labour: neither if they have done any thing to
deceiue their patrons do they therefore loose their libertie: beside that the
patrons suruiuing may by the law take part of the goods of their enfranchised
clients: whereas the aduocats, or protectors can take nothing of the goods or
inheritance of their free borne clients or adherents.
And although there be so many things common to the free borne clients, with the
vassals or adherents, as that they are almost accounted for one, yet is there
great difference betwixt them. For the vassall is bound
with all fidelitie to honour and reuerence The difference betwixt the free borne client and the
vassall. This right is of the Latins called Ius-commissi: & of the French Droit de
comise. his lord, to helpe him being in daunger, and to do him all the
kindnesse possible: and if so be that he shall deceiue his lord, disgrace him,
perfidiously abiure him, or giue him the lye: hee by and by looseth therefore
his fee, which escheateth unto his lord by the right which the lord hath
against his vassall in such case: whereas from the vndutiful or vnkind client,
or adherent, nothing can at all be taken. Moreover if the vassall hath without
any exception giuen his faith unto his lord, or acknowledge no man greater than
him; whether he be sworne or not, he is bound unto the subiection & command
of him the same his lord and prince: whereof he cannot be said to be
discharged, albeit that he neuer so much renounce his fee: whereas the client
or adherent standeth not in these tearmes, being in nothing subiect to his
aduocat or protectour. The vassall also
whether he be a king or pope, or whatsoeuer els oweth faith and seruice vnto
the lord of whome he holdeth his fee, except he renounce the fee: whereas the
free borne client or adherent, whether he be prince or priuat man, is free from
all seruice and commaund of his more mightie aduocat or protectour. In briefe
the right of aVassalage but new: protection most
auntient. vassall age seemeth in a manner to be but new, and before
the comming of the Lombards into Italie vnknowne: whereas the law of protection
is most auntient and before the time of Romulus, who
borrowed it of the Greeks: for it was long before used in Thessalie, Aegypt,
Asia, and Sclauonia, as we read in auntient writers: that so the weaker might
be the safer from the violence or iniurie of the more mightie. The vassall also
receiueth inheritance and fees of his lord, from whose fealtie and obesance
which he oweth unto him, he cannot bee
exempted, albeit that the soueraigne prince should raise the fee of his vassall
depending of him into a countie, dutchie, or principalitie, as hath beene
adiudged by the decree of the parliament of Paris. Whereby it is to be
vnderstood them to erre and be deceiued, who out of Cesars Commentaries interpret them whome he calleth Soldurios et deuotos, to be vassals, seeing that hee hath made no
mention of their fee, without which they cannot so be, ioyning thereunto also,
that they were indeed true and naturall subiects: for that their lives, their
goods, and their persons, were consecrated unto their lord: which is the true
marke of subiection, which the vassals owe onely unto their soueraigne prince,
not in the qualitie of vassals, but in the qualitie of naturall subiects, who
ought to runne the same fortune with their
prince, and to live and die for him if need bee, albeit that the vassall bee
more specially bound, than the other subiects.
All which things tend to this purpose, that it may plainely be perceiued, what
andThe difference betwixt patronage, vassallage, and
protection. how much difference there is betwixt the rights of
patronage, vassallage, and protection, which we see to bee of many for the
likenesse among themselves confounded. For the vassall and the adherent owe
their fidelitie unto their lord and protector; and the one of them are
reciprocally bound unto the other, albeit that the lord be not bound by
expresse word to giue his oath of fidelitie to his vassall, as the protector
ought to his client or adherent, and so solemnly to keepe all the treaties of
protection. The lord and the vassell also ought to deliver solemne letters of
their mutuall obliging of themselves the one
to the other: like as the protectour and the adherent, are bound to giue
letters of protection the one of them to the other: but especially if one
soueraigne prince upon a league made, receiue another soueraigne prince into
his protection, which are to be renewed either of the princes dying. For the
right of protection belongeth not unto the heires, except the same be in the
league so comprlsed: and bee it neuer so prouided for, yet neuerthelesse either
of the princes being dead, it is needful for his successor by lawfull acts to
professe his protection, & to have the league renewed. But to make more
manifest the matter of protection betwixt soueraigne princes, whereof we are to entreat: it seemeth that the soueraigne prince
or people, which hath put it selfe into the
protection of another, is become his subiect. And if he be a subiect, then is
he no more a soueraigne, and his subiects shall also be the subiects of the
protector. And what subiection would a man have greater, than to put himselfe
into the protection of another man, and to acknowledge him for his superiour?
For protectionWhat protection beixt gre princes is. betwixt great
princes, is nothing else but the confederation and alliance of two princes, or
soueraigne lords, wherein the one acknowledgeth the other for superiour; whome
he bindeth himselfe to obserue and reuerence, and into whose protection hee is
receiued, so to be the safer from the iniurie of some other more mightie: also
when the subiect of a prince retireth himselfe into the territorie of another
prince, hee is likewise in his protection; in such sort, as that if he be
pursued after by the enemie, & taken
prisoner in the territorie of another soueraigne prince, hee is not prisonet of
him that pursueth him, but of him into whose territorie he hath fled: as was
iudged by the law of armes at the interparle of peace, which was betwixt the
French king & the emperor Charls the fist, in the
yere 1555, when question was made of the imperial prisoners that the French had
taken in the countie of Guynes, which was then in the subiection of the
English; it was maintained by the Chancellor of England, That they could not be
detained as prisoners, being taken in the territorie and protection of the
English: howbeit that the contrarie might be said: for albeit it was not
permitted to pursue or take prey in another mans territorie, yet it is lawfull
hauing raised it in his owne territorie, to pursue it into another mans ground:
which yet suffereth this exception, If the lord of the ground forbid him not so to do: as did the lord Grey, gouernour of Calais and Guines, who comming in the time of the
pursute, was said to have taken the flying Spaniards into his protection,
although that they were carried away by the French. Now in this case the word
Protection, is not taken in proper signification; for there is no protection,
if there be no conuention: and the strange prince cannot take another princes
subiect into his protection without the consent of his owne prince, as wee
shall hereafter declare.
But yet before let vs determine the propounded question, Whether a
soueraigneWhether a soueraigne prince submitting himselfe
unto the protection of ano ther prince, looseth thereby his own soueraignty,
and so becommeth the other princes subiect. prince submitting himself
unto another soueraigne prince, looseth the right of his own soueraigntie; and
whether he become subiect to the other? For it seemeth that he is no soueraigne, acknowledging a greater than himselfe.
Neuerthelesse I am of opinion that he continueth still a soueraigne, and not a
subiect. And this point is decided by a law, whereof there is not the like, and
hath in diuers readings bene altered: but we follow the originall of the
Pandects of Florence, which hold, That soueraigne princes who in treatie of
alliance acknowledge the protectour to bee greater than themselves, are not yet
for al that their subiects. I doubt not (saith the law) but that allies, and
other people vsing their libertie are not straungers unto vs, &c. And
albeit that in the treatie of confederats and allies, by vnequall alliance, it
be expresly said, That one of them shall respectiuely regard the maiestie of
the other; that maketh not that hee should bee therefore his subiect, no more
than our adherents and clients are lesse free than our selues, although they be not equall with vs, neither in
goods, power, nor honour. And the ordinarie clause inserted into the treaties
of vnequall alliance in these words, Comiter maiestatem
conseruare (that is to say, curteously to preserue the maiestie of the
greater) importeth no other thing, but that betwixt the princes allied, the one
is greater and more honourable than the other; and that the lesser allies
should in al modestie respect the greater. So that it euidently appeareth, that
protection importeth not subiection,Protection importeth not
subiection. but the superioritie and prerogative of honour. And the
more cleerely to vnderstand this point, and the nature of treaties and
alliances, we may say that all treaties amongst princes
are made either with friends, enemies, or newters. The treaties betwixt
enemies, are made to have peace and amitie,
or truce, or to compose warres begun for seignories or for persons, or to
redresse the iniuries and displeasures of one of them against the other, or for
traffick and hospitalitie that might bee betwixt enemies during the time of
truce. As for the others which are not enemies, the treaties which are made
with them, are either by alliance equall, or vnequall: in this the one
acknowledgethAlliance equall▪ or vnequall▪ Vnequall of
two sorts. the other to be superiour in the treatie of alliance;
which is in two sorts, that is to wit, when the one acknowledgeth the other to
be his superiour for honour, and yet is not in his protection: or els the one
receiueth the other into protection, and both the one and the other is bound to
pay a certaine pention, or to giue certaine succours; or els owe neither
pention nor succours. As for allies by alliance equall, which the Latines
call Aequo foedere,
the qualitie is vnderstood, when the one is in nothing superiourAlliance equall. unto the other in the treatie: and that
the one hath nothing aboue the other for their prerogative of honour, albeit
that the one must do or giue more or lesse than the other for the aid that the
one oweth unto the other. And in this sort of treatie, they have alwaies
entreated of amitie, traffique, and hospitalitie, to harbour the one with the
other, and to traffique together with all kind of marchandise, or some certaine
kindes onely, and at the charge of certaine imposts agreed upon by the
treaties. And both the one and the other alliance is of two sorts, that is to
wit, defensiue onely, or defensiueAlliance defensiue only,
or both defensiue and offensiue. and offensiue; and yet may be both
the one & the other, without exception of person, or with the exception of
certaine princes: and the most strait alliance is that which is both defensiue and offensiue, towards all, and against
all; as to be a friend to friends, and an enemie to enemies; and so most
commonly order is taken, and treaties of mariages one of them had with the
other. But yet the alliance is more strong, when as one king is allied with
another king, realme with realme, and one man with another man; as were in
auntient times the kings of Fraunce and Spaine, and the kings of Scotland and
Fraunce. And that was it for which the ambassadours of Fraunce aunswered Edward the fourth, being driuen out of the realme of
England, That the king could not giue him aid, for that the alliances of
Fraunce and England were made with the kings, and the realmes, in such sort
that king Edward chased out of his realme, the league
continued with the realme and the king that therein raigned: the effect of
which words was this, with
such a king, his countries, territories, and seignories: which words
are as it were in all treaties expressed. But these treaties ought also to bee
published in soueraigne courts or parliaments, and ratified by the estates, by
the consent of the Atturney generall, as was decreed in the treatie made
betwixt king Lewes the eleuenth, and Maximilian the arch duke, in the yeare 1482. The third sort of
alliance is that of neutralitie, which is neither defensiue nor offensiue,
which may be betwixt the subiects of twoAlliance of
neutralitie. princes being enemies; as those of the Franche-countie
have alliance of neutralitie with the house of Fraunce, and are assured in time
of warre: in which alliance was also comprised the countrie of Bassigny, by the
decree of Bade in the yeare 1555, in confirming with the king the renouation of
the neutralitie for the Franch-countie. And all these aforesaid alliances are perpetuall, or limited to a certaine time, or
for the life of princes, and some yeares more, as is alwaies in treaties of
alliance agreed upon betwixt the kings of Fraunce, and the lords of the
leagues.
And thus much for the generall diuision of all the treaties which are made
betwixt princes, under the which are comprehended all the particular alliances.
For as for the diuision of the Roman ambassadors, at the enterparle of peace
betwixt them and Antiochus the great, it is verie short.
Liuie saith, Tria sunt Genera
foederum, vnum cum bello victis dicer entur leges: alterum cum pares bello
aequo foedere in pacem & amicitiam venirent:tertium cum qui hostes nunquam fuerunt in amicitiam foedere
count, qui neque dicuntneque accipiun leges. There
are (saith he) three kinds of leagues or confederations; one, when as lawes and
conditions are appointed to them that be in battell ouercome: another when men
in warre equall come together in like league into peace & friendship: the
third, when as they which neuer were enemies, by league ioyne in amitie, who
neither giue nor take lawes. All the others, which are neither subiects nor
allies, are either coallies, or enemies, or newters without alliance or
hostilitie, who all generally, if they be not subiects (bee they allies,
coallies, enemies, or newters) are straungers. The coallies are the allies of
our allies, which are not for all that our allies, noCoallies they be. Coallies alwaies comprised in the
league of their allies. more than the companion of our associat is
ou companion; who yet neuerthelesse either in
generall or speciall tearmes, are alwaies in all leagues comprised. As the
lords of the three confederats of the Grises,
the antient allies of the Swissers, were in expresse tearmes comprised in the
treatie of alliance made in the yere 1531, betwixt king Frances the first of that name, and the Swissers, in qualitie of
coallies. But in the yeare 1550 they were allies unto the house of France, and
comprised in the treatie of alliance renewed betwixt king Henrie and the Swissers, in qualitie of allies by alliance equall, in
like degree and pension with the Swissers, that is to wit 3000 pound, for
euerie league or confederacie, to take away the partialitie that was betwixt
the one and the others. For although the Swissers were allied with the league
of the Grises, by alliance equall by the treatie made betwixt the Grisons and
the seuen little Cantons, in the yeare 1498: so it was yet neuerthelesse that
they constrained the lords of the leagues of the Grises to obey the decrees made in their diets, if it should be there
otherwise determined; which was like to have broken the alliance betwixt the
Grisons and the Swissers, in the yeare 1565, for no other cause, (as said the
Grisons) than to make the Swissers to know that they were their equals in
alliance: but the truth is, that the emperour practised under hand, and gaue
eleuen thousand crownes unto certaine of the most factious of the Grisons, to
make head, as they confessed afterwards being put to torture, and were
condemned in a fine of ten thousand crownes; as I have learned out of the
Commentaries and letters of the French ambassadours, which then was sent vnto
the Grisons. Wee have also example of them of Geneua, who were comprised in the
treaties of alliance made betwixt the house of Fraunce and the Bernois, in
whose protection they then were; and so were
since the yeare 1527, unto the yere 1558, that they exempted themselves out of
protection, and entreated in alliance equall, and have alwaies in alliance bene
comprised in the qualitie of coallies.
But as those alliances which are defensiue and offensiue towards and against
all personsN alliance vnsure or weake, than the simple alliance of commerce
and raffick. without exception, are of all
others the straitest and strongest: so also there is no alliance more vnsure or
weaker, than the simple alliance of commerce and traffique which may be euen
betwixt enemies: which although it may seeme to bee grounded upon the law of
nations, yet we see it oftentimes to bee forbidden by princes in their own
countries, least their subiects should riotously abuse the store of things
broght in, or be pinched with the want of things carried our. And for this
cause princes have in this respect vsed
particular treaties, & granted certaine special priueleges & liberties:
as in the treaty of commerce or traffick betwixt the house of France & the
porttowns of the Easterlings, & the Milanois with the Swissers; wherein
they are by the treaties of commerce bound to deliver a certain quantitie of
graine, at a certain price expressed in the said treaties, which the French
ambassadors would oftentimes have broken, for the doubt that the Swissers made
to enter upon the Milanois, enemies unto the French, for feare the
transportation of corne shuld have bene forbidden: which when the gouernor of
Millan had done, in the yeare 1550, the Swissers were upon the point to haue
made alliance defensiue with the Millanois, or at
leastwise to have had them excepted amongst
the confederats as newters. The force of which league was, that such as were in
the same league excepted, could not become prisoners to any the confederats;
when as yet for all that straungers, although they were no enemies, were by the
law prisoners to them that tooke them: For so Pomponius
writeth unto Quintus Mutius: For (saith he) if we haue
neither friendship nor hospitalitie, nor league of amitie with any nation,
these truely are not enemies: yet what thing soeuer of ours falleth into their
hands becommeth theirs; insomuch that a free man borne of ours, by them taken,
becommeth their slaue; and so likewise it is, if any thing come from them to
vs: thus much he. But this law we now vse not, for regard of that curtesie
which ought to bee betwixt manWho indeed are to be accounted
enemies. and man. But by the name of enemies we vnderstand them vnto
whome we, or they unto vs, have publickly
denounced warte; or els without any denuntiation have of fact made warre upon
vs: as for the rest they are to be deemed of, as of theeves or pirats, with
whome we ought to have no societie or communitie. In auntient time also there
was a treatie of alliance to have iustice done them in a straunge citie, as we
read in the books of the Grecians; but at length by the great consent and
agreement of all nations, the port of iustice hath by little and little bene
still opened, as well to strangers as to citisens.
But in euerie alliance, league, confederation, or conuention whatsoeuer, it
behouethIn all alliance the
soueraigneti i still
unto all Princes, & people to bee reserued safe and vntouched.
that the lawes of maiestie be unto euerie prince or people reserued safe and
vntouched: for otherwise the one should fall into the power and mercie of the
other; as the weaker oftentimes are by the
power & might of the stronger enforced to receiue lawes; which is not so in
the treaties of alliance equall: wherein euen little cities are in the
indifferent lawes of leagues equall unto most mightie kings and people, being
not bound either to obserue the maiestie of their more mightie confederats, or
to giue them place. As a man may see in that treatie of alliance made betwixt
the kings of Persia, & the seignori of Thebes:
For albeit that the Persian empire was bounded almost with the same bounds that
the course of the sunne was, viz▪ from the riuage of
Hellesponrus unto the remotest parts of India; and that the citie of Thebes was
enclosed but in strait wals, and the countrey of Beotia; yet for all that were
they both in the league of their alliance equall. Now where we said, that in
alliance of protection, the protector hath a
prerogative of honour; that is not to be vnderstood onely, that hee ought to be
the chiefe allie, as was Lewes the eleuenth the French
king with the Swissers, who did him that honour aboue the duke of Sauoy, who
was before the chiefe: For alwayes the soueraigne prince be he neuer so little,
in alliance equall, is maister in his owne house, and holdeth the first place
aboue all other princes comming into his countrie: but if the protector
himselfe come, he is the first both in sitting and all other honours.
But here might one say, Why should allies in league defensiue & offensiue
against all without exception, vsing the same customes, the same lawes, the
same state, the same diets, be reputed straungers one to another? Wee haue
hereof example of the Swissers, who are allied amongst themselves, with such
alliance as I have said, since the yeare 1315;
yet say I neuerthelesse that such alliance letteth not, but that they are still
straungers one unto the other, and maketh not that they are one citisens to
theAlliance maketh not but that men may still bee one of
them strangers unto another, & not of the same Ciie or Commonweale. other. We have also hereof
example of the Latines, and the Romans, who were allies in league defensiue and
offensiue, used the same customes, the same armes, the same language, and had
the same friends and enemies: Whereupon the Latines maintained, that it was and
ought to be one and the selfe same Commonweale; and therfore by their
ambassadours demaunded to have their part in the estate & offices of Rome,
as had the Romans themselves. S
societs (said they) equatio iuris est, si socialis exercitusillis est quo duplicent vires suas; cur non omnia aequantur?
cur non alter ab LatinisConsuldatur? Vbi pars virium, ibi & imperij pars
est. And immediatly after, Vnum populum, vnam
rempublicam fieri aequum est. Tum Consul Romanus. Audi Iupiter haec scelera:
peregrinos Consules, & peregrinum Senatum in tuo templo, &c. If
societie (said they) be an equalitie of right, if they have their allies armie,
whereby they double their strength: why then are not all things made equall?
why is not one of the Consuls chosen of the Latines? where part of the strength
is, there should also part of the government be. And immediatly after, It is
but right that there should bee but one people and one Commonweale. Then said
the Roman Consull, Heare ô Iupiter these villanies,
straunge Consuls, and a straunge Senat in thy temple, &c. So hee calleth
them straungers which were allied unto the Romans with the strongest alliance
that was possible to deuise, insomuch that
they seemed to be all of one and the selfe same citie. Yea Festus teacheth vs the Municipes (or enfranchised men) not to haue
bene citisens: whose words we have thought good here to set downe: Municipum id genus hominum dicitur,
qui cum Romam venissent, neque ciues Romani essent, participes tamen fuerunt
omnium rerum ad munus fungendum vnà cum Romanis ciuibus, praeterquam de
suffragio ferendo aut magistratu capiendo: sicut fuerunt Fundani, Formiani,
Cumani, Acerrani, Lanuuini, Tusculani, qui post aliquot annos ciues Romani
effecti sunt. Alo modo id genus hominum dicitur,
quorum ciuitas vniuersain ciuitatem Romanam venit, vt Aricini, Cerites,
Anagnini. Tertio definiuntur ij qui ad ciuitatem Romanam it a venerunt, vt
Municipia essent suae cuiusque ciuitatis coloniae, vt Tiburtes, Praenestini,
Pisani, Arpinates,Nolani, Bononienses, Placentini, Sutrini, Lucenses. That
kind of men (saith hee) is called Municipials, who comming to Rome and being no
citisens, were yet partakers of all things together with the Roman citisens,
except in giuing of voyces, and bearing of offices; as were the Fundani, the Formiani, the Cumani, the Acerrani, the Lanuuini, and the Tusculani, who
after certaine yeares were made citisens of Rome. And otherwise that sort of
men is so called also, whose whole citie came into the citie of Rome; as the
Aricini, the Cerites, and the
Anagnini. And thirdly they who so came unto the citie
of Rome, as that the Colonies of euerie citie were accounted Municipials; as
were the Tiburts, the Praenestini, the Pisani, the Arpinates, the Nolani, the Bononienses, the Placentini, Sutrini, and Lucenses.
Now many I see to be in the same errour, as that the Swissers for like reason
are allThat the Can of the
Swissers are not one, but diuers Commonweales. but one Commonweale:
and yet it is most certaine that they be thirteene Commonweals, holding nothing
one of another, but euerie one of them hauing the soueraignty thereof divided
from the rest. In former time their countrey was but one member of the German
empire, gouerned by the emperours deputie. The first that rebelled were the
inhabitants of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, who treated of alliance both
defensiue and offensiue, in the month of December, in the yeare 1315: whereof
the first articleThe beginning of the Swissers revols from
the Empire, and the first establishing of their Commonweales. was,
That none of them should more admit the commaund of any prince, or endure any
soueraigne prince over him. And afterwards in the yeare 1332 alliance was made
of foure Cantons, which were called the foure townes of the wood, viz. Vri, Schwits, and
Lucerne. And in the yeare 1351, Zurith entred into alliance with these foure.
And in the yeare 1352 Zug was also receiued with these fiue; and the yeare
following Berne. And afterwards in the yeare 1393, was made the treatie of
Sempach (after that the nobilitie of the Swissers was by the commonaltie
discomfited and ouerthrowne) wherein they of Zurich, Lucerne, Berne, Soleure,
Zug, Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Glaris, entred into alliance defensiue and
offensiue; which they renewed in the yeare 1481. Basill was also receiued in
the yeare 1501: Schaffuse also and Apenzel in the yeare 1513, Mulhouse in the
yeare 1520, Rotwill in the yeare 1519. The Valesians also in the yeare 1528, with whom beside the auntient treatie, a particular
treatie was made betwixt them and the Bernoies
for league defensiue. Bienne also entred into league offensiue and defensiue
with the Bernoies, in the yere 1352, after that they had exempted themselves
out of the power of the bishop of Basill their soueraigne prince. All which
treaties of alliance, the abbat of Orbez, ambassadour for the French king vnto
the Swissers, hath let me see. Whereby a man may not onely note the pluralitie
of Commonweals, but the diuersitie of alliances also. For they of Berne may
summon the three little Cantons of Vri, Schwits, and Vnderuald, unto their
succour, by vertue of their first league: and they of Zurich and Berne, may
reciprocally summon the one the other: they of Lucerne may of eight Cantons
summon fiue: And the three little Cantons of Schwits, Vri, and Vnderuald, may
summon all the rest of the Cantons unto their
aid, if they chaunce to be inuaded, and that for diuers causes. The assemblies
of al the Swissers, except the Rhaetians, them of Geneua, and the Valesians,
are holden euerie yeare: and whatsoeuer is decreed by the greater part of the
ambassadours of the cities, bindeth them all in particular, and the lesser part
of the whole in common. The last that entred into the league under the
protection of the Bernois, were they of Geneua.Geneua the
las that entred into league with the Swissers,
under the protection of the Bernois. All these allies, confederats,
and coallies, made two and twentie Commonweales, with the abbat of St. Gal a
soueraigne prince; all seperated in soueraigntie, and euerie one of them hauing
their magistrats apart, their state apart, their bursse, their demaine and
territorie apart. In briefe, their armies, their crie, their name, their money,
their seale, their assemblies, their iurisdiction, their ordinances in euerie
estate divided. And if one of the Cantons of
themselves get any thing, the rest have no part therein: as the Bernoies haue
well giuen to vnderstand: For since they entred into the league, they haue
ioined unto their own domesticall government little lesse than fortie towns,
upon whome they leuie men and money, and giue unto them lawes: over which the
other Cantons have no power at all: as was iudged by Frauncis the first, the French king, by them chosen arbitrator in this
matter. They of Basil also, when in the yeare 1560 they had lent fiftie
thousand crownes unto the French king, they tooke the Canton of Soleure to
themselves in caution▪ but hauing by the common aid of al the Cantons taken in
the bailiwike of Lugan, with certaine other lands beyond the mountaines; euerie
Canton by turne one after another, sent thither their magistrats and
gouernours, for the administration of
iustice▪ that so unto every Canton of the Swissers might be reserued their
right and due. The towne also of Bade, where they commonly hold their yearely
assemblies or diets, is common unto eight Cantons, which after the victorie of
Sempech ioyned in league together. It is also (as I suppose) wel known unto all
men, how that they are not all of one and the same religion, but to bee therein
divided, and had therfore oftentimes taken up arms one of them against another,
if the French king had not wisely prouided therfore; as well for the sincere
loue and affection hee bare unto them, as for the notable interest hee had to
maintaine them in peace: for that of their health and welfare the securitie of
Fraunce seemeth almost wholy to depend.
But unto manie it may seeme, that they altogether make but one estate,
considering that, that which is decreed in their diets in common, bindeth
euerie one of the Cantons,The Cantons of the Swissers
divided among themselves for religion. and the lesser part of them
all: as the seuen Cantons Catholike gaue well to vnderstand unto the foure
Cantons Protestants, at the diet holden in September, in the yeare 1554,
insomuch that the common countrie situat beyond the mountaines, divided in
religion, and gouerned by the magistrats that euerie Canton sendeth thither by
turne; it chaunced that the seuen Cantons Catholike caused them of the common
countrey to bind themselves not to chaunge the religion Catholike: and so
following the same obligation would afterwards haue
proceeded against them of the religion there,
against whome the cantons protestants opposed themselves, and were now readie
to have entred into armes, had not the ambassadour of Fraunce stept in betwixt
them, and wisely pacified the matter: yet for all that with this prouiso, That
the common subiects of the religion should be punished (for chaunging their
religion, contrary unto the league) if the greater part of the cantons should
be of that opinion, and that the cantons catholike should neuerthelesse
redeliver the letters obligatorie of the common subiects. By which meane their
differences were againe well appeased. Wherunto the cantons of Glaris and
Apenzel serued in good stead; who indifferently receiued both the one and the
other religion, and made as it were an equall counterpoise betwixt the one of
them and the other. So that it appeareth that the greater part of the
cantons bindeth the lesse, and euerie one
of them in particular. Yea and that more is, none of the cantons may haue
alliance with any prince whatsoeuer without the wholeNone of
the cantons may make alliance with any prince, wishout the whole consent of
the rest of the cantons consent of the rest. As the cantons
protestants hauing made alliance with Philip the
Landgraue of Hessen, and the seignorie of Strasburg, in the yeare 1532, were by
the rest of their allies enforced againe to depart from the same. As in like
case the cantons catholike were compelled to renounce their new alliance made
with the house of Austria. And albeit that the five cantons catholike Lucerne,
Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, and Zug, had made alliance with Pope Pius the fourth, for the defence of their religion; yet could they not
with any rewards (were they neuer so great) be enduced to renew the same with
his successours. But when treatie was had, for alliance to bee made betwixt
Frauncis the first, the French king, and the Swissers,
nothing more letted the same, than the opposition of the cantons protestants;
who before instructed in the new religion, and persuaded by the earnest sermons
of Zuinglius their preacher, who affirmed it to be
vnlawfull for them to serue straunge princes in their warres, preuailed so
much, that his followers and countrie men would no other wise make alliance
with the king, but by the way of peace and friendship onely. But the leagues
renewed with Henry the second, they of Basil and
Schaffuse, with the catholike cities, ioyned themselves unto the French, not in
league of friendship onely, but in giuing of their aid also: when as for al
that, they of Zutic and Berne, in the yeare 1554, forbad their subiects upon
paine of death to serue the French king in his warres. And the same yere the
gouernors of the canton of Vnderuald,
requested by the cardinall of Trent, That by their leaue hee might leuie
certaine men in their countrey; forbad their subiects in generall, uppon paine
of death, and confiscation of their goods, to go to serue any other prince than
the French king: which are all vndoubted arguments to shew, that among the
Swissers there are as many Commonweals as there are cities or cantons. In like
case the three confederat cities of the Grisons, which consist of fiftie
companies or fellowships, have their governments diuers one from another; and
yet as oft as they have their assemblies, the greatest citie of the Grisons
vseth to send thereunto eight and twentie deputies, the second twentie foure,
and the last fourteene: with power, that whatsoeuer the greatest part of these
their deputies shall agree upon, in matters concerning their common societie, shall bind every one of them in particular:
and sometimes also in matters of greater importance all the people assemble
themselves. Wherefore they are deceiued, which of those three cities would make
one Commonweale. For common assemblies and meetings, common demaines, common
enemies and friends, make not the same Commonweale; no not although they haue
the same bourse, or certaine common treasure: but the soueraigntie of power
that euerie one hath to commaund or restraine their subiects: as in like case,
if many heads of families should become partners of all their goods, yet should
they not therefore make one and the selfe same familie.
The same opinion we may have of the alliance contracted betwixt the Romans
and the rest of the townes of Italie,
combined in league both offensiue and defensiue, against all men without
exception: who yet neuerthelesse were diuers Commonweales, divided both in
their assemblies and soueraigntie. The like we may say of the league of the
seuen townes of the Amphictioniques, who had their meetings and soueraigntie
divided: to whose example most of the townes and seignories of Greece
afterwards entred into the same league and confederation, for the deciding of
their controuersies: and euerie yeare every seignorie sent their ambassadours
and deputies unto the common estates, where the greatest affaires, proceedings,
and differences, betwixt the princes and seignories, were determined by their
deputies, whom they called Myrios: by whom the
Lacedemonians were condemned to the seignorie of Thebes, in the summe of thirtie thousand crownes: and for not
obaying the decree, were condemned in double thereof: for that contrarie to the
treatie of peace, they had surprised the castle of Cadmee. The Phocences also
afterwards when they had robbed the holy treasure at Delphos, were by the
decree of the Amphictioniques, enioyned to restore the money by them so euill
taken out of the temple: for default of which doing, all their country was
adiudged unto the treasurie of the temple: so that if there were any person
which shewed himselfe disobedient unto the decrees of the Amphictioniques, he
therefore incurred the indignation of all Greece.
Here might one say, That all Greece was but one Commonweale, considering the
power of the Amphictioniques: and yet neuerthelesse there were almost as many
diuers Commonweales, as cities, holding
nothing one of them of another, neither of the states of the Amphictioniques;
but that they had so promised one to another, as princes have accustomed to
promise among themselves, and to chuse their allies for their arbitrators:
which neither the Lacedemonians, nor the Phocenses had done, neither could
against their wils be of right thereunto enforced. Yea the Phocenses to giue
the Amphictioniques to vnderstand that they had no power over them, pluckt
downe and tore in peeces the decrees of the Amphictioniques, fastened unto the
pillers of the temple of Delphos. Yet true it is, that Philip king of Macedon (beeing himselfe none of the league) tooke
hereupon occasion to denounce the sacred warre unto the Phocenses, and to
ruinat their state: and in recompence therof obtained the place and priueleges
of the Phocenses: the Lacedemonians being
also excluded out of the league of the Amphictioniques, for hauing giuen vnto
them succours. The like league almost we also find to have bene amongst the
auntient Gaules, as is to bee seene in the CommentariesThe
alliance of the auntient Commonweals of Gaule. of Caesar, where he saith, That Vercingentorix
chosen their generall, caused all the states of Gaule to be assembled. And
albeit that the lords of Autun, of Chartres, of Gergoye in Auuergne, and of
Beauuois, held nothing one of them of another; and that the seignorie of
Bourges was in the protection of Autun; and those of Viarron in the protection
of Bruges, and so consequently the other townes in like sort: yet so it was,
that all the princes and seignories passed their differences by the decrees and
iudgements of the Druydes; unto whose censure if they refused to obey, they
were by them excommunicated, and so of euerie
man shunned, as men of all others most detestable. And yet is it most manifest
that these Commonweales which I have spoken of, had their soueraignties divided
one of them from another, the territories of their cities certainely bounded
out, and every one of them their owne proper state and maiestie.
But it may also happen, that to become but one estate, one Commonweale, &
one seignorie, when the partners of one league doe agree in the same
soueraigntie: a thing not easie to be iudged; if a man looke not neere into it.
As the league of the Achaeans was not at the first but
of three cities, divided in estate, assemblies, and soueraigntie; allies
The league of e Achaeans.
by alliance equal, both defensiue & offensiue: who hauing the same enemies
& the same friends, yet at the beginning kept every one of them vnto
themselves the maiesty of their owne citie. But being troubled with continuall
warres, and enforced to hold their often assemblies, they by little and little
became so straitly vnited together, that in fine they became but one
Commonwealth composed of many: and in tract of time drew unto their estate all
the townes and cities of Achaia and Morea, they all retaining still the first
name of the Achaeans. As it happened unto them of the league, whomeWhereof the Swissers tooke their name. they call
Swissers; for that the canton of Schwits, the least of all the rest, was the
first that reuolted, after that they had slaine their gouernor. And as the
Achaians were called the correctors of tirants; so also the Swissers (to their
great praise) carried this title of honour.
The townes also of the kingdome of Naples, after the massacre of the
Pithagorians, being much troubled, and not knowing unto whome to have recourse,
cast themselves into the protection of the Achaians. But the author and meane
of all these cities, to make one and the same Commonweale, was Aratus, who procured it to be decreed by the estates,
That euerie yere one chiefe generall should bee chosen to commaund in their
warres, and to gouerne their estates: and hee was prince of the Achaians, that
is to say, the first that called together their assemblies. And whereas before
euerie citie sent their ambassadours and deputies with instructions unto the
assemblie of the Achaians (as the Swissers vse to doe) there to giue their
voyces deliberatiue: Aratus brought to passe, that the
assemblie of the ambassadours and deputies so
sent, should make choyce of ten principall men, whome they called Demiurges,
who alone had voices deliberatiue, and power to resolue, to determine, and
decide matters of state: therest of the ambassadours and deputies hauing onely
voyces consultatiue. These two points gained, there by little and little grew
up an Aristocraticall Commonweale, in stead of diuers particular Monarchies,
Aristocraties, and popular Seignories: many tyrants partly for loue, partly for
feare, being drawne thereunto. Now all the spoyle of the enemies, and conquests
made by the generals, were not any one cities, but belonged to them all. So
that at length such was the vnion and consent of the confederats, that all the
townes of Achaia and Morea being made subiect, vnited, and incorporat unto the
state of the Achaians, used the same lawes, the same right, the same customes, the same religion, the same tongue, the
same language, the same discipline, the same manners, the same money, the same
weights and measures, as saith Polybius. The kings of
Macedon entred also into this league; yea the two Philips,
Antigonus, and Demetrius, were chosen chiefe
captaines of the Achaians, holding neuerthelesse their realme seperated apart
from the seignorie of the Achaians. And the Romans knowing well that they could
not possibly conquer Greece, the league of the Achaeans standing whole, gaue
commaundement unto Gallus their Proconsull, by all
meanes possible to doe what he might to breake the same; which hee not in vaine
attempted. For diuers cities complaining unto the states, that under colour of
a league and alliance equall, they had taken from them the managing of their
estate and soueraigntie; and assuring
themselves of the aid of the Romans, reuolted from the communitie of the
Achaians: to meet wherewith, and to stay the other cities from doing the like,
Aratus obtained commission from the states to enforme
against these rebels: after which the cities before reuolted, put themselves
into the protection of the Romans; yet with prouiso, that their estate and
soueraigntie should remaine unto them still. But when the power of the Romans
seemed unto the rest of the Achaeans inuincible, they for the safegard of their
libertie, entred into amitie with the Romans also; yet with condition, That the
Lacedemonians, whome the Romans had in a manner drawne
from the state of the Achaeans, should from thenceforth be under the protection
and power of the Achaeans, except in case
concerning the life or goods of a Lacedemonian citisen, wherewith the Achaeans
might not meddle. Which was by the Romans most subtilly done: that so there
might still be matter of perpetuall discord and civill warre betwixt the
Lacedemonians and the Achaeans. For if the Lacedemonians had bene altogether in
power of the Achaeans, they had with their wealth greatly augmented the
strength of the associats: and on the other side if the Romans should have left
them altogether free, it was to be feared least they should together with their
wonted valour, have recouered their auntient Commonweale also. The like deceit
they used also against the Aetolians, which was another estate and league
divided from theThe league of the Aetolians.
Achaeans, composed of three cities, who had also their estate, assemblies,
& soueraigntie divided; but in fine,
following the example of the Achaeans, they of three Commonweals allied with
alliance equall, both defensiue and offensiue, established one Aristocratical
Commonweale, mannaged by the states of the three confederats, & by one
common Senat, wherein was president one chiefe captaine every yeare chosen.
TheThe league of the Lycians. like we may say of
the three and twentie cities of Lycia, which established one Aristocraticall
Commonweale, like unto that of the Achaeans; sauing that the deputies of the
greater cities had in their generall assemblies three deliberatiue voices, the
meaner citisens two, and the rest but one; as saith Strabo: and moreover out of the estates they chose a captaine
generall, whome they called the Lyciarque, and so the other magistats and
judges of all the cities also. Other alliances also and leagues there were of
the thirteene The league of the 13. Cities of
Ionia. The 12. Cities of Tuscanie: and the
47. Cities of the Latines. cities of Ionia, of the twelue cities of Tuscanie, and of the fortie
seuen cities of the Latines, strongly made by alliance equall, both defensiue
and offensiue, holding their assemblies of their states euerie yeare, and
chusing also sometimes (but not euer) a chiefe captaine or generall, especially
in time of warre: and yet neuerthelesse the soueraigntie of euerie citie
continued in the estate of it selfe, as doth the Swissers. For albeit that the
citie of Rome was entred into league with the Latines, and that Seruius Tullius, and Tarquin the
proud king of Rome, had bene chosen chiefe captaines of the league of the
Latines; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that euerie citie kept still the
assemblies and soueraigntie thereof: and yet the kings of Rome lost nothing
thereby of their maiestie. Now it seemeth at the first show, that such leagues
of cities were like unto those of the
Achaeans: but the like thereof there is not one, except those of the Aetolians:
and at this present the estate of the empire of the Germans, which we will in
due place show to bee no monarchie, but a pure Aristocratie, composed of the
princes of the empire, of the seuen electors, and the imperiall cities. Yet
this is a thing common to all confederat cities, that in time of warre they
have used to make one generall captaine, every yeare to be chosen, or els once
for all. For as the seignorie of the Achaeans chose for their captaines the
kings of Macedon, Antigonus, and Philip the second; and the league of the Aetolians made choice of Attalus king of Asia, as saith Lib. 27.Liuie; and likewise the Latines, of the kings of Rome,
and other their neighbour princes▪ so also the electors have oftentimes chosen
straunge princes, as Henrie of Lutzemburg, Alphonsus the tenth, and Charles
the fift, kings of Castile; who although they were soueraignes in their owne
realmes, were yet neuerthelesse subiects to the empires, as captainesA General chosen by many Cities or States in League together,
maketh not them that have so chosen him euer a what the more one
Commonweale. in chiefe. For as a captaine in chief, being not
soueraigne to them that have chosen him, maketh not them of the league to be
one Commonweale: so also he chaungeth in nothing the estate and vnion of the
Commonweale whereunto hee is called. So Philip Valois
the French king, was chosen generall of the ecclesiasticall forces, as we see
in that league which was made betwixt Philip Valois,
& Henry count Palatine, who was afterwards of the
Germans chosen emperour. And not long since Adolphus
vncle to the king of Denmarke, was chosen chiefe
captaine of the league of the Hauns cities. The
Venetians also as oft as they are to make warre, have used to make choyce of
any straunge generall, rather than of a citisen of their owne. But the German
emperours take upon them a stile of much higher qualitie than of Captains in
chief, or Generall; auoching themselves not onely to bee cheife captaines and
magistrats, but euen monarchs also: which whether it be so or no, we will in
due place declare. They pretend also to have power to commaund not onely the
princes of the empire, but euen them also who hold of them nothing. For it is
not long since that the emperour Ferdinand sent his
ambassadours unto the Swissers, to the end they should not receiue Grombach, nor the conspiratours his adherents, banished
out of the empire: which thing, when the emperour seemed by his letters rather
to commaund than to request; the Swissers (a
free people) were therewith not a little moued. And before that also, Morlet Musa ambassadour for the French king unto the
Swissers, certified the king, How that the gouernour of Milan (as hauing such
charge from the emperour) had forbidden the cardinall of Syon to enter into
league with the French king, for that hee was a prince of the empire: of which
his commaund the cardinall made no great account, but without regard of his
prohibition made alliance with the French king; from whome he receiued twelue
hundred pounds pention yearly. True it is, that in all the leagues of the
Swissers with forren princes, the empire is alwayes excepted, if there be not
thereof expresseThe Swissers in all their leagues with
forren Princes till exceps the Empire
mention made. And for that cause Guiche the kings
ambassadour to the Swissers had thereof expresse charge (as I have seene by the
instructions that were giuen him) to make
mention of the emperour in the treatie of alliance, of the yere 1521. For the
Germans grounded themselves upon a maxime, in vertie whereof the emperour Sigismund caused the Swissers to take up armes against
Frederick of Austria, to the preiudice of the
alliance made with the house of Austria: presupposing that the empire was
superiour unto the Swissers, and that in all treaties of alliance, the right of
the superiour is still to be excepted, although there be thereof no expresse
mention made. Which is certaine, for as much as concerneth the lawes of
maiestie; but the Swissers confesse not that the emperor hath any superioritie
over them, and much lesse the emperour, subiect to the states of the empire. It
is also true, that by the treatie made betwixt the eight auntient cantons,
there is an expresse clause, whereby the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schwits, and Vnderualden (as hauing sometime bene
part of the German empire) declared, That for their part they entended to
comprehend in that treatie the maiestie of the sacred empire, the right whereof
they purposed not to preiudice by that treatie of alliance. And within a few
yeares aftet, the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Vri, and Glaris, in the
name of all the cantons of the Swissers, sent their ambassadours to obtaine the
confirmation of their auntient priueledges, of Ferdinand, then holding a diet of the states of the empire, at
Ausburg. And by the treaties of alliance made betwixt the sacred empire and the
cities of the cantons, it is expresly articulated, That they should not giue
any aid unto any straunge prince, to make warre upon the territorie of the
empire; as I have learned by a copie of the letters of the emperour Charles the fift, written to the lords of the cantons;
whereby hee complaineth, That their subiects ioyned with the forces of the
French king, had entred upon the territories of the empire, contrarie to the
expresse tenour of the alliance that they had with the empire. And not long
after, he by other letters demandeth of the lords of the cantons to punish
their subiects, who had inuaded the territories belonging to the house of Austria, contrarie to the hereditarie alliance made
betwixt the princes of the house of Austria and the
Swissers, in the yeare of Grace 1467, and renewed in the yere 1501, in which
league, the See of Rome, the Pope, and the empire, are excepted: and a yerely
pention set downe, of two hundred florins to be
yeately paid unto every canton. Which alliance
was againe renewed by the xiij cantons, at the diet of Bade holden the xx day
of Iuly 1554. As for the league betwixt the said lords of the cantons, and the
French king, it was onely a league defensiue, for the preseruation of the
states of the allies, and not for the inuading of forreners: which are the true
reasons for which the Swissers are withholden to inuade the territories of the
empire, and of the house of Austria; and not for the
right of any preheminence, or superioritie that the empire hath over them.
Which is also yet more expresly verified by the treatie of alliance, renewed
betwixt the French king and the lords of the cantons, in Iune 1549, out of
which are excluded all such as are not subiect to the Swissers, nor vse not the
German tongue. And that is it for which Charles the
fift, the emperour, laboured by all meanes to make agreement with the Swissers, that the dukedome of Millan,
with the kingdoms of Naples and Sicilie, might be comprised in the hereditarie
treaties of alliance, made with them for the house Austria: which the Swissers latly refused to
grant in the yere 1555. The same we may iudge of the cities of the Grisons,
rent from the German empire, who sufficiently declared themselves to bee in
nothing bound unto the edicts of the empire, or of the emperor; in that they
would not accept euen of a German prince by the emperor appointed to be their
bishop: but the 3 cities of the Grisons, being at variance among themselves,
about the choice of their bishop▪ the Swissers by the authority of the league,
taking upon them to be arbitrators of all controuersies arising betwixt the
confederat cities, without any regard had to the prouision of the pope, or
confirmation of the emperour appointed him to
be bishop which was chosen by the Chapiter, subiect to the Grisons; and
decreed, that from that time forward hee should be bishop whome the league of
the Cadde should make choyce of.
Now seeing that our reasoning is of leagues, and of lawes of armes, question
mightNot lawfull for subiects to entreat of any
particular league or alliance among themselves, or with forren princes,
without the leaue or consent of their own soueraignes. be made,
Whether it be lawfull for subiects to entreat of any particular league or
alliance among themselves, or with other forren princes, without the leaue or
consent of their owne soueraignes? Such alliances, and especially with
strangers princes have used to embarre, for the euill consequences that might
ensue thereon: and namely the king Catholike by expresse edicts hath forbidden
all his subiects so to do. And at such time as Lewes of
Fraunce, duke of Orleance (he which was slaine at Paris) was charge with
many matters, nothing was more grieuously
obiected against him beeing slaine, than that he had secretly entred into
league with Henrie duke of Lancaster. Yet for all that
the princes of the empire thinke it lawfull for them so to doe: and for their
owne safetie to enter into league of alliance, both among themselves, and with
other forren princes, so that it be done without the preiudice of the German
empire. For whatsoeuer leagues are by them otherwise made, are void and of none
effect. But when the empire is excepted, the emperour himselfe is not therefore
excepted, as hath oftentimes but neuer more plainely bene vnderstood, than in
the league which many of the German princes made with Henrie the second, the French king, at Chambort, for the defence of
the German empire, against the emperour Charles the
fift, in the yeare 1552. In which league they
acknowledged king Henry for their superiour, promising
curteously to reuerence his maiestie; and so by their common consent made him
generall of their warres, calling him The Protectour of Princes, and of the
libertie of the empire. And in the yeare 1559 the like alliance both defensiue
and offensiue was made betwixt the king of Sweden, the marques Assemberg, the
duke of Brunsuich, the duke of Cleue, the prince of Orange, the countie
Aiguemont, and diuers other imperiall townes on the one part, and the king of
Denmarke, the duke of Saxonie, the Landgraue of Hesse, the duke of Holste, the
duke of Bauyere, the towne of Nuremberg, the bishops of
Wirciburg, and Bamberg the towne of Lubec, and diuers other, with SigismundAugustus king of Polonia, on the other part. Yea the
emperour Charles the fift himselfe made particular
alliance with the duke of Bauaria, and other the catholike princes, to chuse
his brother Ferdinand king of Romans. And a little after
also the league of Franconia was made betwixt the house of Austria, the duke of Bauaria, the three bishops of Franconia, the
archbishop of Salisburg, and the cities of Nuremberg and Ausberg. And Ferdinand also king of the Romans, for the catholike
religion sake made a particular league with the bishop of Salisburg against the
protestants, in the yeare 1556. Wee have seene also the league which was called
The league of Sueuia, to have made alliance offensiue and defensiue for 40
yeares, without excepting any thing sae the empire.
And the like league also betwixt the Sea townes, which they cal the Vandales, that is to wit, Lubech, Hambourg,
Vimare, Rostoc, Bresme, Suid, imperiall townes, chusing for their chiefe
captaine Adolph vncle to the king of Denmarke, who was
not any way subiect to the empire. Yet in all these leagues was euer excepted
the maiestie of the German empire. Yea that more is, the nobilitie of Denmarke
entred into a league defensiue with Sigismund Augustus
king of Polonia, & the towneA foule and rebellious
league of subiects against their prince. of Luec, against the king of
Denmarke himselfe: greater treason than which none could have bene deuised, if
the king of Denmarke had the highest power over his people, and were an
absolute soueraigne: of which matter, and of all the law of armes wee will in
due place reason: but first it behoueth vs to speake of maiestie, or
Soueraigntie.
CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of Soueraigntie.
MAiestie or Soueraigntie is the most high,
absolute, and perpetuallThe definition of Maiesty or
Soueraigntie. power over the citisens and subiects in a Commonweale:
which the Latines cal Maiestatem, the Greeks , & , and ; the Italians Segnoria, and the Hebrewes , that is to say, The greatest power to
commaund. For maiestie (as Festus saith) is so called of
mightinesse. For so here it behoueth first
to define what maiestie or Soueraigntie is, which neither lawyer nor politicall
philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principall and most necessarie
point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweale. And forasmuch as
wee have before defined a Commonweale to be the right government of many
families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetuall
power: it resteth to be declared, what is to be vnderstood by the name of a
most high and perpetuall power. WeThat Soueraigntie
consisteth in a perpetuall power. have said that this power ought to
be perpetuall, for that it may bee, that that absolute power over the subiects
may be giuen to one or many, for a short or certaine time, which expired, they
are no more than subiects themselves: so that whilest they are in their puissant authoritie, they cannot call themselves
Soueraigne princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of
this soueraigne power, vntill it shall please the people or the prince that
gaue it them to recall it; who alwaies remained seased thereof. For as they
which lend or pawne unto another man their goods, remaine still the lords and
owners thereof: so it is also with them, who giue unto others power and
authoritie to iudge and commaund, be it for a certaine time limitted, or so
great and long time as shall please them; they themselves neuerthelesse
continuing still seased of the power and iurisdiction, which the other exercise
but by way of loane or borrowing. And that is it for
which the law saith, That the gouernour of a countrey, or lieutenant of a prince, his time once expired, giueth up his
power, as but one put in trust, and therein defended by the power of another.
And in that respect there is no difference betwixt the great officer and the
lesser: for otherwise if the high and absolute power graunted by a prince to
his lieutenant, should of right be called Soueraigntie, he might vse the same
against his prince, to whome nothing was left but the bare name of a prince,
standing but for a cipher: so should the subiect commaund his Soueraigne, the
seruant his maister, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that
in all power graunted unto magistrats, or priuat men, the person of the prince
is alwaies to be excepted; who neuer giueth so much power unto another, but
that hee alwayes keepeth more unto himselfe; neither is euer to be thought so
depriued of his soueraigne power, but that he
may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath
committed unto his magistrats or officers, whether it be by the way of
preuention, concurrence, or euocation: from whome he may also take the power
giuen them by vertue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold
it so long as shall please him. These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of
Soueraigntie, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste
of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus
of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular
state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or
magistrats whatsoeuer, unto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power,
is by the princes or peoples grant committed,
can be accounted to have the same in Soueraignty. And albeit that the antient
Dictators had all power giuen them in best sort that might be (which the
antient Latines called Optima Lege) so that from them it
was not lawfull to appeale▪ and upon whose creation all offices were suspended;
vntill such time as that the Tribunes were ordayned as keepers of the peoples
libertie, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the
Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if
appeale were made from the Dictatour, the Tribunes might assemble the people,
appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeale, & the
Dictator to stay his iudgement; as when Papirius Cursor
the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death;
and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned
Mnutius, both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they
had fought with the enemie contrarie to the commaund of the Dictator; they were
yet both by appeale and iudgement of the people acquited. For so saith Liuie, Then the father of Fabius said,
I call* Liui. lib 7.upon the Tribunes, and appeale unto the people, which can do
more than thy Dictatorship▪The dictator of Rome, neither soueraigne prince nor
magistrat.whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gaue
place. Wherby it appeareth that the Dictator was neither soueraigne
prince, nor magistrat, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a
simple commission for the making of wae▪ the
repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state▪ on instituting of new
officers. So that Soueraigntie is not limited either in power, charge, or time
certaine. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of
customes and lawes; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeale to be made, and that
all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they
not for all that any Soueraigntie; for their commission being fulfilled, their
power also expired; as did that of the Dictators. So hauing vanquished the enemie, forth with discharged himselfe of the
Dictatorship, which he had not had but fifteene dayes, Seruilius in eight dayes, Mamercus in one day.
And the Dictator was also named, not by the Senat, or the people, neither by
the magistrats, or request made unto the people; nor by any laws which were
alwayes necessarie to the creating of officers, but by an interrex, or a king
created for a time, borne of honourable blood: for
why, it was not enough for him to be a noble
Senator onely, that should name the Dictator. Now if one should say, that Sylla was by the law Valeria made Dictator for threescore
yeares: I will aunswere as Cicero did, That it was
neither Dictatorship nor law, but a most cruell tyrannie; whereof for all that
he discharged himselfe the fourth yere after he was made Dictator, when as he
with the blood of the citisens had quenched the flames of the civill warres;
hauing yet still in the meane time reserued unto the Tribunes their free power
to oppose themselves against his authoritie. And although Caesar fortie yeares after had inuaded the perpetuall Dictatorship
together with the libertie of the people, yet left hee unto the Tribunes of the
people, their power to oppose themselves against his proceedings: but when as
before, Pompeius being Consull, the verie name of the
Dictatorship was taken out of the Commonweale,
and Caesar, contrarie to the law of Pompeius, had procured himselfe by the law Seruia, to be created
Dictator, hee was by the conspiracie of the Senators slaine in the middest of
the Senat. But let vs graunt an absolute power without appeale or controlement,
to be graunted by the people to one or many to mannage their estate and entire
government: shall wee therefore say him or them toWho is to
be called an absolute soueraigne. have the state of Soueraigntie,
when as hee onely is to bee called absolute soueraigne, who next unto God
acknowledgeth none greaterthan himself? wherefore I say no soueraigntie to be
in them, but in the people, of whom they have a borrowed power, or power for a
certaine time, which once expired; they are bound to yeeld up their authoritie.
Neither is the people to be thought to have depriued it selfe of the power
thereof▪ although it have giuen an absolute
power to one or moe for a certaine time: and much more if the power (be it
giuen) be reuocable at the pleasure of the people, without any limitation of
time: For both the one and the other hold nothing of themselves, but are to
giue account of their doings unto the prince, or the people of whome they had
the power so to commaund: whereas the prince or people themselves, in whome the
Soueraigntie resteth, are to giue account unto none, but to the immortall God
alone.
But what if such absolute power as we have spoken of, be giuen to one or moe
for nine or ten yeares? as in auntient time in Athens the people made one of
the citisensThe great Archon of Athens no soueraigne.
their soueraigne, whome they called Archon. I say neuerthelesse that hee was no
prince, neither that the Soueraigntie of
the state rested in him: albeit that hee was a soueraigne magistrat, but yet
countable of his actions unto the people, his time beeing expired. Yet might
one say, What if that high & absolute power which we have spoken of, were
giuen to one or moe▪ for a yere, with condition not to giue any account atThe Amymones soueraigne magistrats, and es not simple soueraignes. all for their
doings▪ For to the Cnidiens every yeare chose of their
cirisens, whome they called Amymones, that is to say, Men without imputation,
with such soueraignty of power, as that they might not be called to account for
any thing that they had done, neither during the of
their charge, nor after that the same was expired: I say yet for althat, that
the soueraigntie of the state was not in them▪ seeing that they were bound at
the yeares end to restore againe unto the people, the authoritie they were put
in trust withall; the Soueraigntie still
remaining with the people, and the execution thereof with the Amymones, whome a
man might well call soueraigne magistrats, but not simple Soueraignes: For the
one was the prince, the other the subiect; the one the lord, the other the
seruant; the one the proprietarie and seised of the Soueraigntie, the other
neither proprietarie nor possessed thereof, neither holding any thing thereof,
but as a feoffer or keeper in trust.
The same we may say of the Regents of Fraunce, created for the infancie, furie,
orThe Regents of Fraunce▪ absence of the king,
whether the edicts, mandats, and letters pattents, be signed and sealed with the signe and seale of the Regents, and in their
name (as they did before the law of Charles the fift the French king) or els that it be done
in the name of the king, and the mandats sealed with his seale: for in that
there is little or no difference at all: seeing that whatsoeuer is done by the
atturney, the lord allowing the same, may well be thought to be done by the
lord himselfe. Now the Regent is the true protectour of the king and of his
kingdome: for so the good countie Theobald called
himself Procuratorem regni Francorum, that is to say,
Protectour of the kingdome of Fraunce. So when a prince giueth absolute power
to a Regent, or to a Senat, in his presence, or in his absence, to gouerne in
his name; albeit that the edicts or letters of commaund go in his or their
name, yet is it alwaies the king that speaketh or commaundeth. So we seeThe Senat of Millan, or Naples, what power it hath in the
absence of the king of Spaine. that the Senat of Milan or Naples, in
the absence of the king of Spaine hath absolute power to dispatch all mandates in his name: As a man may see by the decree
of the emperour Charles the fift in these words. Senatus Mediolanensis potestatem habeat constitutiones
principis confirmandi, infirmandi, tollendi, dispensandi, contra statuta,
habilitationes, prerogationes, restitutiones faciendi, &c. A Senatu ne
prouocari possit, &c. Et quicquid faciet, parem vim habeat vt si à
principe factum ac decretum esset: Non tamen possit delictorum veniam
tribuere, aut liter as salui conductus reis criminum dare. That is to
say, The Senat of Milan hath power to confirme the constitutions of the prince,
as also to infirme the same, to disanull them, to dispense with them contrarie
to the statutes, to make enablements, prerogatives, and restitutions, &c.
No appeale shall be made from the Senat, &c. And whatsoeuer it shall doe,
shall have like force as if it were done or
decreed by the prince: yet may it not graunt pardon for offences committed, or
giue letters of safe conduct unto parties conuicted. This power almost infinit,
is not giuen unto the Senat of Milan and Naples, in any thing to diminish the
maiestie of the king of Spaine, but altogether to the contrarie, to ease him of
his care and paines: ioyne hereunto also, that this power how great soeuer it
be, is to be reuoked at the pleasure of him that gaue it.
But suppose that such great power be giuen to a kings lieutenant, or the
gouernourPrinces, lieutenants or gouernours of coun tries
for tearme of life, yes no soueraignes. of a countrey for tearme of
his life, is not that a soueraigne and perpetuall power? For otherwise if we
should interpret that onely to be a perpetuall power which shall neuer haue
end, there should be at all no soueraigntie, but in the Aristocraticall and
popular state, which neuer dieth except it
be vtterly rooted out. Or if we vnderstand the word, Perpetuall, in a monarch
for him and his heires, there should be few perpetuall soueraigne monarches,
seeing there bee but few that be hereditarie; so that they which come to the
crowne by way of election, should not be soueraignes: wherefore we must
vnderstand the word Perpetuall, for the tearme of the life of him that hath the
power. Now if the soueraigne and annuall onely, or which hath a certaine
prefixed and limited time to rule, chance to continue his government so giuen
him, beyond the appointed time; that must either be by the good liking of him
that gaue the power, or els by force: if by force, it is called tyrannie; and
yet neuerthelesse the tyrant is a soueraigne: as the violent possession of an
intruder is in nature a possession, although it be contrarie to the law, and they which had the possession before are so
thereof disseised: but if such a magistrat continue his soueraigne power by the
good liking of the superiour that gaue it him, wee will not therefore say that
hee is a soueraigne prince, seeing that he holdeth nothing but by sufferance;
and that a great deale the lesse, if the time be not limited, for in that he
hath nothing but by commission during pleasure: and he that so holdeth his
power, is neither lord nor possessor therof. Men know right well, that there
was neuer greater power giuen to magistrat next unto his prince, thanHenrie duke of Aniou. that which was of late yeares
graunted to Henrie of Fraunce, duke of Aniou, by king
Charles the ninth his brother, for it was most great and
perpetuall, without any exception of the
regall power: yet for all that one cannot say that it was soueraigne, inasmuch
as he was called Leiutenant General for the king, So long as
it shall stand with our good pleasure, ioyned unto it in his letters
patents: which wel declareth a power but during pleasure. Which power of
lieutenancie (as of all other magistracies) ceaseth in the presence of the
prince.
But what shall we then say of him to whom the people have giuen absolute
powerHow the people may create a soueraigne
Monarch. so long as he liveth? in this case we must distinguish: If
such absolute power bee giuen him purely and simply without the name of a
magistrat, gouernour, or lieutenant, or other forme of deputation; it is
certaine that such an one is, and may call himselfe a Soueraigne Monarch: for
so the people hath voluntarily disseised and dispoyled it selfe of the soueraigne power, to sease and inuest another
therein; hauing on him, and uppon him transported all the power, authoritie,
prerogatives, and soueraignties thereof: as if a man should by pure gift
deliver unto another man the proprietie and possession that unto him belongeth:
in which case such a perfect donation admitteth no conditions. In which sort
the regall law is by the lawyer said to have bene made in these words,The regall, or royall law.Cum populus ei & in eum omnem potestatem contulit:
when as the people conferred unto him, and on him all their power. But if the
people shall giue all their power unto any one so long as he liveth, by the
name of a magistrat, lieutenant, or gouernour, or onely to discharge themselves
of the exercise of their power: in this case he is not to be accounted any
soueraigne, but a plaine officer, or leiutenant, regent, gouernour, or
guerdon and keeper of another mans power.
For as the magistrat, although hee make a perpetuall lieutenant, and hath no
care of his own iurisdiction, leauing the entire exercise thereof unto his
lieutenant, yet for all that, it is not in the person of the lieutenant that
the power lyeth to commaund, or iudge, neither the exercise and force of the
law: but if he passe beyond the power unto him giuen, it is to none effect; if
his doings bee not ratified, liked, and approued by him that hath giuen the
power. And for this cause king Iohn of Fraunce, led
prisoner into England, after his returne thence, solemnly ratified all the acts
of Charles the Dolphin, his eldest sonne, made regent in
his absence, to strengthen and confirme the same, so farre as should be
convenient and needfull. Be it then that a man either by commission, or
institution, or by delegation, for a certaine
time, or for euer, exercise the power of another man: he that so exerciseth
this power, is not therefore a soueraigne, although that by his letters of
commission or deputation he be not called a protector, lieutenant, regent, or
gouernour: no not, albeit that such power be giuen him by the customs and lawes
of the countrey, which should be muchHector Boet. in hist.
Scot. stronger than election. As by an auntient law amongst the
Scots, the entire government of the kingdome was committed unto him that was
neerest of blood unto the king in his minoritie, or under the age of xxv
yeares, yet with charge that all things should be done in the kings name: which
law was long ago abrogated, for the danger might grow unto the young king, by
his nigh kinsmen affecting the kingdome: for which, Caesar thought it lawfull for a man to become villanous.
Now let vs prosecute the other part of our propounded definition, and show what
these words, Absolute power, signifie. For we said that
unto Maiestie, or Soueraigntieunto soueraigntie belongeth
absolute power, and what that absolute power is. belongeth an
absolute power, not subiect to any law. For the people or the lords of a
Commonweale, may purely & simply giue the soueraigne and perpetuall power
to any one, to dispose of the goods and lives, and of all the state at his
pleasure: and so afterward to leaue it to whome he list: like as the
proprietarie or owner may purely and simply giue his owne goods, without any
other cause to be expressed, than of his owne meere bountie; which is indeed
the true donation, which no more receiueth condition,
being once accomplished and perfected: as for the other donations, which carrie
with them charge and condition, are not indeed
true donations. So also the chiefe power giuen unto a prince with charge and
condition, is not properly soueraigntie, nor power absolute; except that such
charge or condition annexed unto the soueraigntie at the creation of a prince,
be directly comprehended within the lawes of God and nature. As it is at the
inuesting of the Tartar king. For the great king of Tartarie beeing dead, the
prince and the people to whome the right of the election belongeth, make
choiceThe forme of chusing the great king of
Tartarie. of one of the kinsmen of the dead king, which they thinke
best of (prouided that he be either his sonne or his nephew) and hauing placed
him in a throne of gold, the bishop (after a solemne song sung according to the
manner of their auncestours) turning his speech unto the king, in the name of
the people, saith thus, Wee pray thee, and charge thee to raigne over vs: to whom the king aunswereth, If you
will have me so to doe, you must be readie to performe whatsoeuer I commaund;
whomsoeuer I appoint to be slaine, you shall slay him presently, and into my
hand you shall commit the whole estate of the kingdome: whereunto the people
aunswere, Bee it so: after which the king continuing his speech, saith, My word
shall be my sword: whereunto the people giueth a great applause. This done, he
is taken out of his high throne, and set upon the ground upon a bare boord,
unto whome the bishop againe turning his speech, saith, Looke
up unto heauen and acknowledge almightie God, the king of the whole world:
and behold also this table whereon thou sittest below: if thou rule well,
thou shalt have althings according to thy harts desire; but if thou forget
thy dutie and calling, thou shalt be cast headlongdowne from thy high seat, and dispotled of thy regall power
and wealth, bee brought so low, as that thou shalt not have so much as this
boord left thee to sit upon. This said, hee is lifted up on high, and
by all the people proclaimed king of the Tartars. This so great a power giuen
by the people unto the king, may wel be called absolute and soueraigne, for
that it hath no condition annexed thereunto, other than is by the law of God
and nature commaunded.
The same or like forme of inuesting we may also see to have bene sometimes vsed
inThe forme of inuesting the duke of Carinthia.
realmes and principalities, descending by succession. But the like is not to
that of Carinthia, where yet at this present neere unto the citie of St. Vitus, in a meddow is to be seene a marble stone,
whereunto a countrey pesant unto whom that office of right belonged, stept up, hauing upon his right hand a blacke cow, and
on his left a leane euill fauored mare, and all the people about him; towards
whome he that is to be created duke commeth marching, with a great number of
lords, all apparelled in red, and his ensignes displayed before him; all in
good and seemely order, except the new duke himselfe, who is apparrelled like a
poore shepheard, with a sheephooke in his hand: whome the clowne upon the stone
seeing comming, crieth alowd in the Sclauonian tongue, Who is
that (saith he) that commeth marching so
proudly? whereunto the people aunswere, That it is their prince: then
demaundeth he, Is he a iust iudge? seeketh hee the good of
his countrey? is he free borne? is he worthie of that honour? and withall
religious? Hee is, saith the people, and so shall hereafter be. Then
the peasant giuing the duke a little blow on
the eare, goeth downe from the stone, and is for euer after free from all
publique charges: so the duke mounting the stone, and brandishing his sword,
promiseth unto the people, To be a good and a iust man: and in that habit goeth
to heare masse; which in solemne manner done, he putting off his shepheards
apparrell, and attired like a prince, goeth up to the stone againe, and there
receiueth the homage and oath of fidelitie of his vassals and subiects. True it
is, that in auntient Anno. 133. time the duke of Carinthia was the emperours greatest Huntsman:
but since that the empire fell into the house of Austria, wherunto that
dukedome belonged, both the name of the Great Huntsman,
and the old maner of inuesting the duke grew out of vse, and the duchies
of Carinthia, Stiria, and Croatia, with the
counties of Cilia, and Tirol, remaine annexed unto the dukedome of Austria.
As for those things which are reported concerning the inuesting of the king of
Arragon,The manner of crowning of the kings of
Arragon. they are long since growne out of vse; but this wee haue
heard them to have wont to bee done: The great magistrat of Arragon, whome they
call the Chief Iustice, thus said unto the king: We which are
unto thee in vertue nothing inferiour, and in power greater than thy self,
create thee our king; yet with this condition, that one amongst vs shall
still have more power and commaund than thy selfe. Wherein he is
deceiued that so writeth, the king to have bene then chosen of the people; a
thing that neuer was there done. For Sanctius the Great
by force of armes draue the Moores out of the
kingdome of Arragon, after they had seuen hundred yeares possessed the same:
after which time his posteritie of both Sexes, held that kingdome by
inheritance. And also Peter Belluga, who most exactly
writ of the kingdome of Arragon, denieth the people to have any right in
chusing the king; but when the line of the king vtterly saileth. That were also
a new and more absurd thing, that the king of Arragon should have lesse power
than the states of Arragon, seeing that the same author Belluga saith, That the states might not assemble themselves without
the kings expresse commaundement; neither being assembled, might depart without
leaue giuen them from the king. That were also more absurd and ridiculous, that
such speech should bee used by the magistrat, unto him that was now crowned,
sacred, and receiued a king by right of
succession, who also placed and displaced the same great magistrat whensoeuer
hee list. For the same author writeth, Martin Didato the
greatest magistrat, to have beene placed in that office by the queen of Aragon,
in the absence of Alphonsus her husband, king of Arragon
and Sicilia; and also by her againe discharged of the same office. And albeit
that by sufference of the king, that great magistrat or justice of Arragon,
determineth of the processe and controuersies betwixt the king and his people:
as it is also in England sometime by the high court of Parliament, and sometime
by the magistrat, whome they call the Lord Chiefe Iustice of
England, and by all the judges of this viz.
Fraunce. realme, and in all places: yet neuerthelesse so it is, that the great
justice of Arragon, and all the estates remaine in full subiection to the king,
who is no wayes bound to follow their aduice,
neither to consent to their requests, (as saith the same doctor) which is
generall to all estates of a monarchie, as saith Oldard,
speaking of the kings of Fraunce and Spaine, Who have (saith he) absolute
power. Yet true it is, that none of these doctours tell vs, what absolute power
is. For if wee shall say, that hee onely hath absolute power, which is subiect
unto no law; there should then bee no soueraigne prince in the world, seeing
that all princes of the earth are subiect unto the lawes of God, of nature, and
of nations.
So to the contrarie it may be, that some one subiect may be dispensed withall,
andThat a subiect may be dispenced withall from all the
lawes and customes of his Commonweale, yet be neither prince nor
soueraigne. absolued from all the laws, ordinances, and customes of
his Commonweale, and commaundement of the magistrat; and yet be neither prince,
nor soueraigne. Example we have of Pompey the great, who was dispensed withall from the
lawes for five yeres, by expresse decree of the people, published at the
request of of Gabinius the Tribune, at such time as
extraordinarie power was giuen him to make warre against the pirats: neither is
it any new thing or straunge thing to dispence with a subiect for his obedience
to the lawes, seeing that the Senat sometimes so dispenced without the consent
of the people: vntill the law Cornelia published at the request of a Tribune,
whereby it was ordained, That no person should be exempted out of the power of
the laws, nor dispenced withall by the Senat, if he had not at the least the
consent of two hundred Senators. For by the law of the
twelue tables, it was forbidden upon paine of death to graunt any priueledge but by the great assemblies of the
people; but that law was euill executed, being still infringed by the Senat.
Yet he that is so exempted from one law, or moe, or all lawes, is for all that
alwaies in the subiection and obeysance of them which have the soueraigntie:
yea although he bee for euer absolued from all the lawes of his countrey. As
Augustus, who although he was the prince of the
people of Rome, that is to say, the chiefe in that Commonweale, yet faigning
himselfe to be inferiour to the people in generall, he oftentimes propounded
questions unto the people, as if the people, and not Augustus, should make the lawes: and at the chusing of magistrats,
would shake the citisens by the hands, that so hee might commend them that
stood for the offices unto the people. But it behoueth him that is a soueraigne
not to be in any sort subiect to the commaund
of another: which thing Tiberius wisely meaning in these
words, reasoned in the Senat concerning the right of soueraigntie, saying that
The reason of his doings were no otherwise to be
manifested, than in that it was to be giuenA soueraigne prince is not bound to giue a reason of his
doings.to none: whose office it is to giue laws unto his
subiects, to abrogat laws vnprofitable, and in their stead to establish other:
which hee cannot do that is himselfe subiect unto lawes, or to others which
have commaund over him. And that is it for which the law saith, That the prince
is acquitted from the power of the lawes: and this word the Law, in the Latine
importeth the commaundement of him which hath the soueraigntie. Wee also see
that unto all edicts and decrees there is annexed this clause, Notwithstanding all edicts and ordinances whereunto we haue
derogated, and do derogatby these presents: a clause which hath alwaies bene
ioyned unto the antient lawes, were the law published by the present prince, or
by his predecessours. For it is certaine, thatThat the
lawes, letters pattents, priueleges, grants of princes have no force, but
during the life of the princes that granted them. the lawes,
ordinances, letters pattents, priueleges, and grants of princes, have no force,
but during their life, if they be not ratiby the
expresse consent, or at least by sufferance of the prince following, who had
knowledge there of, and especially of the priueleges. As when Bartolus was sent ambassadour unto Charles the
fourth, the German emperour, for the confirmation of the priueleges of the
citie of Perouze, hee obtained the same, yet with condition, That they should
so long have force, vntill they were reuoked by the succeeding emperours: vnto
whom for all that, no preiudice could have bene done, although that clause had
not bene put to: which was the cause that MichaelDel Hospital chauncelour of Fraunce, constantly refused,
yea euen at the request of the queene, to seale the priuileges by Charles the ix. graunted unto St. Maur des Fossez, for
that they carried with them a perpetuall enfranchisment and immunitie from
taxes, which is contrarie to the nature of personall priueledges, and tended to
the diminishing of the power of his successours, and could not be giuen vnto
corporations or colleges, which live for euer, but for the life of the prince
that graunted them onely, although the word (perpetuall) were thereunto
adioyned. Which for all that if they were graunted unto corporations or
colleges, by a popular or Aristocraticall state, must needs bee for euer, or at
leastwise so long as that popular or Aristocraticall state should continue. And
for this cause Tiberius the emperour, successour to Augustus, would not that the priueledges graunted by the
dead emperours, should bee of any effect, if their successors had not confirmed
them: when as before the priueleges granted by princes, if they were not
limited unto a time certaine, were accounted as giuen for euer. Wee also see in
this viz. Fraunce. realme, that at the comming of new kings, colleges and corporations
require to have their priueleges, power, and iurisdiction confirmed; yea the
verie parliaments and soueraigne courts, as well as other particular
officers.
If then the soueraigne prince be exempted from the lawes of his predecessors,
much lesse should he be bound unto the lawes and ordinances he maketh himselfe:
for a man may well receiue a law from another man, but
impossible it is in nature for to giue A soueraigne prince is not subiect unto the lawes and
ordinances that he himselfe maketh a law unto himselfe, no more than
it is to commaund a mans selfe in a matter depending of his owne will: For as
the law saith, Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a
voluntate promittentis statum capit, There can be no obligation, which
taketh state from the meere will of him that promiseth the same: which is a
necessarie reason to proue euidently that a king or soueraigne prince cannot be
subiect to his owne lawes. And as the Pope can neuer bind his owne hands (as
the Canonists say;) so neither can a soueraigne prince bind his owne hands,
albeit that he would. Wee see also in the end of all edicts and lawes, these
words, Quia sic nobis placuit, Because it hath so
pleased vs: to giue vs to vnderstand, that the lawes of a soueraigne prince,
although they be grounded upon good and lively reasons, depend neuerthelesse
upon nothing but his meere and franke good
will. But as for the lawes of God and nature, all princes and peopleAll princes and people are subiect unto the lawes of God and
nature. of the world are unto them subiect: neither is it in their
power to impugne them, if will not be guiltie of high treason to the diuine
maiestie, making warte against God; under the greatnesse of whome all monarches
of the world ought to beare the yoke, and to bow their heads in all feare and
reuerence. Wherefore in that wee said the soueraigne power in a Commonweale to
be free from all lawes, concerneth nothing the lawes of God and nature. For
amongst the Popes, Innocentius Quartus. hee
that of all others best knew the lawes of maiestie or soueraigntie, and had
almost brought under him the power of all the Christian emperours and princes,
said him to be indeed a soueraigne that was able to derogat from the ordinary
right (which is as I vnderstand it, from the laws of his countrey) but not from the lawes of God or nature.
But further question maybe, Whether a prince bee a subiect to the lawes of
hisWhether prince be subiict
unto the lawes of his coūtrey that he hath sworne to keepe, or not.
countrey, that he hath sworne to keepe, or not? wherein wee must distinguish.
If the prince sweare unto himselfe, That he will keepe his law: hee is no more
bound to his law, than by the oath made unto himselfe: For the subiects
themselves are not any way bound by oath, which they make in their mutuall
conuentions, if the couenants be such as from which they may by law shrinke,
although they be both honest and reasonable. But if a soueraigne prince promise
by oath to keep the lawes which he or his predecessours have made, he is bound
to keepe them, if the prince unto whome hee hath so giuen his word have therein
any intrest; yea although he have not sworne at al: But if the prince to whom the promise was made have therin no intrest,
neither the promise nor the oath can bind him that made the promise. The like
we say, if promise be made by a soueraigne prince unto his subiects, or before
hee bee chosen; for in that case there is no difference, as many thinke: not
for that the prince is bound to his laws, or by his predecessours; but to the
iust conuentions and promises that hee hath made, be it by oath, or without any
oath at all; as should a priuat man bee: and for the same causes that a priuat
man may be releeued from his vniust and vnreasonable promise, as for that it
was too grieuous, or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumuented; or
induced thereinto by errour, or force, or iust feare; or by some great hurt:
euen for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the
diminishing of his maiesty, if he be a
soueraigne prince. And so our maxime resteth, That the prince is not subiect to
his lawes, nor to the lawes of his predecessours: but well to his owne iust and
reasonable conuentions, and in the obseruation whereof the subiects in generall
or particular have intrest. Wherein we see many to be deceiued, which make a
confusion of lawes, and of a princes contracts, which they call also lawes: as
well as he which calleth a princes contracts pactionarie lawes; as they tearme
them in the state of Arragon, when the king maketh any law at the request of
the people, and receiueth therefore any money or subsidie; then the Arragonians
say that the king is unto that law bound, but not so
unto other lawes: and yet neuerthelesse they confesse that the prince
may derogat from the same, the cause of the
law ceasing: which to bee true, as it may by reason and authoritie be
confirmed, so was there no need of money, or of oath, to bind the soueraigne
prince, if it concerned his subiects (to whome he had promised) toThe word of a prince ought to be as an Oracle. have the
law kept. For the word of a prince ought to bee as an Oracle; which looseth his
dignitie, if his subiects have so euill an opinion of him, as not to beleeue
him except he sweare; or else to be so couetous, as not to regard his promise
except therefore he receiue money. And yet neuerthelesse the maxime of right
still standeth in force, That the soueraigne prince may derogat unto the lawes
that hee hath promised and sworne to keepe, if the equitie thereof ceased, and
that of himself without consentThe reason of the law
ceasing, the law it selfe ought also to cease. of his subiects: yet
true it is, that a generall obscure or doubtfull derogation, in this case
sufficeth not, but that there must bee a
derogation in words speciall. But if there bee no probable cause of abrogating
the law he hath promised to keepe, he shall do against the dutie of a good
prince, if he shall go about to abrogat such a law: and yet for al that is he
not bound unto the couenants and oathes of his predecessours, further than
standeth with his profit, except he be their heire. And for this cause the
states of Arragon complained to king Alphonsus, for that
he for gaine had altered and chaunged the money of Arragon, to the great
preiudice of the subiects, and marchants straungers, contrarie to the promise
made by Iames the first, king of Arragon, in the yeare
1265, in the moneth of August, and confirmed by king Peter, in the yeare 1336, who swore unto the estates neuer to chaunge
the money; in recompence wherof the people had
promised every one of them every seuen yeares to pay unto him a maruedie, if
they were in goods worth fifteene maruadies. Now the kingdome of Arragon
discendeth by inheritance unto the heires, both males and females; but the
effect of the contract betwixt the prince and the people ceasing, as the
subsidie for which the kings of Arragon had made that order which I have said,
the king was no more bound to keepe his promise: then were the people to pay
the subsidie upon them imposed.
We must not then confound the lawes and the contracts of soueraigne princes,
forSoueraigne prin ces no bound
unto their laws▪ may yet by their contracts bind themselves unto their
subiects. that the law dependeth of the will and pleasure of him that
hath the soueraigntie, who may bind all his subiects, but cannot bind himselfe:
but the contract betwixt the prince and his subiects is mutual, which
reciprocally bindeth both parties, so that the one partie may not start therefrom, to the preiudice, or without the
consent of the other. In which case the prince hath nothing aboue the subiect,
but that the equitie of the law which he hath sworne to keepe, ceasing, he is
no more bound to the keeping thereof, by his oath or promise, as we have before
said: which the subiects cannot do among themselves, if they bee not by the
prince releeued. The soueraigne princes also wel aduised,Whether Soueraigne princes well aduised, ought to bind themselves by oath
to keepe the lawes of their predecessors. will neuer take oath to
keepe the lawes of their predecessours; for otherwise they are not soueraignes.
But then might some man say, Why doth the German emperour, who hath a
preheminence aboue all other Christian kings, before he be crowned sweare
betwixt the hands of the archbishop of Cullen, to keepe the laws of the empire,
the golden Bul, to establish iustice, to revenge the pope, to keepe the
catholike faith, to defend the widdowes, the
fatherlesse, and poore? Which forme of oath, wherewith the emperour Charles the fift bound himselfe when he was crowned,
cardinall Caietan is said to have sent unto the pope,
whose legat he then was in Germanie. Whereunto I aunswere, that the emperour is
subiect unto the states of the empire; neither taketh upon him the soueraigntie
over the princes electours, nor over the estates; as we shall in due place
declare. And if a man say, That the kings of the Epirots in auntient time
swore, that they should raigne well and orderly according to the lawes and
customs of the countrey, and the subiects also on their part swore to defend
and maintaine their king, according to the lawes and
customes of their countrey: I say yet notwithstanding all these oathes, that the soueraigne prince might derogat
from the lawes, or frustrat and disanull the same, the reason and equitie of
them ceasing. The oath also of our kings, which is the fairest and shortest
that can be, containeth nothing in it concerning the keeping of the lawes and
customes of the countrey or predecessours. The words I will set downe, as they
be taken word for word out of the librarie of Rheims, out of an auntient booke,
which thus beginneth Iuliani ad Erigium Regem Anno 1058
Henrico Regnante 32 iiij. Calend.
Iunij. Ego Philippus Deo propiciante mox futurus RexThe oath of Phi lip the first, son to Henry the first, king
of Fraunce, at the time of his Coronation.Francorum, in die ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo &
sanctis eius, quod vnicuique de nobis commissis canonicum priuilegium, &
debitam legem atque iustitiam conseruabo, & defensionem adiuante Domino quantum potero exhibebo: sicut Rex in
suo regno vnicuiqueEpiscopo & Ecclesiae sibi commisse per rectum exhibere
debet: populo quoque nobis credito, me dispensationem legum in suo iure
consistentem, nostra auctoritate concessurum. viz. The booke of Iulian Erigius, Anno 1058, in the xxxij. yeare of the
raigne of Henrie the first, the fourth of the calends of
Iune. I Philip, by the grace of God forthwith to become
king of Fraunce, on the day of my inuesting, doe promise before God and his
Saints, that I will keepe canonicall priueledge, with due administration of law
and iustice, to euerie one committed to our charge: and by the help of God to
the vttermost of my power defend them, in such manner as a king in his kingdome
ought of right to giue unto euerie bishop & church committed unto him:
& by our authoritie to grant unto the people committed unto vs, the
execution of the lawes remaining in force. I
know that which is found in the librarie of the Beauuais is like unto this, and
the oath of the same Philip the first: but I have seene
another in a little auntient booke in the Abbay of S. Allier in Auergne, in
these words; Ie iure au nom de Deiu tout puissant, &
promets de gouuerner bien et deuement les subiects commis en ma garde, &
faire de tout mon pouuoir iudgement, iustice, et misericorde: I sweare
by the name of the Almighty God, and promise well and duly to gouerne my
subiects committed to my charge: and with all my power to doe them iudgement,
iustice, and mercie. Which seemeth to have bene taken from the prophet Hieremie, where he saith, I am the
great eternallChap. 9.God, which do iudgement, iustice, and mercie; and in which
things I take singular pleasure. Which formes of oathes shew plainely
unto the eye, that the oathes contained in the
booke lately printed and published by the title of Sacre Du
Roy, are much changed and altred from the auntient forme. But both in
the one and the other oath, a man may see that there is not any bond for the
soueraigne prince to keepe the lawes, more than so farre as right and iustice
requireth. Neither is it to be found that the auntient kings of the Hebrewes
tooke any oath: no not they which were anointed by Samuel,
Helias and others. But some take a more precise oath, such as is the
oath of Henry the 3 king of Fraunce, and of Polonia. Ego Henricus Rex Poloniae, &c. Iuro Deo omnipotenti, quòd
omnia iura, libertates, priuilegia publica & priuata iuri communi non
contraria, Ecclesijs,The auntient Hebrew kings not sworne when they were
annointed by the Prophet.principibus, Baronibus, nobilibus, ciuibus, incolis, per meos
praedecessores Reges, & quoscumque principes Dominos, Regni Poloniae
iustè concessa, & quae in interregno decretasunt seruabo, iusque omnibus incolis more maiorum reddam. Ac
si quidem (quod absit) Sacramentum meum violauero nullam nobis incolae Regni
obedientiam praestare tenebuntur, &c. sic Deus adiuuet. viz. I Henrie king of Polonia, &c. Sweare unto almightie
God, that I will keepe all the lawes, liberties, publick and priuat priueleges,
not contrarie to the common law, iustly graunted unto churches, princes,
barrons, noble men▪ citisens, or inhabitants, by the kings my predecessours, or
whatsoeuer other princes, lords of the kingdome of Polonia: as also all such
things as were decreed in the time of the vacancie of the kingdome: and that I
will administer iustice unto all the inhabitants of this
kingdome, after the manner of our auneestours: And if I shall violat this mine
oath (which God forbid) then the
inhabitants of this kingdom shall be bound to yeeld unto vs no obedience,
&c. And so God helpe vs. But this forme of oath sauoureth not of royall
maiestie, but the condition of a meaner prince, such an one as (amongst others)
is chiefe in a Commonweale.
But touching the lawes which concerne the state of the realme, and the
establishing thereof; forasmuch as they are annexed & vnited to the crowne,
the prince cannot derogatLawes royall which concerne the
state of the realme not to be infringed by a
soueraign prince. from them, such as is the law Salique: & albeit
that he so do, the successor may alwaies disanull that which hath bene done
unto the preiudice of the laws royall; upon which the soueraigne maiestie is
stayed & grounded. Yet might one say, That Henry the
5, king of England & France, marying Katherine of
France, sister to Charles the 7, took an oath to keep the high court of parliament in the
liberties & soueraigntie therof; and to cause iustice to be administred in
the realme, according unto the customes and lawes thereof. See the words of the
decree agreed upon for to make him successour unto the crowne of Fraunce, the
xxj of May, in the yeare 1420. I say they caused him to take such an oath, for
that he was a straunger come to a new kingdome; from which the lawfull
inheritour was excluded by a decree of the Parliament of Paris, giuen for
default and conrumacie; for the murther committed uppon the person of Iohn duke of Burgoigne, which was by sound of trumpet
pronounced at the marble table in the presence of the princes. But as for
generall and particular lawes and customs, which concerne not the establishing
of the state of the realme, but the right of men in priuat, they have not used to have bene with vs otherwise
chaunged, but after generall assemblie of the three estates of Fraunce well and
duly made; or of every bailiwike in particular: not for that it is necessarie
for the king to rest on their aduice, or that heeParliaments
impaire not, but most of all show the maiestie and greatnesse of a soueraign
prince may not do the contrarie to that they demaund, if naturall
reason and iustice so require. And in that the greatnesse and maiestie of a
true soueraigne prince, is to bee knowne; when the estates of all the people
assembled together, in all humilitie present their requests and supplications
to their prince., without hauing any power in any thing to commaund or
determine, or to giue voice, but that that which it pleaseth the king to like
or dislike of, to commaund or forbid, is holden for law, for an edict and
ordinance. Wherein they which have written of the dutie of magistrats, &
other such like books, have deceiued
themselves, in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the
prince; a thing which oft times causeth the true subiects to reuolt from the
obedience which they owe unto their soueraigne prince, & ministreth matter
of great troubles in Commonweals. Of which their opinion, there is neither
reason nor ground, except the king be captiue, furious, or in his infancie, and
so needeth to have a protector or lieutenant appointed him by the suffrages of
the people. For otherwise if the king should be subiect unto the assemblies and
decrees of the people, hee should neither bee king nor soueraigne; and the
Commonwealth neither realme not monarchie, but a mee
Aristocratie of many lords in power equall, where the greater part commaundeth
the lesse in generall, and every one in
particular: and wherein the edicts and lawes are not to be published in the
name of him that ruleth, but in the name and authoritie of the states, as in an
Aristocraticall Seignorie, where hee that is chiefe hath no power, but oweth
obeysance unto the commaundements of the seignorie: unto who me yet they all
and euerie one of them faigne themselves to owe their faith and obedience:
which are al things so absurd, as hard it is to say which is furthest from
reason. So when Charles the eight, the French king,
being then but about xiiij. yeres old, held a parliament at Tours, although the
power of the parliament was neuer beforeThe parlements of
Fraunce. no after so great as in those
times, yet Relli, then speaker for the people, turning
himselfe unto the king, thus beginneth his oration,
which is yet in print extant. Most▪high, most mightie, and most Christian king, our naturall and
onely lord, we your humble and obedient subiects, &c. Which are come
hither by your commaund, in all humilitie reuerence and subiection present
our selues before you, &c. And have giuen mee in charge from all this
noble assemblie, to declare unto you the good will and hartie desire they
have with a most firme resolution and purpose to serue, obey, and aid you in
all your affaires, commaundements and pleasures. In briefe, all that
his oration and speech is nothing els but a declaration of all their good wils
towards the king, and of their humble obedience and loialtie. The like speech
almost we see was also used in the parliament at Orleans▪ unto king Charles the ninth, when he was yet but scarce eleuen
yeares old. Neither are the parliaments of Spaine otherwise holden, but that
euen a greater obedience & a greater
loialtie of all the people in generall, is giuen unto the king, as is to bee
seene in the acts of the parliament holden at Toledo by king Philip, in the yeare 1552, when he was yet scarce full xxv▪ yeares
old. The aunswers also of the king of Spaine unto theThe
parliament of Spaine. requests and humble supplications of his
people, are giuen in these words, We will; or else, We decree and ordaine; and such other like aunsweres,
importing the refusall or consent of the prince: yea the subsidie that the
subiects pay unto the king of Spaine, they call seruice. Wherby it appeareth
them to be deceiued, which say that the kings of Arragon cannot derogat from
the priueledges of the states, by reason of the priueleges giuen them by king
Iames, in the yeare 1260, and confirmed in the yeare
1320. For as the priueleges was of no force after the death of the king,
without the confirmation of his successours:
so also the same confirmation of the rest of the kings following was
necessarie, for that by the law no man can raigne over his equals. And albeit
that in the parliaments of England, which have commonly bene holden euerie
third yeare; there the states seeme to have a verie great libertie (as the
Northerne people almost all breath thereafter) yet so it is, that in effect
they proceed not, but by way of supplications and requests unto the king. As in
the parliament of England, holden in October,The parliaments
of England. 1566, when the estates by a common consent had resolued
(as they gaue the queene to vnderstand) not to entreat of any thing, vntill she
had first appointed who should succeed he in the
crowne: She gaue them no other aunswere, But that they were not to make her
graue before she were dead. All whose resolutions were to no purpose without
her good liking: neither did she in that
any thing that they required. Now also the estates of England are neuer
otherwise assembled (no more than they are in this realme of Fraunce, or
Spaine) than by parliament writs, and expresse commandements proceeding from
the king. Which showeth verie well that the estates have no power of themselves
to determine, commaund, or decree any thing; seeing that they cannot so much as
assemble themselves; neither beeing assembled, depar, without expresse
commaundement from the king. Yet this may seeme one speciall thing▪ that the
laws made by the king of England, at the request of the states, cannot bee
againe repealed, but by calling a parliament of the estates: Which is much vsed
and ordinarily done, as I have vnderstood by M. Dale,
the English ambassadour, an honourable gentleman D. Dale. and a man of good understanding, who yet
assured me, that the king receiued or reiected the law as seemed best vnto
himself: and stucke not to dispose therof at his pleasure, and contrarie to the
will of the estates: as wee see Henry the eight to haue
alwaies used his soueraigne power, and with his onely word to have disanulled
the decrees of parliament▪ albeit that the kings of England are not otherwise
crowned, but that they must sweare inuiolatly to keepe the lawes and customes
of the land: which how that oath is to be vnderstood, I referre you to that
which wee have before reported. But here might some obiect and say▪ That the
estates of England suffer not any extraordinary charges
and subsidies to be laid upon them, if it be not first agreed upon and
consented unto in the high court of
parliament: for so it is prouided by an auntient law of Edward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a
buckler hath bene oftentimes seene to defend it selfe against the prince.
Whereunto mine aunswere is, That other kings have in this point no more power
than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the
world, at his pleasure to rayse taxes upon the people, no more than to take
another mans goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely
shewed in the parliament holden at Tours, as weread in his Comentaries: and yet
neuerthelesse if the necessitie of the Commonweale be such as cannot stay for
the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the
assemblie of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good
foresiight and wisedome, next unto God, the
health & welfare of the whole state dependeth: but concerning all sorts of
taxes and tributes, more shall be said in place convenient. True it is, that
the kings of England, since the time of Henrie the first
(as we read in Polidore) have as it were alwaies
accustomed every third yeare to demaund of the people an extraordinarie
subsidie, which is for the most part graunted. As in the parliament holden in
Aprill, in the yeare 1570, the queene of England by the consent of the estates,
drew from them five hundred thousand crownes (as the like whereof is sometime
also used to bee done in Spaine) from which manner of tribute she had now many
yeares before abstained. Now here might some obiect also, That the estates of
England have power to condemne,Polydor. in hist. Anglor. as king Henrie the
sixt was condemned by the estates, to be kept prisoner in the Towre of London. I say that that was done by the ordinarie
judges of England, the lords spirituall and temporall of the upper house, at
the request of them of the neather house; who presented also a bill of request
to the upper house, in the yeare 1571, tending to the end, that the earles of
Northumberland, and Westmerland, & other conspiratours, might be declared
to have incurred the paines contained in the lawes of the land, made against
them that were guiltie of treason. Which showeth well that the estates in bodie
together have neither power nor iurisdiction, but that the power is with the
judges of the upper house, as should be, if the parliament of Paris assisted by
the prince and peers, should be from the estates in bodie together seperated,
to iudge of themselves of great matters.
But yet there remaineth another difficultie to resolue upon, concerning the
aforesaid estates of England, who seemed to have power to commaund, resolue,
and decide of the affaires of state. For queene Marie
hauing assembled them for the passing of the articles of agreement concerning
the mariage with king Philip:
after many disputes and difficulties proposed, in fine, the conclusion of the
treatie was made the second day of Aprill in the yeare 1554, in forme of a
decree conceiued in the name of the estates, in these words: The articles
aforesaid, and that which dependeth thereof, seene and considered of, by the
estates assembled in parliament, holden at the palace of Westminster, it hath
bene said, That concerning the disposition and collation of all benefices and
offices, they are reserued unto the queene; as also of all the fruits,
profits, rents, reuenews of her countries,
lands, and seignories, the queene, as sole and alone shall enioy the royaltie
and soueraignetie of her said realmes, countries, lands, and subiects,
absolute, after the consummation of the mariage; so that the said prince shall
not pretend by the way of the courtesie of England, any claime to the crowne or
soueraigntie of the realme, nor to any other rights, preheminences, or
authorities: That all mandats and letters pattents shal passe under the name of
the said prince and queene iointly: which letters signed with the hand of the
queene alone, and sealed with the great seale, shall be auailable: but being
not signed by the said queene, shall be void and to none
effect. I have willingly set downe the ratification at large, to show that the
soueraigntie wholly without diuision
belonged unto the kings of England, and that the estates had but the view
thereof: For the ratification of the estates, no more than of a court, a
parliament, a corporation, or colledge, sufficeth not to show the power to
commaund, but rather their consent to strengthen the acts, which gtherwise
might have bene called into some doubt, after the death of the queene: or in
her life time by the magistrats and officers of the realme, opposing themselves
against her. Wherfore we conclude the maiestie of a prince to be in nothing
altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the states: but to
the contrarie his maiestie thereby to bee much the greater, & the more
honorable, seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soueraigne:
albeit that in such assemblies, princes not willing to reiect their
subiects, graunt, and passe many things,
whereunto they would not otherwise yeeld their consent, if they were not
ouercome by the requests, prayers, and iust grieuances of the people,
anfflicted and vexed oftentimes without the knowledge of the prince, who
yeeldeth many things unto them all, which he would deny unto them in
particular; or at leastwise not so easily graunt them: either for that the
voyces of euerie one in particular, are lesse heard, than of al together: or
for that the prince at other times commonly vseth to see but by other mens
eyes▪ and to heare but by other mens eares and reports: whereas in parliament
hee seeth and heareth his people himselfe, and so enforced with shame, the
feare of religion, or his owne good disposition, admitteth their iust
requests.
So wee see the principall point of soueraigne maiestie, and absolute power, to
consistThe principall point of soueraigntie.
principally in giuing laws unto the subiects in generall, without their
consent. And not to speake of straunge countries, we have oftentimes seene in
this realme of FraunceLaws in Fraunce altred by the prince,
without the assembling or consent of the .
certaine generall customs abolished by the edicts of our kings, without the
assembling or consent of the estates: when the iniustice of the same is
plainely to be seene; as the custome of this realme, commonly used in every
place, concerning the succession of mothers unto the goods of their children,
hath bene chaunged without assembling of the estates, either in generall or
particular. Which chaunging of customes is no new thing, for since the time of
Philip the faire, the custome generall in this
realme, which suffered not him that was ouerthrowne in sute, to be condemned in
charges also, was disanulled by edict, without
assembling the estates. And the generall custome which forbad to receiue the
testimonie of women in civill causes; was abolished by the edict of Charles the sixt, without calling together of the
estates. For it behoueth that the soueraigne prince should have the lawes in
his power, to chaunge and amend them, according as the case shall require; as
saith the lawyer Sextus Cecilius: euen as the master
pilot ought to have the helme alwaies in his hand, at discretion to turne it as
the wether or occsion requireth: for otherwise the ship might oftentimes perish
before hee could take aduice of them whome he did carrie. Which is a thing
necessarie, not onely unto a soueraigne prince, but sometimes unto a magistrat
also, the necessitie of the Commonweale so requiring, as we have said of Pompee, and of the Decemuiri. And for that cause Augustus after he had
ouerthrowne Marcus Antonius at Actium, was by the Senat
absolued from the power of the lawes, albeit that he as then was but chiefe of
the Commonweale, and no soueraigne prince, as we shall in due place declare.
And after that Vespatian the emperour was also exempted
from the power of the lawes, not by the Senat onely, but onely by the expresse
law of the people as many thinke, and as yet it is to be found engrauen in
marble in Rome: which the lawyer calleth the law Royall, howbeit that it hath
no great probabilitie, that the people which long time before had lost al their
power, should giue it to him that was stronger than themselves.
Now if it be profitable that the soueraigne prince, for
the good government of an estate, should haue
the power of the laws under him; then it is more expedient for the gouernour in
an Aristocraticall estate; and necessarie for the people in their popular
estate: for the monarch is divided from the people; and in the Aristocraticall
state, the lords or gouernours are divided from the commonaltie and vulgar
people; in such sort as that in both the one & other Commonweal, there are
two parties, that is to wit, he or they that hold the soueraigntie on the one
part, and the people on the other; which causeth the difficulties which are
betwixt them for the rights of soueraigntie, which cease in the popular estate.
For if the prince or lords which hold the estate be bound to obserue the laws,
as many think they are, and that they cannot make any law without the consent
of the people, or of the Senat; it cannot also bee againe by law
repealed, without the consent of the one or
of the other: which can take no place in a popular estate, seeing that the
people make but one bodie, and cannot bind it selfe unto it selfe. But, Why
then (will some say) did the people of Rome sweare to keepe the lawes? That was
first begun by Saturnius the Tribune of the people, that
so hee might the more straitly bind the Senators to the lawes by him made:
which Dio Nicaeus writeth to have bene afterward done in
all lawes. But it is one thing to bind all together, and to bind euerie one in
particular: for so al the citisens particularly swore to the obseruation of the
lawes, but not all together; for that every one of them in particular was bound
unto the power of them all in generall. But an oath could not be giuen by them
all: for why, the people in generall is a certaine vniuersall bodie, in power
and nature divided from every man in
particular. Then againe to say truly, an oath cannot beeAn
oath cannot be made but by the lesser to the greater. made but by the
lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can bee greater than the
whole body of the people themselves. But in a monarchie it is otherwise, where
euerie one in particular, and all the people in generall, and (as it were) in
one bodie, must sweare to the obseruation of the lawes, and their faithfull
alleageance to one soueraigne monarch; who next unto God (of whome he holdeth
his scepter & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carrieth alwaies with
it reuerence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still giuen unto a
superiour: and therefore the vassall giueth his oath unto his lord, but
receiueth none from him againe, although that they be mutually bound the one of
them unto the other.
But if it be so, that a soueraigne prince next under God, is not by oath bound
unto any, why did Traian the emperor standing upright,
before the Consul sitting, solemnly sweare to the keeping of the lawes? That
seemeth to have beene so done by him for two causes, the one, for that hauing
gotten the Consulship, together with his principalitie, he swore as the Consuls
did at their entrance into their Consulship; as also al the new magistrats did
the first of Ianuarie, after they had sacrificed in the Capitoll: The other
reason was, for that the Roman emperours at the first had not any soueraigne
power, but were onely called princes, that is to say, the chiefe men in the
Commonweale; which fo me of a Commonweale, is called
a principalitie, and not a monarchy:A principalitie no
Monarch. but a principalitie is called a certaine forme of an
Aristocratie, wherein one is in honor dignitie
and place, aboue the rest: as amongst the Venetians: For the Roman emperour or
prince, at the first was in honour aboue the rest, but not in power: howbeit
that in truth the greatest part of the Roman emperors were indeed tyrants.
Which is well to be vnderstood, for that which happened in the raigne of Caligula the cruell tyrant,The Roman
emperours for most part tyrants. who hauing bid certaine forten kings
and allies of the people of Rome to supper, and question there at the table
arising about their honour and greatnesse; hee to stay their strife, rapt out
this verse, taken out of Homers Iliades;
.
Good it is not to be ruled by many,One king, one lord, if there be any.
And it missed but a little (as saith Suetonius) but that
hee had euen then chaungedSueton. in Caligula. his
principalitie into a monarchie, and set a crowne upon his owne head. For in a
principalitie the prince or chiefe magistrat, who is aboue the rest, is yet no
soueraigne; as we shall hereafter show in the Commonweals of the Venetians, and
of the Germans. And albeit that many of the Roman emperors, had taken upon them
the soueraigntie, and by diuers sleights wrested from the people their
libertie; yet neuerthelesse it was noWhy Traian & some
other good princes have sworne to obserue and keepe the lawes.
maruell if Traian, one of the best princes that euer
lived in the world, swore (as is aforesaid) to
keep the laws, although he in the name of a soueraigne prince were exempted; to
the end by his own example to moue his subiects to the more carefull obseruing
of them: but neuer one of the emperours before him so swore to the obseruing of
the lawes. And therefore Plinie the younger, who in a
pannegiricall oration, set forth the praises of that most worthy prince,
speaking of the oath of Traian, crieth out in this sort,
A great noueltie (saith he) and
neuer before heard of, hee sweareth by whome wee sweare. And after that
in the declination of the empire, Theodoric desirous to
gaine the favour of the Senat and people of Rome, followed the example of Traian, as wee read in Cassiodore, Ecce
Traiani nostri clarum seculis reparamus exemplum; iurat vobis per quem
iuratis, Behold (saith he) we renew the example of our Traian, famous through
all ages; he sweareth unto you, by whome you your selues sweare. And like it
is, that other princes have used the same custome, of taking the like oath at
their coronation, although they have the soueraigntie by the right of
succession. True it is, that the kings of the Northerne people take such oathes
as derogat from their soueraigntie: As for example, the nobilitie of Denmarke
withstood the coronation of Frederick, in the moneth of
August, in the yeare 1559, vntil that he had solemnly sworne that he should not
put any noble man to death, or confiscat his goods, vntill he were iudged by
the Senat; and that all noble men should have iurisdiction & power of life
& death over their subiects, without appeale; and that the king should haue
no part in their fines or confiscation of their goods; and also that the king
should not giue any office without consent of
the counsell: which are all arguments, that the king of Denmarke is no absolute
soueraigne. But this oath was first drawne out of the mouth of Frederick this mans grandfather, at such time as he made
warre against Christierne king of Denmark (who was
driuen out of his kingdome, and after long banishment returning, at length died
in prison, wherein he had lived twentie five yeares) and was afterward
confirmed by Christierne father of Frederick, who tooke the same oath. And to the end hee should not
violat, or breake the same, the nobility to that purpose treated a league with
the towne of Lubec, and Sigismundus Augustus king of
Polonia, who also himselfe seemes not to have much more power over his owne
subiects than hath the king of Denmarke over his.
But of two things the one must be: that is to wit, the prince that sweareth to
keepeTwo great inconueniences ensu ing unto soueraigne
princes by swearing to obserue the laws. the lawes of his countrey,
must either not have the soueraigntie; or els become a periured man, if he
shall abrogat but one law, contrarie unto his oath: whereas it is not only
profitable that a soueraigne prince should sometimes abrogat some such lawes,
but also necessarie for him to alter or correct them, as the infinit varietie
of places, times, and persons shall require. Or if wee shall say the prince to
be still a soueraigne, and yet neuerthelesse with such condition, as that he
can make no law without the aduice of his counsell or people; he must also be
dispensed with by his subiects, for the oath that he
hath made for the inuiolat obseruation of the laws; & the subiects againe
which are obliged & bound unto the lawes,
be it in particular, or in generall, have also need to be dispensed withall by
their prince, for feare they should bee periured: so shall it come to passe
that the maiestie of the Commonweale▪ enclining now to this side, now to that
side, sometimes the prince, sometimes the people bearing sway; shall have no
certaintie to rest upon: which are notable absurdities, & altogether
incompatible with the maiestie of absolute soueraigntie, & contrarie both
to law & reason. And yet we see many, euen them that thinke themselves to
see more in the matter than others, which maintaine it to be most necessarie,
that princes should be bound by oath to keep the laws & customs of their
country. In which doing they weaken & ouerthrow all the rights of soueraign
maiesty, which ought to be most sacred & holy, & confound the
soueraigntie of one soueraigne monarch, with
an Aristocratie, or Democratie: whereby it commeth to passe, that many princes,
seeing that power to be taken from them, which properly belongeth unto them,
& that men would make them subiect to the laws of their country, dispense
in the end, not only with those their country laws, but euen with the laws of
God & nature, making account of them all alike, as if they were bound to
neither, but of both discharged. But to make all this matter more plaine to be
vnderstood,Examples to proue that lawes once made and
established, may not by them that have the soueraigntie be againe
chaunged. we will by examples make manifest that before said. Wee
read it thrice repeated in Dan. that by the customs of
the Medes & Persians, the laws by their kings made, were immutable &
irreuocable; & albeit that the king of the Medes would have exempted the
Prophet Daniel, from the punishment of death, which by
the edict which hee had broken was to haue
bene inflicted upon him; yet was he by the princes forbidden so to doe, who
shewed him, that the edict by him made could not by the law of their countrey
be reuoked: wherunto when the king euen against his will (as should seeme) had
assented, Daniel was accordingly condemned unto the
beasts, and so cast unto the hungrie lions. If then the greatest monarch upon
earth could not derogat from the lawes by himselfe made; the grounds of
maiestie and soueraigntie by vs before laid, must needs faile: and that not
onely in a monarchie, but in a popular state also: as was that of Athens,
whereof Thucydides speaking, showeth that the warre of
PeloponesusThe lawes of the Athenians to be chaunged. began for
a law made by the Athenians, whereby the Megariens were forbidden to come into
the port of Athens; wherein the Megariens complained unto their allies
and friends themselves to be wronged and
the lawes of nations violated: whereupon the Lacedemonians sent their
ambassadours to Athens, to request the Athenians, that that law might be againe
repealed. Wherunto Pericles then in greatest grace &
authoritie with the people, aunswered the ambassodours, That by the expresse
lawes of their auncestours, the lawes once made and confirmed by the people,
and so hanged up uppon the common pillar, might neuer be taken away. Which if
it were so▪ the people was bound not to their owne lawes onely, but euen to the
lawes of their predecessours also. And that more is, Theodosius the emperour would not that the lawes by himself made,
should be of any force, except they were confirmed by the generall decree of
the whole Senat. In like maner also by the decree of Lewes the eleuenth, the French king,
concerning the institution of knights of the order, in the eight article, it is
expresly said, That the king shall vndertake no warre, nor other thing
whatsoeuer of great importance, concerning the high estate of the commonweale,
without knowledge thereof giuen unto the knights of the order, so to have and
vse their aduice and counsell. And for that cause, as I suppose, the edicts of
our kings are of none effect, vntill they be read, published, verified, and
registred in parliament, with the consent of the great Atturney generall, and
the approbation of the court. And in England it is byPolydore. auntient custome receiued, that lawes concerning the state
of the Commonweale should take no place, except they
were authorised by the Estates assembled in the high court of Parliament.
These reasons, although they seeme probable, yet are they not sufficient to
proue the rule concerning Soueraignetie, before by vs set downe, not to be
true: For, as forThe former reasons aunswered. that
which was obiected concerning the law of the Medes, and authoritie of the king
in abrogating of the lawes; it is manifest that it was false, and by the
courtiers his enemies deuised against the life of Daniel: who grieuing to see a man for his wisdome and royall discent
honourable, and yet a stranger, to be in greater grace and favour with the king
than themselves, and exalted in their countrey in degree next unto the king,
made that false allegation of the strength of their lawes against him, with
whose accusation the king deceiued, or els to proue if Daniels God could saue him from death, caused him to be cast unto the hungrie lyons. But hauing in him
seene the wonderfull power and mercie of God towards his seruants, he gaue Daniels enemies to bee deuoured of the same lyons:
wherein the end well shewed, the king to have beene aboue the lawes of his
countrey. In like sort Darius Memnon at the request of a
young Iewish ladie reuokedAhashuerosh Hester. the
decree whereby he had appointed all the nation of the Iewes to be vtterly
rooted out. As for that which Pericles answered unto the
ambassadours of the Lacedemonians, he therein respected not so much the truth,
as the shew thereof, that so taking occasion of warre, which he sought after,
he might frustrate the accusations of his aduersaries, and danger of the law,
as Timaeus and Theopompus haue
truly written, and Plutarch hath not denied. And that
was it for which hee said to the Lacedemonian
ambassadours, That the edicts once hanged upon the pillars, might not be taken
away: which his sophistication the ambassadours returned unto him againe, with
a Lacedemonian quip, saying, That they desired not to have the edict taken away
from the pillar, but onely the table turned. For if the lawes of the Athenians
had bene immutable, why had they such varietie, and infinit multitude of lawes,
which they were wont to establish at the continuall motion of their magistrats,
& to abrogat the old, that so the new might take place? But that Pericles therin abused the Lacedemonian ambassadors, it
is manifest by the oration of Demosthenes against Leptines, who had preferred a request unto the people, to
the end that by a perpetuall and irreuocable edict it might from that time
forward bee forbidden upon paine of death, to present any request vnto
the people for the obtaining of any
priueledge or exemption, and the like paine to bee inflicted upon him that
should so much as speake for repealing that edict. Wherein Demosthenes hardly withstood Leptines, & so
wrought the matter, that his request was receiued, hauing manifestly showed the
people by consenting to this law, to be dispoiled not onely of the prerogative
that it had to graunt exemptions and priueledges to such as should well deserue
of them, but also of the power to abrogat lawes by them made, if the necessitie
of the Commonweale should so require. They had also a popular action,
concerning the breaking of lawes, which was commenced against them that would
have the people to passe any edict contrarie to the lawes before receiued; as
one may see in all the orations of Demosthenes: but yet
that neuer letted, but that the new and
profitable lawes were still preferred before the old vniust lawes. And in like
case the generall edict, wherein it was decred, That the offendors fine once
adiudged and set downe by the people, might not in any wise bee forgiuen or
abated; was yet many times reuoked, and that once in favour of Pericles himselfe, and another time in favour of Cleomides and Demosthenes, who by
diers iudgements of the people, had bene euerie
one of them condemned in a fine ofPlut▪ in
Peri. thirtie thousand crownes. They say also in this realme of
Fraunce, the fine once being paid, be it right or be it wrong, is neuerDemetri. Demost. againe to be restored: and yet we see
oftentimes the contrarie, and the same to bee againe
recouered. It is then a formalitie which is and hath alwaies beene in euerie
Commonweale, that the law makers to giue
unto their lawes the greater weight and authoritie, ioyne thereunto these words
of course, Edicto perpetuo & irreuocabili sancimus,
&c. By a perpetuall and irreuocable decree we ordaine. And with vs
in the beginningThe clause of perpetuitie why annexed vnto
lawes, and yet n lawes perpetuall. of every
law, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris: which words
are added to the eternall memorie of posteritie, least the law should by any be
infringed. And the more to shew the difference of the lawes, such as be made
for perpetuitie, are with vs sealed with greene waxe, and strings of greene and
purple silke: whereas unto the temporary Edicts are put neither strings of
silke, nor greene waxe, but yellow onely. And yet for all this, there is no law
which is perpetuall, no more than were those of the Greekes and Romanes, who in
making their lawes, commonly used to ioyne thereunto this clause, Vt nec per Senatum, nec per
populum, lex infirmari possit: That the law might not either by the
Senate or the people bee weakened: which wordes if they imported a perpetuitie,
why did the people almost in the same moment that it had established a law,
againe abrogate the same. Concerning which matter, Cicero writing unto his friend Atticus: Thou
knowest (sayth he) the Tribune Claudius to haue
decreed that his law should hardly, or not at all, by the Senate or the
people be infringed. But it is sufficiently knowne that regard was neuer had
unto this clause: Vt nec per Senatum nec per populum lex infirmari possit:
for otherwise (sayth he) one should neuer see law
repealed, seeing that there is no law which carieth not this clause with it:
from which men yet doe ordinarily derogate. Thus much he. Which is yet
more plainely to be vnderstood out of the Oration of Fabius Ambustus against the
intercession of the Tribunes of the people, who maintained, that the people
could not chuse both the Consuls of the nobilitie, for that by a law before
made it was ordained, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the
people: Fabius alledged the law of the twelue Tables in
these words, Quod postremum iussit populus id ratum
esto, What the people shall last decree, let that stand for good.
So we see the Medes, the Persians, the Greeks, the Latines, to have used the
same forme and cautions, for the establishing of their edicts and lawes, that
our kings doe: who unto the lawes by them made, oftentimes ioyne this clause:
Without that therefrom can by vs, or our successors be
derogated. Or els, without regard hauing unto any
derogation,which from this present we have declared to be of none
effect. And yet no man can so make a law unto himselfe, but that he may
depart therefrom, as we have before said. Wherefore the repeales and
derogations of the former edicts and lawes, are almost alwaie subiect unto the
latter edicts and derogations. And therefore Solon did
wisely, who would not bind the Athenians to keep his lawes for euer, but
contented himselfe to have them kept for an hundred yeares: and yet
neuerthelesse hee yet liuing,* Plut. in Sol. and
present, suffered (though against his will) the greatest part of them to bee
chaunged.
But that publication or approbation of lawes in the assembly of the Estates or
parliament, is with vs of great power and importance for the keeping of the
lawes; not that the Soueraigne prince is bound
to any such approbation, or cannot of himselfe make a law without the
authoritie or consent of the States or the people: but yet it is a courteous
part to do it by the good liking of the Senat, as saith Theodosius, whichThe soueraigne prince more of
curtesie than of necesitie bound to obserue the
lawes.Baldus enterpreted not to be a thing so much of
necessitie, as of courtesie: as that is also a speech well beseeming soueraigne
maiestie, for a prince to professe himself bound unto the lawes of himselfe
that raigneth. And certainely there is nothing better, or more beseeming a
prince, than by his deeds and life to confirme those lawes which hee himselfe
hath made: for that is of greatest force, for the honour and obedience of the
subiects towards their prince: as contrariwise
nothing is more daungerous for the contempt
both of the prince and of the lawes▪ than without iust cause to breake or
infringe that which thou hast commaunded: as an auntient Roman Senatour said,
Leuius est, & vanius, sua decreta tollere quam
aliorum, It is more lightnesse and vanitieLiuius
lib. 3. to take away a mans owne decrees, than the decrees of other
men. But it is one thing for a man so to doe willingly and of his owne accord,
and another thing to bee bound by bond or oath so to do it.
But what if a prince by law forbid to kill or to steale, is hee not bound to
obay hisAll princes bound and subiect unto the lawes of God
and nature, and to their owne iust conuentions. owne lawes? I say
that this law is not his, but the law of God and nature, whereunto all princes
are more straitly bound than their subiects: in such sort as that they cannot
be from the same exempted, either by the Senat, or the people, but that they
must bee enforced to make their appearance
before the tribunall seat of almightie God: For God taketh a straiter account
of princes than of others, as the maister of wisdome Salomon himselfe a king, hath most truly written. Whereunto well
agreeth that saying of Marcus Aurelius, who for his
desire of knowledge, was called the Philosopher: The
magistrats are iudges over priuat men, princes iudge the magistrats, and God
the princes. This is the opinion of 2 great princes, esteemed of all
other the wisest; unto whom we wil ioine the third, Antigonus king of Asia, who hearing a flatterer say, that al things
were lawfull for kings: Yea, said he, forbarbarous kings and tyrants. The first
that used this kind of flatrerie, was Anaxarchus towards
Alexander the Great, whome hee made to beleeue, That
the goddesse Iustice, was still at the right hand of Iupiter, to shew that
princes could do nothing but that was right and iust: Of which their iustice he
shortly after made proofe, for being fallen into the hands of the king of
Cyprus, he was by hs commaundement with hammers
beaten to death uppon an anuill. But how much more truely did Seneca say to the contrarie, Caesaricum omnia
licent, propter hoc minus licet, When all things are unto Caesar lawfull, euen for that are they lesse lawfull. And
therefore they that generally say, that princes are not subiect unto lawes, nor
to their owne conuentions, if they except not the lawes of God and nature, and
the iust contracts and conuentions made with them, they do great wrong both
unto God and nature, in that they make not the speciall exemption to appeare;
as men say in matters of priueleges. So Dionisius the
tyrant of Sicilie, said to his mother, That he could dispence with the lawes and customes of Syracusa, but not with the
lawes of nature. For as the contracts and testaments of priuat men, cannnot
derogat from the decrees of the magistrats, nor the decrees of the magistrats
from the auntient customes, nor the auntient customes from the generall lawes
of a soueraigne prince: no more also can the lawes of soueraigne princes alter
or chaunge the lawes of God and nature. Wherefore the Roman magistrats did
notably, who unto the end of all their requests & laws which they
propounded unto the good liking of the people, commonly annexed this clause,
Si quid ius non esset E. E. L. N. R. eius ea lege nihilem
rogaretur, that is to say, That if any thing were therein contained
that was not iust and reasonable, they by that law requested nothing. But of
all others they are most absurd, which say, That a soueraigne prince can decree nothing against the lawes of
God and nature, without most apparant reason. For what apparant reason can
there be diuised, for which wee ought to breake the lawes of God? And hereof
proceed such paradoxes as this, That he whome the Pope hath dispensed withall
for the lawes of God, is sufficiently assured before God: which how true it is
let others iudge.
There resteth yet another obiection, by them obiected which with more
reasonAn obiection that princes are bound to the civill
lawes. examine matters. If princes (say they) be bound unto the lawss
of nature, that is to say, of upright reason: and that civill lawes be (in all
things) agreeable unto right and reason, it must needs
thereof follow, that the prince is also bound unto the ciuil laws. And
to that end they alleage that saying of Pacutius unto Theodosius the
emperour, Tantum tibi licet quantum per leges licebit,
So much is lawfull for thee to do, as thou maiest by law doe. For the plainer
aunswering of which doubt, we must thus distinguish: ThatThe
answere, declaring to what lawes a prince is bound, and to what lawes
not. the lawes of a soueraigne prince, whereof question is made,
concerne either that which is publick, or priuat, or common to both: and
generally when question is, it is either of that which is profitable and not
honest, or of that which is honest and not profitable, or is both profitable
and honest; or els of that which is neither of both. And that I call honest,
which is agreeing unto the equitie of nature; unto which naturall equitie it is
manifest all princes to be bound, seeing that which nature teacheth, is
altogether comprehended in the law of nature, whereunto every prince is bound
to obey: neither is such a law to bee called a
ciuile law, albeit that the prince cause it to bee published, but rather the
law of nature. And with so much the more reason, when the law is both honest
and profitable. But if that which is by law commaunded, bee neither honest nor
profitable, although of such things there ought to be no law; yet may the
prince bind his subiects unto those lawes, whereunto he is not himselfe bound,
if they have no dishonour or dishonestie ioyned with them. For there bee some
things honest, some things dishonest, and some in a meane betwixt both. But if
profit repugne against honestie, it is good reason that honestie should take
place. As Aristides the iust, to whom Themistocles was commanded to communicat his deuice, aunswered, That
the counsell of Themistocles was profitable to the
Commonweale; but yet in his iudgement
dishonest: the Athenians hearing so much, enquired no farther after the matter,
but decreed that his profitable counsell to be reiected. But here when we
reason of a Commonweale, we must speake according to the common manner; which
our speech is not to be examined according to the subtiltie of Philosophers:
for they set downe, nothing to be profitable which is not honest, neither
anything to bee honest which is not iust: but that old custome is growne out of
vse, so that of necessitie we must make a difference betwixt things honest, and
things profitable. But if that which the prince by his law commaundeth, be not
honourable, but profitable, he himselfe is not by that law bound, although his
subiects be, so that nothing bee therein contained contrarie to the lawes of
God and nature: and such lawes the prince may
at his pleasure abrogat, or from them derogat, and instead of them make others,
either more or lesse profitable: for things honest, iust, and profitable, haue
their degrees of more and lesse. If then it be lawfull for a prince amongst
lawes profitable, to make choice of them that be more profitable; so also
amongst lawes iust and honest, he may chuse out them that be most upright and
honest, albeit that some therby receiue profit, and some others losse; prouided
that the profit be publicke, and the losse particular: and yet if the prince
shall otherwise decree, it is not lawfull for the subiect to breake the laws of
his prince, under the colour of honestie, or iustice: as if the prince in time
of famine, forbid the carrying out of victuals (a thing not only profitable to
the Commonweale, but oft times also iust and reasonable) he ought not to giue
leaue to some few to carry thē out, to the
preiudice of the common state, & of other marchants in particular; for
under the colour of profit that these flatterers and scrapers carrie things,
many good marchants suffer losse, and all the subiects in generall are
famished: and yet neuerthelesse the famine and dearth ceasing, it is not yet
lawfull for the subiect to transgresse the edicts of his prince, and to carrie
out victuals, vntill the law forbidding the same, be by the prince abrogated,
no not though there seeme neuer so great occasions for the transgressing of the
law: as that now the citie is full of victuall, and all other things
necessarie; and that the law of nature persuadeth vs to giue reliefe vnto
distressed strangers, in letting them have part of such
good things as it hath pleased God to send
encrease of more in one countrey than in another: for as much as the power of
the law that forbiddeth, is greater than the apparant equitie, the show whereof
euerie man might pretend to his desires, except the prohibition in the law be
directly against the lawes of God and nature.
But so sometimes things fall out, as that the law may be good, iust, and
reasonable,A law may be good, iust, and reasonable, and
yet the prince no way subiect or bound thereunto. and yet the prince
to be no way subiect or bound thereunto: as if he should forbid all his
subiects, except his guard and garrison souldiors, upon paine of death to
carrie weapon, so to take away the feares of murders and seditions; he in this
case ought not to be subiect to his owne law, but to the contrarie, to be well
armed for the defence of the good, and punishment of the euill. The same we may
say of other edicts and lawes also, which
concerne but some part of the subiects; which edicts and lawes are called
priueleges, and are iust in respect of certaine persons, or for a certaine
time, or place; or for the varietie of punishments which depend alwaies of the
lawes; albeit that the forbidding of offences is proceeding from the lawes of
God and nature. unto which edicts and lawes the princes are not any way bound,
further than the naturall iustice of the same hath place; which ceasing, the
prince is no more therunto bound, vntill the prince have abrogated the same.
For it is not onely a law of nature, but also oftentimes repeated amongst the
lawes of God, That we should be obedient unto the lawes and ordinances of such
princes as it hath pleased God to set to rule and raigne over vs, if their
lawes and decrees be not directly repugnant unto the lawes of God and
nature, whereunto all princes are as well
bound as their subiects. For as the vassall oweth his oath of fidelitie vnto
his lord towards & against al men, except his soueraigne prince; so the
subiect oweth his obedience to his soueraigne prince, towards and against all,
the maiestie of God excepted, who is the absolute soueraigne of all the princes
in the world.
Out of this resolution we may draw another rule of estate, that is to wit, that
the soueraigneThat a soue▪ prince is bound to his owne
contracts, aswell as other men be. prince is bound unto the contracts
by him made, bee it with his subiect, or with a straunger: for seeing he is the
warrant to his subiects of the mutuall conuentions and obligations that they
have one of them against another: of how much more reason is he the debter of
iustice in his owne fact, and so bound to keepe the faith and promises by himselfe giuen and made to others? As the court
of parliament at Paris writ backe unto king Charles the
ix, in the moneth of March, in the yeare 1563, That his maiestie alone could
not breake the contract made betwixt him and the clergie, without the consent
of the clergie; and that for this reason, For that he was himselfe the debtor
of iustice, and so bound to giue euerie man his right. Which putteth mee in
remembrance of a resolution concerning the upright dealing of princes, worthy
to be engrauen in letters of gold, in their lodgings and pallaces; which is,
That it ought to bee accounted amongst things which by
chaunce seldome happen, if a prince fayle of his promise;A notable saying.and that it is not otherwise to be presumed. For that of
his promise there is a double bond; the one for the naturall equitie thereof:
for what can be more agreeing unto naturall
equitie, than to have iust promise kept? The other, for the honour of the
prince himselfe, who is bound to keepe his promise, although it be unto his
losse; for that he is the formall warrant to all his subiects, of the faith
that they have amongstA soueraigne prince lesse in iustice
to be respected or releeued, than his subiects, when question is of his
promise. them; as also for that there is no more detestable crime in
a prince, than to bee false of his oath and promise. And that is it for which
the soueraigne prince ought alwaies in iustice to bee lesse respected or
releeued than his subiects, when question is of his promise. For if a prince
have once bestowed an honour or an office upon a man, it is deemed, that he may
not without iust cause take it againe away from him; but a particular subiect may: and so it is ordinarily iudged. And wheras
by the law the patron might without cause take
his fee from his vestall; yet was it not lawfull for the prince so to doe.
Whereby it is well to be perceiued, the doctors of the Canon law to erre, and
to be deceiued, who deny a prince to be bound to his owne conuentions or
agreements, otherwise than with a naturall bond: for that say they, every bond
is proper unto the civill law; which their errour is to be remoued: For who can
doubt, but that the bond is of the same nature with the couenant? Wherefore if
the couenant be naturall, and common to all nations, the bonds and actions
arising thereof must needs consequently be of the same nature also. But no
couenant almost, neither any obligation or bond can be deuised, which is not
common both unto the law of nature and nations. But let vs graunt some
couenants to proceed from the meere civill law; yet That soue▪ raigne prince is bound
to his own ciuil couenants. who dare to deny a prince to be more
straitly bound euen unto such civill couenants, and promises, than are the
priuat subiects themselves? yea and that in so strait a maner as that he cannot
with all the absolute power he hath derogat from the same? For so almost all
the learned lawyers are of opinion and accord. And what maruell? seeing God
himself is bound unto his promises. For so he plainly protesteth with the
prophet Hieremie, Call together unto me (saith he) all the people of the earth, that they may iudge betwixt me
and my people, if there be any thing that I ought to have done, which I haue
not done. Let vs noth therefore call into question those things wherof
many doctors have doubted. As whether a prince be bound unto the couenants
which he hath made with his subiects? whereat we need not to maruell, seeing
that out of the same fountaine is sprung, that
no lesse straunge position: that a prince may of right, without any iust cause
enrich himselfe with another mans losse: an opinion repugnant unto the lawes
both of God and nature. But how much more uprightly was it of late iudged in
the court of Paris, that the prince might giue his intrest unto the partie
condemned; but not the intrest of another man. And that in confiscations
creditours are by right first to be preferred, The same court also by another
decree determined, That the prince might derogat from the civill lawes, so that
it were done without preiudice to any particular mens right: which is to
confirme the resolutions which wee before have set downe, concerning the
absolute soueraignetie. And Philip of Valois, by two
testaments which he made in the yeare 1347, and 1350, (which are in the
treasurie of France in a coffer, intituled The
testaments of kings, number 289) ioyneth a clause derogatorie unto the lawes of
his countrey, from which he protested himselfe to be discharged, as not vnto
them bound. The like protestations he also vsed, when hee gaue unto the queene
his wife certaine treasure, and priuat lands, contrarie unto the lawes: with
aswel his prodigall gift, as also that his derogation from the lawes of his
countrey, are yet extant in the publick records. Howbeit that Augustus the emperor thought it not good for himselfe in like case to
vse the like libertie in his Commonweale, but being willing to giue unto his
wife Liuia, that which he could not by reason of the law
Voconia, hee requested to be dispensed with all from that law by the Senat
(although that it was not needfull for him so to have done, considering that he
was long time before in all other things
dispensed with from the lawes) to the intent the better to assure his gift, for
that he was not a soueraigne prince, as we have before showed. For otherwise
hee had not bene any way bound so to doe; as it was in most strong tearmes
iudged by a decree in the court of Paris, in the case of Philip the second, the French king, That he was not bound unto the
customes of the ciuil law, at such time as they which were next of kindred
would have redeemed of him the countie of Guynes: howbeit that many both thinke
and write, the prince to be bound to that law: for that they thinke that law to
be common to all nations, and not proper to any citie: and yet then the which
law the Romans themselves (in some cases) thought
nothing more vnreasonable. But our ancestours What account was made of the Roman civill lawes in
France. would not have euen their subiects bound unto the Roman
lawes; as we see in the auntient records, that Philip
the faire, erecting the parliament of Paris and Monpellier declared, That they
should not be bound unto the Roman laws. And in the erection of Vniuersities,
the kings have alwaies declared, That their purpose was to have the civill and
canon laws in them publickly professed and taught, to make vse therof at their
discretion, but not that the subiects should be any way bound therunto, least
they should seeme to derogat from the lawes of their owne country by aduancing
the laws of straungers. And for the same cause Alaricus
king of the Gothes, forbad upon pain of death, any man to allege the Roman
lawes contrarie to his decrees and ordinances. Which M.
Charles du Moulin (my companion, and ornament of all lawyers)
mistaking, is therefore with him verie
angrie, and in reproach calleth him therefore barbarous: howbeit that nothing
was therein by Alaricus decreed or done, but that which
euerie wise prince would of good right have decreed and done: for subiects will
so long both remember, and hope for the government of strangers, as they are
gouerned by their lawes. The like edict there is of king Charles the faire, and an old decree of the court of Paris, whereby we
are expresly forbidden to alleage the laws of the Romans, against the lawes and
customes of our auncestours. Yea the kings of Spaine also have upon capitall
paine forbidden any man to alleage the Roman laws, in confirmation of their
owne laws, (as Oldrad writeth.) And albeit that there
were nothing in the lawes and customes of their countrey which differed from
the Roman lawes, yet such is the force of that
edict, that all men may vnderstand that the judges in deciding of the subiects
causes, were not bound unto the Roman lawes: & therfore much lesse the
prince himselfe, who thought it a thing daungerous to have his judges bound
unto straunge lawes. And worthy he is to be accounted a traitor, that dare to
oppose straunge lawes and straunge decrees against the lawes of his owne
prince. In which doings when theThe Roman lawes forbidden to
be aught in Spaine. Spaniards did too much
offend, Stephen king of Spaine forbad the Roman lawes to
be at all taught in Spaine▪ as Polycrates writeth: which
was more straitly prouided for by king Alphonsus the
tenth, who commaunded the magistrats and judges to come unto the prince
himselfe, as often as there was nothing written in the lawes of their countrey
concerning the matter in question. Wherein Baldus is
mistaken, when hee writeth the Italians to bee
bound to the Roman lawes; but the French no otherwise than so farre as they
should seeme unto them to agree with equitie and reason. For the one are as
little bound as the other; howbeit that Italie, Spaine, the countries of
Prouince, Sauoy, Languedoc, and Lyonnois, vse the Roman lawes more than other
people: and that Frederike Barbarussa the emperour,
caused the books of the Roman laws to be published and taught: the greatest
part whereof have yet no place in Italie, and much lesse in Germanie. But there
is much difference betwixt a right, and a law: for a right still without
commaund respecteth nothing but that which is good and upright; but a law
importeth a commaundement. For the law is nothing els but the commaundement of
a soueraigne, vsing of his soueraigne power. Wherefore then as a soueraigne is not bound unto the laws of the Greeks, nor
of any other stranger whatsoeuer he be, no more is he bound unto the Roman
laws, more than that they are conformableNeither pope nor
emperour exempted from the law of nature. unto the law of nature;
which is the law whereunto (saith Pindarus) all kings
and princes are subiect. From which we are not to excepteither the pope or the
emperour (as some pernitious flatterers do) saying, That those two viz. the pope and the emperour, may of right without
cause take unto themselves the goods of their subiects.A
dangerous opinion, and not to be taught to princes. Which opinion the
Canonists themselves, the interpretors of the popes law detest, as contrarie to
the law of God: whereunto for all that they ioine this euill limitation, in saying, That they may yet do it of their most high and
absolute power and authority, as they tearme
it: which is as much as if they should say it to bee lawfull for them to rob
and spoyle their subiects, oppressed by force of armes: which law, the more
mightie vse against them that be weaker than themselves, which the Germans most
rightly call, The law of theeves and robbers. But pope Innocent the iiij himself, most skilfull in both the lawes, saith that
most high and absolute power, to bee able but to derogat from the ordinarie
law▪ whereas they would have such absolute and soueraigne power to extend to
the abrogating of the lawes of God and nature. For what is more religiously by
Gods lawes forbidden, than to rob and spoyle other men of their goods? what
thing do we read more often repeated, than to keepe our hands from other mens
things? yea we are by the most holy Decalogue commaunded, not so much as
to desire that which is another mans. Now
certainly it is a greater offence to infect princes with this doctrine, than it
is to rob and steale. For pouertie commonly causeth theeves to seeke after
other mens goods: but they that maintaine such opinions, show the lion his
clawes, and arme the prince so instructed, to pretend unto his outrages, this
goodly show of Law and Iustice: who by nature naught, & made worse by
instruction: so prouing to be a tyrant, maketh no question most shamefully to
confound and breake all the lawes both of God and man: and afterward enflamed
with corrupt desires and affections, which altogether weaken the more noble
parts of the mind, hee quickly breaketh out from couetousnesse to vniust
confiscations, from lust to adulterie, from wrath to murder. So that as thunder
is indeed before the lightning, although it be
latter heard: so also an euill prince, corrupted with these pernitious &
pestilent opinions, peruetting iustice, causeth the fine to runne before the
accusation, and the condemnation before the iudgement. Howbeit it is an in
congruitie in law, to say thatThat a prince power ought alwaies to be measured with the foot of
iustice. a prince can do any thing which is not agreeing with
honestie; seeing that his power ought alwaies to be measured with the foot of
iustice. For so said Plinie the younger unto Traian the emperour, Vt enim
foelicitatis est posse quantum velis: sic magnitudinis velle quantum
possis, As it is (saith he) in thy happinesse to be able to doe what
thou wilt; so beseemeth it thy greatnesse, to will what thou maist. Whereof may
be gathered, that a prince can do nothing that is fowle or vniust. It is also
euill done, to say, that a soueraigne prince hath power by violence to take
away another mans goods, to rob, to commit
adulterie, or to do euill, seeing that so to doe, is rather an impotencie, or
feeblenes, proceeding from a weake mind ouercome with impotent lust and desire,
rather than any soueraignty. Now then if a soueraigne prince may not remoue the
bounds which almightie God (of whom he is the liuing & breathing image)
hath prefined unto the euerlasting lawes of nature: neither may he take from
another man thatPriuat mens losses by princes sometimes to
bee sufferd, for the greater benef of the
Commonweale. which is his, without iust cause, whether it be by
buying, by exchaunge, by confiscation, by league with friends, or peace made
with enemies, if it cannot otherwise bee concluded than by priuat mens losse;
whose goods princes oftentimes permit the enemies to enioy, for the generall
welfare of the subiects and of the Commonweale: howbeit that many be not of
this opinion, but would that euerie man should keepe his owne; and that no publick diminution should be made of any priuat
mans goods, or that if publicke necessitie so required, it were againe to bee
made goodby the whole state: which opinion I like well of, if conveniently it
might so be done. But forasmuch as the welfare of priuat men, and all the goods
of the subiects are contained in the health of our country, it beseemeth priuat
men without grudging to forgiue unto the Commonwealth, not onely their priuat
displeasures, and iniuries receiued from their enemies, but to yeeld also for
the health of the Commonweale, their goods. For peace hath for the most part
some hard measure in it, which is againe recompenced with the publique profit: and this law doth all people vse, that in
conclusions of peace, not only publick things
are recompensed with publike, and priuat things with priuat; but both with the
mutuall profits and detriments of both. And yet I see many great maisters of
both lawes, both to be, & to have bene of opinion, that in those leagues
wherein it is excepted, that no question should be made of the losse on both
sides receiued, such exception should be void, neither to be any thing
preiudiciall unto priuat men: howbeit that we vse it otherwise; for in the
peace of Peronne, made for the deliverance of Lewes the
xj the French king, prisoner unto Charles earle of
Burgundie, it was in one article prouided, That Seigneur de
Torci should not execute the sentence of theThe law
of forgetfulnes necessarie for the ending of ciuile warres, and composing of
controuersies betwixt princes. court of Paris against the lord of
Saneuses. And therefore is Thrasibulus (and that not
vnworthily) commended, that hauing ouerthrowne and driuen thirtie tyrants out
of the citie of Athens, he caused the law of
forgetfulnesse to be proclaimed. Wherein was contained the forgetting of all
priuat iniuries and losses receiued in the late civill warre: which was also
afterwards proclaimed in Rome, after that Caesar was
saine in the Senat, at the treatie made betwixt
the conspirators on the one side, and Caesars partakers
on the other. Yet is it by all meanes to be enduoured, that mens harmes
receiued, should be recompensed with other mens profits, and so as neere as may
bee every man to have his owne, which if it cannot be done without tumult and
civill warres, we must defend the possessors of other mens things, although
they hold them wrongfully, vntill the right honours may be satisfied out of the
common treasure: or if the common treasure be exhausted, to borrow money to
content them. As did Aratus, who hauing restored his countrey to liberrie, after it had for
the space of fiftie yeares bene oppressed with tyranny, restored also sixe
hundred banished men, whose lands & goods had bene by the tyrant
confiscated. Yet would hee not the possessors of those lands, which the tyrants
had vniustly taken from those citisens, to be spoyled therof: for that much
thereof was lawfully bought and sold, and much of it holden in dowrie, so that
it could not be done without a most daungerous turmoile in the state. Wherefore
he bound all the citisens by oath, That they should keep peace and amitie
vntill such time as he returning out of Aegypt, should then take order for all
things. For hauing there borrowed threescore thousand crownes of K. Ptolemaeus Philadelphus, he returned into his countrey,
and priing the land, so wrought the matter, that some
made choice to take money and leaue the land;
and other some thought it better to take mony themselves, than to recouer
againe that which had beene before their owne. Wherefore these causes that I
have said ceasing, the prince cannot take nor giue another mans goods, without
the consent of the owner. And in all gifts, grants, immunities, and
priueledges, this clause is still annexed, Sauing alwaies our
owne right: and the right of other men: Which clause added unto the
inuestiture of the dutchie of Milan, which Maximilian
the emperour made to king Lewes the xij, was the
occasion of new warres, for the right which the Sforces
pretended to the dutchie, which the emperour could not nor would not giue away.
And this clause although it be left out, is yet supposed to be still put in:
for that euen the emperour would he neuer so faine, can no otherwise giue
or graunt any other thing to any bodie. For
that which the common people commonly saith, All to be the
princes, is to be vnderstood concerning power and soueraigntie,How it is to bee vnderstood, All to be the princes. the
proprietie and possession of euerie mans things yet reserued to himselfe. For
so saith Seneca, Ad reges potestas omnium pertinet, ad
singulos proprietas, unto kings belongeth the power of all things, and
unto particular men the proprietie. And a little after, Omnia
rex imperio possidet singuli dominio, The king in power possesseth
allThe king in some cases lesse priuiledged than the
subiect. things: and priuat men as owners. And for this cause our
kings by the lawes and decrees of Court, are bound to void their hands of such
lands as are fallen unto them by way of confiscation
(if they be not simplie and without meane holden of the crowne) to the end that the patrons of them that were proscribed,
should loose nothing of their right in the lands confiscated. And if the king
be debtor to any priuat man his subiect, he is therefore oft times sued,
condemned, and enforced to pay the debt. But that straungers aswell as
subiects, and all posteritie may know of what integritie our kings have bene,
and with what moderation they have borne themselves towards their subiects, let
this be for example, That the king himselfe in the yere 1266, was by the
iudgement of the court of Paris, condemned to pay unto the curat, the tyth of
the fruits euen of his garden of pleasure. So when another of our kings had by
the negligence of his aduocat, made default of appearence at his day; hee by
ordinarie course requested to have that negligent ouersight pardoned: which the
kings request the court of Paris denied, as
appeareth by the decree of the court, in the yeare 1419. But no such strict
proceeding is used against priuat men, who alwaies in such case are againe
restored into the state they before were. And albeit that subiects under xxv
yeares old, almost in all priuat iudgements vse to be againe restored into the
state they were, by the priuelege of their age; yet our kings although but
children, are neuer so restored by the benefit of their age, but in all
iudgements are deemed to bee of full age. And yet the Commonweale neuerthelesse
is alwaies reputed to be in minoritie: which is to aunswere them which are of
opinion, That the Commonweale ought not to be restored; in that they confound
the patrimonie of the prince, with the Commonweale, which is alwaies in a
monarchie divided: but all one in a popular or an Aristocraticall
state. With this stoutnesse of courage the
magistrats bare themselves towards our kings, & with this moderation also
did our kings reuerence iustice, preferring still in all sutes the Commonweale
before priuat men, and priuat men before princes. There is also extant in the
records of the court of Paris, a iudgement giuen against king Charls the seuenth, wherein he was condemned to suffer a wood of his
to bee cut downe which hee had neere unto the citie of Paris, for the publike
vse in generall, and the vse of euerie one of the citisens in particular: and
that more was, the price thereof was set downe for him in the decree, whereunto
a priuat subiect could hardly have bene driuen. Then was it plainely to be
seene how much a king differed from a tyrant: for when this Charls the vij had driuen the English forces out of the hart of
Fraunce, and easily taken the citie of Paris
(which confederated with the English, had wrested the scepter out of this kings
hand) he was so farre from reuenging of his receiued iniuries, that hee vsed
the citisens most curteously, and showed himselfe more obedient unto the judges
than priuat men have used to be. When at the same time Philip
Maria, duke of Milan, hauing oppressed the Commonweale with taxes and
tributes, embarred also his ports and riuers, in such sort as that none of the
citisens without his leaue could passe or trauell thereby, but that first they
must therefore pay money.
Thus we have hitherto showed in what sort a soueraigne is subiect unto the
lawesWhether a soueraigne prince be bound to the promises
or conuentions of the kings his predecessours or not. and conuentions
by him made with his subiects: Now it resteth for vs to see whether he be
subiect unto the contracts and promises of the kings his predecessours; and
whether such his obliging be compatible with
soueraigne maiestie or not. Which in few words to discusse, passing over a
multitude of nice questions which might bee made in this matter: I say that a
prince is bound unto the couenants of his auncestors as well as other priuat
heirs, if his kingdome come unto him by inheritance, or bee giuen him by
testament being not next of kinne: as Ptolemee king of
Cyrene, Nicomedes king of Bithynia, Attalus king of Asia, and Eumenes king of
Pergame, by their wils appointed the people of Rome to inherit their kingdomes.
But what if a kingdome be by will giuen unto the next of kinne? as Henry the eight by his will left the kingdome of England
to his son Edward the sixt:
and substituted unto him his sister Mary, and unto her
Elizabeth her sister, who all successiuely enioyed the
kingdome. In this case wee must distinguish, whether the appointed heire will
accept the state in the qualitie of an heire by testament appointed; or
renouncing the succession of the testator, demaundeth the crowne by vertue of
the custome and law of his countrey. For in the former case the successour is
bound unto all the hereditary obligations and actions of his predecessors, as
if he were a priuat inheritour: but in the second case, he is not bound vnto
the dome of his predecessour, albeit that his predecessour were thereto sworne.
For neither the oath nor the obligation of the dead predecessour, bindeth the
successour in the law, more than so farre as the obligation made by the
testatour tendeth to the good of the Commonweale, and so farre he is bound. And
therefore king Lewes the xij, when he was demaunded the artillerie lent unto Charles the eight, answered, That he was none of Charles his heire. So of late king Francis the
second, to like effect writ his letters unto the lords of the Swissers,
demaunding of him his fathers debts, the copie whereof taken out of the
records, bearing date the xix of Ianuarie 1559, I have here set downe as
followeth, viz. Although that we be not bound to pay the
debts of our most honourableThe letters of the French king unto the SwissersLord, and dead father: for that we have not taken upon vs
this crowne by right of inheritance as his heire, but by the royall law and
custome generally obserued euen from the first institution thereof, which
bindeth vs not, but onely to the obseruing of such confederations and
treaties, passed and made by the kings our predecessors, with other forren
princes and Commonweales, for the good and profit of this crowne.
Neuerthelesse desiring to dischargethe credit and conscience of the said our dead lord and
father, wee are resolued to discharge his lawfull debts, &c. Onely this
requesting you, to moderat the interest, in such sort as you have vsed,
according to the lawes and customes of your countrey, and that no greater be
of vs exacted. Which his request the Swissers by their common decree
approued, so that whereas before they had taken of our people so deepe intrest,
as every sixt yeare came almost to as much as the principall, (which is twice
so much as they doe in Fraunce) they brought it downe to a third part, which
commeth to so much as the principal but in twentie yeares. But that our kings
were not bound unto the bonds of their predecessours, the court of Paris
determined, viz. In the yeare 1256. Wherefore they are
greatly deceiued, which receiue as from an oracle the formall and conceiued
words of the oath which the bishops of Rheims
have at their pleasure not long since deuised, which our kings at their
coronation now vse. For after that the archbishop of Rheims hath set the crowne
upon the kings head, the twelue peers of Fraunce putting to their hands, he
saith unto him these words, Stay you here (saith he) and the kingdome which you have before vntill now holden by
succession from your father, now from henceforth hold as the true heyre
thereof, put into your hands by the power of almightie God, and by the iust
deliverie thereof, which we the bishops and other the seruants of God here
presently make unto you. An honest speech if it were true. But I thinke
no man doubteth, but that the king euen before his consecration enioyeth both
the possession and proprietie of the kingdome, not by inheritance or his
fathers right, and much lesse by the bountie of the bishops or peers, but by the royall law and custome of the realme, as
was long since decreed by Anno. 1463 a decree
of the French men, That no man should thinke the power of the king to depend of
the pleasure of the bishops: not for that the Senat euer doubted of the power
of the king before his coronation; but that those vaine quirkes of the bishops
might be vtterly refelled. For it is an old prouerbe with vs, That the
kingThe king neuer dieth. doth neuer die, but that
so soone as he is dead, the next male of his stocke is seised of the kingdome,
and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him
by succession of his father, but by vertue of the law of the land; least the
succession of the kingdome should be vncertaine, then
which nothing can be more daungerous in a
Commonweale. Wherefore let vs this hold, that the king which is by lawfull
right called unto his kingdome, is so farre bound unto the couenants and
promises of the kings his predecessours, as is for the good of the Commonweale:
and so much the more, if the contracts were made by the consent and good liking
of the people ingenerall, or of the states, or high court of parliament: which
it is not onely seemely for a king to keepe, but also necessarie, although it
be hurtfull unto the Commonweale, considering that it concerneth the faith and
obligation of his subiects. But if the soueraigne prince hath contracted either
with strangers, or with his subiects, for such things as concerne the
Commonweale, without the consent of them wee have before said, if any great
harme redound unto the Commonweale by such contract, it is not reason
the lawfull successour to be therunto
bound: and much lesse if hee have obtained the kingdome by election: For that
he holdeth nothing from his predecessor, as he should doe if he held his state
by resignation, for then he should be bound unto the contracts and promises of
his predecessours, except it were expresly otherwise excepted. But by what
right soeuer the prince shal have receiued his kingdome, whether it be by law,
by testament, by election, or by lot, it is reason that the successours should
performe all such contracts of his predecessor, as redounded to the profit of
the Commonweale: for otherwise it should be lawfull for him contrarie to the
law of nature, by fraud and indirect meanes to draw his owne profit out of
others harmes: but it much concerneth a Commonweale, so much as in it lieth, to
preserue and keepe the publike faith, least in
the extreame daungers thereof, all the meanes for the reliefe thereof should be
shut up. And thus are to bee vnderstood, those things which the court of Paris
decreed in the yeares 1256, and 1294, viz. The king not
to be bound unto the couenants and agreements of the former kings his
predecessours: their opinion being reiected, which say, That a soueraigne
prince is to be thrust out of his kingdome, if he performe not the testament of
the former prince his predecessor: without putting the difference of princely
successions, by vs before put, but vtterly confounding the succession of
princes.
But what needeth (might some man say) this distinction in succession of
princes? seeing that all princes are bound and subiect unto the lawes of
nations, whereof contracts and testaments do depend. Which is not so if wee
speake of all contracts and testaments in
generall: but admit that to be true, yet there of it followeth not, that a
prince is more bound unto the laws of nations, than unto his owne: and that so
far as they agree with the laws of God and nature: wherunto all that we haue
said concerning the obliging of princes, is to be referred. For as for the laws
of nations, if they be any of them vniust, the prince may abrogat them by the
law of his realme, & forbid his subiects to vse the same: as we said before
of seruitude and slaues: which by a daungerous example, by the law almost of
all nations brought into Commonweales, were againe by the wholsome decrees of
many princes well agreeing with the lawes of nature taken away: which being
said of one thing, may also be extended unto other things of like condition:
prouided alwaies, that nothing be done contrarie to the lawes of God and
nature. For if iustice be the end of the
law, and the law is the worke of the prince, and the prince is the lively image
of almightie God; it must needes follow, that the law of the prince should be
framed unto the modell of the law of God.
CHAP. IX. ¶ Of a Prince tributarie or feudatarie: and
whether he be a soueraigne Prince: and of the prerogative of honour amongst
Soueraigne Princes.
THis question deserueth a speciall Chapter by it
selfe, for that it hath no communitie with the auntient markes of Soueraigntie,
which were before the right of Fees, used in all Europe and Asia, and yet more
in Turkie than in any place of the world: where the Timariots hold not the Fees
they have to serue in the warres, but so long as pleaseth the king of the
Turkes, who giueth them no longer but for tearme of their lives: which haue
them with condition, that in time of warre the Timariots shall of their owne charge without any pay bring such a
number of horsemen and horses, as is appointed in the subsidie bookes,
according to the proportion of the rent of the fees, which they cal Timar, which is to say in their language, the Vse and profit, deriued as I suppose of the Greeke word
; and the word Timar signifying with them the honourable vse and profit,
which is the true nature of Fee, to bee free from all tribute or base charges.
And for this cause the vassall in the auntient law of the Lombards, is called
Leude, which is to say, franke and free: Aldius and Alda, affranchised,
from whence the words Alaudium and Laudimia are deriued, signifying the honourable rewards woont to be
giuen to the lord of the fee, taking the oath of fealty of his vassall. But
hauing thus much said for the explanation of these words, let vs proceed
unto our purpose.
We have said here before, him to be an absolute soueraigne, who next vnto
almightie God, is subiect unto none: neither holdeth any thing next unto God,
but of his owne sword: For if he be enforced to serue any man, or to obey any
mans commaund (be it by his owne good liking, or against his will) or if he
hold of another man, he looseth the title of maiestie, and is no more a
soueraigne, as saith a certaine Poet:
Esse sat est seruum, iam nolo These Vicarij were
slaues commaunded. vicarius esse:Qui Rex est, Regem Maxime non habeat.To be a slaue it is enough, I will not serue a slaue:Who is a king, friend Maximus, no other king must
haue.
If they then which hold in fealtie and homage have no maiestie or soueraigntie,
there should be but few soueraigne princes to be found. And if were graunt that
they which hold in fealtie and homage, or that are tributaries, be soueraignes,
wee must by the same reason confesse, the vassall and his lord, the master and
the seruant, to be equal in greatnes, power, and authoritie. And yet the
doctors of the law hold that the dukes of Milan, Mantua, Ferrara, and Sauoy,
yea euen and some Counties also are soueraignes:The county
of Ati. which altogether differ from those
things which wee have before said of the right of maiestie and soueraigntie.
Wherefore it is requisit for vs more exquisitly to entreat of these matters, whereof dependeth the principall
point of soueraigntie, and the prerogative of honour amongst princes, which
they esteeme as a thing unto them most deare of all things in the world.
Wee said before in the Chapter of Patronage (which we otherwise call
Protection) that princes which are in protection, if they have no other
subiection, hold yet their maiestie and soueraigntie, although they have enred
into inequal alliance, whereby they are bound to acknowledge their protectors
in all honour. But there is great difference betwixt them which are in simple
protection onely, and them which hold in fealtie and
homage. For the client, or he which is the simple protection of another
The difference betwixt him which is onely in the simple
protection of another prince, and him that oweth unto him fealtie and
homage. prince onely, acknowledgeth his patron his superiour, in the
league of their confederation, but no further than the dignitie of the person
and place requireth: but the vassall, or he which holdeth in fealtie and
homage, is glad not onely to acknowledge his lord for his superiour, but is
enforced also in humble wise to giue unto him his faith and dutie, or els to
forgo his fee. When I say fealtie & homage, I meane the oath of fidelity,
the submission, the seruice, and dutie of the vassall, which he is by the
tenour of his fee bound to giue unto his lord.
Which that it may be the better vnderstood, we will make nine degrees of
inferiours,Nine degrees of subiection of inferiors
towards their superiors. in respect of their superiours: beside him
who next unto almightie God, acknowledgeth none superiour unto himselfe. The
first sort, is of such princes as are in the
protection of him whose maiestie they obserue and reuerence, and commonly giue
themselves into his protection, so to bee the safer against their most mightie
enemies. The second, is of such princes as acknowledge a superiour in their
confederation, unto whome they vse to pay a tribute or pension, so by his helpe
and aid to bee the safer: which deserueth not to be called patronage, because
it is mercenarie, whereas unto kind dutie no reward is due. The third is, of
such princes as being overcome by the more mightie, have of him receiued peace,
who yet keepe their maiestie and soueraigntie, with condition, courteously to
reuerence the maiestie of the victor, and to pay unto him a yearely tribute,
for which they are from him to receiue neither protection nor aide. And albeit
that these seeme to be more charged than they which are but in protection; yet is it so, that in effect they are
greater, for in paying the tribute they have promised for their peace, they are
acquited, and have nothing to doe with any other for the defence of their
estate. The fourth sort is of them which are themselves kings, and freely
exercise their soueraigntie over their owne subiects; but yet are vassales or
feudataries to some other prince for some fee, bee it greater or bee it lesse,
which they from him receiue. The fift sort, is of them which are not kings,
neither have any soueraigntie, but are become vassals for their fee, and are
simply called meere vassals, who are bound to defend the honour of their lord,
and to take up arms for him, but not at all times, nor against all men. The
sixt sort are they whom wee call liege vassals, who are not naturall subiects
unto the prince, but hauing giuen him their
faith, are bound to defend his dignitie and honour, and for his defence to take
up armes without exception; yet not alwaies, nor in all places, but so farre
forth as the profit of the fee, or the contract of their vassallage extendeth.
The seuenth sort are they whom we call subiects, whether they be vassals or
tenants, or such as hold no land at all, who are bound to fight for the honour
and defence of their prince as well as for themselves, and to have the same
enemies and the same friends that he hath. The eight sort is of them, which in
former time delivered from slauerie, yet retaine a certaine kind of seruitude,
as doe they which are tied unto the soyle, and are of vs called Mort-maines.
The last sort are the right slaues. This distinction of the degrees of
subiection, I have made to take away the confusion that many make of the
subiect with the vassall; and of the simple
vassall with the liege man; and hold, that the liege man oweth all obedience
unto his lord towards and against all men; and that the simple vassall
reserueth his superior: and yet neuerthelesse there is but the subiect onely
which oweth his obeysance. For the vassall, be he liege or simple, if he be not
a subiect, oweth but the seruice and homage expressed in his inuestiture, from
which hee may without fraud exemptThe difference of a
vassall, or a liege man from a naturall subiect. himself, by yeelding
up his fee: but the naturall subiect, which holds in fee, in farme, or fee
simple, or be it that he hold nothing at all that he can call his owne, yet can
hee not by any meanes without the consent of his prince exempt himselfe from
the personall obligation wherewith he is unto him
bound, as we have before declared. The simple
vassall is bound but once in his life to giue his oath of fidelitie unto his
lord: and such a vassall it may be as is neuer bound to giue his oath: for that
the fee may bee without any such obligation of giuing his faith, as is to be
seene in the old lawes of fees, (contrarie to that which M,
Charles du Molin hath both thought and writ) but the subiect whatsoeuer
is alwaies and in all places bound to give his oath, and so oft as it shal
please his soueraigne prince to require it: yea although he were a bishop
without any temporalitie at all. As for the liege man, it is not requisite that
he should bee subiect unto the lord of whom he holdeth: for it may be, that he
may be a soueraigne prince, holding some seignorie of another prince in liege,
fealtie and homage: it may also be, that he may be the naturall subiect of one
prince, and liege man to another, by reason of his fee: or well the simple vassall of one Lord, without being
subiect or liegeman to another: and naturall subiect to another, to whome he is
iusticiable, and yet holdeth of him neither fee nor reuenew. For the vassall of
a vassall is not for that, either vassall or subiect of the same lord, if it
bee not in regard of the same fee. But it is needfull to explaine that we haue
said by examples.
We find that the kings of England have giuen their liege faith and homage vnto
the kings of Fraunce for all the countries which they hold on this side the
sea, except the counties of Oye and Guynes: And yet neuerthelesse they held the
kingdomes of England and Ireland in soueraigntie without acknowledgement of any
other prince whatsoeuer. But after in the yeare 1212 they made themselves
vassals unto the Pope and the church of Rome,
and not onely vassals, but also tributaries: beside the annuall gift of smoke
money, of auntient time graunted by Ine king of England,
in the yeare 740, & augmented by Etelpe, which they
called S. Peters pence. For it is found, that Iohn king of England, by the consent of all the counties,
barrons and lords of the land, made himselfe vassall unto the pope and church
of Rome, and vowed to hold the realmes of England and Ireland of him in fealtie
and homage, with the charge to pay the yearely rent and reuenew of a thousand
markes for euer, upon Michaelmas day, beside the Peter pence, which I have spoken of: & gaue his faith
and homage unto the legat of pope Innocent the third, in
the yeare 1213, in the presence of his chauncelor, the archbishop of
Canterburie, foure bishops, sixe counties, and many other great
lords. The Bull was made in autentique
forme, whereof I have seene the copie in a register of the Vatican, taken out
by the commaundement of chauncelour du Prat, when he was Legat. And albeit that
Sir Thomas More, chauncelour of England, was the
first that maintained the contrarie: yet so it is, that in the same time, and
vntill that king Henrie the eight reuolted from the
pope, in the yeare 1534, the yearely reuenew and tribute was alwaies paied. But
that is worth the noting, that the act of fealtie and homage, giuen unto pope
Innocent the the third, importeth that Iohn then king of England, humbly requested forgiuenesse
of his sinnes of the popes legat. Whereby it is plaine, that patronage of the
bishop of Rome to have bene by him sought for, to extenuat the horrible murder
which he had cruelly committed upon the person of young Arthure his brothers sonne, duke of Britaine, and
lawfull successour to the crowne of England; least otherwise he should haue
bene therfore excommunicated by the pope. Whereas Philip
Augustus, king of Fraunce, for the same cause had confiscated the
duchies of Normandie, Guyenne, Aniou, Touraine, le Maine, & all the
countries whereunto he pretended any right, on this side the sea: which the
kings of England held by fealtie and liege homage of the king of Fraunce; and
yet had the chiefe soueraigntieThe king of Scots vassals to the English. over the
realmes of England, Ireland, and Scotland. For first Constantine king of the Scots, with the rest of the nobilitie of that
country, did fealtie and homage to Adelstan king of England; and after that Baliol king of Scots did fealtie and homage also to the king of England, declaring himselfe to hold the
kingdome of Scotland under the protection of the English, excepting the xxxij
Islands of the Orcades, which then & afterwards also were holden in fealtie
and homage of the kings of Norway; and owe unto the new king comming to the
crowne ten markes of gold, as was agreed betwixt the kings of Scotland and
Denmark, to end the warres, which were renewed for the same isles, in the yeare
1564; as I have learned by the letters of M. Danzai,
ambassador for the king in Denmarke. Howbeit the kings of Scotland which
raigned after Baliol, renounced their homage unto the
English, neither acknowledging them for their superiours, or yet to be vnto
them vassals. And albeit that Dauid king of Scots did
what he could with his subiects to consent that the kingdome of Scotland might
bee holden of England in fealtie and homage:
yet so it was, that he remained nine yeares in prison, and by the treatie made
betwixt Edward the third his brother in law, and him, it
was agreed, that he should be set at libertie, without any more obtained from
his estates but that he should live in amitie and friendship with him. As for
the realme of Ireland, it is not long since it receiued the English government,
excepting yet the earle of Argueil, who seemed alwayes to keepe the state of
soueraigntie.
So might we say also of the king of Denmarke, who is a soueraigne prince in
partThe kings of Denmarke in antient time vassals vnto
the German empire. of the kingdome of Norway, without acknowledging
any prince for his superiour whatsoeuer; and yet holdeth part of the duchie of
Holsatia of the emperour in fealty and homage: in which sort he in auntient
time held the countrey of Denmarke, which was
but a plaine dukedome, when Canutus duke of Denmarke
yeelded fealtie and homage unto the emperour Lothaire,
and afterward to the emperour Frederike the fift: who
first of all sent unto Peter duke of Denmarke the sword
and the crowne, and honoured him with royall dignitie; yet with condition, That
hee should for euer yeeld unto the emperour fealtie and homage: howbeit that
his posteritie afterwards reuolted from the empire. And yet neuerthelesse these
whome I have named, beeing no subiects, neither acknowledging the greatnes of
any prince, but in respect of the feesA fee is not to be
giuen up but simply and without fraud. that they hold of other
princes, are acquitted of their fealtie homage and seruice, by giuing up their
fee without fraud. I say without fraud, for that it is not lawfull for the
vassall to forsake his lord and patron at his need, although he would renounce
his fee: albeit that there be no other
penaltie but the losse of fee appointed for him who in time of warre forsaketh
his lord; for that he doth an irreparable preiudice unto his honour, which for
euer remaineth engaged for so foule a fact, as to have forsaken his lord in
time of daunger: seeing that by the oath of fidelitie the vassall, but
especially the liege vassall ought to aide him, were it against his owne
brethren and children. Yea some lawyers are of opinion, that he ought to aid
his lord and patron, euen against his owne father: wherein I can in no wise
agree with them, for that the first and chiefe fidelitie is due unto our
parents. But if the vassall be also a subiect, hee looseth not onely his fee
and honour, if he forsake his soueraigne prince at his need, but euen his life
thereon dependeth: seeing that it is death euen for a common souldior, not to
defend his captaine in battell. Wherefore we
are not to maruell, if Iohn de Montfort, and Peter, dukes of Britaigne would neuer yeeld their fealtie
unto the French kings without exception, as their liege men for the dukedome of
Britaigne: about which matter the chauncelors of Fraunce and Britaigne were
twice at debate before the kings, Charles the fift, and
Charles the sixt. And albeit that these two kings
caused two acts to be produced, concerning the fealtie and homage done by the
dukes of Britaigne, to Philip the victorious and Lewes the eight: yet for all that, the dukes would not
doe their homage as liege men, but were receiued doing their simple homage
onely. True it is, that the liege homage yeelded to Lewes the eight, was not but for the life of him that did
it, as appeared by the act, without binding of
his successours. And the other act which is of yong Arthure, was not pure and simple, but onely conditionall; as to be
restored by Philip the victorious, unto the territories
and segnories from which he was embarred; which he did not. Now such is the
force and nature of true and lawfull acts, as not to admit any time or
condition, and the act of fealtie and homage of all other acts the least. But
the end of the controuersie was, that the simple oath of Iohn and Peter should bee taken, least they
should seeme to bee the liege vassals of the French: although both those dukes
ought of right to have bene depriued of the fee of the dukedome of Britaigne,
for that they had renounced the French king their lawfull patron. Neither
isThe auntient countie of
Britaigne, vassals to the kings of France. there any doubt, but that
in truth the auntient counties of Britaigne were true subiects and liege men unto the kings of Fraunce (as is to be seene
in the histories of Gregorie bishop of Tours) and being
reuolted, were subdued by Charlemaigne, and afterwards
by Lewes the deuout, to whome they did homage, and
yeelded all obeysance with hostages; as a man may see in the histories of Floard and Girald, whome some call
Vitald, the nephew of Charlemaigne. And againe for another rebellion against Charles the Bauld, in the yeare 1359, they were accused
unto the estates, of treason, & so condemned and executed: which could not
have taken place but against the naturall subiect, for treason against his
soueraigne prince. And after that Herispo countie of
Britaigne, doing his fealtie, and with a great summe of money giuen appeased
Charles the Bauld: as had also before him duke Iudicael pleased Dagobert. Neither
is it true, or like to be true, that Clodoueus, who had bounded the kingdome of Fraunce with
the Pyrenei Mountaines, both the seas, and the riuer of Rheine; or Charlemaigne that had in many places vanquished infinit
numbers of the barbarous nations, and had subdued Spaine, Italie, Hungarie,
Germanie, the Saxons, them of Pomerland, the Polonians, and Russians, and had
extended his empire euen as faire as Scithia, would have receiued the dukes of
Britaigne, euen in the bowels of Fraunce, as companions of the French empire.
And admit that by the favour of any the French kings, they obtained respite of
homage, that could not be preiudicial unto the kings their successors, and much
lesse unto the crowne of Fraunce. And that more is, in the treaties betwixt the
kings of Fraunce, and the first dukes of Normandie, it is expresly set downe,
That the counties of Britaigne, should be
vassals unto the dukes of Normandie, unto whome they had oftentimes giuen their
fealtie and homage: which could nor possibly have bene, if they had not bene
vassals and liege men unto the crowne, seeing that the dukes of Normandie had
giuen their fealtie and liege homage unto the kings of Fraunce, & the
counties of Britaigne unto the dukes. And if true it be, that the vassall can
neuer prescribe for his fealtie and homage against his lord; how then can the
subiect prescribe for his subiection against his prince? So the Seneschall of
Renes (a man verie well learned) cannot abide that Peter de
Dreux prince of the blood, surnamed Maucler, had
acquited the soueraigntie of Britaigne unto the kings of Fraunce, seeing that
hee was vassall and naturall subiect unto the king: and yet neuerthelesse, in
yeelding the homage, had reseruation to make
lawes, to graunt pardons, to call parliaments, to take theRoialties reserued unto the dukes of Britaigne, notwithstanding their
homage due unto the French king. benefit of confiscations euen in
cases of high treason, the regall rights in churches, and feofments of trust.
By which arguments not onely probable, but also necessarie, I am persuaded to
write the dukedome of Britaigne, now euen from the times of the first kings of
Fraunce, to have bene a prouince of the kingdome of France, although Argentraeus otherwise thinke. Yet is it worth the noting
that Iohn Montfort and his successors, although they
went about to have rent the dukedome of Britaigne from the kingdome of Fraunce,
yet as counties of Montfort and Virtus to have alwaies yeelded their fealtie unto the French kings, without exception, as we
read in the records, although that they still
exercised in the countries of Britaigne certaine roialties granted them by the
king.
There is then great difference betwixt him which holdeth simply in fealtie and
homage (being himselfe no soueraigne, nor subiect unto him which is lord of the
fee) and him which is soueraigne of a countrey, and yet vassall to some other
lord for some fee; as of him which is in protection onely, or which is
tributarie unto a prince, hauing soueraigntie over his subiects, or which is
himselfe a naturall subiect. WherforeThe prince that holdeth
of another, is himselfe no absolute Soueraigne. we conclude, that
there is none but he an absolute soueraigne, which holdeth nothing of another
man; considering that the vassall for any fee whatsoeuer it be, be hee Pope or
Emperor, oweth personall seruice by reason of the fee which he holdeth. For
albeit that this word Seruice, in all matter of fees, and customes, is not preiudiciall vnto
the naturall libertie of the vassall; yet so it is, that it importeth a
certaine right, dutie, honor and reuerence that the vassall oweth unto the lord
of the fee: which is not indeed a seruitude reall, but is annexed and
inseperable from the person of the vassall, who cannot be therefrom freed, but
by quitting his fee: prouided yet, that hee bee no naturall subiect of the
lords of the fee, from whome he cannot discharge himselfe by renouncing his
fee.
Now when I say, that homage and personall seruice is inseperable from the
vassall;Homage a personall seruice, and not to be
performed by a deputie. that is so true, as that the vassall cannot
acquit himselfe thereof by his deputie or atturney, as was permitted by the
auntient lawes of fees; which in this point is abrogated in Europe, and Asia; yea and in Italie it selfe from whence
the lawes of fees (as many thinke) first tooke their beginning. For Lewes Sfortia, gouernour of Lombardie, sent his Agent
into Fraunce, to king Charles the eight, to haue
obtained of him that his nephew the duke of Milan might by him be receiued to
do his homage by his deputie for the duchie of Genes: whereunto the king would
not condescend. And when question was made of taking of fealtie and homage of
the marques of Salusse, the court of Paris decreed, That his deputie shuld be
admitted in his name, if the king so thought it good; for that the marques
pretended himselfe to be sicke: yet with that condition, that so soone as he
was able he should come and doe it himselfe in person. The same hath also bene
oft times iudged in such like cases. But contrariwise the lord of the fee
may constraine his vassall to yeeld his
fealtie and homage unto his deputie, as is commonly vsed. But if the vassall be
yet under age, or so young as that he yet wanteth understanding, he is to be
borne with for doing of his fealtie and homage, vntill he be of age to do it,
except it pleaseth the lord of the fee to receiue it by his deputie: As did
king Lewes the xj, who by Philip
Commines his ambassador receiued fealtie & homage of the mother of
young Galeas duke of Milan, for the duchie of Genes, the
duke her sonne being under age, and paying fiftie thousand ducats for reliefe.
And for the same cause in the treatie made betwixt Lewes
the eleuenth, and Maximilian archduke of Austria, in the
yeare 1482, in the 56 article it was expresly set downe, That the subiects on
both parts should be receiued to do their homage by their atturneies, which
otherwise they should have bene constrained
themselves in person to have done, if they had not bene sicke, or had some
other iust and reasonable let; or that it was some bodie collegiat. For it much
concerneth the honour of the lord and patron, whether homage be done unto him
in the person of a king his vassall, or by some oeher base atturney or deputie.
And for this cause it was agreed in the treatie of Amiens, made betwixt Philip the faire the French king, and Henrie king of England, in the yeare 1303, That the king of England
should himselfe in persom come to do his fealtie and homage without exception,
if he were not otherwise letted by sicknesse without deceit: in which case he should send his eldest sonne to doe the fealtie in
his stead. And by another treatie made in the
yeare 1330, betwixt Philip Valois, and king Edward the third, it was also said, That the king of
England should in person come to doe his fealtie and homage, if he were not
without fraud by sicknesse letted; which ceasing, hee should then also come.
And by the treatie of peace, made in the yeare 1259, betwixt Lewes the ninth the French king, and Henrie the
second, king of England, it is expresly declared, That the king of England
should in person himself yeeld his fealtie & liege homage unto the French
king. Which liege homage (as they tearme it) is of that force, as that the
person of no prince, pope, or emperour, is therein excepted. Now the forme of
the homage declared by the treatie, in the yeare 1331, betwixt Philip Valois the French king, and Edward the third, is this: The king of England hauing his hands
ioyned, and put The forme of the homage made by the kings of England vnto
the kings of Fraunce. betwixt the hands of the French king, the
Chauncel or of Fraunce for the French king, shall thus say unto the king of
England, Thou shalt become a liege man to the king of
Fraunce, who here is, as duke of Guyenne, and peere of Fraunce, countie of
Poitou, and Monstrueil, and shalt promise to beare unto him faith and
loyaltie: Whereunto the king of England shall say, I
consent thereunto: Then the king of Fraunce shall receiue the king of
England into his fealtie with a kisse. But the oath of Charles the king of Nauarre was more religious, when he yeelded his
fealtie unto Charls the fift, the French king, in the
yeare 1370: for that he was not onely the French kings vassall, but his subiect
also, unto whome hee promised his faith and loialtie towardes and against all
men, which could live or die: albeit that he was then soueraigne king of
Nauarre, and pretended a right unto the
soueraigntie of Berne, which yet resteth vndecided. The forme of the simple
homage done by Iohn de Montfort, Arthure the second, and
Peter the second, dukes of Britaigne, is like,
excepting the word Liege man. But for vassals which be
also subiects, the forme of fealtie is more religious & precise, for that
they are bound with a double bond, whereas the forren vassals are not so. For
the king of England, Edward the third being come to
Amiens to doe his homage unto the king of Fraunce, refused to ioyne his hands
betwixt the hands of the king, and so returned into his kingdome, where it was
sixe moneths debated betwixt the French kings commissioners, and the assembly
of the estares, about the resolution for the forme of the homage: in fine, king
Edward thought it better to follow the prescript
forme, than to loose so many benefits as he
then enioyed in Fraunce. But if the vassall be also a naturall subiect unto his
lord and patron, he is bound to lay by his sword, his gloues, his hat, his
cloke, his spurres, and upon his knees to put his hands ioyned together, into
the hands of his prince, or of his deputie, and so to take his oath: and by the
custome of this realme, if it pleaseth not the lord, he is not bound to be
present, or to kisse his vassall; but may (if he so please) being present, see
him in forme, as we have aforesaid, giue his fealtie and homage to some small
officer, or before his house, by kissing the hammer of his doore. But by the
customs of Vermandbis, the vassall is bound to do his fealtie unto his lord
being present; but if he be absent, it is sufficient for the vassall being
present, to cause it to be done by his atturney, least the honour of the
vassall should bee impaired by the basenesse
of the person of his lords atturney. But if the vassall have thirtie heires,
every one of them is constrained to yeeld his fealtie unto his patron requiring
the same: as was long since prouided by the decree of Philip the Victorious, the French king, in the yeare 1209. Yet some
vse another custome.
Shall we then say, a Vassall (that is to say another mans man) although he at
homeHomage a base & seruile thing, and therefore
detested of honorable princes. enioy a kingdome, to have a soueraigne
maiestie and power? Shall we call him that is bound to doe most vile seruices,
(and to vse the words of fealtie) him that serueth another man, shall we call
him, I say, a soueraigne prince? And that is it for which manie▪ honourable princes had rather to loose and forgoe right great
seignories, and their most rich fees, than to
serue such a slauerie. And othersome againe, to the contrarie, would not sell
their soueraigntie for any thing in the world. As the prince of Orange refused
of king Lewis the eleuenth, ten times so much as his
principalitie was worth, which stood him in more than hee receiued profit
thereby: And for the same cause Edward the third, king
of England, in the first article of the treatie of Bretigni expresly excepted,
that all royalties should be giuen unto himselfe in those countries which he
had by inheritance in Fraunce; least he should for them have beene enforced to
have yeelded fealtie and homage unto the French kings. Neither for any other
cause did Stephen, Vayuod of Valachia, reuolt from the
kings of Polonia, but for that the king of Polonia had caused his tent to be
cast wide open at the same very instant that the Vayuod was therein doing unto him his homage, that so he might be seene of
all men in doing of it. Which sie disgrace the Vayuod
tooke in very euill part: which is not to be maruelled at in so great a lord as
he, if wee doe but consider, that Calisthenes the nephew
of Aristotle chose rather to loose his life, than after
the Persian guise, in humble and deuout manner upon his knees to honour Alexander the Great: albeit that Alexander courteously tooke them up with a kisse that so honoured him.
Which was also an vsuall thing with the Romane emperours, when they gaue vnto
the kings that were in their protection, their scepters and diademes. For so
Tiridates king of Armenia being come to Rome, humbled
himselfe upon his knee before the emperour Nero, whom
Nero taking by the hand, lift him up, kissed him, and
taking his turbant from off his head, set
thereon a royall crowne, and caused him to sit on his right hand. For albeit
that the kingdomes were giuen by the Romane emperours without reseruation of
fealtie or homage, yet so it was, that the kings laying aside their scepters
and crownes, of their owne accord serued the Romane emperours, some as
seruitors in their chambers, othersome called themselves but the Romane
stewards, as Adherball king of Numidia tearmed himselfe
nothing but the steward of the people of Rome. And Eumenes king of Pergame after the discomfiture and death of Mithridates king of PontusThe wearing
of a cap was in auntient time the marke of them that were but lately made
free, to cover their heads that were shauen when they were slaues.
came to Rome, and with a cap upon his head (in token of his late recouered
libertie) thanked the people of Rome for the same. But Prusias king of Bithynia as oft as he went into the Senate, commonly
kissed the threshold of the gate, calling himselfe the Senates slaue: albeit that he was neither subiect nor
tributarie, nor so much as in the Romanes protection, but ioyned unto them in
equall confederation. All these honours, were they neuer so great, proceeding
from their owne voluntarie will, did little or nothing at all diminish the
maiestie of a soueraigne prince, as doth that forme of homage which is seruile
and constrained, and which the Tartars, Persians, and Turkes esteeme to bee the
true seruice of a very slaue. And truly Solyman the
Turkish king was about to have restored Iohn king of
Hungarie into his kingdome in the yeare 1555, with condition to have holden the
same of him in fealtie and homage, without other subiection (as he by a Chiaus
his embassadour, certified Sigismundus Augustus king of
Polonia) if king Ferdinand, who pretended the kingdome
of Hungarie to belong unto himselfe by
inheritance, had not letted him so to doe; as I have seene by the letters of
Sanislaus Rosdrazeroski, a Polonian, written to Anne Mommorancie constable of Fraunce the same yeare
1555. And for this cause Francis the French king to
hinder that Charlet of Austria should not bee chosen
emperour, declared unto the princes, Electors of the Empire, that the maiestie
of the Empire should be much debased, if they should of his vassall make their
head and Emperour: wherewith the emperour not a little moued, and afterwards at
the battell of Paie hauing taken him prisoner, would
neuer consent unto his deliverance, vntill hee had quite discharged the Low countries from the fealtie and homage wherein they were
before bound unto the French.
But it seemeth that it is not enough to say, that Charles of Austria was vassall unto the crowne of Fraunce, but that he
was thereunto a liegeman also; and not onely aCharles the
fift a naturall subiect of these French Kings▪ liegeman, but euen the
French kings naturall subiect; as borne & brought up in Flanders, then a
prouince of the French kingdom: although many think the citie of Gaunt the
natiue place of Charles, and the cities upon the sea
coast to have bene excepted. For the earles of Flaunders were alwaies accounted
peers of Fraunce, euen from the first beginning of that kingdome: and the
soueraigne roialties thereof, alwaies before reserued unto the same, but
especiallie at the solemne treatie of Arras betwixt Charles the seuenth and Philip the second duke
of Burgundie. Also Charles the fift beeing chosen
emperour, asked leaue of Francis the French king, that hee might leuie of his subiects the
subsidie graunted him at Arras, in the yeare 1520; whereunto the kings aunswere
was, That he would therein do what he might, without diminishing in any thing
the right of his crowne: as I have seene by the instructions giuen to M. De la Roche-Gaucourt at such time as hee was sent
ambassadour into Spaine. Although that greater causes might have beene
alleaged, which might have stayed German princes from the election of Charles the fift. For Charles of
Austria was as thenCharls the fift vassall and liegeman vnto
the pope and the Church of Rome. not onely the vassall, liegeman, and
naturall subiect to the king of Fraunce, but also a liegeman unto the pope and
the church of Rome, for all the countries, lands, and seignories that he then
held, except that which he held of the crowne of Fraunce, or of the empire; howbeit that he as then held nothing of the
empire, but the lands neere unto the Rhene, and Cambray: For Arnold the last of that name, countie of Burgundie, gaue it with the
other countries to the emperor Conrade the second, in
the yeare 1205, and after that, the emperour Charles the
fourth gaue it to Charles the sixt, the Dolphin, by
fealtie and homage, as appeareth by the inuestiture thereof in the treasure of
Fraunce, the copie whereof we have out of the records. But at such time as he
professedThe kingdom of Naples
and Sicilie holden of the pope. himselfe to be the liegeman of the
bishop of Rome, in his fealtie giuen for the kingdome of Naples, he then
promised by his oath, not to take upon him either the charge of the German
empire, if he were chosen emperour by the German princes; either of the
dukedome of Milan; and with these conditions gaue his fealtie and homage vnthe
pope: which is not to be thought any new
clause, but an auntient condition, ioyned unto all the acts of fealtie and
homage giuen unto the pope by the kings of Naples and Sicilie, since the time
that pope Vrban the fift, therin inuested Charles of France brother unto king Lewes. And in the inuestiture of that kingdome, made by Innocent the fourth, unto Edmond
the sonne of Henrie king of England, in the yeare 1255,
the copie whereof we have written out of the Vatican records, are these words,
Ego Henricus, Dei gratia Rex Angliae, nomine Edmundi filij
nostri Regis Siciliae, plenum & ligeum vassallagium facio ecclesiae
Romana. viz. I Henrie, by the grace of God king
of England, in the name of Edmund our sonne, king of
Sicilie, yeeld full and liege homage unto the church of Rome, &c. And in
the act of fealtie and liege homage giuen by
Robert king of Sicilie, in the 1338, he by oath
promised neuer to receiue the imperiall crowne, neither the dukedome of Milan,
nor any seignorie whatsoeuer in Tuscanie, upon paine of the losse of all such
right as he might pretend unto the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie. The like is
also found giuen by Charles king of Naples, in the yeare
1295: and by queene Ione in the yeare 1348, as I haue
read in the register of the Vatican. And for this onely cause pope Iulius the second refused to inuest Ferdinand king of Arragon, Charles the fift the
emperours grandfather by the mothers side, in the kingdome of Naples, but upon
the conditions I have aforesaid: and a yearely rent of
eight thousand ounces of gold, or of foure score thousand crownes, which the
The ounce is worth ten crownes kings of Naples were
bound to pay euerie yeare, and a white ambling gelding, beside the aid
expressed in the inuesture, with reseruation of the countie of Beneuent. Which
their obligation was of such consequence unto the popes, that so soone as they
denounced warre unto any, the kings of Naples were straight wayes in armes for
the defence of the Church of Rome. So Alphonsus king of
Naples, at the denuntiation of pope Sextus, made warre
upon the state of Florence, for that they had hanged the Cardinall of Pisa, the
popes Legat a latere in his pontificalibus. And in our
time pope Paulus the third by his Ambassadour Alexander Farnesius, summoned the emperour Charles the fift, being then with a great armie in
France, to make peace with the French king, so with their vnited forces to make
warre upon the Protestant princes, as was
agreed upon in the first article of the treatie of Soissons, made in September
in the yere 1544: which haply the emperour would not have done (hauing had his
armie but a little before by the French men ouerthrowne in Italie, and now with
doubtfull euent making warre in Fraunce) if he had not bene liege vassall vnto
the pope, & by him threatned to loose the kingdoms of Naples and Sicilie,
as he was well giuen to vnderstand. Which the pope did, not so much moued with
the publike calamitie or troubled estate of the Church, as with the power of
Charles, wherewith he was like to have subdued most
part of Europe, had hee not bene letted by the armes and power of the French.
And albeit that in the yeare 1528, by the treatie made betwixt pope Clement the vij and his Cardinals, besieged in the castle
S. Angelo on the one side, and the emperour Charles the fift on the other, it was set downe, That
the kings of Naples should for euer be acquited of the yerely rent of 8000▪
ounces of gold, and of all the arearages, which amounted unto great summes: yet
so it was, that all the rest of the pointes of the auntient inuestiture, still
stood in their former force and vertue. But euer since, the German emperours
have well knowne, and the pope better, (seeing Rome sacked, and himselfe put to
ransome of 400000 duckets, after he had released the fairest rights of S. Peters demaine) what daunger it was to make choice of the
vassall of a soueraigne prince, and the natural subiect of another, to be head
of the Empire: For with the forces of Germanie he brought downe the pope, and
with the popes power hee ruinated the princes of Germanie. And albeit that by
the imperiall title hee held the duchies of
Milan, of Gelders, and other seignories of the empire, yet so it is, that hee
was the popes antient vassall & liege man, and so consequently to him first
bound, & that more straitly unto the Church than to the empire. Ioine
hereunto also, that the popes have sincePius Quintus the
pope angrie with Ferdinand the emperour for not receiing of him the imperiall crowne. this 300
yeres pretended that the emperor may not take upon him the empire, but hauing
before of them receiued the imperiall crowne; as pope Pius the fift by his Legats sharply rebuked the emperour Ferdinand, for that he had not of him receiued the
imperiall crowne, which his brother Charles had not
before doubted so to receiue; and had by excommunication compelled him so to
doe, had hee not by the intreatie of king Philip his
kinsman, and of the French king, otherwise appeased.
But heresome man will say, How could it be that the emperor Charls the fift, should The same man cannot be liegeman to diuers princ. be liegeman unto the pope, the French king,
and the empire? seeing that no man can be liegeman unto many lords, although he
have many fees holden of them all separatly: For his faith and aid is due to
one alone, and him the first and chiefest, without exception of any man liuing.
And in case he be the vassall of many coheires for one and the same fee, he is
liegeman unto them all together, but not to any of them separatly, considering
that his fealtie cannot be divided; neither can he do his liege homage unto one
of them without exception, for the concurrence of the rest: yet truer it is,
his fealtie to be due unto one onely of his patrons, whome he shall make choice
of, if that his patrons cannot agree, or els to them
altogether; and that law we now vse. For the
condition of the vassall ought not to be made more hard, than if there were
unto one man, but one heire; but it should be much harder if he should bee
enforeed to doe many duties, many seruices, and many times to giue his faith:
and that much more the liege vassall, who cannot giue unto manie his faith
seuerally, without exception.
I here vnderstand the liege homage properly as it is to bee vnderstood in the
lawes of Fees; for that our auncestors have abused this word Liege, in all their auntient treaties of alliance and oathes that they
made: I remember that I have seene 48 treaties of alliance, which our kings Philip the v, and Charles the v.
vj. vij. and Lewes the xj, made with the three electors
on this side the Rhine, and diuers other the princes of the empire, wherein
they by oath sworne betwixt the hands of the kings deputies, solemnly
promised to serue them in their warres
against all men, except the emperour, and the king of the Romans; vowing to be
their vassals and liege men, more or lesse; some calling themselves
councellours, some other pentioners, all liege vassals: except the Archbishop
of Treuers, Elector of the empire, who no otherwise called himselfe, but the
kings confederat, and not his vassall, although he receiued his pention from
the king, as did the other princes; who for all this held nothing of the crowne
of France, but were nothing but pentioners unto the French kings, to whome they
gaue their oath to aid them, at their charge, upon the conditions expressed in
their oathes. Onely the oath of the duke of Guelders, and countie of Iuliers, I
will for example set downe, that thereby men may iudge of the rest, in Latine
conceiued in these words, Ego deuenio vassallus ligiusCaroli Regis Francorum, pro ratione quinquaginta millium
scutorum auri, ante festum D. Rhemigij mihi soluendorum, &c. viz. I
become liege vassall of Charles the French king, for the
summe of fiftie thousand crownes of gold, to be paid unto mee before the feast
of S. Rhemigius, &c. This oath bore date in Iune, in
the yeare 1401. Yea, euen betwixt kings themselves leagues were oftentimes
conceiued in such words, as that the one of them professed himselfe to be the
others vassall. As in the league made betwixt Philip of
Valois the French king, and Alphonsus king of Castile,
in the yeare 1336, it is said, That they should giue and
receiue fealtie and homage the one of the other: which proceeding but
of the ignorance of their ambassadours, is now better vnderstood, as but an
abuse of the words Vassall and Liege: the oathes also of the kings pentioners, and their treaties, carrie no more such words.
Wherefore againe to returne from whence we have a little digressed. I say
then,The vasia ought first to
serue his most auntient Lord that the emperour Charls the fift could not yeeld his liege fealtie and homage unto the
pope without exception, considering that he was liege man, peere, and naturall
subiect unto the French king, and that the seruice and homage is inseparable
from the person. And admit he were not the kings subiect, but his liege man, or
not his liege man but his vassall onely; yet so it is, that in tearmes of right
the liege homage is due unto the most auntient, and that the vassall ought to
serue his most auntient Lord. But if the lords be equall, and yet at variance
amongst themselves for the seruice, hee oweth aid neither to the one nor to the
other: For that in matter of seruices or seruitude, the seruice (for the indiuisible nature therof) is letted by the
concurrence of them to whom it is to be done. For amongst equals the condition
of him which forbiddeth (the seruice) is better: howbeit that in question of
simple alliance, the aid is due unto him that is wronged and inuaded in his
countrey against the other common allie which maketh warre upon him, as it
commonly falleth out if the assailant have no iust cause, and that after
denuntiation to him giuen by the common allies to come to some reasonable
agreement, he refuse so to doe.
But most certaine it is, that the naturall subiect ought alwayes to preferte
his naturall lord aboue all, if he bee present; as him
to whome he is first bound, & from whom he
cannot exempt himselfe. And therefore in the decrees of king Lewes the eleuenth, and of Philip the second,
duke of Burgundie, made for the order of Fraunce, the xiij article, and for the
order of the golden Fleece, the ix article, it is set downe, That the knights
of what prince soeuer it be, ought to aid their naturall lord, whose liege men
they are, and the countrey wherein they were borne, against him that shall make
war upon them, without any blemish to their honour; prouided that their
naturall lord be there in person, and not otherwise, and that they signifie so
much unto the chiefe of the order whereof they are knights. Whereby it
appeareth that the emperour Charles the fift could not
giue his faith unto the electors of the empire, but with reseruation of his
fealtie unto the French king, and afterward unto the Pope. For beside the
kingdome of Naples and Sicilie, holding of the
pope immediatly and without meane, hee was also his vassall and liege man for
the kingdome of Arragon, as I have red in the records taken out of the Vatican▪
where the graunt giuen by Peter king of Arragon is set
downe in these words, Ego Petrus Dei gratia Rex Arragonum,
Comes Barcinonae, DominusThe act of the oath of the king of Arragon giue to the
pope.Montispessulani, cupiens praeter Deum, principali beati
Petri, & Apostolicae sedis protectione muri,
tibi reuerendissime pater, & Domine summe Pontifex Innocēti, & pro
te, sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, & Apostolicae sedi, offero regnum
meum: illudque tibi pro remedio animae meae primogenitorum meorum constituo
censuale, vt annuatim de Camera Regis ducenta quinquaginta Massimitinae
Apostolicae sedi reddantur: & ego ac successores mei, specialiter &
fideles & obnoxi teneamur: hac autem lege perpetua seruandum forumdecerno, quia spero & confido, quod tu & successores
tui, quali beati, Petri manibus in regem duxeris solemniter coronandum.
Actum Romae anno Christi 1204. In English thus: I Peter by the grace of God king of Arragon, Countie of Barcelona, Lord
of Montpelier, desiring next unto God to be strengthened with the principall
protection of blessed S. Peter and the Apostolicall See;
do offer unto thee most reuerent father and high Lord, Pope Innocent, and for thee unto the most holy Church of Rome, and to the
Apostolicall See, my kingdome; and the same for the health of my soule and of
my predecessours, I make unto thee tributarie, so that out of the kings chamber
shall bee yerely paied unto the Apostolical See, two hundred & fifty
Massimitines, & that I and my successors shall be especially bound to be
(unto you) faithfull and subiect; and by this
perpetuall law decree a court to be kept: for that my hope and trust is, that
thou & thy successors shalt lead vs as it were with the hands of blessed
Peter, to be solemnly crowned king. Enacted at Rome
in the yeare of Christ 1204. So that kingdome of Arragon was by the Arragonian
kings offered unto the Bishops of Rome, least they should for their enormities
and murders have bene well beaten. But the kingdomes of Sardinia and Corsica,
was by the popes giuen unto the kings of Arragon (as the popes guise is
bountifull to giue that is none of their owne) for which kingdome the Emperour
was also liege man unto the Pope, as I have scene by the inuestiture thereof
made unto Peter the third, king of Arragon, in this
sort, Pontifex Max de fratrum suorum ascensus,The inuestiture of the kingdomes of Sardinia and Corsica
granted by the pope.dat in feudum regnum Sardiniae & Corsicae, proprietatē
ecclesi Romanae &c. Per capamAuream te praesentialiter inuestimus, &c. Ita tamen quod
tu & successores tui, praestabitis homagium ligium, vassallagium plenum,
& fidelitatis iuramentum, &c. Et centū equites armatos, & vno
equo ad arma, & duobus equitaturis adminus per quēlibet, &
quintagentis peditibus terrae vestrae de Arragonia, cum gagijs per
trimestre, a die quo intrabūt terrā Ecclesiae, &c. Et in super censum
duorū milliū marcarū argenti bonorum, & legaliū strelingorū:
vbicun{que} fuerit Romanus Pontifex in festo▪ beatorus Petri & Pauli,
annis singulis, sub poena excommunicationis post quatuor menses, &c.
& post tertium terminum non solueris, tu haeredes{que} tui, a dicto
regno Sardiniae & Corsicae cadetis ex toto, & regnum ad Romanamecklesiam reuertetur. viz. The great bishop by the
assent of his bretheren, doth giue in fee the
kingdome of Sardinia and Corsica, the inheritance of the church of Rome,
&c. And we personally therein, inuest thee by a cape of gold, &c. yet
so as that thou and thy successours shall therefore giue liege homage, full
vassalage, and oath of fidelitie, &c. And an hundred armed horse-men, and
one horse for seruice, and two furnitures at the least for every one, and fiue
hundred foote-men of your country of Aragon, with pay for three moneths from
the day that they shall enter into the territorie of the church, &c. And
moreover the rent of two thousand markes of good and lawfull sterling money,
wheresoeuer the pope shall be in the feast of the blessed Apostles, Peter and Paul, euerie yeare, upon paine of
excommunication after foure moneths, &c. and if after the third time thou
shalt not pay it, thou and thy heires from the
said kingdome of Sardinia and Corsica, shall altogether fall; and the same
kingdome shall againe returne unto the church of Rome. And after that, Iames king of Aragon, did also like homage at Valence,
betwixt the hands of the popes legate, in the yeare 1353, with reseruation vnto
the pope of appeales, put in by the clergie, and abolishing of the lawes and
customes brought in by the kings of that country. I finde also that Ferdinand, and after him Alphonsus, kings of Aragon, did the like fealtie and homage in the
yeare 1455. And in the publike records of the court of Rome, are to be seene
the names of the vassall kings set downe in this order: the kings of Naples,
Sicilia, Aragon, Sardinia, Hierusalem, England, Ireland, and Hungary. And this
is the old description of such princes as 380 yeres ago, yeelded their
fealtie & homage unto the bishops of
Rome. And since the kingdom of Portugall, wasThe kingdom of
Portugall holden of the pope. by the valour of Henry of Benonia, taken from the Moores, the
kings thereof made themselves vassalls unto the bishop of Rome, and payd the
yearely tribute of two thousand duckats into the bishop of Rome his treasure.
And therefore Innocent the fourth, bishop of Rome, by
his letters admonished the princes of the kingdome of Portugall, to appoint
ouerseers to their prodigall king, who should also take upon them the
gouernement of the kingdome. And as for the Islands of the Canaries, Nigaries,The islands of the Canaries▪ holden of the pope. and
the Gorgonides; the emperour holdeth them also of the
pope. We also reade, that Lewes king of Spaine, did
fealtie and homage unto the pope, in the yeare 1343, with charge to pay yearely
into the chamber of Rome, foure hundred florines of the weight and coine of Florence. And as for the remainder of
the westerne Isles, and of Peru, it is certaine that pope Alexander the sixt, diuiding the new world betwixt the kinges of
Castile and Portugall, expresly kept unto himselfe the inheritance, the
iurisdiction and soueraignetie thereof, by consent of the two kings; who from
that time made themselves his vassalls, of all the purchases and conquests by
them already gained, and that they should from that time forward, gaine or
make, as the Spaniards themselves have written. In like manner pope Iulius the second, gaue unto Ferdinand king of Spaine, Charles the fift, his
grandfather by the mothers side, the kingdomes of Granado and Nauarre; when he had driuen the
Moores out of the one, and Peter D'Albret out of the
other, upon condition to hold them by fealty and homage of the church of Rome. For albeit that Charles the fift, the emperor pretended right unto the kingdome of Nauarre, by reason of the donation to him made by Germaine D'Foix, second wife unto king Ferdinande: yet so it was, that his ambassadours and deputies, when
they came to the conference, seeing that their donation to want sure
foundation, doubted not to pretend the popes interdictions, as the surest stay
of their most vniust rapines. And the cause of the interdiction was, for that
Peter Albret, king of Nauarre,
would not at the command of pope Iulius the second,
breake faith and friendship with Lewes the xij, the
French king, who was first called father of his country, when as hee was king Lewes his liege vassall,
and no way bound unto the pope. So that there remained The maiestie of Charles the fift impugned by this French
author. no kingdome, no not any little territorie or peece of ground,
which Charles the emperour held not by fealtie aud
homage, or whereof he could call himselfe a soueraigne. For as for the Islands
of Maiorca and Minorca, they were long time before reunited unto the kingdome
of Aragon, after that they were taken from the heires of Iames the Fortunate. And in the Low-countries, he had nothing which
was not of necessitie holden of the crowne of France, or of the empire. And
albeit that our princes have by diuers leagues, granted the principalitie of
Flanders and Artoise unto Charles the emperour, yet
remaineth there a country in Burgundie, which they call the countie of
Charrolois, the proprietie whereof belongeth unto the king of Spaine, but the
soueraignetie thereof unto the French king, and is by the king of Spaine holden
in fealty: so that euen for that, he is to
ackdowledge himselfe to be our kings vassall. As forTitle
pretended by the French unto the kingdom of Castile. the kingdome of
Castile, no man doubteth (which hath but looked into the Spanish affaires) but
that the kingdome of Castile by inheritance, descended unto king Lewes the ix. of France, in the right of Blanch his mother: yea, and the nobilitie of Castile by
solemne acts, which are yet extant in the records of France, inuited king Lewes to have taken upon him his mothers kingdome.
Howbeit I doubt not, but that the Spaniards will reply, that Blanch, the daughter of Lewes the ix. married
the king of Castile, upon condition that all such right unto the kingdome, as
might have fallen unto her father, should now be giuen unto his sonne in law:
which thing Lewes could not doe unto the preiudice of
his successours; without the consent of the states: ioyning therevnto
also that the French kings daughters or
sisters, when they are bestowed and married, can receiue nothing but money of
the royall possessions of the crowne of France▪ And albeit that some may thinke
that the French king might giue those lands unto his daughter, as not yet
vnited or incorporate into the crowne of France; yet neuerthelesse there is yet
extant in the records of France, a league made in the yeare 1369, betwixt king
Charles the fift and Henry
king of Castile, then driuen out of his kingdome, whereby I have seene, that
Henry promised as well for himselfe, as for his
successours, to become vassall, and to hold his kingdome of Castile, of the
kings of Fraunce: for that by the meanes of the king of France, he was againe
restored into his kingdome. Seeing then that the kingdome of Castile is
hereditarie descending unto the heires both
males and females, the successours of Henry are bound
unto his deedes and promises. True it is, that the promise of Henry had not power to preiudice his successours, neither the estates
of Castile, without the consent of whom, the treatie was made, if the realme of
Castile had not beene hereditarie. But of the kingdome of Fraunce, it is
otherwise to be thought and determined. And therefore it was by the wise
resolued, that Phillip the Faire, the French king, could
not make Arthur duke of Britaine, vassall unto the king
of England, without the dukes consent; except he would by the same right, giue
up his kingdome of France unto the king of England, which he could by no
soueraigne power doe, without the consent of the estates of France. For
otherwise, his yeelding of it up, should be to none effect or purpose, no more
then that of king Iohn of Fraunce, made unto the king of England in
the treatie at Calais, wherein he withoutThe author haply is
in this partiall, or mistaken. consent of the
states, yeelded unto the king of England, all the right and title he had in the
kingdome of France: which was againe disanulled by the treatie of Chartres, whereby the king of England refused that right
giuen unto him by such yeelding up. The same is to be thought of the league of
Tricasse, wherein Charles the sixt, without the consent
of the states, yeelded the kingdome of France unto Henry
the fit, king of England. And therefore pope Martine could by no request of the English, be perswaded
to ratifie that league, but called Charles the seauenth,
sonne to Charles the sixt, by
the name of the French king: for that the kingdome of Fraunce is neither
deuolued by right of succession, (which they
tearme from one intestate,) neither by testament, neither by resignation, but
by vertue of the law royall, from which the kings themselves cannot derogat
without the consent of the estates; which is not so in the kingdomes of Spaine,
England, Scotland, Naples, and Nauarre.
But cannot the imperiall title (may some man haply say) make him a soueraigne
which is another mans vassall? As the prince or the people making a slaue a
magistrat seemeth thereby to have also enfranchised him; whereof there is no
doubt, if he be the princes or the peoples slaue; for otherwise it is not
lawfull either for the prince, or for the people, to dispose of another mans
seruant: so neither have the German princes any power over other mens citisens
or subiects, such as was Charles the fift. Ioyne
hereunto The emperour n absolute
soueraigne. to also, that the imperiall title of the emperour
carrieth with it no soueraigntie: albeit that the emperour writing unto the
princes of the empire, vse these wordes, Wee command you,
&c. You shall do this, &c. which other princes do not toward
their own subiects: yea and that more is, that the princes electors carrie the
titles of Butlers, Esquiers, and Tasters to the emperour, yet the soueraigntie
of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperour, but in the assemblie
of the states of the empire, who are able to giue law unto the emperour, and to
euerie prince of the empire in particular, in such sort as that the emperour
hath not power to make any particular edict, neither peace nor warre, neither
to charge the subiects of the empire so much as with one impost, nor to call or
dismisse the diets of the empire, without the consent of the princes. And
that is it for which the emperour Maximilian the first, at the diet of Constance, holden in
the yeare 1507, said unto the estates (the popes legat then vrging that the
imperiall crowne was both to be requested and receiued of the pope,) That to
take the imperiall crowne of the pope was but a needlesse ceremonie, seruing to
no purpose; considering that the imperiall authoritie and power depended of the
estates of the empire: which in due place we will more particularly
declare.
Whereby a man may easily iudge, that there are few or none absolute
soueraigneNo prince in Italie which holdeth not of the
pope, or of the empire. princes. For the Venetian Commonweale
excepted, there are no princes or Commonweals in Italie, which hold not of the
empire, the pope, or the crowne of Fraunce: which concerning the kingdome of
Sicilie and Naples, we have alreadie declared. As for the duke of Milan he is a naturall vassall of the
empire, from which hee taketh hisThe duke of Milan.
inuesture, and thereto payeth reliefe: for which the emperour Maximilian the first, in lesse than xv, or xvj yeares space, drue
thence unto himselfe, aboue three hundred thousand pounds: For king Lewes the twelfth at one time paid therfore an hundred
thousand pounds: and the Sforces had it no better cheape. For they which are
now called dukes of Milan, in the remembrance of our auncestors, that is to say
about an hundred and fiftie yeares agoe, were called but lieutenants, and the
citie it selfe but the ordinarie chamber of the empire. And so namely Iohn Galeace the second, and Barnabas his brother, in the inuestiture which they had from the
emperour Charles the fourth, are simply called
lieutenants of the empire. And Galeace the first being
accused for charging the subiects with
subsidies, without the emperours leaue, was by a decree from the emperour sent
prisoner unto the castle of Modene; where after he had of long time lived, he
at length died; whose sonne Actius being by the emperour
Lewes of Bauyere put into his fathers place, for the
summe of an hundred thousand crownes, obtained of him the first title of a
prince, in the yeare 1338. And after that, Galeace the
third, father in law to Lewes duke of Orleans, payed
unto the emperour Fredericke the third, an hundred
thousand florines, for the honour and title of a duke, in the yeare one
thousand three hundred ninetie seuen.
So say we also of the duke of Mantua, who acknowledgeth
himselfe to hold of the The duke of Mantua. Germaine empire, and to be also a
prince thereof.
As for the duke of Ferrara he confesseth euen at this present to hold part of
his seignorie,The duke of Ferrara. euen Ferrara it
selfe, of the pope, and therefore payeth a yearely rent or fee into the popes
coffers. For not long ago, viz. in the yeare 1372, the
marques of Este was by pope Gregory first established
his lieutenant in the city of Ferrara, reseruing unto the church fealtie and
homage, iurisdiction and soueraigntie; with condition also, that he should
yearely pay ten thousand florens of gold into the chamber of S. Peter, and to find an hundred men at armes paied for
three monethes, for the defence of the Church of Rome, so often as need should
require, as I have learned out of the Vatican records. And as for Rhegium and
Modene, he acknowledgeth him to hold them of the empire: albeit that pope Iulius the second
maintained them to be the Church fees, and in that quarrell made warres upon
the Ferrariens and the French king, who gaue them aide: as also to have the
entire reuenue of the fee, beeing before diminished by pope Alexander the sixt, in marrying his base daughter Lucrece unto the duke Alphonsus. And true it
is, that the French kings long since tooke upon them the defence and patronage
of the prince of Ferrara, since the time that Borsus,
first duke of Ferrara, acknowledged himselfe liege vassall unto Charles the sixt, and therfore it was unto him permitted,
that those dukes of Ferrara might beare the armes of Fraunce, the publike acts
whereof yet remaine in the records of Fraunce.
As concerning the Florentines, they of long time have pretended libertie
against the The Florentine empire, for the payment of sixe thousand Florines unto the emperour Rodolphe. As also do the Genowayes, who as they say, were
by the same emperour enfranchised. HowThe Genowayes.
be it that afterwards they hauing receiued great harme from the Venetians, gaue
themselves into protection unto king Charles the sixt,
the French king: and not long after unto the duke of Milan, who receiued them
upon condition that they should therefore do fealtie and homage unto the French
kings.
In like case they of Luca paied unto the emperour Henrie
the fift, twelue thousand Florines to be enfranchised; Sienna ten thousand; And
Peter Gambecourt payed twelue thousand unto the
emperour Charles the fourth for the seignorie of
Pisa.
But these were not true alienations, nor exemptions from subiection; but rather
simple graunts and gifts, with certaine
priueleges to gouerne their estate, under the obeisanceThat
a prince cannot alienat any thing of the publike demaine but that his
successors may again resume the same. of the empire. It was not also
in the power of the emperours, neither of any prince whatsoeuer, to alienat any
thing of the publike demaine, and much lesse of the rights of the soueraigne
maiestie, but that it was alwayes in the power of the successour to lay hand
thereon againe, as it is lawfull for the lord to lay hold uppon his fugitiue
slaue. As the emperour Maximilian, hauing thrust his
armie into Italie, with the power of king Lewes the xij,
and hauing brought a great feare upon all the cities of Italie, gaue them well
to vnderstand: At which time the Florentines sent their ambassadors unto him,
to yeeld unto him fealtie and homage for their estate, and to obtaine of him
the confirmation of their priueleges, which cost them fortie thousand ducats.
And albeit that Cosmus
duke of Florence, by force of armes made himselfe lord of Sienna: yet so it
was, that he tooke the inuestiture therof, & yeelded therfore sealtie &
homage unto the king of Spaine, as perpetuall lieutenant of the empire. Which
is sufficient reason to show, that they of Sienna were not before enfranchised
or exempted from the empire; or if they were, why did then pope Iulius the second pay thirtie thousand ducats to Maximilian the emperour, to redeeme of him the libertie
of Sienna, to the intent to inuest therein . the duke of Vrbin. And yet neuerthelesse all
that letted not, but that the duke of Florence, which had conquered it by force
of armes, was constrained to take the inuestiture
thereof of the king of Spaine, and to pay therefore sixe hundred thousand crownes, which afterwards the king of
Spaine would have againe repayed unto the duke of Florence, to have restored
Sienna into the former estate; which he would not do, being enformed that the
king of Spayne would have giuen it to the duke of Parma, to reunite Placence
and Parma unto the duchie of Milan, from whence they had bene before
distracted. And how then could the German emperours, which are subiects vnto
the estates of the empire, alienat the demaine and rights of soueraigntie, in
giuing the rights of soueraigntie unto the cities of Italie, or libertie vnto
the tributarie people; seeing that the absolute soueraigne prince cannot so do?
no not so much as to distract one clod of the publike land, much lesse to giue
away the proprietie. For kings and other great princes (to say truely) have not
the proprietie of the publike demaines, nay
not so much as the whole vse and profit: for thatThat
princes have not the proprietie of the publike demaine but onely the bare
vse. contenting themselves with the bare vse, the rest belongeth vnto
the common-weale. And for that cause the Emperour Charles the fourth, granting the confirmation of the priuileges to
them of Perouze, ioyned thereunto this clause, Quoad vieret: So long as he should live. And yet for
all that pope Iulius the second tooke that towne from
the Baillions, and put it under the obeysance of the Church, from whence it was
said to have bene taken. And how could the cities of Italie, or duke of
Florence, have any absolute soueraigntie, seeing that for all differences and
controuersies concerning their estates, frontiers, demaines, and tenures, they
plead the same before the emperour, or at least wise in the imperiall chamber,
where their causes are decided, and they enforced to doe as is there adiudged. And albeit that they of Genes,
who seemed to hold lesse of the empire than any one of the other townes of
Italie, where by the marques of Finall (whome they had driuen out of his
estate) summoned before the emperour Maximilian the
second, in the yeare 1559: and that they would receiue the emperour as an
arbitratour, and not as a judge or a superiour: yet so it was, that the
emperour taking upon him the authoritie of a iudge, caused them before warned,
to be summoned, and when that after many peremptorie edicts they made not their
appearance, he pronounced sentence against them, and by an herault at armes
threatned to proscribe the territorie of Genes if they obeyed not his censure.
Now most certaine it is, that there is none but the cities and townes which
hold of the empire, that can be proscribed by Genes threatned by Maximilian the Emperor. the
imperiall proscription, whether it be by sentence of the emperour, or by decree
of the imperiall chamber. For the imperiall chamber could not have proscribed
Minde, Munster, Magdeburg, and others, had they not bene contained within the
bounds and power of the German empire: much lesse could the emperour haue
proscribed Genes, if it had not bene within the power of the Germans. And
therfore when they of Genes had appealed from the interlocutorie sentence of
Maximilian unto the pope, they afterwards renouncing
their appeale, yeelded to the sentence, acknowledging the iurisdiction and
soueraigntie of the empire. And so at length the emperour gaue sentence for the
marques, acknowledging himselfe to be a vassal unto the German empire, whome
they of Genes would have had to have bene thiers. And since that the marques
hath by that definitiue sentence bene
maintained in possession of his marquisat, as I have seene by the letters of
Signior D'la Forest, embassadour for the king, dated at
Vienna the xviij of Iuly, in the yeare 1560: which iudgement the emperour gaue
after he had seene the opinions of the lawyers of foure vniuersities. And not
long after they were by another sentence of the same emperours, giuen in the
moneth of Iuly, in the yeare one thousand five hundred sixtie foure, condemned
in a processe which they had against Anthonie Flisque,
by them banished, who ouerthrew them by an appeale made unto the emperour.
Which things although they bee so plaine as that there
ought thereof to bee no doubt, but that the
cities of Italie on this side the riuers Rubicon and Tiber, excepting some few,
are contained within the bounds of the German empire, & so have of
themselves no soueraigntie; yet is the same made more euident by the generall
consent of all the lawyers of Italie, who deny it to be lawfull for any cities
of Italie to make any lawes or customes, contrarie or derogatorie to the Roman
laws, published by the commaundement of the emperour Frederick. And that the cities of Italie either had no right of
soueraintie at al, or else renounced the same, it is manifest by that league
which was made in the citie of Constance; for in that league among such
priueleges as are confirmed unto the cities of Italie, the rights of
soueraignty are expresly excepted. And therfore Alexander
Imolensis of all the lawyers of his time the most skilful, saith, A
certaine iurisdiction to be thereby giuen vnto
the cities of Italie; but not the rights of maiestie or soueraigntie to be
therefore unto them graunted, and that euen for that reason, for that the
cities doubting or disagreeing about their right, the emperours were wont to
appoint them judges and commissioners for the deciding of their
controuersies.
Much lesse therefore may the imperiall townes and cities contained within
theThe imperial townes and cities subiect unto appeales
made unto the imperiall chamber bounds of the German empire, pretend
themselves to have any soueraigntie, albeit that we see certaine of them to
boast of a certaine show of libertie, which they of old receiued from the
emperors; as Nuremberg from the emperour Fredericke the
first; Isne from Otho the third; Egre from Lewes of Bauyere: yea and some of them there were, which
not able longer to endure the hard bondage of their lords, princes of the
empire, set themselves at libertie, as did
the cities of Vlme, Brunswic, Lubec, and others: but that which they call
libertie, is but an old vacation from certaine seruices, and an immunitie from
customes and tributes graunted by the emperours, without any impeachment to
their maiestie. And therefore those cities which I have spoken of, honour the
maiestie of the German empire, receiue from it lawes, obey the magistrats
thereof, accept of the decrees of the imperiall chamber, and of the assemblies
of the empire: and not onely publique and priuat iudgements of princes and
cities among themselves, but also the priuat iudgements of particular men are
decided by the imperiall chamber, if appellation be made from the sentence
which exceedeth the summe of fiftie crowns. Seeing therefore that the imperiall
chamber may of the power of it selfe confirme
or disanull the iudgements of princes or cities, it must needs follow, that
neither those prinees nor cities have the power of soueraigne maiestie: For as
a certaine Poet (I know not who) saith,
Rescindere nunquam Dijs licet acta Deûm.It is not lawfull for the Gods the acts of Gods t'vndoe.
As for the Swissers Commonweals, we said before, them to have bene rent from
theThe Swissers Commonweal to
be subiect either to the Empire or the king of France. German empire,
as oppressed with the tirannnie of their gouernours: and yet they so honour and
reuerence the maiestie of the German empire, as that they in generall requested
of the emperour Ferdinand, to have the libertie of their priueleges unto them
confirmed: which is a certaine forme of auntient fealtie, and acknowledgement
that they hold their libertie of the empire. And albeit that some there be on
this side the Rhene, which vaunt themselves to have soueraigne power over their
subiects, yet must they needs be the subiects and vassals either of our kings,
or of the German empire. For there is no man which knoweth not (if he remember
the antiquitie of the French) that all the countrey of Loraine, and the realme
of Arles, after the death of the three children of Lothaire were divided betwixt the emperour Charles the Bauld of Fraunce, and Lewes king of Germanie his brother. As Vitald, Floard,
and Lambert the best antiquaries do in their
histories at large declare. Now so it is that the vassall can neuer prescribe
for his homage towards his lord, nor the subiect against the iurisdiction of
his prince; and that the graunts and sufferances of the emperour, and the kings
of France could not preiudice either the crowne or the empire: wherfore we must
conclude these possessours of this maiestie by sufference, to bee subiects and
vassals either unto ou kings, or to the German
empire.
And albeit that many thinke the duke of Loraine to be an absolute soueraigne,
byThe Duke of Loraine no absolute Soueraigne, but vassall
of the German empire. reason of the Armes that he beareth, being an
armed arme, saying, as it should seeme, That he holdeth nothing but of the
sword: yet neuerthelesse so it is, that in his title he calleth himselfe a
prince of the empire; which is indeed to acknowledge the imperiall maiestie. Ioyne thereunto also, that he hath vsually
receiued judges from the imperial chamber, and submitted himselfe to the
iurisdiction thereof. For as for that that hee is the last among the German
princes, nor in their ceremonies holdeth not the place of the auntient dukes of
Loraine; that is, for that he holdeth but a little, viz.
scarce the sixt part of the auntient duchie of Loraine (a prouince of the
German empire) which containeth all that countrey which lyeth betwixt the riuer
of the Maze and the Rhene. And therefore the dukes of Brabant, and the German
emperours, called themselves dukes of Loraine. So the emperour Charles the fourth, in the league which he made with Iohn the French king, calleth himselfe duke of Loraine.
But this countrey which now is called Loraine, is a part of the German empire
and the duke himselfe a vassall of the empire.
For Stephen countie of Boulongne, was in that dukedome
inuested by the emperour Henrie the first, and for that
cause acknowledged himselfe a vassall of the empire, in the yeare 1019. And Frederick of Loraine countie of Vaudemont, duke Charles being dead without heire male, before Sigismund the emperour and the fathers assembled at
Constance, claimed that dukedome of right to belong unto him, as next of kin;
for that it was an imperiall fee, whereof Isabel duke
Charles his heire, who had married Renat duke of Aniou, was not (as he said) capable: which Renat denyed it not to be an imperiall fee, but shewed
many such imperiall fees to have descended unto the daughters. And afterward
the title comming to be tryed by the sword, Renat being
ouerthrowne and taken prisoner by Frederick, could not
be before delivered, vntill that he had
married his daughter Yoland unto Anthonie the sonne of Frederick, with
condition, that if Renat died without heires male, the
duchie of Loraine should descend unto the heires of Frederick, & so unto the house of Vaudemont, as it is come to
passe.
Now if so it be that the dukedome of Loraine be an imperiall fee,
comprehendedThe duchie of Lorine deuolued unto the counties of Vaudemont. within the bounds of
the German empire: neither the lord of Lumes nor the countie of Aspremont, who
are contained within the precinct of Loraine, can chalenge unto themselves any
right of soueraigntie, as they have done, seeing that it is plaine by the law,
that he which hath a limited territorie, hath but the same right over euerie
one of his subiects which are within the compasse of his territorie, that hee
hath over them all in generall; except it appeare, him by some speciall
priuiledge to be free and from the generall
expresly exempted. By which reason all such as pretend a soueraigntie, being
enclosed within the bounds and territorie of another man, may bee thereof
debarred: which a man cannot so easily iudge of them, which in the frontiers of
kingdomes, take upon them a kinde of soueraigne power; as do the five lords or
princes in the confines of Burgundie, whome both the free counties, and the
dukes have oftentimes chalenged for their vassals: and for the soueraigntie of
whome, at such times as they had taken up armes, they obtained of the generals
of both parts, that in the meane time they beeing free might be as newters,
vntill the euent of the warre had decided the cause: and so at length abusing the long possession of soueraigntie, made of that
their right, which they had but by sufferance,
a perpetuitie: but as we have oftentimes before said, so wee must hereafter
oftentimes say, That neither the right of soueraigne maiestie, nor theThe right souraigntie and libertie
not to be prescribed agaist. right of
libertie, can by the client or vassall be prescribed against: and much lesse if
it be withholden by concealement or by sufferance. In like sort the countrey of
Bearne, betwixt the confines of Fraunce and Nauarre, which the kings atturney
generall in the court of Paris maintained to be a prouince holden of the crowne
of Fraunce, and disallowed of the plea of the kings atturney of the parliament
of Thoulouze, who had confessed it not to hold of the crowne, in the yeare
1505; which although it remaine vndecided, yet the king of Nauarre for all that
by sufference holdeth it in soueraigntie. In like case the principalitie of
Dombes was maintained by Lizet the kings
atturney, to hold in fee of the crowne of
Fraunce, and that the duke of Sauoy had no power to giue it to the empire,
under the colour of being the emperours lieutenant, which hee showed to be done
in the most wofull times of the civill warre, when as the dukes of Orleans and
Burgundie had drawne all the whole kingdome into parts, in the yeare 1398: in
like manner the princes of East Frizeland, and they which hold the territory
betwixt England and Scotland, which they call the Batable ground: as also the
abbot of Gosen, betwixt Metz and Pont a Mousson, who holdeth the abbey and
twenty five villages, in title of soueraigntie, without acknowledging any
superior lord whatso. euer: as also the lords of Beauieu, willing to
exempt▪themselves from the crowne of Fraunce, yeelded themselves unto the
empire, and so by the duke of Sauoy, the emperours lieutenant, were receiued into the protection of the empire,
from which they also by little and little exempted themselves, without
acknowledging either duke, king, or emperour for their soueraigne.
As for the dukes of Sauoy, the Italian doctors with one common errour haue
holdenThe Duchie of Sauoie to hold of the empire.
them to have absolute power and soueraigntie, and to have so beene iudged by
the decree of the parliament of Sauoy: a thing altogether contrarie unto the
office of a lieutenant and vassall. And also Osazque the
first president of Piemont writeth, That the dukes of Sauoy have obtained this
power of the emperors, which they could not have as lieutenants of the empire;
as Felinus the best interpretor of the law hath most
truly written. For what can be more contrarie unto soueraigne maiestie, than to
professe ones selfe to be another mans deputie
or officer, (for so the name of a lieutenant doth signifie) or from whom
shouldest thou think thy selfe to have the power of soueraigntie in that
prouince wherein thou thy selfe bearest rule? But euen the dukes of Sauoy
themselves confesse, and all their histories declare, this prouince of the
German empire which is now called Sauoy, to have bene a fee of the same empire,
erected into a countie (holden of the empire in fealtie) by Henry the fit; and afterwards into a duchie
by the emperour Sigismund. And euident it is the dukes
alwayes heretofore, and not long since duke Charles
restored unto his countrey, to have yeelded fealtie and homage unto the
emperour: and two yeares after, viz. in the yeare 1561,
to have sent speciall letters of atturney unto the countie D'Arques chiefe chamberlaine to the emperour, to obtaine for him of the emperour another inuestiture: for
because that that which hee had before taken at Ausburg,
seemed not unto him in sufficient good forme, as I have seene by the letters of
M. D'la Forèst, ambassadour for the king unto the
emperour. But an hard matter it was to make such a forme as should be unto him
good; for that it seemeth that the title or qualitie of a perpetuall
lieutenant, doth preiudice not only unto soueraigntie, but also unto the
qualitie of a feudatarie & proprietarie in those lands which he holdeth of
another man, if it bee not by a doubtfull or improper kind of speech.
The dukes of Saxonie and the counties Palatine are also
perpetuall lieutenants of The dukes of Saxonie and the county Palatine lieutenants of
the empire. the empire; but that is in the emperours absence, to doe
iustice unto the princes and imperiall townes, yea euen against the emperour
himselfe, (as shall in due place bee declared) and to all them which are of
their government: which is a personall office, and not belonging unto lands;
neither can he that taketh upon him the qualitie of a deputie, lieutenant,
o gouernour, be feudatarie or proprietarie of
those seignories that he holdeth of him whose lieutenant he is. And so the
title of perpetuall lieutenantship ought to have relation unto other countries,
without the terrritorie and demaines of his countrey of Sauoy: which neither
the Swissers, nor other princes of Italie & Germanie could endure, and much
lesse the French king, who holdeth nothing of the empire, whereby he might be
iusticiable to the lieutenants of the empire. Ioyne hereunto also, that the Emperour Charles the
fourth made Charles the sixt Dauphin of Viennois,Charles the fixt of Fraunce by the emperour made perpetual
lieutenant of the empire. his perpetuall lieutenant, the xiiij day of
Ianuarie, in the yeare 1378. And for that he was but nine yeares old, he gaue
him the priuelege of his age, by a most ample and gracious charter, whereunto
hang seales of gold, which I have read in the records of our kings. But withall
made him perpetuall lieutenant of the kingdome of Arles, (excepting onely the
countie of Sauoy) and that more is, gaue him power of life and death over the
subiects of the empire; with power also to conferre honors, to impose and raise
taxes, and from the same to exempt whome he saw good, to receiue appeales made
unto the emperour, to make peace and warre, to giue laws unto the subiects, and
to disanull and abrogat the same, and such other like. This lieutenancie was
for all the kingdome of Arles, which extended
from the mountaine Iura (commonly called saint Claudius
mount) and the riuers Araris and Rhodanus, unto the Alpes, and the sea of
Genes; all which the imperials have alwaies pretended to be holden of the
empire. But the earles of Prouince have long since exempted themselves from the
German empire, amongst whome was Raymund the last, one
of whose daughters was married unto Lewes the ninth, the
French king, and the other unto Charles duke of Aniou,
by which meanes the countie of Prouence is come to the house of Aniou, &
from thence by the bountie of countie Renat, unto the
crowne of Fraunce. Albeit that Philip ValoisThe soneraignty of the kingdome of Arles bought of the
emperour by the French king. the French king, had bought of the
emperour Henrie the fit, the
soueraigntie of all the realme of Arles, without excepting either the countie
of Sauoy, or the principality of Oreng, or
Beiauieu, which was afterwards giuen to Lewes duke of
Burbon; either of the countie of Prouence, which was then in the house of
Aniou; either of the franke countie, which was giuen to Philip the hardie, by the emperour Charles the
fourth, in the yeare 1362, being deuolued to the empire for want of heires
male. And the sale of soueraigntie of the said kingdome of Arles, was made for
the summe of three hundred thousand markes of siluer, with promise to cause it
to be ratified by the princes of the empire, who afterwards consented
thereunto: of which their confirmation the emperour gaue Iohn king of Bohemia suretie, who sold also the towne of Luques vnto
the same king, for an hundred and fourescore thousand florines of gold, in the
yeare 1330. The contracts, ratifications, and quittances, are yet in the
treasurie of Fraunce to bee seene, from whence
I have the exemplifications conferred with the originals, wel worthy to haue
bene seene of them who were deputed for the affaires of Sauoy, in the yeare
1562. But that me thinke well worth the marking, that in the deedes of bargaine
and sale, are comprised all the lawes of soueraigne maiestie, which the German
emperours giue unto themselves in all the prouinces of the kingdome of Arles:
wherein are contained the Sauoians, they of Belloioci, they of Prouence, they
of free Burgundie, which the emperour Charles the fourth
gaue to Philip duke of Burgundie to bee possessed in the
imperiall right, the issues male of the counties fayling. Whereby it is
manifest the French kings to have the right of
soueraigne maiestie over all the people of the
kingdome of Arles, and not therefore to owe any fealtie or homage unto the
Getman empire.
And at the same time as it were the emperour Lewes of
Bauatia made Edward theEdward the
third King of England made perpetual Lieutenant of the Empire third,
king of England his perpetuall lieutenant; and by his letters pattents gaue him
power to make lawes, and to administer iustice to all the subiects of the
empire: and that all the subiects of the empire should obey him, and in his
name to yeeld unto him fealtie and homage: which was an occasion rather sought
for, than offered, for him to make warre upon the French king, who then held
Cambray and the castles of Creueceur, and Payerne,
members of the empire: for that by the auntient leagues made betwixt the French
kings and the emperours, it was prouided, That they should not one of them take any thing from the other, or molest one
the others sublects; as was declared unto king Edward by
the imperiall princes allied with him, and then assembled in the towne of Hale:
which is a most certaine argument that the kings of Fraunce holdThe Kingdome of France not to hold any thing of the
Empire. nothing of the empire; neither that the emperours have any
right in that kingdome. Which is also expresly set downe in the contract of
purchase of Philip Valois, which I have here before
rehearsed, which beareth this clause: And the kings and
realmes of Fraunce shall continue in their priueleges, enfranchisments, and
liberties, that they have alwayes holden against the German empire,
whereunto they are in nothing subiect. Which was well giuen the
emperour Sigismund to vnderstand, at such time as he of
his imperiall power would have made the countie of Sauoy duke, in the towne of
Lyons▪ against whome the kings officers there
so opposed themselves, as that hee was glad to get him out of the kingdome, at
libertie to vse his owne power, which he did in great choller and displeasure.
And this was done by the expresse commaundement of the king, Charles the sixt, to cover two notable errors that had bene before
committed: the one passing by sufferance, in that the emperour Sigismund being magnifically receiued at Paris, and as
beseemed the kings vncle, had place in a royall seat in full parliament; and
the other, that afterwards he was suffered to make Seneschal
D' Beaucaire knight; although the court had in this last point
admonished the king, that unto him onely it belonged to make knights in his
owne kingdome; as it had twice before bene solemnely iudged by two decrees
against the counties of Flaunders and Neuers. Which I have the more willingly noted, to show the errour of Alciat, who hath maintained, that theAlciat and Bartholus taxed. French king is subiect to the empire;
which is a wilfull errour or ingratitude, considering the entertainment he had
in Fraunce to teach and write the truth: which I thinke not to have proceeded
from him of ignorance, but in favour of the emperour Charles the fift, who drew him to Pauie, and there doubled his
salarie: or els to the imitation of Bartholus, author of
that errour, who writ the same things of the French kings that Alciat did: at such time forsooth as he was by the
emperour Charles the fourth of a bastard not onely made
legitimat, and by him ennobled, but power also giuen him to take the benefit of
age to him and his, which should professe to teach the lawes, with armes also
answerable unto his dignitie and honour: viz. a Lyon
Azure in a field Argent. For which so many and
so great benefits he writ all them to be heretikes, which should deny the
German emperour to be lord of all the world: which hee seemeth to have gathered
of the words of Antoninus Augustus, unto the law Rhodia;
I am (saith he) the lord of the
world, and law of the sea: which words seeing they were spoken but for
ostentation sake, and for the augmenting of his honour, lesse need to bee
refuted; seeing that the Roman empire when it was at the greatest, (which was
in the time ofThe Germane Empire not now the tenth part of
the Romane empire.Traian the emperour) contained scarce the thirtieth part
of the world, and that the German empire is not now the tenth part of the Roman
empire. And yet the emperour Sigismund sick of that incurable disease of ambition,
sought to have brought every mans government
under his, although he was in that his hope much deceiued. For intruding
himselfe to have made the duke of Lituania a king (whose countrey lieth aboue
two hundred leagues from the frontiers of the empire of Germany) hee sent him a
crowne and a sword, which for all that the duke refused, neither thought it
good to chaunge the name of the Great Duke (whereby he
was called) although he had of himselfe shaken off the seruile yoke of the
Tartars, least in so doing hee might seeme to have attributed his power and
soueraigntie unto the Germans.
We see also that the Germaine Emperors have sent the royall Crownes vnto
theThe kings of Polonia hold nothing of the
empire. Dukes of Polonia, before they were by the Pope suffered to
beare the Royall title; which they refused: and yet certaine it is, that the
Kings of Polonia neuer held any thing of the
Empire. Oftentimes indeed the Germaines have attempted to have subdued the
Polonians, whose vaine attempts the Polonians have not onely repulsed, but also
ioyned unto their kingdom the countries of Silesia and Prussia, both rent from
the body of the Germaine Empire. Which when the Prutenian knights had taken in
euil part, and thereof oftentimes complained to the states of the empire, yet
the emperors thought it not good for to attempt any thing against the
Polonians, by whom they had knowne the imperiall armies to have been many times
repulsed and ouerthrown. And yet for all this, the Polonians refused not to
take their royall scepters from the bishops of Rome. True it is that the
bishops of Rome of long time striue with the GermaineThe
fruit that came of the strife betwixt the German emperor and the pope for
the soueraign tie of the Christian Commonweale. emperours for the
soueraigntie and chiefe government of the Christian Commonweale, and as chiefetaines of the faction, drew all the
Christian princes and cities into armes; so that many cities and Commonweales,
especially in Italie, were at such mortall hatred amongst themselves, as that
they receiued not greater harme from the enemies of the Christian religion and
name, than they did from one another. Neither wanted there some which writ in
earnest, al Christian kings to be the bishop of Romes clyents and vassals; and
in case that they were foolish, furious, or prodigall, that they might haue
ouerseers appointed over them by the pope: which we have before said, to haue
been done by pope Innocent the fourth, against the king
of Portugall. And albe it that pope Innocent said, That
his meaning therein was not in any thing to preiudice the regall power, in
appointing such an ouerseer; yet did not his sayings at all agree with his dooings. Pope Vrban
the fift also made no doubt, to make legitimate Henry
the bastard king of Castile, so to thrust out of his kingdom his brother Peter, borne in lawfull wedlocke: who thereupon, by the
power of the French, was not onely thrust out of his kingdom, but saine also by his bastard brother. Some there have been
alsoThe immoderat and absurd pow er which some attribute
unto the pope. which have passed further, saying that the pope hath
in power iurisdiction over the emperour; but over all other kings and princes
really and indeed: excepting over the French king, whom the canonists
themselves confesse, indeed, and ofright to acknowledge none greater than
himselfe under God. Which Belluga a Spanish doctor, and
Oldrade the beautie of his time do also better
declare, saying that the French king neither in fact nor of right acknowledgeth
any prince of the world superiour unto himselfe. But these great clearks which thus giue the popes power over other princes,
have no better reason for that they say, than the authoritie of pope Gelasius, who hath written, That the pope hath power to
dispoyle all kings and princes of their soueraigntie and power. And some others
there be which have maintained, That appeales may be made from all people and
princes unto the pope, That there is none but the emperour and the pope which
can reuoke their owne decrees, and deptiue other kings and princes of their
soueraigntie and rule; That there is no prince but hee, unto whom the pope hath
confirmed his principalitie: And that which of all other is most absurd, that hee of himselfe may giue priueleges, exemptions,
and immunities unto another princes subiects
contrarie to the decrees and lawes of all princes; and that he is the only and
supreme vmpiere and judge of all mans lawes. And what maruell if he rule ouer
princes, which commaundeth over angels? For so truely Clement
V. P. M. doubted not to commaund the angels. Yea some there be that
have written, That so often as the pope shall put this clause to his rescripts,
De plenitudine potestatis, Of the fulnesse of our
power: so oft doth he therein derogat from the lawes of all princes. And albeit
that some have holden also, That we must rest upon that that the pope saith,
without farther enquire of the veritie therof; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that
Baldus hath written, That a man may say unto him, Salua reuerentia vestra, By your reuerences leaue. And
upon the maxime set downe by the canonists, That the pope can
do all: the diuines graunting it to be
so, do yet more subtilly, and as it were in two words moderat the same, Claue non errante, The key not erring. And forasmuch as
it is every good subiects part to maintaine the greatnesse and maiestie of
their owne princes, I will not enter into the disputes of Iaques de Terranne the popes chamberlaine, nor of Capito, nor of M. Charles du Moulin, and
others, who have oftentimes ouershot themselves either of set purpose, or els
pressed with violent passions, have vnawares entred into matter of religion,
and so carried away either with loue or hatred of the pope, have filled their
writings with raylings. Whereas I here speake not but of temporall
soueraigntie, which is the subiect that I entreat of, (whereof they speake not)
to the end it may be vnderstood, who be absolute soueraigne princes; and
whether the other princes be subiect unto the
emperour, or the pope, or not.
For at the beginning, after that pope Gregorie (he which
first called himselfe the seruantThe beginning of the popes
greatnes. of the sernants of God) had obtained of Phocas emperour of Constantinople, the prerogative over all the
bishops; his successours after turning the spirituall power into the temporall,
by little and little still encreased their power, in so much that the princes
as wel for the fear they then had towards God, as for the dignitie of the
prelacie, began to reuerence them much more than in former times; but much more
after that the empire of the East began to decline, which was after that the
popes had by their interdictions forbidden the people of Italie their obedience
unto the Constantinopolitan emperours, or to pay them any tribute; upon
occasion taken, that Leo the emperour, surnamed Monomachus, or the Image breaker, and also Thomas the
emperor, had caused the images of Saints to be cast downe and broken: wherewith
the people moued, and enraged with the authoritie of the bishop of Rome, slew
Thomas in the temple of Saint Sophia. Wherefore the power of the Greeke empire being weakened in the
East, by the incursions of the Barbarians; and the Greeke emperors out of hope
againe to recover Italie; the kings of Lombardie then also doing what they
might to make themselves lords of all Italie, and the popes also on their parts
no lesse desirous to have therein a share, and finding themselves too weake to
make their partie good against the Lombard kings, uppon this difference cast
themselves into the protection of the kings of Fraunce, who then were the
greatest Monarches of Christendome; wherein
they were not of their hope deceiued. For hereupon, Pipin GrandeThe popes put themselves into the
protection of the French Kings, Pipin and Charlemaigne his sonne, the popes
great champion. Mr. of Fraunce (a man of great wealth and power, who
then disposed of all the affaires of the realme) with a great army passing ouer
the Alpes, ouerthrew and discomfited the power of the Lombards, and afterward
going to Rome, was the first that gaue unto pope Zacharie, part of the seignorie of Italie, who had before crowned him
king of Fraunce, forbidding the peeres and people of Fraunce to make choyce of
any other for their kings but of the house of Pipin,
hauing publikely pronounced king Childerike for his
sottishnesse to bee vnable for the government. Whereunto the people of Fraunce made so much the lesse resistance, for that Pipin then had the nobilitie and the armie of Fraunce at commaund: and for that the pope (who as
then was esteemed as a God upon earth) was the author thereof, unto whome Pipin had before solemnly promised, and giuen him letters
pattents thereof, That if hee should become victorious over the Lombards, he
should giue unto the Church of Rome the Exachat of
Rauenna, which contained thirtie cities, and the prouince of Pentapole, which
contained sixteene cities moe: which he after the victorie performed, laying
the keyes of the said cities upon Saint Peters altar:
yet reseruing unto himselfe and his successours in the crowne of Fraunce, the
soueraigntie of both the prouinces; and that more is, power also to chuse the
popes. Whereunto the pope not onely willingly graunted, but almost persuaded
Pipin to take uppon him the name of an emperour:
which title none then vsed, but the emperours
of Constantinople. But Pipin being dead, the Lombards
againe tooke up armes, to the great disquiet of the popes, who againe had
recourse unto the French kings, as unto a most sure sanctuarie. Whereupon Charles, Pipin his sonne (for his many and worthy
victories surnamed the Great) with a strong army passing
the Alpes, not onely ouerthrew the king of the Lombards, but euen their
kingdome also: and hauing surely established the power of the Roman bishops,
was by them called Emperour: and they againe by Charles
so long as he lived, all chosen bishops of Rome. But after the death of this
Charlemaigne, they which were of great credit in
Rome, caused themselves to be chosen pope by the clergie, whether it wereHow the French Kinges lost the prerogatione they had in the
chusing of the Pope. for the distrust they had to obtaine that
dignitie of the kings of Fraunce, hauing no favour in the court; or through the negligence of the French kings,
who had thereof no great care; or that it was by reason of the great civill
warres which arose betwixt the children of Lewes the
Gentle, wherewith the French kings busied, lost the prerogative they had in
chusing of the chiefe Bishop. Yet Guitard, a good
antiquarie, who lived in the same time writeth, 3 popes successiuely to haue
come into France to excuse themselves to Lewes the
Gentle, That they had beene by the clergie of Rome constrained to accept of the
papal dignitie, beseeching him to confirme the same: which he either as a man
not desirous of glorie, or els fearing to prouoke the clergie (being then in
great authoritie) did: of which his error he afterwards though to late full
sore repented him; being by the colledge of cardinals constrained to yeeld up
his cowne, & to make himself a monke, and the queene his wife a nunne, shut up apart from
her husband in a cloister with other nunnes, who yet were againe afterwards
delivered by the princes and nobilitie of Fraunce, (disdaining to see the pride
of the clergie) and so againe restored unto their former honours.
But after the death of this Lewes the Gentle (who was
emperour of Fraunce, of Germanie, and of the greater part of Italie, and
Spaine) the empire was divided into three kingdomes, which the brethren Charles the Bauld, Lothaire, and
Lewes, euerie one of them held in title of
soueraigntie, without acknowledging any superioritie of one another; and
againe, the kingdom of Lothaire was divided amongst his
children into three parts: unto one fell the kingdome of Loraine, unto another
the kingdome of Arles, and to the third the
kingdome of Italie: Lewes holding Germanie, and Charls the emperour, Fraunce. So their divided power
began to decay, and the wealth of the bishops of Rome greatly to encrease: they
now succeeding one another by way of election, and in nothing acknowledging the
maiestie of the French kings, as they ought to have done: which came to passe
especially in the time of pope Nicholas the first,When the pope began first to excommunicat Princes. who
better vnderstood to mannage matters of state than had his predecessours, and
was the first that used the rigour of excommunication against princes, hauing
excommunicated Lothaire the younger brother of Lewes king of Italie. But the children of Lothaire being afterwards dead without issue, those
three kingdomes which I spoke of,viz. of Loraine, Arles, and Italie, were divided betwixt
their vncles, Charles and Lewes.
Wherefore Lewes king of Germanie gouerned Italie, which
fell unto his part, by his lieutenants and deputies; whose power was not such
asto withstand the popes, but thatThe increasing of the
popes power. they still by little and little extended their power and
government: which especially hapned at such time as Guiscard the Norman had subdued the kingdome of Sicilie and Naples,
taken from the Greekes and Moores; who to weaken the power of the Germans, and
to raigne himselfe the more safely in Italie, ioyned hands against them with
the Bishops of Rome. But the posteritie of Guiscard
being dead without heires male, left the kingdome of Naples and Sicilie unto a
woman their heire; married unto the German emperor Frederick the second, who going into Italy, there to confirme his
power, made choice of another pope (one of
his own fauorites) than was he whom the colledge of cardinals had before
chosen: which was pope Innocent the fourth, a man both
for his birth and learning famous; who driuen out of Italie, and comming into
Fraunce (the popes surest sanctuarie) and strengthened with the wealth and
power of Lewes the ix, the French king (whether it were
for reuerence of him the pope so solemnly by the cardinals chosen, or to weaken
the power of the Germans) excommunicated the emperour Frederick the second: who seeing himselfe thereby become odious vnto
all men, & himselfe like to be forsaken euen of his own subiects, &
great trobles arising also against him in Italy, fearefully returned into
Germany, hauing obtained absolution of pope Innocent, by
yeelding up his authoritie and power for any more creating of the bishops of Rome, leauing the kingdomes of
Naples and Sicilie unto his base sonne Manfred, who was
also excommunicated by pope Vrban the fist: who not yet
so contented, called in Charles of France, duke of
Aniou, brother to king Lewes the ix, whome he inuested
in the aforesaid two realmes of Naples and Sicilie, reseruing unto the See of
Rome the countie of Beneuent; fealtie, homage, iurisdiction, and soueraigntie
for the rest; with a yearely and perpetual fee of eight thousand ounces of
gold, as we have before said. After which time the house of Arragon, which by
right of kindredWhy the kings of Arragonmade themselves the
popes vassals for the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie, and submitted also
unto him the rest of their kingdoms. succeeded the posteritie of Manfred, being alwaies at oddes with the house of Aniou,
and so in continuall warres for these kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie; and
seeing it not possible for them to recover them so long as the pope was their
enemie, they ound meanes to gaine the popes favour, and so made
themselves the popes vassals, not onely for the kingdomes of Naples and
Sicilie, but also for the kingdomes of Arragon, Sardinia, Corsica, Maiorque,
and Minorque: which they partly did also for to obtaine the popes pardon for
their offences, as we have before said. The bishops of Rome in the meane time
out of the troubles of these two great houses, encreasing their owne power and
profit, peaceably enioyed the territorie about Rome, Spolet, and Beneuent, with
a good part of Tuscanie, by vertue of the donation which wee have before spoken
of.
As for the citie of Rome, sometimes mistresse of the world, they brought it
vnderHow the citie of Rome was brought under the popes
obeysance. their obeysance, hauing by little and little oppressed the
libertie thereof, no man gainsaying them.
Albeit that Charlemaigne hauing conquered Italie,
expresly commaunded that it should remaine in full libertie, with power left
unto the inhabitants to gouerne their estate, which the Roman bishops had also
by their oathes confirmed; as Augustine Onuphre the
popes chamberlaine writeth, and as it well appeareth by the Vatican
records.
Now if there were any soueraigne prince that were a tyrant, or an heretike, or
thatThe great daun, get princes were sometimes in by
reason of the popes excommunication. had done any notorious crime, or
not obeyed the popes commaund; hee was by the pope forthwith excommunicated:
which was occasion enough to cause his subiects to
reuolt from him, and to arme other princes against him which was so
excommunicated; who then had no other meane
left to be againe receiued into favour, but to make himselfe feudatarie to the
Church of Rome, and the popes vassall. As I have before said of Iohn king of England, who made himselfe vassall to Innocent the third, for the murther committed in the
person of young Arthur duke of Britaine. And augmented
also the feodall rent of England, for the murder committed by the commaundement
of the king of England, in the person of Thomas
Archbishop of Canterburie. As in like case it chaunced for the murther
committed in the person of Stanislaus archbishop of
Guesne, by the commaundement of the king: for which the pope excommunicated the
king, and tooke the roiall title from the kings of Polonia; enioyning also
their subiects therefore (as some have written) to shave their heads behind, in
such sort as we yet see them to doe: which
whether it be true or no, I dare not to affirme, neither could the Polonians
tell me the cause thereof when I asked it of them: but manifest it is by
auntient records, that after the murther of that bishop, the kings of Polonia
all thought they had the power of soueraigne maiestie, yet were they called but
by the name of dukes, vntill the time of Lucold duke of
Polonia, who receiued the royall crowne and title, of pope Iohn the xxij, upon condition to pay into the popes coffers a certaine
yearely tribute, which is yet at this day paid for the lampe of Saint Peter, as weThomas Cramerus. Soveraigntie by the pope pretended
unto the Kingdome of Hungarie. read in their histories. And beside
those kingdomes which wee have spoke of, viz. England,
Arragon, Naples, Sicilie, Hierusalem, Polonia, Sardinia, Corsica, and the
Canaries, all feudataries or tributaries unto the popes, or els both together;
they have also pretended the soueraigntie of
the kingdome of Hungarie, to belong unto them, and so it is comprised in the
Catalogue of the Chauncerie of Rome. And I have seene in the Vatican Register,
an act dated in the yeare 1229, whereby Ladislaus the
first, king of Hungarie, promiseth his obedience unto pope Benedict the xij, and acknowledgeth that he ought to receiue the
crowne at his hands. And by another act of Ladislaus the
second, king of Hungarie, excommunicated for the disobedience by him committed
against the popes Legat; for to have his obsolution, he bound himselfe to pay
yearely into the popes chamber an hundred markes of siluer; which obligation
beareth date the yeare 1280. Yet in the same Vatican register, dated in the
yeare 1308, whereby it appeareth also, the barons of Hungarie to have sharply
opposed themselves against the popes Legat,
alleaging Saint Stephen the first king of Hungarie, to
have receiued his crowne of the pope, and that they would not endure the pope
to have any such prerogative over them: and yet neuerthelesse they letted not,
but that the king by themselves chosen, might if so pleased him cause himselfe
to bee crowned by the pope. And in the end of that act are many decrees of the
popes legat, concerning the state of that kingdome, with prohibitions to the
kings of Hungarie for alienating any the demaines of the crowne: which may
seeme to have bene the cause that Andrew king of
Hungarie, was by Honorius the pope cited to Rome, to
show why he had alienated part of the publike demaines. Innocentius also the third expresly enioyned the king of Hungarie to
fulfill his dead fathers vow; threatning if he should refuse so to doe, to
depriue him of his kingdome, and to giue it to
him that was next of kin. Which a man need not to thinke strange in those
times, seeing that at the same time wee see the prohibitions made by the pope
unto the counties of Tholouze, (and inserted into the Decretals) that they
should not raise any new charges upon their owne subiects. As for the kingdome
of Hierusalem and Syria, wonne by Godfrey of Buillon and
his allies, it is manifest that he therefore professed himselfe to be the popes
vassall, and to hold it of him by fealtie and homage: besides that we find it
comprised in the Catalogue of the feudatarie kings of the church of Rome. And
as concerning the Grand Masters of the honourable order
of S. Iohn Hierusalem, which was composed of eight
sundtie people The Grand Master of S. Iohn Hiersualem feudatarie both to
the king of Spaine and the pope. of diuers language, they were
alwayes inuested by the pope, and yet do fealtie and homage unto the popes for
the soueraigne power which they have over the knights of their order: albeit
that they did homage also unto the emperour Charles the
fist, for Tripolis in Barbarie, before it fell into the hands of the Turke: as
now also they doe at this present unto the king Catholike, for the isle of
Malta, which was upon that condition giuen them.
And as for the kingdome of Nauarre, under the colour of excommunication
takenThe kingdome of Nauarre holden of the pope.
from Peter Albret, we said before, that it is by the
kings of Spaine holden of the popes of Rome by fealtie and homage. And not many
yeares ago pope Pius the fift would under the same
colour of religion, have taken also the rest that was yet left, from Ione queene of Nauarre, hauing caused her to be
cited to Rome; and afterward for default and contumacie, causing her by his
commissioners to bee condemned: had not king Charles the
ix taken upon him to protect her, as being his subiect, vassall, and neere
kinswoman: which he gaue all Christian princes to vnderstand, unto whose
maiestie the proscription of that most honourable queene might well have seemed
preiudiciall.
For many were of opinion that the pope was absolute soueraigne lord of all the
kingdoms of Christendome. And in our age, at such time as Henry the eight, king of England, was reuolted from the pope, the
earle of Aisimund, an Irish man, sent letters unto Henry
the second the French king, (the copie whereof I have taken out of the records)
whereby he offered himselfe to become his subiect, if he should of the pope
obtaine the soueraigntie of the kingdome of
Ireland, which we said to have bene under the fealtie of the bishop of Rome,
since the time of Innocent the third. They have also
pretended themselves to have the soueraigntie of Mirandula, and of the counties
of Concorde, Rege, Modene, Parma, & Placence, for which the popes Iulius the second and third, both of them made great
warres against the French king, when as yet it was most manifest those cities
to depend of the German empire. Of Parma, and Placence there is no doubt; and
the rest they confesse Maud the countesse to have had by
inheritance, holden by fealtie of the emperours, which she gaue to the church
of Rome.
Now if we graunt the aforesaid cities might have beene giuen unto the bishop
ofThe pope of right vassall unto the German empire for
the cities he holdeth thereof in fee. Rome, and to have bene indeed
giuen, as the bishops themselves vaunt; they must also confesse themselves to have bene vassals unto the German
empire. But for that it seemed a dishonour to the bishop of Rome, which said
himselfe to have power over all princes, to be accounted a vassall and client
of the emperours; they said (but falsly) the soueraigntie of all the cities of
Italie, which were within the dominions of the Church of Rome, to have bene by
the emperours graunted unto the bishop of Rome. And to exempt themselves, they
produce a donation which I have read in the Vatican register without date or
name of bishop, whereby Otho the emperour (but which Otho it is not said, when as there have bene foure of
that name) doth giue unto the church of Rome Pisaurum, Ancona, Fossabrum, and
Ausun. Other letters pattents also there is of the emperour Otho the fourth, unto pope Innocent the third,
conceiued in these words,Ego Otho quartus rex Romanorum semper Augustus, tibi domino
meo papae Innocentio tertio, tuis{que} successoribus ecclesiae Romanae,
spondeo, polliceor, & iuro, quod omnes possessiones Ecclesiae,
&c. I Otho the fourth, king of the Romans,
alwayes victorious, do auow, promise, and sweare, to thee my lord pope Innocent the third, and to thy successours of the church
of Rome, that all the possessions of the Church, &c. And that which
followeth after, containeth a most copious confirmation of all the lands and
cities which then were in the dominion or patrimonie of the church of Rome,
whether they were giuen by the emperours themselves, or by any other lords or
princes whatsoeuer: in the number of which cities are
these contained: Comitatus Perusiae, Reatae, Saluiae,
Interamnae,Campaniae, nee non Roman, Ferrariam, &c. Marchiam,
Anconitanam, terram Comitisse Matildis & quecunque sunt circa
Rodicofanum vsque Ceperanum, exerchatum Rauenne, Pentapolim cum alij terris,
&c. The same forme of confirmation is in the Vatican records to be
seene, both of Rodolph the emperour, and Charles the fourth, bearing date the yeare 1289, and
1368, importing that they also out of their aboundance gaue unto the pope and
to the church of Rome so much as should be needfull, and all that which Henrie the fift his grandfather had before giuen and
confirmed unto the church, that so all the occasions of discord which had
before bene betwixt the emperors & the popes, might be altogether taken
away. So that if these donations be good, the popes are exempted from their
fealtie and homage due unto the emperours, by reason of the fees that they hold and which are members of the German
empire. But if the emperours could not without the consent of the princes and
cities of the empire, giue away the publike territories and rights of
soueraigntie; and that the imperiall and publike territories cannot be
encroached upon; and much lesse the right of soueraigntie and patronage, whose
authoritie for euer over the subiects and vassals cannot bee prescribed
against; it must needes follow, the popes to bee the vassals of the German
empire.
The same we may say of the election of the bishops of Rome, which the
GermanRight pretended by the German Emperours to the
election of the pope. emperours pretend of right to belong unto them.
For the emperour Frederick the second to have absolution
from pope Innocent the fourth, caused to be delivered
unto him his letters pattents, sealed with a
seale of gold, dated the yere 1229: whereof I have seene the extract, and of
his empire the seuenth, and of his raigne in the kingdome of Sicilie the xxij.
Whereby he entirely renounceth the right of election which he had in the
creating of bishops, vsing these words, Illum abusum abolere
volentes, quem quidam praedecessorum vt electiones libere fiant & cnonice, Wee willing to abolish that abuse which
some of our predecessours were knowne to have exercised in the elections of
prelats, graunt that those elections may be freely and canonically made. By
which words he seemeth to renounce not onely the creation of the bishop of
Rome, but all other bishops also. Howbeit that in truth that right of chusing
of the popes belonged to the kings of Fraunce, and not unto the German princes,
who have but vsurped the name and title of
emperours, got by the prowesse and force of Charlemaigne
king of Fraunce, and by him left unto his successors the kings of Fraunce, and
not unto the kings of Germany: for so they were called in all the auntient
treaties and histories of Germanie and Fraunce, and not emperours, except those
which were crowned by the popes. But after that the power of the German kings
was farre spred in Italie, they then sought to vsurpe unto themselves that
right of chusing of the bishops of Rome: whether it were for the encreasing of
their owne wealth and power, or for to take away the ambition and foule
corruption then used in voyces giuing, and in their elections. For the emperour
Henrie the third thrust out of his papacie Gregorie the sixt, chosen pope by the clergie, and set
Clement the second in his place; and afterwards
Popes chosen and placed by the Germane emperour.
compelled the clergie to sweare, not from thenceforth to admit any into the
papacie, without the consent of the German emperours; as we have learned out of
the Vatican records. But Clement the second being dead,
the colledge of Cardinals sent ambassadours unto the emperour to appoint whome
hee thought good to bee pope, who appointed Pepon,
afterwards called Damasus the second; who dead, the
clergie againe sent ambassadours unto the emperour, for the creating of a new
pope: who sent unto them Brunon, otherwise called Leo the ix: and after him Victor
the second. After whose death the clergie made choyce of Frederick, and after him of Alexander the second: which when the emperour Henry the fourth vnderstood, he sent them Cadol bishop of Parma for pope, who although he were
so receiued in all Lombardie, yet was he thrust out by pope Alexander. After Alexander succeeded Hildebrand, otherwise called Gregorie the seuenth, chosen also by the clergie, who upon the
grieuous paine of excommunication, forbad all lay men to bestow any
Ecclesiasticall liuings or benefices upon any whomsoeuer: And also
excommunicated the emperour Henrie the fourth, for
disobeying his commaundement in creating of bishops in Germanie. Wherewith the
emperour moued, and with his armie passing over the Alpes, chased this Gregorie the seuenth out of the citie, who had holden the
papacie eleuen yeares, and placed in his stead Clement
the third, who held that dignitie seauenteene yeares, against foure popes
successiuely chosen by the clergie. After whose death Henrie the 5 the emperour made Bourden pope; without regard of whom, the clergie
neuerthelesse made choice of Calistus the second a
Burgundion, who draue out Bourdin, before nominated by
the emperour: and by a decree made at Wormes, enforced Henrie to sweare neuer more to take upon him to bestow any spirituall
liuings upon anie: yet with condition, that he might be in the assemblies of
the Bishops assistant, if he thought it so good. Which decree of the emperour
Henry the fift is yet extant in the Vatican records,
in these words, Pro salute animae meae dimitto Deo &
sanctis Apostolis Petro & Paulo, sanctaeque Ecclesiae Catholicae, omnem
inuestituram per annulum & baculum, & concedo in omnibus ecclesijs
quae in imperio meo sunt, Canonicam fieri electionem. For the health of
my soule I remit unto God and the holy Apostles Peter
and Paule, and to the
holy Catholique Church, all inuestiture to bee made by Ring and pastorall
staffe, and do graunt Canonicall election to be made in all the Churches which
are in mine Empire. Neuerthelesse 229 yeares after, the Emperour Lewes of Bauaria created Nicholas
the fift bishop of Rome: Iohn the two and twentith, a
Frenchman, then itting as pope at Auignion, who
peremptorily citied the emperor to appeare before him and for default &
contumacie, pronounced sentence of excommunication against him: The emperour
likewise on the contrarie side summoned the same pope Iohn to come before him, saying the bishops of Rome to be subiect vnto
his edicts and commaunds, as emperour: and by sentence giuen at Rome, where Nicholas the Antipape held his seat, depriued Iohn of his papacie. Which Nicholas afterwards retiring himselfe
unto Pisa, was by the citizens there betraied into the hands of pope Iohn his mortall enemie at Auignion, where he shut up in
prison, for sorrow languished to death: and the emperour excommunicated, and
therefore detested of all men, was forsaken of his subiects. And this was the
eight emperour whome the bishop of Rome excommunicated:The
eight emperours excommunicated by the pope were these▪ Fredericke the first,
Frederick the second, Philip, Conrade, Otho the fourth, Lewes of Bauaria▪
Henrie the fourth, and Henry the fift. after whose fall the German
emperours thought it not good afterwards to attempt any thing against the
bishops of Rome. But to the contrarie the emperour Charles the fourth gaue out his letters pattents, in the yeare 1355,
whereby he acknowledgeth unto pope Innocent the fift,
That although hee were chosen emperour by the princes, yet that he ought to
take the confirmation of his election, and the imperiall crowne of him the
pope; beginning in these words, Post pedum oscula beatorum,
&c. After the kissing of your blessed feet,
&c. Which words we see still repeated in all the emperours letters unto the
bishop of Rome, euen from the time of Lewes of Bauaria,
vntill now.
There is also extant in the Vatican, the forme of the coronation of the
emperors,Base seruices to be done by the emperour to the
pope. and by the emperour Charles the fourth
approued; but no where more seruile seruices: where amongst other ceremonies,
the emperour is as a subdeacon to minister unto the pope whilest he is saying
masse; and after diuine seruice done, to hold his stirrop whilest he mounteth
to horse, and for a certaine time to lead his horse by the bridle: with diuers
other ceremonies at large set downe in the Vatican
records, which it is needlesse here to
rehearse. And yet one thing more is worth the marking which is not in the
record expressed, which is, that the emperour to receiue the imperiall crowne,
must goe to seeke the pope wheresoeuer he be, and to follow him if hee chaunce
to remoue; as did the emperour Charles the fift, who
being come into Italie, with hope to have gone unto the* pope at Rome, being
aduertised of his departure thence to Bononia, wasClement
the suenth. glad thither to follow him:
that so the dutie of an inferiour prince towards the maiesty of his superiour
might the more plainely be perceiued. But after the death of Charles the fift, Ferdinand the emperour could
not obtaine, that the pope should in his absence ratifie his election; but was
oftentimes by the pope threatned, That hee would take such order for him, as
that he should have nothing to doe with the affaires of the German empire: neither would he admit the emperours lawfull
excuse, vntill hee was by the requests and meditation of the French king, and
of the king of Spaine appeased: which the German princes tooke in euill part,
seeing they had promised unto Ferdinand to imploy their
whole power for the defence of the maestie of the
empire, against that the popes enterprises; as I have learned by the letters of
the kings ambassadour,The humble subscription Charls the
fift used in his letters to the pope. dated at Vienna, in Iuly 1559.
And to show a greater submission of the emperours unto the popes, the
subscription of the emperours letters unto the pope, is this, Ego manus ac pedes vestrae sanctitatis deosculor, viz. I kisse the
hands and feet of your Holinesse. So used alwayes the emperour Charles the fift to subscribe to his letters, when he
writ unto pope Clement the seuenth. Which he did not
upon a faigned courtesie, but indeed in most
humble and seruile manner kissed the popes feet, in the open sight of the
people, and the greatest assemblies of many noble princes, at Bononia, Rome,
and last of al at Marsielles in Prouence, where were met together the pope, the
emperour, the kings of Fraunce and Nauarre, the dukes of Sauoy, of Buillon,
Florence, Ferrara, Vitemberg the Grand Master of Malta, with many other princes
and great lords, who all kissed the popes feet, except the dukes of Buillon and
Vitemberg, Protestant princes, who had forsaken the rites and ceremonies of the
church of Rome. In farre more baseThe base submission of the
Duke of Venice and of Fredericke the second unto the pope. sort did
that duke of Venice humble himselfe (who of the Venetians themselves is called
a dog) for that he with a rope about his necke, and creeping upon all foure
like a beast, so craued pardon of pope Clement the 5.
But nothing was more base, than that which
almost al historiographers which writ of the popes affairs, report of the
emperor Fredericke the second▪ who to redeeme his sonne
out of prison, lying prostrat upon the ground at the feet of pope Alexander the fourth, suffered him to tread uppon his
head, if the histories be true. Whereby it is well to be perceiued, the
maiestie of the Emperours,The maiestie of the emperours
greatly diminished by the pope by the power (should I say) or by the
outragiousnesse of the Bishops of Rome, to have bene so diminished, as that
scarce the shadow of their antient maiestie seemeth now to remaine. They also
say themselves to be greater than the emperours, and that so much greater, as
is the Sunne greater than the Moone: that is to say, six thousand six hundred
fortie and five times, if we will beleeue Ptolomee and
the Arabians. And that more is, they have alwaies pretended a right unto the
empire: for the imperiall seat being vacant,
they have giuen the inuestitures unto them which held of the empire, and
receiued of them their fealtie: as they did of Iohn and
Luchin, vicounts of Milan, the imperiall seat being
emptie in the yeare 1341, who are in the records called vassals of the church
of Rome, and not of the empire; and are forbidden their odedience unto Lewes of Bauaria the emperour, who was then
excommunicated, as we have before said. For which cause the Canonists haue
maintained, that the emperour cannot giue up his imperiall dignitie unto any,
but unto the pope: for which they yeeld this reason, That the emperours haue
their soueraigntie of men, and the popes of God:
howbeit that both of them, as all others also in general, are of right to
attribute all their power unto almightie God.
Neuerthelesse the emperour Charles the fift worne with
yeares and sicknesse, resigned his imperiall dignitie into the hands of the
princes electors, and sent unto them his resignation by the prince of Orenge.
But howsoever the Bishop of Rome pretended to have a soueraigntie over all
Christian princes, not only in spirituall, but also in temporall affaires;
whether they got it by force of armes, or by the deuotion and graunt of
princes; or by long possession and prescription: yet could not our kings euen
for any most short time endure the seruitude of the bishop of Rome, nor be
moued with any their excommunications, which the popes used as firebrands to
the firing of the Christian Commonweales. For these the popes
interdictions,The French kings not afraid of the pops ex
communication. or excommunications, were wont with other nations, to
draw the subiects from the obedience and
reuerence of their prince: but such hath alwaies bene the loue of our kings
towards their people (and so I hope shall be for euer) and the loyaltie of the
people towards their kings: that when pope Boniface the
eight saw himselfe nothing to preuaile by his excommunication, nor that the
people were to be drawne from the obedience of their king, after he had
publikely excommunicated Philip the Faire, he in like
maner excommunicated all the French nation, with all them which tooke Philip for a king. But Philip
hauing called together an assemblie of his princes, and other his nobilitie,
and perceiuing in his subiects in generall a wonderfull consent for the defence
of his state and soueraigntie: he thereupon writ letters unto Boniface (which are common in euerie mans hand) to reproue him of his
folly: and shortly after sent Nogaret with his armie into the popes territorie, who
tooke the pope prisoner, (giuing him well to vnderstand that the king was not
his subiect, as he had by his Bull published) but seeing him through
impatiencie to become furious and mad, he set him againe at libertie. Yet from
that the popes interdiction, the king by the aduice of his nobilitie and Senat,
appealed unto a generall councell, which had power over the pope, abusing the
holy cities. For the king next unto almightie God had none his superiour, vnto
whom he might appeale: but the pope is bound unto the decrees and commaunds of
the councell. And long tims before Philip the
Victorious, and his realme being interdicted by pope Alexander the third, who would have brought him into his subiection:
answered him by letters, That he held nothing of the pope, nor yet of any
prince in the world. Benedict the third, and Iulius the second, had
used the like excommunication against Charles the
seuenth, and Lewes the twelfth (who was called the Father of his countrey) that so as with firebrands they
might inflame the people to rebellion: yet failed they both of their hope; the
obedience of the subiects being in nothing diminished, but rather increased:
the Bull of excommunication which the popes legat brought into Fraunce, being
by the decree of the parliament of Paris openly torne in peeces, and the legat
for his presumptuousnesse cast in prison. And not long after Iohn of Nauarre, who called himselfe countie Palatine, when he had
made certaine publike notaries in Fraunce, and made legitimat certaine of his
bastards, by vertue of the authoritie which he had (as he said) from the pope,
he was therfore by a decree of the parliament
of Tholouze condemned of treason. True it is, that they which have thought
better to assure the maiestie of the kings of Fraunce against the power of the
pope, have obtained the popes buls whilest they yet sate in the citie of
Auignion▪ to bee exempted from their power. And namely there is in the records
of Fraunce a Bull of pope Clements the fift, whereby he
not onely absolueth Philip the Faire and his subiects
from the interdiction of Boniface the eight, but also
declareth the king and the realme to be exempted from the popes power. Pope Alexander the fourth also gaue this priuilege unto the
realme of Fraunce, That it could not for any cause bee interdicted▪ which was afterward by seuen popes successiuely confirmed, viz. by Gregory the viij. ix. x. xj, Clement the fourth, Vrban the fift, and Benedict the twelft; whose bul
yet remaine in the records of Fraunce: which yet seeme unto me not to encrease,
but rather to diminish the maiestie of our kings, who were neuer in any thing
beholden unto the popes. And that more is, the court of parliament of Paris,
hath by many decrees declared that clause, Auctoritate
Apostolica, By the authoritie Apostolicall:The
clause, Auctoritate Apostolica, vsually put into the
popes buls or decrees, reiected in France. vsually inserted into the
popes rescripts sent into France, to be void, meere abusiue, and to no purpose:
and therefore it behoueth him, that would helpe himselfe by any such the popes
rescript, to protest in iudgement, That he would not any way take benefit of
that clause. By all which things it is plainely to be vnderstood, not onely the
kings, but the kingdome of Fraunce also, to have bene alwayes free from all the
popes power and commaund. For as for that
which Iohn Durand himselfe a French writer, saith, That
the French kings are subiect unto the pope, so farre as concerneth their oath,
it needeth no refuting; as by him written being bishop of Mende, and at such
time as under the color of oathe ioined unto contracts, the ecclesiastical
iudges drew unto themselves the hearing and determining of all matters: which
their iugling craft was both by the kings edicts, and the decrees of the high
courts of parliament, long since met withall, and taken away. But if the French
king shall in his owne priuat name contract with the pope, he may voluntarily
and of his owne accord bind himselfe unto the popes iurisdiction, which we read
to have bene done by Philip Valois, at such time as he
borrowed the summe of three hundred and thirtie thousand florines of gold, of
pope Clement the
sixt, which is an ordinarie clause in all obligations, in which sort the pope
himselfe might aswell as a priuat man be bound also. But this money the pope
may seeme also not to have lent without reward; but beeing himselfe of the
house of Turene, it may be thought that he for this
summe so lent, procured of the king the great priueleges which the counties of
Turene yet at this day enioy. Yea but I know some to pretend, that the French
kings ought to receiue their royall crowne at the hands of the pope: for that
king Pipin so receiued it at Saint Denise in Fraunce, of pope Zacharie: as though
one act in discontinued solemnities, and of so great consequence, could giue a
right, or establish a perpetuall law: which it cannot do in the getting of the
least discontinued seruice; but by the prescription of 100 yeres: albeit that
in truth the king leaueth not to bee king,
without any coronation or consecration, which are not things of the
soueraignty. And that no man can deny, but that if the donation of the exarchat
of Rauenna & Pentapolis, one of the fairest countries of al Italie, be made
by the kings of Fraunce unto the popes, and the church of Rome; it is also
holden of that crowne of Fraunce: seeing that the confirmation of the
seignories so giuen, was requested of Lewes the Gentle,
successour to Charlemaigne: which confirmation Carolus Sigonius, a most skilfull man in the antiquities
of Italie, writeth himselfe to have seene and read. Wherefrom a man may draw
two most certaine arguments; The one, That the donation was made by the
predecessours of Lewes the Gentle: And the other that
the soueraigntie of the seignories so giuen, was yet reserued: For otherwise
there should not have needed any of king Lewes his confirmation; considering that king Pipin had by law of armes wonne those territories from
the emperours of Constantinople, & therfore might of right both giue them
by himselfe so wonne, and also appoint lawes unto them so by him giuen. Albeit
that the Constantinopolitan emperour sent ambassadors into France unto Pepin, to have had him to have infringed & reuoked
the said donatiō: which they could not of him obtaine, but returned as they
came; as is to be seene in the histories of Floardus and
Sigonius. And that more is, Augustinus Onuphrius the popes chamberlaine, who had diligently
searched all the Vatican records (speaking of the
popes) confesseth, that the exarchat of Rauenna, Romandiola, the duchie of
Vrbin, and part of Tuscanie, were giuen to
the Church of Rome. But hee speaketh not of that which I have read in the
extract of the Vatican register, viz▪. Iohn, surnamed
Digitorum, to have written in letters of gold, the
donation pretended to have bene made by Constantine: in
the end whereof are these words, Quam fabulam longi temporis
mendacia finxit; which words I thought not good in any thing chaunge:
as being much stronger arguments than those of La. Valla, to conuince the lies of Augustin Egubin, who of purpose to deceiue, hath forged
in Greeke the donation of Constantine, to giue it the
more credit; whose deceit is easie to be refuted both by the manner of the
stile, and the knowledge of antiquitie: and is sufficiently refelled by Sigonius and Onuphrius both
Italians. Which is also well iustified by the epistle of pope Iohn, written in the yeare 876, who
therein confesseth the great largeses and donations bestowed upon the church of
Rome by Pipin, Charlemaigne, and his successours: and by
the auntient marble table, which is yet to be seene at Rauenna, wherein are
these words contained, Pipinus Pius primus amplificaendae
ecclesiae vam aperuit, & exarchatum Rauennae
cum ampliss. The rest of the inscription time hath defaced. And thus
much concerning the greatnesse and soueraigntie of our kings.
I will not here touch the greatnesse and soueraigntie of the Negus of AethiopiaThe princes seing the great Negus of Aethiopia no kings nor
soueraigns. commonly called Prester Iohn,
whome Paeu. Iouius writeth to have fiftie tributarie
kings under him, or (to say better) gouernours of Prouinces, which yeeld vnto
him not onely their ordinarie tributes, but also their fealtie and homage, and
that in greater humilitie, than verie slaues do
unto their lords: as a man may see in the historie of Francis
Aluares a Portugall, who dwelt sixe yeres in Aethiopia, and yet
neuerthelesse they are called kings without cause, because they be no absolute
soueraignes, seeing that they be but tributaries, yeelding fealtie and homage
unto another man.
As for those princes which are no Christians, I have nothing to say, for the
small assuranceThe Mahomitaine princes by their lawe
forbidden to cal themselus lords or soueraigns. we have by the
writings and reports of others, much differing among themselves. Yet
neuerthelesse so it is, that in one chapiter of the Alcoron, it is expresly for
bidden all the Musulman (that is to say the right
beleeuing) princes, to call themselves lords, except their Caliph or great
bishop their great prophet Muhamed his vicar. By meanes
of which prohibition the Mahometan bishops have vsurped absolute soueraigntie
aboue all their princes, giuing kingdomes
and principalities, to whome they thought good, in name and title of
governments: which may be also the cause that no Musulman prince weareth a
crowne upon his head: albeit that before the most auntient kings of Asia and
Afrike did weare crownes. And namely Ioiada the high
priest, hauing consecrated Ioas king of Iuda, set a
crowne upon his head. But the Musulman princes think that chapter not to haue
bene made by Muhamed their law giuer, but by their
Caliphes, (who of many diuers corrupt Alcorans made but one, long time after
the death of Muhamed, defacing the rest, and for the
augmenting of their maiestie, to have bene into their Alcoran by them inserted.
But at such time as three of their great bishops had for the desire of
soueraignty, at one time taken upon them the name of the great Caliph, the princes of Persia, the Curdes, the Turkes,
the Tartars, the Sultans of Aegypt, the kings of Marocco, of Fez, of Telensin,
of Tanes, of Bugia, and the people of Zenetes, and of Luntune, exempted
themselves from the obeysance of the Caliphs, to hold their kingdomes in
soueraigntie: as also the kings of Tombut, of Guynee, of Gaoga, and other
kings, which dwell more into the hart of Afrike, who know not the Caliphes
commaund, neither acknowledge any greater than themselves: except theyDiuers Mahomitaine kings tributaries unto the king of
portugal which hold in fealtie and homage of the king of Portugall,
as the kings of Calecut, of Malachie, of Cambar, and of Canor, whomethey haue
compelled so to do, and to pay them tribute; hauing
also subdued all the sea coast of Afrike, and of the East Indies, and
almost in infinit number of places built
fortresses; yea and in the island of Ormus euen under the nose of the Persian
king, hauing built a most strong castle, and straitly exacting tribute and
custome of such as passe that way, or chaunce to arriue in the Persian gulfe;
and had done the like in the red sea, had not Barnagas
gouernour of that coast, and the king of Aethiopia his subiect, cut the
Portugals in peeces, and rased the fortresses which they had begun to build,
under the colour of alliance and amitie contracted by Lopes ambassadour for the king of Portugall, with the king of
Aethiopia, in the yere 1519. And yet for all that certaine it is, that the king
of Portugall was of auntient time feudatarie or vassall unto the king of
Castile, and the kingdome of Portugall a memberPortugall of
auntient time a member of the kingdom of Castile. of the kingdome of
Castile: which for the greater part holden by force by the Moores, was giuen to Henrie, brother
to Godfrey of Buillon, in marriage with the base
daughter of Alphonsus king of Castile: from whome are
descended all the kings of Portugall, since this foure hundred and fiftie
yeares, unto Henrie the Cardinall, who last raigned:
hauing (of long) exempted themselves from the soueraigntie of Castile, and
holding diuers kings their tributaries and feudataries, of whome Emanuel was the greatest, and for his martiall prowesse
amongst the rest most famous; who vanquished the aforesaid kings, and caused
them to pay him tribute. For there are now no feudatarie kings in Asia, or
Africa, which are not also tributarie; howbeit in auntient time the kings of
Persia, and the Romans, hauing subdued kings unto their empire, for most part
made them to become their tributaries: as for such fealtie and homage as is of
vassals exacted, they knew not what it
ment. For Philip the second, king of Macedon, being by
the Romans ouercome, they graunted him peace uppon condition, that he should
pay them into their common treasure, a certaine yearly tribute; which Perseus, Philip his sonne, afterwards refusing to pay,
drew upon himselfe a great and heauy warre, to his owne vtter destruction. And
yet oftentimes such tributarie kings had others tributarie unto themselves, who
had also power of life and death, and other roiall soueraignties over their
owne subiects. So the kingdome of Dauid was contained
within the bounds of Palestine, and yet he enforced the neighbour kings to pay
unto him tribute, his posteritie neuerthelesse not long after yeelding tribute
unto the Aegyptians, and the Assirians. So the kings of Slauonia, and the
Commonweale of Carthage used the like
authoritie and right over the princes under their dominion, that the Romans
exercised over them, enforcing them to bring their yearely tributes into their
treasuries.
Yet is there difference betwixt a tribute and a pention: for a pention is paid
in respectDifference betwixt a pention and a tribute.
of fealtie, or in time of warres to receiue aid against our enemies: but a
tribut is giuen, thereby to have peace; howbeit that he which receiueth such a
pention, commonly boasteth of it, as of a tribute: as the kings of England
called the pention of fiftie thousand crownes, which Lewes the xj paid unto them by the treatie of Piqueni, by the name of
a tribute; vntill that Elizabeth the daughter of Edward king of England was married unto Charles the eight, king Lewes his sonne.
Howbeit that Philip Comines denyeth it to have bene either pention or
tribute; yet needes it must bee either the one or the other. So the Grand
Signior calleth the German emperour his tributarie, for the pention which he
payeth euerie yeare for the peaceable enioying of a part of Hungarie. The
Venetians also, the Genowayes, the Ragusians, the kings of Algiers and of
Tunes, in his letters and in the conuentions of peace, he calleth by the name
of his great friends and allies, but accounteth them indeed his tributaries.
But the great Precop Tartar, who in auntient time was soueraigne of all the
realmes from Volga to Boristhenes, held all the princes and lords of those
countries as his vassals and tributaries, who not onely
kneeled before himselfe, but stood before his ambassadours sitting: For so the Knez of Moscouie behaued himselfe before
the ambassadours of this▪ Tartar prince, and was therefore of other princes
commonly called but by the name of a duke: howbeit that the dukes of Moscouie,
for this and diuers other such indignities cast off the seruile Tartars yoke,
in the yeare 1524. And the first that reuolted from them was Bsilius the first, who called himselfe
The Great Chamberlaine of God, andThe Moscoui an absolute soueraigne
prince.King of Moscouie: and so he which at this present
raigneth, in despight that other princes tearme him but a duke, stileth
himselfe The Great Emperour: as in truth he in power
either excelleth, or is equall unto the greatest kings his neighbours,
excepting the kings of the Turkes▪ albeit that the right of soueraigne maiestie
be not defined by the spatiousnesse of places, or the greatnesse of countries,
as if that might make a prince either The notable saying of Eumenes to king Antigonus. more
or lesse soueraigne: as Eumenes being ouerthrowne, and
hauing nothing left him of his owne more than the castle wherein he was
besieged, yet when as he was to treat of peace with Antigonus king of Asia (who as he was in power, would also in honor
have seemed to have bene his superiour) answered, That he Plutar. in Eumene. acknowledged no man greater than
himselfe, so long as he had his sword in his hand.
And yet among soueraigne princes there is a certaine prerogative of honour
dueDegrees of honour among soueraigne princes being
equall. unto the more auntient Monarches and Commonweals, although
they bee in wealth & power inferior unto them that be more new or of later
time: as we see amongst the xiij Cantons of the Swissers, who are all
soueraignes, acknowledging nether prince nor monarch in the world for their
soueraigne: the Canton of Zurich in all their assemblies The order of the Cantons of the Swissars. hath the
prerogative of honour: For their deputie as a prince in the name of all the
rest of the Cantons, receiueth and dismisseth the ambassadours of other kings
and Commonweals; and unto him onely it belongeth to call a generall assemblie
of all the states of the Cantons, and againe to dismisse the same; albeit that
the Canton of Berne be much greater and stronger: Next unto them of Berne, are
Lucerne, and Vri, albeit that they are defended neither with wals nor ditches,
no more than are the Schwits, and Vnderuald, which follow in order unto them of
Vri: then follow after them Zug, Glaris, Basill, Friburg, and Soleurre. Now
haply a man may say, That this is done according to the time that euerie Canton
entred into their alliance: which is not so; for by their treaties it
appeareth, that the first that entred in that confederation and alliance were they of Vri, Schwits, Zug, and
Vnderuald.
Sometimes also the more auntient Monarches and Commonweals lose their
prerogative of honour; as when they put themselves into the protection of
latter princes,Degrees of honour betwixt soueraign princes
being in alliance together. or yeeld themselves tributaries: in which
case it is most certaine, that they are alwaies lesse than the other into whose
protection they put themselves, or unto whome they pay tribute. As it chaunced
almost to all kings and princes which sought the protection of the Romans:
whereas others which were come into equall alliance with them, as the Hedi, were in their leagues called their confederats,
their equals and brethren: and yet for all that, they in truth and effect were
inferiour unto them in honour. And verily Augustus the
emperour showed himselfe wonderfull ceremonious and difficult in the honours which he bestowed on kings and princes,
allies and under the protection of the empire of Rome; making Tetrarques,
inferiour unto Ethnarques, and these inferiours unto kings; and the more
auntient allies of the Romans, superiours unto the rest that came into their
alliance after them. And albeit that the Romans in the flourishing time of
their popular estate, seemed not much carefull of such ceremonies of dignitie
and honour which is of kings and princes more regarded, yet did Q. Martius Philippus their ambassadour show himselfe
therein curious: Who contending with Perseus king of
Macedon, which of them shuld come over the riuer upon the frontiers of Macedon, unto the other: and Perseus
for that he was a king, refusing to come over
unto the Roman ambassadour, the ambassadour yet by sweet speech drew him ouer:
Which he did (as he said unto the ambassadors of the allies and confederats
there present with him) to show that the honour of the Romans was greater than
that of the Macedonian kings; who for all that would in nothing giue place vnto
the Romans. Yet was there a greater cause than that, which Martius, or els Liuie omitted, which was
forthat Philip the father of Perseus had upon conditions, receiued peace of the Romans and also
paid unto them tribute; which his father Philips act, if
he had disliked, he should not have medled with the kingdome: although that he
was otherwise vnworthy therof, who his father yet liuing, had aspired unto his
inheritance: and being but borne of a concubine, had slaine his brother borne
in lawfull marriage. But after that hee
ouerthrowne and vanquished by Paulus Aemilius▪ had lost
the hope of his kingdome▪ he writ letters unto Aemilius,
generall of the Roman army, yet stiling himselfe a king: which his letters the
Roman generall reiected, and would not vouchsafe to open them, except he first
renounced his roiall dignitie, which can onely agree unto him which hath a
soueraigne power, subiect to no other princes commaund.
And for the same cause Francis the first the French king
declared unto Cardinall Bibiene the popes legat, that
the pope his master ought not to suffer the emperour Charles the fift to call himselfe king of Naples and of Sicilie,
seeing that he was but the Popes vassall. Whereof the legat gaue aduertisement
unto Iulian Cardinall de Medices, who was afterwards
pope; to the end that that title might have beene rased, which as he certified him by his letters, was by the charters of
fealtie, forbidden the kings of Naples to take: whereas for all that, in all
the records which wee have got out of the Vatican, that is not onely not
forbidden, but the name and dignitie of the king of Naples and Sicilie
expressely set downe, as namely in the inuestitures of Charles of France, of Carobert, and of Iohn. So many times ambassadours euill instructed in
their masters affaires, through ignorance commit therein many notable defaults.
And by the same reason we should take the royall title of a king from the king
of Bohemia, who holdeth his kingdome in fealtie and homage of the empire; and
not for that it is so little, as many have written, that it is for that cause
no kingdome, which were to measure kings by the elne: but it is, for that the
countrey of Bohemia was by the emperour Fredericke the first, for title of honour onely erected
a kingdome, without preiudice unto the right or soueraignetie of the empire.
But to say truth, this title agreeth unto none that is another mans vassall,
nor hath nothing of his owne in title of soueraigntie. And it maybe, that for
this cause pope Pius the fourth gaue not the royall
title toThe title of a king belongeth not unto an other mans
vassal neither to him which holdeth nothing of his owne in soueraigntie. The
maiestie of the emperour still impugned by this French author▪ and the
French kings too much exalted.Cosmus duke of Florence, albeit that he would very
gladly have so done: whereof the emperour Maximilian the
second, being by the French embassadour aduertised, not vnfitly replied, Italia non habet regem nisi Caesarem: Italy hath no king
but the emperor. Although that be to be vnderstood of the maiestie of the
German empire (whereof the Florentine state dependeth) & not of the
emperour, who is himselfe subiect unto the estate of the empire: albeit that
all christian princes giue him the prerogative of honor, next unto the pope, whether it be for that he is chiefe of
the German empire, or els hath got it by long prescription of time. So also
next unto the emperour, all other princes have used to giue this prerogative of
honour unto the French kings; not only for the long possession thereof, but
also for that in all the world (whether you looke among the Christians, or the
Tartars, the Turkes, the Ethyopians, the Indians, or Barbarians) is not to be
found so auntient a kingdome, or such a continuall discent of kings of the same
stocke and line as is among the French kings. And therefore Baldus (being himselfe an Italian Lawyer and a subiect of the empire)
sayth well, That the French king carieth the crowne of
glorie aboue all the kings, who have alwaies giuen him that preheminence of honour. And there is also yet extant an
epistle of pope Gregories unto king Childebert, the beginning whereof is this: Quanto
caeteros homines regia maiestas antecellit, tanto caeterarum gentium regna,
regni vestri culmen excellit: by how much the royall Maiestie excelleth
other men, by so much doth the Maiestie of your kingdome excell the kingdomes
of other nations. As in truth this prerogative is unto him due: for the Germane
emperours themselves cannot denie, but that the German empire was sometime a
prouince and member of the auntient kingdome of Fraunce, conquered by the
prowesse of Charlemaigne king of France, and power of
the French nation: but afterwards rent againe from the same, being giuen in
partition to Lewes of France, yongest son to Lewes the Gentle, at such time as Charles the Bauld the French emperour
held the imperiall seat of the empire: Howbeit that yet neuerthelesse the
Germane princes the Othons, by the graunt of the Roman
bishops hauing got the imperial title, have by little & little through the
ignorance of our embassadors vsurped & taken unto themselves this
prerogative of honour aboue the French kings. As in like case the king of
Spaine not many yeares agoe would have preuented our kings ambassadours: but
was at the request of M. Nouuaille, ambassadour for the
French king, by a decree of the Venetian Senat embarred so to doe, in the yeare
1558: and so likewise afterwards by a decree of the pope, giuen by the consent
of all the colledge of Cardinals: where the pope said with a lowd and cleare
voyce, That the French kings had beene alwayes the auntient protectours of the
church of Rome, and that the fairest and
fruitfullest prouinces of the kingdome of Spaine, had bene dismembred and rent
from the kingdome of Fraunce: than which nothing could in that kind have beene
more truely spoken; for by our kings, the authoritie of the bishops of Rome
hath bene delivered from contempt, their wealth encreased, and their power
confirmed.Contention at the counsel of Trent betwixt the
Spanish and French embassadours about their places. Wherein the pope
also in some sort amended the errour committed in the councell of Trent; where
Mendoza the Spanish ambassadour, preferring himselfe
and taking place before the French ambassadour (which then was M. Lansac, assisted with the M. M. of Ferrier & Faut)
was to have bin compelled to have departed from the councell, or els to haue
kept the auntient order of ambassadours, and so to have followed the French
ambassadours: who withstanding the Spanish ambassadors presumption, requested that he might not so inuert the order of the
ambassadours: saying, that otherwise he would himselfe forsake the Councell,
and cause the French bishops to depart thence also. Whereunto the Spanish
ambassadour craftily answered, That as he would not go before the French
ambassadour, so would he not be enforced to follow him; and so tooke his place
by himselfe apart from all the rest of the ambassadors. Yet notwithstanding
these two former decrees which I have spoken of, the Spanish ambassadour not
long after at Vienna in Austria, earnestly requested of the emperor, That he
might goe in the same degree and order with the French ambassadour; or that
they might at leastwise go formost by turnes (as did the Roman Consuls, who had
the preheminence, the twelue sergeants, and power to commaund, successiuely,
each of them his day) which Henrie the second the French king hearing of, writ againe to his
ambassador, That prerogative of dignitie to be of so great moment and
consequence, as that nothing therein was by him to be said or done more than he
had commission for. And Ferdinand the emperour not
willing to offend either the one or the other, thought it good to forbid them
both from comming together, either unto sermons or other publikeA good order for the auoiding of contētion betwixt the
ambassadors of great princes, for their places▪ assemblies. The Senat
of Polonia troubled with the same difficultie, thought it not good to preferre
one ambassadour before another, neither to preferre them by turnes, or yet to
make them equall: but decreed of all ambassadours in generall, that as every of them first came into the frontiers of the kingdome
of Polonia, so should they be first in order
heard. And so accordingly M. De Monluc bishop of Valence
(who for his wisedome and dexteritie for mannaging of matters of estate, had
beene fifteene times ambassadour) hauing by great celeritie preuented the
Spanish ambassador, had also first audience; wherewith the Spanish ambassadour
offended, would as then say nothing: as I have vnderstood by M. de Nouuaille abbot of Belle-iste, a man of great honour and vertue;
who then was also ambassadour into Polonia, as he now is at Constantinople. But
before the yeare 1558, neuer Christian prince made question of the preheminence
of the French ambassadours before them of Spaine: and namely the English men
alwayes preferred them before the Spaniard; albeit that they had bene auntient
allies and friends unto the one, and enemies unto the other. As after the
death of queene Marie, in the chapter holden by the knights of the most honourable
order of the Garter, upon Saint Georges eue, in the
yeare 1555, concerning the conferringThe French preferred
before the Spanish. of honours, it was decreed, That the French kings
place should be aboue the rest, next unto the prince on the right hand; where
before was the place for Spaine, while king Philip was
married unto the queene. And the next day after being Saint Georges day, a day of great solemnitie unto the knights of that order,
a seat was accordingly reserued for the French king, on the right hand next
unto the prince: and another on the left hand for the king of Spaine, next vnto
the emperours seat on the same side, being then emptie. And afterward in the
time of Charles the ix, the queene of England caused to
be sent unto him the banner of Fraunce, of the same stuffe and greatnes that
her owne was, as the king was aduertised by
M. de Foix then his ambassador there; and in the roll
or Catalogue of these knights, which is signed euerie yeare by the queene, the
French kings name is euer the first, next unto her owne.
But to take away these difficulties and ielousies betwixt princes, about their
honors, which are otherwise ineuitable and daungerous: it is declared in the
xiij article of the ordinances of king Lewes the xj,
touching the order of knights, that they should bee placed according to the
time of their receiuing into the order, without prerogative of king or
emperour. For euerie soueraigne prince who is neither tributarie, vassall, nor
in the protection of another, may as seemeth unto him best in his owne countrey
bestow the prerogatives of honour upon whomsoeuer hee pleaseth, and to reserue
the chiefe place unto himselfe. We know right
well that the Venetians, the Rhagusians, the Genowayes, the Moscouites, and the
Polonians, are in league with the great Turk, and yet hath he alwaies giuen the
prerogative of honour unto the French king, calling him in his letters the
Greatest, and the Greatest among the most Great Princes of
the Christians: & stileth himselfe The greatest
of all Princes, and the chiefe Sarrach or Prince of the Musulmans; that
is to say, Chiefe Prince of the right beleeuing or
faithfull, which last prerogative of honour the Christian princes
themselves have giuen him by their letters: and as for the first title it
seemeth himselfe to have taken it from the auntient
emperours of Constantinople, who bare in their armes foure B. which we
call Fusills, wherby thesewords are signified; , that is to say King of kings, raigning
over kings. Which was the title that the kingsThe
armes of the antient emperors of Constantinople. of Babilon in
auntient time tooke upon them also, as we may see in Ezechiel, who calleth the great king Nabucodonosor that is to say, King
of kings; for that all the kings of Asia were unto him tributaries: after which
the kings of Persia hauing ouercome the kings of Asiria, as Esdras writeth, used the same title: & after them the Parthian
kings also, as Dion writeth, that Phraates the king of Parthia called himselfe King of kings. But
neither feudatarie kings which hold all their territories of others; neither
dukes, marquesses, counties, or other like princes can of right vse the title
of soueraigne maiestie, but only of his Highnesse, his Serenitie, or his Excellencie, as wee have before said.
Wherfore seeing that princes Tributaries, and Feudadaries, are not to be
accounted absolute soueraignes; neither they which are in the protection of
others: let vs now speake of the true markes of Soueraigntie, thereby the
better to know them who they be that be such.
CHAP. X. ¶ Of the true markes of Soueraigntie.
SEeing that nothing upon earth is greater or
higher, next unto God,Soueraigne princes God his lieutenants
upon earth. than the maiestie of kings and soueraigne princes; for
that they are in a sort created his
lieutenants for the welfare of other men: it is meet diligently to consider of
their maiestie and power, as also who and of what sort they be; that so we may
in all obedience respect and reuerence their maiestie, and not to thinke or
speake of them otherwise than of the lieutenants of the most mightie and
immortal God: for that he which speaketh euill of his prince unto whome he
oweth all dutie, doth iniurie unto the maiestie of God himselfe, whose lively
image he is upon earth. As God speaking unto Samuel, of
whome the people of Israel had vnaduisedly asked a king, It
is not thee (saith God) but me whome they haue
despised.
Now to the end that one may know him that is such an one (that is to say a
Soueraigne prince) we must know the markes,
which are not common unto other subiects also: for if they were common vnto
others, than should there be no soueraigne prince. And yet they which have writ
best of or concerning a Commonweale, have not sufficiently and as it ought,
manifested this point, than which none is more plentifull or more profitable in
the discourse of a Commonweale▪ whether it were by them for flatterie, for
feare, for hatred, or by forgetfulnesse omitted. For when Samuel had denounced him king whome God had before chosen, and
consecrated him before the people, as if he had but come by chaunce; he is
reported to have writ a booke of the power and Soueraigntie of a king, which
the Hebrew priests have written to have bene by their kings suppressed and
rent, that so they might more freely tyrannise over their subiects. Wherein Phi.
Malancthon in mine opinion is deceiued, who hathHow
Samuel his speech unto the people concerning the power of a king, by them
demaunded, is to be vnderstood. thought those things which Samuel spoke unto the people, concerning the crueltie or
insolencie of tyrants, to belong unto the right of soueraigne maiestie: Whereas
hee in that his Oration unto the people, would have reclaimed them from the
alteration and innouation of the state, and to have beene better aduised. Will you (saith he) know the custome of
tyrants? It is to take away the goods of their subiects, and to dispose of
them at their pleasure; to take the tenth of their labours, to rauish other
mens wiues, to take from them their children to abuse them, or to make of
them their slaues: For the word which hee vseth, signifieth not lawfull
rights in that place, but mens customes and manner of doing. For otherwise the
good prince Samuel should in all his speech be contrarie unto himselfe: for in giuing of an
account before the people, of the charge that God had giuen him over them; Which of you (saith he) is it amongst
you that can accuse me of euill, or say that I have taken of him either gold
or siluer, or other present whatsoeuer? Whereunto all the people with
great applause and acclamation gaue him this prayse, That he
had neuer done them wrong, nor taken any thing of any person
whomsoeuer. Should then this good prince being of so great integritie,
godlinesse, and iustice, as he is reported to have bene of, have pronounced the
cruelties, insolencies, and adulteries of Tyrants, as lawes of Soueraigntie for
princes to imitate? And amongst the Greekes there are
none, who have any thing written concerning the lawes of
Soueraigntie, except Aristotle, Polybius, and Dionysius
Halicarnasseus, who have writ with so great breuitie and obscuritie▪ as
that they seeme rather to have propounded the question, than to have declared
what was to be thought thereof, as not therein well resolued themselves. For
there are (saith * Aristotle) three parts of a
Commonweale, the▪ Arist. li. 4. d Repub. one to take aduice and councell, the other to establish magistrats and
officers, and euerie man in his charge, and the third to administer and execute
iustice. Here (in mine opinion) or else no where he seemeth to speake of the
right of Soueraigntie; for that a Commonweale can by no meanes receiue that
diuision, as it were of the whole into parts, except the soueraigne government
were also spoken of. Nether hath Polyb. lib. 6▪ de militari ac
domestica Rom. disciplina.Polybius▪ also determinatly defined or set downe the
rights and marks of Soueraigntie: but in
speaking of the Roman Commonwealth, he saith, That their estate was mixt of the
Power royall, of the Aristocraticall government, and the Popular
libertie: seeing (saith he) that the people made lawes and officers;
the Senat▪ disposed of the prouinces and common treasure, receiued and
dismissed ambassadours, and had the mannaging of the greatest affaires; the
Consuls held the prerogative of honour, in royall forme and qualitie, but
especially in warres, wherein they were all in all. Wherein it appeareth, that
he hath touched the principall points of Soueraigntie, seeing that they vnto
whom he attributeth the same, had the chiefe government of the Commonwealth.
But Dionysius* Dioys. Halycar lib. 4.Halycarnasseus seemeth thereof to have written better,
and more plainly than the other. For he saith, That king Seruius, to take away power from the Senat, gaue power to the people, to make and abolish lawes, to determine
of peace and warre, to place and displace officers, to heare the appeales of
all the magistrats. And in another place speaking of the third trouble which
happened in Rome, betwixt the nobilitie and the people, he saith, That Marcus▪ Valerius the Consul showed unto the people, that
it ought to* Lib. 7. content
it selfe, to have the power to make lawes, to chuse officers, to receiue
appeales from all the magistrats, and so to leaue the rest unto the Senat.
Since which time the lawyers have amplified these rights, and they of later
time, much more than they before them, in the treaties which the call The rights of Regaltie, which they have filled with an
infinit number of particularities, such as are common unto dukes, counties,
barons, bishops, officers, and other subiects of soueraigne princes: in such
sort that they call dukes soueraigne princes,
as the dukes of Milan, Mantua▪ Ferrara, and Sauoy: yeaA
probable errour. euen some counties also dukes subiects, being all or
most part blinded with this errour; which hath in it a great appearance of
truth. For who is there that would not deeme him to be a soueraigne, which
giueth lawes unto his subiects, which maketh peace and warre, which appointeth
all the officers and magistrats of his countrey, which imposeth tributes, and
at his pleasure easeth whome he seeth good: which hath power of life and death,
and in briefe to dispose of the whole Commonweale. All which they before
rehearsed, have power to doe: and what more can a man desire in a Soueraigne
prince? For all these are the markes of Soueraigntie. And yet neuerthelesse we
haueThe dukes of Milan, Sauoy, Ferrara, and Florence▪
with such other like great princes no soueraigns: and the reasons why
before shewed that the dukes of Milan, of Sauoy, of Ferrara, of Florence, and
of Mantua, hold all of the empire: and that the
most honourable title that they haue, is to be princes and deputies of the
empire: we have also said that they have their inuestiture from the empire: and
that they yeeld their fealtie and homage unto the empire: in briefe that they
are naturall subiects of the empire, and borne in the territories subiect vnto
the empire. Then how can they be absolute soueraignes? For how should hee be a
soueraigne, which acknowledgeth the iurisdiction of another greater then
himselfe? of one which reuerseth his iudgements, which correcteth his lawes,
which chastiseth himselfe, if he commit abuse? We have before shewed that Galeace the first, vicount of
Milan▪ was accused, attainted, conuinced, and condemned of treason by the
emperour, for hauing without leaue raysed
taxes upon his subiects, and that hee therefore died in prison. And if any of
them shall contrarie unto the lawes, by force; sufferance, or by vsurpation
take upon them the soueraigntie; are they therefore soueraigns? or shall they
prescribe against the fealtie and obedience which they owe unto their prince?
Seeing that they confesse themselves but princes and deputies of the empire.
They must then renouce the titles of princes and dukes, of Highnesse and Excellencie, & stile
themselves kings, to vse the title of soueraigne maiestie, which they cannot
doe, without reuolting from the empire; as did Galuagno
vicount of Milan, who therefore endured the grieuous punishment of his
rashnesse. We have also shewed that the cities of Lombardie were subiect vnto
the empire. In briefe we had declared also the
intollerable absurdities that should ensue, if the vassals should be
soueraignes, especially when they have nothing but what they hold of another:
and that this were nothing else but to make the subiect equall with his lord,
the seruant with his maister: he that receiueth the law, with him that giueth
the law, him that oweth his obedience unto him that is to commaund, which
seeing they are things impossible, wee may well conclude that dukes, counties,
and all they which hold of another man; or that receiue law or commaundement
from another, be it by force, or otherwise by contract, are in no wise
soueraignes.
The same opinion we have of the greatest magistrats, of kings Lieutenants
general,The greatest magistrats or lieutenants no
soueraigns. Gouernours, Regents, and Dictators; what power so euer
they haue, if they be bound unto the lawes
appeales, and commaund of an other man, they are not to be accounted
soueraigns. For it behoueth that the markes and recognisances of soueraigntie
be such, as that they cannot agree to any other, but to a soueraigne prince:
for otherwise if they be to be communicated with subiects, a man cannot say
them to be the true markes of soueraigntie. For as a crowne if it be broken in
peeces or opened, looseth the name ofA fit
comparison. a crowne; so soueraigne maiestie looseth the greatnesse
thereof, if any way bee opened to tread under foot any right thereof; as by
communicating the same with subiects. And for this cause in the exchange made
betwixt king Charles the fift, and the king of Nauarre,
for the territories of Mante and Meullan, with Montpellier, wherin the royall
rights are articulated, they are said all wholly and alone to belong unto the
king. It is also by the common opinion of the
lawyers manifest, that those royall rights cannot by the soueraigne be yeelded
up, distracted, or any otherwise alienated; or by any tract of time be
prescribed against: and therefore Baldus calleth them
Sacra Saerorum, of Sacred things the most Sacred: and
Cynus Indiuidua, things inseparable, or not to bee
divided. And if it chance a soueraigne prince to communicat them with his
subiect,Soueraigntie admitteth no companion or pertaker
therin. he shall make him of his seruant, his companion in the
empire: in which doing he shall loose his soueraigntie, and be no more a
soueraigne: for that he onely is a soueraigne, which hath none his superiour or
companion with himselfe in the same kingdome. For as the great soueraigne God,
cannot make another God equall unto himselfe, considering that he is of infinit
power and greatnes, and that there cannot bee two infinit things, as is by naturall demonstrations manifest: so also
may wee say, that the prince whom we have set down as the image of God, cannot
make a subiect equall unto himselfe, but that his owne soueraigntie must
thereby be abased; which if it be so, it followeth that the administration of
iustice, which Aristotle maketh the third part of a
Commonweale, is not the true marke of soueraigntie; for that it indifferently
agreeeth almost to all magistrats aswell as to the prince: neither in like sort
to make or displace officers; for that the prince and the subiect have both
this power; not only in appointing the officers seruants at home, and in time
of warre, but euen of the officers, and magistrats
themselves, which commaund in peace or in warre. For we read that the Consuls, in auntient time created the militarie
Tribunes, who were as marshals in the armie, and he whome they called the
Interrex created the dictator, and the dictator appointed the collonel of the
horsemen: & in every Commonweale where iustice is giuen with fees, the lord
of the fee may at his pleasure appoint officers, and without cause displace
them againe, if they have not their offices in recompence of some their
deserts. The same opinion we have of punishments and rewards, which magistrats
or captaines inflict or giue unto them that have deserued the same, aswell as
the soueraigne prince. Wherefore it is no true marke of Soueraigntie to giue
reward, or to inflict punishment unto such as have so deserued, sith it is
common both to the prince and the magistrat: albeit that the magistrat haue
this power of the prince. It is also no marke
of Soueraigntie to have power to consult of the affaires of the state, which is
the the proper charge of the priuie Councell, or Senat of a Commonweale; which
is alwayes divided from him which is therein soueraigne; but especially in a
popular estate where the soueraigntie lieth in the assemblie of the people,
which is alwaies an enemy unto wisedome and good councell. Whereby it is to be
perceiued, not any one thing of those three wherein Aristotle said a Commonweale to consist, to be the true marke of
Soueraigntie.
As for that which Dionysius Halycarnasseus saith of Marcus Valerius the Consull, in the Oration which he made
unto the people of Rome, for the appeasing of the troubles then risen betwixt
the Senat and them; That the people ought to content themselves to have the power to make lawes and magistrats; that
is not sufficient to declare a Soueraigntie of power in them, as I have before
declared concerning the magistrats. Yea the power to make lawes is not the
proper marke of Soueraigntie, except we vnderstand thereby the soueraigne
princes lawes; for that the magistrat may also giue lawes unto them that are
within the compasse of his iurisdiction, so that nothing be by him decreed
contrarie to the edicts and lawes of his soueraigne prince. And to manifest
this point, we must presuppose that this word Law,
without any other addition, signifieth The right commaund of
him or them, which have soueraigne power aboue others, without exception of
person: be it that such commaundement concerne the subiects in
generall, or in particular: except him or them which have giuen the law.
Howbeit to speake more properly, A law is the commaund of a Soueraigne concerning all hisWhat lawe properly is.subiects in generall: or els concerning generall things,
as saith Festus Pompeius, as a priuilege concerneth some
one, or some few: which law if it bee made by the priuie councel, or Senat of a
Commonweale, it is called Senatus consultum, as the
priuie councell:The difference betwixt Senatus consultum, and Plebiscitum, a decree
of the Senate and of the people. or decree of the senat. But if the
vulgar people made any such commaund, it was called Plebiscitum, that is to say, The commaund of the meniall people: which
after many seditions and sturs, betwixt the Nobilitie and the common people,
was in the end called a law. For the appeasing whereof all the people in the
assemblie of the great estates, at the request of M.
Horatius the Consull made a law, that the Nobilitie and the Senat in
generall, and euerie one of the people in particular, should bee bound to
keepe the decrees and lawes which the
common people should make, without appealing therefrom; or that the Nobilitie
should have any voyce therein. But forasmuch as the nobilitie and the Senat
made small account of such the peoples decrees and ordinances; the aforesaid
law was afterward renewed, and againe published, at the instance of Q. Hortentius and Pub. Philo
Dictators: From which time forward such the peoples decrees were no more called
Plebiscita, but simply laws, whether they concerned
every man in particular, or all men in generall. As for the commaundements of
the magistrates, they were not called lawes, but onely edicts. For an Edict (as
M. Varro defineth it) is the commaund
of a Magistrat; which his commaund bound What an edict is. none, but them which were of his
owne iurisdiction; prouided alwaies that such his cōmands were not contrary
unto the ordinances of the great magistrats, or to the laws and commaundements
of his soueraigne prince, and were no longer in force than the magistrat
pleased, or had charge. And for that all the magistrats were annuall in the
Roman Commonweale, there edicts had not force but for one yeare at the most.
And therefore they which succeeded in the same office, were either to allow or
reuoke the edicts, by their predecessors before made: & if so be that they
were against the laws, or for longer time than the magistratie of him that made
them, then were they to none effect: which when C.
Verres did, he was in these words accused by Cicero,
Qui plurimum (inquit) edicto tribuūt, legem annuam appellāt, tu plus
edicto complecteris, quàm lege, They that attribute most (saith he) unto an
edict, cal it but an annual law; but thou comprehendest more in an edict, than
in a law. And for that the emperour Augustus, hauing
oppressed the liberty of the cōmonweal, called himself but Imperator (that is to say chief captain & Tribune of the people)
he called also his own decrees by the name of edicts: but such as the people
made at his request, he called them Leges Iuliae; which
maner of speech the other emperors after him used also; in such sort, that this
word Edict, is by little & litle taken for a law, especially when it
commeth out of the mouth of him which hath a soueraigne power; be it for one,
or for al, be it an edict perpetual or onely prouisionall. Wherefore they abuse
the words, which call edicts which are proper unto magistrats by the name of
laws: but in what sort soeuer that it be, there are none but soueraigne
princes, which can giue laws unto their
subiects, without exception, be it in ge nerall or in particular. But here
might some man obiect, That the Senat of Rome hadThat the
senate of Rome had no power to make lawes, but annuall decrees only.
power to make laws, & that the more part of the greatest affaires of
estate, in peace or war, were in the power of the Roman Senat to determine of▪
But what the authority of a Senat is, or ought to be in every Commonweale, we
shal in due place declare. But by the way to answere that that is obiected, I
say, that the Senat of Rome, from the expulsion of the kings, vntill the time
of the emperours▪ had neuer power to make law, but onely certaine decrees and
ordinances: which were not in force past a yeare, wherewith for all that the
common people were not bound, and so much lesse the whole body and estate of
the people. Wherein many are deceiued and especially Conan, who saith, That the Senat had
power to make a perpetuall law: for Dionysius
Halycarnasseus, who had diligently read the Commentaries of Marcus Varro, writeth, That the decrees of the Senat had
not any force, if they were not by the people confirmed: and albeit that they
were so confirmed, yet if they were not published in forme of a law, they then
had force but for one yeare. No more than the citie of Athens, where the
decrees of the Senat were but annuall, as saith Demosthenes in the Oration which hee made against Aristocrates: and if it were a matter of importance, it was referred
vntoA pretie quip of Anacharsis. the people to
dispose thereof as they thought good: which Anacharsis
the philosopher seeing merily said, The wise and graue
propound matters at Athens, and fooles and mad men resolue thereof. And
so the Senat in Rome did but consult, and the people commaund: For so Liuie oft times
saith, Senatus decreuit, populus tussit, The Senat hath
decreed, and the people commaunded. Yet true it is, that the magistrats, and
namely the Tribunes, oft times suffered the decrees of the Senat, in a maner to
have the force of lawes, if the matter seemed not to impare the power of the
people, or to be preiudiciall unto the maiestie of the estates in generall. For
so properly the auntient Romans said Cicero pro Ra birio Perduellionis ro.Imperium in magistratibus, auctoritatem in Senatu, potestatem
in plebe, maiestatem in populo inesse dicebant, Commaund to be in the
magistrats, authoritie in the senat, power in the meniall people, and maiestie
in the people in generall. For the word Maiestie, is proper unto him which stirreth the helme of
the soueraigntie of a Commonweale.Maiestie proper only unto a soueraigne prince. And
albeit that the law Iulia concerning maiestie made by the people at the request
of Augustus, hold him guilty (Laesaemaiestatis, or as we say) of treason, which striketh a magistrat
in the execution of his office: and that sometime the Latine historiographers,
yea and the lawyers themselves also giue the title of maiestie unto the Consull
and Pretor; as in saying, Maiestatem consulis, maiestatem
praetoris, The maiestie of the Consull, the maiestie of the Pretor: yet
is it but improperly spoken, neither by our lawes is he guiltie laesae maiestatis, that hath hurt a prince, a duke, a
countie, or a magistrat: but he onely that hath violated the person of a
soueraigne prince. And so by the lawes of Sigismundus
Augustus king of Polonia, made in the yeare 1588, it is set downe that
the crime Laesae maiestatis, should take no place
further than his owne person; which is
according to the true signification of laesa maiestas.
And for this cause it seemeth that the dukes of Saxonie, of Bauaria, of Sauoy,
of Loraine, Ferrara, Florence, and Mantua, put not into their stiles of honour,
this word Maiestie, contenting themselves with the title
of Highnesse: and the duke of Venice with the addition
ofThe duke of Venice no soueraigne prince. his Serenitie, who (to speake properly) is but a verie
prince, that is to say, the first, for hee is nothing else but the first of the
gentlemen of Venice: and hath no more aboue the rest of the Senators, than the
chiefe place and dignitie of the Commonweale in all their assemblies, wherein
he sitteth as chiefe; and the concluding voyce into what corporationThe order of the Venetian Commonweale. or colledge he
come, if there be any question of voyces. And as in Rome the edicts of the
magistrats bound every man in particular (so that they were not contrary
to the decrees of the Senat) and the
decrees of the Senat in some sort bound the magistrats (if they were not
contrarie to the ordinances of the common people) and the ordinances of the
common people were aboue the decrees of the Senat; and the law of the whole
bodie and estates of the people, was aboue all the rest: euen so in the
Venetian Commonweale, the decrees of the magistrats bind euerie man in
particular, according to the precinct and iurisdiction of euerie magistrat: but
the corporation and colledge of the Decemuiriis aboue particular magistrats:
the Senat is aboue the Decemuiri, and the great Councell (which is the
assemblie of all the gentlemen of Venice) hath the power of soueraigntie,
containing the Senat, and all the rest of the magistrats, within the power of
the commaund thereof, in such sort, that if the Decemuiri bee divided
with euen voyces, they appeale unto the
councell of the Sages, consisting of xxii, who if they cannot agree, the Senat
is assembled, and if the matter concerne the high points of soueraigntie, as is
the maiestie of the Commonweale, then it is referred unto the great Councell.
And therefore when any thing is decreed by the Decemuiri these words are ioyned
unto the decree, In consiglio Di Dieci: whereunto if the
colledge of Sages be ioyned, there is also commonly added, Con la Giunta, but if it be a decree of the Senat, it is declared in
these words, In Pregaidi: but if it be in the great
assemblie of the gentlemen of Venice, these words are commonly adioyned
thereunto, In Consiglio Magiore. For in these three
corporations or colleges, are almost all things dispatched which belong vnto
their lawes, their customes, and Commonweale, except such matters which the Septemuiri (the most secret councell of
the State) vse by themselves to determine. It is therefore but by sufferance
that the Decemuiri or the Senat make decrees and ordinances, which for that
they are found iust and reasonable, they passe sometime into the force of law,
as did the edicts of the auntient Roman Pretors, which if they were equall and
iust, their successours kept them: and so by tract of time were receiued as
lawes; yet for all that was it alwayes in the power of the new Pretors to make
others: neither were they bound to obserue or keepe them of their predecessors.
But Iulian the lawyer gathered a great number of such of
these edicts of the former Pretors, as he thought best,
and after that he had interpreted them, and brought them Magistrats edicts confirmed by him or them that have the
soueraigntie become lawes▪ into ninetie bookes, he gaue the same vnto
the emperour Adrian for a present; who in recompence of
so great a worke, made him great Prouost of the citie of Rome, and thereby made
way for his nephew Didius Iulianus, afterwards to aspire
unto the Roman empire. Adrian himselfe also perswaded
the Senat, that not onely the edicts which Iulian had
gathered, but other his owne writings should bee taken for lawes, which he
confirmed also by his authoritie, and yet neuerthelesse still held the name of
edicts, which hath deceiued many, who have accounted those lawes as Pretors
edicts. So also Iustinian the emperour, to the example
of Adrian, by decree commaunded many things which the
lawyers had after Iulian written unto the Pretors
decrees (after they had bene by him as he thought good corrected) to be
receiued for laws, the name of edicts still
remaining, being yet indeed nothing lesse than edicts, but lawes aswell as
those which every soueraigne prince in his owne Commonweale by the decrees of
his lawyers and courts, hath commaunded to be receiued for lawes; as it oft
commeth to passe in this realme, that the kings seeing diuers ordinances and
decrees of parliament most equall and iust, have confirmed the same, and caused
them to be published, and to passe in force of lawes; to show that the power of
the law lyeth in him that hath the soueraigntie: and which giueth force vnto
the law by these words, Sancimus Iubemus, We ordaine and
commaund; which are words proper unto soueraigne maiestie, as saith the Consull
Posthumius, in the oration which he made unto the
people, Nego iniussu populi quicquam sanciri posse, quod
populum teneat, I deny that any thing can bee ordayned without the peoples commaund, that can bind the
people. The magistrat also presenting his request unto the people, for the
enacting of a law, commonly began with these words, Quod
bonum, faustum, foelixque sit vobis ac Reipub. velitis, Iubeatis, Will
you, and commaund you, that which may be good, happie, and fortunat, to you,
and the Commonweale. And in the end of the law are still these words, Si quis aduersus eafecerit, &c. If any man shall do
against these things, &c. Which they called Sanctio,
that is to say an ordaining or enacting, declaring the punishments or rewards
due unto them that should keepe or breake the law: which are speciall
formalities and proper unto the maiestie of them which had the power to make
the law; but neuer used by the Senat in their decrees, nor by the magistrats in
their edicts. Ioyne hereunto also, that the
penaltie annexed unto the lawes of a soueraigne prince, is farre different from
that which is ioyned unto the decrees or ordinances of magistrates, or of
corporations and colledges, which have certaine limited penalties and fines,
for the most part concluded by a mercement or forfeit of money, or with
whipping chere: For there is none but the soueraigne prince, which can unto his
edicts ioyne the paine of death, as it hath bene also forbidden by an auntient
act of parliament, and the clause of arbitrarie punishment ioyned unto the
ordinances and decrees of magistrats and gouernours, which euer inclusiuely
extended unto death.
Wherefore let this be the first and chiefe marke of a soueraigne prince, to bee
ofThe first and cheife marke of soueraigntie.
power to giue lawes to all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them
in particular, (yet is not that enough, but
that we must ioyne thereunto) without consent of any other greater, equall, or
lesser than himselfe. For if a prince be bound not to make any law without
consent of a greater than himselfe, he is then a verie subiect: if not without
his equall, he then hath a companion: if not without the consent of his
inferiours, whether it be of his subiects, of the Senat, or of the people, hee
is then no soueraigne. And as for the names of Lords and Senators, which wee
oftentimes see ioyned unto lawes, they are not thereunto set as of necessitie
to giue thereunto force or strength, but to giue unto them testimonie and
weight, as made by the wisedome and discretion of the
chiefe men, so to giue them the better grace, and to make them to bee the
better receiued; and not for any necessitie at
all. For we find the most auntient edicts of Saint Denys
in Fraunce, of Philip the first, and of Lewes the Grosse; whereunto the names and seales of the
Queenes Anne and Adella, as also
of Robert and Hugh are annexed:
And namely in the twelft yeare of the raigne of Lewes
the Grosse, and of Adella the sixt.
Now when I say that the first and chiefe marke of Soueraigntie is for the
prince toIt belongeth only unto soueraigne princes to grant
priuileges, and what a priuilege is. be of power to giue lawes vnto
all his subiects in generall, and to euerie one of them in particular: these
last words concerne priuileges, which only belong unto soueraigne princes to
graunt, and particularly to others, to whome they be graunted. A priuilege I
call a lw made for one, or some few particular men:
whether it bee for the profit or disprofit of
him or them for whome it is graunted. For so speaketh Cicero,
Priuilegiam▪ Cicero pro dom
sua et post re ditum in Senaetu.de meo capite latum est, A priuilege was made concerning
my life, he meaneth the law made against him by the common people at the motion
and instigation of Clodias the Tribune, (to have him
called to account for certaine citisens put to death contrarie to their
appeale, about the conspiracie of Cateline) which he in
many places calleth Lex Clodia, or a Law made by Clodius, whereof he oftentimes most grieuously
complained, both in the Senat and before the people, saying, That by the law of
the xij Tables it was forbidden any priuileges to be graunted, but Comitijs Centuriatis, that is to say, in the generall
assembly of the whole bodie of the people. For so be the words of the law, Priuilegia nisi comitijs centuriatis ne irroganto; qui secus
faxit capital esto, Priuileges let
them not be graunted but in the greatest assemblies of the people; and hee that
shall otherwise do, let it be unto him death. As for such priuileges as bring
profit and commoditie to them to whome they be graunted, they are more truely
called benefits. And in this all that have written of Royalties agree, that it
belongeth not to any, but unto a Soueraigne, to graunt priuileges, exemptions,
immunities, and to dispence with the edicts and ordinances of other former
princes: howbeit that priuileges in monarchies have not bene vsed, but onely
for the tearme of the life of the monarch himselfe that graunted them: as Tiberius the emperour made them all to know which had
obtained any priuileges from the emperour Augustus, as
Suetonius writeth. But now if any shall obiect vnto
me, the magistrats themselves to discharge men oftentimes of the lawes: and the Senat of Rome to have so oftentimes
done. I will aunswere him as did Papinian the lawyer,
That we are not to consider what is done at Rome, but what
ought indeed to be there done. For by the tribunitiall law Cornelia,
the Senat is forbidden to discharge any Roman of the lawes, except there were
two hundred of the Senators▪ present: which exemption from the laws seemeth
also to have bene granted unto the Senat, by reason of the difficult assembling
of the whole people.
But some man may say, that not onely the magistrats have power to make edicts
and lawes, euerie one according to his authoritie and iurisdiction, but also
that particular men make customes, both generall and particular. Which customes
have almost the force of lawes, and yet depend not of the iudgement or power of
the soueraigne prince, who as he is maister of
the law, so are particular men maisters of the customes. Whereunto I answere,
that custome by little and little take force; and in many yeres difference betwixt the beginning of customes and
lawes: and that both of them depend of the power of the soueraign
prince. by the common consent of all or most part; but the law
commeth forth in a moment and taketh strength of him which hath power to
commaund all: custome creepeth in sweetly and without force, whereas the law is
commaunded and published with power, yea and oftentimes contrarie to the good
liking of the subiects. For which cause Dion Chrisostome
compareth the law to a tyrant, and custome to a king. Moreover the power of the
law is much greater than the power of custome: for customes are by lawes abolished, but not lawes by customes; it beeing
alwayes in the authoritie and power of the
magistrat againe to put in execution such lawes as are by custome almost out of
vse. Custome also propoundeth neither reward nor punishment, whereas the law
alwayes carrieth with it either the one or the other, if it be not a law
permissiue, which easeth the penaltie of another law: and in briefe custome
hath no force but by sufferance, and so long as it pleaseth the soueraigne
prince, who may make thereof a law, by putting thereunto his owne confirmation:
whereby it is to be scene, that all the force of lawes and customes lieth in
the power of him that hath the soueraigntie in a Commonweale.
This then is the first and chiefest marke of Soueraignty, to be of power to
giue lawsThat the power to make lawes cannot be vnto
subiects communicated. and commaund to all in generall, and to euerie
one in particular; which cannot bee
communicated unto subiects. For albeit that a soueraigne prince giue power to
any one to make lawes, of such strength and vertue as if he himselfe had made
them: as did the people of Athens to Solon, and the
Lacedemonians to Lycurgus: yet were these lawes neither
the lawes of Solon nor Lycurgus,
who were but as commissioners and procurators for them which had giuen them
that charge; but they were the lawes of the Athenians, and Lacedemonians:
neither had these lawes had any force, had not the people by their consent
authorised the same. They indeed wrot those lawes, but the people commaunded
them; they composed them, but the people enacted them. And almost alwayes in a
Popular or Aristocraticall state, the lawes tooke name of him which propounded
or engrossed the same, who was nothing els but the simple procurer thereof: the confirmation of the same being from him
which had the soueraigntie. So when the Decemuiri by the people created at Rome
for the making of lawes without appeale, had sent ambassadours into Greece, to
amplifie their lawes, and in xij tables comprehended the best of them, they
commaunded all the people to bee called together, to behold and consider of
those lawes publikely set up: and so at length after three Faire dayes (the
vsuall time appointed for the establishing of laws) the people in their
greatest and generall assembly, commaunded, or rather enacted them to stand for
laws. But unto what power it belongeth to make a law, unto the same also it
appertaineth to abrogat or derogat from the same. under this power of making
& of abrogating of the law, is also comprised the declaration &
correction of the same, when it is so obscure,
that the magistrats upon the cases propounded find contratietie or intollerable
absurdities, yet may the magistrat according unto right and reason also
interpret the laws, & encline them either unto lenitie or seueritie: so
that he beware that in bending them too much, he breake them not; yea although
that they seeme unto him hard or vniust: but let him heare what Vlpian saith, Duralex, sic tamen
scripta est, An hard lawWhat power the magistrate
hath to interpret the lawe. (saith he) but so it is written: which if
the judge shall presume under the colour of equitie to breake, he is by the law
condemned of infamie. So ought the law called Laetoria,
(or rather Praetoria) to be vnderstood, which Papinian reciteth, without naming of the author. Wherby
it is permitted unto the Great Praetor of the citie of Rome, to supply, to
correct or amend the laws: which must (as we said) be moderatly & in a
measure done: for if a man should otherwise
vnderstand it, it should thereof follow, that a simple magistrat should be
aboue the lawes, if hee might at his will and pleasure alter and infringe the
same: and also that he might bind both the people and the prince unto his
edicts; which we have before showed to be a thing impossible.
under this same soueraigntie of power for the giuing and abrogating of the law,
areAll the other markes of soueraigntie contained vnder
the first. comprised al the other rights & marks of soueraignty:
so that (to speak properly) a man may say, that there is but this only mark of
soueraigne power, considering that all other the rights thereof are contained
in this, viz. to have power to giue lawes unto all and
euerie one of the subiects, & to receiue none
from them. For to denounce warre unto Other the marks of Soueraigntie the enemie, or to
make peace with him, although it seeme to be a thing different from the name of
the law, yet is it manifest these things to bee done by the law, that is to say
by the commaundement of the soueraigne power. So also is it proper vnto
soueraigne maiestie, to receiue the subiects appeales from other, and the
greatest magistrats, to place and displace the greatest officers, charge or
exempt the subiects from taxes and subsidies, to graunt pardons and
dispensations against the rigour of the law, to have power of life and death,
to encrease or diminish the valour and weight of the coyne, to giue it title,
name, and figure: to cause all subiects and liegemen to sweare for the keeping
of their fidelitie without exception, unto him to whome such oath is due: which
are the true markes of soueraigntie, comprised under the power of being able to
giue a law to al in generall, and to every one
in particular, and not to receiue any law or commaund from any other, but from
almightie God onely. For a prince or duke who hath power to giue lawes unto all
his subiects in general, & to every one of them in particular, is yet no
soueraigne, if he receiue his power from the emperour, the pope, or the king,
or any other greater than himselfe: or yet have a companion in his government,
a companion I say, for that he seemeth in a manner to have a superiour or
maister, which hath a companion, without whose helpe and consent hee can
commaund and doe nothing: much lesse is he a soueraigne, if hee bee another
mans lieutenant or deputie.
But forasmuch as the word Law, is too general a marke,
it is the more expedient particularly The second marke of Soueraigntie. to specifie the
rights of Soueraigntie, comprised (as I have said) under that soueraigne law;
as to denounce warre, or treat of peace, one of the greatest points of
soueraigne maiestie: for that oftentimes it draweth after it the ruine, or
assurance of a Commonweale; which is to be verified not onely by the law of the
Romans, but of al other nations. And for that there was more daunger to be
feared from warre, than from peace, it was lawfull for the common people of
Rome, to commaund peace, but if question were for making of warre, it might not
be decreed, but in the greatest assembly of all the states together, vntill
such time as that the meniall people had also full power to make lawes. And
therefore was it that warre was decreed against Mithridates by the law Manilia,
against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, against Philip
the second, king of Macedon, by the law
Sulpitia: peace was also made with the Carthaginensians, by the law Martia. And for because Caesar had
without commaund of the people made warres in Fraunce, Cato
Vticensis was of opinion in the Senat, that the armie was to be called
home, and Caesar for his presumption deliveted unto the
enemie. In like case the estates of the people of Athens determined of warre
and peace. As a man may see by the war by them decreed against the Megarians,
against the Syracusians, and against the kings of Macedon. I here but briefly
set downe certaine examples of two of the greatest and most famous popular
Commonweales that euer yet were: For in a regall state there is none (as I
suppose) which doubt all the power of peace and warre to be in the king:
insomuch as that for any man to attempt euen the least thing therein without the kings commaund, is unto the dooer thereof
dangerous, if the king might thereof have before bene aduertised: and what
charge soeuer that they giue unto their deputies or commissioners, to entreat
of peace or of alliance, yet consent they unto nothing, without the aduertising
of the king; as was to be seene in the last treaty of Cambray, betwixt the
French king & the king of Spain; the cōmissioners on the kings behalfe
writ to him from howre to howre, the whole proceedings both of the one part and
of the other. But in popular or Aristocraticall estate, we oft times see that
after the warre is once denounced, it is then managed by the aduise of the
Senat, or priuie counsell onely: yea and sometimes by
the aduice of one onely captaine also:The greatest daunger in war. for that nothing is more
dangerous in warre, than to have the secret pollicies thereof reuealed: which
must needes be, if the people have therein to doe. And therefore we read in the
Greeke and Latine histories the designes and enterprises of warre to have beene
still managed by the wisdome and direction of some one or other captaine, or in
case that the matter were of greater importance and consequence, by the
counsell of the Senate, without any more speaking thereof unto the people,
after it was once by the peoples commaund denounced and proclaimed against this
or that enemie. But if one should say, warre to have beene oftentimes denounced
by the advice of the Senate, without the consent or commaund of the people: I
confesse it to have sometimes indeed so happened and fallen out, but yet very
seldome: and that the Senate in so doing did
vsurpe the maiestie of the people: which was the cause, that the Tribunes
ofThe Senate in Rome had no power to denounce warre
without the consent of the people. the people, and faithfull keepers
of their libertie, oftentimes interposed themselves to crosse the matter, as we
see in Liuie, where he sayth: Controuersia fuit vtrum populi iussu indiceretur bellum, an satis esset S.
C. peruicere Tribuni, vt Q. Consul de bello adpopulum ferret, omnes
Centuriae iussere. Controuersie was (sayth he) whether war should be
denounced by the commaundement of the people: or els that the decree of the
Senate was sufficient, but the Tribunes preuailed; so that Quintus the Consull propounded the matter unto the people, which all
the assembly of the people commaunded. Howbeit, that the Senat it selfe would
not ordinarily denounce war, except the people had before so decreed, As T. Liuius speaking of the second Carthaginensian war,
sayth,Latum inde adpopulum vellent iuberent, populo Carthaginensi
bellum indici: It was afterwardLib. 1▪ Dec. 3.
propounded unto the people, whether they willed and commaunded war to be
denounced unto the people of Carthage. And in another place, Ex S. C. populi iussu bellumLib. 1. Dec. 2.praenestinis indictū. By a decree of the Senat, by
cōmandement of the people war was proclaimed against them of Praeneste. And
againe, Ex authoritate patrum populus PalaepolitanisLib. 8. Dec. 1▪bellum fieri iussit, The people following the authoritie
of the Senat, commaundedLib. 9. Dec. 1. warre
to be made against them of Palaepolis. And afterward, Populus
bellum fieri Aequis iussit, The people commaunded warre to be made
against the Aequi. And at such time as warre was to be vndertaken against the
Samnites, Patres solemniLib. 8. Dec. 1.more indicto decreuerunt, vt ea de re adpopulum
ferretur, The fathers after the solemne manner decreed, that concerning that matter it should bee referred unto the
people: Where Liuie in calling it the solemne manner,
declareth it to have bene a thing so used to be done. And so against the
Herniques, * Populus hoc bellum frequens iussit,
TheLib. 5. Dec. 1. people
in great number commaunded this warre. And against the Vestines, * Bellum ex authoritate patrum populus aduersus vestinos
iussit, The people following the authoritie of the Senators commaunded
warre to be made against the Vestines. The like manner of denouncing warre was
also amongst the Tarentines, so long as their popular state endured. For so
saith Plutarch, Ex authoritate Senatus populum Tarentinum
Romanis in ferri bellum iussisse, The people of Tarentum following the
authoritie of the Senat, to have commaunded warre to bee made against the
Romans. And Liuie speaking of the Aetolians, which were gouerned
by a popular government, saith it to have bene by their lawes forbidden, that
any thing should bee determined concerning peace and warre, but in the
Panaetolian and Pylaican counsell. And for that the nobilitie of Polonia,
Denmarke, and Sweden, pretend the right of Soueraigntie to belong unto them, it
is not lawfull for their kings without their authoritie and consent either to
denounce warre, or to vndertake it being denounced against them, except in case
of urgent necessitie, according to the order of Casimire
the great. True it is that in Rome concerning peace the Senate oftentimes
determined thereof without the consent of the people;
as we may see in all the treaties of peace betwixt the Romane and the
Latines: and in the confederats warre the
Senate passed all the treaties of peace and alliance without the people, viz. in the tumult and uprore of Italie: least the hard
assembly of the people, and danger of delay, might have brought some detriment
unto the Commonweale. Yea sometimes the generals and great commaunders in the
warres, of themselves determined of peace and warre, without the commaundement
of theNo peace by the Generall concluded with the enemie
good without the confirmation of him or them that have the
soueraigntie. people or Senate, especially if the warres were in some
countrey a farre off: as wee see in the second warre of Carthage, the three Scipioes made all the treaties of peace and alliance with
the people and princes of Spaine and Affricke, without the aduise of the Senat.
Yet true it is, that the Senate, yea and oft times the people authorised their
actions, and ratified their treaties, after that they were made: and if they
were in anie thing preiudiciall unto the
estate, had ofthem no regard. In which case the hostages and captaines yeelded
unto the enemie, were at their owne perill to answer the matter. As the Consull
Mancinus, who for that the peace he had made with the
Numantines, was reiected and not ratified by the Senate and the people, was
himselfe delivered unto theThe Romains oftentimes disclaymed
the peace by their ge nerals made with their enemies without the consent of
the people. enemie. And that is it which a certaine Senatour of
Carthage, as Liuie reporteth by way of exprobration
obiected unto the Romane embassadours, saying, Vos cum
Luctatius Consul primò nobiscum fedus icit, quia neque authoritate Patrun,
nec populi iuss ictum erat, negastis vos eo
teneri. Itaque aliud foedus publico consilio ictum est. You at such
time as Luctatius the Consull first made peace with vs;
for that it was made without the authoritie of the Senat, or commaundement of
the people, said you were not therunto bound:
and therefore another peace was by your common councell made. And the same
author speaking of Manlius the Proconsull of Asia saith,
Gallograecis bellum illatum, non ex Senatus authoritate,
non populi iussu: quod quis vnquam de sua sententia facere ausus est?
Warre was made upon the Gallogrekes, neither by the authority of the Senat, nor
the commaund of the people, which what man durst of himselfe euer do? But this
was Orator like spoken by the aduersarie against Manlius
being absent; for that it was sometime so done, we have by examples declared.
Spurius Posthumius the Consull, also being himselfe
with his armie shut up in the Straits and rockes of the Appennin mountaines, in
daunger with hunger to perish, before hee could have heard from the Senat or
the people, what they would have had him to have done; to deliver himselfe and the Roman armie out of those straites, of
himselfe made peace with the enemie, though upon verie hard and dishonourable
conditions. But when he with his armie disarmed, was returned to Rome; the
Senat and the people reiected the peace with the conditions by him accepted.
Yea Posthumius the Consull himselfe, in the assembly of
the people said, Cùm me seu turpi, seu necessaria sponsione
obstrinxi, qua tamen, quando iniussu populi facta est, non tene tur populus
Romanus, nec quicquam ex ea praeter Corpora nostrae debentur Samnitibus,
dedamur per faeciales nudi vinctique, Seeing that I have bound my
selfe, whether it be with a shamefull or a necessarie promise and agreement,
wherewith for all that the people of Rome is not bound, forasmuch as it was
without their commaundement made, neither is there any thing thereby unto the
Samnites due, more than our bodies; let vs
naked and bound be so yeelded unto them. So the Consull called it not a treatie
of peace, but a simple or necessarie promise. And in truth the enemies had
caused the Consull and all the captaines and lieuetenants of the army to
sweare, and further taken sixe hundred hostages, al which they might have put
to death, if the people would not confirme the agreement taken; in which making
they yet committed one grosse ouersight, in that they bound not all the
souldiers in the armie by oath to returne into those straits and enclosures of
the mountaines, and euen into the same state they were before, or els to yeeld
themselves all prisoners, in case the people would not
confirme the agreement by them made; which had they done, no doubt but that the Senat and the people would have sent them
againe into the same state they were, as they did the Consull, with the sixe
hundred sworne hostages, whom for all that, the Samnites refused to receiue of
the herauld. For in like case after the great ouerthrow by the Romans receiued
at Cannas, when Hanniball had sent eight thousand
souldiers, there taken prisoners, to Rome, to redeeme their libertie with the
ransome of a pound of gold for every head; and that the Senat would not agree
thereunto, but decreed, that they should either become the enemies slaues, or
die: the Consuls charged those souldiers, before the appointed day to returne
unto the enemie; who all obeyed their commaund, but one, who by a craftie wile
sought to delude the oath, before by him giuen unto the enemie for his returne;
whome the Senat for all that sent bound hand
and foot unto Hannibal. Or if it had seemed too hard a
thing unto the Senat, to have yeelded the whole army being sworne unto the
Samnites, they would vndoubtedly yet have confirmed those hard conditions of
peace by them agreed upon. As did Lewes the xij, the
French king, in the treatie made at Dijon by the lord
Trimouille with the Swissers, giuing them hostages of
the chiefest men of his army, with condition that the Swissers might put them
to death, if the king should not ratifie the agreement with them made. As did
the duke of Aniou unto the hostages which those which were besieged in the
castle of Eruall had giuen him: when he saw that Robert
Knolles, captaine of the castle, being arriued within the castle, after
the agreement, would by no meanes suffer the castle to be surrendred, saying,
That the besieged without him could couenant
nothing: and so also caused the prisoners that he had taken to be beheaded▪ For
otherwise, if it were lawful for captains to entreat or conclude of peace at
their pleasure, without expresse commaundement or ratification, they might bind
both people and soueraigne princes, unto the pleasure and appetite of their
enemies, and such hard conditions as they pleased: a thing most absurd and
vnreasonable, seeing that a common aduocat may not in the least matter of
another mans, come to agreement, without expresse charge from him whome it
concerneth.
But some may say, that these rules take no place in Venice, where the Senat
doth wholly discerne and determine of peace and warre, neither amongst the
customes of the Swissers and Grisons, which are popular estates. And in the
conuersion of the Florentine Commonweale, from
the nobilitie unto the popular estate, it is in one article especially
prouided, that the people shall have to do with nothing, but with making of
lawes, creating of magistrats, and the common treasure; as for peace and warre,
and other things concerning the soueraigntie of the state, should be wholly in
the power of the Senat. Whereunto we have before said, that Popular and
Aristocraticall estatesHard for the popular or
Aristocraticall estats by the multitude well to mannage martiall affaires:
and why. cannot if they would, well manage martiall affaires, for the
hard assembling together of the people: and in case that the people might be at
all times assembled, yet were it a thing of great perill and daunger, to haue
those things which ought of all others to bee most secret in a Commonweale, the
councels (I say) of peace and warre, reuealed and made knowne unto the Vulgar
people: which therfore were of necessitie to be left unto the Senat, yet the power of peace and warre cannot be taken
from the nobilitie or people in either state, the soueraigne maiestie thereof
saued. And albeit that the people giue the charge thereof unto the Senat, yet a
man knoweth right well, that the commissions and mandats which are giuen out
for such purpose, depend of the authority of the people, and under the peoples
name are put in execution by the Senat, which is but the peoples procurator and
agent, taking authoritie from the people, as all other their magistrats doe. As
for monarchies, it is without any question that the resolution of peace and
warre dependeth of the soueraigne prince, if the estate bee a pure monarchie,
For the kingdome of Polonia, Denmarke, Sweden, and
Norway, as they are states changeable and
vncertaine, as the nobilitie is stronger than the prince, or the prince than
the nobilitie: the resolution of peace and warre so dependeth of the nobilitie,
as that the state seemeth to be rather Aristocraticall than regall. And
therefore the names of their dukes, marquesses, counties, gouernours, and
councellors, commonly to be in their leagues expressed, and their seales
thereto annexed: as the peace betwixt the Polonians and the Prussians, made by
king Sigismundus Augustus was sealed with an hundred and
three seales of the nobilitie of his countrey: neither was there fewer in the
act of the lawfull creation of king Henry to be king of
Polonia.
The third marke of Soueraigne maiestie is to be of power to create and
appointThe third mark of soueraigntie. magistrats,
than which no more certaine signe can be, especially the principall
officers, which are not under the commaund
of other magistrats. This was the first law that Tublius
Valerius made after the expulsion of the kings out of Rome: that the
magistrats should be chosen and appointed by the people. Which selfe same law
was published also by the Venetians, at such time as they first assembled into
the Gulfe, for the establishing of their state, as Contarenus writeth: than which law there is none more religiously kept
by the Senat and the Venetian people. Yet much better is it kept in monarchies,
where all is gouerned by one, and where the greatest, the meaner, yea and the
least offices of all, as of Porters, Sergeants, Clarkes,
Trumpeters, Criers, which in the Roman state were placed and displaced
by the Roman magistrats are prouided for by order from the prince, euen vnto
the meanest offices. I have said the appointing of princes officers, that is to say, of the chiefe magistrats,
for there is no Commonweale, where it is not permitted unto greater magistrats,
as also to many corporations and colledges, to make certaine meniall officers
under them: as I have before showed of the Romans. But yet that they doe by
vertue of the office, which they hold, and as proctours created with power, to
substitute other their deputies under them. We see also that clients and
vassals, albeit that they hold their iurisdiction of some soueraigne prince in
fealtie and homage, have neuerthelesse power to establish judges and officers
in their iurisdiction: but yet this power is giuen them by some soueraigne
prince. For no doubt dukes, marquesses, counties, barons, and lieutenants of
countries, were no other of their first institution but judges and officers; as
we shall in due place declare. But sometimes in
a popular estate power is giuen unto the greater magistrats to create the
lesser; as we read that the people of Carthage had a custome to make fiue
magistrats,The lesser magistrates in a popular estate
somtime created by the greater▪ but not without power from them which had
the soueraigntie for to make choyce of the hundred and foure
magistrats of the Commonweale; as they do also at Nuremberg, where the Censors
which are chosen of the great Councell, chose the new Senators, and that done,
giue up their charge. The Senate which is of xxvj, making choyce of the eight
Auntients: and afterward of the xiij of the seuen Burgamasters, and of the xij
Iudges for civill causes, and five for criminall. Neither is this any new
matter; but an old and auntient fashion. For Aristotle
writeth, the people of Carthage to have used to chuse five men, who according
to their discretion still made of the hundred and foure magistrates: which was
also a thing ordinarie unto the Roman Censors,
who by their discretion supplied the number of the Senators, which the Consuls
did before by the sufferance of the people, who from the beginning made them,
as Festus Pompeius saith. And sometime the dictators
were for that purpose onely made to supply the number of the Senators. As Fabius Buteo named Dictator by the Consull Terentius, following the decree of the Senat, made choyce
at one time of an hundred seuentie seuen Senators, in stead of them that were
dead. Howbeit that to speake properly, a Senator is no magistrat, as we will
show in the discourse concerning the Senat. But howsoever that it was, whether
it were the Consuls, the Dictators, or Censors, that
made choice of the Senators, & so supplied the Senat, they did it not but by the power of the people, which
was also to be reuoked at the peoples pleasure. So may we also say of the
Turkes Cadelesquires, which are as the kings two great Chauncelours, who haue
power to place and displace all the Cadies and Paracadies, that is to say, the
judges and their deputies. And in Aegypt, in the time of the Sultans
government, before it was by Selymus the first
conquered, the great Edegnare, which was a Cunstable to the Sultan, had power
to place all the other officers: as had in auntient time the Grand M. of the
Pallace in Fraunce. And it is not long ago but that the chauncelour of Fraunce
had power at his pleasure to bestow all offices which had none, or but some
little fees, viz. of some three or foure crownes at the
most: which was reuoked by king Francis the first. And
albeit that alwaies the chauncelor, the great
Edegnare, and the Grand M. of the pallace, had all their power from the kings
and Sultans, as by them placed: yet was so great power verie daungerous vnto
the former kings and Sultans, which by little and little have since beene cut
so short, as that in the raigne of Charles the seuenth,
the verie baylieffes and seneschals were placed by the prince, who before were
wont to be placed by the maiors, whose lieutenants they were. Sometime also it
may be that magistrats, corporations, or colleges, have power to nominat and
chuse the principall magistrats: as we read in the records of the court of
Paris, that by a law made in the yeare 1408, it was decreed that the officers
of the high court of parliament should be made by election; and so thereupon
commaundement was giuen unto the chauncelour to go into parliament for the
election for the offices vacant. Which law was
againe reuiued by king Lewes the xj, in the yeare 1465.
And after him in the time of Charles the eight, not only
the presidents, the kings councellors, and aduocats, were made by election, but
euen the kings atturney generall (who is the onely man of all the body of the
court, which oweth not oath but to the king alone: albeit that the atturneyes
of other parliaments, which he calleth substitutes, take their oath in the
court) was chosen also by the suffrages of the court: In the yeare 1496. But
yet all their letters of prouision & confirmation of their elections into
their offices, then were, and yet are, alwayes graunted by the king▪ without
whose confirmation their election was to no purpose. Which may serue for
aunswere to that which one might say, that Arthure duke
of Bretaigne, was chosen Cunstable of Fraunce,
by the voyces of all the princes, of the great Councell, and of the parliament
in the yeare 1324. For albeit that the king Charles the
sixt, was then distraught of his wits, & that the seales of France had in
them not the image of the king, but of the queene onely: yet neuerthelesse the
said new constable taking upon him the government of the kings sword, and of
the French armie, being sworne to the keeping of the lawes, at the same instant
acknowledged himselfe to hold his office and power in fealtie and homage of the
king: so that all authoritie and power to commaund, may well seeme to flow and
be deriued from the fountaine of the prince onely.
Yet may some say that the Great Palatine of Hungarie, who is the greatest
magistratGreat magistrats somtime chosen by the estats of
the countrey, or otherwise: but still approued and confirmed by the
king. of that kingdome, and the kings lieutenant generall, is chosen
by the estates of the countrey: it is true;
but yet his prouision, institution, and confirmation, belongeth unto the king,
who is the chiefe head and author of his power. Howbeit that the estates of the
kingdome of Hungarie, yet pretend to have the right to make choyce of their
kings; the house of Austria maintaining the contrarie. And it seemeth that the
kings have by sufferance passed it ouer, that the estates should still have the
chusing of the great Palatine, so to cause them to forget the election of the
king. Whereunto for all that they have beene so obstinatly wedded, as that they
have thosen under the colour of protection, to put themselves under the Turkes
slauerie, rather than to have this power for the choyce
of their kings (by the house of Austria) wrested from them. It is not therefore the election of great officers which
declareth the right of soueraigntie; but the princes approbation, ratification,
and confirmation, without which the magistrat is of no power at all. Yet if
such creation of magistrats were by the founders of Commonweales, and law
makers, so giuen unto the people, or colleges, as that they could not from the
people or colleges be taken, then truly the prince should not have the right of
soueraigne maiestie or power: for that the magistrats power were not to be
attributed unto the prince, but to the people; as by little and little it
happened unto the kings of Polonia. For when as by a law made by Sigismundus Augustus, all the magistrats of euerie
countrey, were to be chosen by the particular states of every government; the
maiestie of the kings, who also raigned by the good liking of the people, was therby much impaired. Which
confirmation of magistrats so chosen, is no new thing; for euen from the time
of the Gothes we read in Cassiodorus, that Theodoricus king of the Gothes, gaue his letters of
confirmation unto the officers whome the Senat had chosen; vsing these words in
his letters directed unto the Senat, for one whom they had made a Senator, Iudicium vestrum P. C. noster Comitatur* Cassiodorus. lib. 1. Epist. 6.assensus, Our consent, Reuerent fathers, doth accompany
your iudgement. Now seeing that power to commaund over all the subiects of a
Commonweale belongeth unto him that holdeth therein the soueraigntie; it is
good reason also that all magistrats should acknowledge their authoritie to
proceed from him.
But now let vs speake of the fourth marke of Soueraignetie, that is to wit, of
the LastThe fourth marke of soueraigntie.Appeal, which is and alwayes hath beene one of the most
principall rights of soueraignetie. As a man may see after that the Romaines
had driuen out their kinges: not onely the last Appeal, but euen all Appeales
from the Magistrates, were by the Law Valeria reserued unto the people. And for
that the Consuls and other Magistrates oftentimes gaue small eare unto them
that did appeal unto them, the same Law was often times* renewed: and by the
Tribunitiall law Duillia the paine of death adioyned lib. 1. & 7. & 10. there vnto,
for him that should oppose himselfe against the same; which Law Liuie calleth the foundation of the popular libertie:
albeit that it were euill executed. The same Law was yet more straitly kept in
Athens, where the last Appeal was reserued unto the people, not onely from the
Magistrates of the citie, but euen from the Magistrates of their allies and fellowes also: as the writings of Zenophon and Demosthenes do right
well declare. The same Law Contarenus writeth to haue
been the first that was by the Venetians made for the establishing of their
Commonweale: viz. That all men might freely appeal from the Magistrates, vnto
the Graund counsell of the people. Nether was Francis
Valori Duke of Florence for any other cause slaine, then for not hauing
giuen way unto the Appeal, made from him unto the Great counsell of the people,
by three Florentines by him condemned to die, and so notwithstanding their
appeal by him executed. But some may say, that not onely this Duke at Florence,
but at Rome the Dictators, and other Magistrates also
oftentimes put to death condemned citisens, notwithstanding their appeal made
unto the people, as is in many histories to be
seene. Whereof there was an heauie example made by the Senate of Rome, which
caused the remainder of the Legion sent to Rhegium being
taken and brought to Rome, to be whipped and afterward beheaded without regard
of the appeales by them made unto the people: or to the intercessions of the
Tribunes exclaiming, the sacred Lawes concerning Appeales to be violated, and
troden under foote. Whereunto in briefe I aunswere, as did Papinian, That we ought not to rest our selues upon that they doe at
Rome, but on that which ought to bee there done. For it is most certaine, that
a man might appeale from the Senat unto the people: and that ordinarily the opposition or intercession of one of the Tribunes,
stayed the proceedings of the whole Senat; as
we have before touched. And the first that gaue the power unto the Roman Senat
to iudge without appeale, was Adrian the emperour, for
the edict of Caligula, whereby he gaue power to all
magistrats to iudge without appeale, tooke no place. And albeit that Nero decreed, that they which without cause had appealed
unto the Senat, should be punished with like punishment, as if they had
appealed unto his owne person: yet forbad he not men to appeale from the Senat
unto himselfe, although he had referred the appeales from all the magistrats
unto the Senat. But this aunswere seemeth directly contrary unto that we haue
before said. For if no appeale were to be made from the Senat unto the
emperour, but that the last appeale was unto the Senat, then was not the last
appeale the true marke of soueraigntie. Ioine
also hereunto, that the Great master of the Pallace, whome they called Praefectum Praetorio, gaue iudgement without appeale,
receiuing also the appeales of all the magistrats and gouernours of the empire,
as sayth Flauius Vopiscus: as in every Commonweale* Flauius Volpiscus in Florian. we see certaine courts and parliaments which gaue iudgement without
appeale; as the eight parliaments in Fraunce, the foure courts in Spaine, the
imperiall chamber in Germanie, the councell at Naples; the fortie at Venice,
the Rota at Rome, the Senat at Milan; and so the greater courts of other
cities, who heare and decide either all or most part of causes, both publike
and priuat, without appeale: and in all the imperiall townes, duchies, and
counties, depending of the empire, no appeale is to be made unto the imperiall
chamber, in criminall causes once iudged by the magistrats of the
prince, or of the imperiall cities: whereby
it appeareth the last appeale not to belong onely unto the right of soueraigne
maiestie. Whereunto I aunswere, under the name of Appeale, to be also contained
requests made unto the prince, which the law call civill Supplications: so that
when we may not appeale from the sentence of the greater magistrats, yet may we
by way of request put up our supplications unto the prince, which hath moued
many of our late lawyers to say, civill supplications to belong unto the right
of soueraigne maiestie: and albeit that almost alwaies the decrees are againe
iudged by the same judges, as oft as request is made unto the prince concerning
a iudgement giuen▪ yet is it in his wil & power either to receiue or reiect
the request▪ and oftentimes hee calleth the cause unto himselfe therof to
determine, or to reuerse that which hath bene
done; or else remitteth it unto other judges, which is the true marke of
soueraigntie and last appeale, wherein the maiestie of the prince or people
doth most appeare: forasmuch as it is not lawfull for any magistrat or judge to
chaunge or amend their iudgement once giuen or recorded, without leaue of their
soueraigne prince, and that upon paine of false iudgement. And if so bee that
the soueraigne prince wouldA soueraigne prince cannot by any
edict prohibit his subiects to appeale from his magistrates or to prefer
their humble requests unto himselfe. make an edict, that none of his
subiects should appeale from any of his magistrats, or preferre any request
unto himselfe against their iudgements, as the emperour Caligula was about to have done: yet neuerthelesse should it alwaies
be lawfull for the subiects to appeale, or to exhibit their requests unto the
prince: For that the prince cannot so bind his owne hands, or make such a law
unto himselfe; either prohibit his grieued
subiects from comming unto him with their humble supplications and requests:
For that such edicts concerning appeales and iudgements, are but civill decrees
and lawes wherewith the prince cannot be bound, as we have before said. For
which cause it seemed a new and absurd thing unto the Senat of France, and
especially unto Michael del' Hospital, that the
commissioners appointed to proceed against the president of Allemand, forbid
him by a decree made against him, to come within twentie leagues of the court,
so to cut him off from the meanes to preferre his petitions; which the king
himself could not of right take from his subiect, althogh it were in his power
to grant or reiect his request being once made unto him
knowne. We see also, that in all graunts of
publike lands by way of pention, with power and iurisdiction unto the children
or neere kinsmen of the house of Fraunce, and generally in the erection of
duchies, marquisats, counties, and principalities, fealtie and homage, appeale
and soueraigntie, are still reserued: that sometime there is onely reseruation
made of appeale and soueraigntie: as in the declaration made by king Charles the fift, to Iohn duke of
Berrie, bearing date the third of March, in the yeare 1374: wherein is also
fealtie and homage comprised. For it is certaine that the duchie of Berrie was
then the portion giuen unto the duke of Berry with the charge of rights royall,
and reuersion to the crowne for want of heires male: as I have learned by the
letters of graunt, which are yet in the treasurie of Fraunce. We see also the
like declaration of Philip Archduke of Austria, (Charles the fifts father) made to king Lewes the twelft, and another of him the same, in the
yeare 1505: wherein he acknowledgeth and professeth himselfe readie to obey the
decrees of the parliament of Paris, in regard of the countries of Artois and Flaunders, and of other
lands which he held of the king; and not to forbid them of those countries to
appeale unto the court at Paris. And in the treatie of Arras, made betwixt▪
king Charles the seuenth, and Philip
the second, duke of Burgondy, there is expresse reseruation made of
fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie, for those lands which he and his
auncestors held in fee of the crowne of Fraunce. Neither did Charles the fift the French king take any other occasion to make warre
against the English men, than for that their English magistrats and gouernors
which had the government of Aquitaine, under the fealtie of the French, would not heare the subiects appeales. At which time
the court of Paris commaunded the king of England to be summoned, and for
default of appearance pronounced sentence against him: whereby the duchie of
Aquitaine was for that cause confifcated unto the king, as is to bee seene by
the decree of the parliament of Paris, giuen the xiiij of May, in the yeare
1370. For otherwise if a soueraigne prince shall remit unto his vassall the
right of appeale and soueraigntie; which is unto himselfe due, he maketh him of
a subiect a soueraigne prince; as did king Francis the
first, discharging the duke of Loraine of all fealtie and homage, appeale and
soueraigntie, for the castle of Chasteler upon the Maze in the yeare 1517. But
when hee suffered the same duke in soueraigne manner without appeale to gouern
in the duchie of Bar; and that the dukes,
officers, and magistrats afterward abused their permissiue authoritie, as in
absolute soueraigntie, the kings atturney generall thereof complained unto the
king, aduising him not to suffer the rights of his soueraigne maiestie to be so
impaired. Which thing Anthonie then duke of Loraine
understanding, and after him Francis his sonne, by
recognisance in autentique manner declared, that their purpose was not in any
thing to derogat from the fealtie and homage, appeale and soueraigntie that
they ought unto the crowne of Fraunce, by reason of the said duchie; and that
they had not therein used soueraigne iustice but by sufferance: which letters
of recognisance are in the publique records to be seene, and were afterward
exhibited unto the priuie councell, in the yeare 1564, in the raigne of Charles the ninth, who by all means sought by a most gratious and large charter to have giuen
unto Charles then duke of Loraine, the soueraigntie of
the duchie of Bar: but all in vaine, forasmuch as the king can by no meanes
alienat from himselfe, the rights belonging unto his soueraigntie, no not the
high court of Paris assenting thereunto, although the power and authoritie of
that court may where the king is, seeme to be nothing; in the presence of whom
all the power and authoritie of all magistrats cease.
Wherfore the best & most expedient way, for the preseruation of a state is,
neuer to giue any marke or right of soueraigntie unto a subiect, and much lesse
unto a straunger: for that is one step and degree to
mount unto his soueraigne maiestie. And therefore No marke or right of soueraigntie is by the prince to be
bestowed upon his subiect or a stranger. it was long doubted in the
councell, whether power and authoritie without appeale, should be graunted vnto
Francis duke of Alencon (who had made mee master of
the requests and one of his councell) in that his dukedome; as had before bene
graunted unto the auntient dukes there. And although he were the kings best and
most louing brother, yet one of the atturneyes generall was so bold as to say
in full councell, That it were better to bring in twelue courts of parliament,
than to suffer that, albeit that that iurisdiction was for a short time
granted, and extraordinarie judges by the king appointed; with reseruation of
appeales, in many cases and causes, as also with exception of fealtie and
homage. Wherein our auncestors much offended, who with too much facilitie
(should I say, or necessitie) graunted the same iurisdiction unto the dukes of
Normandie. For by this meanes the dukes of
Britaigne and Burgundie reuolted from our kings unto the kings of England; for
that such judges were denied them, as had bene granted unto the dukes of
Alencon: taking it grieuously themselves, in the name of their magistrats to be
summoned unto the court at Paris, there to have those things reuersed which
their magistrats had vniustly determined; althogh sometime they were things of
right small weight and importance; whereof the dukes of Britaigne complained
both unto king Philip the Faire, and Philip the Long, who by their letters patents sent unto the court of
parliament in February 1306, and in October 1316, declared that their meaning
was not, that the duke of Britaigne or his officers, should bee called before
them into the court; but in question of soueraigntie, or in case they should
deny to doe iustice, or els had giuen false
iudgement.
The same we are to thinke of all the princes and cities of Germanie, from whome
euen in priuat iudgements men may iustly appeale unto the imperiall chamber, if
the matter exceed the summe of 50 crowns, or if any controuersie be betwixt the
cities and princes themselves. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, neither the
German princes, nor cities to have in them the right of soueraigntie: For that
it is a capitall crime, euen treason it selfe, to appeale from a soueraigne
prince, except he appeale as did that Greeke (whosoeuer he was) who appealed
from Philip king of Macedon euill aduised, unto himselfe
being better aduised. Whice manner of appeale Lewes of
Burbon, prince of Conde used also from the interlocutorie sentence of Francis the second, the French king, which he hauing vnderstood the cause, is said to haue
giuen against him in the priuie councel: Which manner of appeale Baldus the great lawyer alloweth as good▪ and to be
receiued. And well it would beseeme the maiestie of soueraigne princes to
behold and follow the example of that Macedonian king, who receiued the
appeale; or if they would needs that their decrees whatsoeuer should stand fast
and irremouable, because they would not seeme vnconstant or variable, that then
they should do as did the same king to Machetas, who of
his owne goods recompensed him, for that hee had vniustly condemned him in,
without chaunging of his former decree and iudgement.
From this marke of Maiestie, and benefit of supreame Appeale, dependeth also
the The fift marke of soueraigntie power to grant grace
and pardon unto the condemned, contrarie to iudgement giuen, and to the rigour
of the lawes; be it for life, be it for goods, be it for honour, or recalling
from banishment: for it is not in the power of the magistrats or judges, how
great soeuer that they be, to graunt the least of these things unto the
condemned person, or of themselves, to alter any thing of the iudgements by
them once giuen. And albeit that the Proconsuls and gouernours of prouinces,
had as much power in their iurisdiction, as had all the magistrats of Rome
together: yet so it was, that it was not lawfull for them so much as to restore
him whome they had but for a time banished (as wee read
in the letters of Plinie the younger, gouernor of Asia
unto Traian the emperor)
and much lesse giue pardon unto men condemned to die: which is most straitly
forbidden all magistrats in every Commonweale, be it well or euill ordered or
gouerned. And albeit that Papirius Cursor, the dictator,
may seeme at the request of the people to have giuen pardon to Fabius Max. collonell of the horsemen, for hauing giuen
battle contrarie to his commaund, although he had slaine xxv thousand of the
enemies: yet neuerthelesse in effect it was the people which gaue the pardon:
albeit that they most instantly besought the dictator to pardon the fault:
Which they themselves might at the same time have done, but yet had rather to
request it of Papirius, than to take the guiltie person
from him against his will. For Fabius understanding
himselfe in his absence to be by the dictator condemned, appealed unto the
people: before whom Papirius defended his iudgement, as iustly giuen
against Fabius: which a man of his vertue and seueritie
would not have done, if an appeale might not have bene made from the dictator,
unto the people: and that in it was the power of life and death. Sergius Galba the Orator also, in like iudgement by Cato the Censor, attainted of treason, tooke his refuge
unto the people, who moued with his teares, and embracing of his children,
pardoned him. Whereupon Cato said, That Galba had beene well whipped, had hee not taken himselfe
unto his teares and his children. The same power of life and death had also the
people of Athens, as appeareth by Demosthenes, and Alcibiades, who both condemned, were afterward by the
people pardoned, and againe restored both unto their goods and honour. And
amongst the Venetians it is not lawfull for any their magistrats, no not for the duke himselfe, the Senat, or the
Decemuiri, to graunt pardon unto the condemned: for that is left unto the
discretion of the great councel of the Venetian gentlemen onely. The Decemuiri
before abusing their power by sufferance, graunted pardons, and neuerthelesse
was order taken in the yeare 1523, that the counsell of the Sages, which are in
number xxij, should therein be assisting unto them: and that the pardon should
take no place, without the generall consent of them all: but at length in the
yeare 1562, the councell was forbidden at all to meddle, or to have to doe in
that matter. And albeit that the emperour Charles the
fift, in the erection of the Senat at Milan, graunted thereunto all the markes
of soueraigntie, as unto his lieutenant and deputie in his absence, comming
verie neere unto absolute soueraigntie: yet so
it is, that hee still reserued unto himselfe the power to graunt pardon and
mercie unto the condemned; as I have learned by the letters patents by him
graunted: which hath bene a thing right straitly obserued and kept in all
Monarchies. And although that in Florence during the popular state, the eight
men without all right had vsurped the power to graunt pardons: yet was that
power againe restored unto the people by Sodorin, after
the chaunge of the state. As for other kings they have still thought nothing
more royall, than to deliver the condemned from death: neither do they suffer
the judges or magistrats of other dukes and princes, to examine the letters
graunted by the king for the restoring of the condemned: although that they
examine the pardon graunted. And albeit that king Francis the first had giuen unto his
mother power to graunt pardon unto the condemned: yet for all that the court of
Paris, hauing taken order to have it showed unto the king, that it was one of
the fairest markes of soueraigntie, which could not be communicated unto a
subiect without impairing of his maiestie: the Queene mother thereof
aduertised, renounced thisThings properly belonging unto the
soueraigntie of a prince can in no wise be imparted unto a subiect.
priuilege, and restored the letters patents unto the king, before they were of
her requested. For indeede that prerogative could not of right bee graunted
unto the French Queene, neither any other the proper markes of
Soueraigntie.
And albeit that the Roman lawes say that the empresse is dispensed with from
all edicts and lawes: yet that taketh no place in this
realme of Fraunce; yea there is found a decree
in the records of the court, in the yeare 1365, in Iuly: whereby the queene was
condemned to lay downe in the court the money of her demaunded, whilest the
matter was in tryall; that the creditor might demaund it so laid downe uppon
good caution giuen: which by the Roman law is a meere iniurie, so to begin sute
of execution. I find also that king Charles the sixt,
gaue power to M. Arnald de Corbie, chauncelour of
Fraunce, by letters pattents, the xiij of March, in the yeare 1401, to grant
pardons unto the condemned, some of the great Councell being present with him▪
but that was at such time as the chauncelours were almightie, hauing all in
their owne hands: and that king Charles the sixt was
then not in the power of himselfe but of others, by reason of his
maladie.Priuileges wrongfully wrested from kings cannot by any new
confirmation be made good.
Now if any man shall obiect and say, That in auntient times the gouernours of
prouinces gaue pardons, as we yet may see by the custome of Henault, and of
Daulphinie: as also that the bishop of Ambrun, by autentique charters pretended
this power. Hereunto I aunswere, that such customes and priuileges, wrongfully
wrested and exported from our kings, were of good right abrogated by an edict
of king Lewes the twelft. And if such priuileges be of
no force: so may we also say their confirmations to bee of no more strength.
For the confirmation is neuer any thing worth, if the priuilege bee of it selfe
naught. Now must it needes be naught, for that it cannot bee seperated from the
crowne. For as wee have before said, that the priuileges by princes euen
lawfully graunted, cannot stand good for euer: so the rightes of
Soueraigntie, which cannot by the kings
themselves bee graunted unto any, without giuing away of ther Scepter and
kingdome, can much lesse being granted, bee by them confirmed.
As for Gouernours, Deputies, Lieutenants generall of Soueraigne princes, it is
another reason; for that they have not that power by priuilege, or by office,
but by commission, as the deputies or lieutenants of their princes. But in the
state of a well ordered Commonweale, this power of Soueraigntie ought not to
bee giuen to any, neither by commission, neither by title of office, except it
bee for the establishing of a Regent in his government, for the great distance
of places; or for the captiuitie of Soueraigne princes: or for that they are
furious; or else in their infancie▪ As it was
done by Lewes the ninth, who for his tender yeares, was
by the estates of Fraunce committed to the tuition of his mother Blanche of Castile; after that she had giuen certaine
princes for assurance that shee should not giue the tuition of him to any other
person. So the government of the kingdome was committed unto Charles the fift, as Regent during the captiuitie of his father king
Iohn. And in the captiuitie of Francis the first, Louise of Sauoy his mother,
tooke uppon her the protection of the kingdome committed unto her by the king
her sonne▪ with all the royalties thereof, in the title of Regent. And the duke
of Bedford Regent in Fraunce, king Charles the sixt
being there distraught of his wits.
But heer may one say unto mee, that notwithstanding the decree of Lewes the xij.The great priuilege of the chapiter of the church of in granting pardon unto the condemned. the chapiter of the church of Roan
pretendeth alwaies to have priuiledge to graunt pardon in the favour of S.
Romane: the day before whose feast, it forbiddeth all the judges, yea and the
parlament of Roan it selfe, to execute or put to death any one of such as then
be condemned; (as I have seene it put in practise being in commission for the
Prince, for the generall reformation of Normandie) and for that the court
notwithstanding the chapiters pardon, had after the feast caused to bee put to
death one, which it had before the feast condemned: the chapiter thereof
greeuously complayned unto the king; hauing to friend one of the princes of the
blood▪ the parlament sent also their deputies, amongst
whom Bigot the kings attourney was verie earnest in
his oration in the Senat for the abuse, and
encroaching upon the kings maiestie: but the favour of the great bishops more
preuailing then reason, that priuilege was for all that he could say or do with
the publike shame and losse continued: but was since taken away by king Henry the third. This priuilege had great affinitie with
that whichA great priuilege granted unto the Vestall
Virgines and the Cardinalls in Rome. was giuen unto the Vestall
virgins at Rome, which was to giue pardon unto him that was going to execution,
if any one of the Vestal virgins by chaunce happened to meete him, as saith Plutarke in the lyfe of Numa. The
like custome whereof is yet kept in Rome, for if a condemned man there meet a
Cardinall, he is thereby delivered from punishment. But I deeme that to bee
most pernitious in the priuilege of S. Romane, that no man could enioy the
benefit thereof which had but lightly offended: but he onely that had done the most execrable villanies that were
possible to be found, such as the king used not to pardon, that such offences
as could nether by the lawes of God nor man, nor by the favour of Princes be
pardoned, might yet under the colour of S. Romanes priuilege be remitted and
forgiuen. But that is ioyned with the greatest impietie to thinke the pardon to
be so much the more acceptable to Cod, by how much the fact committed is the
more haynous or detestable. But I am of opinion (sauing alwaies the better
iudgement) that no soueraigne Prince, nether yet any manWhat
is by the lawe of God death, ought not by the prince to be in any wise
pardoned. a▪ live can pardon the punishment due unto the offence
which is by the law of God death, no more then he can dispence with the law of
God, whereunto he is himselfe subiect. And if it be so, that the magistrat
deserue capitall punishment, which dispenseth
with the law of his king▪ how shall it be lawfull for a soueraigne prince, to
dispence with his subiect from the law of God? And further if the Prince him
selfe cannot giue away the least civill interest of his subiect, or pardon the
wrong done unto an other man: how can he than pardon the wrong done vnto
almightie God? or the murther wilfully committed; which by the law of God is
death, for all the pardon he can giue. But then wherein (might a man say)
should the princes mercie show it selfe or appeare? if it could not show grace
unto the punishment appointed by the law of God? Wherunto I aunswere, that
there are meanes plentie, as in pardoning bloodshed committed by chaunce, or in
defence of a mans selfe, or in mitigating the rigour of the positiue civill
lawes: as if the prince should upon paine of death forbid a man to beare
armes, or to carrie victuals unto the
enemie; pardon shall yet well be bestowed upon him that hath borne armes for
the defence of himselfe onely; or on him which constrained by pouertie, hath
sold victuals deere unto the enemie, to releeue his owne great necessitie. Or
whereas by the law the punishment for theft is death, the good prince may
conuert that punishment into the restitution of foure fold, which is the
punishment by the law * of God appointed. But the wilfull murderer You shall take himDeut 19. & 21.
(saith the law) from my sacred altar, neither shalt thou haue
pitie on him, but cause him to dye the death: and afterwards I will stretch
forth my great mercies upon you. Neuerthelesse the Christian kings on
that day which they commaund to bee most holy kept, as on Good Friday, vse for most part to pardon some one man or other,
condemned of Whie grieuous offences are to be seuerely punished and not
in any wise pardoned. most horrible and notorious crime. Now pardons
graunted to such villaines drawe after them plagues, famine, warres, and ruines
of Commonweales; and that is it for which the law of God saith, That in
punishing them that have deserued to dye, they shall take away the cause from
among the people: for of an hundred villaines there commeth scarce two of them
into the triall of iustice: and of those that come, the one halfe of them for
want of proofe and of witnesses escape vnpunished: and then if when they are
proued princes graunt unto them pardon, what exemplarie punishment shall there
be for offences and villanies committed in the Commonweale? And many offendors,
when they cannot of their owne prince obtaine grace
and pardon, interpose the favour of some other
forren prince, who becommeth an intercessour for them. Whereof the States of
Spaine complained unto king Philip, presenting unto him
a request, to the end he should aduertise his ambassador in Fraunce, no more in
the behalfe of the French king, to request pardon of the king of Spaine, for
the condemned men which had retired themselves out of Spayne into Fraunce: for
that hauing obtained pardon, they many times slew the judges, who had before
condemned them. But ofThe most gratious and commendable
pardon that a prince can giue. all the graces and pardons that a
prince can giue, there is none more commendable, than when he pardoneth the
iniurie done against his owne person: and of all capitall punishments none is
more acceptable unto God, than that which with most seueritie is executed, for
the wrong done unto the maiestie of himselfe. But what then are we for
to hope for of the prince, which most
cruelly revengeth his owne iniuries, and pardoneth the wrong done to others;
and especially those which are directly done to the dishonour of almightie
God.
Now that which we have said concerning the grace and pardon graunted by a
soueraigne prince unto men condemned, is to the vttermost to be extended, euen
unto the preiudice of the great lords, unto whome the confiscation of the
offendours lands or goods by law or custome belong, who are not to be receiued
to debate or impugne the pardon graunted by the prince; as by decree of
parliament hath bene adiudged. Now many there be, which draw the grace of the
princes gracious restitutions unto priuat iudgements: as when a man is for want
of councell deceiued or cosoned; or requesteth
the benefit of his minoritie, which in many cities and Commonweals are proper
unto soueraigne princes: but yet are not the markes of soueraigne maiestie,
except only the legitimating of bastards, of fees, and such like: for why the
rest were partly by the magistrats hauing vnderstood the cause, and partly by
the lawes and customes vsually graunted. For in the lawes of Charles the vij and Charles the viij, it is
expresly commaunded unto the judges, in deciding of causes, not to have any
regard of the decrees of forraine courts, further than they should with equitie
agree: which by this common clause unto all decrees in this realme commonly
annexed (Si satis superque apparet, If it shall
sufficiently, and more than sufficiently appeare) is declared. Which clause if
it be not ioyned unto the decree, the magistrat hath but to vnderstand of the
fact; the punishment thereof being reserued
unto the law, and the pardon unto the soueraigne prince. And that is it for
which Cicero crauing pardon of Caesar for Ligarius saith, I
have oftentimes pleaded with thee before the iudges, but I neuer said, for
him whom I defended, Pardon him my lords, he was deceiued, he thought it
not, if euer hee do so againe, &c. So children vse to say unto their
parents, of whome they craue pardon: But before the iudges we say, That the
crime is for euill will forged, the accusor is a slanderer, the witnesses
false and subborned. In which words he plainely shewed▪ that Caesar hauing soueraigne power, had also the power of
life and death, (and so to graunt pardon) which the judges had not.
Now as for liege fealtie and homage, it appeareth, that it is one of the
greatest rights The sixt marke of soueraigntie of soueraigntie; as we
have before declared: in respect of him to whom it is due, with out
exception.
As for the right and power to coyne money, it is of the same nature with the
law,The seuenth marke of soueraigntie. and there
is none but he which hath power to make a law, which can appoint the value,
weight, and stampe of the coyne: which is well to be vnderstood by the Greeke
and Latine worde; for the Latine word Nummus▪ seemeth
well to have beene deiued of the Greek word . For nothing is in a
Commonweale of greater consequence next unto the law, than the value, weight,
and stampe of the coyne; as we have in a spe▪ ciall
treatise declared: and in euerie well ordered Commonweale, none but the
soueraigne prince hath power to appoint the
same. As we read they did in Rome, when the value of the Victoriat was
appointed and set downe, it was done by an expresse law of the people. And
albeit that the Senat by decree to ease the publike necessitie, made the halfe
pound of copper as much worth as the pound; and a while after the quarter, as
much worth as the pound, vntill that the ounce was valued as much worth as the
pound: yet all this was done by the consent of the Tribunes, without which
nothing that the Senat had therein decreed was of any force. And after that,
Constantine the emperour made a law, That they which
had coyned false money should be punished as men guiltie of high treason: which
law all princes have most straitly kept, taking unto themselves the
confiscations of false coynes, excluding all others, which have any claime thereto. With like punishment also are they to
be punished, which without the princes leaue coyne good money. And albeit that
many particular men in this realme, had in auntient time priuilege to coyne
money, as the countie of Touraine, theThe right and power to
coine monie the inseperable marke of soueraigntiec to be granted vnto
subiects. bishops of Meaux, Cahors, Agde, and Ambrun, the counties of
S. Paule, of Marche, Neuers, Blois, and others: yet for all that king Francis the first, by a generall edict took away all
those priuileges: which could not indeed be graunted: but beeing graunted, were
by the law made void: ioyning hereunto also, that they were not to endure, but
for the life of them that graunted them, as we have before showed in the nature
of priuileges: howbeit that this marke and right of soueraigntie ought not in
any sort to be at all communicated unto a subiect. As it was well declared to
Sigismundus Augustus, king of Polonia, who in the yeare 1543, hauing
giuen priuilege unto the duke of Prusse, to coyne money: the estates of the
countrey made a decree, wherein it was comprised, that the king had no power to
giue away that right, as beeing inseparable from the crowne. For which selfe
same reason the Archbishop of Gnesne in Polonia, and the Archbishop of
Canterburie in England, both chauncelours, hauing obtained the same right and
priuilege from their kings, were thereof againe depriued. And for this cause
all the cities of Italie holden of the empire, which had of the former
emperours obtained this priuilege of coyning of money; in the treatie at
Constance gaue up the same unto the emperour, excepting them of Luca, unto whom
in fauor of pope Lucius the third, their countrey man;
the emperour at his request graunted that priuilege. We read also, that the principall occasion that Peter king of Arragon tooke hold of, to driue Iames king of Maiorque out of his kingdome was, for
hauing coined money; pretending that he had no right nor power so to doe. Which
was also one of the occasions that Lewes the xj tooke
hold of, to make warre upon Francis duke of Britaigne,
for that hee had stamped a coyne of gold, contrarie to the treatie made in the
yeare 1465. And the Romans when as they suffered money of Brasse, and siluer to
be coyned in all their prouinces, yet did they forbid any to be there coyned of
gold, reseruing that still unto themselves. Howbeit that Iohn duke of Berry had priuilege of Charles the
fift, the French king, to coyne money of both mettals; who because hee would
not any thing therein offend, caused peeces of gold to bee coyned with the
figure of a sheepe upon them, of the finest
and purest gold that euer was either before or since coyned in this realme.
Yet is it not to be omitted, that though the prince contrarie unto the law,
shall giue to any man power to stampe money, that the worth and valour thereof
stil dependeth of the soueraigne prince; in such sort, that they which so coyne
the same, have no other profit thereby but the stampe onely; where of princes
do wonderfully vaunt and glorie. But of auntient time in the Roman Commonweale,
whilest it was a popular state, the Triumuiri Monetales,
or masters of the mint, coyned the money with such a stamp or marke as they themselves thought good, with their names &
these letters thereuppon,III Viri, A. A. A. FF. which Caulis baileiffe of the mountaines interpreteth, Aere, Argento, Auro, Flauo, Ferunto: but more truely thus, Trium viri, Auro, Argento,King Seruius the first that coined monie in Rome.Aere, Flando, Feriundo. And truely Seruius king of the Romans was the first that there stamped an heauy
coyne of brasse, with the figure or impression of an Oxe upon it, to the
imitation of Theseus king of Athens, who had coyned
money with thePlutarch in Theseo. same figure or
marke, and the figure of an Owle. Whereby it appeareth the Greeke and Latine
princes of old, not to have bene touched with that vaine desire of glorie,
wherewith other princes were tormented: and wherafter the kings of Asia and
Affrike most greedily longed. The first that coyned money in Greece with his
owne imagePhilip of Macedon the first that coined monie in
Grece with his owne image thereon. thereon, was Philip king of Macedon: which peeces of money were therof called Philippaei; therein imitating the Persean kings, who
called their peeces of gold first stamped with the image of Darius, by the name of Dariques. Whereof king
Darius was so ielous (as Herodotus writeth) as that he caused Ariander
gouernour of Aegypt to bee beheaded, for hauing stamped the money with his owne
image. As for the same cause also the emperour Commodus
beheaded his minion Pecenninus. And also king Lewes the xij hauing left all the power and right of
Soueraignty unto the Genowayes, whom he had ouercome, forbad them neuerthelesse
to stampe their money with any other marke or figure, than with his owne image,
in stead of the forme of a Gibbet, which they before gaue, and yet giue upon
their money, as the marke of iustice.
Now if the power of coyning money be one of the rights and markes of
Soueraigntie; The eight marke of soueraigntie. then so is also the
power to appoint measures and weights; although that by the customes receiued
there is none so pettie a lord, which pretendeth not to have this right.
Whereby it commeth to passe, that by the infinit varietie of weights andThe great varietie of waights and measures hurtfull to a
commonweale. measures, the Commonweale taketh no small harme. Which
was the cause that the kings Philip the Faire, Philip the Long, and Lewes the xj
had resolued, that there should be in this kingdome but one manner of weight
and measure: and now the commissioners appointed for that purpose, by comparing
them together, had made euen all the measures and weights of this realme, and
brought the matter to good effect, had not king Lewes by
death bene taken away, before it was fully perfected: yet the booke whereby the
same might more easily be brought to passe, is yet extant in the court of
accounts: howbeit that the execution
thereof proued more difficult than was thought it would have done, by reason of
the great contention, and sutes that thereof arise. Neuerthelesse we read in
Polybius, that the same was wel executed in all the
cities of Achaia,Lib. 3. and Morea, where they had not but like
money, like weights, like measures, customes, lawes, religion, officers, and
government.
As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts upon the subiects, is as proper
unto soueraigneThe ninth marke of soueraigntie.
maiestie, as is the law it self: not for that a Commonweale cannot stand
without taxes and tallages, as the President the M. hath well noted, that taxes
were not leuied in this realme, but since the time of Saint Lewes the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the publike
necessitie be leuied or taken away; it cannot bee done but by him that hath the soueraigne power; as it hath bene
iudged by a decree of parliament, against the duke of Burgundie; and many times
since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the priuie Councell.
And for that diuers particular lords, cities, and corporations, under show of
the common good, have imposed diuers taxes and payments upon their people: king
Charles the ninth, by a generall edict by him made in
the parliament at Orleans, expresly forbiddeth them so to doe without leaue:
albeit that for the common necessitie they be borne withall in so doing without
commission, so that they exceed not the summe of twentie five pounds. And
afterward the same edict was more straitly againe
renewed at Moulins, well agreeing both with law and equitie. And although that the Roman Senat in
time of warres, yea and the Censors themselves imposed certaine taxes and
payments, which could hardly have bene extorted from the bodie of the whole
commonaltie: yet so it was, that that still passed by the sufferance of the
Tribunes of the people, who ost times also opposed themselves against the same.
Yea and that in such sort, that they presented a request unto the people, that
from that time forward no man upon paine of his head should bee so hardie, as
to cause any law to be passed in the campe: for that the Senat by subtill
meanes had there in the campe at Sutrium, caused to be published that notable
imposition, which they called Vicesima Manumissorū,
that is to say, the twentith part of the goods of them that were manumised;
under colour that it was to pay the armie withall: which thereunto right willingly agreed: and so suffered the
law to passe. And inThe Romaine commonweale greatly relieued
by the great riches by Paulus Emilius brought to Rome, after the ouerthrowe
of king Perseus the second Carthaginensian warre, at such time as
there was great want of coyne in the common treasurie; there was by a law made
a taxe generally imposed uppon every man, which was by another contrarie law
againe repealed, after the returne of Paulus Aemylius,
who with the spoyles of Perseus king of Macedon, so
filled the citie, and euerie priuat man also with wealth, as that the people
was from that time discharged of all taxes and payments, vntill the Triumuirat
civill warre, about an hundred yeares after, vntill that such new taxes and
tributes as by the power or couetousnes of former tyrants had bene imposed upon
the people, were by the good Herodianus.
emperour Pertinax againe eased and taken away.
But here might some say, diuers particular lords here and there, to exact not
onely customes, but tributes also, not onely in Fraunce, where (as Caesar hath most truly written) nothing is more
contemptible than the vulgar people: but in England and Germanie, and much more
straitly in Denmarke, Polonia, and Norway: which impositions and tributes, are
confirmed and growne strong, both by long prescription of time, and vse of
iudgements: yea and that to be lawfull, euen unto such as have neither
soueraigntie, nor any iurisdiction at all, the court of Paris hath adiudged.
Whereunto I aunswere, that the thing hauing begun by abuse, and by long
continuance of time inueterat, hath well some colour of prescription: but yet
an abuse can neuer be so ouergrowne, but that the law shall euer be of greater
force than it; whereby the abuse is to be
reformed: and for that cause it was forbidden by an edict of Moulins, that any
tribute should be exacted of the subiects, under the colour of prescription:
for that many lawyers and judges have exposed all the strength and force of
iudgements onely in prescription alone: not regarding whether that which is in
question can of right bee prescribed or not.
Now if Pompeius hath denied, that the common high way
can by any continuance of time be prescribed upon: why then should these men
thinke the rights of customes and tributes, or of soueraigne maiestie to be
prescribed against; and yet the common high way belongeth not unto the right of
Soueraigntie. Wherefore it were better to
confesse (which yet without deadly wrong cannot bee done) those aforesaid
things which we have spoke of, not at all to belong unto the right of
soueraigne maiestie: or else to say that the kingdome it selfe, and in briefe
the royall crowne and scepter might be prescribed upon. The same we are to
thinke also of the exemptions from the payment of taxes and tributes, which no
man can graunt unto another man, but hee which hath the soueraigne power in a
Commonweale: which is also prouided for in an article of the edict at Moulins:
neither is that enough, but that the charters of such immunities graunted, must
be also enrolled in the records of the court of accounts, and be allowed of by
the judges of the court of Aydes. But what kind of taxes and tributes there be, and how farre they are to be exacted, shall in
due place be declared: let it now for the
present suffice, it to appeare, that right and power to belong only vnto
Soueraigne maiestie.To lay an imposition upon salt, no marke
of soueraigntie.
Now many there be that thinke also, that to have power to lay an imposition
upon salt, is a more proper marke of Soueraigntie than the rest: and yet therof
giue no good reason. For almost in every Commonweale we see salt pits and mines
both to be, & alwayes to have bene in priuat mens possession, not onely
upon the sea coasts towardes the South (for toward the north it hardeneth not
with the Sunne) but also in the mediterranean regions, wherein mines of salt,
and wels of salt water are found. As in Spaine, in Italie, Fraunce, and the
countrey of Cracouia, is found salt in great aboundance. Yea euen at Rome we
read, some priuat men to have had salt mines. Yet true it is, that manie
soueraigne princes have of auntient time
imposed tribute upon salt; as did LysimachusThe kings which layed the first imposition upon salt.
king of Thrace, Ancus Martius king of Rome, Philip Valois king of France, who were the first that
exacted tribute upon salt, every one in his owne kingdome. And albeit that by
the law Valeria the people of Rome were freed from such customes &
tributes, as had by their kings bene brought in and imposed upon them: yet Liuius the Censor thought no imposition in the
Commonweale lighter or fitter, than that which was laid upon salt; who thereof
surnamed Liuius Salinator, (or Liuius the Salter.) For why that imposition little or nothing
impaireth the right of priuat men: but that they still remaine lords and owners
of their salt pits, aswell as of their other mines, sauing unto the Soueraigne
prince his rights and customs.
But forasmuch as the sea it selfe cannot be proper unto any priuat man, the
rightsHow farre of a soueraign prince may lay impositi
ons upon the sea, from his owne coast. thereof belonging unto such
soueraigne princes as dwell thereby, who may lay impositions thereupon thirtie
leagues off from their owne coast, if there bee no other soueraigne prince
neerer to let them, as it was adiudged for the duke of Sauoy. Neither can any
but a soueraigne prince giue them letters of safe conduct; which the Italians
call Guidage; nor yet of right take any wracke: as is
expresly prouided for by the decree of the emperour Fredericke the second. A thing truely most barbarous, and not in
auntientWrackes by what small right they belong to
soueraigne princes. time of soueraigne princes vsed, shamefully to
suffer the reliques of the goods and fortunes of such as have by shipwracke
miserably perished, and whome we ought with some part of our owne to releeue,
being cast upon our coast, and which ought with good faith to be againe restored, to be most shamefully I say spoyled. Yet
such is the manner of all that have ports upon the sea, in this case to show
such extremitie aswell unto their owne people, as to straungers. But by what
right doe you aske? The common errour maketh the right: or if the wrong be done
not by errour, but by knowledge, then it is meere wickednesse, masked with the
vaile of errour. For I have heard that at such time as the emperours
ambassadours complayned unto Henry the second, the
French king, in the yeare 1556, that two gallies which had suffered wracke upon
the coast of Corcyca, were taken by Iordan Vrsin,
requesting to have the same gallie againe restored: he was aunswered by Anne Mommerance then constable of Fraunce, that wracks by
the law of all nations belonged unto such princes as ruled upon the coasts
whereon they were cast. Which law was so
strong, as that Andrew Doria neuer so much as complained
of the losse of two of his gallies, confiscated by the prior of Capona the
French Admyrall, for casting anchor onely uppon the land without leaue, which
of antient time men by the law of nations might right lawfully do. And wheras
by the Roman law it was lawfull for any man to seise uppon things lost, or
uppon goods or lands vacant and forbidden: now it is onely lawfull unto them
which have the soueraigne power, or some other iurisdiction by law or custome
confirmed unto them, to take unto themselves things lost or forsaken, and that
after a certaine determinat time: which in a thing
moueable is defined to be fortie dayes after the publication of the thing lost or forsaken: except it be in the meane
time by the right owner chalenged. And as for vacant possessions, the Roman
emperours have decreed, That they may at any time within foure yeares be againe
recouered by the prince: but that after foure yeares once expired, a man may
prescribe euen against the common receipt. But forasmuch as these things are
also graunted unto priuat men, they no more belong unto the right of
Soueraigntie, than it doth to have a receipt of his owne: which is not a thing
common unto priuat men onely, but euen the prince himselfe hath his owne
receipt divided from the publike receipt; and his owne possessions seperat
apart from the possessions of the Commonweale: and so diuers officers were by
the Roman emperours appoynted unto both. So Lewes the
xij the French king, hauing obtained the
crowne, erected the chamber at Blois, for his particular demaines of Blois,
Montfort, and Cousi, which he commaunded to be divided from the dukedome of
Orleans, and the other publike possessions; and the accounts thereof to be kept
apart by themselves. But amongst the rights of receipt, there be some that
belong not, but unto the soueraigne prince onely: as the confiscation of goods
or lands in cases of high treason, under which are comprehended also such as be
conuicted of impietie against God, which we call Heresie; or of offence against
the Commonweale, as in coyning false money. Howbeit if our late lawyers haue
with two much learned and curious subtiltie in an hundred and fiftie chapters
found out the lawes and rights of the receipt: but yet so as that of one they
make ten, that so they may seeme the moe: so confounding and mingling
the rights of soueraigntie with the rights
of receipt (which are also common unto priuat men) and publike things with
things priuat. The other rights of receipt are almost all common unto the
soueraigne prince, with other lords iusticiaries, as to have right vnto
treasure found: and the power to graunt Faires, which was in auntient time a
marke of Soueraigntie; as now it is at this present comprised under the case of
priuileges.
As for the right of Marque, or of Reprisall, which soueraigne princes haue
properTo grant letters of Marque, or of reprisall now to
belong only unto the soueraign prince. unto themselves from all
others, it was not of auntient time proper unto a soueraigne prince; but
permitted unto every man without leaue, either of magistrat or of prince to
take reprisall, which the Latines called Clarigatio:
howbeit that the princes by little and little
gaue this power unto magistrats and gouernours; and in the end reserued this
right unto their owne soueraigntie, for the better assurances of their peaces
and truces, which were oftentimes broken by the rashnesse of some particular
men, abusing this right of Marque or Reprisal. In this realme the parliament
graunted letters of Marque, as we find by the decree of the xij of Februarie
1392, vntill that Charles the eight by an especiall
edict, reserued that power unto himselfe, in the yeare 1485. It is also of our
men properly called a royaltie or right of soueraigntie, whereby the prince, a
bishop being dead, taketh unto himselfe the profits of the bishopricke, in the
meane time whilest another bishop is chosen by the chapter, or by the prince
himselfe appointed: and so being sworne, is put into possession thereof: but
forasmuch as that in all places is not
obserued: and few there be that have that right, it is not to bee accounted
among the markes of soueraigntie.
There be many other right small things, which are accounted proper vnto
princes,Small things and yet proper only unto soueraign
princes. as things concerning their greater reputation and dignitie,
as in their edicts, mandats, and commissions to vse these words, Dei Gratia, by the grace of God; which wordes Lewes the xj, the French king, forbad the duke of
Britaigne to vse in his life; although we read them to have bene used almost in
all auntient leagues; and attributed not unto great princes and commaunders
onely, but euen to the least magistrates and deputies
also. The kings of Fraunce have also reserued unto themselves the right to
seale with yellow waxe, a thing forbidden
their nobilitie and other their iusticiaries; which Lewes the xj by speciall priuilege and letters patents graunted as a
great favour unto RenateTo seale with yealowe wax graunted unto a great prince as a
favour. of Aniou, king of Naples and Sicilie, that in fealing he
might vse yellow waxe: with like priuilege unto his heires also, confirmed in
parliament the 28 of Iune 1465. He which copied the Comentaries of Tillet, calleth it white waxe, which I find our kings
neuer to have vsed.
But much more it belongeth unto the royaltie of soueraigne maiestie, to be able
toTo be able to chang the subiects language a marke of
soueraigntie. compell the subiects to vse the language and speech of
him that ruleth over them: which the Romans so commaunded their subiects, that
euen yet at this day they seeme farre and wide to raigne over a great part of
Europe. But the king of the Hetruscians, who
last was by the Romans ouercome in all other things yeelded unto them, but in
that he could in no wise be perswaded to yeeld, to chaunge his countrey
language, and to receiue the Latine tongue, as Cato
Censorius writeth. But France for that it swarmedThe
cause whie the French tounge is somuch confounded with latine. as it
were with citisens of Rome, did so confound the Latine tongue, with the
naturall countrey speech, as that the auntient writers called our countrey men
Romans; yea the iudgements and decrees of the higher court of parliament, viz. of Paris were set downe in Latine (which the
presidents and gouernours were commaunded to doe) vntill that Francis the first had giuen order that they should vse their owne
countrey language: as by like edict Edward the third
commaunded the judges and magistrats of England, to giue iudgements in their
owne countrey language, when as before they
used the French. And at such time as the Sarasins had subdued the greatest part
of Asia, and Afrike: they withall most farre spred their language and religion
euen into the farther part of Spaine: which when Philip
king of Spaine would gladly have suppressed, yet could he by no meanes effect
it.
Some amongst the markes of Soueraigntie, have put also the power to iudge
andA soueraigne prince may according to his cōscience
discide matters beyond either lawe, or custome. decide matters,
according to their conscience; a thing common to all iudges, if they be not by
expresse law or custome prohibited so to doe. And that is it for which wee
oftentimes see in the edicts upon the articles committed to the arbitratarie
iudgement of the judges, this clause added, Wherewith we haue
charged our conscience. For if there be either custome or law to the
contrarie, it then is not in the power of the judge, to passe beyond the law, or to dispute against the receiued
law. For that was a thing forbidden by the most politique lawes of Lycurgus: and also by the most auntient lawes of
Florence, whereas a soueraigne prince may do both, if he be not by the law of
God forbidden; whereunto we have before showed him to be still subiect.
As for the title of Maiestie it selfe, it sufficiently appeareth, that it onely
belongeth toThe title of maiestie proper to soueraigne
princes. him that is a soueraigne prince: so that for him that hath
no soueraigntie to vsurpe the same, were a verie absurd thing: but to arrogat
unto himselfe the addition of most excellent and sacred maiestie, is much more
absurd▪ the one being a point of lightnes, andTitles dewe to
God beseeme not princes. the other of impietie: for what more can we
giue unto the most mightie and immortall God, if we take from him that which is
proper unto himselfe? And albeit that in
auntient time neither emperours nor kings used these so great addition or
titles: yet the German princes neuerthelesse have oft times giuen the title of
Sacred Maiestie unto the kings of Fraunce; aswell as unto their emperour. As I
remember my selfe to have seene the letters of the princes of the empire,
written unto the king, for the deliverance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in Fraunce: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra,
Maiestas, or Your Sacred Maiestie▪ an addition proper unto God, apart
from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some
vse the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of
Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferrara, and Florence: some of
Excellencie, as the princes of the confines; or else
of Serenitie, as the duke of Venice.
I omit here many other meaner rights which Soueraigne princes every one of them
pretend in their own countries, in number infinit, which yet are no marks of
soueraignMarkes of soueraigntie ought to be such as are
proper to all soueraign princes in generall. ty, such as ought to be
proper to all soueraigne princes in generall, apart from all other lords,
iusticiaries, magistrats, and subiects, and which are of their owne nature
incessible and not to be alienated from the soueraigntie: nor by any course of
time to be prescribed. And if the soueraigne prince shall giue or grant any
lands or lordship of the publique possessions, unto any, with iurisdiction and
power to vse the same, in such sort as he himselfe might: albeit that the
royall rights properly belonging unto soueraigntie, be not in the charter or
writings expresly excepted: yet are they alwayes by the verie Soueraign rights cannot by the prince be alienated neither
by any other be prescribed against. law it selfe thought to be
excepted, which by an old decree of the counsell of France was decreed not only
for graunts made unto priuat men, but also for such gifts or grants as were
made unto the princes themselves descended of the royall blood and familie:
which royall rights can by no tract of time whatsoeuer, be prescribed against
or vsurped upon. For if publique place, or the publique possessions of the
Commonweale cannot be got by any prescription: how much lesse then can the
royalties proper unto soueraigne maiestie be prescribed upon. But it is
certaine by the edicts and lawes concerning the publike demaine, that it is not
to bee alienated, neither by any tract of time to be gained. Which is no new
thing: For it is two thousand yeares agoe since that Themistocles, making seisure of certaine lands belonging unto the
publike demaine, vsurped by some priuat men;
said in the oration which hee made unto the people of Athens, That mortall men could nothing prescribe against the immortall God: neither
could priuat men in any thing prescribe against the Commonweale. The
selfe same speech Cato the Censor used also in the
Oration which he made unto the people of Rome, for the reuniting of some part
of the publike demain, vsurped upon by certaine priuat men. How then can a man
prescribe upon the rights and markes of Soueraigntie? And that is it, for which
in law he is guiltie of death, that in any sort vseth the markes properly
reserued unto the maiestie of a Soueraigne prince. And thus much concerning the
principall points of Soueraigne maiestie, in as briefe manner as I possibly
could, hauing handled this matter more at large in my booke De Imperio. And forasmuch as the
forme and estate of a Commonweale dependeth of them that have the Soueraigntie
therein: Let vs now see how many sorts of Commonweales there be.
Finis Lib. Primi.
THE SECOND BOOKE OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.
CHAP. I. ¶ Of all sortes of Commonweales in generall,
and whether there bee any moe then three.
FOrasmuch as we have before sufficiently spoken of
Soueraigntie, and of the rights and markes
thereof; now it behoueth vs to consider who they bee which in every Commonweale
hold that Soueraigntie; thereby to iudge what the estate is: as if the
Soueraigntie consist in one onely prince, wee call it a Monarchie: but if all
the people bee therein interressed, we call it a Democracie, or Popular estate:
So if but some part of the people have the Soueraigne commaund, we account that
state to be an Aristocracie. Which words we will vse, to auoide the obscuritie
and confusion which might otherwise arise, by the varietie of gouernours good
or bad: which hath giuen occasion unto many,
to make moe sorts of Commonweales than three. But if that opinion should take
place, and that we should by the foot of vertues & vices, measure the
estate of Commonweales; we should find a world of them, and them in number
infinit. Now it is most certaine, that to attaine unto the true definitions and
resolutions of all things, wee must not rest uppon the externall accidents
which are innumerable, but rather upon the essentiall and formall differences:
for otherwise a man might fall into an infinit and inextricable labyrinth,
whereof no knowledge is to bee had, or certaine precept to be giuen. For so a
man should forge and fashion infinit numbers of Commonweales, not onely
according to the diuersitie of vertues and vices; but euen according to the
varietie of things indifferent also. As if a Monarch were to bee chosen for
his strength, or for his beautie, for his
stature, or for his nobilitie, or riches, which are all things indifferent; or
for his martial disposition, or for that he is more giuen to peace, for his
grauitie, or for his iustice, for his beautie, or for his wisdom, for his
sobrietie, or his humilitie, for his simplicitie, or his chastitie; and so for
all other qualities, a man should so make an infinitie of Monarchies: and in
like sort in the Aristocratique state, if some few of many should have the
soueraigntie aboue the rest, such as excelled others in riches, nobilitie,
wisedome, iustice, martiall prowesse, or other like vertues, or vices, or
things indifferent, there should thereof arise infinit formes of Commonweales:
a thing most absurd, and so by consequent the opinion
whereof such an absurditie ariseth, is to be
reiected. Seeing therefore that the accidentall qualitie chaungeth not the
nature of things: let vs say that there are but three estates or sorts of
Commonweales; namely a Monarchie, an Aristocratie, and a Democratie. We call it
a Monarchie, whenThat there are but three sorts of
commonweales viz: a Monarchie a Democratie: and an Aristocratie. one
man alone hath the soueraigntie in a Commonweale, in such sort as wee haue
aforesaid. And a Democratie, or Popular estate, when all the people, or the
greater part thereof hath in it the soueraigne power and commaund, as in one
bodie. The Aristocratie is, when the lesser part of the people hath the
Soueraigntie, as in one bodie, and giueth lawes unto the rest of the people,
whether it be in generall, or in particular: all which things are of themselves
more cleerer than the day. And true it is, that the writers of auntient time do
therein well agree, that there can be no lesse then three kindes or sortes of Commonweales: Whereunto some others haue
ioyned a fourth, composed of all three: and some other a fift, diuers from all
the rest.
Plato hath unto these three well adioyned a fourth kind,
that is to wit, where some few of the better sort excelling the rest in vertue,
have the soueraignetie: which for allThe diuers opinions of
the auntient writers concerning diuers sorts of commonweals. that in
proper tearmes, is nothing else but a pure Aristocratie:
how be it, he hath not receiued the mixture of the aforesaid three states, for
an other diuers forme of a Commonweale. Aristotle beside
these three kinds of Commonweales which we have spoken of: and the fourth also
named by Plato, setteth downe a fift kind of Common
weale, by confounding together the three former states, and so maketh fiue
sorts of states or Commonweales. But Polybius reckneth
up seauen sorts; three commendable: three
faultie: and the seauenth compounded of the mixture of the three first. Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Marcus Tullius, Thomas More, Gaspar
Contarenus, Frauncis Machiauell, and many other following Polybius, have as it were with one consent approoued his
opinion, which in deed is most auntient, and tooke not beginning from Polybius, although he would seeme to be the authour
thereof, neither from Aristotle, but aboue foure hundred
yeares before Aristotle. Herodotus (the father of
antiquitie) writeth, that fourth kind of a Commonweale, confused of the three
other, to have be commended of many, and yet for all
that contenting himselfe with the three former kinds, reiecteth the rest as
imperfect: And were it not that I were not onely by probable arguments, but
euen by forcible reasons drawne from that opinion of Polybius,Tullie, and the rest, I could easilie have suffered my
selfe to have been ouercome by the authoritie of so great and graue men. It
behoueth vs therefore by lively reasons to shew them to have erred and been
deceiued, which have brought in that fourth kind of Commonweale composed of the
mixture of the other three: which I trust the more plainly to bring to passe,
if I shall vse the same examples in refelling of them, that they themselves
have before vsed. For they them selues have set downe the Lacedemonian, Roman,
and Venetian Commonweales to have been compounded and sweetely mingled with the
three kind of states, that is to say, with the Monarchie, Aristocratie, and
Democratie. But when Plato said, the best kind of a
Commonweale o be composed of the mixture of a
Monarchie and Democratie, he was therefore forthwith reprehended by his scholler Aristotle, saying, that of these two could no commendable state be
made, and that therefore it was better of all three estates to make a fourth:
wherein Aristotle reasoneth also against himselfe; for
if he confesse no good thing possiblie to be made of two extreames; what shall
then bee made of three confounded amongst them selues? And for that this
opinion for the making of a fourthNo fourth estate of a
commonweale to be made of a confusion of a Monarchie, a Democratie and an
Aristocratie. estate of the confusion of the rest, may moue great
troubles in Commonweales, and therein worke maruelous effects, it is requisite
for vs well to examine the same: For when states of Commonweales are in them
selues contrarie, as a Monarchie and a Democratie, they
are by contrarie lawes and ordinances to be gouerned. The Florentins throughly perswaded of that opinion of the auntients
for the mingling of the three estates together, as the best forme of a
Commonweale; when they moued with the seditious sermons of P.
Soderin, and Hierome Sauanarola, had translated
the soueraignetie or chiefe power of the Commonweale unto the people: thought
it best to keepe the rout of the vulgar and common people from bearing of
offices and rule, and altogether from the affaires of state: that so the chiefe
managing of matters might be reserued unto the more auntient sort of the
citizins, and such as were of greater wealth and abilitie then the rest: who
yet had not power to dispose of all matters, but onely of such things as were
the chiefest, viz. the making of lawes, the creating of magistrats, and
disposing of the common treasure: reseruing the rest unto the Senat and
magistrats, that so they might inioy that
moderat state of a Commonweale, whereof they had so strongly dreamed. And
certes if of the three estates moderately mixed might a fourth state arise, it
should have a certein power by nature diuers from the rest: as we see in
Harmonicall consent, composed of Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion
artificially confused; yet quite differing from them both: so as if the mixture
of things of diuers and contrarie natures, ariseth a third all together
differing from the things so together mixed. But that state which is made of
the mixture of the three kinds of Commonweales, differeth in deede nothing from
a meane popular state; For if three cities, whereof one of them is gouerned by
a king, and so a Monarchie; the second by the nobilitie, and so an
Aristocratie; the third by the people, and so a Democratie; should be confounded, and so thrust together into one and
the same forme of a Commonweale, and so the chiefe power and soueraignetie
communicated unto all: who is there that can doubt but that that state shall be
all together a state popular? except the soueraignetie should by turnes be
giuen; first to the king, then to the nobilitie, and afterwards to the people;
As in the vacancie of the Roman kingdome, the king being dead, the Senators
ruled by turnes: yet must they needes againe fall unto one of these three kinds
of a Commonweale which we have spoken of: nether could this alternatiue manner
of gouernement be of any long continuance, either yet more profitable to the
Commonweale, then as if in an euill gouerned familie, the wife should first
commaund the husband; then the children them both; and the seruants after them
to dominier over all.
But to confound the state of a monarkie, with the Popular or Aristocratical
estate, is a thing impossible, and in effect imcompatible, and such as cannot
be imagined. For i soueraignetie be of it selfe a
thing indivisible, (as wee have before showed) how can it then at one and the
same time be divided betwixt one prince, the nobilitie, and the people in
common? The first marke of soueraigne maiestie is, to be of power to giue
lawes, and to commaund over them unto the subiects, and who should those
subiects bee that should yeelde their obedience unto that law, if they should
also have the power to make the lawes? who should he be that could giue the
law? being himselfe constrained to receiue it
of them unto whom he him selfe gaue it? So that of necessitie we must conclude,
that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state,
that then the state must needs be a state popular. Now if we shall giue power
unto the people to make lawes, and to creat magistrats, and not to meddle in
the rest; we must yet needs confesse that such power giuen unto the magistrats
belonged unto the people, and that it is not giuen but as in trust unto the
magistrats: whom the people may againe displace, euen aswell as they placed
them, in such sort as that the state should alwaies be popular.
And to proue that which wee have said to be true, let vs take the same examples
that Polybius, Contarenus, and the rest have left vs; They
say that the state of the Lacedemonians was
composed of all the three kinds of states which we spoke of: For that in that
Commonweale they had two kings representing a Monarchie; eight and twentie
Senators representing an Aristocratie; and five Ephori figuring and patronizing
the popular estate. But what will these men then say to Herodotus, who bringeth theThat the Lacedemonian
commonweale was meare aristocraticall, and not composed of the confusion or
mixture of the three sorts of commonweals. Lacedemonian estate for an
example of a most pure Aristocratie? what will they also aunswere unto Theucidides, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plutarche? who speaking of the warres of Peloponnesus (which continued
twentie yeres betwixt the Popular and the Aristocratique Commonweals) say, that
the whole drift of the Athenians and their allies was to chaunge the
Aristocraties into Democraties, as they did in Samos, Corfu, and all the other
cities by them subdued. Whereas contrariewise the Lacedemonians purpose and intention was to chaunge the Popular
states into Aristocraties, as in deede they did in all the cities of Greece
after the victorie of Lysander; yea euen in the citie of
Athens it selfe, where after he had layed the wals euen with the ground, he
tooke the soueraignetie from the people, and gaue the same unto thirtie
citizens, (who are therefore of the Athenians called the thirtie Tyrants) to
rule and gouerne in such sort and manner as they did amongst the Lacedemonians,
where so many, and no moe had the gouernement of the state. But among the
citizens of Samos, the Siaeyons, the Aeginits, the Mylesians, and other cities
of Ionia and the lesser Asia, they gaue the soueraignetie unto Tenne principal
men, with one chiefe Captaine over them, for the managing of the warres;
calling hoame againe such as had bene banished
for holding with the Aristocratie, and driuing into exile them that were chiefe
of the popular factions.
What will they also say to Maximus Tyrius, who reckning
up the States which held the pure Aristrocratie first of all nameth the
Lacedemonians, and after them the Thessalians, the Pellenians, the Cretentians,
and the Mantineans. We must first conuince these so many and so famous authours
of vntruth, before we can thrust the Lacedemonians from their Aristocratie:
which writers liuing almost in the same time wherein the Athenian and
Lacedemonian Commonweales flourished, and beeingGasper
Contareus, Nicholas Machiauel, Sir Thomas Moore. The cause that induced
Polybius and others to say that the Lacedemonian estat was a state composed
of the mixture of the three states and forms of a commonweale. The historie
of a Lacoedemonian commonweale. themselves Grecians, were like more
certainly and truely to know these things, than a Venetian Senator, a
Florentine, or an English man.
What was it then that deceiued Polybius, who was himself
a Megalopolitan, borne neere unto the Lacedemonians? Truely it was euen the
name of the Lacedemonian kings. For Lycurgus hauing
altered the state of the Commonweale, and by the good will and consent of the
kings themselves (who deriued their pedegree from Hercules) hauing translated the soueraigntie unto the people, left
unto the kings, but the bare name and title onely, and to be the generals in
warres. For why the regall power was now before alreadie sore shaken and
weakned: after that Aristodemus king of Lacedemonia, had
at once left his two sonnes to raigne together over the Lacedemonians (to the
imitation of the Messenians, over whome Amphareus and
Leucippus together raigned) who whilest they would
both be kings and commaund over all, could neither of them so be, but by their ielous conceits and contentions,
drawing the state into factions, gaue occasion to Lycurgus, being descended also of the same stocke with them, to
ouerthrow their royall power, leauing unto them and their house nothing els but
the name and show of kings, giuing the rest unto the Senat and the people. But
as in Athens and Rome, after the kings were thence driuen out, they yet left
the name of a king unto a certaine priest, whome they called King of the
Sacrifices, to doe a certaine sacrifice, which the king himselfe onely had in
former time done: Which priest for all that was himselfe subiect unto the great
bishop, and could not (as Plutarch saith) have any estate, or beare any office as the other priests
might: euen so did Lycurgus unto the two kings of Lacedemonia, who upon the matter were
nothing but Senators, hauing but their voyces with the rest, without any power
at all to commaund; but to the contrarie were themselves constrayned to obey
the commaundements of the Ephori, who oftentimes put them to their fines, yea
and condemned them to death also, as they did the kings Agis and Pausanias, the soueraigntie still
resting with the people, in whose power it was to confirme or infirme the acts
and decrees of the Senat. Thucidides also himselfe
reiecteth the opinion of them which thought the kings each of them to have had
two voyces. But about an hundred yeares after the popular state, ordayned, was
againe chaunged by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus;
seeing it to bee an hard matter to call the people together, and a great deale
harder to rule them by reason, being assembled;
oftentimes at their pleasure reuersing the most wholesome and religious decrees
of the Senat. Wherefore they chaunged that popular government into an
Aristocratie, subtilly wresting an Oracle of Apollo to
that purpose: whereby the God (as they said) commaunded that from thenceforth
the government of the Commonweale should be in the power of the Senat: and yet
to please the people so grieued to have left their power, they gaue them leaue
to draw out of themselves five judges, called Ephori, as Tribunes or patrons of
the people, who should examine the sayings, doings, and deuises of the kings,
and by all meanes let them from the exercising of tyranny. And these Ephorie,
euerie ninth yeare once, upon some cleere night gazing upon the firmament (as
Plutarch saith) if they then saw any starre, as it
were, sparkle or shoot, they thereupon
committed their kings to prison, who might not thence be delivered, vntill the
Oracle of Apollo had so declared. In like manner the
Phylactes or Gailor, euerie yeare had the king of Cumes in prison, vntill the
Senat had determined what should be done with him. Now this state of the
Lacedemonian Commonweale endured about five hundred yeares, vntill the time of
Cleomenes, who hauing slaine the Ephori and the
Senatours, and so oppressed the Commonweale, tooke uppon himselfe the
soueraigntie, and so held it vntill such time as he was ouercome by Antigonus king of Macedon; who hauing vanquished him,
restored that Commonweale into the state it was before: howbeit that twentie
yeares after, being fallen againe into the power of Nabis the tyrant, who was afterward slaine by Philopomenes, that Commonweale was
vnited unto the state of the Achaeans, whereof it was a prouince, vntill that
about thirty yeares after, it was by Gallus the Roman
Proconsull taken from the Achaeans, and by Roman emperours set at libertie.
Thus in few words you may see the true historie of the the Lacedemonian
Commonweale, for most part taken from Xenophon, Thucidides,
Liuy, & Polybius, whereof yet no man hath
more curiously written than Plutarch, who out of the
Lacedemonian acts and publike records, hath corrected such things as of others
have bene but slightly or falsly set downe and reported: which hath giuen
occasion to many to be deceiued, and to thinke that state to have bene mingled
of the three diuers kindes of Commonweales. Which is plainly to be gathered out
of Liuie, where he bringeth in Nabis the first tyrant of Lacedemonia, thus speaking to TitusFlaminius, Noster legulator Lycurgus, non in paucorum manu
Rempubesse voluit, quem vos Senatum appellatis,
nec eminere vnum aut alterum ordinem in ciuitate, sed per aequationem
fortunae & dignitatis fore credidit, vt multi essent qui propatria arma
ferrent, Our lawgiuer Lycurgus (saith he) would
not the state of our Commonweale to bee in few mens hands, which you call the
Senat, neither would have any one or other order to excell the rest in our
citie; but by the making equall of mens fortune and dignitie, thought it would
come to passe, that there should be many which would beare armes for their
countrey. Thus he couereth his tyrranny with the show of a popular state, when as then there was no popular estate at all; yet in
that he said most truely, that Lycurgus at the beginning gaue the soueraigntie unto the
people.
But let vs see the rest. They also have put for example the Roman Commonweale,
which they said to have bene mingled of the three kinds of Commonweales: For so
saith Polybius (who was maister to Africanus the Great) Wee see (saith hee) the regall power in the
Consuls, the Aristocratie in the Senat, and the Democratie in the people.The Romaine commonweale a meare popular state and not composed
of the three formes of commoweals. unto whome do plainely assent Dionysius Halycarnasseus, Cicero, Contarenus, Sir Thomas
More, and many others: which opinion for all that is neither grounded
uppon truth not reason. For where is this Monarchie, that is to say, the
soueraigne government of one man? which in the two Consuls cannot bee imagined.
But soueraigne maiestie, if it were in the consuls could not possibly be
divided betwixt two, for the indiuisible
nature thereof, which it seemeth more probable and reasonable to attribute the
same unto the dukes of Genua or Venice. But what regall power could there bee
in the two Roman Consuls? who could neither make law, nor peace, nor warre,
neitherNo soueraigntie in the Romaine Consulls any
great officer, neither graunt pardon, neither take a peny out of the common
treasure, neither so much as to whip a citisen, if it were not in time of
warre, without leaue of the people: which hath bene a power alwaies giuen to
all gouernours of armies, whome we also may so call kings, and with greater
appearance than the Consuls, who had not power but the one of them after the
other, and that but for the space of one yeare onely. The constable of Fraunce,
the chiefe Bassa of the Turkes, the Bethudere in Aethiopia, the Edegnare in the
kingdome of Afrike, have ten times more power
than had the two Consuls together, & yet for all that they are but subiects
& slaues to other princes, as were the Consuls subiects and seruants vnto
the people. And to what purpose say they, that the Consuls had such royall
authoritie, seeing that the least of the Tribunes of the people might imprison
them. As did Drusus the Tribune, who by a sergeant tooke
Philip the Consull by the coller, and cast him in
prison, for that hee had interrupted him, as he was speaking unto the people:
and that he might lawfully so doe, shall hereafter be declared. The power of
the Consuls was to lead the armies, war being before denounced, to assemble the
Senat, to present the letters of the captaines and allies unto the Senat, to
giue audience unto ambassadours before the people or the Senat, to call
together the great estate, and to demaund the aduise of the people, about
the election of officers, or promulgation
of lawes; who yet standing, spake unto the people sitting, and their mases
downe, in token of their subiection unto the people. The same authoritie with
the Consuls had the chiefe gouernour of the citie in their absence. Ioyne
hereunto also, that the Consuls had power but for one yeare: wherefore I leaue
this opinion as scarce worthy the refuting.
Now as concerning the Senat, which they say to have had the forme and power
ofThe smal power of the Romaine Senate: and that therein
was no resemblance of an Aristocratie an Aristocratie, it was so
farre there from, as that there was neuer priuie councell, which had not more
authoritie: for it had no power to commaund either particular men, or
magistrats: yea the Senators might not assemble themselves, except it so
pleased the Consuls, or the Praetor in the absence of the Consuls: insomuch
that Caesar a popular
man, perceiuing himselfe not gratious with the Senat, oftentimes called the
people together in the yeare of his Consulship: but the Senat in all that yeare
he assembled but once or twice, still presenting his request unto the people
when he would obtaine any thing: which was no great noueltie, for the Consull
for his pleasure to doe, contrarie to the good liking and mind of the Senat.
For we read (that the Senat at such time as it was in greatest authoritie that
euer it was) in the daungerous time of the Commonwealth, hauing requested the
Consuls to name a dictatour, the Consuls would therein doe nothing: insomuch
that the Senat hauing no power to commaund them, neither any sergeant or like officer, which are the true markes of them which haue
the power to commaund, sent Seruilius Priscus with their request unto the Tribunes in this sort, *
Vos (inquit) Tribuni plebis Senatus appellat, vt in tanto
discrimine Reipublicae dictatoremLiuius lib. 4.dicere, Consules pro vestra potestate cogatis: Tribuni pro
collegio pronunciant, placere Consules Senatui dicto audientes esse, aut in
vinculase duci iussuros, The Senat (saith he) appealeth unto you the
Tribunes of the people, that in so great daunger of the Commonweale, you for
the great authoritie you haue, would compell the Consuls to nominat a Dictator:
whereupon the Tribunes pronounced for their whole societie, that their pleasure
was, that the Consuls should be obedient unto the Senat, or els that they would
commaund them to prison. And in another * place the same author saith,
ThatLiuius lib. 27. the Senat was of aduise, that
the Consull should present the request unto the people, for the commaunding of him whom they would have Dictator:
which if the Consull should refuse to doe, that then the Praetor of the citie
should do it: who if he should refuse also, that then the Tribunes of the
people should propound the matter. Consul negauit se populum
rogaturum, Praetoremque rogare vetuit: Tribuni plebis rogarunt, The
Consull denied to request the people, and forbad the Praetor also to request
them, the Tribunes made the request. Wherby it euidently appeareth, that the
Senat could not so much as commaund the lesser magistrats, the greater
magistrats forbidding them. And as for that which Polybius saith, That the Senat had power to iudge of cities and
prouinces, and to take punishment of conspirators against the state: * LiuieLiuiu. lib. 26. showeth it to have bene otherwise, as when question was made for the
chastising of the traitors of Campania, who
after the battell at Cannas had ioyned themselves unto Hannibal, an auntient Senator said in full Senat, Per Senatum agi de Campanis iniussu populi non video posse, I see not
that any thing can by the Senat bee done concerning the Campanians without the
commaundement of the people. And a little after, Rogatio
ferator ad populum, qua Senatui potestas fiat statuendi de Campanis,
Let request bee made unto the people, wherby power may be giuen unto the Senat,
to determine concerning the Campanians. And upon the request to that purpose
presented unto the people, the people gaue them commission, and commaunded the
Senat to proceedThe people of Rome in their assemblies did
e in token of the
soueraigntie. against them in this sort, Quod
Senatus maxima pars censeat, qui assident id volumus iubemusque, What
the greatest part of the Senat shall agree uppon, wee that here sit will and commaund the same. Neither is Polybiussse deceiued, in saying, That the Senat at pleasure
disposed of the prouinces and governments: whereas Liuie
the best author of the Roman antiquities, is of contrarie opinion, writing
thus, Quitus Fuluius postulauit a
Consule vt palam in Senatu diceret, permitteret ne Senatui vt de prouincijs
decerneret, staturusque eo esset quod censuisset, an ad populum laturus:
Scipio respondit se quode Republica esset facturum. Tum Fuluius a vobis peto
Tribuni plebis vt mihi auxilio sitis. Quintus Fuluius requested of the
Consul, that hee should openly say in the Senate whether hee gaue leaue or not
unto the Senat, to determine of the prouinces, and whether he would stand to
that it should decree, or els would referre the matter unto the people:
Whereunto Scipio answered, That hee would do that which
should be for the good of the Commonweale.
Then said Fuluius, I request you the Tribunes of the
people to aid and helpe me. So that it plainely appeareth, the Senat to haue
had no power at all, neither the decrees thereof to have bene of any force,
without the consent of the Tribunes of the people: and that the rest they had
by the sufferance of the same people. Now he that hath nothing but by
sufferance, hath indeed nothing of his owne, as we have before said. Yea such
decrees of the Senat, as were confirmed by the consent of the Tribunes of the
people, unto whome they were to be communicated, could not yet be put in
execution, except that either the Consuls did so command; or that the Consuls refusing so to do, the Tribunes themselves propounded
the same unto the people. So that in briefe
all matters of estate, and namely all the councels and decrees of the Senat
were of no force or vertue, if the people did not so command: or if the
Tribunes of the people consented not thereunto, as wee have before touched, and
shall more at large declare in speaking of a Senat. Wherefore in the Roman
state, the government was in the magistrats, the authoritie and councell in the
Senat, but the soueraigne power and maiestie of the Commonweale was in the
people. Excepting that time wherein the Decemuiri contrarie to the law, kept in
their hands longer than a yeare, the soueraigne power to make lawes committed
unto them; from which they were shortly after by force of armes remoued: for
then it might of right have bene called an Aristocracie, or more properly to
say an Oligarchie. Now as we have before said,
that the power of magistrats (how great soeuer it be) is not of themselves,
neither theirs, but as committed unto them in trust: so at the first, after the
driuing out of the kings, the Senators were chosen by the people; who to
discharge themselves of that labour, committed that charge to the Censors, who
were also chosen by the people, so that upon the matter all the authoritie of
the Senat depended of the people, who at their pleasure used to confirme or
infirme, to ratifie or disanull the decrees of the Senat.
The same opinion hath Contarenus of the Venetian
Commonweale, saying it to beThe Venetian estate a pure
Aristocratie and not composed of the three formes of commonweals also
mixt of the three formes of Commonweales, as were those of Rome and
Lacedemonia: For, saith he, the royall power is in a sort in the duke of
Venice, the Aristocracie in the Senat, and the
popular estate in the Grand Councell. But Ianot after
him hath most curiously brought to light the true estate of the Venetian
Commonweale; wherein he sheweth by most euident testimonies, drawne out of the
most auntient and true Venetian records, That Contarenus
in so saying was much deceiued. He sheweth plainely, that not past three
hundred yeares ago, before the time of Sebastian Cyanee
duke of Venice, the Venetian estate was a pure monarchie. Howbeit that Contarenus writeth it to have bene established in the
state it now is eight hundred yeares: and Pau. Manutius,
saith it to have so stood twelue hundred yeares: all which Ianot proueth out of the publike records, and certaine historie to be
vntrue. But howsoever that be, plaine it is, at this day to be a pure
Aristocracie: For by the view of the citie and the A viewe taken of the Citizens and gentlemen of
Venice. citisens, which was taken about thirtie yeares ago, were
reckoned nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citizens, beside
children under seuen yeares old, but of Gentlemen, in whome resteth the
soueraigne power of that state, betwixt foure and five thousand yong and old:
yet had the church men and gentlemen under five and twentie yeares old, nothing
to do with the state, more than to looke on, neither had they accesse into the
Grand Councell, but by way of request: the young gentlemen beeing so upon
request receiued at the age of thirtie yeares, according as discretion was to
be seene more in some one, than in some others: and yet hath it not bene found
this hundred yeare, that the Grand Councell assembled, to decide the great
affaires of that state, hath exceeded the number of fifteene hundred, as is to
be seene in the histories of Sabellicus, and of cardinall Bembus, the rest
being absent. It is therefore the leastThe soueraigntie of
the Venetian estate to be in the grand counsel. part of the Venetians
that have the soueraigntie, and they also of certaine noble families, for all
the gentlemen borne in Venice, are not receiued into the Grand Councell; but
there are of one and the same stocke, of the same race, of the same name,
whereof some are citisens, and come not into the councell, and the others come.
I do not here set downe the reason why, which every man may see in Sabellicus. This great councel as Contarenus saith, hath soueraigne power to make and repeale lawes, to
place or displace all officers, to receiue the last appeales, to determine of
peace and warre, and to giue pardon unto the condemned.
Wherein Contarenus condemneth himselfe: for seeing it is (as he saith) it cannot be denied, but
that the state of this Commonweale is Aristocratique. For were it that the
Great Councell had no other power than to make lawes and magistrats, it were
enough to proue it to be an Aristocraticall state, as we have before said: for
if those officers have any power, they hold it of the Seigneurie: which
sufficeth to show, that neither the Decemuiri, neither the Senat, neither the
Sages, nor yet the duke with his sixe councellors, have any power but by
sufferance, and so farre as it shall please the Great Councell. As for the duke
himselfe he alone of allThe small authoritie and power the
Duke of Venice hath. other magistrats hath no command at all, as not
hauing power to condemne any man before him, neither to stay or examine any
man; which is the first marke of command, giuen euen unto the least magistrats,
neither may he decide any cause whether it be in matters of state, or administration of iustice; either in the assembly of
the sixe councellors, or of the Decemuiri, or of the Sages, or of the Senat, or
of the fortie judges in civill or criminall causes, or of the Grand Councell.
For albeit that he may enter into all their corporations and colleges, yet so
it is, that he hath but his voice, as any one of them; but that he vseth to
giue it to the last: neither dare he to open any letter directed unto the
Seigneurie, or admit or discharge any ambassadours, but in the presence of his
sixe councellors, or of the Decemuiri, or to go out of the citie without leaue.
Yea Falerius the duke, for that he had without the
consent of the councell married a straunger, was by the Decemuiri hanged. And
beside him Sabellicus reckoneth up twelue dukes moe,
either by the tumultuous people slaine, or otherwise put to death for abusing
their authoritie. But he weareth a most
pretious cap, a robe of gold, he is followed, honoured, and respected as a
prince: and the coyne carrieth his name, albeit that the stampe of the
Seigneurie be upon it, which are all tokens of a prince: all which royall
magnificence we graunt him to haue, but yet all without power or commaund. Now
if it were so that we should not according unto truth, but after showes and
appearances iudge of the estate of Commonweales, there should be found none
simple and pure, but all mixt and confused in such sort as they say. Yea the
empire of Germanie should be much more mixt, than the Venetian state. For the
emperour hath other markes andThe state of the Germaine
empire and of the Swissers, Aristocraticall and not mixt. more royall
than hath the duke of Venice: then the seuen princes electors, with the other
princes, have the show of an Aristocracie, or of an Oligarchie: and the
ambassadours of the imperiall townes resemble
a Democracie. And yet for all that most certaine it is, that the imperiall
state of Germanie is a pure Aristocracie, composed of three or foure hundred
persons at most, over whome one prince beareth rule, to put in execution the
decrees of the councell, or els is to be forced to giue up his office, as wee
shall in due place declare. In like manner they say also the states of the
Swissers to be mixed of the three diuers formes of a Commonweale: Amongst whome
the Burgamaister representeth the king, the Senat an Aristocracie, and the
assemblies generall and particular, the state popular: and yet for all that men
know might well, that all their states and Commonweales are either popular, as
are they which inhabit the mountaines, or els Aristocratike, as are almost all
the rest.
And this opinion of the mixed state hath so possessed the mindes of men, that
manyThe estate of France a pure Monarchie and not
mixed. have both thought and wit this
monarchie of Fraunce (than which none can bee imagined more royall) to be mixt
and composed of the three kinds of Commonweals, and that the parliament of
Paris hath the forme of an Aristocracie, the three estates of a Democratie, and
the king to represent the state of a monarchie: which is an opinion not onely
absurd, but also capitall. For it is high treason to make the subiect equall to
the king in authoritie and power, or to ioyne them as companions in the
soueraigntie with him. And what popular power appeareth, when the three states
are assembled? or the parliament called? or wherein is
the soueraigne maiestie of a prince so much
manifested, as when every man in particular, and all men in generall, aswel the
noble as the meniall, with bended knee, and bare head, adore their king? offer
unto him their requests, which he at his pleasure admitteth or reiecteth. What
counterpoise of a popular power against the maiestie of a monarch can there be
in the assembly of the three estates? yea of the whole people, if it could be
gathered into one place, whichThe power of a soueraign
prince in nothing dimi nished by his parliament, but rather much the more
therby manifested. humbleth it selfe, requesteth and reuerenceth
their king. So farre is it from that such an assembly in any thing diminisheth
the power of a soueraigne prince, as that thereby his maiestie is the more
encreased and augmented. For it cannot bee exalted into a more high degree of
honour, of power, and of glorie, than to see an infinit number of great lords
and princes, and people innumerable, of men of all sorts and qualitie, to
cast themselves downe at his feet, and to
doe homage unto his maiestie; seeing that the honour, glorie, and power of
princes, consisteth not but in the obeysance, homage, and seruice of their
subiects. If then no forme or fashion of a popular power can bee imagined in
the assembly of the three estates, which they make in this realme, no more or
haply lesse than in England and Spaine: much lesse shall there be an
Aristocracie in the Court of Peeres, (who are so called, for that they bee
equall one with another among themselves, but not with the prince, as some haue
too rustically deemed) or in the assembly of all the officers of the realme,
considering that the presence of the king doth make all power and authoritie of
all corporations and colleges, and of all officers aswell in generall as in
particular to cease: in such sort, as that no magistrat hath power to commaund any thing in his presence, as we will in
de place declare. And albeit that the king sitting
in his seat of iustice, the chauncelour first addresseth himselfe unto him, to
know his pleasure, by commaundement from whome he goeth, gathering the aduise
and opinions of the princes of the blood, and other great lords, the peeres and
magistrats, which he reporteth againe unto him: yet is not that so done, to the
intent to number the voyces, as in the consistorie among the judges, but that
the king understanding their opinions, may as seemeth unto him good, receiue or
reiect the same. And albeit that most times he follow the opinion of the
greater part, yet to make it knowne, that it is not the judges or magistrats
decree, but the decree of the prince onely, and that the rest of the magistrats
have therein no power, the chauncelor pronounceth not this or that to be thought good unto the judges of the
court, but with a lowd voice vseth these words, The king
sayeth unto you. Wee see also that the court of parliament, writing
unto the king, keepeth euen yet the auntient stile, which is this in the
superscription of their letters, To our Soueraigne Lord the
King. The beginning ofThe forme the courtes of
parliament in Fraunce hold in writing to the king. which letters is
on this sort, Our Soueraigne Lord in most humble wise, and so
much as in vs is we recommend vs to your good grace, And the
subscription placed as low as may be: Your most humble and
obedient subiects and seruants, the men holding your court of
Parliament. Which is not t thanner of the lords of an Aristocracies speech: neither
of such as are companions in Soueraigntie with the king, but of true and humble
subiects. And for that I have touched this point before, I will now lightly
passe it ouer. The state of Fraunce therefore
is a pure Monarchie, no mingled with the popular
power, and so lesse with the Aristocratique Seigneurie: which mixture of states
is altogether impossible, and incompatible. And Aristotle most subtilly examining this opinion, for the mixture of
states, truly calleth the state composed of an Aristocratic and a Democratie
, that is to say a
Commonweale: but showeth not how that may be done, neither giueth thereof
example, as he vsually doth in others: but to the contrarie confesseth, that he
knew none such in his time; or yet had found any such before, albeit that he is
reported to have gathered an hundred Commonweales into
one booke, which booke is now lost. And forasmuch as Aristotle seldome or neuer reporteth
the true opinions of Plato, but to the contrarie alwaies
disguiseth and obscureth them as the antient Academiques have right well noted;
and namely where hee reiecteth his Commonweale; upon whose sayings many resting
themselves have oftentimes deceiued both themselves and others. We not addicted
to either, will in few words set downe the true opinion of Plato concerning his Commonweale, deseruing well to be knowne for the
better understanding of the question we have in hand, which some which neuer
read the same, call a diuine opinion: some others in the meane time treading
the same under foot, and rayling thereat as fast.
Plato faigned unto himselfe onely two Commonweales,
whereof the first hee attributed to Socrates, who neuer
thought (as saith Xenophon) of that which Plato maketh him to say:
and in his Commonwealth he taketh away these words, Mine, and Thine, as the source and fountaine of
all euil, and would have al goods, yea wiues and children to be common. But
seeing euerie man to find fault therewith, he quietly left it, as if he had so
writ more for argument sake, than for that he so thought, or to have the same
put in effect. The second is his owne, wherein hee taketh away the communitie
ofPlato his commonweale a pure popular estate and not
mixt. goods, of women and children: as for the rest those
Commonweales are both in all things alike. For both in the one and the other,
he would not have aboue five thousand and fortie citisens, a number by him
chosen to have 59 entire parts: in which Commonweales he also maketh three
estates or degrees of men: viz. the Guardes, Souldiors,
and Labourers: and after that diuideth the citisens into three degrees,
according to the vnequall rate of their
substance. As for the soueraigntie hee giueth it unto the whole multitude of
the people; as to make and abrogat lawes, cause sufficient enough to iudge that
he ment to make it a popular estate, if there were nothing else. But he passeth
on farther, and giueth unto the whole assembly of the people power to place and
displace all the officers: and not content with that, willeth also that the
people should have all the power to iudge in criminall causes; for that they
are (as he saith) all therein interessed. In briefe he giueth unto the people
power of life and death, to condemne, and to graunt pardon; which are all
euident arguments of a popular state. For he appointeth no soueraigne
magistrat, which might represent the state royall, and but a little of the
forme Aristocratique: for he willeth, that the Senat, or the counsel for
the affaires of the state, which he calleth
Guards or keepers should consist of foure hundred citisens, to be chosen of the
people. Whereby it is most euidently to bee vnderstood, that Plato his Commonwealth is the most popular that euer was, yea then
that of his owne countrey of Athens, which Xenophon
thought to have bene the most popular state in the world. I omit the 726 lawes
set downe by Plato, in the twelue books for the
government of his Commonweale: sufficeth it mee to have showed Plato his imagined Commonweale not to have bene made of a
mixture of an Aristocracie, and Democracie, as Aristotle
said, whose errour Cicero, Contarenus, and others, one
after another following, led the rest that followed them into errour also.
Let vs therefore conclude, neuer any Commonwealth to have beene made of an
Aristocracie and popular estate; and so
much lesse of the three states of Commonweales, and that there are not indeed
but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodotus first
most truely said amongst the Greekes, whome Tacitus
amongst the Latins imitating, saith, Cunctas nationes &
vrbes, populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt, The people, the
nobilitie, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities.
But some man will say, May there not be a Commonweale, wherein the people hath
the power to create the magistrats, to dispose of the common reuenew, and power
of life and death; which are three markes of soueraigntie, & the nobilitie
to have power to make lawes, to dispose of peace and
warre, and of the impositions and taxes; which
are also markes of soueraigntie: and besides all these to have one royall
magistrat aboue all, unto whome all the people in generall, and euerie one in
particular should yeeld their faith and liege loyaltie, and from whose
iudgement none might appeale or present any civill request. For so the rights
and markes of soueraigntie should seeme to be divided in three parts: the
people chalenging one part thereof, the nobilitie another, and the king the
third: whereby in that state a mixture might seeme to bee made of the royall
Aristocratique and popular state together. Whereunto I aunswere, that such a
state was neuer found, neither that such a state can bee made, or yet well
imagined,That it is impossible to compose one commonweale
of the mix ture of the three formes of commonweals. considering that
the markes of soueraigntie are indiuisible. For the nobilitie which should haue
the power to make the lawes for all: (which is as much as to say to commaund
and forbid what them pleased, without power
to appeale from them, or for a man to oppose himselfe against their commaunds)
would by their lawes at their pleasure forbid others to make peace or warre, or
to leuie taxes, or to yeeld fealtie and homage without their leaue: and he
againe to whome fealtie and homage is due, would bind the nobilitie and people
not to yeeld their obedience unto any other, but unto himselfe. And admit that
euerie one would seeke to defend his owne right, and not suffer any thing to be
taken from him that he thought belonged to himselfe: yet that doth most differ
from the nature of a Monarchie, that he which hath the soueraigntie, should
himselfe bee enforced to obey any other but especially his subiect. Whereby it
commeth to passe, that where the rights of soueraigntie are divided betwixt the
prince and his subiects: in that confusion
of the state, there is still endlesse sturres and quarrels, for the
superioritie, vntill that some one, some few, or all together have got the
soueraigntie. Whereof as there be many examples of old, so is there none fitter
in our time, than the example of the kings of Denmarke, whome the nobilitie
euer since Christiern the great grandfather of Frederike which now raigneth, hath almost made subiect
unto the lawes. Christiern they thrust out of his
kingdome, and set up his cosen in his place, with condition that he should
neither make peace nor warre, without the leaue of the senat: nor that he
should have any power to condemne any gentleman to death; with many other like
articles, which I will in their place set downe: which the kings since that
time have sworne to keepe: which that they should not go against, but that they might be the more firmly kept, the
nobilitie will in no case that the king should of himselfe make any peace; and
yet have themselves made a league with the king of Polonia, and them of Lubec,
against the king, for the defence of their libertie. So indeed are the rights
of Soueraigntie divided betwixt the king and the nobilitie, but so as that they
both liuing in perpetuall feare and distrust; do seeke for the alliance and
fellowship of their neighbour princes and people, so to receiue the lesse harme
one of them from another. With like surges and tempests is the kingdome of
Sweden also tossed, the king whereof lived in such distrust with his nobilitie,
as that king Henry wasTo diuide the
rights of soueraigntie daungerous to all commonweals. glad to take a
German for his Chauncelour, and one Varnnes a Norman for his high Constable: and yet
at length was by his nobilitie thrust out of his royall seat, and by them cast in prison, wherein hee lived seuenteene
yeare. Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of soueraigntie are divided,
are not rightly to bee called Commonweales, but rather the corruption of
Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most
truely written. For as bodies by nature well framed, if they begin to change,
with wonderfull stinke and contagion annoy all that come neere them, vntill
they bee quite altered, and become new things; as when egges are set upon,
which before they were set, and after they be hatched also have a good smell
and taste, though in the verie alteration of them not so: so also Commonweales
which chaunge their state, the soueraigne right and
power of them being divided, find no rest from civill warres and broiles, vntill they againe recover some one of the
three formes, and that the soueraigntie be wholie in one of the states or
other.
Yet might one say, that in the estate of the Romans the lesse part of the
people chosen out of the richer sort made the lawes, and greatest officers;
namely the Consuls▪ the Praetors, the Censors, had both soueraigne power of
life and death: and disposed of warre, and that the greater sort of the people
made the lesser officers and magistrats, to wit, the Tribuns of the people; the
foure and twentie militarie Tribunes; the two Aediles or Sherifes; the
Treasourers; the Scout, and mynt masters, and gaue also all benefices vacant,
and more then that the greater part of the people iudged of the great criminall
processes before Sylla, if it tended not to the naturall or civill death of
any. And by this meane it seemeth that that
Commonweal was composed of an Aristocracie, and of a popular estate: Whereunto
I answere, that it had well some appearance, but yet neuerthelesse was in
effect a true popular estate: for albeit that the great estate of the people
was divided into sixe degrees, or companies, according to every ones abilitie,
and that the knights, and the greatest part of the Senators, and of the
nobilitie, and richer sort of the people were of the first companie: who
agreeing among themselves, the lawes by them made were published, and the great
magistrats by them chosen receiued to take their oath: yet neuerthelesse true
it is that the five companies that remayned, had tenne times as many citizens
in them: and in case that all the Centuries of the first companie agreed not
upon the matter, they then came to the second
companie, and so by order even to the sixt and last, which in deede seldom
times or neuer happen. Matters being still so agreed upon, as that they came
not alwayes unto the second companie, but seldom to the third, and most seldom
to the fourth, scarcely at all unto the fift, and neuer unto the sixt: wherein
was all the rabble of the poore and base people, in number farre exceeding all
the rest: yet sufficeth it for our purpose, that all the people had thein part,
to shew it to have beene a popular state: albeit that the most noble and richer
sort were first called. And yet for all that the meniall people, (that is to
say, the greater sort of the people) without the nobilitie, seeing them selues
sometime deceiued of their voices (after that the kings were driuen out) and
little or no regard to be had of them, began tumultuously to arise: whereof
grew the three departures of the people
into the mount Auentine, whither the people in armes had retired them selues
for the defence of their libertie and power against the nobilitie: which could
not bee appeased vntill it was lawfull for them to chuse unto them selues their
owne sacred magistrats, and that in their owne assemblies, from which the
nobilitie was excluded: and then the Commonweal seemed in a maner to have beene
mixt of the nobilitie and the people. But if a man will consider the shortnes
of the time, and the turmoyles where with the Commonweal was in the meane time
afflicted, he shall confesse that it could scarce have stood in that state,
although most miserable twentie or thirtie yeares: neither yet so long, had it
not on every side beene beset with enemies. For shortly after the people tooke
unto them selues the power to make lawes,
wherein the maiestie of the Commonweal is contained; and so by little and
little wrested from the nobilitie (much against their will & long strugling
therefore) the other soueraigne rights also: in somuch that the nobilitie
scarce made twelue lawes in the space of foure or five hundred; And yet at the
same time that the people chose the greater magistrats by their greatest
assemblies, the vulgar people was there present, and enrolled in the sixt
companie, which although it most seldom gaue suffrage or voice, yet might it so
do, if the other companies should have disagreed among them selues: a reason
sufficient to showe the state even at that time also to have beene a popular state.
Yet for all that a man may say that it followeth not hereof that there are not
but three sorts of Commonweals, although they cannot be amongst them selues
mixed: for it may be that of threescore thousand citizens in a citie, fortie
thousand may have the soueraigntie, and twentie thousand be excluded: where,
for that the greater part beareth the sway, it shal be a popular state: and
contrarie wise if but an hundred of that multitude shall have the soueraigntie,
it shall be an Aristocracie; for that the lesse part of the citizens gathered
together hath the soueraigne power: what then, if of the same number of
citizens five and twentie thousand shall hold the chiefe power? Truely, it may
be doubted whether such a state be an Aristocracie, although the lesse part of
the citizens enioy the soueraigntie, the rest being reiected: for why, it
differeth much whether an hundred citizens, or
five and twentie thousand beare rule, and much more if of an hundred thousand
citizens five and fortie thousand have the soueraigntie: or of so great a
multitude thirtie onely should beare the sway, the rest excluded, as among the
Lacedemonians: yet I alwaies deeme it to be an Aristocracie, if the lesser part
of theIn what state soeuer the lesser number beareth rule
over th grea ter it is to be accounted an
Aristocratie. citizens beare rule over the rest: for otherwise if the
diuersitie of the number should make the diuersitie of Commonweals, there
should be of them a million, yea an infinite of diuers kinds of Commonweals:
for the number of them which should have part in the state encreasing or
diminishing, should make an infinite diuersitie, whereof no knowledge is to be
had; suffiseth it the soueraigne power to be with the greater orWhat a principa litie is. lesser part of the people, for
the making of an Aristocracie or Democracie. The rest of the difficulties which might be moued concerning the
nature of every Common weal shall hereafter be in due place declared.
Yet one thing remayneth in the question we have in hand to be discussed, which
is that the Roman Commonweal under the emperour Augustus, and the other emperours after him, unto the time of Flauius Vespatianus, was called a principalitie, of which
sort of Commonweal, neither Herodotus, neither any of
the Greek or Latine writers, except Tranquillus, seemeth
to make any mention: for he writeth that the emperour Caligula, seeing diuers kings at his table to enter into the tearmes
of honour, and the antiquitie of their houses among themselves; with a loude
voice brought forth that verse of Homer which Agamemnon vseth against Achilles,
who would needs make himselfe equall and
companion with him.
.
An euill thing it is to be ruled by many:one prince, and one king, where there is any.
And much it missed not but that hee had euen than taken upon him the imperiall
crowne, and chaunged the forme of the Roman principalitie into a kingdome; and
thus much he. whereby it is to be vnderstood the Roman state under Augustus after the battell at Actium, to have beene
neither a Popular state, an Aristocracie, nor a Monarchie. Now a principalitie is nothing else then an Aristocracie, or a
Democratie,What a Principalitie is. in which one
chiefe commaunded every man in particular, and it is but the first in generall:
for this word (Prince) to speake properly signifieth no
other thing but him that is first. So the Iewes complained Aristobulus the first of the house of the Amoneans, to have chaunged
the principalitie which was Aristocratique, into two kingdomes, at such time as
he tooke one crowne to himselfe, and sent an other to his brother. The like wee
find, that the auncient cities of Tuscanie made alliance with Tarquinius Priscus king of the Romans; upon condition that hee should
not have power over them of life and death: neither to
put garrisons into their townes, nor to impose
upon them any taxes or tallages; or to chaunge any of their customes or laws,
Sed vt ciuitatum principatus penes regem Romanum
esset, but that the principalitie of their cities onely should be with
the Roman king: for so saith Florus. Now all those
cities were of a popular state. Wherefore Tarquinius was
but the first and chiefe in the assemblies of those cities, who might gouerne
the multitude no otherwise than doth the emperour in the German empire, or the
duke in Venice, or Genua, who may most rightly be called princes, as in the
same sence in antient time the chief magistrat among the Athenians, was called
, or prince: yet was
that Commonweale of all other most popular.
But if there be two chiefe magistrats of like power, as in Rome; or three, as
in many cities of the Swissers; or foure, as
amongst them of Geneua; it cannot there be called a principalitie, for that
none is there chiefe or principall. But in the Roman Commonweale, Augustus by a crafty deuise hauing made himselfe but
great Generall of the armie (by the name of Imperator) and Tribune of the
people for defence of their profit, (from whome for all that he had taken their
libertie) and as it seemed almost enforced by the Senat, had taken upon him the
charge of the Commonweale for ten yeares, made that state in show and false
semblant but a principalitie, when as before hee had placed in all the
prouinces fortie legions, and taken three for the safetie of his person, and
put sure garrisons into all the castles and strong fortresses of the empire: so
inuading the royal power without a Scepter, without a Diadem, or a Crowne;
whose successors In matter of state he that is maister of the forces, is
master of the men, of the▪ lawes, and of all the commonweale.
(excepting some few) some more, some lesse, exercised most cruell tyranny. For
Tiberius in the beginning of his raigne, rise upon
the Consuls, and meeting them gaue them way, (as sayth Tranquillus) but afterwards oppressed the Commonweale with most filthy
seruitude and slauerie. But here is to be considered what was in deed done, and
was not made show of: for he that beareth greatest sway in the Commonweale, him
men thinke to have the soueraigntie: but if question be made of the right, then
are we to looke not what is indeed done, but what ought to be done. Wherfore it
appeareth a principalitie to be nothing els, but an Aristocratie, or a
Democratie, hauing some one for chiefe or principall aboue the rest, the
soueraigntie yet still remaining with the nobilitie or the people.
CHAP. II. ¶ Of a Lordly Monarchie, or of the sole
government of one.
WE have before said, that a Monarchie is a kind of
Commonweale, wherein the absolute soueraigntie lyeth in the power of one onely
prince: which definition we are now to explaine. When we say of one, so the
word Monarchie of it selfe importeth: For if we shall in theA true soueraig commaundeth all others his
subiects, but is himselfe by none commaunded. government ioyne two or
moe, no one of them shall have the soueraigntie: for that a soueraigne is hee
which commaundeth all others, and can himselfe
by none be commanded. If then there be two princes equall in power, one of them
hath not the power to commaund the other, neither can hee suffer the commaund
of the other his companion, if it stand not with his owne pleasure, otherwise
they should not be equals. Wee may then conclude, that of two princes equall in
power in the same Commonweale, and both of them in al things lords of the same
people, and of the same countrey indiuisibly, neither the one nor the other
hath therein the soueraigntie: but it may well be said them both together to
have the soueraignty of the state comprised under the name of an Oligarchie, but is more properly
called a Duarchie, a kind of Aristocracie, which may be
of continuance and durable, so long as the two
princes shall well agree together. As Romulus and Tatius, one of them king of the Romans, and the other of
the Sabines, after certaine conflicts, making peace entred into societie
together, upon condition, that both their people vnited together, should dwell
within the same walles, and by the name of Quirites by common soueraigntie be
gouerned by both kings. But Romulus, who before by the
slaughter of hisA very hard matter for two princes in one
and the same commonweale long to hold the soueraigntie togeather.
brother Remus had rid himselfe of his fellow in the
kingdome, could not long endure the straunger to raigne with him, but caused
him to be slaine, or at leastwise held the murtherer excused, being for the
fact apprehended. Long time after the Roman empire was conuerted from a
Monarchy into a Binarchie: at such time as Antoninus
Pius left M. Aurelius, and Aelius Verus, emperours, and both fellowes in the same
empire: of which two Aelius in short time after died, and not without the suspition of
poison. For it is, and alwayes hath bene a thing most hard to maintaine the
equall soueraigntie of both together. And that which Lucan writeth,
Nulla fides regni socijs, omnis que potestas,Impatiens consortis erit.No sincere loue is to be found in partners of the soueraigne state,And fellowship in power great, is alwaies mixt with mortall hate.
Is especially to be vnderstood of a Diumuirat, or soueraigne government of two
together. For that the government of three
or moe together in the soueraigntie, may bee firme, but of two not so; seeing
that by nature one thing is but contrarie to one, and not to many: the third as
a meane still ioyning the extreames together. And therefore the Roman
emperours, when as they at the same time tooke upon them the same soueraigntie
of government, least by the mutuall concurse of their power, they should violat
their faith and friendship, divided the empire, the one being emperor of the
East, and the other of the West; the one residing at Constantinople, and the
other at Rome, in manner as if they had bene two Monarches, although sometimes
the same edicts and lawes were in both empires by the common consent of both
princes published. Yet so soone as they began to quarrell, the two empires were
indeed divided in power lawes and estate. So
might a man say of the Lacedemonian Commonweale well gouerned by one king. But
when Aristodemus left the kingdome to be gouerned
wholly, and divided by his two sonnes Froclus and Euristhenes both at once, they quickly fell at oddes, and
had their state taken from them, by Lycurgus (beeing
himselfe a prince descended of the blood of Hercules)
and the soueraigntie by him giuen unto the people. The like happened unto Amphareus and Leucippus, kings of
the Messians. But the Argiues least they should sal into the same troubles, to
auoid the plurality of kings, at such time as Atreus and
Thyestes at once seised upon their fathers kingdome,
the people (I say) made choyce of the wiser, or as Lucian saith of the more learned. And the princes of the blood of Meronee and Charlemaigne, divided
the kingdome amongst them. So the children of
Clodoueus, of their fathers one kingdom made foure of
equall power. And the three children of Lewes the
Debonaire divided so many kingdomes amongst them. Neither do we read many at
once long to have holden a kingdome together vndivided: for the indiuisible
nature of soueraigntie, and the fellowship of government, is alwayes full of
dangers, where no one hath the soueraigntie, except when a straunge prince
marrieth a queene, among such as are acquainted with womens government: where
commonly the pictures of the man and his wife, their names and armes are ioined
together; as if the soueraigntie belonged unto them both: as it chanced when king Ferdinand married Isabel queene of Castile, Anthonie
of Burbon, Ioane queene of Nauarre, and Philip king of Spaine Marie the daughter of Henrie king of England. Howbeit the English men would not
suffer him to have any part with her in the soueraigntie, or of the fruites or
profis thereto belonging, but that the same should remaine wholly unto her
selfe; albeit that they were contented that they should both (for fashion sake)
beare the name, and both the one and the other signe charters, and commissions,
but yet so, as that the signe of the queene might of it selfe bee sufficient,
but that without hers the signe of king Philip should be
to no purpose. Which was also agreed upon with Ferdinand
king of Arragon, hauing married Isabel of Castile,I the king, and I the queene. where all the commaunds
were signed, Yo el Roy, and Yo la
Reyna; and by the secretarie of the
state, with sixe doctors: but as for the soueraigntie it was wholly in the
queene. Than which no more effectuall reason can be giuen against the
Manichies, who crroneously appointed two gods of equall power; one good, &
the other euil: for if it were so they being contrarie the one to the other,
should either ruinat the one the other, or els being at continuall variance,
should without ceasing trouble the sweet harmonie and concord that we see in
this great world. And how could the world endure those two lords of equall
power, and contrarie in will the one to the other, seeing that the least citie
or Commonweale cannot suffer two, albeit that they were brethren, if they
should fall neuer so little at variance: much more easily could it endure three
such princes than two; for that the third might vnite the two, or els ioyning
himselfe with the one, constraine them both to live in peace. As it happened so
long as Pompee, Caesar,A commonweale better gouerned by three great soueraigns then
by two. and Crassus lived, whome the people
called the monster with three heads: for so long they peaceably gouerned the
Roman empire, which then depended of their power. But so soone as Crassus was slaine in Caldea, straight way the other two
fell in sunder, and so egerly made warre the one of them upon the other, as
that to reconcile them was impossible, vntill that one of them had quite
ouerthrowne the other, and made himselfe maister of all. The like happened
after the death of Caesar, in the Triumuirat of Augustus, M. Antoninus, and Lepidus, who hauing of one popular Commonweale, made three Monarchies;
and Lepidus vnfit for government, had submitted his
authoritie unto Augustus, although Antoninus had married Augustus his sister, and
that they two had equally divided the empire betwixt them, and lived in
countries farre distant one from another; yet
rested they not long, but that the one of them was shaken out of all, by the
authoritie and power of the other. Whereafter ensued the sure state of the
empire, established under one mans government. Wherefore let vs hold it as
resolued upon, that it cannot be called a Monarchie, where the soueraigntie is
in two mens power; neither that any government can consist in that state, if
they shall fall at variance betwixt themselves.
Now Monarchie is divided into three formes: for he that hath the soueraigntie,
isThree sortes of monarchies. Great difference betwixt
the state, and the government of the state of a commonweale. either
lord of all: or else a king, or a tyrant, which maketh no diuersitie of Common
weals, but proceedeth of the diuersitie of the gouernour in the Monarchie: For
there is great difference betwixt the state, and the government of the state: a
rule in pollicie (to my knowledge) not before
touched by any man: for the state may be in a Monarchie, and yet the government
neuerthelesse popular; if the king do distribute all places of commaund,
magistracie, offices, and preferments indifferently unto all men, without
regard of their nobilitie, wealth, or vertue. But if the prince shall giue all
commaund, honours, and offices, unto the nobilitie onely, or to the rich, or to
the valiant, or to the vertuous onely, it shall be a royall Monarchie, and that
simple and pure, but yet tempered in maner of an Aristocracie. So also an
Aristocratique seigneurie, may gouerne their estate popularly; diuiding the
honours and preferments therein unto all the subiects
indifferently: or else Aristocratically, bestowing them upon the nobilitie or
richer sort onely; which varietie of government hath deceiued them which haue
made a mixture of Commonweals, and so made more sorts thereof then three,
without hauing regard that the state of a Commonweal is different from the
administration and government of the same: But this point we will farther touch
in place convenient.
Wherefore a lawfull or royall Monarchie is that where the subiects obey the
lawesThe three sorts of Monarchies aptly
described. of a Monarque, and the Monarque the lawes of nature, the
subiects inioying their naturall libertie, and proprietie of their goods. The
lordly Monarchie is that where the prince is become lord of the goods and
persons of his subiects, by law of armes and lawfull warre; gouerning them as
the master of a familie doth his slaues. The tyrannicall Monarchie, is where the prince contemning the lawes of
nature and nations, imperiously abuseth the persons of his free borne subiects,
and their goods as his owne. The same difference is also found in the
Aristocratique and popular estate: for both the one and the other may be
lawful, lordly, and tirannicall, in such sort as I have said: for the greatest
tyrannie of all other is of Tully called the rage of the
furious and turbulent people.
Now as concerning the lordly Monarchie, it is convenient for vs first to
intreatThe lordly Monarchie the first that was amongst
men. thereof, as of that which was first amongst men: for they are
deciued which following the opinion of Aristotle,
suppose that golden kind of men (more famous for the poets fables, then for
that there were any such in deed) to have made first choice of their heroicall kings: seeing we find, and all men are
perswaded that the first Monarchie was established in Assiria, under the power of Nemrod, whom the
holie scripture calleth the great hunter; which is a common phrase of speach
amongst the Hebrewes, by which word they signifie a
theefe, or robber. For the auntient writers, viz. Plato,
Aristotle, and Xenophon, have put robberie among
the kinds of hunting, as wee have elswhere noted. For before the time of Nemrod no man is found to have had powerNemrod the first Monarkie. and rule one over an other,
all men liuing in like libertie; he being the first that tooke upon him the
soueraigntie, and that caused free borne men to serue: whose name seemeth to
have beene giuen him according unto his qualitie, for asmuch as Nemrod signifieth a terrible lord. Soone after the world
was seene full of slaues, Sem one of the sonnes of Noe yet liuing. And in
the whole course of the Bible, the scripture speaking of the subiects of the
kings of Assiria and Aegipt, calleth them alwaies slaues: and not the holie
scripture onely, but the Greekes also, who alwayes in their writings tearme
them selues free, and the Barbarians slaues; meaning by the Barbarians the
people of Asia and Aegipt. And therefore the kings of Persia denouncing warre,
demaunded the earth and the waters, (as Plutache
writeth) to showe that they were absolute Lords of all that was in the land and
sea conteined. And that is it for which Xenophon in his
Cyropaedia writeth, that it is a thing good and
commondable among the Medes, that the prince should be lord and owner of all
things: And thereof came the adoration which not onely the subiects, but
straungers also, yea and the embassadors of
forren nations used towards the kings of Persia, to showe that all was in his
power. For when Themistocles, whose name euen then and
long before was most famous, would after the manner of the Greeks have spoken
unto the Persian king, Atabanus captaine of the kings
gard, kept him from comming unto him, neither would suffer him to preferre any
request unto him, vntill such time as he had after the Persian manner adored
him: but afterwards when he was gon out of the kings presence, hee courteously
spake unto him, and in these words excused that he had done; It is seemely O
Themistocles, to follow the fashion of the countrey
wherein a man is: you Grecians make great reckning of
your libertie and equalitie of commaund; but we esteeme it for the best thing in the world to reverence, serue, and
honour our king, as the image of the living God. Whereunto agreeth that which
Liuie writeth, Barbaris pro legibus
semper dominorum imperia fuerunt. The commaund of their lords haue
beene alwaiesA lordly Monarchie, not to be accounted a
tirannie and whie. unto the Barbarians for lawes. Neither ought this
lordly monarchie to be accounted a tyrannie: for it is not inconvenient, that a
soueraigne prince hauing in good and lawfull warre vanquished his enemies,
should make himselfe lord of their goods and persons by the law of armes,
governing them now his subiects, as doth the good housholder his seruants or
slaues: as wee see it a thing receiued by the manner and custome of almost all
nations. But the prince which shall by vniust warre, or other vnlawfull meanes
make of freemen his slaues, and possesse himselfe of their goods, is not a lordlike Monarche, but a verie tyrant: from
which Adrian the emperour was so farre, as that he would
not that a slaue a player, should enioy his libertie, which his master at the
request of the people of Rome had giuen him in the Theater, but left it to the
discretion of his master, to be as he thought good disposed of: As had Tiberius before, and after that Marcus
Aurelius Adrian his sonne in like case forbid the same: whatsoeuer
consent the master had giuen at the clamour of the people; reputing it rather
forced than done of good will: to the end that the full disposition should be
in every mans power, of that which unto him belonged. And now although at this
present there be few princes which have in their absolute power the bodies and
goods of their subiects, although we see many tyrants; yet are there many in
Asia and Africa: but in Europe I know none
which take so much upon them, beside the Princes of the Turkes, and of the
Moscouits. True it is that the Moscouits call themselves Chlopes,The great Turk and the Moscouite the only lordly Monarque in
Europe that is to say, seruants, which wee corruptly call slaues. But
the Fmperour of the Turkes styleth himselfe Sultan, that
is to say Lord: not so much for the largenes of his possession, (seeing that
the king of Spaine hath under his dominion and rule, people for their crueltie
barbarous, for their multitude innumerable, in places infinite: which his
kingdome is bounded with the same countries, wherewith the course of the sunne
is bounded, being ten times greater then the Turkes empire) but is therefore
called Lord of the Turkes, for that he is lord of their persons and goods; whom
for all that he gouerneth much more courteously and freely, then doth a good
housholder his seruants: for those whom wee
call the princes slaues, or seruants, the Turkes call them Zamoglans, that is
to say tribute children; whom the prince vseth no otherwise to instruct, then
if they were his children: and to bestow on them noble preferments, which are
of others desirously sought after. As for his Timariot horsmen, they hold all
their possessions in fealtie of the Prince, as it were during pleasure,
renewing their letters patents from ten yeares to ten yeares: neither when they
dye can they leaue their children heires of their possessions, but of their
moueables onely; except by the gift of the prince they keepe the possession of
their fathers lands, as they doe of his goods. Other princes there are none in
Europe which call themselves lords of the bodies and goods of their subiects,
and fewer in auncient time then at this present: for Augustus the emperour himselfe, although he were in
effect the greatest monarch in the world, yet so it was that he so abhorred to
be called Lord: neither had any that held of him in fealtie and homage.
Now if one say that there is no Monarque in Europe which pretendeth not all
theHow the goods and landes of subiects belong unto the
soueraigne prince. goods and lands of his subiects to belong unto him
in right of direct soueraigntie, neither any man which confesseth not to hold
his goods of his soueraigne prince: yet I say that that sufficeth not that any
man should therefore of right be called lord of all, or a lordly Monarche:
seeing that every subiect hath the true proprietie of his owne things, and may thereof dispose at his pleasure: although the
prince for pompe and show challenge vnto
himselfe the soueraigntie thereof. And yet there are diuers lands which are
called Allodial, wherein the prince hath neither proprietie, nor
soueraigneThe Hunnes the first that brough the lordly
soueraignmēt of Monarks into Europ. right, as not holden of him. The
Hunns a Tartar-like nation come from the farthest parts of Scythia, at such
times as they with fire and sword destroied almost all Europe, first showed the
example unto the Lombards and Almans, Germaine nations, and to the Frankes, the
auncient inhabitants of Fraunce, calling themselves Lords of all, and so
accustomed these nations to lord it over all: as that no man could hold a turfe
of ground but by their leaue. True it is that the Romans hauing vanquished
their enemies, most commonly solde them for slaues, or else condemned them to
lose the* Plutar in . seauenth part of their lands: which lands they straight waies gaue vnto
their Colonies in pure proprietie. But princes
and people instructed in ciuilitie, for feare of rebellion, or distrust of
their owne power, reiected such lordlike soueraigntie as had the kings of
Persia and Asia over their subiects: contenting themselves with the shadow of
such lordly Monarchie. And albeit that the Persian kings before the time of Artaxerxes, had used to cause their great lords and
magistrats to be stript starke naked before them and whipped as slaues: yet
king Artaxerxes was the first that ordained that they
should in deed be stript, but should not have but their cloathes and garments
onely beaten: and wheras their haire was wont in dispite to be pulled off, he
commaunded the wooll of their cappes onely to be so pulled. True it is that Francis Aluarez writeth, that heThe
great Negus of AEthiopia a lordly Monarque. hath seene in Aethiopia
the great Chauncelour, and other great lords and gouernours of prouinces stript starke naked, and cast upon the ground
whipped as slaues before their prince: who held the same as a great honour vnto
them; by the discourse of whose hystorie, a man may easilie gather the great
Negus of Aethiopia to be a Lordly Monarque. But the people of Europe more
couragious, and better souldiers then the people of Africke or Asia, could
neuer endure the lordly Monarques, neither had euer used them before the
incursions of the Hunnes into Europe, as I have before said. And first of all
Odonacre king of the Herules, who almost at the same
time invaded Italie, that Attila did Germanie; hauing
brought Italie under his subiection, tooke the third part of the territorie
from the subiects (the punishment of all people by him vanquished,) but left
their persons free, and themselves lords of their goods, without any The beginning of tenants and fees, and what in auntient time
they were. tenure, or yeelding unto him of any fealtie or homage. But
after that the Almans, Lombards, Frenchmen, Saxons, Burgundians, Gothes,
Ostrogothes, Englishmen, and other Northren people had tasted the maners and
customes of the Hunnes, they began to make themselves Lords, not of the
persons, but of all the lands of them whom they had vanquished: and yet
afterward reseruing unto themselves the most fruitfull part thereof, left the
rest unto the auncient inhabitants, to be by them inioyed, yet as holden of
them in fealtie, with paying of some small tribute if they should change the
possession thereof: which for this cause are called Seigneuries, or Lordships;
to show that the shadow of the auncient lordly Monarchie as yet remayneth,
although greatly diminished. For these fees and lordships were in auncient time
nothing else but benefits and rewards giuen to
souldiors for terme of their lives, and afterward by favour continued from the
father to the sonne: except dukedomes, marquisats, earledomes, and other like
honours and dignities, giuen unto dukes, marqueses, earles, and such like
honorable personages, and not unto the lands: a custome not yet chaunged in
England and Scotland for regard of the dignities, where the dukes and counties
being dead, their children and successours have their lands; but not still the
dignities, prerogatives, and titles of their predecessours: for when fees or
lands were giuen to souldiours for terme of their lives, they afterward
obtained, that they might either by their wills, or
else dying intestate, leaue them unto their children; and that if there were no
heires males left, they should by law
descend unto the women: excepting in Germany, where the women are excluded from
the inheritance of lands in fee▪ which was the strongest argument which Fredericke countie of Vaudemont used against Renat of Aniou king of Sicilie at the counsell of
Constance, demaunding of the Emperour that he might be invested in the dukedome
of Loraine, considering that it was an imperial fee, and by consequent that Isabel wife to Renate was not
thereof capable: although she were the duke of Lorains daughter. Howbeit that
Renate the king of Sicilie, might by an other reason
have defended himselfe, that is to say, that in question of fees, and seruices,
we are to follow the lawes and customes of the land that oweth the seruice, and
not of that whereunto the seruice is due: now by the custome of Loraine the
daughters succeede in fees. But how soeuer
it be, most certein it is that the marks ofThe markes of
lordly Monarchies more to be seene in the Northren countries then in any
other parts of Europ. Lordly Monarchies, have continued in Germanie,
and towards the North more than in the other parts of Europe. For albeit that
William the Conquerour, hauing conquered the realme
of England, by force of armes, called himselfe not onely lord of that realme,
but also caused it to be proclaimed, that the soueraigntie and proprietie of al
his subiects goods, mouable, and immouable unto him belonged: yet neuerthelesse
so it was, that he contented himselfe with the direct soueraigntie, fealtie and
homage: theCharls the fift made himselfe the lordly Monorque
of Peru. subiects still enioying their libertie, and full propertie
of their goods. But the emperour Charles the fift, after
he had subdued the great countrey of Peru, made himselfe Lordly Monarch
thereof, causing all things to be holden of him, excepting the
slaues, whome for that they were innumerable
he caused to be set at libertie. As for the lands he left them to be enioyed by
them that possessed them at his pleasure: and not to descend unto their
children by inheritance. A craftie and subtill deuice, whereby Lagasca the lawyer, the emperours lieutenant in Peru (Gonsulo Pizarra, and the rest of the authors of rebellion
vanquished and ouerthrowne) by a perpetuall bond to keepe the inhabitants of
that country, within the compasse of their duety, compelled them for euer to
aske of the king of Spaine, the possession of their goods, their kinsmen beeing
dead: except the parents themselves yet liuing, had before procured the same to
be graunted for their children in time to come: which was not to be obtained
without a great sum of money to be paid into the kings coffers: they of greater
power in the meane time being thereby kept
from raising of any new sturres. For like cause whereof in oneAll persons of what degree soeuer sorbidden by the Mahometain
lawes, the great Caliph only excepted. chapter of Mahomets, it is forbiden all persons of what degree or qualitie soeuer
to call themselves in any sort lords, except the Caliph, or great bishop the
successour of Mahomet, who at the first was the onely
Lordly Monarch or lord of all, giuing unto kings and princes their
principalities and kingdomes, during his pleasure, vntil that the Othoman
princes, the Curdes, and the kings of the higher part of Asia and Afrike, by
little and little exempted themselves out of their power (by reason of the
diuision betwixt them and the Anticaliphes) and so tooke unto themselves the
kingdomes of those countries.
But yet here might some man doubt whether the lordly Monarchie be not a
Tyranny,A lordly monarkie no tiranny. considering that it
seemeth to be directly against the law of nature, which reserueth unto euerie
man his libertie, and the soueraigntie over his owne goods. Wherunto I
aunswere, that of auntient time it was indeed against the law of nature to make
free men slaues, and to possesse himselfe of other mens goods: but if the
consent of all nations will, that that which is gotten by iust warre should bee
the conquerours owne, and that the vanquished should be slaues unto the
victorious, as a man cannot well say that a Monarchie so established is
tyrannicall: seeing also wee read that Iacob the
Patriarch, by his testament leauing unto his children certaine lands that hee
had gotten, said that it was his owne, for that he had
got it by force of armes. And that more is,
the rule that willeth that the law of armes should take no place where there be
superiours to do iustice (which is put in practise against the greatest
princes, and imperiall cities of Germany, who be proscribed by the empire, for
not making restitution of that which belonged to others) sheweth right well,
that where there is no superiour to commaund, their force is reputed iust. For
otherwise, if we will mingle and confound the Lordly Monarchie, with the
tyrannicall estate, we must confesse that there is no difference in warres,
betwixt the iust enemie and the robber; betwixt a lawfull prince and a theefe;
betwixt warres iustly denounced, and vniust and violent force; which the
antient Romans called plaine robberie and theft. We also see tyrannicall states
and governments, soone to fall, and many tyrants in short time slaine: whereas
the seigneurelike states, and namely the
Lordly Monarchies have bene both great and of long continuance, as the auntient
Monarchies of the Assyrians, the Medes, Persians, & Aegyptians;Whie the lordly monarchie is more durable then the royall
monarchie. and at this present that of Aethiopia (the most auntient
Monarch of all Asia and Afrike) whereunto are subiect fiftie kings as slaues,
if we may beleeue Pau. Iouius, who all are, and tearme
themselves the slaues of the Grand Negus of Aethiopia. And the reason why the
Lordly Monarchie is more durable than the royall, is for that it is more
maiesticall, and that the subiects hold not their lives, goods, and libertie,
but of the soueraigne prince, who hath by iust warre conquered them; which
plucketh downe the courage of subiects, so that the slaue acknowledging his
condition, becommeth humble, abiect, and hauing as they say a base and seruile
hart. Where to the contrarie, men free borne,
and lords of their owne goods in a royall Monarchie, if one would make them
slaues, or take from them that theirs is, they would not take it, but easily
rebell, bearing noble harts, nourished in libertie, and not abastardised with
seruitude. And thus much concerning a Lordly Monarchie: Now let vs speake of
the Monarchie Royall.
CHAP. III. Of a Royall Monarchie.
A Royal Monarch or king, is he which placed in
soueraignty yeeldeth A royall Monarque. himselfe as obedient unto the
lawes of nature as he desireth his subiects to be towards himselfe, leauing
unto every man his naturall libertie, and the proprietie of his owne goods. I
have put to these last words for the difference of a Lordly Monarch, who may be
a iust and vertuous prince, and equally gouerne his subiects, being himselfe
yet neuerthelesse lord both of their personsThe difference
betwixt a royall and a lordly Monarque. and goods. And if it so
chaunce the Lordly Monarch hauing iustly conquered his enemies countrey, to set
them againe at libertie, with the proprietie of their goods: of a lord he
becommeth a king, and chaungeth the Lordly Monarchie, into a Monarchie Royall.
And that is it for which Plinie the younger saith vnto
Traian the emperour,Principis sedem obtines, ne sit Domino locus, Thou
holdest the seate of a prince, Lord it not. This difference (betwixt a Royall
Monarch and a Lordly) was well noted by the auntient Persians, calling Cyrus the elder (which ouerthrew the Monarchie of the
Medes) by the name of a king: but tearming Cambyses a
lord, and Darius a marchant; for that Cyrus was a gentle and courteous prince towards his subiects, but Cam byses his sonne was haughtie and proud, and Darius too great an exactor and couetous. So it is also
reported Alexander the Great to have bene aduised by Aristotle, to beare himselfe towards the Greekes as a
father; but towards the Barbarians as a lord: which
his councell Alexander neuerthelesse reiected, willing
that the Greekes should be reckoned of
according to their vertue, and the Barbarians according to their vices; saying,
that the whole earth was but one citie, and his campe the Castle thereof.
We have moreover said in our definition, that the subiects ought to be obedient
unto the Royall Monarch, to show that in him alone lyeth the soueraigne
maiestie; & that the king ought to obey the lawes of nature: that is to
say, to gouerne his subiects, and to guide his actions atcording unto naturall
iustice, whose luster was brighter than the light of the sunne it selfe. It is
then the true marke of a Royall Monarchie, when theThe true
markes of a royall Monarque. prince sheweth himselfe as obedient vnto
the lawes of nature, as he wisheth his subiects to be unto himselfe. Which it
is not hard for him looking into the dutie of a good prince to obtaine; as fearing God aboue all; if he be also
pitifull unto the afflicted, wise in his enterprises, hardie in his exploits,
modest in prosperitie, constant in aduersitie, aduised in his speech, wise in
his councell, careful of his subiects, comfortable to his friends, terrible to
his enemies, courteous to the good, dreadfull towards the euill, and iust
towards all. Which royall soueraigntie so set downe, as that the subiects stand
obedient unto the lawes of their prince, and the prince likewise unto the lawes
of nature: the law being on both sides a mistresse, or as saith Pindarus, a queene raigning over both, it shall in the
same bonds vnite the subiects among themselves, and together with their prince:
whereof shall grow a most sweet harmony, which may with wonderfull pleasure and
felicitie blesse them both. This is that regall and lawfull Monarchie of
one, which we seeke after, whether the
kingdome descend by succession, as it most commonly doth; or by the law, as
this of ours, or by election, as in many kingdomes towards the North; or by
gift, as the kingdome of Numidia (which by Caesar
brought into the forme of a prouince, was by Augustus
the emperour giuen to young Iuba, who so of a slaue
became a king) or as the kingdome of Naples, and Sicilie, giuen to Charles of Fraunce, and after to Lewes, first duke of Aniou, or left by testament, as in former times
the kingdomes of Tunes, Fez, and Marocco, and was also of late put in practise
by Henrie the eight king of England, who by his will
left that kingdome unto his son Edward the sixt, to whom
hee substituted his sister Marie, and unto her Elizabeth, who was afterward queene: or that the kingdome
bee got by fraud and deceir, so that he raigne
iustly, as Cecrops, Hieron, Gelon, and Pisistratus, who right wisely used their power, as saith Plutarch: and in our time Cosmus de
Medices: or by chaunce, as the kingdome of Persia, by the neying of an
horse fel to Darius Histaspis one of the seuen Persian
lords, it being so before agreed, after they had slaine the Mages, who had
vsurped the kingdome, that he whose horse first neyed, should have the
kingdome: or be it that the prince by force of armes, by right or wrong conquer
his kingdome, prouided that he uprightly gouerne the same so by him conquered;
as Titus Liuius saith of king Seruius,
Neque enim praeter vim quicquam adius regnt habebat. Neither had he any
thing but force unto the right of the kingdome; and yet he was a good king, as
it oftentimes hath bene seene of a robber and a theefe, to have proued a
vertuous prince; and of a violent tyranny, to
have growne a iust royaltie. Or be it that the king bee chosen for his
nobilitie, as was Campson chosen Sultan of Aegypt by the
Mamalukes: or for his iustice and deuotion, as Numa in
Rome: or for his age, as the antient Arabians made choice of the eldest amongst
them for their king, as saith Diodorus, and they of
Taprobana, as saith Pliny: or for his strength and
force, as Maximinus the Roman emperor, being of such
stature and strength, as that he seemed to have come of the race of Giants: or
for his feature and beautie, as was Heliogabalus,
therefore chosen emperour of the same Roman empire: or for his height and
stature, as in Aethiopia the kingdomes were still
giuen to the tallest: or for that he could drinke most, as in Scythia, as Aristotle saith; who defineth a king to be him, who
chosen by the people, raigneth according to the desire of them his subiects:
from whose will (as hee in another place saith)* Polit lib. 3. if he neuer so little depart, he
becommeth a tyrant. Which his description is not onlyAristotle blamed. without reason, but also daungerous: for that
soucraigne power which he said to bee most proper unto a king, must so needs
fall, if the king could nothing command against the liking and good will of his
subiects; but must to the contrarie be constrained to receiue lawes of them In
briefe it should be lawfull for the people to do all things; and the most iust
and best kings should so be accounted for tyrants: neither were a king to be
reputed of any thing else, than as of a meane magistrat, unto whome power were
to bee giuen, and againe taken away at the peoples pleasure. Which are all
things impossible, and no lesse absurd also,
than is that which the same Aristotle saith, That they
are barbarous people, where their kings come by succession. When as yet his
owne king and scholler Alexander the Great, was one of
them which descended in right line from the blood of Hercules, and by right of succession came to the kingdom of Macedon.
The Lacedemonians should be also barbarous, who from the same stocke of the
Heraclides, had had their kings about a thousand yeares. The people of Asia
also, the Persians, and Aegyptians, should so all bee barbarous: in whome not
onely rested, but from whome all humanitie, courtesie, learning, knowledge, and
the whole source and fountaine of good lawes and Commonweales have sprung: and
so at last none but Aristotle with some handfull of
Greekes should bee free from barbarisme.
Whereas indeed nothing can be deuised more daungerous unto the state ofThe opinion of Aristotle concerning kings impugned. Arist. Polit. 3 a Commonweale, than to commit
the election of kings unto the suffrages of the people; as shall in due place
be hereafter declared. Although Aristotle be in that
also deceiued, where he saith, That there be three sorts of kings; & yet
hauing in his discourse reckoned up foure, in casting up of the account he
findeth out a fift. The first hee calleth Voluntarie kings, as raigning by the
will and good liking of the people, such as were the kings of Heroique times,
whome he supposeth to have bene Captains, Iudges, and Priests. The second he
saith, are proper unto the barbarous nations, where kings come by succession.
The third are made by election. The fourth was proper to the Lacedemonians,
whome he saith to have bene perpetuall generals in their warres; the sonne still succeeding his father. The fift and
last kind, is of them which hauing themselves got the Lordly soueraigntie, vse
their subiects, as doth the maister of the house his slaues. As for the first
sort of kings, we find, that they indeed executed the offices of judges,
captaines, and priests, yet none of them are found to have ruled at the will
and pleasure of the people, either to have receiued their authoritie from the
people, before Pitacus king of Corinth, and Timondas king of Nigropont: but to the contrarie* Plutarch writeth, That the first princes had no other
honour before their eyes,Plutar i
These. than to force men, and to keepe them in subiection as slaues:
whereof the holy scripture also certifieth vs of the first Lordly Monarch Nemrod; leauing the soueraigntie to their children, in
right of succession; as saith Thucidides. Which hath
also beene well confirmed by the succession of
a great number of kings of the Asirians, Medes, Persians, Indians, Aegyptians,
Hebrewes, Lacedemonians, Macedonians, Sicyonians, Epirots, Athenians: and their
lines failing, the people in part proceeded to make choice of their kings by
way of election, some others inuaded the state by force, other some maintained
themselves in Aristocratike and popular seigneurie; as witnesseth Herodotus, Thucidides, Iosephus, Berosus, Plutarch,
Xenophon, and other most auntient historiographers of the Hebrewes,
Greeks, and Latines, sufficient to conuince the opinion of Aristotle of vntruth in those things that he hath writ concerning
kings. Whereas also he comprehendeth the Lacedemonian
generals, under the name of kings: he is therein deceiued, seeing it is before declared, that he cannot be a king, which hath
not the rights of soueraigntie. And that the Lacedemonian kings, after the
conuersion of that Commonweale, were nothing but Senators, and subiect to the
magistrats commaund, wee have also before shewed. Yea the generals power was
not alwaies giuen unto them, as Aristotle supposeth, who
calleth them the perpetuall generals of the warres: for asmuch as that power
and authoritie was communicated to their citisens also, as to Lysander, Leonidas, Callicratides, Gilippus, whome the Lacedemonians
oppressed with warres preferred before their kings. And albeit that Agesilaus was one of their kings, yet so it was, that he
durst not take upon him the charge of a generall, vntill the Seigneurie had so
commanded; as Plutarch in his lives reporteth. And when
they were chiefe captaines and generals, they
gaue them yet no royall power, no more than had the generals of the Acheans,
which were made by election, considering that they were subiect unto the slate
of the Acheans, who if they so deserued punished them, as they did Democritus their generall, whome they fined at thirtie
thousand crownes, as wee read in Pausanias. So the
Ephori punished their kings with banishment, imprisonment, and fines, yea and
sometime wih death, as we have before said. We must
not therefore put these in the ranke of kings, no more than him which is a
Lordly Monarch, lord of the persons and goods of his subiects, who hath his
proper difference seperated from a Monarch Royall.
As for the third sort of kings, which he said was made by election, that can
make no difference of kings, no more than can
the second, which he said was by succession, for otherwise he should by the
same meanes make also a sixt kind of kings, made by chaunce; as was Darius the first: and so a seuenth by donation, an eight
by testament,The difference of Monarques hw it is to be gathered. and a ninth by finnes
and deceit, and a tenth by force: which were nought else, but to make an
infinit sort of kings, who all neuerthelesse are comprehended under one kind.
For the difference of Monarches is not to be gathered by the meanes of the
comming to the state, but by the meanes of gouerning of the estate. Which as we
said is comprised in three kinds or sorts, viz. the
Lordly Monarchie, the Royall Monarchie, and the Tirannicall Monarchie. But
whereas Aristotle under the name of kings comprehendeth
them also which were woont for a short time to be chosen, to establish or
reforme the Commonweale, and that done, to
giue up their charge, are quite different from the regall power. Neither hath
it any apparance to call them kings, which are nothing els but simple
commissioners, such as were the dictators in the Roman Commonweale, whome Dionysius Halicarnasseus writeth, to have bene in power
and office like unto them whom the Thessalians called Archos, the Lacedemonians Cosmos, the
Mitylenians Aesymnetes, hauing like charge that the
baily of Florence had at such time as that Commonweale was gouerned by a
popular government; that is to wit, the Grand Councell of the people made
choyce of eight or ten persons, best seene in their affaires, to reestablish
the state, and to put againe in order that which by processe of time was fallen
into disorder, either in their lawes, or in their customes, in their
reuenewes, or in creating of their officers:
which done they discharged themselves of their offices: like as the Decemuiri,
or ten commissioners, which were chosen in Rome, to reforme that was amisse in
the state, whome wee should by this meanes, according to the opinion of Aristotle call also kings; which should be a thing verie
absurd; for asmuch as the qualitie of a magistrat, and much lesse of a
commissioner hath nothing agreeing or common with the soueraigne maiestie of a
king. And albeit that Caesar in his Commentaries saith,
the inhabitants of Autun to have euerie yeare chosen them a magistrat with
royall power; that is of them but improperly spoken: for why, it is manifest,
that he which was a magistrat could be no king. And
that more is, the gouernours of the countries
and prouinces conquered by Alexander the Great, although
that after his death euerie one of them tooke upon him the soueraigntie in the
country or prouince that he gouerned; yet it was a long time before they durst
stile themselves by the name of kings. The first that began was Antigonus, after the victorie by himAntigonus the first of the successours of Alexander that stiled himselfe
king. obtained against Ptolomeus Lagus: after
which he set a crowne upon his head, and used in his titles the name of , or king. And immediatly
after, the Aegyptians called Ptolomee king; as to their
imitation did the Assyrians Seleucus, and the Thracians
Lysimachus also. And not to go further, the auntient
kings of Loraine and Burgundie, after that they had yeelded fealtie and homage
unto the German emperour, lost the name and soueraigntie of kings, and called
themselves but dukes: for that now they were
no more kings, according to that fit saying of Martial,
Quirex est, regem Maxime non habeat. For why, the name of a king is
alwaies maiesticall, and the most honourable that a soueraigne prince can haue:
and for that cause the habit, the markes, the signes of kings, have bene
alwaies particular, and proper unto themselves; as the royal armes, the golden
robes, the crowne and scepter, not to be communicated unto other men. And there
was nothing that made the maiestie of the Roman kings so venerable, as the
royall ornaments which Tarquinius Priscus brought from
the antient kings of Hetruria, as we read in the histories. And the Romans
themselves, after they had driuen out the proud Tarquin
their king, although they abhorred the verie name of a king, and much more the
government, hauing chaunged the royall state into a popular: yet so it was, that the Roman Senat used to send unto kings,
their allies and confederats, the royall marks of kings; namely a diadem or
crowne of gold, a cup of gold, the iuorie scepter; and sometime the popular
robe embroidered with gold, & a chaire of iuorie, as the histories declare.
And in the Commentaries of pope Gregory the
seuenth,* Tacit lib 2. Appianu,
Liuius Val. Max. we read that Demetrius was by the scepter,
crowne, and ensigne established king of Croatia and Sclauonia: of which things
the bishops of Rome have oftentimes bene liberall (should I say) or prodigall?
aswell as the emperours: yet had they no more so to do, then had the Greeke
emperour Anastasius, who sent the Consulatie ornament
and titles of Augustus unto Clodoueus king of Fraunce, who (as Aymon saith)
receiued them in the citie of Tours: or than Iustinian,
who gaue unto king Childebert the title of a Senator: by which things it is certaine, to be
derogated from the soueraignty of anothers maiestie, which is it selfe the
chiefest, except they bee receiued from them that are in their confederation
their superiours. But as for the Frenchmen they had not made any league with
the Greeke emperours, but by their valour had thrust the Romans out of the
possession of their kingdome. True it is, that betwixt confederats of equall
power, ornaments of honour, as girdles, rings, and such like, may both bee
giuen and receiued, without any emparement to their maiestie: but to receiue
the honor of a Consull, or of a Senator, is as much as to acknowledge the
maiestie of a superiour. Frederike the emperour (first
of that name) sent unto Peter prince of Denmarke, a
sword and a crowne, with the title of a king, which was a title contrarie to
the effect, considering that he yeelded
himselfe vassall unto the empire, and did fealtie and homage unto the emperour,
for the realme of Denmarke, promising and binding aswell himselfe as his
successours, to hold that kingdome of the empire, in this forme, Tritemi cap. 17.Rex Danorum Magnus se in potestatem Imperatoris tradidit,
obsidesdedit, iuramentum fecit, se successoresque suos, non nisi imperatoris
& successorum eius permissu regnum adepturos, The great king of the
Danes hath delivered himselfe into the power of the emperour, hath giuen
hostages, taken his oath, that he and his successours shall not but by the
sufferance of the emperour and his successours, take upon them that kingdome.
Wherein he two wayes offended, first, for that allured
with the ornaments sent him by the emperour,
hee diminished his owne maiestie: and then for that he bound unto perpetuall
seruitude, not himselfe onely, but his posteritie also: who perceiuing the
errour, reuolted from the empire. for seeing that the kingdome of Denmarke
depended of the voices and suffragies of the Senat and the people, hee could
not bind, not onely his posteritie, but not so much as himselfe unto that law.
The duke of Austria also was by the same emperour, and
almost at the same time, honored with the same ornaments and title, yet with
condition that hee should still remaine in the perpetuall obeisance of the
German Empire, wherein he then was, and euer had beene: but when he breaking
his faith, had reuoulted from the empire, he was within twelue yeares after
spoyled both of his royall dignitie and title. By like errour Henry the first king of England, sonne to William the Conquerour, whilest he yet lived caused Henry his eldest sonne to bee crowned king: for he
straight way after, would needs be equall with his father, and take upon him to
mannage the greatest affaires of state; in such sort that great quarrels and
contentions arise betwixt the father and the sonne, euen unto parts taking,
which had without doubt ruinated the state, had not the sonne beene before by
death prevented. So also in this realme, when the familie of the Capets had vsurped the kingdom, the better to confirme
their wealth and power, not as yet well grounded; lest the kingdom after the
death of their kings should fall into an Anarchie, they still caused▪ their
sonnes (whilest they themselves yet lived) to be crowned and proclaimed kings.
So Hugh to assure this succession, caused his sonne
Robert to be crowned king: Robert,
Henry: and he afterwards Philip; which manner of
crowning of the sonnes, the fathers yet liuing, after their estate and power
better confirmed and established, was againe left. And so to doe, unto mee
seemeth a thingDaungerous for soueraign princes to cause
their sonnes whilst they themselves yet live to be crowned king with them. verie daungerous, especially if
the new crowned king be sicke with the ambitious desire of rule: for that the
subiects more willingly behold the sunne rising then setting: except the king
have many kingdomes, with great fluds, most high mountaines, or the deepest
seas, one from an other divided, not easily with the wings of aspiring ambition
to be passed. So Seleucus king of both Asiaes, graced
his sonne Antiochus not onely with the royall dignitie,
but also placed him in the government of the kingdome of the higher Asia; which
is a thing may well be suffered where kings have used to be created by the voices of the Senat, and the people▪ as are the
kings of Denmarke, Sueuia, Polonia, Tartaria, Bohemia, Hungarie, and Tunes: who
commonly cause him whom they desire to raigne, to be before hand elected by the
suffragies of the people, and to bind the princes by oath unto him, So Changuis first of all the Tartar kings, chosen king by
his subiects, caused Hoccata his eldest sonne to be
crowned king, himselfe yet liuing. And Gostanus king of
Sweden hauing vsurped upon that state against the king of Denmarke, caused his
sonne Henry to be also chosen king. And Frederik now king of Denmarke, was chosen king in the
yeare 1556, two yeares before the death of his father: who not yet so secured,
but doubting least his vncles Iohn and Adolphe after his death should practize a new election, and so raise
new stirres, requested the French king by M. Danzai the French ambassadour, and afterward by an
embassadour of his owne, (sent directly for that purpose) to stand his friend,
and to receiue him into his protection. So have done, and yet also doe the
kings of Marocco, Fez, and Tunes. And in our memorie Ferdinand of Austria yet liuing, caused Maximilian his sonne to be chosen and crowned king of Hungarie and
Bohemia: as shortly after Maximilian did the like for
his sonne Ernestus; and so peoples voices by little and
little taken away are at length quite buried in obliuion. The like was also
attempted for the nominating of his successour by Sigismundus
Augustus king of Polonia, but was letted so to
doe by the states of that kingdom, although it seemed for the good of that
Common weal, for the auoyding of sedition,
which might rise about the election: yet would not the states of that kingdom
thereto agree; for feare least the right of their election, should so passe
into the force of succession. As we see the Germain Empire to have taken so
deepe roote in the most honorable familie of the house of Austria, as that there is but little hope for the pulling of it out
thence againe. And thus much concerning a royall Monarchie: now let vs likewise
speake of the third kind, which is a Tyrannicall Monarchie.
CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of a Tirannicall Monarchie.
A Tirannicall Monarchie is that where one man
treading vndetÀ tirannicall Monarchie. foot the lawes
of God and nature, abuseth his free borne subiects as his slaues: and other
mens goods as his owne. This word Tyrant deriued from
the Grekes was of the proprietie thereof honorable, and in auncient time
signified no other thing then a Prince, which without the consent of the
people, had by force or fraud possessed himselfe of the state; and of a
companion made himselfe their master: whom they called a Tyrant, although he
wereThe name of a tirant in auntient time taken in good
part: and how the same became odious. a right wise and iust prince.
So Plato writing to Dionysius the
Tyrant of Syracusa by way of honour giueth him
this title; Plato to Dionysius the Tyrant greeting, and
the answere was; Dionysius the Tyrant to Plato health.
And so the rest aswell philosophers as friends, honestly called them Tyrants
which had by force or finenesse got the soueraigntie of their cities and
states: in which name the Tyrants themselves also gloried. And to show that the
name of a Tyrant was aswell giuen unto a good and iust prince, as to an euill
and wicked, it appeareth euidently in that, that Pittacus and Periander reckened among the
seauen Sages of Graece, were called Tyrants, hauing taken unto themselves the
state and government of their countries. But for the mercie of their enemies,
were constrained for the safetie of their lives and goods to have gardes of
straungers about their persons, and great garisons in their fortresses and
strong holds: and for the maintenance of their
souldiours and retinue were enforced to lay upon their subiects great
impositions and tributes: and seeing their lives not yet so assured, hauing but
poore friends, and puisant enemies, put to death, or banished the one, to
enrich the other; and hauing taken their goods, rauished also their wiues and
children: they with these outragious enormities raised a wonderful hatred of
themselves through out the whole world. For we read that Dionysius the elder which had oppressed Syracusa had alwaies about him
for the garding of his person and the citie ten thousand footmen, and as many
horsemen; beside a fleete of foure hundred gallies still readie furnished with
all things necessarie: and yet thought it not a strength sufficient to keepe
under those fewe citizens that were left, whom he had vtterly disarmed, and in
most seruile manner oppressed: although hee
had before taken away not onely their societies and companies; but forbidden
also neighbours and friends to eate together, and oft times commaunded them
returning home from supper or making merie, to be robbed and spoiled by his
garde; to the intent there might bee the lesse friendship amongst them, and so
they more hardly conspire against him. And yet for all that Plutarque hath giuen him the praise of a good prince, as one who in
iustice and vertue exceeded many, who abusing the most honorable names of
Kings, are themselves polluted and defiled with all maner of vices. For we are
not much to rest upon the vaine show of words and
glorious titles; when as often times the worst men arrogate unto them
selues the most commendable names, showes,
and recognancies of vertue; against which sort of Princes, the subiects for all
that vse to cast forth most reproachfull taunts: as the three Ptolemeis kings of Aegypt; of whom the one had put to death his
brother; the other his mother; and the third his father: the subiects in
derision called them A lover of his brother.Philadelphe,A lover of his mother.Philometor, and A lover of his
father.Philopator. Also the most reuerend and holy names haue
become abhominable, for the wickednesse of them that have most filthyly abused
the same. The name truely of a king is holy, yet was it for the pride of Tarquinius, and the rauishment of Lucretia by his sonne, made hatefull unto the Romans. And the crueltie
of Scylla in his Dictatorship made the Dictators odious.
So the immoderat ambition of Francis Valori made the
Confalonniers of Florence hatefull unto the
Florentines. And so also it is euident, the name of Tyrant to have bene hateful
to all nations for oppressing of the people.
But it may be, that one and the same prince, whose dominion is large and wide,
may beare himselfe as a king unto his naturall subiects: and as a lordly
monarch towards them, whome he hath by iust warre subdued, and as a tyrant
toward the rest: or that in the same citie he may tyrannise over the rich and
better sort of the citisens; and yet show himselfe courteous and gentle vnto
the poore and baser sort. And amongst tyrants there are diuers sorts and
degrees of more or lesse: and as there is not so good a prince, which hath not
some notable vice; so wee see that there is none so cruell a tyrant, which is
not endued with some good vertue, or hath not in him some thing to be commended. Wherefore it is a thing of most euill
example, and thereto daungerousA soueraign princes actions
are not by his subiects to be rashly censured▪ withall, rashly and
foolishly to censure a prince, whose actions and comportments we throughly know
not; whereas we ought first wisely to weigh his vertues and vices, his
heroicall or base and euill disposition: after the manner of the Persians, who
condemned no man to death (although conuicted of the crime whereof he was
accused) except it first appeared by his former life, whether his vices
exceeded his vertues or not. For so Liuie did well, who
hauing diligently reckoned up Hannibal his vertues, and
comming afterward unto his vices, saith, Has tot ac tantas
virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant, These his so many and great vertues,
were counteruailed with great vices. Wherefore least the good should be
confused and so confounded with the bad; o that we should under the name of a tyrant
comprehend them also which were right worthy and famous men: let vs compare the
worst tyrant with the best king; that by such comparison of the two extreames,
those may bee the better perceiued which are in the middest betwixt both. Now
when I say the best king, my meaning is after theThe best
king. common manner: neither doe I seeke after such an one as is
accomplished with all heroicall vertues; or the rare paragon of iustice,
wisedome, and religion, a man without all imputation: which in the fables of
auntient worthies, were propounded with more magnificence than truth, for
princes to looke upon and to imitat; such as neuer was, nor euer shall be: but
rather such an example of a good and iust king, as is indeed in the ranke of
princes to be found; and such an one as is alwayes readie to bestow his
goods, his blood, and life, for the good of
his people: What manner of prince is of Homer in two
words called , whose
whole endeuour is to bee indeed such an one as Codrus
and Decius are reported to have bene, who aduertised by
the Oracle, that the victorie over their enemies depended of their death,
without farther delay sodenly sacrificed their lives: and Moyses aboue all, whome Philo calleth the most
wise law giuer; a most iust prince, who besought God, That he might rather die
the euerlasting death of the wicked, and have his name blotted out of the booke
of life, than that the people committed to his charge, should endure so great
and grieuous punishment as it had deserued: by which
prayers hee appeased the wrath of God, like a most good king, & true father of his people: than which name Augustus the great emperor is reported neuer to haue
heard any title or addition, unto him more pleasing, at such time as M. Valerius Messala, was by a decree of the Senat, and of
the people of Rome, called Father of his countrey. For
why, the best prince nothing differeth from the best father, as Xenophon was woont most excellently to say.
Now the greatest difference betwixt a king and a tyrant is, for that a king
conformethThe greatest difference betwixt a king and a
tyrant. himselfe unto the lawes of nature, which the tyrant at his
pleasure treadeth under foot: the one of them respecteth religion, iustice, and
faith; whereas the other regardeth neither God, faith, nor law: the one of them
referreth all his actions to the good of the Commonweale, and safetie of his
subiects; whereas the other respecteth nothing
more than his owne particular profit, revenge, or pleasure: the one doth all
his endeuour for the enriching of his subiects; whereas the other seeketh after
nothing more, than by the impouerishment of them, to encrease his owne wealth:
the one of them accounteth his owne goods to be the goods of his people; the
other reckoneth not onely the goods, but euen the bodies of his subiects also
to be his owne: the one of them seuerely revengeth the publique iniuries done
against the state, and easily pardoneth the wrongs done unto himselfe; the
other most cruelly revengeth his owne, and pardoneth that which is done against
others: the one easily forgiueth the offences of other men, but is of his owne
misdeeds a seuere judge; whereas the other most sharply revengeth euen the
least offences of others, but is unto himselfe most favourable: the one of them favoureth the honour of modest matrons, and
other mens wiues; the other triumpheth in their shame and dishonour: the one
refuseth not to bee freely and discreetly reproued for that he hath done
amisse; the other hateth nothing more than the graue free spoken man: the one
enforceth himselfe to maintaine and keepe his subiects in peace and unitie;
whereas the other seeketh still to set them at ods, so to ruinat them one by
another; and with the confiscation of their lands and goods to enrich himselfe:
the one taketh pleasure to see his subiects, and to be of them oftentimes seene
and heard; whereas the other feareth their presence, and hideth himselfe from
them, as from his enemies: the one reposeth his estate and fealtie in their
loue towards him; the other in their feare: the one taketh no care but for his
subiects; the other feareth nothing more than
them: the one chargeth his subiects as little as he can, neither exacteth any
thing of them, but when the publike necessitie so requireth; whereas the other
drinketh his subiects blood, gnaweth their bones, and out of them also sucketh
euen the marrow, so by all meanes seeking to weaken them: the one aduanceth
unto the highest degrees of honour the best and most vertuous men; whereas the
other stil promoteth the greatest theeves and villaines, whome he may vse as
spunges, to sucke up the wealth of his subiects: the one frankly bestoweth the
greatest and most gainful offices of the state upon men of best deserts, who
free from briberie & corruption, may defend the people from all iniurie and
oppression; whereas the other setteth the same to sale to such as will giue
most for them, so by their robberies and vnreasonable exactions, to keepe the people vnder, and then afterward when
they are well fatted, to cut such caterpillers throates also, so to be
accounted great iusticiars: the one measureth his manners, according unto his
lawes; the other measureth his lawes, according to his owne disposition and
pleasure: the one is readie to expose his life for the good of his countrey and
people; the other wisheth it and them all to perish for himselfe: the one is
beloued and honoured of his subiects; the other hateth them all, and is
likewise of them hated: the one in time of warre hath no recourse but unto his
owne subiects; whereas the other hath no greater warre than against them: the
one hath neither guard, nor garrison, but of his owne
people; whereas the other for the defence of his person, and keeping of his subiects in awe, hath alwayes a garrison of armed
straungers to go before him: the one liveth secure in all quiet and
tranquilitie of mind; the other troubled with carefull and contrarie thoughts,
stil languishing in perpetuall feare: the one expecteth a most blessed and
eternall life in heauen; the other still fearing euerlasting paines of hell:
the one hath the immortall good author of all his actions; the other followeth
the aduise of wicked men and damned spirits: in briefe the one is praised and
honoured of all men whilest he liveth, and much missed after his death; whereas
the other is defamed yet liuing, and most shamefully reuiled both by word and
writing when he is dead. And albeit that a tyrant abound in wealth, haue
honour, soueraigntie, health, and surpassing Champion like strength of bodie,
with the deepe and profound knowledge of many
and great matters, and flowing eloquence most of tyrants to be in others
feared; yet shal he therefore be neuer the better, but wel the worse; abusing
his wealth to fulfill his lust; his soueraigntie, to the oppressing of other
mens libertie; his strength for the performing of his villanie; and his
knowledge for the circumuenting of the plaine and simple, and shamefull
confusion of all things. Which so many and notable gifts, if they chaunce by
the grace and goodnesse of God to bee giuen to any good prince: we then esteeme
of him, as of a God, sent euen down from heauen into the earth here amongst
vs.
But what need we to vse many examples to proue this to be true, being of it
selfe soTirants slaine by effeminate and weake
persons. manifest in euerie mans eye. And seeing that we find in
histories tyrannie to have bene of all men so
much feared, hated and detested, that euen schollers and weake women have not
doubted to aduenture with daunger of their lives, to gaine unto themselves the
honour of the killing of tyrants. As did Aristotle (not
hee of Stagira, but hee that was surnamed the Logitian) who slew a tyrant of
Sicione. And Thebe, who slew herTirants neuer in safetie. husband Alexander,
tyrant of the Pheraeans. And to thinke that tyrants might by force warrant
themselves, is but meere and vaine errour. For who were of greater force than
were the Roman emperors, who ordinarily had fortie legions at their command in
their prouinces, and three moe in Italie, beside their Praetorian bands, for
the defence of their persons: and yet in no place in the world were there so
many princes slaine; yea sometimes the captaines of their guards slew them euen
in their pallaces, whome they guarded. As Cherea the tyrant, and the Mamalukes eight Sultans of
Aegypt.
But he that would see the miserable ends of tyrants, let him but read the lives
of Plutar in Arat et
TimoleoneTimoleon, and of Aratus, where
hee shall see the tyrants drawne out of the nest of their tyranny, stripped
starke naked, theeves beaten to death with clubbes in the presence of Children,
and the rest of the common people: and after that their wines and children,
their kinsfolkes and familiar friendes most cruelly murthered and slaine: and
that more is the verie image & statues of them that were dead in their
tyranny, accused, and publikely condemned, delivered unto the common hangman to
bee as it were executed; their bones also taken out of their graues, and cast
into most lothsom iakesses, and the raking
officers of these tyrants dismembred, and most miserably tormented with al the
cruelty that a people enraged could deuise: their edicts & laws torn, their
castles and proud houses rased and laid euen with the ground, and the verie
memorie of their name, by publike iudgements and written bookes, condemned to
perpetuall infamie, as an example to all future princes, to the end they might
have in detestation such plagues, so pernitious and dangerous unto mankind.
And albeit that tyrants whilest they lived, have not wanted their flattering
clawbacks,Tyrants alwayes infamous and detested.
whome they with rewards enduced to write their vnworthie prayses; yet wee read, that after their death, such their histories, and
panegiricall orations, before written in their
prayses, were burnt, torne and suppressed, and the truth (yea sometime with
more too) brought to light, & in stead of them other most reprochfull and
contumelious writings published, in such sort, as that not so much as one small
fragment of any booke written in the prayse of any tyrant, were he neuer so
great, is now extant or to be found. Which thing maketh tyrants, whilest they
yet live to fret and fume as if they were mad: for that they see they must in
time become a laughing stocke unto the people and their verie enemies. And
albeit that they euill perswaded of the immortalitie of the soule, thinke the
same to perish together with the bodie, or haply before the body, which
embaulmed with sweet odours may be long preserued, yet so long as theyTyrants still tormented with the feare of future in
famy. live they still feele the torment of the infamie to come, which
they yet liuing see shall befall them after
their death. Whereof Tiberius the emperour grieuously
complained, but Nero much more, who wished that when he
died, yea that whilest hee yet breathed, all the world might with fire be
consumed. And for this cause Demetrius, surnamed Poliorcetes, to gratifie the Athenians vndertooke the
warre for the defence of their rights and libertie, to the intent to be
honoured by their learned writings; knowing well that the citie of Athens was
as it were the watch of the whole world, which might in like sort make the
glorie of his noble acts to shine throughout the world, as doth a beacon set on
fire upon the top of an high tower: neither was he therein deceiued: but so
soone as he gaue himselfe over unto vices and villanies, there was neuer tyrant
better (than he was by them) washed; hauing his name most shamefully by them
defamed, by whome he had bene before
commended. And albeit that some may think tyrants, for that they have no taste
of true praise, to care the lesse what posteritie either thinke or say of them,
yet in truth live they most miserably, if their life be so to be called, which
live in continuall feare, still feele the most sharpe sting of greefe; seeing
themselves, their lawes, their wiues and children, their kinsfolks and friends,
euer in daunger. For it is impossible for him that hateth and feareth his
subiects; and is againe of them all himselfe also hated and feared, to be able
long to continue or stand. Whereby it commeth to passe, that in stead of being
assailed by his enemies, hee is oft times uppon the sodaine assailed by his
owne subiects. Neither may hee repose any trust or confidence in his friends,
unto whom he is himselfe oftentimes a traytour and disloyall, causing
them for the least suspition to be slaine:
as we read it reported of Nero, Commodus, Caracalla, and
such other tyrants. And sometime the whole people with one rage and surie
runneth headlong upon the tyrant, as it did upon Phalaris,
Heliogabalus, Alcetes tyrant of the Epirots, and upon Andronicus emperour of Constantinople, whom stript and set upon a bare
asses backe, the people of Constantinople caused to endure all the indignities
and reproaches that were possible, before they would giue him leaue to die. Yea
and sometimes it chanceth, that euen they themselves are the occasion of the
hasteningTyrants oftentimes to hasten their owne deathes
in seekeing to eschu the same. of their
owne death, as it is reported of Caracalla the emperour,
who would needs know of Iultus, his mothers
Mathematician, whom he thought should succeed him in the empire (for that is a
common course amongst tyrants in their affairs and doings, to aske the councell and aduise of wisards and diuels) vnto
whome the Astronomer by his letters aunswered, That Macrinus was the man that should succeed him; which letters by chaunce
falling into the hands of Macrinus: he thereupon
forthwith caused Caracalla to be slaine, for feare of
the danger prepared for him by Caracalla. So Commodus also, hauing hardly escaped the stabbe which a
murtherous villaine was about with a dagger to have giuen him, (who in giuing
of the blow said, That the Senat had sent him that) straight waies after made a
roll of al them whom he purposed to put to death: which roll by good hap
comming into the hands of Martia his concubine▪ and she therein finding her owne name enrolled amongst
the rest, to auoid the daunger prepared for
her and the rest, caused the tyrant to be forthwith slaine. Of like examples
all the auntient histories are full, which show plainly the lives of tyrants to
bee alwayes beset with a thousand ineuitable mischiefs, death still hanging
over their heads.
Now the state of a royall Monarchie is quite contrarie unto a tyrannie: for the
kingThe happie estate of a good Royal prince, in
comparison of a Tyrant. is so vnited with his subiects, that they are
still willing to spend their goods, their blood, and lives, for the defence of
his estate, honour, and life; and cease not after his death to write, sing, and
publish his prayses, amplifying them also in what they can. As we see in Xenophon the lively purtract of a great and vertuous
prince, drawne under the person of Cyrus, whose praises
he hath with wonderfull eloquence set forth, to giue eaxmple to other princes for to imitat and conforme themselves vnto;
as did Scipio Africanus,The worthie praise of Scipio Africanus. who hauing
alwaies before his eyes and in his hands Xenophon his
Cyropoediae, and framing himselfe to the imitation
thereof, profited so much, as that he in vertue, honor, and prowesse,
surmounted all the kings and princes, not of his owne age onely, but of former
times also; in such sort, that certaine pirats enflamed with the report of his
fame, and knowing that he was in his house in the countrey farre from any
towne, came and beset the same: against whom as he was about to put himselfe
with his people in readinesse, and so to have stood upon his guard: they
perceiuing the same, forthwith threw downe their armes, assuring him that they
were not come thither, but onely to see him, and to do him honour, which they
most humbly requested, that they might be
admitted to do him. Now if the lustre and brightnesse of vertue in such a
prince, hath drawne euen theeves and pirats into the admiration thereof; than
of how much greater force ought it to be in good and loyall subiects? And what
prince is there so foolish or void of sence, which would not wonderfully
reioyce to heare it reported, how that Menander king of
the Bactrians, was for his vertue & iustice so well beloued of his
subiects, as that after his death the cities were at great strife & debate
amongst themselves, which of them shuld have the honor of his sepulchre:
neither could the matter be appeased, vntill that at length it was agreed, that
euerie one of them should in the honour and memoriall of him build a seuerall
tombe or sepulchre. What tyrants malice also or dissimulation is so great,
whome Plinie his Panegyricall oration would not driue into a phrensie? who when he had
therein with all worthie prayses so adorned Traian the
emperour, as that it seemed nothing more could thereunto be added: he so
concludeth the period, That nothing greater or better could bee wished for vnto
the Commonweale, but that the immortall gods would imitat the life of Traian. Which excessiue amplification, although it sauour
of impietie, yet who doubteth but that it proceeded from the zeale of a most
famous man, towards his most excellent prince? for whose daunger at his going
out, and welfare at his comming home, all the temples were filled; and who
himselfe in his solemne prayers, was thus woont to couenant with the gods, That
they should keep and preserue him, if they saw it to be for the good of the
Commonweale. What tyrant is so cruell, what show soeuer he make, which most hartily wisheth not for the honour which
king Agesilaus receiued, at such time as he was fined by
the Ephori, for hauing alone robbed the hearts and gained the loue of all the
citisens unto him? What king is there, which wisheth not to have the surname of
Aristides the Iust? a title more diuine and royall
than euer prince yet knew how to get: albeit that in stead thereof many haue
caused themselves to be called Conquerors, Besiegers, Lightnings. Now on the
contrarie part, when as we read of the most horrible cruelties of Phalaris, Busiris, Nero, and Caligula, who is he which is not moued to a iust indignation against
them? or hearing of their miserable and wretched ends,
can containe himselfe from reioycing thereat?
Thus have we seene the most remarquable differences betwixt a king and a
Tyrant, which are not hard to be perceiued betwixt the two extremes of a most
good king, and a most detestable Tyrant: but is not so easilie to be deemed,
when the prince taketh part of a good king, and some other part of a tyrant: so
as it were tempering the good with the bad. For so things oft times fall out,
that for the varietie of times, places, persons,Necessarie
seueritie not to be accounted tirannie but to be in a soueraigne prince much
commended. and other occasions presenting themselves, princes are
constrained to doe such things, as may seeme unto them tyrannicall, and vnto
others commendable. Wherefore let no man measure Tyrannie by Seueritie, which
is oft times in a prince most necessarie: neither for his castles, gardes, and
garisons: neither by the soueraigntie of his commaunds, which are in deed more
to be wished for, then the sweet requests of tyrants: which draw after them an
ineuitable violence. And that is it for which in law, he which hath bound
himselfe at the request of a Tirant, is alwaies againe to be restored into his
former estate, wherein he was: whereas if he that shall so doe at the
commaundement of a good prince shall not by the law be relieued: neither are
those murthers, proscriptions, banishments, incests, rauishments, and other
such villanies which happen in civill warres, in the chaunging or destruction
of the states of commonweales, or the establishment of the same, to be called
tyranies: for that in such violent conuersion and chaunge of state, it cannot
otherwise be. As it fell out in the Roman Triumuirat, in the election of diuers
Emperours, and in our time Cosmus de Medices, first
taking upon him the dukedome of Florence. For he after the death of his kinsman
Alexander Medices, slaine by the conspiracie of his
enemies, tooke unto himselfe a strong garde of straungers for the defence and
safetie of his owne person: built castles and strong holds: fortified the citie
with strong garrisons: imposed new tributes and customes upon the subiects;
which unto the common people, and men abusing the popular libertie, seemed
violent oppressions and tiranies: but unto the wise men necessarie and wholsome
remedies: especially in such a sicke citie and Commonweal, as with most
desperate diseases and incurable vlcers was like otherwise to have perished: as
also against such vnruly citizens, and inured to all licentious libertie; who
had a thousand times conspired against this new Duke, reputed for one of the
most wise and vertuous princes of his time: but of them accounted a
tyrant.
Now to the contrarie it hapneth often that the state of a citie or Commonweal
ruinatedSeueritie in a prince more wholsome for the
Commonweale thn letie. by the too much lenitie and facilitie of one prince, is againe
relieued and upholden by the austeare seueritie of an other. It is sufficiently
knowne how terrible the tyranie of Domitian was unto the
Senat, the nobilitie, and other the great lords and gouernours of the Roman
Empire; in somuch that all his lawes and edicts were by their procurement after
his death repealed: and yet for all that was he euen after his death also most
highly by the generall consent of all the prouinces commended: for that the
Proconsuls with the other magistrats and officers of the Commonweal, were neuer
before more upright or freer from corruption then they were in his time, for
feare they had of his seueritie, & him. But when Nerua who succeeeded him in the Empire, abhorring seuerity, enclined altogether to lenitie, & things began
to fall into a most miserable estate; the lawes being prostituted, iustice
peruerted, and the poore by the mightie oppressed: then Fronto the Consul with many moe with most earnest desire, wished for
that crueltie and tyranie which they before had condemned in Domitian. Also when a prince with most sharpe seueritie as with a
bridle, keepeth in the mindes and licentious desires of a furious and
headstrong people, as if it were an vntamed beast: such wholsom seueritie ought
in no wise to be accounted or called tiranie; but to the contrarie Cicero calleth such licentious libertie of the vnrulie
people meere tiranie.
It may be also that a prince may exercise tiranie against the great ones in the
state, as it alwaies hapneth in the violent chaunge of
an Aristocratie into a Monarchie, when Diuers causes inducing princes unto Tyranie. as the
new prince being in necessitie and poore, and not knowing where to have money,
oft times falleth upon the rich, without regard of right or wrong: or else
infranchiseth the common people from the seruitude of the nobilitie, and the
rich by that one and selfe same act to gaine the goods and wealth of the rich,
and the favour of the poore. But of all tirants there is none lesse to be
detested than he which preieth upon the rich to ease the necessitie of the
poore. Now they that praise the goodnes, bountie, and courtesie of a prince,
without wisedom; are themselves vnwise and ignorant in matters of state,
abusing therein both their praises and leasure: for asmuch as such simplicitie
without wisedome is most dangerous and pernitious unto a king, and much more to
be feared than is the great seueritie of a cruell, couetous, and inaccessible
prince. So that it seemeth our auntient
fathers not without cause to have used this Prouerbe, That of
a craftie and subtill man is made a good king: which saying unto the
delicateA true Paradox. eares of such as measure
all things by false opinions rather than by sound reasons, may seeme right
strange: for by the too much sufferance and simplicitie of too good a king, it
commeth to passe that flatterers, extorcioners, and men of most wicked
disposition, without respect, inioy the principall honors, offices, charges,
benefits, and preferments of the Commonwealth, spoyling the reuenues of the
state: wherby the poore people are gnawne unto the verie bones, and cruelly
made slaues unto the great: in somuch as that in stead of one tirant, there is
ten thousand. Out of which corruption also of the magistrats, and too much
curtesie of the king, proceed many mischiefes
and euils; as impunitie of offenders, of murderers, and oppressours: for that
the king so good and so gratious cannot refuse to graunt them pardon. In
briefe, under such a prince the publique good is turned into particuler, and
all the charge falleth upon the poore people: as wee see in cathares and fluxes
in sicke and rheumatique bodies, the maladie still falleth unto the weakest
parts; which to be so, we might proue by many examples aswell of the Grekes as
of the Latins: but we will go no farther than to this our owne * realme, which
was in the most miserable case that euer it was, under the raigne of Charles surnamed the simple, and of some called Charles do nothing. ItThe happie
estate of Fraunce under king Francis the first, a wayward and hard
Prince. was seene also, great, rich, and florishing, in armes, lawes,
and learning of all sorts in the time of Francis the
first: but especially some few yeares before his death, when as he waxing old, became so wayward and inaccessible, as
that no man durst come unto him to craue any thing of him; hauing driuen the
courtly doggs, and shameles persons far from him, bestowing rewards, offices,
honours, and benefits upon none but such as were vertuous, and had well
deserued of the Commonweal: and withall so gouerning his bountie, as that at
the time of his death were found in the common treasurie almost a thousand Sestertioes, that is to say, seauentie hundred thousand
french crownes, besides three moneths tribute which was now due: neither was
the Commonweale unto any then indebted, more than unto the Swissers, and the
Banque of Lyons, whom he would not pay, so to keepe them in awe: at which time
he had firme amitie and peace also with all princes and people: and the bounds
of his kingdom extended euen unto the gates of
Millan: his realme full of great captaines, and of the wisest men of the
world.
But within twelue yeares after that Henry the second his
sonne raigned (whose bountieThe lenitie and immoderat
boūtie of king Henry the second, most hurtfull unto the kingdome of
Fraunce. was so great, as that the like was neuer in any prince of
his time,) we saw the state almost quite chaunged: for as he was sweet,
gratious, and courteous, so could he not denie any thing to any person; so that
his fathers treasures were in few moneths scattered, the great offices and
places of commaund were set to sale more than euer, the greatest spirituall
preferments without respect bestowed upon vnworthy men, magistracies sold to them that would giue most, and so consequently
to the most vnworthie greater customes and
payments exacted than euer were before: and yet when he died, the estate of the receipt of Fraunce was found charged with two and
fortie millions, after it had lost Piemont, Sauoy, the isle of Corsica, and the
frontiers of the Low countrey: Howbeit that all these losses were but little,
in comparison of the losse of his reputation and honour. Whereas had the
facilitie of this great king bene tempered with seueritie, his lenitie with
some rigour: his bountie, with a certaine sparing, and that for a weake and
soft spirit, he had borne a stout and couragious mind: we had no doubt lived
both well and happily, neither had the Commonweale fallen into such miserable
calamities as now we have endured.
But to hold this golden meane (some man will say) as it is hard for euerie man
to do: so for princes whom diuers strong
perturbations call out of the middle course unto the one or other of the the
extreames, it is of all others most hard. True it is, that vertue consisting in
the meane, is enuironed with many vices, much like unto a straight line, which
is hard to be found among a million of crooked: which graunted, yet so it is
neuerthelesse, that it is better and more expedient for the people and the
preseruation of an estate to have a rigorous and seuere prince, than too gentle
and courteous. The bountie of the emperour Pertinax, and
the enraged youthfulnesse of Heliogabalus had brought
the Roman empire euen unto the verie point of vtter ruine: when as the
emperours Seuerus of Afrike, and Alexander Seuerus of Syria, by a rude kind of seueritie and imperiall
austeritie reestablished the same, in the former brightnes and
maiestie, to the great and wonderfull
contentment of all good men. Thus therefore is the prouerbe that we receiued
from our auncestors (That of an euill and subtill man is
madeHow the paradoxe, That of an euill and craftie man is made a
good king, is to be vnderstood.a good king) to be vnderstood: for otherwise the word
euill, of the proprietie of it selfe signifieth not
so much seueritie, as the vttermost point, or the extremitie of impietie, which
our auncestors called euill: so Charles king of Nauarre was called an euil king, than whom none was
more wicked of his time. Wee must not therefore iudge a prince to be a tyrant
for his seueritie and rigour, so that he do nothing contrarie to the lawes of
God and nature. But forasmuch as this discourse hath brought vs on so far, let
vs see also whether it be lawfull for a good man to lay violent hand upon the
person of a tyrant.
CHAP. V. ¶ Whether it be lawfull to lay violent hand
upon a tyrant; and after his death to disnull all his
acts, decrees, and lawes.
THe proprietie of the word Tyrant, being not well knowne, hath deceiuedWho is
properly a Tyrant and that hee may lawfully be of any man slaine.
many, and armed the subiects unto the destruction of their princes. We haue
before said him properly to be called a Tyrant, who of his owne authoritie
taketh upon him the soueraigntie, against the
will of the people, without election, or right of succession, neither by lot,
by will, nor iust warre, nor speciall calling of God: and this is he, whome
poth the lawes and the writings of auntient fathers commaund to bee slaine;
propounding also most ample rewards unto such as should kill him: viz. the honourable titles of nobilitie and prowesse,
armes, statues, crownes, and in briefe the goods of the Tyrant also; as vnto
the true deliverer of his countrey, or as the Cretensians vse to say of his
mother. Neither in this case make they any difference betwixt a good and a
vertuous prince; or a wicked man and a villaine. For it is not lawfull for any
man liuing, of himselfe to inuade the soueraigntie, and to make himselfe
maister of his fellowes, what colour of vertue or
iustice soeuer they pretend: and that more is,
in law he is guiltie of death, that wrongfully taketh uppon him any the markes
proper unto soueraigne maiestie. If then the subiect will inuade or take uppon
him the state of his king by any meanes whatsoeuer; or in a popular or
Aristocraticall state, doth of a companion make himselfe a soueraigne, hee
deserueth death: So that our question in this respect hath in it no
difficultie, but that such aspirers may of all the people, or any of them, be
lawfully slaine. Yet true it is, that the Greekes have in this point differed
from the Latins; as whether a man in this case ought by way of fact to
preuentWhether a Tyrant may be lawfully slayne before he
be lawfully tried and conuicted▪ the course of iustice? For why, the
law Valeria published at the request of Pub. Valerius
Publicola giueth leaue to every man to kill a Tyrant, and afterward to
trie the cause of him so slaine. Which law seemeth also not to want good ground
of reason: for that to proceed by way of
iustice, the Commonweale should bee consumed with the firebrands of tyranny,
before the fire once kindled could bee quenched: Besides that, who should cal
into question of iustice the Tyrant, armed with his guard and garrisons? who
should take him being possessed of the castles and strong holds? were it not
better by times to oppresse him by force, than by too religious standing upon
the proceeding of the law, to loose the law together with the state? Howbeit
the law of Solon is quite contrarie unto this, expresly
forbidding to proceed by way of fact, or to kil him that seeketh to possesse
himselfe of the soueraigntie, but first to bring him unto his triall; which
seemeth more reasonable than the law Valeria: For that otherwise good &
innocent men might oftentimes be taken out of the way and slaine by their
enemies, under the color of aspiring, before
the truth could be tried: who so once dead, are in that regard alwayes
accounted as men iustly slaine. But these two lawes so repugnant and contrarie,
may in mine opinion thus be well reconciled; if the meaning of Solons law be referred unto him, who suspected of
aspiring, hath not as yet possessed the castles or strong places, seduced the
people, nor armed himselfe with strong garrison: and the law Valeria unto him
who hath openly declared himselfe a Tyrant, seised uppon the castles and
citadels, and strengthned himselfe with garrisons. In the first case wee find
that Furius Camillus the dictator, by way of iustice
proceeded against Marcus Manlius Torquatus: and in the
second case Brutus and Cassius
euen in the Senat and most open assembly of the people, slew Caesar, thinking of nothing lesse. But Solon,
when as he too religiously (should I say) or
superstitiously, had ordained that Tyrants should be lawfully tryed before they
were put to death, whilest he yet lived saw Pisistratus
of a subiect to aspire unto the soueraigntie of the Athenian state, against
whome for all that they which slew the Tyrants at Athens proceeded not by way
of iustice; whose children neuerthelesse Harmodius and
Aristogiton slew, contrarie unto the law, by the
priuat authoritie of Solon onely.
But here might many questions be made, as, Whether a Tyrant who by force
orWhether a Tyrant hauing aspired unto the soueraigntie,
and afterwards confirmed therin by the consent of the people in general, may
yet lawfully be slay▪ fraud hauing
oppressed the libertie of the people, and so aspired unto the soueraigntie, may
be iustly slaine; hauing after his aspiring caused himselfe to be so chosen or
confirmed by the voyces of the people in generall? For why, it seemeth that
such a solemn act of election, is a true
ratification of him in his tyrannie, the people consenting thereunto. Yet am I
neuerthelesse of opinion, that he may lawfully be slaine, and that without any
lawfull processe or triall, except he shall first renounce his authoritie, quit
his forces, and so put himselfe into the power of the people: for why, that
cannot bee thought to be done by the free consent of the people, which they do
by constraint, being by the Tyrants dispoyled of their authoritie and power. As
when Sylla caused himselfe to be confirmed dictator for
fourescore yeares, by the law Valeria, which hee caused to be published, hauing
at the same time a strong and puissant armie of his own within the citie: Lib. de▪ legibus.Cicero said, That it was no law at all. And in like case
Caesar, who about
thirtie sixe yeares after, caused himselfe by the law Seruia, to bee made
dictatour perpetuall. And also Cosmus Medices, who after
the death of his kinsman Alexander hauing an armie in
the citie of Florens, caused the Senators to chuse him duke of that citie for
euer: about which election whilest they made some doubt, hee so thundered with
his artillerie before the pallace, as that the Senat doubting otherwise of the
safetie of themselves, and of the rest of the citisens, hasted the rather to
make choyce of him. Howbeit if the children or posteritie of a tyrant, shall
for long time, as by the space of an hundrd yeares, in continual possession
hold the soueraigntie, possessed by their great grandfathers or auncestours,
and so by their iust commaunds, gouern the Commonweale; such a government ought
not now to be called a tyrannie, for that in this case,Long prescription serueth in staed of a iust title.
as in all other things, a prescription of so many yeares serueth in stead of a
iust title. And whereas it is said, that the rights of soueraigntie cannot be
prescribed: that is to say, in lesse then an hundred yeares, and concerneth
priuat men, who the Commonweale yet standing upright, seeke to vsurpe the
soueraigntie, but concerneth not the generall conuersion or chaunge of the
whole state of a Commonweale. Wee said that the possession of the posteritie of
a tyrant ought to be of long continued without interuption or interpellation:
that is to say, that the subiects have not with any conspiracie rebellion, or
intercession, troubled the government of the tyrant, or of his posteritie: for
thereby it is in a sort euident, and to bee gathered, the subiects of their
owne accord to have yeelded unto his commaunds, and to have taken him for their
iust prince. But interpellation or gain▪
saying, and resistance, may aswell be showed & declared by deeds as by
words: of which sort was that which Aquila the Tribune
of the people did, who in sight of all the people tooke off the crowne that was
set upon the head of Caesars statue, Caesar himselfe in vaine fretting thereat; who afterwards unto such
grants of honours and preferments as he gaue unto his friends, would still adde
that, If by Aquil his leaue we may
do it. And thus much concerning a Tyrant, whether hee bee a good man or
an euill, who without all right hath aspired unto the soueraigntie of the
Commonweale wherein he liveth.
But the chiefe question of this our discourse, is to know, whether a soueraigne
princeWhether a lawful soueraign prince tiranizing may of
his subiects be lawfully ayne or not. come
unto that high estate by election, or by lot, by rightfull succession, or by
iust warre, or by the especiall vocation of all-mightie God; forgetting his
dutie, and become without measure cruell, couetous, and wicked, so peruerting
the lawes of God and man, and such an one as we commonly call a Tirant, may be
lawfully slaine or not. And true it is that many interpretours, both of Gods
and mans lawes, have said it to be lawfull: many of them without distinction
ioyning these two incompatible words together, a King a
Tyrant: which so daungerous a doctrine hath bene the cause of the vtter
ruine and ouerthrow of many most mightie empires, and kingdomes. But to discide
this question wel, it behoueth vs to distinguish an absolute soueraigne prince,
from him which is not so: and also subiects from straungers, according as wee
have before declared. For it is great difference to say that a Tirant may
lawfully be slaine by a prince a straunger; or by his owne subiect. For as of
all noble acts, none is moreThat a prince tyanizing may by an other straung prince be lawfully
slaine. honorable or glorious then by way of fact, to defend the
honour, goods, and lives of such as are vniustly oppressed by the power of the
more mightie, especially the gate of iustice being shut against them: as did
Moyses seeing his brother the Israelite beaten and
wronged by the Aegyptian, and no meanes to have redresse of his wronges; so is
it a most faire and magnificall thing for a prince to take up armes to relieue
a whole nation and people, vniustly oppressed by the crueltie of a tirant: As
did the great Hercules, who traueling over a great part
of the world with wonderfull prowes and valour
destroyed many most horrible monsters, that is to say Tirants: and so delivered
people without number among the gods: his
posteritie for many worlds of yeares after, holding most great kingdomes, and
other the imitatours of his vertues: as Dio, Timoleon,
Aratus, Harmodius, Aristogiton, with other such like honorable princes
bearing the titles of chastisers and correctors of Tyrants. And for that onely
cause Temir-Cutlu, whom our writers commonly call Tamerlan emperour of the Tartars, denounced warre vnto
Baiazet king of the Turkes, who then besieged
Constantinople; saying that he was come to chastice his tiranie, and to deliver
the aflicted people; whom indeed he in a set battell vanquished in the plaines
neare unto Mount Stella: and hauing slaine and put to
light three hundred thousand Turkes, kept the
tirant (taken prisoner) in chaines in an yron Cage vntill he dyed. Neither in
this case is it materiall whether such a
vertuous prince being a straunger proceed against a Tirant by open force, or
finenes, or else by way of iustice. True it is that a valiant and worthy prince
hauing the tirant in his power, shall gaine more honour by bringing him vnto
his triall, to chastice him as a murtherer, a manqueller, and a robber: rather
then to vse the law of armes against him. Wherefore let vs resolue upon that,
that it is lawfull for any straunger to kill a Tirant; that is to say a man of
all men infamed, and notorious for the oppression, murder, and slaughter of his
subiects and people. But as for subiects to do the same, it is to be knowne
whether the prince that beareth rule be an absolute soueraigne; or not: for if
he be no absolute soueraigne, then must the Soueraigntie of necessitie be
either in the people, or in the nobilitie: in which case there is no doubt, but
that it is lawfull to proceed against a
Tirant by way of iustice, if so men may preuaile against him: or else by way of
fact, and open force, if they may not otherwise have reason. As the Senat did
in the first case against Nero: and in the other against
Maximinus: for that the Roman Emperours were at the
first nothing else but princes of the Common weal, that is to say the chiefe
and principall men, the soueraigntie neuerthelesse still resting in the People
and the Senat: as I have before showed, that this Commonweal was then to haue
bene called a principalitie: although that Seneca
speaking in the person of Nero his scholler sayeth: I am the onely man amongst liuing men, elect and chosen to be
the Lieutenant of God on earth: I am the Arbitratour of lyfe and death: I am
able at my pleasure to dispose of the state and qualitie of every man.
True it is that he tooke upon him this
soueraigne authoritie by force wrested from the Senat and people of Rome: but
in right he had it not, the state being but a verie principalitie, wherein the
people had the soueraigntie. As is also that of the Venetians, who condemned to
death their Duke Falier, and also executed many others,
without forme or fashion of any lawfull processe: forasmuch as Venice is an
Aristocraticall principalitie, wherein the Duke is but the first or chiefe man,
soueraigntie still remayning in the state of the Venetian Gentlemen. As is
likewise the Germain Empire, which is also nothing else but an Aristocraticall
principalitie, wherein the the Emperour is head and chiefe, the power and
majestie of the Empire belonging unto the States thereof: who thrust out of the
government Adolphus the emperour in the yeare 1296: and
also after him Wenceslaus in the yeare 1400, and that by way of justice, as hauing
iurisdiction and power over them. So also might we say of the state of the
Lacedemonians, which was a pure Aristocratie, wherein were two kings, without
any soueraigntie at all, being indeed nothing but Captaines and Generals for
the managing of their warres: and for that cause were by the other magistrats
of the state, sometime for their faults condemned to pay their fine; as was
king Agesilaus: and sometime to death also as were Agis and Pausanias. Which hath
also in our time hapned unto the kings of Denmarke and Sweden, whereof some
have beene banished, and the others died in prison:
for that the nobilitie pretendeth them to be nothing but princes, and not
Soueraignes, as we have before showed: so
also are they subiects unto those states which have the right of their
election. And such were in auntient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls,
whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes calleth Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselves
subiects, and iusticiable unto the Nobilitie, who had all the soueraigntie:
causing them euen to be put to death, if they had so deserued. And that is it
for which Amphiorix the captaine generall, whom they
called the king of the Liegeois said; Our commaundes
(saith he) are such, as that the people hath no lesse power
over vs, then we over the people: wherein he showed euidently that he
was no soueraigne prince: howbeit that it was not possible for him to haue
equall power with the people, as we have before showed. Wherefore these sorts
of princes, hauing no soueraigntie, if they
polluted with wickednes and villanie, cannot be chastised by the authoritie and
seueritie of the magistrat, but shall abuse their wealth and power unto the
hurt and destruction of good men; it alwayes hath and shall be lawfull not for
strangers onely, but euen for the subiects themselves also, to take them out of
the way.
But if the prince be an absolute Soueraigne, as are the true Monarques of
Fraunce,That it is not lawfull for the subiects either by
the way of fact, or iustice to attempt any thing against the honour, life,
or dignitie of their soueraigne prince, be he neuer so euill or
wicked. of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkie, Moschouie, Tartarie,
Persia, Aethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdomes of Affricke, and
Asia, where the kings themselves have the soueraigntie without all doubt or
question; not divided with their subiects: in this case it is not lawfull for
any one of the subiects in particular, or all of them in generall, to attempt
any thing either by way of fact, or of iustice against the honour, life, or
dignitie of the soueraigne: albeit that he had
committed all the wickednes, impietie, and crueltie that could be spoken; For
as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subiect hath no such
iurisdiction over his Soueraigne prince: of whom dependeth all power and
authoritie to commaund: and who may not onely reuoke all the power of his
Magistrats; but euen in whose presence the power of all Magistrats,
Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and
shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawfull for the subiect
by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassall against his lord;
nor the slaue against his master; and in briefe, if it be not lawfull, by way
and course of iustice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawfull
to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to doe by strength and force,
but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subiects have power and
strength, but whether they have lawfull power to condemne their soueraigne
prince. Now the subiect is not only guiltie of treason in the highest degree,
who hath slaine his soueraigne prince, but euen he also which hath attempted
the same; who hath giuen councell or consent thereunto; yea if he haue
conccaled the same, or but so much as thought it: which fact the lawes have in
such detestation, as that when a man guiltie of any offence or crime, dieth
before he be thereof condemned, he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect
state, except he have conspired against the life and dignitie of his soueraigne
prince: this onely thing they have thought to bee such, as that for which hee
may worthily seeme to have bene now alreadie
iudged and condemned; yea euen before he was therof accused. And albeit that
the lawes inflict no punishment upon the euill thoughts of men; but on those
onely which by word or deed breake out into some enormitie: yet if any man
shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his
soueraigne prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet iudged
this same thought worthie of death, notwithstanding what repentance soeuer he
have hadTreason but thought of punished with death.
thereof. As in proofe it fell out with a gentleman of Normandie, who confessed
himselfe unto a Franciscan Frier, to have had a purpose in himself to haue
slaine Francis the first, the
French king: of which euill purpose and intent he repenting himselfe, receiued
of the frier absolution, who yet afterward
told the king thereof; who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the
fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his triall, where he was
by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards
executed. Which wee cannot say, that the judges did for feare, seeing that they
had oftentimes refused to ratifie the edicts and letters patents by that
gratious king granted, notwithstanding whatsoeuer commaundement hee did giue
for them to confirme the same. And so in Paris, although a foolish man and
altogether out of his wit, called Caboche, drew his
sword upon Henrie the second, Francis his son, as with a purpose to have slaine him; but without
effect or hurt done, yet was he neuerthelesse condemned, and so put to death,
without any regard had unto his lunesie or frensie; although the lawes euerie where excuse the madde and lunitike man,
from all punishment, what murther or villanie soeuer he doe; seeing that hee is
more than enoughThat soueraigne princes whatsoeuer ught to bee unto their subiects sacred and
inuiolat. tormented with the frantike furious passion it selfe. And
least any man should thinke themselves to have bene the authors of these lawes
and decrees, so the more straitly to prouide for their owne safetie and honour,
let vs see the lawes and examples of holy Scripture. Nabugodonozor king of Assyria, with fire and sword destroyed all the
countrey of Palestine, besieged the citie of Hierusalem, tooke it, robbed and
rased it downe to the ground, burnt the temple, and defiled the sauctuarie of
God, slew the king, with the greatest part of the people, carrying away the
rest that remained into captiuitie into Babilon; and yet not so contented,
caused * the image of himselfe made in gold, to be Dan. cap.. set up in publike place, commaunding all
men without exception to adore and worship the same, upon paine of being burnt
alive: and caused them that refused so to doe, to be cast into a burning
furnace: and yet for all that the holy * Prophets directing theirBare. 1. Hier. 29 letters unto their brethren the Iewes, then in
captiuitie at Babilon, will them to pray unto God, for the good and happie life
of Nabuchodonosor and his children, and that they might
so long rule and raigne over them as the heauens should endure. Yea euen God
himselfe doubted not to call Nabuchodonosor his seruant;
saying, That he wouldHier. 2. Ezec.9 make him the most mightie prince of the
world. And yet was there euer a more detestable tyrant than he? who not
contented to be himselfe worshipped, but caused his image to be also adored,
and that upon paine of being burnt quick. And yet for all that we see the prophet Ezechiel,
enspired with the spirit of God, angrie with Sedechia
king of Hierusalem, greatly to detest his perfidious dealing, disloyaltie, and
rebellion against king Nabuchodonosor, whose vasall hee was, and as it were reioyceth him to have bene
most iustly slaine. We have also another more rare example of Saul, who possessed with an euill spirit, caused the priests of the
lord to be without iust cause slain, for that one of them had receiued Dauid flying from him, and did ofttimes what in his power
was, to kill, or cause to have bene killed the same Dauid, a most innocent prince, by whome he had got so manie victories
over his enemies: at which time he fell twice himselfe into Dauid his hands; who blamed of his most valiant souldiers (over whom
he then commaunded) for that he would not suffer his so mortal an enemie then
in his power, to be slaine, being in most
assured hope to have enioyed the kingdome after his death, he detested their
counsel, saying, God forbid that I should suffer the person of a king, the
Lords annointed to be violated. Yea moreover hee himselfe defended the same
king persecuting of him, when as hee commaunded the souldiers of his guard
ouercome by wine and sleepe to be wakened. And at such time as Saul was slaine, and that a souldiour thinking to do Dauid a pleasure, presented him with Saul his head: Dauid forthwith caused the same
souldier to be slain, which had brought him the head, saiing, Go thou wicked,
how durst thou lay thine impure hands upon the Lords annointed? thou shalt surely die therefore: and afterwards without all
dissimulation mourned himselfe for the dead
king. All which is worth our good consideration. For Dauid was by Saul persecuted to death, and yet
wanted not power to have revenged himselfe, being become stronger than the king
by the aid of his enemies, unto whome hee fled euen against his will: besides
that he was the chosen of God, and annointed by the hands of Samuel, to be king of the people, and had also married the kings
daughter: and yet for all that he abhorred to take upon him the title of a
king, and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of Saul, or to rebell against him, but chose rather to
banish himselfe out of the realme, than in any sort to seeke the kings
destruction. So we also read, that the most holy and best learned men that euer
were amongst the Iewes▪ whome they called the Essei
(that is to say, the true executors of the law of God) held, that soueraigne princes whatsoeuer they were,
ought to bee unto their subiects inuiolable, as persons sacred, and sent vnto
them from God. And wee doubt not, but that Dauid a king
and prophet, led by the spirit of God, had alwaies before his eies the law of
God, which saith, Thou shalt not speake euill of thy prince,
nor detract the Magistrat.* Exod. 23. 28. Neither is
there any thing more common in all the holy Scripture, than the forbidding not
onely to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince, but euen for the verie
magistrats also, although (saith the Scripture) they be wicked and naught. If
therfore he be guiltie of treason against God and man, which doth but detract
the magistracie; what punishment then can be sufficient for him that shall
attempt his life? For the law of God is in this case yet more precise than are
the lawes of men: For the law Iulia holdeth but him guiltie of treason, which shall
giue councell to kill the magistrat, whereas the law of God expresly forbiddeth
in any sort to speake of the magistrat euil, or in any wise to detract him.
Wherefore to aunswere unto the vaine and friuolous obiections & arguments
of them which maintain the contrarie, were but idly to abuse both our time and
learning. But as he which doubteth whether there bee a God or nor, is not with
arguments to be refuted, but with seuere punishments to bee chastifed: so are
they also which call into question a thing so cleere, and that by bookes
publikely imprinted; that the subiects may take up armes against their prince
beeing a Tyrant, and take him out of the way howsoever: howbeit that the most
learned diuines, and of best understanding, are cleere of opinion, that it is
not lawfull for a man not only to kill his
soueraigne prince, but euen to rebell against him, without an especiall and
vndoubtfull commaundement from God; as we read of Iehu,
who was chosen of God, and by the prophet annointed king of Israel, with
expresse commandement vtterly to root out all the house of king Achab. He before as a subiect had right patiently borne
all his wickednesse and outrages. Yea the most cruell murthers and torturing of
the most holy prophets, and religious men, the vnworthy murthers, banishments,
and proscriptions of the subiects; as also the most detestable witchcraft of
queene Iesabel: yet for all that durst he attempt
nothing against his soueraigne prince, vntill he had expresse commaundement
from God, by the mouth of his prophet, whome God indeed so assisted, as that with a small power he slew two kings, caused
seuentie of king Achab his children to be put to death,
with many other princes of the kings of Israel and of Iuda, and all the
idolatrous priests of Bahal, that is to say of the
Sunne, after thas hee had caused Iesabel the queene, to
be cast headlong downe from an high tower, and left her bodie to be torne in
peeces and eaten up of dogges. But we are not to apply this especiall
commaundement of God, unto the conspiracies and rebellions of mutinous subiects
against their soueraigne princes. And as for that which Caluin saith, if there were at this time magistrats appointed for the
defence of the people, and to restraine the insolencie of kings, as were the
Ephori in Lacedemonia, the Tribunes in Rome, and the
Demarches in Athens, that they ought to resist and impeach their
licentiousnesse and crueltie: he sheweth
sufficiently, that it was neuer lawfull in a right Monarchie, to assault the
prince, neither to attempt the life or honour of their soueraigne king: for he
speaketh not but of the popular and Aristocratique states of Commonweales. And
we have before shewed, that the kings of Lacedemonia were no more but plaine
Senators and captaines: and when he speaketh of states, he saith, Possibly, not
daring toThe warrs of the Germaine princes against Charies
the fit in Germanie in Luthers iudgment not
lawful. Sledan. lib. 4. assure any thing.
Howbeit that there is a notable difference betwixt the attempting of the honour
of his prince, and the withstanding of his tyranny; betwizt killing his king,
and the opposing of ones selfe against his crueltie. We read also, that the
Protestant princes of Germanie, before they entred into armes against Charles the emperor, demaunded of Martin Luther if it were lawfull for them so to doe or not; who
frankly told them, That it was not lawfull,
whatsoeuer tyrannie or impietie were pretended; yet was he not therein of them
beleeued: so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamentable warre, the end whereof
was most miserable, drawing with it the ruine and destruction of many great and
noble houses of Germanie, with exceeding slaughter of the subiects: whereas No cause (as saith Cicero) can be thought iust or sufficient for vs to take up armes
against our countrey. And yet it is most certaine, that the
soueraigntie of the empire resteth not in the person of the emperour, (as we
will in due place declare) but being chiefe of the state, they could not
lawfully take up armes against him, but by a generall consent of the state, or
of the greater part of them, which was not done: then much lesse is it lawfull
to take up atmes against a soueraigne prince. I cannot vse a better example, than of the dutie of a sonne towards his
father: the law of God saith, That he which speaketh euill of his father or
mother, shall be put to death. Now if the father shall be a theefe, a
murtherer, a traytor to his countrey, as an incestuous person, a manqueller, a
blasphemer, an atheist, or what so you will else; I confesse that all the
punishments that can bee deuised are not sufficient to punish him: yet I say,
it is not for the sonne to put his hand thereunto, Quia nulla
tanta impiet as, nullum tantum scelus est, quod sit parricidio
vindicandum. For that (as saith an auntient Orator) no impietie can be
so great, no offence so hainous, as to be revenged with the killing of ones
father. And yet Cicero reasoning upon the same question,
saith, our country to bee deerer unto vs than our parents. Wherefore the prince
whom you may iustly call the father of the
country ought to be unto every man dearer & more reuerend than any father,
as one ordained & sent unto vs by God. I say therfore that the subiect is
neuer to be suffered to attempt any thing against his soueraign prince, how
naughty & cruel soeuer he be lawful it is, not to obey him in things
contrarie unto the laws of God & nature: to flie and hide our selues from
him; but yet to suffer stripes, yea and death also rather than to attempt any
thing against his life or honour. O how many Tirants should there be; ifWhat great inconueniecies should
ensue if it were lawful for subiects under the
colour of tyrants to kil their soueraign princes it should be lawfull
for subiects to kill Tirants? how many good and innocent princes should as
Tirants perish, by the conspiracie of their subiects against them? He that
should of his subiects exact subsidies, should be then (as the vulgar people
accompt him) a Tirant: he that should rule and commaund contrarie to the good
liking of the people, should be a Tirant: (as
Aristotle in his Politiques sayeth him to be) he that
should keepe strong gardes and garrisons for the safetie of his person, should
be a Tirant: he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his
state should be also counted a Tirant. And in deed how should good princes be
assured of their lives, if under the colour of tirannie they might bee slaine
of their subiects, by whom they ought to be defended? Not for that I would say
it not to be lawfull for other Princes by force of armes to prosecute tiranie
(as I have before said) but for that it is not lawful for subiects so to doe.
Howbeit that I am rather of Diogenes the Cinique his
opinion, who one day meeting with Dionysius the yonger, then liuing in exile at Corinth, and seeing him merily sporting himselfe in the streats
with iesters and minstrels; verie soberlie said unto him, Truely thou art now
in an estate vnworthie of thee. I hartilie thank thee (said Dionysius) for hauing compassion on me. And thinkest thou said Diogenes that I thus say for any compassion I have of
thee? mistake me not, for I speake it rather in dispite of the life thou now
leadest, to see such a vile slaue as thee, worthy to grow old, and die in the
accursed state of tirannie, as did thy father, thus to sport thy selfe in
securitie, and quietly to passe thy time among vs. For can any hangman more
cruelly torment a man condemned to torture, than feare? Feare I say of death,
of infamie,The miserable state and condition of a Tyrant
whilst he liveth. and of torture: these bee the reuenging furies
which continually vex Tirants, and with eternall terrours torment them both
night and day: Then enuie, suspition, feare,
desire of revenge, with a thousand contrarie passions at variance among
themselves, do so disquiet their minds, and more cruelly tiranize over them,
than they themselves can over their slaues, with all the torments they can
deuise. And what greater wretchednesse can happen unto a man, than that which
presseth and forceth the tirant? to have a desire to make his subiects beasts
and fooles, by cutting from them all the waies to vertue and learning? To bee a
slaue and subiect unto a thousand spyes and pryers into other mens lives? to
heare, see, and vnderstand, what is done, saied, o
thought of all and every man? and in stead of ioyning and vniting of his
subiects in loue and amitie together; to sow amongst them a thousand quarrels
and dissentions: to the end they should alwaies be at defiance among
themselves, and in distrust one of an other?
And who can doubt but that a Tirant still languishing in such torment, is of
all men most miserable, and more afflicted and tormented, than if he should die
a thousand deaths? Death (as sayeth Theophrastus) is the
end of all miseries; and the repose of the vnfortunate, as sayeth Caesar: neither the one nor the other being in that point
superstitious, as not persuaded of the immortalitie of the soule, or that it
longer lived than the bodie, or that there remayned any farther paines for the
wicked after this life: so that to wish a Tirant slaine as a punishment for his
deserts, is but to wish his good and rest.
But most Tirants have ordinarilie neare unto their owne persons certeine
Mynnions,The policie of some Tyrants to auert from
themselves the peoples rage. of whom they make great account and
reckning: whom they vse as spunges to suck up
their subiects blood, upon whom when occasion serueth, they discharge
themselves; to the end that the people entering into furie, should seise upon
them, and spare themselves: So had Tiberius, Seian; Nero,
Tigillin; Dionyse the younger, Phyliste; and of
late Henry king of Sweden, George
Preschon, whom we read to have beene giuen as a prey unto the furious
people, and by them to have beene rent and torne in peeces. So the Emperour Anthonius Caracalla to please the people, put to death
all the flatterers who had before induced him to kill his brother. Neither did
Caligula in better sort intreat his claw-backs. And
by these sleights have Tyrants oftentimes wel escaped the rage and furie of the
people. But if the conspiratours began their furie at the person of the Tyrant himselfe, then were not onely his
friends and favourites, but euen his wiues, children, and neerest kinsmen, most
cruelly slaine. Which they did not onely all Greece ouer, but in Sicilie also:
as after the death of Hiero the Tyrant, ensued the
slaughter of all his friends and kinsfolks, the rage of the people with
vnspeakable crueltie bursting out, euen to the dismembring of his sisters and
cosens: his statues were cast downe, all his edicts reuoked, not only those
which were vniust and vnreasonable, but euen those also which were right
commendable and necessarie; to the intent that no memoriall of Tyrants might
remaine: yet true it is, that oftentimes their good decrees were still kept.
And that is it for which Cicero said, That there was
nothing more common, than to approue the acts of a
Tyrant, and yet to place in heauen them that
had slaine them. And yet he in another saith it be a doubt, not yet resolued
upon, viz. Whether a good man ought to come unto the counsell
of a Tyrant consulting euen of good and profitable matters? And yet
this question dependeth of the other: for if a man make conscience to be
assistant unto a Tyrant, consulting of good things, for feare least in so doing
he should seeme to approue his tyrannie: wherefore should he then approue the
good lawes and decrees by him made? for that is also no lesse to ratifie his
tyranny, and to giue example to others, aswell as to giue councell unto a
Tyrant, in good and commendable things. Except one should say, that tyrannie
which yet is in the force and strength of it selfe, is shored and countenanced
by theThat not only the good acts and decrees of Tyrants,
but eue their euill acts and decrees also are
oftentimes of necessitie after their death▪ to be rtained in a commonweal. councell of good and honest men, under the
couert of some one or other good and
commendable act, which would otherwise of it selfe fall, by the onely euill
opinion conceiued of tyrannie; whereas he which is alreadie dead, cannot be
againe reuiued to ratifie his other euill acts. Yea it oftentimes falleth out,
that not onely the good & profitable acts of Tyrants, but euen their euill
and vniust acts and orders are of necessitie to be retained also, if we will
have the Commonwealth in safetie to stand. Wherefore Thrasibulus after he had put to flight the thirtie Tyrants of Athens:
and Aratus hauing slaine Nicholas
the Tyrant of Sicyone: and to the imitation of them Cicero after the death of Caesar the dictator,
perswaded the publication of the lawes of forgetfulnesse, to extinguish the
desire of revenge: yet for the most part ratifying the acts of those Tyrants,
which they could not vtterly disanull, without the ruine of the whole
Commonweale. As for that we read the acts of
Nero and Demetrian, to haue
beene reuoked, and disanulled by the Senat, that concerneth certaine perpetuall
edicts of theirs, which for that they had a perpetuall inconuenience annexed
unto them, would if they had not bene abrogated, have in time vtterly ruinated
all that was now againe set in order: as for their good & cōmendable
lawes, they were not at all altred. For what time was more glorious than Nero his first five yeares raigne? what more fit or
better for the well ordering of a Commonweale? Insomuch that Traian himselfe a most excellent prince, deemed no man to have bene
like unto Nero, for the well gouerning of a Commonweale.
unto this the opinions of the lawyers agree, who hold the successoursThe successours of Tyrants how farre they are bound to that
which the Tyrants their predecessoures have promised. of Tyrants to
be bound unto all such things as the Tyrants their predecessours have iustly promised or done, but not unto the rest.
So the emperour Constantine the Great, by a law
abrogated such things, as Licinius the Tyrant had before
vniustly decreed, but confirmed the rest. The like we read to have bene done by
Theodosius the younger, and Arcadius the emperours, after the death of the Tyrant Maximus, by this law, Quae Tyrannus
contra ius rescripsit non valere praecipimus: legitimis eius rescriptis non
impugnandis, What the Tyrant hath against right decreed, we commaund to
be of none effect; not impugning his lawfull decrees. And albeit that these two
yong emperours, to be revenged of the Tyrant Maximus,
had by a generall edict reuoked all the prodigall gifts and preferments, which
he lauishly had bestowed uppon wicked men, and of no desert in the Commonweale:
and also disanulled his iudgements and
decrees: yet would they not repeale any thing that had bene by him decreed or
graunted, without fraud and deceit, and the hurt of the Commonweale. Those last
wordes without fraud and deceit, which we read in Theodosius, his law, are added against Tyrants Agents,
& Brokers, who are especially to be laid hold upon, to the end that others
take not example by them, to build their houses, or enrich themselves by the
ruine or hurt of others, during the time that tyranie beareth sway; or that the
Commonwealth is with civill warres divided. As it happened in the state of
Milan, rent in sunder by the Venetians, the French, the Swissers, and the
Spaniards, euerie one of them taking unto themselves
so much thereof, as they could by force and strength, as if it had bene
by good right, and the Sforces the rest: where amongst others it fortuned Iason the famous lawyer, a favourit of the Spaniards, by fraudulent
meanes to obtaine the goods of Triuultius, a worthie
captaine of the French part: but the Spaniards afterwards driuen out, and the
French returned, Iason was right well beaten with his
owne lawes and decisions, being by the captaine Triuultius againe thrust out of his vniust possession, and that by his
owne doctrine. In which case yet the force of lawes and decrees oughtNaturall equitie in all cases cannot in any lawe be comprised,
but is oft times to be left unto the religious arbitremēt of men expert in
matters of state. not to be of so great force and power, as naturall
and upright equitie it selfe, which cannot be fully comprised in any lawes, but
is to be left unto the religious arbitrement of them who know how to mannage
the affaires of state, and wisely to ballance the particular profit, with the
counterpoise of the publique, according to the infinit varietie of times, places, and persons; alwaies remembring the
profit of euerie man in particular, and of all together in generall, not to be
one and the same: and that the publike is alwaies to be preferred before the
priuat, except the priuat be grounded upon the greatest equitie and reason. As
if the Receiuers in the heat of the civill warres, or in the raigne of a
Tyrant, or in such time as lawfull enemies make inuasion, shall be enforced to
pay the publike money: it is good reason it should be allowed them, as paid
unto the Commonwealth. For so it was iudged by decree of the parliament of
Naples, for them that had paid unto the receiuers of Charles the eight, when as after the returne of the Spaniards, they
would have enforced the receiuers to have paid the money twice, naturall reason
(in this case) preferring the priuat profit before the publike. For the
receiuers could not otherwise doe, the
Frenchmen then fully possessed of the kingdom of Naples. But if the Receiuers
or debtors of the Commonweale, shall without any summons or constraint, or for
some colourable suit, pay unto the enemie, or a Tyrant, part of that which is
due, to accept in stead of the whole, they shall yet still remaine not onely
debtors for the whole, but be in daunger also of treason. Wherefore to conclude
this question, It is not meet that the good decrees or laws of a slaine tyrant
should be repealed or disanulled.
And in this, the princes much deceiue themselves, which ouerthrow and make
voidMurthers euen of euill and tyrannicall princes, not
to be rewarded, but seuerely punished. all the acts of Tyrants, their
predecessours; and namely they which giue reward to them that have slaine
Tyrants, to make them a way unto the soueraigntie. For they shall neuer assure themselves of their owne lives, if they
seuerely punish not the conspiratours against their owne prince and murtherers
of him, although hee were neuer so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Seuerus the emperour, who put to death all them which had
any part in the murther of the emperour Pertinax: which
was the cause (as saith Herodian) that there was no man
which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu the emperour put to death all the murtherers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their owne
hands unto the emperour Otho, to have had of him reward
for their distoialtie. And Theophilus emperour of
Constantinople caused them all to be called together, who had made his father
emperour, after they had slaine Leo the Armenian, as if he would have well recompensed
them for so great a good turne: who being come together with many other, who
though not partakers of the murther, were yet desirous to be partakers of the
reward; hee caused them altogether to be slaine. And that more is, the emperour
Domitian put to death Epaphroditus,
Nero his manumised seruant, and secretarie to the state, for hauing
holpen Nero to kill himselfe, who most instantly
requested him so to doe, being thereby delivered from the executioners hands,
and crueil exemplarie death. And these things wee read not onely Tyrants, but
euen good kings also to have done, not so much in regard of their owne safetie,
as of the dignitie of them that were slaine. As Dauid
did unto him who in hope of reward brought him his
father in lawes head cut off, but slaine by his enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to
bee put to death him that had murthered king Darius,
abhorring the subiect which durst to lay hand upon his king: although Alexander himselfe by lawfull warre sought after his life
and state, as beeing his lawfull enemie. And yet in mine opinion the thing that
hath most preserued the kings of Fraunce and their persons inuiolated, is for
that they have not used crueltie towardsLenitie of soueraign
princes towards them of their owne blood offending them; and so in their
daunger, or otherwise their honorable prisoners: unto themselves both
commendable and profitable them which were neere unto them in blood,
albeit that they were attainted; conuicted, yea and condemned as enemies to
their prince, and guiltie of treason. As Iohn the
second, duke of Alencon, although he was twice for the same cause condemned, as
for that he had with the enemies conspired against king Charles the seuenth and the Commonweale, and the sentence of death
pronounced against him by the Chancelour, yet
for all that would not the king, that he should bee executed. Many have blamed
this the kings too much clemeneie, as daungerous: but they see not, that kings
in so doing, do not so much deliver their kinsmen from punishment, as
themselves; neither so much to prouide for other mens safetie, as for their
own; nor that in forbidding the blood of their kinsmen to be shed, they spare
their owne; nor that hee which putteth a prince of his owne blood into the
executioners hands, or causeth him to be murthered, forgeth a knife to cut his
owne throat. For wee have seene the emperours of Constantinople both of
auntient and latter time, and many kings of Spaine and England, who fouling
their hands in the blood of their princes, suffered themselves afterward in
their persons that which they had done to others. For not to speake of those
things which are reported to have of late
bene done in the house of Castile: one king in that nation cruelly murthered
six of his brethren: and in lesse than thirtie six yeares fourescore princes of
royall blood, were (as Philip Comines in his
Commentaries reporteth) in England either slaine or executed by the bloudie
executioners hands. Now the greatest safetie of a soueraigne prince, is to haue
their subiects persuaded, that they ought to be holy and inuiolat; although it
much concerne the Commonweale also, the kings stocke to be most sacred, least
the princes of the blood being taken out of the way, the Commonweale fall also;
or else troubled with endlesse sedition, bee rent in peeces, as we shall in due
place declare. I know well that some have blamed Seleucus, for not hauing put to death Demetrius, surnamed the Besieger, one of the most valiant princes that euer was; but hauing onely kept him in
prison: And Hugh Capet, for hauing kept in prison in the
castle at Orleans, Charles the last of the blood of king
Charlemaigne: And Henrie the
first, king of England, for hauing kept in prison vntill his death, his elder
brother Robert, hauing before caused his eyes to bee put
out: As also Christiern father to Frederike king of Denmarke, for hauing kept his cosen the king of
Denmarke thrust out of his kingdome, five and twentie yeares prisoner, who as a
priuat man there died in prison, in the castle of Calembourg, being 77 yeares
old: And Iohn king of Sweden, who keepeth his elder
brother Henrie (reiected by the people) prisoner euer
since the yeare 1567, least he should trouble both him and the Commonweale. But
they have bene, and yet are by this meanes more reuerenced and honoured
of their subiects, than if they had put
these their so honourable prisoners to death.
But here some men wil obiect, The keeping of such princes prisones, to be a
thingThe keeping of great princes prisoners,
daungerous. full of perill and daunger: which I confesse, and was the
onely reason that moued the pope to counsell Charles of
Fraunce, to put to death Conradin his prisoner, the
sonne of Manfroy king of Naples. As with like crueltie
had Ptolomie, last king of Aegypt caused Pompey the Great, after his flight unto him from the
battaile of Pharsalia, to be slaine; his councellors saying unto him, That dead men bit not. And yet neuerthelesse neither could this Ptolomee escape
destruction: neither wanted there heires enow of the house of Aragon, who ceased not to driue out them of the house of Aniou,
and to recover againe the kingdome: and albeit that he which put him to death,
beeing himselfe afterward also condemned to die, escaped: yet so it was, that
the infamie of so detestable a murther, without cause committed uppon the
person of a young innocent prince, hath yet tested upon them which did the
execution to their owne destruction. And truely our auncestours seeing Iohn duke of Burgundie, rashly in the verie time of
iudgement, confessing the murther of Lewes his kinsman,
duke of Orleans; and yet to have easily escaped the daunger, said, That surely
from thence foreward a man might have the blood of princes good cheape, and in
so saying said well. For the same Iohn comming afterward
under safe conduct, was himself likewise serued, and in cold blood slaine, they that were the authors of his death
escaping vnpunished.
CHAP. VI. ¶ Of an Aristocratie.
AN Aristocratie is a forme of Commonweale, wherein
the lesseWhat an Aristocratie is. part of the
citisens with soueraigne power commaundeth over all the rest; and euerie
citisen in particular. And in that it is contrarie unto the estate Popular, for
that in the Aristocraticall state the lesser part of the citisens command, and
in the Popular state the greater: and yet in
that they both agree, that they which have the soueraignty, have power to
commaund over every one in particular, but not over all in generall. Wherefore
a Monarchie is in that better and more honourable than the other two; for that
in it the power of one extendeth it selfe over all in generall, and in
particular also: a thing in mine opinion well worthy the noting. And like as a
Monarchie is either Royall, Lordlike, or Tyrannicall: so also anThree sorts of Aristocraties. Aristocratie may be
Lordly, lawfull, or factious; which in auntient time the called an Oligarchie;
that is to say, a Seignorie of a verie small number of Lords. As were the
thirtie lords of Athens, ouerthrowne by Thrasibulus,
whom they called the thirtie Tyrants. Or the ten commissioners, commonly called
the Decemuiri, appointed to reforme the lawes
and customes of Rome: and long after the Triumuiri, who by force oppressing the
libertie of the people, inuaded the soueraigntie. And that is it for which the
auntients have alwaies taken this word Oligarchie, in the euill part, and
AristocratieImpossible to establish an Aristocratie only
of good men. in the good; defining it to be A
government of good men. But we have before declared, that in matters of
state (to vnderstand of what forme euerie Commonweale is) we must not haue
regard whether the gouernours thereof bee vertuous, or otherwise; but to the
government thereof. It is also a difficult matter, and almost impossible, to
establish an Aristocratie composed onely of good men; for that cannot bee done
by lot, neither by election, the two vsuall meanes: whereunto we may ioyne the
third, by lot and election together, as
impossible as the other; vertue with fortune hauing no agreement. Neither is
lot and fortune to be admitted unto the consultations of honest causes: and if
the same should be committed unto the choyce of the promiscuous and vulgar
people, they would not make choyce of men altogether vnlike themselus; that is
of fools, of wicked and most impudent men, good and wise men (if there be any)
euerie where being the least part of the people: and what more shamefull thing
could there be, than the honour and reputation of wise men, to depend of the
iudgement (should I say, or of the rashnesse) of the head strong people. Yet
let vs grant some few good and wise men to bee in the citie, truely they will
shun euen the verie sight of the wicked and of the
bedlem multitude: neither if they come unto their common assemblies, be so shamelesse and impudent, as to name and make
their choice of themselves as of wise men. For so Lactantius
Firmianus meerely iesteth at the seuen Sages of Greece: If they were
but wise (saith he) in their owne iudgements, then were they not wise: but in
the iudgement of others, much lesse, who were not wise in iudging no mo wise
but seuen, and all the rest fooles.
But some may say it should do well herein to imitate the auncient Romans, and
other Latins, in the choice that they by solemne oath made of the most valiant
and warlike man of all other for their Generall: who so chosen, should make
choice of a second for his Lieutenant most like himselfe: and he likewise of
the third: and the third of the fourth; and so in order one valiant man of an
other, vntill the number of their Legions were
filled. This truely might seeme a good way for the forming of a Commonweal of
good and worthie men, at the first beginning thereof: But who should prefine
the measure and number of those good men? and who should be suertie unto the
Commonweal, that every one of those good men, should still make choice of an
other good man like himselfe; rather then of his sonne, his brother, his
kinsman, or his friend? and admit it were so done, sith every where there are
so few good men, who should defend them from the multitude, and violence of
them that were left, as fools and wicked men? But admit that a Commonweal may
at the first be made of such a select number of good men; how long shall we
think it can so stand? And that is it for which there neither is, nor euer was
any pure Aristocratie; wherein the most vertuous onely had the soueraigntie. For albeit that the Pythagorians hauing drawne
unto their line the most noble and honorable princes of Italie: in the time of
king Seruius Tullius had chaunged certeine Tyrants, into
iust Regalities, and were in hope also by little and little to have brought the
Oligarchies, and Democraties, into Aristocraties, as in some places they had
alreadie done: yet neuerthelesse it so fell out, that the popular men, and
ringleaders of the people, seeing all power and authoritie, under the coulour
of vertue, to be taken out of their hands, entered into great conspiracies, and
so arming the people against the Pythagoreans, and the desperate rout, against
the better sort: (as easie it was for the stronger to oppresse the weaker)
burnt them in their diet, and massacred almost all the rest that escaped from
the daunger of the fire: which shamefull
murther of the Pythagorians raised great sturres in Italie.Whersoeuer the lesser part of the people hath the soueraignties there is
one kind or other of an Aristocratie.
Wherefore whether they be of the better sort, or of the worse; of the richer
sort, or of the poorer; of the nobler, or of the baser; of the more warlike, or
otherwise which hold the soueraigntie, so that it be the lesser part of the
citizens or people, we call it by the name of an Aristocratie. This lesser part
of citizens or people we need not to define by any certein number: for that the
varietie of numbers is infinite, and can by no man be comprehended. As admit
there be ten thousand citizens, of whom an hundred have the soueraigntie; if in
their common assemblie three score of them shall be of oneThe lesser part of the people in an Aristocratie not to be defined by any
certaine number. opinion for the making of a law: that law shall in
generall bind the other fortie which have part also in the soueraigntie, but
are the fewer in number, together with the other nine thousand nine hundred excluded from the government, and the same three
score being of one mind together, shall rule the whole ten thousand in
particular: Neither yet for all that is the soueraigne right drawne unto those
three score; But as in every lawfull Colledge and Corporation, the greater part
is every where the better: so it followeth that three score being of one
accord, shall over rule the other fortie both altogether and a part: except by
law concerning soueraigntie it be prouided, that two thirds of the citizens
agreeing among themselves, should preuaile against the rest; as we see it set
downe in almost all the lawes and statutes of Colledges: by which meanes threescore foure citizens, shall in the aforesaid number
of an hundred, be superiou unto the other
thirtie six. Wherefore in an Aristocratie we are not to have regard how little,
or how great the number of the citizens is; prouided that they which have the
soueraigntie over the rest, be fewer in number than the one half of the whole.
For admit there be an hundred thousand citizens in a Commonweale, of whom ten
thousand have the soueraigntie over the rest, it shall as well be called an
Aristocratie; as if of ten thousand citizens, one thousand onely should hold
the estate: considering that both in the one and other Commonweal, the tenth
part hath the soueraigntie: so we may say where the hundred, or the thousand
part of the citizens beare the sway; and the fewer that they be, the more
assured and durable is the state; so that they be not at variance amongst
themselves. As the estate of the Pharsalians was the most durable of The Aristocratical estate of the Pharsalians. Graece,
and yet it had but twentie Gouernours. And the Lacedemonian Commonweal, which
caried away the prize of honour from all the others of the East: albeit that it
was most populous, yet for all that it had in it but thirtie Gouernours, chosen
out ofThe estate of the Lacedemonians. the better
sort, to continue in the government so long as they lived. The Epidaurians
saith Plutarche had but an hundred and foure score of
the noblest and welthiest of the citizens which had part in the soueraigntie:
out of which number they chose the counsellours of the state. The auntient
Commonweale of Marseilles in Prouence (whichThe auntient
estate of them of Marseilles. in the iudgement of Cicero was the best ordered Commonweal that euer was in the world) had
in it six hundred citizens which held the soueraigntie: out of which number of
six hundred were taken the Senators, and fifteene magistrats, and of these
fifteene magistrats were three Presidents set
over them in maner of the Roman Praetors. The like we may deeme of the Rhodians
and Theban Common-weales, after that their popular estates were chaunged into
Aristocraties, the richer sort possessing themselves of the soueraigntie: than
which nothing can bee more commodious for the Commonweal, especially if good
citizens cannot be had. For which cause Titus Flaminius
the Consul established the townes and cities of the Thessalians in forme of an
Aristocratie, making Senatours and Iudges of the richer sort, and giuing to
them the soueraigne power, whom it concerned most, that their Commonweal should
continue in rest and peace. Which order Andrew Doria
seemeth to have followed inThe Aristocraticall estate of
Genua framed by Andrew Doria. reforming the Commonweal of Genua, by
him drawne from the obeysance of the French,
in the yeare 1528, at which time he by the consent of the citizens there
established an Aristocratie of eight and twentie families, chosen as well out
of the base commonaltie, as out of the nobilitie, so that they had six houses
within Genua, all whom by a law he made noble, & partakers of the
soueraigntie of the state: leauing unto their discretion, every yere to chuse
unto them ten other citizens, such as they should think fittest for their
vertue, for their nobilitie or riches. Out of these eight and twentie families,
he established a Counsell of fower hundred men, every yeare to be chosen for
the government of the state: who also made choice of the Duke, and eight
gouernours for two yeares to continue, whom together they call the Seignorie;
for that unto them it belongeth to manage the
waightie affaires of the Common wealth: except some such great matter happen,
as may require the aduise of the Senate, which consisting of an hundred
persons, is vsually every yeare chosen by the nobilitie, by secret voices, by
lot giuen, as they do in Venice. And every one of these eight Gouernours after
his office expired, continueth for two yeares Procurour of the Common wealth:
and from that time forward, remayneth one of the priuie councell, together with
them which are and have beene Dukes, who are Procurours of the Common weal so
long as they live. Besides that there are fortie Captaines every yeare chosen,
and an hundred men deputed to every one of those captaines, which is a legion
of foure thousand men, appointed for the strength and
defence of the citie: over which legion there
is one Colonell, or chiefe Captaine, whom they call the Generall; who are all
chosen by the voices of the nobilitie: As for their iurisdiction or
administration of justice, they vse strangers, viz. a
Praetor, who is alwaies a stranger; with two Lieutenants his assistants, the
one for the receit, the other for criminall causes: and five other Ciuilians,
judges for all priuat causes for two yeares, all strangers also; whom, they
call the Rota. Yet besides them, there are seauen
extraordinarie Iudges chosen out of the Citizens, for the extraordinarie
deciding of causes. Besides whom were also five Syndicques to receiue
informations against the Duke, and the eight Gouernours, after that their
charge was expired, causing proclamation to be openly made, That if any man had
any complaint against them, for any wrong or iniurie receiued from them, he
should come in and be heard: at which time
if none complained, they had letters testimoniall giuen them, in witnesse of
their upright dealing in their office. The same yeareThe
estate of Geneua that Doria established an
Aristocratie at Genua, they of Geneua also changed their Pontificall monarchie
into a Popular state, gouerned in maner of an Aristocratie. And albeit that the
Towne long time before pretended, it selfe not to bee subiect unto the laws
either of the Duke of Sauoy or of the Pope, but to be free from them both; yet
the citizens thought it not best for them to attempt any thing, vntill that
discord about the Soueraigntie was risen not only betwixt the Duke & the
bishop, but euen betwixt the bishop and the people also: at which time they
tooke hold upon the occasion then presented unto their desires for the changing
both of their Religion & state. Wherefore
their Commonweale now set at libertie, they established a Counsell of two
hundred citizens, with soueraigne and perpetuall power; but that the people
still reserued unto themselves the confirmation of lawes, the election of their
Syndicques and other the great magistrats, and the treaties of peace and warre;
all which belong unto the right of Soueraigntie, as we have before declared.
Now out of this great Counsell of two hundred, they made choice of a perpetuall
Senat of threescore persons: and out of that Senat, they take five and twentie
to be of the priuie Counsell for euer, chosen all by the great Counsell, and
the foure Syndicques chosen every yeare for soueraigne Magistrats, beside the
other Iudges and magistrats ordinarie. But the difference betwixt this
Commonweal and that of Genua is notable, but especially in this, that the Genowaies vse every yeare to change their
great Counsell of fower hundred, and Senat of three score, with other their
Magistrats, except some few which continue for two yeares. Whereas the great
Counsell of Geneua, the Senat, and priuie counsell are once chosen for euer:
yet so, as that the censuring of every one of them every yere is still reserued
unto the Citizens: which is most straitly looked vnto; whereby it commeth to
passe, that the Commonweal of Geneua is more firme, and lesse subiect vnto
alteration or seditious innouation than is that of Genua. Moreover the choice
of the great Counsell, the Senat, and of the priuie Counsell at Geneua is not
made all at once, as at Genes and Venice; but a roome being become void by the
death or attainder of a councelour of the priuie Counsell of five and twentie,
they proceed to the choice of an other out of
the great counsell, to put in his place into the priuie Councell: and after
that of a citizen, or at least wise of a Burgeois, to put into the great
counsell, a man not any way sported or defamed: not hauing any regard in the
choice of them, unto their wealth, or nobilitie, but in what they may vnto
their vertue and integritie only: a thing (as we read) used amongst the
Lacedemonians, who after the death of their Senators, made choice of others in
respect of their honour and vertue onely.
The Swissers except the Grisons, and the other five little cantons, have almost
theThe state of the) Swissers. same forme of a
Commonweale; as we see at Zurich the great Councell of two hundred, the Senat, and the priuie Councell established after the maner
of Geneua: or to say better, that of Geneua
after the forme of Zurich; which is almost like unto that of Berne. Which
neuerthelesse differ in this, that with these the great Councel & the Senat
chaunge euerie yeare: which they do not at Geneua: for with these the
fraternities, which they call Zunfft, euerie one of them
composed of one, two or three occupations: which are eleuen at Schaffouse,
twelue at Zurich, fifteene at Basil; and in other places more or lesse, chuse
twelue persons of euerie fraternitie, for the great Councell: and for the Senat
they chuse two, as at Zurich; or three, as at Basil; of whome one is the chiefe
of the fraternitie. So that the great Councell at Zurich, consisteth of two
hundreth, of 244 at Basil, of 86 at Schaffuse. And of Senators at Zurich the
number is fiftie, at Schaffuse twentie sixe, and at Basil sixtie three. But
they which are so chosen by the voyces of the
fraternitie, are confirmed also by the great Councell, and by the Senators or
magistrat, or by the old Senat, as at Basil. For the one halfe of the Senat is
that which was before, which had the charge alreadie sixe monethes. And the
other-moytie of the Senat, is of those which are but newly chosen, to the
intent that the Senat should not be wholy chaunged all at once. True it is,
that the auntient Senat of Basil, chose alwaies the Senat for the yeare
following: and the Burgamasters who had for their companions three Tribunes at
Zurich, and two at Basil, who with the Bourgamasters being foure, have nine
other persons, as assistants ioyned unto them, and so together make the
colledge of the thirteene men (as they call it) unto whome all the mannaging of
the secret affaires of the Commonwealth are committed: and without whose authoritie nothing vsually is propounded vnto
the Senat or great Councell to resolue of. There are also at Zurich eight men,
which have charge of the common receit, over whome one Bourgomaster is
gouernour. And at Zurich and Shaffuse the new Senators determine all causes
criminall: whereas in all the other townes the Prouost of the empire, with
three Senators in the name of the whole Senat decide the same: which prouost is
also chosen of the Senat, and generally none may bee chosen into the Senat
which is defamed or base borne. By all which it is manifest, that their estate
is gouerned Aristocratically; and yet more at Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solere, where the fraternities
and companies have no voyces in the state, neither power o authoritie to meet together, more then for matters
concerning their occupations and trades: but
euerie yeare foure captaines or chiefe men of euerie citie, chose out sixteen
other citisens, men of greatest integritie, and without all imputation: who
three daies before Easter make choice of the great Councell, consisting of an
hundred of the better sort of the citisens at Lucerne, and of more than two
hundred at Berne: which great Councell afterwards chuseth the Auoyer, which
they call Schuldthessen, and the other magistrats. And
particularly the Auoyer, with the aforesaid sixteene, and the foure captaines
chose the Senat, which is of xxvj at Berne, and xviij at Lucerne: who have the
power of the state at Berne for a yeare. The foure captaines are also annuall
chosen by the great Councell; by which captaines and the treasurors, all the
judges are lected
and confirmed by the Senat: which Senat hath also the deciding of the first
appeales. The second appeales are decided by the same Senat of xxvj, and xxvj
others whome the Senat shall make choice of. But the last appeale of all is
unto the great Councell, the chiefe whereof is the Auoyer: where if question be
of the life, fame, or fortune of any the citisens: it is by the decree there
made decided, without further appeale. The same order almost is used in the
state of Friburg, in making choyce of the great Councell, consisting of two
hundred of the better sort of the citisens: by whome afterward is chosen the
Senat of twentie foure persons, and the Auoyer with the foure captaines.
Whereby it is well to be vnderstood those estates of
the Swissers to bee Aristocratique,The estate of the Swissers Aristocraticall, et temperated with a certaine mixtu of popularitie. yet popularly tempered: for
that the way is open for all the citisens of what de gree soeuer unto all the
officers and places of commaund, benefits and charge in the Commonweale, if
they be not men infamed, distracted of their wits, or otherwise vtterly
ignorant of government. That is also belonging unto popularitie, that almost
all their magistrats are annuall: which temperature of the better or richer
sort with the meaner or poorer, in being capable of the honours of the
Commonweale, maketh the same much more firme and stable, than if the honours
and preferments were communicated but unto the Senators or richer sort onely;
with whome the vulgar people is most commonly at oddes: and that so much the
more amongst the Swissers, where the nobilitie (except some few) long sithence
destroyed and almost rooted ou, the people tooke upon them the soueraigntie: which by little and
little falling againe unto the nobilitie (excepting
in the five mountaine cities) have with a popular moderation tempered their
states with better lawes and orders than the rest. For commonly the
Aristocraticall state admitteth none but the Senators, the nobilitie, or richer
sort, unto the honours and offices of the state, the rest being quite excluded.
Howbeit there have bene moe Aristocraties, consisting of the more auntient and
noble families, than of the richer or more vertuous. As the Commonweales of the
Samians, the Corcyreans, the Rhodians, and Cnidians, and almost all the
Commonweales of Greece, after the victorie of Lysander,
were by him chaunged into Aristocraties of the most auntient families, in
chusing out ten or twentie, or at the most thirtie, unto whome hee committed
the soueraigntie for the government of
their estates. Wee see also the state of Venice, to be as we have before shewed
meere Aristocratike: And them also of Rhaguse, of Luca, of Ausbourg, of
Nuremberg, to be composed in forme of Aristocraties, of the most auntient
families, although they be but few in number. For as for the RhagusiansThe estate of the Rhagusians. (in auntient time called
Epidaurians) hauing new built the citie of Rhaguse, neere unto the auntient
citie of Epidaurus, vtterly rased by the furie of the
Gothes, and exempting themselus from the government of the Alhanois,
established among themselves an Aristocratike forme of a Commonwealth, gouerned
by the most noble and auntient families; following therein almost the example
of the Venetians: yet still much more respectiue and carefull of their
nobilitie, than are the Venetians. For a Venetian gentleman may marrie a base woman, or a common citisens
daughter: whereas the Rhagusian gentleman may not marrie a common citisen,
neither a straunger, how noble soeuer, if she be not a gentlewoman of Zarafi,
or Catharo, and bee farther worth at the least a thousand ducats. There are
also but twentie foure houses, which have part in the state: out of whom are
drawne diuers families, out of which the great Councell of about three hundred
gentlemen is drawne; prouided alwaies that they bee twentie yeares old, when
they are so chosen. These make choyce of threescore gentlemen Senators, for the
mannaging of the affaires of the state, and in cases of appeale, so that they
be aboue the value of three hundred ducats: who have also the hearing of
criminall causes of importance, as if question be of the life, honour, or state
of any gentleman. Beside this Senat there is a
priuie councell of twelue persons, with a yearely prince or gouernour of the
citie; and five masters of requests (whome they call Prouisors) men appointed
to receiue the requests of the people presented unto them in what court soeuer.
There are also six Consuls to decide civill causes, and five other judges for
criminall matters, and thirtie others for the deciding of such suits and
controuersies as exceed not the summe of three hundred ducats. Many other
meaner officers they have also, of whome we will in due place speake. Truely
this Commonweale of Rhaguse hath of all others that we have heard, the purest
Aristocratie, and farthest from all popular mixture.
The citie of Luca also gouerned after the same fashion, admitteth The estate of of Luca. onely
the auntient families to bee partakers of the soueraigntie of their government,
who are but few, albeit that about the yeare 1555 there were numbred two and
fiftie thousand citisens, besides women. Out of the nobilitie are created an
hundred & twentie yearely Senators: out of whome are chosen the ten
Councellors of the priuie Councell, with the prince whome they call the
Gonfalonnier. And in these consisteth the soueraigne state of this Commonweale.
Other officers there be also, as Censors, Pretors, and Receiuers, of whome we
will in due place speake. Suffiseth it now for the present to have shewed
diuers Aristocraticall estates, in respect of soueraigntie, to the end by
diuers examples both of the auntient and new Commonweales, we may the better
vnderstand the true nature of an Aristocratie.
And forasmuch as diuers men beleeue, and some of them of greatest knowledge
ofWhether the Germaine empire be a Monarchie, or a eere Aristocratie. the Germans have by
writing also published, the German empire to be a true Monarchie: we will also
speake of that estate, whereof although we have in briefe somewhat spoken
before, yet here we will more at large thereof discourse, and show the same to
be an Aristocraticall estate. True it is, that from the time of Charlemaigne unto the raigne of Henrie surnamed the Falconer, it was a pure Monarchie by right of
succession, continued in the royall blood of the said Charlemaigne. But the descent of Charlemaigne,
taking end in this Henrie the Falconer, the Monarchie by
the voyces of the princes being translated from this Henrie, hath of long time continued by the right of election: insomuch
that the seuen princes Electours, hauing by little and lirtle withdrawne
the soueraigntie, have left nothing vnto
the emperour, but the bae marks therof in show; the
soueraigntie it selfe in effect remaining unto the state of the seuen electors,
of three hundred German princes or thereabouts, and the ambassadours deputed
for the imperial cities. Which when it first happened, I see no man to have yet
written▪ For that such things as by little and little and little creepe into a
Commonweale, are scarcely at all perceiued, neither well felt, vntill the
change bee quite made. Now wee have before shewed that it is an Aristocratike
state, wheresoeuer the lesser part of the citisens or people commaund over the
rest together, and over euerie one in particular. And so it is, that the
estates of the empire, composed of three or foure hundred men (aIn whom the soueraigntie of the Germaine empire
consistteth. I have said) have the soueraigne power priuatly over the
emperour himselfe, and over all the other
princes, and townes of the empire in particular: as also to giue lawes to all
the subiects of the empire, to determine of peace and warre, to lay taxes and
impositions upon the people, to appoint judges both ordinarie and
extraordinarie, to iudge of the goods, honour, and lives of the emperour, the
princes and imperiall townes: which all are the true markes of soueraigntie.
Which if it be so, as most certaine it is, who can denie but that the state of
the German empire is a true Aristocratie? And that to bee true which I haue
said, is most euident; sith it is so, that the power of soueraigne commaund
dependeth of the acts and decrees of the estates. But the decrees are made by
the seuen princes electors, accounted for one third part of the
voyces: and by the other princes of the
empire, in number not aboue three hundred, who have also another third part of
the voyces: and by the deputies of the free cities or imperiall townes, in
number seuentie, or thereabouts, which have the other third part of the
deliberatiue voyces: by whome all the lawes and decrees of the empire, or
whatsoeuer els is propounded, have used to be made, established, disanulled, or
confirmed. And hath nothing particular in respect of the state, different from
other Aristocraties, but that the seuen princes electors have (as we said) one
third part of the voyces; the princes another, and the imperiall townes the
rest: in such sort, as that if the seuen electors and the deputies, or the
deputies and the princes, or the electors and the other princes, be of accord and agree in one, the decree whatsoeuer passeth.
And for that the ecclesiastical princes are
the greater number, they oftentimes carrie away the matter against the lay
princes: which was the cause that the same lay princes, who had before
renounced the Romish religion, tooke in euill part the diet which Charles the fift held at Ratisbon; neither being thither
sent for, would come. And like as the gentlemen of Venice, Luca, and Rhaguse,
vntil they be twentie yeares old enter not into the great councell, neither
have any part in the soueraigntie: euen so likewise the children or neere
kinsmen of the German princes, be they young, or be they old, have no voyces in
the diet, if they be not qualified princes of the empire: which are a certaine
number of Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, Lantgraues, Burgraues, Margraues,
Barons, Archbishops, Bishops, and Abbats. And albeit that the duke of Loraine
be a prince of the empire, and hath a voyce
with the rest of the princes, yet so it is, that his vncle the countie Vaudemont, of the same stocke and house with him, as
other like princes of the same ranke and order, have neither voyces nor places
in the assembly of the states and princes of the empire, but are reckoned
amongst the children of those princes. Howbeit yet many are of opinion, the
princes and imperial cities to have their soueraigne states apart, neither to
be bound unto any other mens commaunds or lawes, otherwise than as friends and
confederats; in such sort and manner, as the Swissers have their cities and
iurisdictions among themselves, one divided from another. But the difference is
to him that looketh neerer thereinto, right great, euerie Canton being
soueraigne in it self, and not subiect unto the lawes and commaundements of
others; neither otherwise bound among
themseues, than in aliance offensiue or defensiue, as we have in due place
declared: whereas the German empire is vnited by the estates generall in
soueraigntie, who not onely have power to bridle the princes and cities, with
fines, exile, proscription, and other seuere punishments, but also to depose
and thrust out of the empire euen the emperours themselves, as they did the
emperours Adolphus and Venesaus, with many others. Beside that, the estates
make ordinatie decrees and lawes, which bind all the subiects of the empire, as
well in generall, as in particular. And that more is, the ten circles or
circuits of the empire, hold their particular estates, and yet bring their
requests, complaints, and grieuances, unto the estates generall, to receiue
their commandements and resolutions, as lawes. Moreover the princes electours,
the day after the The princes Electors hold their states of the empire and not
of the emperour. coronation of the emperour, protest themselves to
hold their states of the empire, and not of the emperour, albeit that they doe
their homage betwixt the emperours hands. In briefe, all iurisdiction and
soueraigntie of all appeales in civill causes, aboue twentie crownes by the
auntient lawes, and fortie by the new, appertaine unto the imperiall chamber,
as to all the appeales of the subiects of the empire: which chamber is composed
of twentie foure judges, and one prince of the empire, chosen euerie yeare,
according to the order of the ten prouinces or circuits. And if so be that any
controuersie arise betwixt any of the princes, or the imperiall cities
themselves; whether it bee for their bounds, their lives, their honour or
states, the deciding thereof belongeth unto the judges of the imperial court:
except it please the whole states of the empire to take unto themselves the hearing and determining of the matter, in
such their generall assemblies as we have before spoken of. As in the yeare
1555, it is set downe in a decree of the empire, That if from that time forward
any prouince, prince, towne, or subiect of the empire should beare armes
against the German nation, hee should bee iudged by the states of the empire;
who to that end were appointed to hold a diet at Wormes. And in the same diet
holden at Ausburg, it was forbidden all the princes of the empire, to raise any
armie, or to take up armes in the aid of any straunge prince, and that uppon a
great penaltie. And that more is, it is expresly and most straitly forbidden by
the laws Lib. 2. cap. 28. of the
empire, any prince, towne, or corporation, to be so hardie, as to prohibit or
let the appeales of the subiects unto the
imperiall chamber, and that upon great paine also. And in fine, the emperour
himselfe, as head of the assemblie of the states, more straitly bindeth them as
it were into one bodie and Commonweale, than if they were but ofThe maiestie of the empire not to rest in the emperour but in
the whole assemblie of the estates of the empire. themselves onely:
and yet in him resteth not the maiestie of the empire, but in the whole
assemblie of the states. For other which hold the soueraigne power in
Commonweales, doe themselves creat princes, dukes, and earles, whereas the
emperour is himselfe by the other dukes and princes of the empire created. How
therefore can hee being the selfe same man be both the soueraigne and subiect
of the empire, lord, and vassall, maister, and yet constrained to be obedient
unto the estates? And not unto the estates onely, but euen unto the deputies
and lieutenants of the empire? Which unto some
may seeme right straunge, and yet is indeed most true. I truely my selfe haue
read the letters of a great lord, pentionarie unto the king, directed unto Mommorancie the Connestable, bearing date the twelft of
May, in the yeare 1552: whereby hee aduertiseth, that Henrie the second (then the French king) had iust cause to complaine
unto the duke of Saxonie, and the countie Palatine, lieutenant for the empire,
to have iustice against the emperour Charles the fift
and his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans, according
to the golden bull, and decrees of the states: for that they contrarie unto the
lawes of the empire and customes of their auncestors, hauing intercepted the
kings letters directed unto the estates of the empire, had not suffered the
same to bee unto them delivered, but also forbidden the archbishop of Mets,
chauncelour of the empire to receiue or
present the same unto the states, as his office was. And by the assemblie of
the imperiall diet holden at Heidelberg, in the yere 1553, it was decreed, that
none of the emperours court should mannage any the affaires of the empire; as I
have seene by letters from the French ambassadour. And as for monies
extraordinarily raysed by the decree of the estates, for the affaires of the
empire, they are not brought into the emperours coffers, but are laid safely up
in store in certaine cities therefore appointed: viz.
Strausbourg, Lubec, and Ausbourg: Neither is it lawfull for the emperour to
take so much as one peny out of the common treasure, without the consent of the
state. Al which most plainly show them to be in an errour, and much deceiued,
which call the German emperour a Monarch; or which deeme that Aristocraticall
estate to bee a right Monarchie. Whereas all
to the contrarie the emperour Maximilian the first,
great grandfather to him which now raigneth (albeit that hee was ambitious
enough) yet in a discourse which hee had with the states of the empire
concerning such matter, told them, That hee thought it not needfull to take the
imperiall crowne at the hands of the Bishop of Rome, neither to stand upon such
ceremonies, seeing that the soueraigne power, as they knew, rested in the
states themselves. Neither is it lawfull for the emperour of himselfe, or at
his pleasure to call together a diet of the empire, without some especiall and
extraordinarie vrgent cause, neither to dissolue the same: but at the breaking
up of euerie diet, order is there taken for the diet to bee holden the
yeare next following. So that it is not
lawfull for the emperour to rall an assemblie of the states, which it was
lawfull for the Roman magistrats to do, as also for other magistrats in euerie
popular and Aristocraticall Commonweale, so that it were done by commaunding of
euerie one, as in particular, but not of altogether, as in common: After the
auntient manner of the Romans, whereby the Consull might by his edict call
together all the Senators, one by one into the Senat, upon paine of proceeding
against them, by seising upō their bodies or goods, by way of imprisonment,
taking of pledges or rasing of their houses. And yet for all that the German
princes are not bound to come unto the diet of the empire, if they be by none
commaunded, but by the emperour, as they gaue Charles the fift the emperour well to vnderstand, in the
yeare 1554: and also Maximilian the second, refusing in the yeare 1566, to have any diet
then according to his request holden. And if it fortune the emperour, or king
of the Romans, to come unto the frontiers of their territories, the princes
euerie one of them in their degree goe to meet them, but yet in such sort, as
if it were but to meet a straunge prince.
Now if one should say that the Emperour beareth himselfe as a Iudge, and
determinerHow the emperour determineth the quarels and
controuersies betwixt the princes, or the imperial town of the empire. of all quarrels and
controuersies betwixt the Princes, or the imperiall Townes; True it is at the
first motion, and when the parties are content to accept thereof, and that also
but as Lieutenant for the Empire: as in like case the Duke of Saxonie, and the
Countie Palantine might also iudge as the Imperiall Lieutenants: and yet for
all this, appeal made unto the Estates of the
Empire suspendeth the power of the Emperour, aswell as of the imperiall
Lieutenants. Yet might some say, that the Princes of the Empire by their
letters, and in the assemblies of the States, vse these magnificall titles
towards the Emperour, Your sacred Maiestie, and such
like, which cannot be applied but unto him which is himselfe a Soueraigne: such
as slaues would scarce vse towardsGlorious flattering itles giuen to princes neuer awhit encrease their
souerign ti.
the greatest kings on earth: titles for fashion sake, foolishly or wickedly
(should I say) giuen by flatterers unto men, which are onely fitting the most
mightie and immortall God. And yet do in deed no more increase the power of the
Germaine Emperour, then of the King of the Romains: whom by such like prodigall
pompe and words, a man might also think to have the power of soueraigne
Maiestie; so that in that Empire there should
be two Soueraignes: and yet for all that one of them subiect unto the other.
For so George Helfustein Baron of Gondelphfingen,
pronouncing the speach of Ferdinand king of the Romans
in the generall assemblie of the States of the Empire in the yeare 1556,
calleth him their Soueraigne Lord.
But the greatest argument of Soueraigntie is, that the Emperour giueth the fees
ofHow the emperour bestowe the
fees of the empire. the Empire being void, unto whom he pleaseth, and
inuesteth in them whom he seeth good: and that without the consent of the
States. Whereunto I againe answere, that the expresse consent of the Estates is
not necessarie, and yet is it not altogether done without their good liking,
who neuerthelesse permit the same; when as they might aswell cut of this point,
as they have done the other marks of Soueraigntie. And howbeit that the embasadour Marillac was of
opinion, that the Emperour had not this power: and therefore aduertised king
Henry, how that the Emperour Charles the fift had at Bruxels in the yeare 1551, inuested Philip of Spaine in the Duchie of Millan without the
consent of the States of the empire: yet can he not find so much as any one
inuestiture of any Imperiall fee, in the conferring whereof the expresse
consent of the Estates was had. But certein it is, that the Emperour bestoweth
not these fees or inuestitures, but as in qualitie of the Lieutenant of the
empire: in such sort as he receiueth the fealtie and homage of the princes,
for, and in the name of the empire. As in like case Ferdinand the emperour without the consent of the estates of the
empire, receiued Granuellan sent unto him with speciall
charge and deputation from Philip king of Spayne in the yeare 1565, to do for him the fealtie and
homage due unto the Empire, for the Duchie of Millan, and the perpetuall
Lieutenancie of the principalitie of Sienna: granting unto him as a vassall of
the Empire charters of his fealtie done: and for the confirmation of his
possession therein. The same is to be thought concerning the confirmations of
benefices, and other royall rights, which giuen by the princes or cities of the
empire, or by the Chapters and Colleges of priests themselves, are yet
neuerthelesse to be confirmed by the Imperial authoritie: according to the
agreement made betwixt the Bishop of Rome, and the estates of the Empire. As
for letters of safe conduct which he giueth vnto
embassadors, heralts at armes, and other strangers,The maiestie of the Germaine emperour by this French author
still empaired whereunto the ordinarie clause is adioyned in these
words, Forasmuch as wee for our Imperiall power may do all
things: they show right well that the Emperour was in auncient time a
soueraigne Monarchie; which he now is not: For why then should the Electors and
other princes of the Empire refuse to grant unto the emperour, the diet which
he requested of them in the yeare 1566? or why then should both hee and his
officers be by them forbidden so much as to touch the monies by them raised for
the maintenance of the warres. And to cut it short, we need not but to look
into the articles of the oath made by the Emperours (by vs before declared) to
know yet more euidently, that the soueraigntie of the Empire is not any wise in
the emperour, albeit that he carrie the crowne, the scepter, and weare the
other most precious and imperial habits, and
in all solemnities and ceremonies hath the precedence before other the
Christian kings, yea and that men attribute unto him the title of Most sacred Maiestie, all in deed hauing the show of
soueraigne and royall maiestie, but yet not the thing it selfe. And yet to say
the trueth, a man knoweth not how to do him so great honour as the maiestie of
the sacred empire, whereof he is the head, deserueth. But the manerA great pollicy in Aristocratical estates to giue unto him
least power to whom they giue most honour. of well gouerned
Aristocratike states, is to graunt unto him the least power to whom they giue
the greatest honour: and sometimes also least honour unto them that be of most
power: as of all others the Venetians in the ordering and government of their
Commonweal best know how to vse that matter. Seeing therefore wee have thus
showed the Empire to bee but an Aristocraticall estate, we may well conclude,
That there is neither prince nor imperiall
citie which hath therein the soueraigntie, being nothing else but members of
the empire, every one of them gouerning their estate under the power, and
without any thing derogating from the lawes and ordinances of the empire.
Wherein many are deceiued, which make so many Commonweals as there are princes
and imperiall townes; the contrarie wherof we have before showed. But as in
this realme every citie and feigniorie have their Iudges, Consuls, Sheriffes,
and other their particular officers which gouerne their estate; so is it in the
Imperiall townes and cities: but that here are moe roiall judges; whereas in
the empire there is none but the Imperiall chamber onely which receiueth the
Appeales from the other judges and lieutenants of the empire. And yet
neuerthelesse when it chanceth the empire to
be divided into factions, and part takings; or that the princes bandie them
selues one of them against an other (which hath beene too often seene) then
every towne and prince for the most part beare them selues as diuers
Aristocraticall estates, and particular Monarchies; making of every member a
particular bodie of a soueraigne Commonweale.
Now as the state of the Empire it selfe is entirely Aristocratique, so also the
great imperiall townes and cities hold their estates in Aristocraticall forme:
as Ausburg, Nuremberg, Wormes, and others, which are almost all Aristocraties;
albeit that in trueth some of them are more popular than others, as is the
citie of Strasbourg. But for breuitie sake I
will for example onely set downe the state of the citie of Nuremberg,The estate of Nuremberg Aristocraticall. the greatest,
most famous, and best ordered of all the imperial cities, established in forme
of an Aristocratie; wherein of an infinite number of citisens there are but
xxviij. auntient families which have power over all the rest of the subiects,
which are within the iurisdiction of Nuremberg. Out of these xxviij. families,
they every yeare first make choice of two Censors, men without any imputation;
which done, all the rest of the magistrats are every one of them displaced:
then these Censors according to their owne discretion make choice of xxvj.
Senators: who out of themselves chuse xiij. persons, for the managing of the
secret affaires of that Commonweal: and out of the
same Senat also make choice of other xiij. Sheriffes also: beside the vij.
Bourgmasters, which are an other particular
counsell, whose authoritie aud power is much like unto that of the Decemuiri in
Venice. And these Magistrats which we have spoke of, are they which mannage all
the greatest affaires of that Commonwealth. I speak not of the five criminall
judges: nor of the twelue appointed for the deciding of civill causes; neither
of the Prouiditor for victuals, the two treasurers: nor of the three maisters
of the wards: almost of like authoritie with the procurators of Saint Marke at Venice, to the imitation of whome they of
Nuremberg seeme in some sort to have bene desirous to fashion their
Commonweale. And albeit that of the imperiall townes some of them be freer than
other; as are those which be neither in subiection nor protection of other
princes, namely Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Lubec, Hambourg, Breme, Wormes, and Spires. Yet so it is, that they all as subiects
have a reuerent regard unto the maiestie of the German empire. True it is, that
there are many which have exempted themselves from the power of their princes,
to maintaine themselves in libertie: and now of late to hold of the empire, as
the towne of Brunswich, which hath withdrawne it selfe from the obeysance of
the princes of Brunswich, Wormes and others, whichMost of
the Iperiall cities of Germanie gouerned in form o Aristocraties. have exempted themselves from
the power of their auntient lords. As in like case the Swissers and Grisons,
now divided Commonweals, but sometimes subiects of the empire. And namely, the
lords of the Canton of Fribourg, in the treatie of Combourgeoisie, betwixt them
and the lords of Berne, call the towne of Fribourg a member of the empire,
albeit that they have their state therefrom divided unto themselves in full
soueraigntie. Some others acknowledge and
confesse themselves to hold their liberties and priuileges, for the government
of their estate from the emperour; as they of Vri, vnderuald, and Schwits,
hauing their letters patents therefore from Lewes of
Bauaria the emperour, bearing date the yeare 1316. They also of Tietmarsh for
the confidence they had reposed in the strength and situation of their
countrey, (placed in the frontiers of the kingdome of Denmarke) withdrew
themselves from the German empire, and established their Commonweale in forme
of an Aristocrati, of eight and fortie of the better
sort of them, who so long as they live have the soueraigntie, and when one of
them is dead, still chusing another in his place. True it is, that in the yeare
1559, Adolph duke of Holst did what he could to haue
subdued them, pretending that Christiern his great grandfather had of the emperour Frederike the third obtained the soueraigntie over them
of Tietmarsh, for hauing dismembred themselves from the empire; as I have seene
by the letters of Maister Danzai, ambassadour for the
king into Denmarke.
Wherefore it is manifest not onely the whole estate of the Germaine empire, but
euen the imperiall citties, themselves also to be gouerned in manner and forme
of pure Aristocraties. But heere we must have regarde in considering of the
Aristocratique estate that wee confound not the princes and chiefe magistrates
of a Commonweale with kings: nor a counsell of the nobilitie with a Senate:
wherein Historiographers often times erre and goe astray, and that specially
when as in a Commonweale there are so few of
the nobilitie or better sort to mannage the state, as that they are both
Senatours and magistr ats: which government of few, the Greekes call an
Oligarchie. So the Pharsalian estate was gouerned by twentie of the nobilitie:
the Lacdemonians by thirtie, neither were there moe in all the cities of the
Greeks after the victorie of Lysander. They of Thetmarsh were gouerned by eight
and fortie; and had no other Senatours then the Seignorie it selfe: the
Cnidians by threestore (whome of their integritie of life they called Amymones)
but these were but annuall magistrates: whereas the other were perpetuall. And
all be it that the Cnidians neuer gaue any account of
that they had done in time of their government, yet were they not therefore
soueraigne lords, but soueraigne magistrats;
who their magistracie once expired, were again to restore unto the nobilitie,
the soueraigne governments by them committed to their charge. In like case they
of Zurich chose euerie yeare thirtie six magistrats, of whom twelue by course
gouerned foure moneths: which forme of government continued unto the yeare
1330, that the common people enraged and rising up in mutinie cast them out,
creating in their stead a Senat of two hundred of the nobility, with a Consull
chiefe amongst them: and all those estates had the counsell of their nobilitie
and Senat all one. Yet doe they better and much more surely, which in an
Aristocratie (how little soeuer) be it deuide the counsell of the nobilitie
from the Senat: as amongst the Rhagusians, where although the number be but
small of them that gouerne that Commonweale,
being it selfe shut up into a small roome: yet of them is made a Senat of
threescore men, out of whom are selected twelue to mannage the secret affaires
of their state. Heretofore also the Commonweale of Chio established in forme of
an Aristocratie by certaine Genua gentlemen of the house Austinian, hauing won it from the emperours of Constantinople; every
yeare made choice of twelue counsellors of estate for the Senat: out of whome
they chose foure, who with one soueraigne prince or magistrat gouerned all the
affaires of state: the authoritie of which foure for all that, was but for six
months, the soueraign magistrat yet stil holding his place for two yeres: in
which manner of government they honorably maintained their estate, vntill that
of late yeares it was by the Grand Signior taken from the Genowayes, and so
vnited unto the Turkish empire.
And thus much concerning the definition of an Aristocratie. Now as concerning
the profits and dangers incident unto an Aristocratique estate: & the
manner of the government thereof, we will in due place declare. It resteth now
to answere unto thatFour sortes of Aristocraties by
Aristotle set downe. which Aristotle saith concerning an
Aristocratie, being altogether contrarie unto that which is by vs before set
downe. There are (Plit lib. 4. Cap.. saith hee) foure sorts of Aristocraties:
The first, where none but the richer sort, and that to a certaine reuenue, haue
pan in the government of the Seignorie: The second, where the estates and
offices are giuen by lot unto them which hold most wealth: The third, where the
children succeed their fathers, in the government of the Seignory: And the
fourth, when they which take upon them the state, vse a lordlike power and
commaund without lawe. And yet neuertheles in the same booke, and a little
after, hee maketh five sorts of Commonweales, viz. the Regall, the Popular, the
gouerment of a few, the government of the nobilitie▪ and after these a fift
kind, composed of the other foure: which (as hee saith* Lib. 4. Cap. 7.
afterwards) is no where to be found. But such a medley of Commonweales wee haue
before not onely by probable but euen by necessarie reasons also, prooued to
bee impossible, and by nature altogether imcompatible: wherefore letting that
passe, let vs now also show the diuers formes of Aristocraties by Aristotle set downe, to bee no way considerable. First
hee no where defineth what an Aristocratie is: the verie cause of his errour.
For what can bee more vaine, than to say it to be an Aristocratie where the
ritcher or the better sort have onely part in the government?Aristot. by the author impugned. For it may bee that of ten thousand
citisens, six thousand of them hauing two hundred crownes of yerely reuenue,
have all part in the Seignorie; and yet neuerthelesse the state shall be a
popular state, considering that the greater part of the citisens have the
soueraignitie: for otherwise there shall be no popular Commonweale at all. The
like might be said for the government of the better sort also, who might
chaunce to be the greater number of the citisens, which should have part in the
Seignorie: and yet according to the opinion of Aristotle, it should also be an Aristocraticall estate, albe it that the greater part of the people beare therein
the sway. As for the government of good men,
if we shall measure them according to the highest degree and perfection of
vertue, we shall not finde one such: but if after the common manner, and
opinion of the people, so euerie man will call himselfe a good man. But to
iudge of an otherHard to iudge who is a good man.
mans integritie and vertue, as it is an hard matter for any man to do, so hath
it it also unto wisemen alwaies seemed a thing most dangerous: Insomuch that
the wise and graue Cato being chosen out for the
purpose, durst not giue sentence whether Q. Luctacius
was a good man or not. But admit that in euerie Commonweale the good are in
number fewer than the bad; & yet have the government of the common state:
why for the same reason hath not Aristotle made one sort
of Aristocraty, wherin the nobilitie hold the soueraignitie? seeing that they
are euer fewer in nūber then the base & vulgar sort: why also maketh he not an other sort of Aristocratie,
wherein the most antitient families although but of base degree bore rule? As
it chanced in Florence after that the nobilitie were driuen out. For it is
right certain that there are many base families, who although they be not
famous or much spoken of for any great thing by them or their auncestours done,
are yet more auncient and honest then a number of upstart gentlemen, who
happily scarce knowe their owne fathers. He might also make an other sort of
Aristocratie, wherein the tallest and greatest should have the soueraignitie as
he himselfePoli. lib. 3. Cap. 5. saith they do in Ethiopia: and so
consequently also an Aristocratie of the fairest, of the strongest, of the
valiantest, of the wisest, of the learnedst, and of others with such like
qualities of the bodie, or of the minde: as wee see to bee incident but into the fewer sort: whereof should ensue an
infinite multitude and varietie of Aristocratique Commonweales. But that
seemeth also unto mee most strange that hee should say the second sort of an
Aristocraty, to be where the richer sort by lot have the government and
mannaging of the state, whereas alwaies, elsewhere, hee had said lots properly
to appertaine unto the popular state. Thus the Athenian Commonweale was of all
other most popular, he with Xenophon agreeth: and yet
for all that the greatest honours, offices, and preferments were not their
giuen, but unto the richest before the time of Pericles. And in Rome which was
also a popular state, before the law Canuleia the greatest honours, priesthood,
and preferments, were not bestowed upon any of the common vulgar sort of
people, but upon the most auntient gentlemen
whome they called Patricii: a most certain argument that the Commweale may
be in state popular, and yet gouerned
Aristocratically: and that there is a notable difference betwixt the state of a
Commweale; and the government of the same, as we have before said. As for the
fourth sort of Aristocraties, wherin (as Aristotle
saith) some few which take upon them the mannaging of the state, vse a Lordlike
power and commaund over all without law, in manner of a tiranie: we have before
showed the difference betwixt a Monarchie royall, Lordlike, and tirannical: the
like difference whereof is also in the Aristocraticall government: wherein the
Lords may gouerne their subiects as slaues, and dispose of their goods, as may
the Lordly Monarke, without law and yet without tiranising also: not vnlike the
good maister of the familie, who is alwaies
more carful of his slaues, than of his hired Seruants: and so also loueth them
better. For why it is not the law which maketh the iust and rightfull
government, but the true administration of iustice, and equall distribution
thereof. And the fairest thing in the world that can be desired in matter of
state, (in the iudgement of Aristotle himselfe)A wise and vetuous king the greatest
ornament and stay of a Commonwe is to have a wise and vertuous king, knowing how to gouerne his people
without lawe: considering that the lawe oftentimes serueth many but as a snare
to deceiue and snarle men in: and is also of it selfe dumb and inexorable: as
the nobilitie of Rome complained at such time as the people would needes haue
lawes, and be gouerned by them, after that the kings
were driuen out, who gouerned without law & gaue iudgement according to the diuersitie of the facts or causes presented
before them: which manner of iustice the consulls and nobilitie, who in some
measure held the Commonweale in an Aristocratique state continued, vntil that
the people desirous to bring it unto a popularitie, requested to bee gouerned
by the equalitie of lawes, and not to have their lives, fame, and fortune, to
depend of the iudgement of the nobilitie & choice magistrats only: which
their request after that it had bin, with much a do 6 yeres debaited, against
the Lordlike Aristocraticall government of the nobilitie: they at length at the
instance of their Tribune Terentius Arsa caused it to
passe in force of a law, that from that time forward the nobilitie, consulls,
and magistrates, should themselves as well as the people, be bound to all such
lawes, as the Decemviri to that purpose appointed by
the people should set downe and make. It is
not therfore the law which maketh good Princes, or magistrats in a Commonweale,
be it a Monarchie or Aristocratie; but upright reason and iustice, engrauen in
the mindes and soules of iust princes and Magistrats; and that much better then
in tables of stone. Neither euer were there more cruell tirants then were they,
which bound their subiects with greatest multitude of edictsNeuer worse government then where the greatest multitude of lawes w. and lawes, which he tyrant Caligula of purpose, and to no purpose, caused to bee set downe in
so small letter, as that they could hardly be of any man red, but with Linceus eyes, to the intent thereby to entangle the moe
through ignorance transgressing the same: whose successour and vncle Claudius in one day made twentie edicts: and yet for all
that there was neuer greater tiranie then then: neither worse or more vilanous
men. But as an Aristocratie well ordered is
of it selfe a maruelous faire and goodly state: so can there be none worse if
it be once corrupted: when as for one tirant thereNo forme
of a commonweale worse then a corrupt Aristocratie shal be many: and
that especially when the nobilitie shal bandie it selfe against the people: as
it often times chaunceth; and as we reade it to have in auncient time fallen
out, when as in many Aristocratique estates none was by the nobilitie admitted
into their number for the government of the state; but that they must first
sweare, to be for euer enemies unto the people, and all popular men: a course
not so much tending to the destruction of the cominaltie and people, as of the
nobilitie and mightie men themselves: and so to the vtter subuersion of all
Aristocraties, as we shall in due place declare And thus concerning the
Aristocraticall estate: now let vs likewise see what a popular estate is.
CHAP. VII. ¶ Of a Popular Estate.
A Popular estate is a forme of Commonweale, wherin
all or mostWhat a popular estate is. part of the
people togeather commaundeth in soueraignetie over the rest altogether, and
over euerie one in particular. The principall
point of a popular estate is seene in this, that the greater part of the people
hath the Soueraigne commaund and power not onely over euerie one in particular,
but also over the lesser parte of all the people together. As for example in
Rome, where there were but five and thirtie tribes or companies of the people:
eighteene of these companies together, had soueraigne power over the other
seauenteene: and authoritie to establish lawes, whereunto both they and euerie
one of the Citises in particular were subiect and
bound, wherfore Tiberius Gracchus the factious Tribune of the people requested Marcus
Octauius his companion and fellow of himself to giue up his office, before that the eighteene tribes had giuen their
voices for the deposing of him: for
withstanding of Tiberius propounding and vrging the
lawes for the diuision of lands: and for opposing himselfe against the profit
of the people. Also at such time as Lucius Rullus, the
busie Tribune by request which hee presented unto the people, concerning the
diuision of lands, desired that the commissioners which had that charge, might
bee chosen by the greater part of the seauenteene tribes of the people onely:
Cicero, then Consull tooke
thereupon occasion amongst the other things to crosse the entertainement of his
request, and publication of the law, saying: that the Tribune in so doing went
about to deceiue the other eightteene Tribes, that is to say the greater part
of the people of their voices, which the Consuls obiection was the lesse to
have bene regarded, and the more easily to have by the Tribune bene
answered, for that his request was, but if
it pleased the people (that is to say: the greater part of the 35 Tribes) that
the lesse part of the people (that is to say the seauenteene tribes) might
appoint the commissioners▪ so that the maiestie of the people notwithstanding
his request remained still whole and vntouched: considering that the lesser
part of the people was thereunto to be deputed, but at the will and pleasure of
the greater part: to the end that the greater part of the people should not
still for euerie trifling matter be called together. So by the law Domitia it was prouided that if by the death of any of
the Augures, Preests or Bishops any benefice fell voide, they should assemble
but 17 tribes of the people for the nominating of him, whom they would haue
chosen Bishop: so that he which was by nine of the tribes of the people
nominated and allowed, was by the chapiter or
Colledge of Augures or Bishopps to be admitted and receiued.
When I say the greater part of the people to have the soueraignitie in the
popularGreat difference whether voyces▪ be taken by Poll
o by Tribes & companies, in a popular
Commonweale. estate; that is so to be vnderstood, when the voices are
to bee taken by Pole as in Venice, in Rhaguse, in Genua, in Luca, and almost al
Aristocratique Commonweales: but if the voices be taken by tribes, parrishes,
or companies sufficeth it, of them to have the greater part, also albeit that
there be in them far the lesser part of citisens, as it hath commonly chanced
in auncient popular Commonweales. In Athens the people was divided into ten
principall tribes, whereunto in favour of Demetrius, and
Antigonus they ioyned two others, of them called Antigonia and Demetria: and againe
the people was divided into thirtie sixe classes or companies. But such
diuisions according to the diuers encreasings
of the people, and more easie and commodious giuing of voices are often time
changed. So Romulus at first deuided all the people in
RomeThe small number of the people of Rome, and how they
were divided in the time of Romlus, and how they
were againe divided in the time of King Seruius▪ with the manner of their
giuing of voyces. which then was about 3000 into three tribes or
parts: and after that euerie part into ten companies, appointing over euerie
one of them an head: how be it the voices (as Liuy
saith) were then al giuen by poll. But by the ordinance of king Seruius the people was againe divided into sixe
companies, according unto every mans wealth and reuenue: in such sort: as that
the first companie wherein the richest were enrolled, had asmuch power as all
the rest: if the centuries of this first companie were al of one accord and
mind in giuing of their voices, that is to say fourescore centuries, which were
but eight thousand persons; for in that case the voices of the other fiue
companies were neuer asked. But if two or
three centuries of the first companie were not of the same opinion with the
rest: so many centuries of the second company were drawne out as might supply
that defect, and that so often in euerie companie, vntill the number of
fourescore companies were filled up. So that in taking voices they seldom came
unto the third & fourth company: but most seldom unto the first, and vnto
the sixt neuer: in which sixt companie was the refuse of the people, and
poorest citisens, which according to the view then taken, were in number aboue
threescore thousand: beside the bourgesses and citisens of the five first
companies in number sixteene thousand▪ And had this
ordinance of king Seruius still remained in force after
kings were driuen How the people of Rome wrested unto it selfe the
soueraigntie, and how that state of an Aristocratie became a Democatie, or a meere popular state. out, it had
not bene a popular state but an Aristocraticall, for that the lesser part of
the people had then therein the soueraignetie. But shortly after the expulsion
of the kings the common people seeing themselves oppressed by the wealth &
power of the greater, reuolted thrice from the nobilitie, and held their state
apart: to the intent they might every one of them, as wel the poore as the
rich, the base as the noble, have their voices alike; neither could they be
before quieted, vntill they had obtained power out of the bodie of themselves
to chuse their Tribunes, the maintainers of their liberties: wherof their
Tribunitial assemblies began first to be holden. But for asmuch as the nobility
& richer sort dispersed among the tribes, caused the poorer & meaner
sort (for the most part their followers▪) to giue their voices at their
appointment & pleasure; there was a decree
made, That from thenceforth the nobilitie should no more be present at the
assemblies of the common people: which was then divided into eighteene tribes,
which by little and little in continuance of time tooke such increase, that
they grew to the number of five and thirtie tribes: who at length by meanes of
their factious Tribunes got unto themselves the soueraigntie of the Commonweal,
with power to make all the lawes, and chuse all the magistrates, except the
Consuls, the Praetor, and Censors, which for that they were the greatest
magistrates, they were still chosen by the greatest assemblies, that is to say
of the nobilitie and people together, the whole bodie of the people beeing (as
wee said before) divided into tribes or companies. But forasmuch as the
enfranchised men, and such as by desert had
obtained the libertie of the cittie, mingled through all the tribes of the
people of Rome, in number far exceeded the naturall and antient citisens, and
so by multitude of voices, carried all things away from them: which (as we haue
before said) was by Appius the Censor done, thereby to
gratifie the vulgar people, and by that meanes to obtaineHow
Fabius by great wisedome ouerthrew the popular
deuise of Appius, and so obtained the name of Maximus. of them what so he would: Fabius Maximus the
Censor by great wisdom ouerthrew all the grace that Appius had by cunning got, by thrusting all the enfranchised men, and
such as were of them discended, into foure tribes by themselves: so to preserue
the antient and freeborn citisens in the right of their voices. For which onely
fact by him brought to passe without tumult or sedition, hee obtained the name
of Maximus, or as we say, the Greatest. Which his order
still continued, vntill that about 300 yeares
after, Seruius Sulpitius Tribune of the people, would
needes have the enfranchised men againe enrolled into the Tribes of their
maisters by whome they were before manumised or set at libertie: but before
this his motion was brought to effect, he was himselfe slaine: which for all
that in the time of the civill warres betwixt MariusMarius popular. and Silla, was
by Marius (hauing ceised upon the citie) effected: so to
make the estate of the Commonweale more popular, and to weaken the authoritie
of the nobilitie and richer sort. Demosthenes after the
victorie of Philip king of Macedon at Chaeronea
attempted the like at Athens; by presenting a request unto the people, That the
enfranchised, and other the inhabitants of Athens, might be enrolled in the
number of citisens: which his request was then
euen openly reiected, albeit that there then were not aboue 20000 citisens:
which was seuen thousand moe than was in the time of Pericles, when as were found but thirteene thousand citisens enroled,
out of whomNo Commonweal so popular as that all the people
gaue therein voice, it being sufficient that the greater part of the tribes
still caried aw ay the matter. also 5000 strangers, who had syly crept in for citisens, were sold for slaues: and
yet the multitude of the slaues was than ten times more than the number of the
citisens.
This which I have said, may well serue to aunswere that which might bee
alleaged, That there is not, neither haply euer was any so popular a
Commonweale, as wherein the subiects had all voyces alike; or if they had, that
they could all meet together to make lawes, create magistrats, and vse the
other markes of soueraigntie: a good part of them to
the contrarie being ordinarily still absent, and so the lesse part making the
law▪ But it sufficeth, that the greater part
of the tribes carried away the matter, albeit that haply in some one tribe a
thousand citisens were in voyces equall unto another, wherein there were ten
thousand; considering that the prerogative of euerie mans voyce was in this
tribe reetued unto him. Yet hereby it came to passe,
that the more ambitious fort of men oftentimes by bribes or favour corrupted
the chiefe men, and as it were the ringleaders of the tribes, especially at
such time as the lesser part of the people was present at the assemblies: Which
to meet withall, it was therefore oftentimes prouided, that when any law of
importance was made, it should in no wise bee againe repealed, except there
were six thousand citisens at the least present at the assemblie, who gaue
their consent to the reuoking thereof; as is oftentimes to bee seene in
Demosthenes. And the Ostracisme (as Plutarch writeth) tooke no place upon any man, except six thousand
citisens at the least agreed in one therein: which yet was the lesser part of
the people. Te like whereof is also obserued in the
lawes of the Venetians, being of any great weight or importance; and namely in
laws concerning the execution of iustice, whereunto this clause is adioyned,
That the great Councel shal not in any thing derogat from the law established,
except there be at the least a thousand Venetian gentlemen there present; and
that of them, eight hundred all agree in one and the same opinion, for the
repealing of the law. Whereunto the Roman lawes, concerning corporations and
colleges, seeme also to have had regard; where two third parts of the
Collegiats, and of them also the most voyces must agree, to giue any law
or order unto the rest. And in all the
assemblies of the Venetians, which have bene called together for the government
of the seignorie in our daies, there have scarcely at once met together
fifteene hundred gentlemen: so that when the law willeth a thousand of them at
the least to be present, the meaning of the law is, that there should two third
parts of those which have voyces in the state be still present, and of them
eight hundred to be all of one opinion for the passing of any matter: which I
thinke to bee therefore done, for that eight hundred of them make the greater
part of fiftene hundred: a thing requisit, where voices are taken by the Poll,
as in Venice, and not by tribes or companies, as they did in Rome and other
popular estates, by reason of the infinit multitude of them which had part in
the seignorie. And in Rome, vntill the law Fusia, (made 693 yeares after the building of the citie) they confounded the voices
of the tribes, to the intent it might lesse be vnderstood which way every tribe
had gone, so to auoid the displeasure of the citisens among themselves, about
the giuing of their voices. So at Strasbourg the most popular of the German
cities, and at Mets, although it came into the power of the French, yet they
giue their voices by tribes; as the three popular Commonweals also of the
Grisons, call the tribes and companies unto their assemblies, for the creating
of their magistrats, and making of lawes: yet so, as that the greater tribes
have the greeter part of the suffrages or voyces. True it is, that the cantons
of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and Apenzel, which are true
Democraties, and hold the more popular libertie, for that they are mountainers,
make their assemblies for most part in open
places, and there euerie one of them (being fourteene yeares old) giue their
voices for the chusing of the Senat, the Aman, and their other magistrats,
which they doe by lifting up their hand, after the auntient forme of the
Athenian and manner of
other such popular Commonweales, sometimes constraining their neighbours with
drie blowes to hold up their hand, as they did of old. In like manner the
tribes of the Grisons, which are of others most popular, and most popularly
gouerned of any Commonweale that is, make their common assemblies for the
choice of their Aman: (which is the soueraigne magistrat in euerie one of their
little cantons:) where he which hath bene Aman the
three yeares before, standing upright, and excusing himselfe unto the people, craueth of them pardon for
whatsoeuer hee hath done amisse in his office before: then after that hee
appointeth out three citisens, out of whome the people chose one for their Aman
or chiefe magistrat for the yeare following: after whome they chose also his
lieutenant, who is as it were the chauncellour, and thirteene other
councellors, of whom foure are of the councell for the more secret affaires of
the state, and after them the Camarlign, or Chamberlaine treasurer for the
common treasurie. But in this there is a notable difference, betwixt the
governmentThe cantons of the Swissers much ruled by their
great men, but the Grisons not so. of the Grisons, and of the other
Cantons of the Swissers: for that hee which can giue unto his side, two or
three of the principal officers, of any one canton of the Swissers, who are
ruled by certaine great men bearing sway amongst them, may assure himselfe
to have gained the whole canton: whereas
the people of the Grisons hold themselves in nothing subiect or pliant vnto
their officers, if the good liking of the whole commons be not gained; as I
have seene by the letters of the bishop of Bayonne, ambassadour for the French
king: and afterward by Maister Bellieure ambassadour
also, and a man of good understanding in matters of state, hauing the same
charge, gaue the king to vnderstand, in the moneth of May 1555, how that the
ambassadour of Spaine had almost caused all the companies of the Grisons to
reuolt, insomuch that in assemblie of the Cade, there were moe voyces for
Spaine, than for Fraunce. And after that how that they of the Comminaltie of
Linguedine, hauing not receiued the money promised them by the Spaniards, laid
hand uppon the Spanish pentioners amongst
them, and putting them to torture, afterward condemned them in a fine of ten
thousand crownes to be by them paid into the common treasure. Wherein the
French ambassadour so well bare himselfe, that notwithstanding the Spanish
practise, they within two moneths after, together with the rest of the cantons
of the Swissers sent 27 ambassadours into Fraunce, to renue and confirme their
former alliances.
These examples of popular cities we have set downe, that thereby the force and
nature of popular states and Commonweales might the better be vnderstood:
Wherefore let vs then conclude; That to be a popular State or Commonweale
wherein the greater part of the people have the soueraigntie; whether their
voices be giuen byAristotle his opinion concerning an
Aristocratical or popular Commonweale. poll, by tribes, companies,
parishes, or communities. And yet Aristotle writeth vnto
the contrarie: We must not saith he,
according to the common opinion iudge the estate popular, where the greater
part of the people have the soueraigntie: And afterward for example bringeth
forth xiij. hundred citisens in a citie, of whom a thousand of the better &
richer sort have the soueraigntie, excluding the rest: we ought not saith he to
deeme this a popular state; no more than that to be an Aristocratie, wherin the
lesser part of the citisens have the soueraigntie, being men of the poorer
sort. And after that he concludeth thus: The popular estate is wherein the
poorer sort of the citisens have the soueraigntie; and an Aristocratie where
the richer sort beare the rule, whether they be moe or fewer in the one or in
the other much concerneth not. And by this
meanes Aristotle to establish his owne, reiecteth the
common opinion of all people: yea euen of the Philosophers and law-giuers
themselves: which common receiued opinion hath alwaies beene, is, and shall be
mistris in matters of state. And yet he had neither true nor probable reason to
depart from the common opinion: whereas thereof ensueth a thousand intollerable
and ineuitable absurdities. For so we might say that the faction of the
Decemuiri or ten commissioners, appointed for the correcting and amending of
the euill lawes and customes of Rome, taking upon them the soueraigntie, was a
popular estate; albeit that all histories call it an Oligarchie, although they
in that barenes of the Commonwealth were not chosen for their wealth, but for
their wisedome onely. And to the contrarie, when
the people for the maintenance of their
popular estate had driuen them out, a man might say that the state was then
chaunged into an Aristocratie. So should we also say, if twelue thousand of the
richer sort had the soueraigntie, and but five hundred of the poorer sort were
excluded, that that state were an Aristocratie. And againe to the contrarie, if
there were but five hundred poore gentlemen, which had the government over the
rest of the richer sort, one should call such a Commonweal a popular state. For
so saith Aristotle, calling the Commonweales of
Appollonia, Thera, and Colophon popular states, wherein a few auntient verie
poore families had the soueraigntie over the rich. Yea he passeth on further
and saith, that if the greater part of the people hauing the soueraigntie,
giueTo iudge of an estate we are not to consider who haue
the magistracies or offices but who they be in whom the soueraigntie
resteth. the great offices and honours of their state unto the
fairest or tallest of their citisens, it shall
no more be a popular, but an Aristocratique estate: which is an other foule
errour in matter of state, considering that to iudge of an estate, the question
is not to know who have the magistracies or offices: but onely who they bee
which have the soueraigntie and power to place and displace the magistrats and
officers, and to giue lawes unto every man.
And these absurdities, and others also much greater then they, ensue hereof, in
thatThat the state of a commonweale may be of one sort,
and yet the government therof of another and that quite contrarie.Aristotle hath mistaken the manner and forme of the
government of a Commonweale, for the soueraigne state thereof. For as we haue
before said, the state may be a pure royall Monarchie, and yet the government
there of popular: as namely if the prince giue honours, offices, and
preferments therein to the poore, aswell as to the rich: to the base aswell as to the noble, and so
indifferently to all without respect or accepting of person. As also it may be
that the state be royall, and yet the government aristocraticall: as if the
prince giue the honours and offices to a few of the nobilitie, or to a few of
the richer sort onelie, or some few of his fauorits. And to the contrarie, if
the people hauing the soueraigntie, giue the most honorable offices, rewards,
and preferments unto the nobilitie onely, as they did in Rome, vntill the law
Canuleia, the estate should be in deed popular, and yet the gouerment
Aristocratique. So if the nobilitie, or a few of the better sort should haue
the soueraigntie, and yet bestow the most honorable charges and preferments
upon the poorer and baser sort, aswell as upon the rich, without favour or
respect of persons: the state should be Aristocratique, and yet popularly gouerned. But if all or the greatest part of
the people hauing the soueraigntie, shall giue the honorable offices and
preferments indifferently to all, without respect of person, or by lot bestow
the same upon all the citisens: a man might wel iudge that estate not onely
popular, but also to be most popularly gouerned. As was done at Athens at the
request and motion of Aristides the just, whereby all
the citisens were receiued into all the offices of the Commonweale, without
respect of their wealth, contrarie to the law of Solon,
whereby it was prouided, that in bestowing of honours and places of authoritie
and commaund, regard also bee had unto mens abilitie and wealth. So likewise if
the nobilitie onely, or some few of the richer sort should have the
soueraigntie in the state, and so exclude all the rest of the people from the
honorable places and preferments in the
Commonweal, so to keepe them to themselves alone: one might say that estate not
to be aristocratike only, but also aristocratically gouerned; as wee may see in
the state of Venice. But here happily some man will say, that none but my selfe
is of this opinion, and that not one of the auntient, and much lesse of the
moderne writers which intreat of matters of state or Commonweales, have once
touched this point. True it is that I cannot denie the same; yet this
distinction neuerthelesse seemeth unto me more then necessarie, for the good
understanding of the state of every commonweal; if a man will not cast himselfe
head long into an infinite labyrinth of errours, where
into we see Aristotle himselfe to have fallen: mistaking
the popular Commonweal for the
Aristocratique: and so contrarie wise, contrarie to the common receiued
opinion, yea and contrarie to common sence also: For these principles euill
grounded, nothing that is firme and sure can possiblie be thereon built. From
this errour likewise is sprung the opinion of them which have forged a forme of
a Commonweale mingled of all three, which we have for good reasons before
reiected.
Wherefore let vs firmely set downe and resolue that there are but three formes
ofThat the state of a Commonweal may be of one sort and
the government of an other, withour confusion of the states.
Commonweales, and no moe, and those simple also, and without any confused
mixture one of them with an other; albeit that the government be sometimes
contrarie to the state: As a Monarchie is
contrarie to a Democratie or popular estate; and yet neuerthelesse the
soueraigntie may be in one onely prince, who may popularly gouerne his estate,
as I have before said: and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the
popular estate with a Monarchie, which are states of themselves incompatible,
but is well (as it were) a combyning of a Monarchie with a popular government,
the most assured Monarchie that is. The like we may deeme of the Aristocratique
estate, and of the popular government: which is by farre more firme and sure,
then if the estate and government were both Aristocratique: the state standing
almost inuiolable, when as the subiects by such a moderat kind of gouerment are
amongst themselves combyned, as also unto the Commonweale. And albeit that the
government of a Commonweale may be more or
lesse popular, aristocratique, or royall, (as of tyrannies, some may be more
cruell than others,) yet so it is that the state in it selfe receiueth no
comparison of more or lesse. For the soueraigntie is alwaies indiuisible and
incommunicable in oneSoueraigntie allwaies by nature of
itselfe indiuisible. alone, or in the lesse part of all the people,
or in the greater part thereof; which are the three sorts of Commonweales by vs
set downe. And as for that which we have said, that the government may be more
or lesse popular, may be deemed so to be, by the Commonweales of the Swissers,
where the mountaine Cantons of Vri, Schwits, Vnderuald, Zug, Glaris, and
Apensel are so popular, as that the soueraigntie of the CommonwealThe popularitie of the mountain .
resteth onely in them all, so that they be fourteene yeares old, in somuch that
their chiefe magistracies & places of greatest commaund are sometime giuen
euen to verie Sadlers, and such other mechanicall men: neither of the aforesaid
Cantons is any one of them walled except Zug.
The other new Cantons and Geneua, are lesse popular, gouerning thrmselues by
certein lords, which they call the Councell, as I have learned by Master
Basse-fountaine Bishop of Limoges, who long and discreetly without blame, as
any one embassadour, hath to his great honour mannaged this charge. And albeit
that the Bernoies and they of Zurich compose their Senat of diuers handy crafts
men, yet they vse commonly to creat their Auoyers (or chiefe magistrats) of
their most noble and auntient families: whereby they are lesse subiect vnto
seditions and tumults: whereas the lords of the three Cantons of the Grisons
being more popular, are also more subiect unto seditions and sturres, the
people in their assemblies being hard to be
gouerned; and once moued, hard to be pleased; as the ambassadours of princes
have alwaies by experience found. For the true nature of theThe true nature of the people. people is, to desire libertie without
restraint of bit or bridle whatsoeuer: and to have all men equall in wealth, in
honour, in paines, and rewards; without regard of nobilitie, wisedome, or
vertue: and as Plutarch saith wisely to have all cast
into lot, and euen ballance, without respect or favour of any man, then if any
valiant or honourable minded of the nobilitie or richer sort shall by any
meanes attempt to restraine the people so intemperatly abusing their libertie;
them straight waies they do what they can to kill or to banish, and
confiscating their goods, divided the same among the poorer sort, and that the rather, if they be rich, or seeme to aspire:
Yea oft times it happeneth, that the common
people puft up with the punishment or slaughter of some one mightie man,
violently breaketh out upon the rest, and that especially if it be once come to
armes,The beginning▪ of the popular estate of the
Swissars. and that the nobilitie be by the force of the people
ouerthrowne. As it happened at the establishing of the popular estate of the
Swissars, after the battell of Sempach, where almost all the nobilitie was
slaine, and the rest which were left constrained to renounce their nobilitie;
and yet neuerthelesse were excluded from all honours and offices of charge in
the Commonweale, except at Zurich and Berne (which is in them the lesse to be
maruelled at, for that the nobilitie there, with great safetie and without
force of armes, made their peace with the victorious common people, now before
quite spentThe auntient Gretians and Italians in their
popular libertie more insolent than were the Swissars. with civill
warres.) Yet for all this insolencie, did the Swissers more moderatly vse
their popular libertie, than did in antient
time the Grecians or Italians, who oftentimes would needs have all bonds and
obligations burnt or canceled: yea sometime the common people set on by such as
were farre endebted, ranne uppon the creditours and rich men, robbed their
houses, and enforced them to make an equall diuision of their possessions and
lands, forbidding them the hauing or possessing of cattell or lands, aboue a
certaine number or rate by them set downe: from which kind of dealing the
Swissers have alwaies abhorred. And albeit that the publike pensions of
princes, and gifts of straungers, in some of the Swissers cities, are not laid
up in the common treasure, but divided among the people in particular; in the
diuision whereof hee that hath most male children hath also a greater part than
the rest: yet for all that, when as they of
the canton of Glaris requested of Morlet, the French
kings ambassadour, in the yere 1550, That the priuat and extraordinarie
pensions, which the greater men yearely receiued of the king, might together
with the publike pension bee equally divided amongst them all: King Henrie denied so to doe, and said, He would rather
restraine his bountie, than suffer his priuat liberalitie to be so at their
pleasure confounded with the common. Yea that worse is, the insolent libertie
of the auntient Greeke popular Commonweales, proceeded to that libertie (should
I say) or rather lewd madnesse, as to banish them that were more wise and
discreet than the rest for the mannaging of their affaires, as they did Damon, maister to Pericles: and
not onely wise and discreet, but euen the most iust and vertuous also; as was
Aristides in Athens, & Hermodorus at Ephesus: which what
thing is it else, than to go about to pluck up vertue it selfe by the root? But
they were afraid least so great brightnesse of vertue in one great citisen
orWhy in popular commonweales they oftentimes bannished
the most wise and vertuous men. subiect▪ should so dazle the eyes and
minds of the rest of the common people, that forgetting their libertie, they
should chuse rather to live in subiection unto so wise and vertuous a man, than
to rule thēselues. Which thing they the more feared, if unto his vertues and
good parts were ioyned nobilitie, or power, or experience in great matters; who
with force ioyned thereunto, might from the citisens either with their will, or
against their will, extort their libertie. Whereas the nobilitie and better
sort, to the contrarie make no account or reckoning of the popular state: but
thinke it good reason, that he which hath the most nobilitie, wealth, vertue,
or knowledge, should be also the more
esteemed, respected and honoured; and that the honourable charges in the
Commonweale, should of right be due unto such men: and therefore alwaies desire
and seeke to have themselves alwaies divided and seperated from the dregges and
rascalThe inequalitie of the nobilitie and of the vulgar
or commonpeople, not possible to be brought to any good conformity in one
and the same state. sort of the common people. Sith therefore the
princes and nobilitie so much differ from the common and base people, it is a
thing impossible by any meanes to make them together equall: or being made in
honors and commaund, euen to reconcile thē among themselves, together with the
Commonweale: and so (as they say) with one and the same brewing to moderat two
so contrarie humors. Albeit that Solon vaunted, that if he had power to make lawes, he would make them
such as should be most indifferent, both for
the rich and the poore, the nobilitie and the base: which the nobilitie thought
Solon to meane of the equalitie in Geometricall
proportion; and the people of the proportion Arithmeticall: whereby it came to
passe, that both the states yeelding unto him, gaue him power for the making of
them lawes, and establishing of their Commonweale. But these things, as also
what commodities or inconueniences attempted upon euerie Commonweale, shall in
their due places bee more at large declared: sufficeth it now with what
breuitie well might be, to have set downe the descriptions and kinds of all
Commonweales, as also what is to euerie one of them proper, straunge, or common
with others: and also who in euerie Commonweale hath the power of Soueraigne
maiestie. Now let vs prosecute euerie part and limme, as it were, of a Commonweale, which are tied unto the
soueraigntie of the state, as members unto the head; viz. the Senat, the magistrats, the officers, colleges, and
corporation▪ and that in such order as wee have here rehearsed them.
Finis Lib. Secundi.
THE THIRD BOOKE OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.
CHAP. I. ¶ Of a Senat, or Councell of Estate, and the
power thereof.
A Senat is a lawfull assemblie of Councellors of
Estate, toThe definitio of a
Senat. giue aduise to them which have the soueraigntie in euerie
Commonweale. For so order requireth, that
hauing before spoken of them which have the power of soueraigne maiestie, and
of the markes thereof, and also touched the diuersitie of Commonweales: We
should now also speake of the Senat, as of the chiefe and principal part of a
Commonweal, next unto the prince. Not for that a Commonweale cannot altogether
be without a Senat or Councell: for a prince may be so wise and discreet, as
that he cannot find better councell than his owne: or els hauing not whome to
trust, taketh aduice neither of his owne people nor of strangers;That a wise prince needeth not allwaies to be aduised by his
counsell. The wonderfull secresie of Iulius Caesar in all his
affaires. but of himselfe alone, as we read of Antigonus king of Asia, and of Lewes the
eleuenth the French king; whome the emperour
Charles the fift doubted not in that to imitat: as
also of Caius Iulius Caesar among the Romans; who neuer
spoke any thing unto others, of the enterprises he had in hand: nor of his
iourneies, no not so much as of the day of battell; and yet performed great
matters, albeit that he were beset with many great and right puissant enemies:
and was therefore the more redoubted, for that his designes were so close and
couert, as that they were still executed before they enemy could perceiue them:
who still was by that meane ouertaken, and ere hee were aware surprised.
Besides that, the captaines and souldiors reposing themselves in the wisedome
of such a prince or generall, were alwaies in expectation, prest, and readie
euen in a moment, to performe whatsoeuer he should command, but with the
holding up of his hand. No otherwise than the
members of a bodie well composed are alwaies readie to receiue & put into
execution whatsoeuer reason shal commaund them, although they be no whit
partakers of the concell thereof.
Now many have (and that in mine opinion) without cause doubted, Whether it were
better for the Commonweale to have a most wise and vertuous prince to gouern
the same without councell; or a dull and vnfit man of himselfe for government,
but well prouided of a graue and wise councell? And truely unto the wise
neither the one nor the other seemeth any thing worth. But if the prince be so
wise as they suppose, as that he greatly needeth not
of councell: yet the greatest point for his aduantage n matters of any consequence is, to keep his
designes and resolutions secret, which onceSecrecie in a
prince most needfull. laid open and so made knowne, serue no more but
as mines discouered; causing ofttimes the ruine and decay of most famous cities
and states. And therefore the wisest princes have still used to speake and
talke most of such things as they meant least. And as for an heauie headed and
foolish prince, how should he be well prouided of a graue and wise councell,
sith that the choice thereof dependeth of his owne will? and that in a prince
there is no greater signe of wisdome, than to know well how to make choice of
wise men, whose councell he may vse and follow.
But forasmuch as the brightnesse and beautie of wisedome is so rare amongst
men,Whether it be lesse daungerous unto a Commonweale to
have a good prince assisted with counsel, or an euill
prince directed by good counsell. and that we must with all obedience
reuerence such princes as it shall please God to send vs; the fairest wish that they can make is, That they may have a graue
and wise councell. For it is not by much so dangerous to have an euill prince
and a good councell, as it is to have a good prince misseled by euill
councellours; as said the emperor Alexander. Wherefore
we say, that a prince ought to follow the good aduise and councell of his graue
and wise councellors, not onely in his more great and weightie affaires, but
euen in his meane and least matters also (albeit that in truth nothing can be
meane or little, which concerneth the Commonweale) For there is nothing
thatThe great benefit that a prince hath by following the
good aduise of his wise counsel, and the daungers to him ensuing by the
reiecting therof: giueth greater credit and authoritie unto the lawes
and commandements of a prince, a people, or state, or in any manner of
Commonweale, than to cause them to passe by the aduise of a graue and wise
Senat or Councell: and the rather, if it be doubtfull whether it be profitable or no, which the prince or state would haue
done. And that of all others, Charles the fift the
French king, was woont best to doe: For hauing a purpose to driue out of his
kingdome the Englishmen, who in fealtie held all the castles and townes in
Aquitaine; and now prouided of all things, which he thought needfull for the
doing thereof, he receiued the complaints of the Frenchmen of Aquitaine (the
king of England his subiects) against the English gouernours, directly
contrarie unto the treatie of Bretignie: who for such appeales and complaints
unto the king, had used them euill. upon which occasion, whether of purpose
sought for, or by chaunce offered, the king tooke hold: but yet would not
vndertake the warre, without the councel and
good liking of the nobilitie and people, whose helpe he was to vse therin.
Wherfore he commanded them all to be assembled unto the parliament of Paris,
pretending that he had sent for them to have their aduise, and by their
wisedome to amend what had by himselfe not altogether so wisely bene done or
considered of. Which warre by that councell decreed, prospered in his hand, and
tooke good successe. But when the subiects see things done either without
councell, or contrarie to the will and decrees of the Senat or councell, then
they contemne them and set them at naught; or els fearfully and negligently do
the commaunds of their princes and magistrats: of which contempt of lawes and
magistrats, ensue the seditious and slaunderous speeches of the people; and so
at length most daungerous rebellion, or els open conspiracie against the prince, drawing after it the vtter subuersion of
all estates. And so Hiero king of Sicilie was together
with all his kindred and friends most cruelly slaine, for that hee so proudly
and insolently contemned the Senat, nor in any thing asked the aduise therof;
by the aduise whereof (his grandfather hauing inuaded the soueraigntie) had
before gouerned the state fiftie yeares and more. The same errour committed Caesar, not only in the time that he was Consull, but in
his dictatorship also, neuer vsing the aduise or councell of the Senat: The
principall occasion that was taken for the killing of him, being for that he
vouchsafed not to rise unto the whole bodie of the Senat (consisting of about a
thousand Senators) comming at once unto him; too arrogantly and indeede too foolishly done; not that Caesar was by nature or disposition so prowd, but for that when he would have risen up unto the Senate, he was
by Cornelius Balbus (his flattering claw-backe, and a
man of all other most inward with him) persuaded not so to doe. For which
selfesame cause, also the Romans had long before slaine their first king and
founder of their cittie, and driuen out their last king the prowd Tarquin: for that both of them contemning the Senate, did
all things on their owne heads and the latter of them seeking also quite to
suppresse the Senate, by putting of the Senatours to death: which thing was not
dangerous onely unto those princes which wee have now spoken of, but also vnto
Lewes the eleuenth the French king, who in nothing
asked the aduice of his Counsell, but had thereby (as hee afterward confessed)
brought himselfe within an inch of his vtter ruine: for which cause, hee would
not that his sonne Charles the eight, should vnderstand any more but three words of
Latine (and those, such as are razed out of the historie of Philip Comines,) to the end that mistrusting of his owne wisedome, he
should rest himselfe upon the graue counsell of others, and so by their aduice
to mannage his affaires rather than by his owne. For it is rightGreat learning in a prince somtime daungerous. certaine,
that great learning in princes is often times a thing no lesse dangerous than a
knife in a mad-mans hand, except he be by nature well giuen, and more
vertuously instructed and brought up. Neither is there any thing more to be
feared, than great learning accompanied with iniustice, and armed with power.
There was neuer yet prince lesse learned (except in deedes of armes) than Traian, neither any of greater knowledge than Nero; and yet for all that, this man had neuer his peere
for crueltie, nor the other for bountie: the
one of them deadly hating the Senat, and the other in all things following the
aduice thereof. Seeing therefore that a Senat is a thing so profitable in a
Monarchy, and so necessarie in all Popular and Aristocraticall estates, as is
in man wit and reason, without which his body cannot long gouerne it selfe, or
have at all any being: let vs first speake of the qualities requisite in
Senatours or Counsellors; then what number they ought to be, and whether there
ought in a Commonweale to bee moe Counsells than one, and of what things they
are to counsell of: and last of all, what power is to be giuen unto the Senat
or Counsell in a Commonweale.
First we said the Senat to be a lawfull assemblie: which is to be vnderstood of
theSenators from whom they have their lawfull
power. power which is giuen them by the prince, or soueraigntie in
other states, to assemble themselves in time
and place to them appointed. As for the time and place when and where they are
to meet, it is not much materiall, sith that the diuers occasions and
opportunities of occurrents doe oft times of themselves require, and as it were
point out the same. Yet is the decree of Lycurgus in the
mean time to be commended, forbidding any pourtraitures or pictures to be in
the place where the Senat shuld consult, for that the obiect of such things as
wee behold, often times distract the phantasie, and transport reason else
where, which ought wholy to be intentiue unto that which then is to be
consulted of. We said moreover in the definition of a Senat, That they should
be Counsellors for the estate: to put a difference betwixt them and other
counsellours and magistrats of the Commonweale, who are oftentimes called to
giue their aduise unto the counsellours of
estate, yea and unto the prince himselfe, every one according to his qualitie
and vocation; and yet are not for all that counsellours for the estate, but
onely upon occasion men extraordinarilie called. And as for the name and title
of Senatour, it signifieth a man well strucken in yeares: as also the Greeks
call the SenatWhereof a Senator tooke name: and that a
Senate ought to consist of men wel strucken in yeares., which showeth well
that the Greeks and Latins composed their Senats of seniors or aged men, whom
our countrie men call Seigneurs, for the authoritie, reuerence, and dignitie,
which hath alwaies beene giuen unto the auntients, as unto the wiser sort, and
men of greatest experience: upon that hope and opinion that they which were elder than the rest, should also in wisedome exceed
the rest. For so it is prouided for, in the
lawes of Charles the great; Nulli per
sacramentum fidelitas permittatur, nisi nobis & vnicui{que} proprio
seniori: Let credit be giuen to no man upon his oath, but unto vs and
every proper elder: whereby he meant the manumised mens patrons, rather than
the Senators; as if honour and reuerence were due rather unto the elder, than
the yonger. Also by the custome of the Athenians, when the people were
assembled to giue their aduice, the huisher with a loud voice called all them
that were fiftie yeares old together, to consult of that which should be good
and profitable for the Commonweale. And not only the Greeks and Latins haue
giuen this prerogative unto the aged, to giue counsell unto the Commonweale,
but also the Aegiptians, Persians, and
Haebrewes, who taught other people well and wisely to gouerne their estates.
And what more diuine order would we have than that of God? who when he would
establish a counsell unto the Israelits his people▪ Deut. Cap. 1.Assemble unto me (saith he) seauentie
of the most auntient of the people, wise men, and fearing God. For
albeit that a man might find a number of discreet, wise, and vertuous yong men,
experimented also in the affaires of the Commonweale (a thing for all that
right difficult,) yet so it is that it should yet be a thing right perilous to
compose of them a Senat (which were rather to be called an assemblie of yong
men) for that their counsell should not be receiued, either of the yong or of
the old: for that they of like age would esteeme themselves as wise as they,
and the other themselves much wiser than such yong counsellours. And in matters
of state (if in any thing in the world) opinion hath no lesse, yea and oftentimes more force than the trueth it selfe. The
common people thinketh, and that right well, yong men neuer, or else right
seldome to excell in wisedome: but they which are such, can neither gouerne the
people, nor chastice the offendours, or in the open assemblies of the people
persuade them unto that which is good and profitable. Neither is there any
thing in a Commonweale more dangerous, than the subiects to have an euill
opinion of the Counsell or magistrats which commaund over them: for then how
shall they obey them? and if they obey them not, what issue isYoungmen by Solon forbidden to be admitted into the Senat,
seemed they neuer o wise. thereof to be
expected. And therefore Solon forbad any yong man to be
admitted into the Senat seemed he neuer so wise; which the Graecians in their
owne language have better set downe than the Latins▪ . And Licurgus
before him, had composed his Senat of the
elder sort. And not without cause have the lawes giuen the prerogative of
honour, priuileges, and dignities unto the Elders; for the presumption we ought
to have that they are wiser, of better understanding, of more experience, and
fitter to giue counsell than the yonger sort. Yet for all that, is not that
graunted to all old men: no not to them which hauing before excelled in vertue
and wisedome, are now growne so old and decrepit, as that their naturall forces
faile them, and their braines weakned, can no longer do their dutie, but are
now as men destitute of wit and iudgement, vnable longer to vse the instruments
by nature giuen them to reason with, so that in them their verie mind seemeth
to be with age both weak and sicke; whom Plato himselfe, who appointed the Elders to be keepers of
his Commonweal, hath excused from any longer bearing of charges in the
Commonweal, or for any more giuing of counsell. It is also said in the holie
Scripture, That God hauing chosen seauentie Elders, powred upon them aboundance
of wisedome: for which cause the Hebrewes call their Senators, the Sages, or
wise men. And Cicero elegantly (as he doth all things)
calleth the Senat the soule, the reason, and understanding, of aThe Senat the soule of the commonweale. Commonweale;
meaning thereby to conclude, that a Commonweale can no more maintaine it selfe
without a Senat, than the bodie can it selfe without a soule, or a man himselfe
without reason: and that Senators should by long experience and practise be able and readie, to heare, consider, and resolue of the
greatest affaires of the Common weale. For
whatsoeuer things are notably done in warre, or peace, in making of lawes, in
appointing the orders and degrees of the subiects, in reforming the manners and
conditions of the people; and in briefe in the whole disposing of the Common
weal, are all nothing else but the execution of such things as are by a wise
counsell deuised and resolued upon: which the Greeks for that cause called ,Politique wisedome euer to be ioyned with fait
and justice. as if nothing could be more sacred than good counsell,
and the Hebrewes , as
who should say, the most sure foundation of all things, whereupon all faire and
commenda ble actions are built, and without which all things fall, and are
turned upside downe. When I say a wise counsell, my meaning is that politique
wisdome should bee euer ioyned with faith and justice: for it is no lesse, and
I know not whether more dangerous, to have a
Senat or Counsell consisting of euill and wicked men, how wise and expert
soeuer they be; than of the ignorant and foolish: for that these as they cannot
much profit, so can they not much hurt the Commonweal; whereas the other by
their mischieuous counsell to revenge themselves, make no question or doubt to
endanger or ouerthrow the whole state of the Commonweal, so that they onely may
stand safe in the middest of the ruines thereof, yea and many times contrarie
to their own conscience, stick not most earnestly to crosse their aduersaries
opinions▪ although most profitable to the Commonweal, turning their priuat
hatred unto the common destruction? albeit that they reap no other profit
thereby, then the triumph which they account themselves to have gotten of the
shame of them, whom they have in counsell
vanquished, drawing them of their owne faction as it were in a string after
them.
An other sort of Senators there are also which are led neither with enuie,
hatred,A Senatour to too much
conceited of his owne opinion, a thing unto the Commonweale
dangerous. nor loue of any man, but with an obstinate conceit and
loue of their owne opinions, from which they will not by any reason or
perswasion suffer themselves to be remoued, and therefore come into the Senat
armed with such a force and multitude of arguments, as if they were euen there
to combat with their enemies; least that they should seeme to have erred in
their discourses, or lightly to have changed their opinions. And that worse is,
such strong conceited men, account it a great shame to them, to agree with any other man in opinion; but thinke
themselves to have most brauely acquited themselves, if as when men driue but
one naile with another, they also shall obtrude one opinion to another: than
which I cannot tell whether any thing can bee worse, being a thing no lesse to
be shunned, than a rocke in the deepe sea But as a wise maister in a wrought
sea, if he cannot by reason of the tempest in safetie put his ship into the
desired port, yeeldeth then unto the wind, and taketh in all his sailes, lest
otherwise carried away by force of tempest he suffer shipwracke: and so trieth
it out, vntill the sea be againe calmed, and more favourable winds arise: Euen
so the irremouable resolution of a Councellor, in consultations of matters of
state, was neuer of wise men commended; but alwaies deemed as a thing ioyned
not onely with a certaine obstinacie, but also arrogancie of mind: Whereas to
the contrarie, sometimes to change a mans
opinion, is not onely commendable, but also wholsome and profitable unto the
Commonweale: and according to the new occurrents of time, to apply also the
deuises of new councels: sometime with the agreeing voices, approuing the
opinion euen of the more ignorant and simple sort. And therefore Sir Thomas Moore in the Vtopian Commonweale by him deuised,
wisely set downe, That nothing should bee disputed or reasoned upon, the same
day it was propounded, but to be still reserued unto the next assembly of the
Senat▪ to the end, that he which had rashly and vnaduisedly delivered his
opinion, should not afterward enforce himselfe to maintaine the same, rather
than to yeeld to reason.
Wherefore it beseemeth a wise Senator, euen in the entrance of the Senat, to
layThe dutie of a wise Senator. downe all favour
towards his friends, all hatred towards his enemies, and all high conceite of
himselfe; ayming at no other end, but to the aduancement of the glorie of God,
and the welfare of the Commonweale. Wherein the manner of the Lacedemonians was
to be commended, who were so readie to defend whatsoeuer was once decreed for
the good of the Commonweale, as that they which had before impugned the same,
would now so conforme themselves for the establishing thereof, as that they
would themselves refell what they had before to the contrarie commended: and
all because it was not lawfull for them to dispute of the lawes once
established by the Senat: which manner of custome the Achaeans and Florentine
Commonweales, afterwards borrowed from the
Lacedemonians. And albeit that learning be alwaies necessarieLearning necessarie for a Senator, but upright integritie more. for
a Senat or Councellor, especially the knowledge of antiquitie, and of the
estates of Commonweals: as also to be seene in the lawes of his owne country,
which he ought not to be altogether ignorant of, yet is a sound iudgement
ioyned with faith iustice, and integritie more necessarie: by meanes whereof he
may easily persuade any thing without much eloquence. But aboue all things a
Senator must beware that heeThat a Councellor of estate
ought not to be pensionar to another prince. suffer not himselfe to
be corrupted with the bountie of forren princes: neither bee beholden to any
forren lord or prince, for any thing that he holdeth of him, whether it be by
fealtie and homage, by mutuall obligation, or by pention, which hee receiueth:
which although it be a thing most daungerous in a Commonweale, and ought
therefore to be capitall: yet for all that
there is nothing than that more common in the Councell of princes. Except in
the citie of Venice, which hath a Senat so free from this kind of base
corruption, as that euen for that cause their priests (bee they neuer so free
or nobly borne) out from comming into the Councell of state; for that they are
thought to be sworne to doe nothing against the commoditie or profit of the
bishop of Rome. Whereupon it is, that commonly the citisens before the giuing
of their voyces, crie out alowd Out of doores with the
priests.For a i Preti. And namely they banished Hermolaus Barbarus their ambassadour unto the pope; as
they did not long ago cardinall Mule, their ambassadour
unto him also, for that they had of him receiued the cardinals hat, without
leaue from the Seigneurie. But I find, that in this realme there have bene
thirtie five chauncellors, which have bene
cardinals or bishop at least: and so in England the like. And in Polonia, where
the archbishop of Gnesne is by inheritance alwaies chancellour of the realme:
the kings of that country have bene glad to make a lay man their
vicechauncellor, by no oath bound unto the bishop of Rome. As for pentions
giuen by straungers unto the minions or ambassadors of other princes, it is a
thing so ordinarie, as that it is growne into a verie custome. Yea Mounsier Cotignac the French ambassadour into Turkie, was so bold
as to presume to marrie a Greeke gentlewoman, without making of the king at all
acquainted therewith. And not long after, another also at the instigation of
Mhemet Bassa, and the duke of Naxo, would likewise
have married the prince of Valachia his
sister: which poore prince for refusing to giue his consent thereunto, which he
for feare had before graunted, was by the Bassa thrust out of his estate, and
Stephen Bathor (who now gouerneth the kingdome of
Polonia) placed in his stead. All which, with other such like enterprises, are
dangerous in an estate, and therefore in a well ordered Commonweale, in no wise
to be suffered. And these unto me seeme to be the chiefe qualities and
ornaments of a good Councellour of Estate.
But beside these, in many Commonweales nobilitie of birth is alwaies in a
Senator required; as at Venice, Rhaguse, and Nuremberg: and amongst the
Polonians it was by Sigismundus
Augustus, in the yeare 1550 by law prouided, That no man should
Nobility of birth and also wealth to be in a Senator
required. be chosen a Senator, except he were nobly descended, by the
fathers side at least, & had also borne armes. In other places choyce was
made of them by their wealth, as at Genes, and in auntient time in Atheus by
the lawes of Solon: and so almost in all other auntient
Commonweales. And namely Augustus the emperour, would
not that a Roman Senator of his time should be lesse worth than thirtie
thousand crownes, supplying of his owne bountie what the wise Senators being
poorer wanted: not that it was so necessarie unto their Councell, but that so
they might have wherewith to maintaine their estate, aunswerable unto their
calling: as also least the rest proud of their wealth, should contemne the
other which were poorer, as commonly it falleth out in the Aristocratique
estate, where the Senator is chosen by his wealth. And by the auntient
order of the Romans also, no man could be
made a Senator, except he had before borne some honourable place or charge in
the Commonweale. And therefore the Censors from five yeares to five yeares,
registred in the roll of the Senat, all them which had borne any great or
honourable office or place in the Commonweale; viz. such
as had bene Consuls, Praetors, Aediles, or at least Quaestors. And for that in
the ouerthrow of Marius 90 Senators were slaine; Sylla created Dictator, to supply the order of the
Senators, which he favoured, created twentie Quaestors, and Caesar fortie, who at the same time should be made Senators, with
power also to giue voyces, which before was not lawfull, vntill they had by the
Censors bene nominated and registred. Which indeed is a laudable custome, and
in many well ordered Commonweals at this
present obserued. As in Polonia none is receiued to be a Senator, which is not
a Palatine, a Bishop, a Castellan, or Captaine; or else before hath beene
imployed in some honourable ambassage, or bene generall of an armie. Neither
hath any man place in the Great Turkes Diuano or Councell, but the foure Visier
Bassaes, the two Cadilisquiers or Chauncellors, and the twelue Beglerbegs,
gouernours of great prouinces.
But whereas we have before said, that Senators are to be chosen out of such as
have before borne some honourable place or office in the Commonweale: that
concerneth not them which shamefully buy their offices, neither the Commonweale
wherein honours and offices are bought for money: for those vertues which we
said to bee required in a Senator; namely
iustice, faith, integritie, wisedome, experience, and knowledge in the lawes
both of God and man, are things so sacred and diuine, as that they cannot for
any reward or money be bought. Now that a Senator should by the Senat be
examined or tried, is a new and vnwonted thing: as men whome either the
Censors, or the other offices and honours by them before obtained, had
sufficiently alreadie tried. Yet in the time of the Gothes, the Commonweale
being by them chaunged, we read it to have bene done: For so aith Theodoricus, with Cassiodore, Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit solicitus
honor Senatus, The carefull care we have of the honour of the Senat,
causeth vs to examine such as are to be admitted into the Senat.
As for the number of Senators it cannot be great, considering the perfection
requisit The number of Senators commonly oe
in an Aristocratique or popular Com monweale, than in a Monarchie. in
a Counselour of estate. True it is, that in popular and aristocratique
Commonweales, to auoid seditions, and to feede the enraged famine of the
ambitious, which have part in the soueraignetie: they are oft times enforced to
augment the number of the Senatours; as in Athens by Solons law, they by lot every yeare made choice of foure hundred
Senatours; whereunto it pleased them afterwardes to adde another hundred, that
so fifty might by lot yearely bee drawne out of every one of the ten tribes:
unto whom they ioyned also another hundred, to make up the full number of 600.
After that they had unto the ten tribes ioyned two others, namely the tribes of
Antigonus and Demetrius, albeit
that in the time of Pericles, there were not in the
citie aboue 13 thousand citisens, and 20
thousand in the time of Demonsthenes. For which cause
(as I have said) Plato in his popular Commonweale: by
him set downe, appointeth the Senate to consist of an hundred threescore and
eight of the better and wiser sort, which was the thirtith part of 5040
citisens the full number of them, of whom he would have his Commonweale to
stand. And in like case, Romulus tooke the thirtith part
of his subiects to make the first Roman Senate of, choosing out of 3000, (the
whole number that then was of the citisens) an hundred, and them also by him
chosen not by lot, but by discretion, euen of the nobler sort of his people:
viz. such as whose auncestours had neuer serued as slaues. But afterward, the
Sabins being according to the league receiued into the citie, hee added vnto
the former number another hundred; unto whom,
after the kings driuen out, Brutus also put to an
hundred moe, which number of three hundred Senatours, so continued by the space
of almost foure hundred yeares, without increasing or diminishing. But in the
time of Cicero, it is manifest that there were about
five hundred, by that he writeth foure hundred and fifteene Senatours, to haue
giuen voices when Pub. Claudius, who was afterwards
tribune, was brought in question for hauing polluted the sacrifices of Bona Dea, by committing of adultery with Pompeia: at which time, when the Senatours were not
constrained to be present in the Senate, no man can doubt, but that many of
them then dispersed into all the prouinces of the Roman empire, or otherwise
busied with their owne affaires, or letted with age and sicknesse, were then
also absent. And after that, Caesar to have moe beholden unto him, and for the better establishing
of his owne gouernement, augmented the number of the Senatours unto a thousand,
chusing into that honourable order, not onely citisens of all sorts, but euen
Frenchmen and other strangers also, namely Lu. Licinius
the Barber, as saieth Acron. But Augustus (after the Commonweale againe pacified) seeing the danger of
so great a number of Senatours, brought them to the number of sixe hundred,
with purpose to have brought them also to the antient number of three hundred,
which was not much more then the ten thousand part of the whole number of the
citisens, being then almost infinite.
Wherefore the number of Senatours is not to bee appointed, according to the
Of whom it is fittest to make choice for Senators in an
Aristocratique or popular Commonweale. multitude of the people,
neither to serue the ambitious desire of the ignorant; and much lesse for the
drawing of money from them, but onely for the respect of the vertue and
wisedome of them which have deserued the place; or if it be not possible
otherwise to satisfie the ambition of them, which have part and interest in the
estate of popular and aristocratique Commonweales, but that of necessitie the
gate of the Senate must bee opened unto the multitude, that it be yet so
ordered, that none should therein have deliberatiue voices, but such as had
borne the greatest offices▪ and charges in the state: as in the Cretensian
popular Commonweale, all the citisens had free accesse and enterance into the
Senate, and there might franke and freely deliver their opinions, but not with
authoritie to determine any thing, that power being still reserued unto them
onely which then were, or had before beene
the great magistrates. And in the Senate of the Achaeans, none but the generall and the ten Dimiurgi, had power to
determine of such things as were in counsell propounded. Howbeit a wise
lawegiuer will neuerThe daunger of hauing many
Senators. goe so farre, if hee may otherwise auoid the popular
sedition: for beside the manifest daunger, which is for reuealing of counsell
communicated to so many persons: it giueth also occasion unto the factious for
troubling of the state, if they which have the power to determine and resolue
upon matters, shall in opinion differ from them which have but voices
consultatiue; which indeede are accounted as nothing: for preuenting of which
dangers, both the one and the other, the antient Greekes in their Commonweales
still created a counsell apart, of the grauest and
wisest of their Senators (whom they called
and ) to consult of the more
secret and vrgent matters of state; as also by themselves to dispose of the
greatest affaires of the Commonweale, and to consider what thing were to be
consulted of in the open Senat, or publikely to be propounded unto the people.
Besides that, what an hard matter it was of such a multitude of Senatours, to
assemble so many as were requisite, and to make them to agree when they were
assembled; the estate in the meane time standing in danger & the
oportunitie for the well mannaging of matters passing. The Senators office
amongst the Romans was most glorious and full of honour; and yet could Augustus the emperour neuer bring to passe, that the
Senators should be present at the ordinarie Senat, which was holden the calends
or ides of euerie moneth at the farthest; albeit that he set great fines upon them that were absent, and gaue not their
assistance: which grew so heauie upon the offendors, as that he was glad to
take of them so offending euerie fift man by lot. And Ruscius
Caepio the rather to inuite them to that their dutie, by his last will
and testament left a certaine summe of money to them that came into the Senat.
For it was requisit that there should be fiftie Senators at the least for the
making of any decree, and oftentimes an hundred, or two hundred, yea and
sometimes foure hundred, which was two third parts of six Senators; as in
corporations and colledges the manner is. Howbeit Augustus the emperour at length taking away the necessitie of so great
a number, appointed two hundred to be sufficient, beeing two thirds of three
hundred; which was the lawfull number of the Senators appointed by Brutus. Moreover the Senat was not ordinarily assembled
but three times a moneth; and if it pleased not the Consull (without whose
commandement the Senat might not assemble it selfe) or the greatest magistrat
in the absence of the Consull, sometime an whole yeare passed without calling
together of the Senat: as Caesar did in his first
Consulship, hauing the Senat bent against him; and yet in the meane time by
prodigall bountie caused euen what he would to be decreed by the people.
Whereas Solon had much better prouided for the matter
among the Athenians, hauing beside the ordinarie Senat of 400, euerie yeare to
be changed, appointed also a priuie and perpetuallThe
counsel of the Areopagi i Athens. Councell
of the Areopagi, consisting of threescore of the wisest and grauest sort of the
citisens, men without reproach, who by all the degrees of honour were risen to
have the mannaging of all the most secret
affaires of the state, and to foresee that in time of daunger the Commonwealth
should take no harme. Of which councell how great the need was, was then well
vnderstood, when as Pericles to gaine the favour of the
common sort, had taken away the authoritie from the Areopagits, and translated
the same unto the people: for shortly after, the state of that Commonweale sore
shaken both with forren and domesticall warres, began forthwith to decline and
decay. Wee find also, that the Aetolians, beside their great Councell, which
they called Panaetolium, had also their priuie Councell
chosen of the grauest and wisest men amongst them; of whome Liuie speaking, saith, Sanctius est apud Aetolos
consilium eorum quos apocloets appellant, There is among the Aetolians
a more sacred (or priuie) Councel, of them whom they call apocletos: and immediatly after, Arcanum hoc gentis Consilium, This is the secret* Select counselours. Councell of the nation: Whereas
before he had said, Legibus Aetolorum cauebatur, ne de pace
belloue, nisi in Panaetolio & Pilaico Consilio ageretur, It was
prouided by the lawes of the Aetolians, that nothing should be entreated of
concerning peace or warre, but in their Panaetolio, or Pilaican Councell. Wee
read also, that the popular Commonweale of the Carthaginensians, beside their
Senat of foure hundred Senators, had also a particular or priuie Councell of
thirtie Senators, men of greatest experienceThe counsel the Carthaginensians. in their publike affaires
and matters of state: Of whome Liuie thus saith, Carthaginenses xxx legatos seniorum principes adpacem
petendam mittunt: id erat sanctiusapudeos Consilium, maximaque ad Senatum regendum vis,
The Carthaginensians (saith he) send thirtie ambassadors, the princes of their
elders to sue for peace: and that was the more sacred Councell with them, and
the greater power for the ruling of the Senat: which manner of Councell the
Romans wanted. And therefore Liuie wondereth (as at a
right strange thing) that the ambassadors of Greece and Asia, which came to
Rome, could of so great a number of Senators vnderstand nothing of that which
king Eumenes then plotted in the full Senat, against Perseus king of Macedon, Eo silentio
curia clausa erat, The court (saith he) was with such silence shut up:
Whereby he sufficiently sheweth, that in his time, as also long before that,
nothing was done or agreed upon in the Senat,
which still was not by one or other of so great a number reuealed. For which
cause the Senators themselves sometimes were constrained to become clarkes and
secretaries in the secret affaires of the state, and to take of euerie man an
oath, not to reueale any such thing as was in the Senat decreed, vntill such
time as it was put in execution: For as yet no capitall punishment was
appointed for such as shuld reueale or bewray the secret councel of princes.
And indeed how could any thing there be kept secret, where five or 600 Senators
were priuie to all that was done in the Senat, beside the clarks and
secretaries for the state? When as also the yong Senators children, before the
time of Papyrius Praetextatus might come into the Senat,
& carrie the news of such things as were there done, unto their mothers.
Augustus was the first, who out of the Senat made choice of some few of the wiser sort to be of his
priuy coūcel, without giuing the rest of the senat to vnderstand, that he
would with them resolueAugustus the first in Rome who out of
the whol body of the Senate made choice of some fewe of the wiser sort, to
be of his priuie counsels of the most important and secret affaires
of state, but onely to have their aduise concerning such things as were to be
afterward propounded in the open assemblie of the Senat. Immediatly after whose
death, Tiberius the emperour requested of the Senat, to
have twentie Senators appointed him, with whome he might (as he would have them
to beleeue) consult of such things as the Senat was further to bee moued of.
Whose example the wiser sort of the emperours afterwards followed; namely Galba, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Alexander Seuerus: of whome Lampridius speaking, He neuer (saith he) made decree without the
aduise of twentie lawyers, and diuers other of the Senators, (men of great
euidently and understanding in matters of state) euen to the number of fiftie, to the end there might be no fewer
than were necessarie for the making of a decree of the Senat. Whereby it
euidently appeareth, that in that priuat Councell of fiftie Senators, with the
prince, were the greatest matters dispatched; and that it was not onely to
consult of that which was to be in the Senat propounded, but euen to resolue
and determine of the most secret and important affaires of the state, and so by
little and little to draw them from the Senat, unto the more priuat councel of
the prince. By which meanes was also prouided for another difficultie
(otherwise in a Monarchie ineuitable) which is the multitude of Senators, which
could not still follow the prince; unto whome for all that his councell ought
to bee alwaies assistant, especially in a
Monarchie, where the prince is to visit diuers his prouinces: or is himselfe in
person busied in his warres. For which cause and no other, the auntient diuines
and poets, have faigned Pallas alwaies to sit on the
right hand of Iupiter, but not Iupiter on the right hand of Pallas: to giue vs
thereby to vnderstand, That the Councell ought alwaies to be present with the
prince, but not the prince to bee tied to the place where the Councell is
resident: which were a thing not onely not agreeable with the maiestie of a
soueraigne prince, but also impossible. And albeit that there bee many things
in euerie Commonweale dispatched by the priuie Councell, wherewith it is not
needfull either the people or the rest of the nobilitie to be made acquainted:
yet so it is, that in a Monarchie it is expedient and
requisit that the prince should himselfe vnderstand them: or at leastwise that euerie man should thinke that he
so doth, so to giue the greater authoritie and credit unto such things as are
by the Councell decreed, and that the subiects should not complaine and say,
The king vnderstandeth not hereof. And for this cause
the Grand Signior of the Turkes hath alwaies a lattise or grate, opening into
the Diuano, or chamber wherein his Councell sitteth, to the intent to keepe his
Bassaes and them of his councell in awe; whilest they thinke him their prince
alwaies to see them, and to obserue their proceedings and doings.
But it may be (may some man say) that a Commonweale may be so little, and
menIn small Commonweales the priuie Counsell is not to be
divided from the Senat. of experience in it so few in number, as that
not a Senat, but euen such a priuie Councell as we spake of, cannot therein be
made. In which case of so strait a Commonweale, it is not needfull to diuide the Senat apart from the priuie
Councell. As in the Commonweale of the Pharsalians (which was within most
narrow bounds shut up) there were but twentie persons which had the
soueraigntie, who in that state serued for the nobilitie, the Senat, and priuie
Councell. And yet neuerthelesse in the Lacedemonian Commonweale alwaies both
before and after the conquest of Greece, there were but thirtie lords, both for
the state and the Senat: and yet out of this number of thirtie, they made
choice but of twelue for the mannaging of the secret affaires of their state,
as we read in Xenophon: establishing the same forme of
government in Athens also, where they deputed thirtie lords for the government
of that state, as they did in all the rest of the cities of Greece, except some
little ones, over whome Lysander placed ten chiefe men, without any other Senat or priuie
Councell. And the reason was, for that they had resolued to chaunge all the
popular states of Greece, into Aristocraties; which they could not have done in
the lesser townes, if they should in them have erected a seignorie, a Senat,
and a priuie Councell. But for the present there is almost no Commonweale, be
it Popular or Aristocratique, which hath not a Senat and particular or priuat
Councell: yea and oftentimes beside both them, a Triumuirat of some few, for
the mannaging of the more secret affaires of state, and that especially in a
Monarchy. For so Augustus the emperour (albeit that he
surpassed all the rest that came after him, both in wisdome, and happinesse)
beside the Senat, which he had filled with 600 Senators,Maecenas and Agrippa▪ the onely men with whom Augustus the
emperour resolued of his greatest affaires. and the priuat councell
of twentie select men, had also another neerer and more inward councell of Maecenas and Agrippa, with whome
he resolued of his highest affaires, calling unto him none but them two after
the victorie of Actium▪ to resoluè with, Whether he should still hold, or
discharge himself of the empire. So Iulius Caesar, had
none but Q. Pedius, and Cornelius
Balbus of his most inward councell, unto whom also he gaue his manner
of writing in secret caracter, for them the better to vnderstand his secrets
thereby. So Cassiodorus speaking of the secrets of
princes, saith, Arduum nimis est principis meruisse
secretum, Too high a thing it is (saith he) to have deserued to be of
the princes priuitie. We see in like case, that the court of the parliament of
Paris,Diuers counsels at diuers times erected in France
for matters of state. was the auntient Senat of the realme of
Fraunce: but when it tooke pleasure in deciding of civill controuersies, nor
could not well bee remoued from the citie; the
kings appointed another councell, which for that it handled matters of greatest
importance, in the time of Charles the seuenth, was
called the Great Councell: which when it was also entangled with deciding of
extraordinarie suits and controuersies, by the lawes of Charles the eight, and much more by the lawes of king Lewes the xij, who appointed a court of twentie judges;
king Francis the elder remoued that Great Councell from
medling with the secret affaires of state, hauing got unto himselfe another
councell of certaine select princes his friends: which of the Latines is
called; The Familiar Councell, and of our countrey men, The princes priuat
Councell. But Francis being dead, Henrie his sonne
got another councell also: which for that it consisted of few, was called the narrow or strait Councell. But at
last, when that Familiar or priuat Councell, was thought to exceed also with
the multitude of Councellors, Henrie the third, the
sonne of Henrie ordained another Councell, which for
that it was only to consult of matters concerning the state of the Commonweale,
and not of suits and controuersies, was called the Councell for the State.
Beside these, it was thought meet that there should also be a more secret or
chamber Councell, wherein the king rising from his bed, should confirme or
reiect such things as were by the Councell decreed: there are princes letters
opened, ambassadors reported, and messages delivered. There is also apart
another Councell of the Finances instituted by Henrie
the second, and by little and little taken from
the auditors, wherein are assistant the intendants and secretaries of estate of
the Finances, and the treasuror for the common treasure. Beside all which
princes have alwaies had a more strait Councel, of two or three of their most
inward and faithfull friends; who so highly stand in the princes favour, not so
much for their youth or person, as for their wisedome and vertue. As for the
chamber Councell whereof we spoke, it consisteth but of a few, and albeit that
by the decree of Charles the ninth, made in Nouember, in
the yere 1563, it is in the first article expressed, that so soone as the king
was up, all the princes and the councell might come into the chamber, yet was
not that his decree therein obserued or kept.
Which pluralitie and diuersitie of Councels in the kingdome of Fraunce, ought
Seauen counsels in Spaine. not to seeme straunge,
seeing that in Spaine there be seuen, beside the strict and inward Councell,
which are alwaies in diuers chambers neere unto the king, and yet within the
compasse of the same house or lodging; to the intent, that the king going from
one of them to the other, may the better be enformed of his affaires: as namely
the councell of Spaine, the councell of the Indies, the councell of Italie, and
the councell of the Low countries, the councell for the warres, the councell
for the order of Saint Iohn, and the Inquisition. Now if
any man there be, that thinke the greatnesse of that kingdome (than which neuer
yet was any greater) to require so many councels: I denie it not, but yet so he
may see also in Venice, which hath no verie great territory, foure councels,
beside the Senat and Great Councell: viz. the councell
of the Sages for matters at sea, the councell of the Sages for matters at land,
the councel of the Decemuiri, or ten men,Diuers counsels in Venice. and the councell of the
Septemuiri, or seuen men; where the duke maketh the seuenth man, which they cal
the Seignorie, when it is ioyned with the councell of the ten men, and the
three presidents of the fortie, beside the Senat of sixtie; which with the
magistrats may come to the number of six score. And what then should let, but
that where there be but few men worthy to be of councell for the state, but
that the Senat may be made right little, and the priuie councell lesse, and yet
divided from the Senat also. The state of the Rhagusians is but strait, &
comprised almost within the same bounds, wherewith the wals of the citie are
enclosed, and yet the Senat consisteth of threescore. In the citie of Nuremberg
is a Senat of twentie six Senators, and a priuie councell of thirteene, beside another councell of the seuen
Bourgomasters. The Canton ofThe counsel of the Cantons of the Swistars. Schwits is
the least of all the Cantons, and yet for all that beside the Senat of fortie
five persons, it hath a priuie councell of seuen, of whome the Aman is chiefe.
Which selfe same forme of councell is also kept in the canton of Vti. As for
the cantons of Zurich, Berne, Schafluse. Basill, Soleurre, Friburg, and
Lucerne, they have alwaies beside the Great Councell, a little councell also.
The Great Councell of Berne consisteth of two hundred Senators; and the little
of twentie six: At Lucerne of an hundred, and the little of twentie eight: At
Saint Gal also the Great Councell is of sixtie six, and the little of twentie
foure: At Coire the Senat is of thirtie, and the priuie councell of fifteene. And without going so farre, it is well knowne, that
the state of The counsel of Geneus. Geneua is enclosed within the
compasse and circuit of a mile, yet for all that beside the councell of two
hundred, it hath a Senat of sixtie; and after that a priuie councell of twentie
fiue. Neither is there any canton so little, (except the three cantons of the
Grisons, gouerned by the common popularitie) which hath not a priuie councell
beside the Senat, wherein some have three, and some have foure. As in the
canton of Bafill, where the secret affaires of state are mannaged by two
Bourgomasters, and two other chiefe men of their colleges, whom they call
Zunfft maisters. And in like case at Berne the two Auoyers, and foure ensigne
bearers, have the ordering of all the secret businesse of their state; as hath
the priuie councell in a Monarchie. And namely in the diets and assemblies of
the thirteene cantons, there is none but the priuie councell of the ambassadours, which make their decrees, and direct
their commissions, concerning their common affaires: I say then that it is a
thing most profitable in euerie CommonA priuie counsell
besids the Senat necessarie in euerie Commonweale. weale, to have at
the least one priuie councell beside the Senat, sith that the auntient rulers
of both the Greekes and Latines have so taught vs, reason so shewed vs, and
experience therein confirmed vs.
But there is a notable difference betwixt the Senat of a popular or
AristocratiqueThe manner of consultation in the Senat of
a popular or Aristocratique estate, and in the Senat of a Monarchie much
different. Commonweal, and the Senat of a Monarchie: for in them the
diuises and consultations are had in the secret or priuie counsell; but the
resolutions and decrees are all made in the great Counsell, or in the assemblie
of the States, or of the people, if the matter be such as is to be unto them
published: whereas in a Monarchie the manner
of proceeding is quite contrarie, wherein nothing is communicated or imparted
to the people, or the nobilitie, but such things as seeme unto the Senat
doubtfull, or being of greater importance, are still referred unto the priuie
Counsell; and if the matter concerne the soueraigntie, it is reserued unto the
iudgement of the soueraigne prince onely. And albeit that the Senat or Counsell
in a Monarchie seeme to do all the rest of it selfe, yet still we see all to
depend of the princes commaund. And this which we have said concerning the
manner of consultation, is almost no where better put in practise thenThe manner of the proceding in their consultations in matters
of state, in Venice. in Venice: where if any difficultie arise in the
counsell of the sages, it is commonly discided by ioining of the Decemuiri vnto
them, (and therefore unto such decrees as are by them made are ioined Con la Giunta) and if they cannot so agree, but still
rest among themselves in opinion divided, they
call unto them the Septemuiri or counsell of seauen: but if so nothing can be
decreed for the diuersitie of opinions, the matter is then propounded in open
Senat: And sometimes also (although but seldome) if the matter be of such
consequence, or so much concerne the maiestie of the State, as that the
authoritie of the Senat seemeth not to be thereunto sufficient, or that the
Senat be thereupon divided, it is propounded in the great counsell of all the
gentlement of Venice, where it taketh the last and finall resolution; which as
Aristotle writeth, was also the auncient custome of
the Carthaginensians, where if the Senat could not agree, the difference was
disputed, debated, and discided by the people.
Now all this differing of resoluing and determining, proceedeth from the
diuersitie of the soueraigntie, and of them
which have the mannaging of the government: for what the Senat decreeth in an
Aristocratique, or popular Commonweal, that the nobilitie, or people ratifieth
and commaundeth if the matter so require: contrarie to that we see to be done
in a Monarchie, where the wiser the prince thinketh himselfe, the lesse he
vseth the counsell of the Senat: (albeit that he oft times aske the aduise
thereof, to make his doings the more acceptable, or for the easing of himselfe,
committeth unto them commissions for extraordinarie justice, or the iudgement
of inextricable matters and causes of appeales) especially if the Senat be so
great as that the prince by publishing of his secrets
to so many persons, shall not come to the point of his designes. By The policie of the Romain emperours to drawe the Senat from
matters of state by busiyng it with other extraordinarie causes. this
meane Tiberius the Emperour sought to kepe the Senat
busied in disciding of great and extraordinarie causes, to make it by little
and little to forget the understanding of matters of state. And after him Nero likewise ordeyned that the Senat should have the
hearing of Appeales which before were made unto himselfe, and that the fine for
the offence set downe by the Senat should be as great, as if he had heard the
cause himselfe; By this meane making of a Senat an ordinarie court and
iurisdiction of Iudges: who in the time of freedome of that popular Commonweal
neuer used to judge, except ordinarilie in conspiracies, and other such like
great offences against the state: or that the people which had the hearing of
many causes, had committed the understanding thereof unto the Senat. For which
cause Cicero accusing Verres
saith in this sort, Quo
confugient socij? quem implorabunt? ad Senatum deuenient, qui de Verre
supplicium sumat? non est vsitatum, non est Senatorium: Whither shall
our friends and allies flie? whom shall they aske help of? shall they come vnto
the Senat, to take punishment of Verres? it is no thing in vse, it appertaineth
not unto the Senat. Wherein many deceiue themselves, which think that the Senat
judged, when they saw that the Senatours were drawne by lot to judge of publike
and criminall causes, sometimes by themselves, sometime with the knights, by
the law Liuia, and afterwards with the knights and the Treasurours, by the law
Aurelia: for there is great difference betwixt the bodie of the Senat, and the
Senatours taken in the qualitie of judges, and betwixt the priuie Counsell, and
the counsellours thereof comming into the soueraigne courts to judge. For before Nero the Senat
neuer had so much as ordinarie iurisdiction orThe Senators
of Rome as Senators no iudges, but when they were thereunto extraordinarilie
by commission appoynted. power to judge of any matter; And namely Augustus would not that the Senat should trouble it
selfe, with the judging of the honour, or of the life of Senatours, albeit that
he were thereunto importuned by his friend Moecenas. And
albeit that Tyberius the emperour often times sent vnto
them such causes, yet was it but extraordinarie and by way of commission; which
Adrian the emperour afterward caused to passe into
the forme of an ordinarie iurisdiction. We see in like case that Philip the faire, or as some others say Philip the long, to discharge himselfe of the Court of parlament, and
easilie to take from it the dealing with the affaires of state, made it an
ordinarie Court, giuing it iurisdiction, and a fitting place in Paris: which
Court was in auntient time the Senate of
Fraunce, and yet at this day calleth it selfe the Court of Peeres, erected by
Lewes the yong, (according to the truer opinion) to
giue counsell unto the king; as we may see by the creation of Countie D' Mascon for a Peer, by king Charles the fit, in the yeare 1359, where it
is said that the king of Fraunce ordained the twelue Peers, to giue them their
counsell and aide, and tearmed it selfe, as yet it doth at this present, (by
way of prerogative of honour) the Court of parlament (without any other
addition)The court of Paris sometime the auntient Senat
of Fraunce by the king forbidden to deale with matters of state. as
it is to be seene in the letters which it wrote unto the king: whereas the
other Courts of later time established, vse their particular additions; As, The Parlament of Tholouse, of Roan, of Burdeaux, of Dion, of
Gratianople, and Aquasexia. But in the
raigne of Charles the ix, at such time time as the Court
of Paris liked not of the decree of the Senat, whereby the king in the Court of
Roan was by the voices of the princes declared sufficient for the government of
the kingdome without a Regent, according to the law of king Charles the first: the king yet under age, aduised the court, to
meddle only with the desciding of controuersies, and the equall administration
of justice: for that the king his predecessours had for that onely purpose
appointed that Court, and there placed them, and not to become his tutors, or
protectors of the realme, or keepers of his towne of Paris: and therefore
commaunded such lawes and edicts as hee had appointed to be proclaimed in the
court of Paris, to be published: wherein if any thing
should be contained that seemed not to stand with right and reason, he could
(as he said) be content to be thereof
tould; but yet so as that after he had vnderstood the matter, if it were his
pleasure to have the law proclaimed, they should forthwith without farther
reply do that they were commaunded: with which the kings edict the court was
wonderfully troubled; and for that the judges were equally divided into two
opinions: the one being willing to have the kings edict published, and the
other denying the same. The Court thought good againe to aduise the king, that
the court might not be enforced to allow or publish such things as should
thereunto seeme vnreasonable or vniust. Wherewith the king displeased, caused
his priuie Counsell to be called, and by the authoritie thereof a decree to bee
made the xxiiij. of September, whereby the parlament of Paris was forbidden
once to call in question the lawes or decrees
proceeding from the king concerning matters of state: which was also before by
king Francis decreed in the yeare 1528. In like case the
great Counsell which was not almost employed but in affaires of state, in the
raigne of Charles the seauenth, and Charles the eight, was by little and little so filled with sutes, that
Charles the viij. made it an ordinarie court of
seauenteene counsellours; whom Lewes the xij. made up
xx. beside the Chauncelour, who was President thereof, (in such sort, that
under king Francis there was but a President in steed of
a Chauncelour) who were not imploied but in hearing of extraordinarie causes by
way of commission, or remitting of the priuieThe priuie
counsel of Fraunce almost brought into the forme of an ordinarie court by
hearing of priuat and particular causes counsell, and ordinarily the
appeales of the Prouost of the houshold. We se also the priuie Counsell it
selfe to be as it were brought into the forme of an ordinary court, by heating the differences betwixt the Townes and the
Parlaments, and oft times betwixt particular men, euen for small matters: to
the end that such a great companie of the nobilitie, and men of marke, should
be busied with some thing, hauing as it were lost the understanding of the
affaires of state, which can neuer sort to good end, if they be communicated to
so many persons: where the wiser sort are commonly over ruled by the greater
part, ioining hereunto also, that it is impossible, to keepe the counsellMatters of state not without daunger to be communicated vnto
many. of the state secret: or to know in such a multitude who it is
that discouereth the same, nor to cast them out who are holden for suspect:
Except by vsing the custome of the auntient Athenians, by vertue whereof the
Senatours by a secret iudgement which they
called might with all
libertie, and without displeasure condemne the blabbing Senator, or him that
had defiled the honour of his estate. As in like case the Roman Censors without
forme or fashion of processe, had accustomed to remoue the vnworthie Senators,
and by that meanes to exclude them out of the Senat; except they would put
themselves upon their triall before the judges which were aboue the Censors, or
that the people had giuen some new office, or honorable charge to him that was
so remoued by the Censors, or condemned by the judges. But the Romans were much
to blame, both for too easie receiuing and remouing of the Senatours, and that
in too great number: For Fabius Buteo made Dictator to
supply the defect of the Senat, at one time receiued in an 177 Senatours.
Whereas Lentulus and Gellius
Censors at one dash remoued 64. Howbeit, it were more seemly and agreeing
with the dignitie and honour of a Senat to
receiue into it few, and them also chosen and culled out as pearles; than to
exalt unto so high degree of honour men worthieSenator or coun selours of estate not easily to be admitted
nor without greate cause to be againe displaced. The auntient counsel of
England in number fewe. and vnworthie, and afterwards to cast them
downe againe with eternall infamie and dishonour, unto whom they had before
giuen their helping hands: Besides that it cannot alwaies be done without
danger and sedition, or the dishonour of him that ruleth. It is foure hundred
yeare since that the Priuie Counsell of England, at the instance and ute of the Archbishop of Canterburie (then Chauncelour)
established, there were there into but fifteene persons then chosen; neither
hath it euer since passed the number of twentie; and
yet by meanes of that little Counsell they have retained their state most faire and florishing in times both of peace and
warre, as is by their histories to be seene; and by the treatie of peace made
betwixt Lewes the ix, and Henry
the first, king of England; which for the more assurance thereof was sworne by
the Prince and the xvij priuie Counsellors: viz. one
Archbishop, one Chauncelor, one Bishop, six Earls, and six other Lords, with
the great Treasurour, and a magistrat whom they call chiefe Iustice of England.
Now I doubt not but that in every Commonweale, many by vaine ambition, favour,
impudency, or corrupt briberie, in sort euen against the Prince and peoples
will find meanes to enter into the sacred Senat; against which inconuenience
remedie might be well prouided, if we would but vse Solons law. For he would have none to bee admitted into the Senat of
the Areopagits, but such as had without touch,
by all the degrees of honour ascended unto the highest places and preferments
of the Commonweale: for so he deemed him to be well able to hold a place in the
Senat without staggering or falling, that could hold himselfe upright in such
dangerous and slipperie wayes. And that is it for which all the auntients both
Greeks and Latins, have so highly commended the Senat of the Areopagits,
composed of sixtie persons, as we read in Athens. The same manner is yet vsed
among the five lesser cantons of the mountaine Swissers, that they which haue
passed through all the honourabre estates should continue Senators for euer:
but this is not the way to have good resolution, and yet lesse to keepe the
affaires of state in secret, in that the Senators of the little cantons, which
are fortie five in Zug, and an hundred sixtie foure in Appenzel, and more or lesse in the others, when question is
of matters of importance, may euerie one of them bring with him into the
councell two or three of the citisens, such as he liketh best of. Whereby it
commeth to passe, that sometime there are foure or five hundred, part Senators,
part others, assembled together into the Senat, and yet all have deliberatiue
voices therein. Whereas multitude is euer an enemie, unto wise resolutions.
And thus much concerning the number of Councellors of estate: let vs now also
breefly speake of them that are to propound matters in the Senat; and then of
suchWho they be that ought to propound matters in the
Senat or counsel. things as are there also to bee propounded. As
touching the first, men of auntient time have alwaies had great regard unto the
qualitie of them which were to propound any
thing in the Senat. For we see that to have bene the proper charge of the
greatest magistrats in Rome, whome for that cause they called Consuls: or in
their absence the greatest magistrat that was in Rome (to wit, the Praetor of
the citie) supplied the place of the Consull: receiuing the particular requests
both of the citisens and straungers, of ambassadours from forren princes, and
allies letters from the gouernours of their prouinces: which letters he read in
the Senat, asked euerie mans opinion, commaunded the decrees of the Senat to be
written, & also dismissed the Senat. Amongst the Grecians the greatest
Praetor executed the same office▪ who among the Athenians was called ; & the rest as they
were created in some places , who bare almost the
same office that do the prouiditors in the cōmonwealth of Rhaguse, & the
sages in the state of Venice: howbeit that there the three Auogadors ordinarily
propounded unto the senat, that wherof it is to consult. In the councel of the
Greeks the president caused to be cried aloud by a sergeant, That if there were
any person that had any thing to say concerning the good of the state, he
should speake: which Titus Liuius speaking of the
Achaeans affirmeth generally of all the Greeks. But as forA
notable custome of the Aetolians in propounding of matters in their
Senat. the Aetolians, their custome was most notable, worthy to be of
all men regarded, being highly commended and approued by Philipemen generall of the Achaean league; which was, that the
presiden, or hee which in full councell propounded
any thing which seemed unto himselfe good, should
therein have no voice himselfe. A great meanes
to take away the practises and couert traines, which are commonly made in
Popular and Aristocratique estates, where the busiest heads easily draw others
to their opinions. Howbeit I cannot commend the fashion and custome of them of
Genes,The custome of Genes discommended. where
none but the duke alone hath power to propound in the Senat that which pleaseth
himselfe. For beside the difficultie of speaking with the duke on euerie side
beset, and troubled with infinit affaires, and to lay before his eyes a
thousand diuers reasons for the debating of the matter in the councell: it is
also daungerous to giue so great authoritie to one person, that he may open or
keepe secret to or from the Senat, whatsoeuer himselfe pleaseth; it being not
lawfull for any man to propound any matter but himselfe. It is also much
perilous one citisen, who first delivereth his opinion to be of such authoritie and power, as that the rest which are
to speake after him, dare not freely say what indeed they thinke. And that is
it for which it is wisely prouided in the realmThe laudable
custome for the propounding of matters used in Fraunce. of Fraunce,
that it is permitted to all them which have accesse into the councell (although
they therin have neither deliberatiue voice nor place) euerie man to propound
his owne requests, & to aduertise the councell of that which is profitable
for the Commonweale; to the end it may be the better prouided for. And
oftentimes their opinion is also thereof demanded, and then afterward the
aduise of the councellors of the estate, which in councell have place and
deliberatiue voice, in such sort and order, as that the great lords deliver
their opinions last; to the end, that the libertie of the lesser should not be
impaired by the authoritie of the greater princes or magistrats, and especially
by the power of ambitious and factious men,
who cannot in any case abide to be contradicted. In which course they which
have onely voyces consultatiue, make way for them which have voyces
deliberatiue: and oftentimes broach unto the councell good and lively reasons:
and where they in any thing erre, they are without ie lousie againe by the
others brought into the right. Which is a custome much more commendable than
that of the Romans, where the Consull first demaunded the opinion of the chiefe
man in the Senat, or els of him that was appointed Consull for the yeare
following. And yet neuerthelesse the contrarie was used before the people: for
first the particular men delivered their opinions, and after them the lesser
magistrats, and last of all the greatest, to
the intent that the libertie of the lesser should not be preuented by the
authoritie of the greater. Ioyne hereunto also, that the ambition to speake
first doth oftentimes draw after it the enuie of some, and the ielousie of
others. So wee see the cruell emperours to discharge upon the Senat, the
discontentment that the people had of their cruelties, caused such things as
they would have done to bee propounded or red in the Senat: which to gainesay
or seeme to dislike of was death. Which was not to demaund the aduise of the
Senat, but indeed most imperiously to command the same. Where of an auntient
Senator complaining saith, Vidimus curtam elinguem, in* Plinius iunior in pangirico.qua dicere quod velles periculosum: quod nolles miserum
esset, We have seene (saith hee) the court dombe, wherin to speake that
thou wouldest was daungerous; and to say that thou wouldest not, was a thing
right miserable: For that the emperor Dometian, (vnussolus censebat quod omnes sequerentur) alone decreed
what all men should follow: and commendeth Traian (quod eo
rogante, sententias libere dicere liceret, vinceretque sententia non prima,
sed melior) for that he propounding of matters, euerie man might freely
speake his mind: and that opinion preuailed not which was first, but best. By
the custome of the auntient Hebrewes, the king refrained from comming into the
Senat, least any should bee contrarie unto him, or hee to any; for so they writ
in their Commentaries.
It were also to be wished, that the Councell should sit in the morning yet
fasting, for that is not to be holden for a councell
well disgested, which is done after dinner, as The fiittest time for counselours to sit in councell
saith Philip de Commines, and especially in countries
where the people are subiect unto wine. Salomon
detesteth those princes, who when they ought in the morning to feed their mind
with religious contemplation of high and diuine matters, doe with full feeding
pamper the inordinat desire of their languishing & broken lust, & with
new nourishment kindle the fire of new desires: Which he in three words
declareth, Wo (saith he) unto princes
which cate early. Which is a thing so much the more to be detested, by
how much many thinke it to be the greatest brauerie, to bee well whitled with
wine. For what can be more beastly than was the old maner of the Germans, who
neuer used to consult of their greatest affaires but in middest of their cups
persuaded so that every one of them warme with wine, should discover the verie
secret of his hart, and to be the more
eloquent to persuade what they thought to bee most expedient. Which custome
they have now well changed, insomuch that euen their priuat and domesticall
contracts made when they are in drink, are to none effect or purpose, it being
alone aWhat things are in the Senat or councell of the state
to be cheifly consulted of. sufficient cause for the iudge to reuoke
them being so made. Now as concerning such things as are to be consulted of in
the Senat, they depend of such occasions & affairs, as in course of time
present themselves. The antient Romans first consulted of matters concerning
their religion, as the marke and end wherat all humane actions ought both to
begin and end. There was neuer also, saith Polybius (he
himselfe being an Atheist) a people more deuout than this: adioining therunto
moreouer, That by meanes of religion they had established unto themselves the
greatest monarchy in the world. Then after
matters of religion, and worship of the immortall gods, are to be entreated of
the greatest and most vrgent affaires of state, and most concerning the
Commonweale, as the making of peace or war: in both which, long delay is no
lesse dangerous, than is tooA good rule by the auntient well
obserued in all their consultations for matters of state. hastie
resolution. In which case, as in all things doubtful, the antients had a rule
which suffered no great exception, which was, That we ought not to do, neither
to councell any thing to be done, wherof we doubt whether it be iust or iniust,
profitable or hurtfull; or if the harme that may ensue bee greater than the
profit that may come of the enterprise that is to be taken in hand: but if the
harme be euident, & the profit doubtful, or contrariwise, there is then no
deliberation to be had or doubt made which to chuse. But the doubt is greater, when as that which we are to
consult of, hath in show moe & greater profits, if we can bring it to good
effect, than it hath hurt if wee faile therein. Howbeit the more wholsome
opinion of the antients is to bee preferred, viz. That
when question is of matters of estate, things doubtfull, or subiect to the
change of fortune,Things doubtful or subiect to fortune, in
consultation of matters of state not to be at al embrased. are not at
al to be embraced. And therfore the subtiller sort, cause thē that be more
simple, to propound and persuade in councell such things as seeme vnto
themselves doubtfull; to the intent that so the blame may rest upon them, if
things fall out euill: & yet the honor redound unto themselves if it fall
out wel. Howbeit nothing ought to beNothing ought of right
to be praised by the euents. thought commendable and well done, which
dependeth of the euent. For it behoueth vs by most certaine arguments and
reasons to show wherfore this or that is to be done, and not by the euent: yea it behoueth a wise man rather to
feare vnfortunat euents, than to presume of happie successe. And therfore a
wise councellor neuer resteth himselfe upon the chances of fawning fortune, or
upon aduentures, but still forceth himselfe by good and wise discourse to
gather the true effects of precedent causes: albeit that hee oft times see, the
most aduenturous and rash, to be the most happie & fortunat in their
attempts. And therefore the antient diuines (who couered wisedome in fables)
doubted not to exclude that goddesse whom they called Fortune, out of the
coūcell of the gods; least that which should be sought for by wisedome, should
seeme to have bene obtained by the rashnesse of fickle fortune. And yet for all
that wee see nothing to be more cōmended or blamed,
than the good or euil end of mens actions: and
so wisdome measured by the foot of fortune. But if the law condemne the
souldior that ighteth with the enemie without the
commaundement of his captaine, although hee carrie away the victorie; how much
more dangerous ought it to be, to put the hope of councels, & state of the
Commonweal in the vncertaine hope of fortune? Besides that, such continuall
aduentures do oftentimes draw after them the ruine of aduenturous princes. And
therefore to auoid that nothing should be rashly or vnaduisedly decreed in the
councel, I like well the aduise of sir Thomas Moore, To
propound the day before what was in the Senat to be resolued on the day
following; to the end that such deliberations might the better be disgested:
prouided for al that, That question be not of the particular interest of any of
them which have voice in the councell: for in that case it is much better to resolue upon the matter the same day, &
without delay, than to attend vntil the sound iudgement of some be preuented by
the subtilties of others, & that men come prepared with long traines of
reasons, to reuerse that which ought of right to be concluded. For as the
truth, the more naked and simple it is produced, the fairer it is; so is it
most certaine, that they which disguise it by figures or colours of Rethorique,
take from it the lustre and naturall beautie thereof: a thing which a man ought
aboue all things in matters of councell to shun. True it is, that to vse
oloquence, in the assemblies of the people, and with the sweetnes of speech to
delight the ears of the ignorant multitude, or with faire words to blind their
eies, or with pleasing reasons to turne their minds from rage and furie to
peace and quietnes, is a thing not onely commendable, but necessary also. But al these things are far to be
remoued from a Senat or councell, if aduise be to be sought for or required of
such Senators as we have spoken of, that is to say of wise men. And the
Lacedemonian breuitie full of good reasons, is to be vsed, that they all may
have time to speake: & that no orator hauing got the possession of
speaking, shold with long discourse or speech exclude the best & wisest of
the senators. And therefore by an old decree of the Areopagits, it was not
lawfull in that graue councell, to vse either any induction or after-speech. As
for the delivering of their opinions by secret suffrages, as amongst the
Venetians; or by changing of places, as amongst the Romans, I cannot greatly
commend of either, but especially if the matter in consultation consist of many points, of which some are to be liked
of, and othersome to be reiected: so that it is necessarie to propound euerie
article or point apart, which the Latins terme diuidere
sententiam, and so to cause the Senators to passe & repasse from
one side to another. Into which difficulties the Venetians falling, are
oftentimes constrained to leaue their secret voices giuen by lots, and to giue
the same by word of mouth; which they vse to do, when question is of the life,
fame, or fortune of any man, according to the maner of the antient Greeks &
Romans; a thing which cannot by secret voices, by lot, without iniustice be
done, for the infinit varietie of cases which may present themselves to be
iudged upon. Now as the Senat of a Commonweale is not bound to the
certaineThat the Sena ought not
to intermedie with the iurisdiction of the magistrat. hearing and
deciding of causes, so ought it not to trouble it selfe with intermedling with
the iurisdiction of the magistrats, except it be in the controuersies of the
greatest magistrats, or soueraigne courts
among themselves. And for this cause Tiberius the
emperour, in the beginning of his raigne protested in the Senat, That he would
not alter any thing in the course of iustice, neither have to do with the
iurisdiction of the ordinarie magistrats. And they which make a confusion of a
Senat & priuie councel, do greatly diminish the dignitie & honor
therof, for that it ought to be regarded as to confirme the princes actions,
& wholly to attend the publike affairs: worke enough to busie a senat,
except it be when question is of the life or honour of the greatest lords and
princes, or of the punishment of cities, or other such causes of like
consequence and importance, as may well deserue the
assemblie of the Senat; as in auntient time the Roman Senat, by commission from the people, had the hearing of the
treasons and conspiracies of their allies, against the state, as we see in
Liuius lib. 26Liuie.
Yet resteth the last point of our definition, that is to say, that the Senat is
establishedWhat power a Senat or counsel of stateis of
right to have in a well ordered Commonweale. to giue aduise and
councell to them which have the soueraigntie in euerie Commonweale. To giue
aduise (I say) and councell; for that the Senat in a well ordered Commonweale,
ought not to have power to commaund, nor to direct out their mandats, neither
to put into execution their aduises and consultations, but onely to make report
thereof unto them which have the soueraigntie. Now if a man should aske,
Whether there be any Commonweale wherein the Senat hath such power? It is a
question but of fact: but if demaund were made, whether of right it ought so to
have or not? our opinion is, that in a well
ordered Commonweale it is in no wise to be suffered: for that it cannot be
without impeaching of the soueraigntie, and that much lesse in a Monarchie,
than in an Aristocratie, or a Popular estate. And in that the maiestie of a
soueraigne prince is knowne, in that he can, and his wisedome, in that he
knoweth to weigh and iudge the aduise of his councell, and so conclude
according to the resolution of the wiser part, and not of the greater.
Now if any man thinke it straunge or inconvenient for all other magistrats and
soueraigneWhy magistrates and soueraign courts have a
greater commaunding power then hath a Senat or counsel of state.
courts, to have power to commaund, in their owne names to direct out their
commissions, and the Senat that iudgeth of their authoritie and controuersies,
to be depriued of this power: let him consider that unto such magistrats and
courts, power is giuen them euen by their
institution, election, and creation, and by the charters and grants unto them
made for the limiting of their charge and power, without which neither martiall
nor civill or domesticall affaires can well be gouerned: whereas there was
neuer Senat in any auntient well ordered Commonweale, which had any power to
commaund by vertue of the institution thereof. So we see, that in the kingdoms
of Fraunce, Spaine, and England, the priuie councell is not erected or
instituted in forme of a bodie politique or colledge; neither to have power by
the election or ordaining thereof, to order or commaund any thing, so as is
necessarie for all magistrats, as we shall hereafter declare. And as for that
that some will say, That the priuie councell
may disanull and reuerse the iudgements and decrees of the magistrats and
soueraigne courts: and so conclude, that it is not without great authoritie and
power: mine answere is, that the decrees of the councell depend not in any
thing of the councell it selfe; but of the royall power, and by commission
onely, in qualitie of extraordinarie iudges for the execution of iustice,
besides that the commission and authoritie of the priuie councell is alwayes
ioyned with the person of the king. And therefore we see in a Monarchie all the
decrees of the priuie councell to carrie these words with them, By the king in his priuie councell: which can do nothing
if the king bee not present or at leastwise confirme the acts of his councell.
But wee have before shewed the power of all magistrats and corporations to
cease, and bee suspended in the presence of the prince. Now if the power of the Senat be nothing in the absence of the
prince, and much lesse in his presence, where then is the Senats power? And if
the Senat cannot of it selfe decide and determine a controuersie; how can it
then dispose of such things as belong unto the state of the Commonweale? and
that is it wherfore we see such things as are decreed upon by the Senat, to be
still referred unto the prince: or if they bee of lesse importance, yet to be
still confirmed with the princes authoritie, hand, and seale. Which is no new
matter, but of auntient time done. For we see an old charter making mention of
one Endobalde, countie of the Pallace of king Clotoire, who sitting in councell with the Senat, was to
report the decrees thereof unto the king, to the end to have them by him either approued or reiected.
But the doubt is greater, whether the Senat in a Popular or Aristocratique
estateWhether the Senat in a popular or Aristocratique
estate ought to have more power then in a Monarchie. ought to haue
more power than in a Monarthie, or not? considering the great difference there
is betwixt one lord and many, or betwixt one prince the soueraigne commaunder
of his people; and an infinit number of men; as in a Popular estate. Besides
that, we read also, that in the Roman Commonweale (which is holden to haue
beene one of the most flourishing and best ordered that euer was) the Senat had
power to dispose of the common treasure, and publike reuenue (one of the
greatest points of soueraigntie) to appoint lieutenants and gouernours of
princes, to grant triumphs, and to dispose of religion. And for this cause Tertullian saith, That neuer any God was receiued in
Rome, without the decree of the Senat. And as for ambassadours of kings and
people, none but the Senat receiued and
dismissed them. And that which more is, it was forbidden upon paine of treason,
to present any request unto the people, without the aduise of the Senat before
had, as we have before declared. Which was not onely in Rome obserued, but also
in all the Graecian Commonweales. For offending wherin Thrasibulus was in Athens accused of treason, as was afterwards also
Androtian byWhat power the Senat
or counsel ought to have in a popular or Aristocratique estate.Demosthenes. Which order is euen at this time better
obserued and kept at Venice, than euer it was in Rome or Greece. And yet
notwithstanding all this I say, that the Senat of the Popular or Aristocratique
estates ought not to have but the aduise and consultation of matters of state
onely, the power still depending of them, which had the soueraigntie. And as
for that which is said of the power of the Roman Senat, that which it had, was nothing else but dignitie, authoritie,
councel, and not power: for thatThat the Senat of Rome had
no power to commaund in matters of state. the people of Rome might
when it saw good confirme o repeale the decrees of
the Senat, which had no power to commaund, and much lesse to execute the
decrees therof; Dionysius Halycarnassaeus hath well
noted, and Liuie himselfe oft times vsing this forme of
speech, Senatus decreuit, populus iussit, The Senat
decreed, and the people commanded. Wherein Festus
Pompeius is deceiued, interpreting the word iussit, commaunded, for decreuit, or decreed.
So that it belonged to the Senat to decree, and to the people to commaund. As
when Liuie speaking of the authoritie of Scipio Africanus, saith, Nutus eius pro
decretis patrum, pro populi iussis esse, His beck was in stead of the
Senators decrees, and the peoples commaunds. And that the least Tribune of the
people, opposing himselfe against the Senat,
might stay all the decrees thereof. I have here before noted certaine places
out of Titus Liuius: whereby it euidently appeareth,
that the Senat could in nothing commaund: and especiall by the decree where it
is said, That the Consull if he should thinke it so good, should present the
request unto the people, for the making of a dictator: and if it pleased not
the Consull, then the Praetor of the citie should take that charge upon him:
who if he would therin do nothing, that then one of the Tribunes should do it.
The Consuls (saith Liuie) would therein doe nothing, and
forbad the Praetor also to obey the Senat: Now had the Senat had so much power
to commaund, as had the Consull, or one of the Tribunes of the people, it would
neuer have used such kind of speech; neither would the Consul have forbidden
the Praetor to obey the Senat. For indeed
the Senat could not commaund the Praetors, but used these or like words, If it should so seeme unto them good; or if so it were their
pleasure. So the same man in another place saith, Decreuerunt patres vt Marcus Iunius Praetor vrbanus si ei videretur,
Decemuiros agro Samniti, Appuloque, quoad eius publicum erat metiendo,
deuidendoque crearet, The Senators decreed, that Marcus Iunius, Praetor of the citie, if he should thinke it so good,
should appoint ten men for the measuring and diuiding of so much of the Samnite
and Appulian land, as belonged to the Commonweale.
Now if any man should say that these words, Si ei videretur (if it should so seeme unto him good) imported a commaund: the contrarie is proued
in that, that Liuie speaking of the punishment of the
Campanians, saith, That the Consull Fuluius hauing red
the decree of the Senat which caried these words: Integram
rem ad Senatum reijceret si ei videretur: interpretatum esse, quid magis è
Republica duceret, aestimationem sibi permissam: That he should, if he
thought it so good, referre the whole matter unto the Senat: to have so
interpreted the decree, as if the matter had beene committed to his discretion,
to deeme what he should think best and most expedient therein to doe for the
Commonweale: at which time question was of the lives and goods of all the
Campanians, part of whom the Consull of himselfe without farther authoritie
from the Senat caused to be put to death, and the rest to be sold by the drume.
But that the dignitie of the Magistrats was in
the Roman Commonweale greater than the Senats, it appeareth by that, that such
as writ letters unto the Senat and people of Rome,The
dignitie of the great magistrats in the Romaine Commonweale greater then the
dignitie▪ of the Senat. if they therein comprehended the Magistrats
also, they still placed them in order before the Senat; as is manifest by the
inscription of their letters, in this sort; Cn. Plancus Imp.
Cos. desig. S. P. D. Coss. Pret. Tribb. pleb. Senatui, Populo, plebiquè
Romano: Cn. Plancus Generall, Consull elect, unto the Consuls, Pretors,
Tribunes of the people, the Senat, People, and Comminaltie of Rome sendeth
greeting. Wherefore Cicero doth but orator like taunt
Vatinius, when he saith, Art not thou a most certein
murtherer of thy countrey? thou leftest not unto the Senat, that which neuer
man tooke from it; that Legates should be appointed by the authoritie of that
order. And he in * Liuieib. 28. when as he speaketh of
Triumphes, saying, It was neuer before by the people determined of triumphes,
the estimation and bestowing of that honour hauing alwayes beene with the
Senat: no not the kings themselves to have impaired the maiestie of that order:
he speaketh (I say) but like an orator: for that there was nothing which might
not be taken from the Senat, the magistrat propounding a request to the
contratie unto the people: as we have by examples before declared. But how
soeuer the Senat for the maintenance of the authoritie thereof made decrees,
yet could it not commaund or put in execution any of those things that were by
it decreed: neither had it so much as any Lictors or Sergeants, the true markes
of them which have power to commaund. But the
Magistrats hauing the decrees of the Senat in their hand, directed their owne
mandats and commissions for the execution thereof, if they thought it so good:
assuring themselves to be out of blame in doing that the Senat had before
decreed, it being alwaies readie to maintaine them in so doing: So the Senat
being no way able to restraine Caesar, tooke their
refuge to that auntient decree of the Senat, which was commonly made but in the
dangerous times of the Commonweale, viz. Videant Consules ac
caeteri Magistratus ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica: Let the
Consuls and other magistrats foresee that the Commonweale take no harme: with
which decree of the Senat (saith Caesar) the Consuls
armed, sodenly raised their power and took up armes against Caesar: by which words it appeareth, authoritie to have beene in the Senat, but the chiefe commaund in the
Magistrats. But if any TribuneThe great power in the
Tribunes of Rome. of the people once opposed himselfe against the
decree of the Senat, not onely the authoritie of the Senat, but of the Consuls
and other magistrats also ceased. And for that cause there were ordinarily some
of the Tribunes at the gate of the Senat, (before that the law Atinia gaue them
entrance into the Senat house) unto whom the decrees of the Senat were brought
and showed, for them to confirme by writing over them this letter T, or reiect by putting thereunto this word Veto, that is to say, I forbid it.
So that the Senat did nothing but by sufferance of the people, or of the
Tribunes, who were as it were espials of the Senat, and keepers of the libertie
of the people, hauing alwaies free power to take
exception to whatsoeuer was decreed, if the people by expresse law tooke it not from them, permitting the whole disciding
of the matter propounded, unto the Senat, without the interruption of the
Tribunes. As it did at the request of Tiberius Graccus
Tribune of the people, giuing leaue unto the Senat for that yeare to dispose of
the Consularie prouinces, with expresse prohibition unto the Tribunes for the
opposing of themselves, for that time onely. For after that time the people oft
times gaue the prouinces and governments, without the aduise or authoritie of
the Senat. Now to say that the Senat had the disposing of the common treasure,
true it is, but that was but upon sufferance, and so long as it pleased the
people; as we may see by the law Sempronia, whereby the people decreed that the
souldiours should be apparelled of the charge of the common treasure. And he
that hath no power but by sufferance, and by
way of intreatie hath no power at all, as we have before said. So in like case
we see the Auogadours or Triumuiri in the Venetian state often times to oppose
themselves, not onely against the proceedings of the Sages and Decemuiri, but
euen of the Senat also, and so cause the matter to be brought unto the hearing
of the graund Counsell.
But here againe a man may say, that if the Senat in bodie or lawfull assemblie
hadWhat an authoritie was among the Romans. no
power to command, there was then no difference betwixt the decrees of the
Senat, and that which they call The authoritie: for so
it was that if there were lesse then foure hundred Senatours, by the decree of
Augustus, (who were afterward brought to the number
of fiftie) that they agreed upon, was called an Authoritie, but not a Decree
of the Senat. As also we may see by the law
Cornelia, published at the request of a Tribune of the people: whereby it was
forbidden the Senat any more to graunt priuileges or dispensations, except
there were two hundred Senatours at the least present. Whereby it is to be
gathered, that the Senat in such number had power to commaund: whereunto I say
that a decree in the nature of it selfe carrieth with it no commaund, no more
then the sentence of the judge, if the commission be not on foor. Now the Senat
neuer iudged or determined, neither could giue out any commission or mandate;
and therefore neuer had the power to commaund their decrees to be put in
execution, without the power and authoritie of the magistrats still being of
none effect. And yet whatsoeuer decree the Senat had made, and were it neuer so
well by the power of the magistrat confirmed;
was but annuall as Dionysius Halicarnasseus hath well
written; and not perpetuall as Conan supposeth.
But how then (might some man say) did the Senat cause three hundred souldiours
citisens of Rome, which remayned of the Legion that had sacked Rhegium in
Sicilie where they were left in garrison, to be led away, and being stript and
beaten, to be all afterward beheaded before the people, without any regard had
unto the opposition of the Tribunes, or appeales of the condemned, most
miserably crying out, the sacred lawes to be therein broken and troden vnder
foot. But herein question was of militarie discipline, which in that respect
hath nothing common with domesticall lawes andMartiall
discipline respecteth not the common or domesticall lawes. customes.
Beside that it was done but by the aduise of the Senat, the execution thereof
being performed by the magistrats, who were
not bound to obey the Senat, if they had not beene thereunto willing. Yea
moreover such was the crueltie and horriblenes of the villanie by the garrison
souldiours committed at Rhegium, who themselves most cruelly rifled the citie,
which they ought with their blood to have defended against the assaults of the
enemie: as that it caused all the ordinarie power of the lawes to cease: no
punishment being thought sufficient to revenge the same. Which cases when they
chaunced, the tittles and querks of lawes were little at all regarded,
especially in the midest of such a noise of weapons. But as oft as the Senat or
Consuls attempted to infringe the soueraigntie of the
people, or to breake the laws, as oft times
they did the Tribunes, were straight waies readie to oppose themselves against
them. For in that Caius Cornelius Tribune of the people,
made a request unto the people, that the Senat from that time forward, should
not decree any thing against the libertie of the people, and the maiestie
thereof: it sufficiently declareth the Senat oft times before contrarie vnto
the law, to have vsurped the rights of soueraigntie: howbeit therein is not to
be respected what was done, but what of right ought to have bene done. Howbeit
it is manifest, that the Senat in the latter times thereof had power to make
lawes: but then it had left off to be a Senat, and was then become rather an
ordinarie court of judges. And yet the magistrats themselves, as the Praetors,
the Aediles, yea and the famous lawyers also made a great part of the Roman
law, albeit that they had no power to commaund
at all: but all this dependeth fo the good liking of the prince or people,
without whose authoritie and commaund, the force of the law, edict, or decree
made, was nothing. Seeing then that the Senat in a Popular estate hath no
ordinarie power to commaund, nor to do any thing but by sufferance; much lesse
power shall it have in an Aristocratique estate, or in a Monarchie: and so much
the lesse in a Monarchie by how much kings are more ielouse of their estates,
than are the people, and better know than they, how to defend their owne
soueraigntie.
But whereas we said, It was not lawfull without the priuitie of the Senat, to
propound any request unto people, that indeed was so prouided by the law
Popilia and Hortensia: yet was it lawfull alwaies without the priuitie of the
Senat, to propound requests unto the
Comminaltie: and although that by the Consularie law Cornelia, it was also
forbidden without the priuitie of the Senat, to propunnd any request unto the
Comminaltie, yet was that law shortly after againe by the law Pompeia repealed
and abrogated. Wherein many with great libertie abuse the words Populi ac Plebis Romanae, (the People and Comminaltie of
Rome) and especially the Greekes, and such as ignorant of the Roman antiquitie,
interpret the Greeke writers.
That is also worth the noting, that albeit that the request which the
magistrats were about to propound unto the people, were disliked of the Senat,
yet might they neuerthelesse lawfully moue the same unto the people, after they
had once made the Senat acquainted therewith. The same may serue also for an
aunswere to that which Iosephus the historiographer saith, That Moyses forbad the king to denie any thing concerning the
publike, without the aduise of the Senat, and the high priest (howbeit that
this article is not to be found in all the law) yet thereof it followeth not,
that the king was thereby of necessitie bound to follow their aduise. For
albeit that the Roman emperours terme themselves the principall Senators, or
chiefe of their councell; yetWhy the Romain emperours
somtime called the Senators their companions, or good lords. such
additions in nothing diminished their maiestie. Yea albeit that they called the
Senators their companions, or good lords and maisters; as did Tiberius, who in the beginning of his raigne called the Senators, Indulgentissimos dominos, His most louing Lords, as we
read in Tacitus. But how much princes gaue unto the
Senat, and the Senat unto princes, Plinie the younger doth in two words (as it were)
declare; where hee thus speaketh of a certaine decree of the Senat, Voluntati tamen principis sui, cui in nulla re fas putaret
repugnare, in hac quoque re obsequi, but to obey the will of their
prince, whereunto they thought it not lawfull in any thing to resist, euen so
in this this thing also to show themselves obedient.
And further also, the Senators or Councellors of the estate, to speake properly
are no where accounted either as officers or commissioners: neither in Viz Fraunce. Senators neither officers nor
commissioners. this realme are they by any law, or edict, or charter
of the kings made councellors, but only by a short briefe without any seale,
signed with the kings hand, expressing in few words, that the king during his pleasure giueth them place and deliberatiue
voice in his councell. But the king being
dead, they must have another such briefe for the holding of their places,
except such as for their calling, or the charge they have in the Commonweale,
have accesse and entrance into the councell.
Now if any man aske, Why a Senat in a well ordered Commonweale, should notFor what reason a Senat in a well ordered Commonweal should not
have also power to commaund. have also power to commaund? The
principall reason is, for that if it should have power to commaund also what it
had in councell decreed, the soueraigntie should rest only in the councell: and
so the councellors of the estate, in stead of councellors should ther of become
maisters, hauing the mannaging of the affaires, and power to dispose of all at
their pleasure; a thing impossible to be done, without the impairing, or to say
better the vtter subuersion of all soueraigntie and maiestie: which is so high
and so sacred, as that it belongeth not vnto
subiects, of what estate or condition soeuer, once to touch it either nie, or a
farre off. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, them that giue commaund unto a
Senat, to go about the destruction of the Commonweale, and vtter ruine of the
state. And for this cause the Great Councell of Venice (wherein the maiestie of
their state consisteth) seeing the Decemuiri to take upon them aboue that which
was committed to their charge, forbad them upon pain of high treason to
commaund or determine of any thing concerning the state, nor so much as to
write their definitiue letters; but to have therein recourse unto the
Seignorie, vntill the Grand Councel were assembled. For which selfe same
reason, and that moe of the citisens also might be partakers of that honour,
hey have decred, That the six councellors of estate, assistants unto the
duke, shall not be but two moneths in that
so honourable a charge: to the end that the custome to commaund should not
breed in them a desire still to continue the same,That the
Senato counsell of estate ought to be
perpetual, and not every yeare chaunged: with the daungers that ensue of
such yearely chaunge as also to aspire higher. Howbeit I am not of
opinion so to have the councellours of estate changed and rechanged; but rather
to have them perpetuall, as they were of antient time at Rome, Lacedemonia and
Pharsalia, and yet are in Polonia and Geneua. For the yearely chaunging which
they made in Athens, and yet make in Venice, Rhagusium, Luques, Genes,
Nuremberg, and diuers other townes of Germanie, doth not onely greatly obscure
the glorie of the Senat, which ought to shine as the sunne, but also draweth
after it the ineuitable daunger of disclosing and publishing of the secrets of
the estate: ioining hereunto also, That the
Senat, all new, cannot bee enformed of affaires passed, neither yet well
continue the entertainment of the affaires present. Which for that it seemed
unto the Florentines a thing verie daungerous, they at the request of Peter Soderin their Gonfalonier (and a chiefe man in the
reforming of their estate) decreed, That all the Senat of fourescore, should
from six moneths to six moneths bee remoued; excepting such as had before bene
Gonfaloniers or chiefe officers in the Commonweale, whome they appointed
perpetuall Senators, of purpose to instruct the other new Senators in the
affaires of state. The same order they of Genes are faine also to take in their
mutable common Senat, wherein such as have bene dukes and Syndics are
perpetuall Senators. Wherein the Rhagusians are better prouided of their Senat
than are the Venetians, whose example they seeme to have followed in the
forming of their Commonweale: For in Venice
the Senat changeth every yeare all at once: but in Rhaguse the Senators which
are also but one yeare in charge, change still one after another, and not all
in one yeare. But if the desire of honour bee so great, as that the citisens
cannot otherwise be satisfied, except they all by turnes may have place in the
Senat, we must then imitat that which Solon did; who in
the Popular estate of the Athenians by him framed, appointed a mutable▪ Senat
of foure hundred citisens every yeare to be changed: but withall hee made a
perpetuall priuie Councell of the Areopagits, to the intent, that that mutable
Senat, and yearely change of all the other magistrats
might thereupon rest, as upon a most firme and sure stay. And thus hauing
spoken of a Senat, order requireth that we
should also speake of the Officers and Commissioners in a Commonweale.
CHAP. II. ¶ Of the Officers and Commissioners in a
Commonweale.
AS in the whole bodie of the law concerning
Commonweales, are contained many things right fruitfull and commodious: so also
amongst the rest, the reasoning and discourse concerning publike persons, hath
alwayes bene thought most profitable: and albeit that many things concerning magistrats are thought common and vsuall, yet
lie the same for most part almost wrapped up in obscuritie: For that they which
have thereof reasoned, do therein define nothing plainely. Wherefore I haue
thought it best to begin this our discourse of their definitions. An Officer
therefore is a publike person, who hath an ordinarieWhat an
Officer is? what a Commissioner is? charge by law limitted unto him.
A Commissioner is a publike person, but with an extraordinarie charge limited
unto him, without law, by vertue of commissionely. Which definitions so by vs
set downe that they may become more plaine, it shall not be amisse to make a
diuision of publike persons, euen from the first beginning of them. And first I
call them publike persons, who are to attend upon the publike
affaires:A publique person who? Two sorts of publique persons.
of whome there are two sorts, one which hath power to commaund, whome they call
Magistrats: and another sort which hath no such commaunding power, but is onely
to vnderstand or to put in execution the commaundements of the others; and are
yet all publike persons also. Howbeit for all that, all publike persons are not
Officers, or Commissioners; as Archbishops, Bishops, and Ministers, are publike
persons, and beneficed men rather than Officers: which we must not mingle
together, considering that the one sort is established for matters diuine, and
the other for worldly affaires, which ought not to be confounded. Ioyning
hereunto also, that the establishing of them which are employed in diuine
matters, dependeth not of the politique edicts or lawes, as the Officers do.
Let vs then see the definitions by vs set downe, whether they be good or no, before we enter into the deuision of
Officers, for that no man, either lawyer, or of them which have before
entreated of the state of Commonweales, hath truely told what an Officer, a
Commissioner, or a Magistrat is: which for all that is a thing most necessarie
to be vnderstood, seeing that the Officer is one of the most principall parts
of a Commonweale, which cannot stand without Officers and Commissioners. But
forasmuch as Commonweales were first serued by Commissioners, before they were
serued by Magistrats or Officers (as wee will hereafter show) it is fit that we
should first speake of Commissioners, and of the difference betwixt them and
the Magistrats or Officers.
Aristotle saith, That a Magistrat is he that hath a
deliberatiue voice in the Senat,Aristotle his definition of
a Magistrat impugned. and in iudgement, with power also to commaund.
He also calleth the magistrat which is not proper but to them which are
of power to commaund, and agreeth not unto officers that serue, as Vshers,
Sergeants, Trumpetors, Scribes and Notaries, whom he putteth into the ranke of
Magistrats, and yet have no power to commaund: so that this definition is in
that respect too short. Besides that, it is a thing more absurd, that he should
not be a Magistrat, which hath no entrance into the priuie councell, neither
yet deliberatiue voyce, nor power to iudge: for if it were so, there should be
but few magistrats in all Commonweales, considering that there are so few
conncellors of the priuie councell in well ordered
Commonweales, and among them not one which hath deliberatiue voice, but by commission: and albeit that they had such voice,
yet had they no commaund, as we have before declared.
And as for the lawyers, there be but few of them which have touched this
string:The lawiers definitions of magistrats
censured. and namely doctor Iouean confesseth,
That it alwaies seemed unto him an hard thing, rightly to define a Magistrat.
And indeed in the definition of a Magistrat by him made he is deceiued: For he
saith, That a Magistrat is he to whome the prince hath giuen any charge▪ in
which sence and sort all Commissioners should be magistrats. But D. Cuiacius▪ beside the definition of Aristotle, promiseth to bring three others: A Magistrat (saith he) is
a publike person, who hath preheminence in doing of iustice; or hee which
sitteth in seate of iustice; or else he which hath iurisdiction and publike
iudgement: so that by his account he
appointeth foure definitions, with that of Aristotle.
Which is directly against the Maximes of all Philosophie, and contrarie to the
principles of Logike, that one should giue more than one definition to one
thing: and is also impossible by nature. But if any say, That many descriptious
may be giuen of one and the same thing, for that the accidents are manie which
are in one thing: true it is, but an hundred descriptions cannot declare and
make manifest the substance or nature of a thing: Which in the Art of reasoning
is a great fault: but in the knowledge of the law much greater, and especially
in the matter of Magistrats and officers, which is the entrance of the law,
where the lawyers begin. For the principall markeThe
principall marke whereby a magistrate is knowne. whereby a Magistrat
is knowne, which is, To have power to commaund; is in these three definitions wanting: and the magistrats lieutenants
have the hearing of causes, are presidents in iudgement, and sit in the seat of
iustice, and yet for all that are no magistrats at all. The bishops also sit in
publike iudgement, and seat of iustice, and have the hearing of causes: For
when Lentulus the Great Bishop, made relation unto the
Senat, of the decrees of the colledge of Bishops, and the law Clodia,
concerning the consecrationThe auntient bishops in Rom no magistrats▪ and why. of Ciceroes house, thus he began his speech, Pontifices
religionis sunt iudices, legis Senatus, The Bishops (said he) are
judges of religion, and the Senat of law. So doe the Cadies, or Mahometane
Bishops in the East; and yet for all that they are no magistrats, considering
that they had or have no power to commaund, nor to call men before them, to
imprison them, or to put their owne iudgements in execution: neither have they any sergeant or officer whome they can
commaund, no more than have the Cadies, or Paracadies in Turkie, or the
auntient bishops of Rome; which is a thing worth the marking. And sometimes
cleane contrarie, some have authoritie and power to commaund, which have no
iurisdiction or hearing of the cause at all, as wee will hereafter shortly
show. And that more is, the Commissioners of publike extraordinarie causes, in
antient time deputed by the people of Rome, whom the law calleth quaestores parricidij, had (as at this present
Commissioners appointed by the prince haue) power to heare the cause, to sit in
iustice, to iudge, to commaund, to compell, and yet for all that were no
magistrats. Which being so, none of the aforesaid definitions can bee good.
Besides that there is another fault in them, for not hauing distinguished the
magistrats from the other officers, nor made
any difference betwixt an officer, & a commissioner; whereof a great
confusion and medley of commissioners and officers must needs ensue. Carolus Sigonius, who seemeth more curiously to haue
searched into the definition of a Magistrat, is yet therein many waies also
deceiued: For he calleth all them magistrats which have any publike charge of
worldly affaires, without making of any difference betweene officers and
commissioners, or betwixt the magistrats and other officers, which have also
publike charge; besides that he giueth power to al magistrats, to iudge, to
commaund, and to put in execution, euen unto the Aruspises. Howbeit as a
definition ought not to extend farther, or lesse way,
than doth the thing that is defined: so ought
also the description of a magistrat in this our treatise of a Commonweale, to
agree to all magistrats of all Commonweales indifferently.
Now in the definition by our selues proposed, we first said, all officers
(whither theyThe difference be twixt magistrats and priuat
men, as also betwixt magistrates and commissioners. were magistrats,
or magistrats seruants) to be publique persons: who in that differ from priuat
men: for that priuat men have nothing to doe with the affaires of the Common
weale. We said also the Magistrats to have an ordinarie charge, whereby to
differ from Commissioners, who have also publique charge, but yet
extraordinarie, according to the occasions in the occurents of time presented:
such as were in auntient time the Dictators, criminall Quaestors, and other
judges extraordinarily by the people of Rome appointed, at the motion and
request of the Magistrats. And last of all we Offices not to be erected, but by expresse edict, or
lawe. said, their ordinarie charge to be to them by law limitted and
bounded: for the erection of their publique ordinarie charges, erected by the
name of offices, which otherwise should be no offices, if there were not for
them an expresse edict or law. A thing alwaies obserued in the auntient
Commonweales both of the Greeks and Latins; and now also better than euer: and
to this end Princes cause their edicts to be published, in their soueraigne and
inferiour courts: and in this realme of Fraunce, the charters of offices newly
erected are sealed with greene wax, with labels of greene and red silke, and
this style, viz. To all men present and to come, with a
continuance perpetuall: whereas the letters pattents of commissions, are sealed
with yellow wax, with a labell of plaine parchment, without any perpetuitie.
And albeit that all Corporations and Colleges
be graunted by the prince with a charge by law limitted for euer, as I haue
said; yet so it is, that if the king will augment or increase the number of the
corporation or colleges of judges, or other magistrats, yea or of the most base
or vile officers: as of Sergeants, criers, trumpetours, land measurers,
broakers, and such like, it must be done by publique edict, verified and
inrolled: of examples whereof all the records of the courts of justice are
full. But whereas we said the lawes concerning officers to be perpetuall,Offices to be perpetuall although that the officers oftentimes
chaunge. that is to be vnderstood of the perpetuitie of the offices,
which continue for euer after they be once by edict erected, (what time soeuer
it be that is prescribed unto the officers themselves,) vntill that by
contrarie edicts or lawes the same offices be againe put downe. Although the officer hold his place but for the space
of eighteene moneths, as did of long the Censors their censorship, (which for
al that was at length prorogued for five yeares,
for that so great an office could not in lesse time well be discharged,) or for
a yeare: as did all the other offices in Rome, by the law Villia: or for six
moneths, as did the Senators of Florence, after it was a popular estate: or for
two moneths, as did the six Counsellours of the seignorie which are assistant
unto the duke of Venice: or for one day onely, as the Captaines of the two
fortresses of the castle of Rhaguse,Lawes neuer awhit the
stronger for being written whose office is perpetuall, albeit that
their commaund last but for one day. But howsoever it be that offices be
erected with ordinarie and publique charge, it must still be done by law: not for that it is needfull to have parchment
to write it in, or greene waxe to seale it with, or yet magistrats to publish
the edicts concerning the erection of such offices: for the writing, the seale,
the verification, albeit that they giue credit unto the lawes which are made,
yet make they no lawes; no more than they doe other acts and contracts. But to
the contrarie there were neuer lawes more strong or better kept, than those of
the Lacedemonians, which Lycurgus forbad to be written,
and were for that cause called Rhetes: for so he was persuaded that they should
the rather remaine inuiolat and of long continuance, if they were once writ in
the hearts of his citisens, and not in tables, in their mindes, and not in
bookes. The Athenians in like case had a certeine forme of presenting their
requests unto the people, which if the people receiued, it then passed into the force of a law: which they used to ingraue in
brasse, and to fasten it unto a pillar, lest
any man should under the colour of ignorance excuse him selfe in transgressing
the same. So when question was for the erecting of an hundred new Senators in
Athens out of the two new Tribes of Antigonus and Demetrius, the law for the erection of them was published
unto the people: which was also done in the erection of all other offices as is
to be seene in Thucydides, Plutarch, and Demosthenes.Al offices in Rome erected by one or other expresse
lawe. The like is to be said of the Roman magistrats: for the Consuls
were created by the law Iunia: and the Tribunes of the people by the law
Duillia: and when question was for the creating of one of the Consuls out of
the people, it was done by the law Licinia. And afterward the Praetor for the
administration of justice in the citie was made by the law Sextia. And the
foure Praetors for publique criminall causes, (beside the other before erected) by the lawes Cornelia and Baebia.
So may we also see of all the other Magistrats erected by the Emperours: that
it was alwaies done by expresse Edict, wherein the time, the place, and their
ordinarie charge are limitted. As in all the first & twelft bookes of the
Code, and in the Edicts of Iustinian it appeareth where
every magistrat hath his particular Edict.
We have put also into our definition of an Officer, that he must have an
ordinarieAn officer alwaies hath an ordinary charge, and
in that he differeth from commissioner whose
charge is alwaies extraordinarie. charge, for that the commaunds of
the people of Rome granted by commissions and extraordinarie charges were
aswell called by the name of Lawes, as were those that were made for ordinarie
offices: the charge, the time, and place being still limitted by commission: as
a man may see by the commissions granted unto the Dictators, which were sometime made by the decree of the people, as I
have before shewed. And also by the commission granted to Pompee for five yeares, therein to end the Pirats warre: with commaund
over all the coasts and hauen townes of the Mediterranean Sea, all granted vnto
him by the law Gabinia. As also by commission giuen him for the warre against
king Mithridates, granted by the law Manilia. But
forasmuch as these were not but extraordinarie charges, a man could not call
them offices, which are still ordinarie and perpetuall. And for because those
warres were in short time to be ended, it was not meete therfore to create a
new magistrat, whose office and charge should be perpetuall, but onely
extraordinarily to commit the care of that warre unto a most sufficient Captaine and Generall: unto whom fiue
yeares time was limitted at the request of Catulus: to
the intent that Pompee in that time might end the warre,
and not longer to protract it to be so alwaies in imployment: Or if the warre
were sooner ended, that then his commission should end also. And all such
extraordinary charges we call by the name of Commission. The Dictatorship was
also a charge giuen by commission, and not an ordinarie power: for why, the
Dictator was not but extraordinarily and without law nominated by the Interrex
or Consul, some great matter so requiring: and for that all offices ceased the
Dictator being created, his commission was limitted but unto six moneths at the
most, and if he had soner dispatched the businesse for which he was appointed
Dictator, his commission then also expired, and his authoritie ceased; as we
have by many examples before declared. And as a man may see by Liui lib..Aemilius Mamercus, who chosen Dictator, and the same day
hauing dispatched the businesse for which he was chosen, the verie next day
following gaue up his charge: showing therein how little he liked of long rule
or authoritie. Howbeit such is the nature and power of all Commissions, as that
according to the pleasure ofCommissions to depend of the
pleasure of him or them that have the soueraigntie in the state. him
that hath the soueraigntie, they may be either reuoked or proroged. And albeit
that commissions in Popular and Aristocratique Commonweales are almost still li
mitted unto a certaine time: yet in a Monarchie that extraordinarie and
permissiue charge is tyed to no time at all: for why, in Popular and
Aristocratique estates and governments, the greater
the charge is giuen by commission, the more need it is to have it in short time expired; least longer power might giue
occasion to ambitiousThe greater the charge is that is giuen
by com mission the shorter time it ought to endure. minds to take
unto themselves the government, and so to oppresse the libertie of the state.
And therefore the dictatorship was but for six moneths, neither was that power
euer longer proroged to any man in that free Commonweale, except to Furius Camillus. For at such time as the people of Rome
had extraordinarily created the Decemuiri with a yearely and soueraigne power,
for the reforming of their old lawes and customes, and the making of new and
more commodious for the state: their commissionLarge and
long commissions daungerous to the state. which should not haue
passed, a yeare being expired, was againe by the people for another yere
proroged, with absolute and soueraigne power: and all other magistrats
suspended during the time of their commission; vntil that out of the best lawes
of other cities they had gathered the lawes of
the twelue tables. upon which continuance of bearing rule, these Decemuiri
tooke occasion to oppresse the libertie of the state, and to take upon
themselves the soueraigntie, had it not by force againe bene wrong out of their
hands, and that no without the great trouble and turmoile of the citie. For
which cause the people from thenceforth erected the offices of the Tribunes of
the people, as defendors and keepers of their libertie; who alone of all the
magistrats held their places after the creation of the dictator, all other
magistrats and officers being for that time suspended. The Florentines did
otherwise, who almost euerie sixt yeare extraordinarily created eight or ten
Commissioners, with soueraigne power, and without limitation of time, for the
ordering of their Commonweale, and the reforming of the abuses therein: who being once created, all other their
magistrats ceased. By which meane these ambitious in effect tooke upon
themselves the government, albeit that in outward appearance they made faire
show of the giuing up of their charge. For the suspending of all magistrats in
generall, is a thing right dangerous, not onely in Popular and Aristocratike
estates, but euen in a Monarchie also: which yet I neuer knew to have happened
in this kingdome of Fraunce, but at such time as king Iohn was taken prisoner by the Englishmen: For then Charles the fift hauing gotten of his father the government of the
kingdome, appointed fiftie commissioners for the reforming of the Commonweale,
with power to examine the doings and abuses of all the other magistrats, from
whome as then all power was taken. At which time the Commonweale destitute of gouernours, was by the seditious
wonderfully disturbed: but more of these things in their place.
But the better and the more easily to vnderstand the difference betwixt an
office andThe difference betwixt an office and a
commission. a commission, a man may in some sort say, that an office
is a thing borrowed, which the owner cannot demaund againe before the time it
was lent for bee expired: but a commission is a thing which one hath but by
sufference, end as it were by leaue, which the owner may againe demaund when he
seeth good. And that is it for which Tacitus merily
speaking of the raigne of Galba, which continued but
three moneths, saith, Praecarium seni imperium, & breui
transiturum, The old mans empire was but by sufference and in short time to passe away: not for that he had indeed
his empire by sufferance, but for that he was now growne extreame old, and
being vnfit for the government of the empire, foresaw that in short time it
must againe by naturall death bee taken from him, although he had not (as
indeed he was) bene before slaine. Howbeit a Commission is of such nature, as
that it expireth so soone as the charge thereof is executed, although it be not
reuoked, or that the time was graunted longer for the execution therof, and yet
neuerthelesse may be alwaies reuoked, whensoeuer it shall please him that
graunted it, whether the matter for which it was graunted be yet entire or not,
as wee have before showed by the example of the Dictators. And to this purpose
there is an old deeree of parliament yet extant in the
records of the court of Paris, against the purseuants sent to Troy with the judges for the publike extraordinary
causes, being indeed none of the bodie of the court, who (the commission
expired) neuerthelesse yet bearing themselves as purseuants, were by the court
commaunded to resigne up their office, and a decree made them to be no officers
at all.
I stand longer upon this point, which although it may seeme easie unto men of
experience, yet unto others it may seeme strange: yea two of the greatest
orators of their time, namely Demosthenes and Aeschines grounded the state of their orations and pleas
upon this point. For when Ctesiphon had presented a
request unto the people, That it would please them, that Demosthenes for his good deserts towards the Commonweale (and namely
for hauing most strongly fortified the walles and castles of the citie of
Athens) might in the open theater be
rewarded with a crowne of gold. Aeschines Demosthenes
his greatest enemie, opposed himselfe against the entertainment of the request,
alleaging for the cause thereof, That by the law no man was to be rewarded,
except he had first giuen an account unto the people of his office well
discharged, as all magistrats were bound to do. Demosthenes for that it concerned his owne honour and reputation,
taking the matter in hand, made of all others a most excellent oration for Ctesiphon, or more truely to say, for the crowne he would
have had, alleaging, That the law spake not but of Magistrats; and that charge
of repairing and fortifying of the wals and other fortresses, was no
magistracie or office, but onely a simple commission; and therefore in his
vulgar tongue saith, .To fortifie is no magistracie but a certaine charg and
ministrie. Which the Latines properly called Curatio, which is to say a Commission. Wherby it appeareth, that
publike charge, for repairing of the walles, not to have bene an ordinarie
matter, but extraordinarie, for that there is not still need for to repaire
them. Neither ought it to seeme strange, if Demosthenes
well knew to distinguish and put a difference betwixt a commission and an
office (as hauing bene of long time exercised in the publike affaires, and as
it were in the middest of the Commonweale) both which Aristotle altogether confounded. The one of them also hauing alwaies
mannaged the affaires of state; and the other as saith Laertius, neuer intermedling therein. And that is it for which Nicholaus Grouchius, and Carolus
Sigonius, for not hauing vnderstood the difference betwixt an office
and a commission, have so much troubled
themselves with replies and reioynders, without any resolution at all, as men
ignorant in the knowledge of matters of law and of state. All which shall I
hope be well manifested, by that which shall be set downe in this booke.
In the laws of Charlemaigne Commissioners were called
missi, a mittendo; which signifieth sent; which the
Germans call by an old word Skaken: whereof they called
the court of judges, which were extraordinarily sent into the prouinces (&
were indeed nothing else but Commissioners) Scacarium.
But here perhaps may some man say, That the Commissioners of the castle of
Paris, and judges of the court of Requests of the Pallace, are also officers:
which being so, how could it then be, that an office and a commission should
not be also all one? Whereunto I answere, That of antient time Commissioners turned into iudges, and yet still knowne by
the name of commissioners those judges were but simple commissioners,
with authoritie and power during pleawho yet afterwards for the common good and
profit were made perpetuall officers, with an ordinarie and perpetuall charge
and power committed unto them them: their old and former name of commissioners,
yet by abuse or for the honor of that court still remaining: whereby those
judges of the court of Requests, are yet called the Commissioners of the
Parliament; as judges appointed, and againe to be reuoked at the pleasure of
the prince. Which judges of the court of Requests (for all that) cannot now be
reuoked by the king himselfe, except they first bee by capitall iudgement condemned, or willingly of themselves resigne their
places: for so it was by the law of Lewes the eleuenth prouided. Not for that commission is
incompatible with an office, most part of compassions being not directed but
unto magistrats or officers: but for that an officer in the qualitie of an
officer, cannot be also a commissioner, for the self same charge limited vnto
him by his office. For such commissions as they call Excitatiues,
extraordinarily directed unto officers for matters concerning the reuiuing the
iurisdiction, or authoritie of their offices, are not properly commissions, if
the time or the place be not by the commission altred; as to iudge according to
the latter proceedings, and to leaue the former: for after that the time and
order appointed by the law, is altered by the authoritie of the prince or
magistrat, it is to be now determined by commission. Now the difference herein
which the lawyers hold, is notale, as▪ That if any
officer have iudged of a fact contained in his
commission, in the qualitie of an officer, that his iudgement is naught: but
yet that is to be vnderstood in a thing which concerneth not his office: For if
there bee a concurrence of the commission Excitatiue, with the charge contained
in the erection of his office, the ordinarie hearing of the cause is to be
preferred before the commission, euen as the qualitie of the officer is to be
preferred before the qualitie of the Commissioner; and the acts of the officers
more assured than the acts of the Commissioners. And so in such concurrence of
authoritie, if the officer commissionat also in a matter belonging to his owne
charge, have not declared in what qualitie he had the hearing of the cause: the
act by him done shall be taken, as the act of an officer, to the intent it may
be the more firme and sure. It is also Extraordinarie commissions extenuating the authoritie of the
magistrate odiou. manifest, extraordinarie
commissions extenuating the power and authoritie of magistrats or officers to
be odious, or at leastwise lesse gratious, if they bee not for the reforming
and amending of the abuses and corruption of the officers. As they do in
Venice, from five yeares to five yeares: And euerie yeare in Genes, where the
Sindies are afterwards Commissioners, to heare the abuses committed by the
magistrats & officers (which in auntient time in Athens was giuen to
certaine ordinarie magistrats) as also at Rome by the law Bebia▪ when as before
Quaestors or judges were by commission appointed by the people. That
extraordinarie hearing of causes of the judges by commission, was also
gratious; which Vespasian the emperour appointed for the
hearing and determining of suits and
controuersies, which in the time of the civill warres were growne infinitly,
and for the deciding whereof the whole lives of all the magistrats would haue
scarce sufficed. Commissions may also bee graunted for things concerning the
greater part of officers, or a whole corporation or colledge, in which and like
cases commissions are necessarie. And I remember that king Charles the ninth, hauing directed his letters patents, in the yeare
1570, for the generall reformation of the waters and forrests of Normandie,
which drew after it question of the fairest of his demaine; from the hearing
whereof the precedent and councellors of the parliament of Roan were forbidden:
Which interiection although they left nothing vnattempted to have letted, yet
so it was, that in fine they agreed thereunto, after that I had againe
and againe presented unto them the kings
commaunds, to that effect and purpose, and commenced suit not onely against the
principall men of that prouinciall court, about matters concerning my
commission, but also against the whole bodie and corporation of the citie of
Roan, for the rights which they pretended against the king; and that, that was
the cause for which I had obtained the interdiction.
But briefly, and yet more plainely and plentifully to make plaine all sorts of
Commissioners, whether they be for the government of prouinces, or for the
warres; orDiuers sortes of commissioners, and from whom they
have their commissions. for the administration of iustice, or for the
kings receits and treasure, or other things concerning the state. We say, that
the commissions come still from the soueraigne prince,
or from the magistrats, or from commissioners deputed by the soueraigne
prince; for a fourth there is not. Againe
Commissioners deputed, are either taken out of the number of magistrats and
officers, or out of other priuat men. And if the commission be directed vnto
the magistrats or officers, it is either for matter belonging unto them by
their office, or otherwise not belonging unto them. And in what sort soeuer it
be that commission be directed, whether it be to an officer, or a particular
person, it is directed with power and authoritie to heare and proceed in the
cause; either without appeale, or else with appeale reserued unto the
soueraigne prince, (if the commission came from him) or unto the magistrats
named in the commission; or els a commissioner is appointed by him whome the
soueraigne hath deputed: as sometime commission is giuen out for the
instruction of the affaires, or proceedings unto the definitiue sentence exclusiuely ro inclusiuely, sauing the
execution thereof, if appeale bee made. Sometime also Commissioners are
appointed by the magistrars to examine a fact, or the right of a matter, or
both the one and the other together; sometimes without any power or commaund,
and sometime with both.
This diuision extendeth to all Commissioners, in what forme of Commonweale
soeuer it be. As is to be seene in the state of the Romans, where the mannaging
of the warres, and government of the countries and prouinces newly conquered,
at the first belonged unto the ordinarie magistrats and officers, viz. the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors, yea euen a
good way from the citie, whilest that the Roman empire was yetThe gouernour of the prouinces in the
Romaine empire nothing but commissioners contained within the bounds
of Italie: But after that the bounds thereof were extended further, they then began to appoint Commissioners to gouerne
their prouinces, in stead of their ordinarie magistrats, who although they were
all by one name called Potestates, yet for all that they
gouerned the prouinces in stead of Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors: they were
also called Proconsuls, Propraetors, Proquaestors, that is to say,
Commissioners, or Lieutenant sent in stead of Consuls, Praetors, or Quaestors:
As is in Liuie to be seene, who speaking of Philo the first Proconsull saith, Actum
cum Tribunis Plebis est, ad populum ferrent vt cum Philo Consulatu abijsset,
pro consule rem gereret, The tribunes of the people were dealt with,
that they would moue it unto the people, that when Philo
was out of his consulship he might rule as proconsul. But after that the empire was growne great, and also extended farre,
such commissions were by the sufferance of the people graunted by the Senat, to
such as were lately gone out of their offices in the citie, who agreed among
themselves for the government of the prouinces; or if they could not so fall to
agreement, cast lots for them, which they called Cmparare inter se, & sortiri: Except the
charge and commission were of such consequence and importance (by reason of
some great warre alreadie risen, or like to arise in the prouince) as deserued
to have some valiant and great captaine without lot thereunto by the Senat
appointed: Where if any partaking or factions chanced to arise about the
matter, the people at the request of the Tribunes appointed one thereunto by
commission. As it did Scipio Africanus, to whome the
people gaue commission for the mannaging of the warres in Spaine and Affrike,
and by that meanes drew Hannibal out of Italy, and discharged that country of a
long and most dangerous war. The like commission was without lot
extraordinarilie by the people also granted to Paulus
Aemylius, to make warre against Perseus king of
Macedon. And so also to the great captaine Pompey
against the pirats, by the law Gabinia, and against king Mithridates, by the law Manilia: all they which the yeare before had
borne office, beeing reiected, the people naming whome they pleased and best
liked. Howbeit that this was no vsuall matter, but right seldome times done:
For ordinarily the Consuls, Praetors, and Quaestors discharged, and so going
our of their offices in the cities, cast lots for the
prouinces, if they could not otherwise agree for the government of them among
themselves:The cause of the ciuil war betwixt illa and Marius. and for that the charge of the warre against Mithridates by lot fell unto Cor.
Sylla, Marius by the working of Pub. Sulpitius,
one of the Tribunes by him suborned, caused it to be by the people taken from
him; and by extraordinarie commission giuen unto himselfe: which was the cause
of the most cruell and bloodie civill warre that euer was in Rome. So also was
the prouince extraordinarily appointed unto Cato
Vticensis, against Ptolomee king of Cyprus;
which by him vndertaken, Clodius boasted, That he had
pluckt out Catoes tongue, which had alwaies before beene
at libertie to speake against extraordinarie powers and commissions. Sometime
also if the horriblenesse of some enormious fact required a more seuere triall,
the matter was propounded unto the people, who put it over by commission vnto
the Senat; which out of the bodie of it selfe
appointed some one or moe, not onely for instructions, but euen to heare and
end the matter. As when Lucius Tubullus the Pretor, had
with grieuous extortion most filthily polluted the Tribunall seat, and
peruerted iustice; so that the people leauing the ordinarie course, and the
magistrats to whom the hearing of the matter belonged, referred it wholly vnto
the Senat by extraordinarie commission: the Senat forthwith deputed Cn. Scipio to iudge and end the cause. So also when Tiberius the emperor by cōmission appointed the Senat to
enquire of the murthers committed betwixt the Nucerians & Neapolitans: the
Senat deputed the Consuls to enquire therof. Yea sometime the senat without
commission from the people, but as it were by meere soueraignty appointed
commissioners, if the case in question were committed in Italy, out of the territorie of the citie of Rome, as a thing
belonging to the Senat, apart from all others; as saith Polybius: as it happened in a straunge robberie and murther, wherof
Cicero speaketh in his booke De
Claris Oratoribus; to the hearing whereof (hee saith) the Senat deputed
the Consuls. By which examples here before produced, it appearethWhether cōmissioners appointed by the prince, or people hauing
the soueraigntie, may appoint their Deputies and so commit the matter to
others. that Commissioners appointed by the prince, or people hauing
the soueraigntie, whether they be magistrats or priuat men, may appoint their
deputies, and so commit the matter to others, if it be not expresly forbidden
them by their commission so to doe; or that question be of the estate it selfe
in the commission: as the ambassadours or Commissioners which are to entreat of
peace, or alliance, or other such like things cannot commit the same to others.
As is also to be said if question be of the life, ame, or state of any man: wherein the manner
and examination for better instructions may be deputed to others, but not the
iudgement it selfe, except the judge before appointed by commission excuse his
absence by sicknesse or some other lawfull cause. But Iustinian the emperour afterwards ordained better by forme of a
perpetuall edict, That Commissioners appointed by the prince, should depute
nothing of their commission to others more than the instructions of the suit:
neither thought he that sufficient, but decreed also, that the Commissioners
appointed by the prince should themselves heare the appeale, and instructions
of the suit. But to meet with all that is to be met with, the most sure rule is
to have al that is commited, particularly in the commission,
expressed, and so the commissioners to be
ruled by the commission, as is the manner in all well established
Commonweals.
And albeit that a man might make many questions concerning commissions
graunted, as well by the soueraigne prince, as by the magistrates, in time both
of peace and warre: yet will I thereof touch but two or three, and those most
necessarie to bee vnderstood of them which have the managing of the affaires of
state, whether it be in peace or warre. Wherefore leauing the rest, and to bee
briefe: wee say that theDiuers wai
whereby commissioners cease. commission ceaseth by the death of him
that graunted the same, or by his reuoking of the commission: or in case that
the commissioner during the time of the commission,
obtaine some office or preferment equall to him that graunted the
commission: for then one of them cannot
commaund the other. But as for the expresse reuocationWhether the acts of a commissioner done after his commission reuoked, and
yet before he had knowledg of the reuocation thereof, be good or not?
declared by the princes letters or edicts, concerneth as well them which are
ignorant of such reuocation of their authoritie and commission, as them which
know it. And albeit that the acts of a commissioner so reuoked, done after the
reuocation of the commission, and yet before the knowledge of such a reuocation
to him giuen, hold for good but in regard of particular men, towards whom the
commissioner hath executed his commission; and especially, if they haue
voluntarily yeelded unto the commissioner, knowing the commission to be
alreadie reuoked: and that towards others the acts of the commission after the
reuocation of the commission, are of none effect by the rigour of the law, yet
equitie and reason bindeth them thereunto, vntill that the commissioners or appointed iudges doe know that their
commission is reuoked. For as a commissioner hath no power vntill he haue
receiued his commission: so likewise the commission dureth, vntill the
reuocation thereof be signified; or at leastwise vntill the commissioner know
that it is reuoked. And therefore Celsus sayth, that the
acts of the gouernour of a prouince are good and auaileable, if the
commissioner know not that his commission is called in. And although Pope Innocent were of opinion, that it was otherwise to be
iudged, if question were of life or honour, and was therein of many followed,
yet he continued not in that opinion. And albeit that he was a popeA good decree of Pope Innocent the
fourth. & soueraigne prince, and a man most skilfull in both the
lawes, yet willed he no greater authoritie to be giuen unto his writings than
to other mens, neither to rest thereon further
than there were good and strong reason therefore. But to take away these
antient difficulties, the secretaries to the state have used to ioyne vnto
commissions, and almost to all mandats and letters pattents this clause, A die qua rescriptum Significabitur, From the day that
the rescript shall be notified: which clause if it be omitted, yet is it
alwayes necessarily to be vnderstood. And thus much concerning the expresse
reuocation of a commission.
So also a Commission taketh end by the death of him that graunted it, bee
heeWhether a commission alwaies taketh end by the death
of him that graunted it? prince or magistrat; prouided alwaies, that
the thing committed bee yet whole and entire: for otherwise the commissioner
may continue that which hee hath begun, so that it be done without fraud. But
it is fraud in law, when a Commissioner not aduertised by a purseuant or expresse rescript (but by some other
certaine meanes) of the death of the prince, the matter being yet whole,
neuerthelesse proceedeth therein. Now the matter is not whole and entire, which
cannot by the Commissioner bee left off without proiudice to the publike state,
or to the right of priuat men: as in matter of iustice, if the parties haue
contested, the thing is no more entire, but the Commissioners may and ought to
go through with that they have begun, whether it bee the prince or the
magistrat that hath giuen them commission. And so in warre the matter is said
not to be entire, if the battell stand ranged before the enemie, and that the
retreat cannot without euident perill be made: in which case the generall is
not to forbeare the giuing of battaile, although he be certainly enformed of
the death of the prince; or that it be forbid
him to ioyne battaile. So if rebellion arise, which cannot otherwise be
appeased but by the execution of the authors thereof; that is first to bee
done, and afterward knowledge thereof to be giuen, (as saith the lawyer)
although the death or countermaund of the prince happen or come in the meane
time. Yet the commissions comming from the prince, or letters mandatorie, are
in that different from the other letters royall, which they call letters of
iustice: for that these coutinue in their force and vertue, whereas the letters
of commaund expire after the death of the prince. Yet neuerthelesse the new
prince oftentimes ratifieth that which was done by the commaundement of his predecessour, although he died, the matter yet
whole and entire, and the rather if it be well
and for his profit done; which the magistrats cannot do to the commissioners by
them appointed, for that their ratifications in tearmes of iustice are neuer to
be receiued. And thus much concerning all the sorts of Commissioners.
Now, that we have alreadie said of Commissioners, hath no place in officers,
forWhether the power of officers nd together with the death of the prince? that their power endeth
not together with the death of the prince, although it bee in some sort holden
in sufferance, and as it were suspended vntill they have letters from the new
prince, or confirmation from him for the continuance of their offices. And for
this cause the parliament of Paris after the death of king Lewes the eleuenth, decreed that the officers should continue in their
charge, as they had before done, vntil that they receiued commaund to the
contrarie from the new king; following therein an auntient decree giuen in like case in the moneth of October, in the
yeare 1380. Howbeit the court of Toulouse after the death of Charles the seuenth, otherwise decreed than had the parliament of
Paris, viz. That all their iurisdiction should cease,
vntill they had receiued new commaundement from the new king; and yet that if
any occurrents should chance wherein the authoritie of the court should bee
requisit, that then the court should proceed by letters and commissions,
intituled The people holding the Parliament royall of
Toulouse, firmed with the seale of the court, without any mention
making of the king. But forasmuch as the king comming unto his kingdome by
right of succession, vseth his maiestie before he be consecrated; as it was
iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, the nineteenth of Aprill, in the
yeare 1398 (contrarie to the opinion of many)
it belongeth not unto any officers, parliament, or Senat, to doubt of the power
or maiestie of the prince: which if it were not, neither were they to have any
authoritie or power: neither are in any other sort to proceed, but as officers
unto the king, and under his obeysance. But if it were lawfull for the people
to make choice of their king, as it is in Polonia, Denmarke, and Hungarie;
(where the kings beeing dead, the maiestie of the kingdome is to returne vnto
the people) another thing were to bee said: For then the magistrats vse not the
princes name in the vacancie of the kingdom (for that then there is no king)
but every one of them do their lawfull acts and duties, as if they had such
power from the Senat and the people) by force of the law, and power proper unto the magistrats: whereas Commissioners and
judges extraordinarily appointed, can by no meanes (the prince being dead) hold
their authoritie and power; for that they do nothing by the vertue of the law
or of ordinarie power: and not for that commissions be odious, and offices
gratious (as some have thought) for oftentimes a commission is more gratious,
yea and more profitable also unto the Commonweal, than any officers ordinarie
power. And as for the decree of the parliament of Paris (bearing date the
sixteenth of October 1381) whereby it was ordained, that the kings edicts and
commands should have like power the king being dead, that they had whilest he
yet lived; that is so to be vnderstood, if the charge committed bee then begun
to be put in execution. And therefore if the power of the magistrats be
annuall, and the king die before the
magistrats yeare be expired, yet may the magistrat neuerthelesse hold his
office for his yeare: or if it be perpetuall, continue the same in such sort
and so long as the law giueth him leaue, for that his office dependeth not of a
simple commaundOffices by lawe established, are not but by
contrarie edicts or lawes to be put downe. which may still be
reuoked, or of a charge which cannot be recommaunded, but is grounded upon a
law, receiued, published, verified, and registred: in such sort as that his
office cannot be suppressed but by a contrarie edict or law. As when question
was for the suppressing of the militarie Tribunes, (for the discord betwixt the
Senat and the people, before created with the power of the Consuls) and in
their steady to restore again the Consuls, it could not be done vntill that by
the law Licinia, that power of the Tribunes was againe
taken away. And in our time when as the fift and sixt president of the parliament of Paris were to be suppressed, they
were not yet therefore displaced (for that against their wils they could not,
except that for some capital crime they had bene before condemned) but an
expresse edict was made, that after their death none should be more placed in
their roomes, but so their offices to bee suppressed. So by a generall edict
made by Charles the ninth, at the request of the estates
of Orleans, in the yeare 1560, all offices erected after the death of king Francis his grandfather, were againe suppressed. And oft
times it happeneth, that one officer is by one law made; but more often, that
many are made at once: as when threescore sergeants were at once created by one
edict of king Francis the first; and the criminall
judges at once erected throughout the realme by an edict in the yeare 1527▪
when as before the same man was judge both of
criminall and civill causes. Which course was so straitly obserued and kept in
the kingdome of Fraunce, as that the verie clarkes of the clarke of the
parliament, were by expresse edict made an office, though afterwards by another
edict againe suppressed, at the instance of the chiefe clarke, in the yeare
1544: as were other small charges, which the Roman Commonweale were by the
magistrats themselves commonly giuen unto their seruants, without any law at
all. Neither is it sufficient for the magistrats and other officers to be by
the law created, but that their successours also have a particular declaration,
to testifie that they have obtained their offices, and yet no need of any new
edict or law. And for this cause the princes commissions directed unto the
officers in the quality of officers, continue in force to their
successors: for that the prince therein
maketh choice of the magistrat or officer, and not of the person: but if choice
be made of any mans person, whose name is expressed in the commission, he being
dead, his successour in the same office cannot execute the commission, for that
the prince made choyce not of the magistrat but of the person.
Yet there are other differences also betwixt an officer and a commissioner: for
thatThe power of an officer or magistrat larger, than the
power of a commission. the power of an
officer besides that it is ordinarie, it is also better authorised, and larger
than is a commissioners, & that is it for which the Edicts and lawes leaue
many things to the consciences and discretions of the Magistrats: who
indifferently applie and interpret the lawes according to the occurrents &
exigence of the causes presented: Whereas
Commissioners are otherwise bound, and as it were tyed unto the verie words of
their commission, and especially where question is of the affaires of state: as
in the charges and commissions of Embassadours or Commissioners deputed to
negotiate betwixt princes, where the Commissioners may not without danger of
their lives passe one point beyond the lesson they have in writing, if this
clause (which is oft times put unto the charges and instructions of
Embassadours and Commissioners to treat with princes) be not thereunto annexed,
viz. That if any thing else be to be done, the
Embassadour shall at his wisedome and discretion, according to the chaunge of
places, times, and persons, have care thereof: much like unto that clause
whereof Aeschines the Orator speaketh in the oration
which hee made for the defence of his legation; where he saith, that this
clause put into the the commission of Embassadours, viz. That they should do whatsoeuer they saw to be
for the common good; extended not unto that they had in their expresse and
particular charge: so that the aforesaid clause extendeth not unto the
principall obligations and resolutions of treaties, as to the making or
breaking of peace, but onely unto the accessories and matters of lesse
importance. As if question be of any thing to be graunted unto the enemies or
friends, for the inlarging of their power to the hurt of the Commonweale, it is
not lawfull for the Embassadours without speciall commaund to intreat thereof:
For seeing that in the lesse affaires of priuat men, an Attourney or Proctor
hauing a generall authoritie with full and entier
power, may not yet for all that giue, acquite, or alienate any thing, or
giue or take an oath of any person without
a speciall charge; much lesse ought he so to doe in things touching the
publique, and namely in things concerning the state: well may things done
without commission, be confirmed, yet could they not of right without
commission be so done. For albeit that in priuat matters he may say himIn matters of state e that goeth
beyond his commission is worthely blamed, although that things fall out er so wel. selfe to have well and duely
executed his charge, which hath done it better than was to him inioyned, yet in
publique affaires of the estate it is not alwaies so: for the Souldiour which
hath assailed the enemie, or the Captaine which hath giuen battell contrarie to
the Generals commaund, are both worthie of death, although they obtaine the
victorie. For what could euer have more honorablie beene done, or more worthie
eternall praise, than was that which was done by Fabius,
collonell of the horsemen under Papyrius Cursor the Dictator? who with the losse but of
an hundred men onely, slew twentie thousand of the enemies; and yet for that he
contrarie to the Dictators commaund had ioyned battell with the enemie, he was
brought in question of his head, neither had so escaped, had not the Dictator
(ouercome by the earnest intreating of the people) so rested contented. And
therefore Caesar in like case speaking of one of his
captaines called Syllanus, said him to have done well
and wisely in not giuing of battell, although he were sure to have caried away
the victorie: for that said he it is not the dutie of a captaine, to do any
thing that is by his Generall forbidden him. Yea so much it concerneth not to
doe any thing that is forbidden in matters of warre, as that the Lieutenant
generall to an other man, ought not to giue the enemie battell, except
it be so expresly giuen him in charge:
which was the cause that the Countie of Aiguemond was
shrewdly shent of the Spaniards, for giuing battell unto the Mareshall de Termes (although he therein tooke him prisoner and
discomfited the French armie) for that he had hasarded the whole state of the
low Countries, if he had lost the bartell. But this latter point is to be
vnderstood of such as be Lieutenants, or subiect to the commaund of others, who
by vertue, of their office have not power to command. For an officer, as the
Consull, or in his absence his Lieutenant; or with vs the Constable, the
Marshall, or other Generall of the armie, placed as in title of office, to haue
full and absolute commaund over the armie, and to mannage the warre, may by
vertue of his office, and without attending any other speciall commaund, make
warre upon the denounced enemies, pursue them
and giue them battell, besiege them, and take their fortresses and strong
holdes, and dispose of the armie according to his discretion, if he have not
expresse commaundement to the contrarie from his soueraigne, and so his power
suspended: yet hauing taken any strong places, or the enemies Generall, he may
not without speciall commaund deliver them, or yet make peace with the enemie.
True it is, that in popular estates these points are not, neither can bee so
straitlyLarge commission to be giuen to generals for the wars in popular
commonweals than in Monarchies, and why? kept, the generals thereof
themselves doing almost all; which in a Monarchie depend of the will and
pleasure of one onely prince: For why it is more easie to know the pleasure of
the prince, than of the people; of one man, than of many thousands. As
we may still see in Liuie large commissions by the people giuen unto the generals of their
warres▪ as in the warres against the Hetrusceans, all power was giuen unto Fabius, Omnium rerum arbitrium & a Senatu, & a populo,
& a collega, Fabio Consuli Commissum, The disposing of all things
(saith he) was both of the Senat, and the people, and his fellow in office
committed to Fabius. And in another place, Initio liberum pacis at belli arbitrium permissum▪ At the
beginning the free disposing of peace and warre was committed unto him. And yet
neuerthelesse they kept this difference betwixt them which had the mannaging of
their warres by vertue of their office, and them which did the same by
commission; as that the Consuls, Praetors, and others, hauing power to make warre by vertue of their office, might auow and
iustifie their owne actions, without any other
ratification, except they had taken upon them some thing that concerned the
soueraigntie of the people; whereas the Commissioners, if they therein passed
their cōmission, must of necessitie have their actions by the Senat or by the
people ratified. As Pompey hauing had commission for the
mannaging of the warre against king Mithridate, passing
farther made warre also against diuers other nations and people, at his
pleasure bestowing the kingdomes, estates, and towns by him conquered and
wonne: and albeit that the people would infringe or reuoke nothing of that hee
had done, yet neuerthelesse after his triumph, he oftentimes requested the
Senat, that those his doings might by it be ratified: and finding the Senat to
make thereof difficultie, and to vse therein long delayes; he to strengthen and
backe himselfe against his enemies, and such as
were about to looke into his doings, ioined himselfe in friendship and alliance
with Caesar, so to make themselves both of them the
stronger. For albeit that hee had a generall commission, and that in that case
all was at his discretion: and therefore (as some thinke) needed no
ratification: yet is it not so, the generall clauses of commissions being
alwaies to be interpreted and ruled to the best good and profit of the
Commonweale▪ not in any thing giuing power to doe that is hurtfull unto the
publike state; which is not a thing lawful or permitted euen unto a priuat man
to do, hauing a charge in generall tearmes committed unto him. Wherefore these
words expressed in commissions, be they Gouernors, Captaines, Iudges, or
ambassadors (for things to be done)General clauses in
commissions for things to be done according to the descriptiō of the
commissioners how they are to be vnderstood?At their discretion according to their wisedome; or at
their will and pleasure: and others such like, are still to be so interpreted and vuderstood, as
euerie good and wise man would interpret and vnderstand them, still respecting
the good and profit of the Commonweale: wherein if any fault be committed,
account thereof is to be giuen; the least fault that can be, being still in
matters of state, and publike interest to be enquired after: no excuse of
errour, or ignorance, being therein to be admitted or accepted. And much the
lesse, if he which hath taken uppon him such publike charge had it not laid
upon him, but was by him sought for: neither offered unto him, but by force by
him extorted. For if priuat mens faults, when they have taken upon them the
charge to do any thing one of them for another (although it bee of their owne
accord) be not excusable; how should they then be excused in matters concerning
the state and Commonweale.
But to the intent that the force of Commissions and offices may the better bee
vnderstood, it shall not be amisse to produce the examples of the auntient
Romans, and to compare their manner of speech in the making of them, with that
of ours. As inHow the auntient Romaines gaue extraordinarie
power unto their generals by commission. that which Festus Pompeius saith, Cum imperio esse dicebatur
apud antiquos, cui nomina▪ tim a populo dabatur imperium, He was said
of the auntients to have power, to whome by name power was by the people giuen:
which is asmuch as to say, by expresse commission, without appeale unto any
other magistrat, unto whome so authorised the law gaue power to command: For
that a magistracie or office cannot be wishout power to commaund. So we see in
Liuie, at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, Placuit▪omnes qui Dictatores, Consules, Censoresue fuissent cum
imperio esse, donec recessisset hostis a muris, that is to say, A
decree was made (or commission giuen) that all such as had bene Dictators,
Consuls, or Censors, should have power and authoritie to command, vntill the
enemie were departed from the walles. So Cicero speaking
of Augustus Caesar saith, Demus
imperium Caesari, sine quo res militar is geri nō potest, Let vs giue
(saith he) power and authoritie unto Caesar, without
which militarie affaires cannot be mannaged. For why, Octauianus yet but yong, could by the law neither beare office, nor
lead the armie, much lesse without power and authoritie take upon him a
generals charge: and therefore Cicero persuaded, That the charge for the mannaging of the warre should with power by commission be giuen vnto
him: which place of Cicero hath much troubled both Sigonius and Gruchius. For had Octauianus bene either Consul or Praetor, Cicero would not have used these words, for that he
should then by law have had the power and commaund of a magistrat.
Beside this, there was also a notable difference betwixt the manner of
propoundingThe manner of propounding of requests unto the
people for the creating of magistrates and commissioners in auntient time
diuers. the request for the creating of a magistrat, and of a
Commissioner: For the magistrat was vsually created by vertue of the lawes
before made; the magistrat thus asking the people, Quos
vellent Consules fieri, Whome they would to be made Consuls? and so of
the other magistracies and offices being vacant. But for commissions of
command, they used these words, Vellent iuberent vt huic vel
illi imperium esset in hac vel illa prouincia, If they willed and commaunded that this or
that man should have the government in this or that prouince. As is reported of
Scipio Africanus, who had commission with power to
commaund, although he were not yet of age to beare office, or to be a
magistrat. And Cicero speaking of all sorts of
commissions saith, Omnes Potestates, Imperia, curationes, ab
vniuerso populo proficisci conuenit, It beseemeth al potestats,
commaunds, and commissions, to come from the bodie of the whole people. Where
by the word Potestates, he vnderstandeth the gouernours
of princes, who were properly so called. And by the word Imperia, Captains, who had particular commission to mannage the warres
(howbeit that the word Imperia, is vnderstood also of
the civill magistrats) with power to commaund. By the word Curationes, is meant all other charges, without power to commaund. The word Imperator,
signifieth properly a generall or chiefe captaine, as Plinie speaking of Pompey, Toties Imperator antequam
miles, So often a generall before he was a souldior. But generally the
word Curatio, importeth all sorts of commissions; as is
easily to be gathered by this place of Cicero, Idem transfero
in magistratus, Curationes, Sacerdotia: The same I transferre into
magistracies, Commissions, and Priesthoods; which are the three sorts of
publike charges. Vlpian the lawyer allo well
distinguisheth a magistrat from him whome he calleth Curator
republicae, of whome he hath made an expresse booke: whome the law
calleth by a Greeke word ; who had no power to condemne, nor to appoint any fine, which was lawfull
for all magistrats to do, as we have before
showed.
But it is to be noted, that al commissions passe into the nature of offices, as
oft as thatHow commissions passe into the nature of
offices. is by law made an ordinarie charge, which was before done by
commission, as we have by the examples of our owne Commonweale before declared.
And that which was before giuen at the pleasure of the magistrats, becommeth
also an office, if he that hath the soueraigntie doth by law establish the
same. As in auntient time the Consuls, as it were by commission made choice of
the six Colonels, whome they called Tribunos militum,
vntill that about 642 yeares after the foundation of the citie of Rome, it was
by an expresse law (made at the request of the Tribunes of the people) set
downe and decreed, That from that time forward it should bee an ordinarie
office, and the people to have the choice of
them: which was euer after obserued, except some such great warre were in hand,
as that it was thought needfull, that extraordinarie choice should be made of
those Colonels by commission: As in the Macedonian warre against king Perseus, Licinius and Cassius the
Consuls, made a motion unto the people, That the Tribunes, or Collonels of the
souldiors, might for that yeare bee chosen by the Consuls, as indeed they were.
So likewise in auntient time also, the Consuls, Praetors, and other great
magistrats made choice of their slaues and seruants for their vshers,
secretaries, sargeants, Trumpetors, and such like; as they did also in this
realme, vntill the time of Philip the Faire, who was the
first that tooke this power from the bailiefs and seneschals, and yet leauing unto the lords justices, power to establish
sergeants and notaries in the prouinces of
their iurisdiction and territorie. And in like case the kings atturney
generall, in the time of our fathers, made choice of such aduocats as hee
thought best for the pleading of the kings causes; who are now as ordinarie
officers created by the prince himselfe, the particular commission before giuen
unto the atturney generall, being conuerted into the forme of a most honourable
office. And thus much in generall concerning Commissioners and officers: it
followeth now that wee should also speake of Magistrats, and of such other
things as are unto euerie one of them properly belonging.
CHAP. III. ¶ Of Magistrats.
A Magistrat is a publike officer, which hath power
to commaundWhat a magistrate is. in a Commonweale.
And an Officer we said to bee a kind of publike person, who hath an ordinarie
charge by law appointed unto him. But a Commissioner wee said to bee a publike
person also, with a publike, but an extraordinary charge, at the pleasure of
the prince. Now orderly proceeding required that wee should before speake of
Commissioners, then of officers; for that they were before any lawyers or
Officers established. For right certaine it is, the The first commonweales gouerned without lawes. first
Commonweales were by soueraigne power gouerned without law, the princes word,
becke, and will, seruing in stead of all lawes, who both in time of peace and
war, by commissions gaue out charge to whome they pleased; and againe at their
pleasure reuoked the same, all depending of their full and absolute power,
being themselves not bound to any lawes or customes at all. And that is it for
which Pomponius writeth, the Roman Commonweale to haue
bene at the first gouerned by regall power, without vse of any law. And Iosephus the historiographer, in his second booke against
Appian, desirous to show the most honourable
antiquitie of the Hebrewes, and of their lawes, saith, That Moyses of all others was the first that euer writ lawes. And that in
Moses the first that euer writ laws. five hundred
yeares after, the word Law was neuer heard of. Alleaging in proofe therof, That
Homer in so many books as were by him written, neuer
vseth this word , or
Law: a good argument that the first Commonweals used not but Commissioners,
considering that an officer cannot be established without an expresse law (as
we have said) to giue him his ordinarie charge, and limited to a certaine time:
a thing seeming to diminish from the power of soueraigntie. For which cause
kings and princes (ielous of their state and greatnesse) have vsually annexed
unto all their letters pattents of office, an auntient clause retaining the
marke of lordly Monarchy, viz. That the officer should enioy
his office so long as it stood with the princes pleasure. Whereby it
appeareth the officers power to depend of the princes power▪ rather than of
order. And albeit that this clause be to no purpose in the kingdome of Fraunce,
for that by a law by Lewes the eleuenth established, ordinary offices and charges, by the
prince once lawfully bestowed, cannot from them on whom they are so bestowed be
againe taken, except they have committed some criminall cause worthy of death;
and that in Spayne, England, Denmarke, Sweden, Germanie, Polonia, and all
Italie the like order be obserued: yet for all that, the Secretaries of estate
neuer forget the same: a great argument that all charges and offices were of
auntient time in the nature of commissions; which whither it bee profitable
unto Commonweales or not, shall in due plaec be hereafter declared. But let vs
before speake of the Magistrat which whave before defined to be a common or publique officer with power to
commaund.
Now there is no lesse difference amongst writers betwixt the officer and
magistrate,Al magistrates to be officers but not al
officers to be magistrats. then there is betwixt the officer and
commissioner. For albeit that every Magistrat be an officer, yet every officer
is not a magistrat; but onely they bee Magistrats which have power to commaund,
which their greeke names , and well
declare;Al magistrates to have power to commaund.
as who should say Commaunders, and the latine word Magistratus, which is asmuch as to say masters and commaunders. And
for that the Dictator was he which had the greatest power to commaund, the
auntient writers called him Magister populi, the word
Dictator signifying a Commaunder; as who should say, saying the word, and it
was done: for that edicere is as much as to commaund,
which is prope unto Magistrats: for that edicts are
the Magistrats commaunds. Howbeit that many
herein deceiue themselves, who supposing the bookes written in latin in the
name of Mar. Varro to be his, say that the Dictator is
so called, quasi dictus ab interrege, as so called of
the Interrex: But by the same reason the Collonell of
the horsemen might be also called a Dictator; for that he was then also so
appointed by the Dictator, as is to be seene through all the historie of Liuie, and should rather be called Dictatus, as a man appointed; in the signification passiue, than Dictator in the actiue. Wherefore Dionysius Halycarnasseus Varro his domesticall friend better saith,
the Dictator to have beene so called as an Edictator,
that is to say, a soueraigne commaunder, and was therefore called Populi magister, or the Master of the people.
Now we have before declared the definition of a Magistrat by the yonger
lawiers, and by Aristotle himselfe set downe, to be in no wise to be allowed or
maintained:Aristotle by the author impugned. who
call none but him a Magistrat which hath a deliberatiue voice in iudgement, and
in the priuie counsell, with power to commaund; and principally saith hee to
commaund: for in his sixt booke de Republica, seeing the
number of officers to be infinite, whom he calleth all , a name proper unto Magistrats hauing
commaund in the commonweale: he findeth himselfe therein much entangled, for
that he seeth others also besides them necessarie for the ornament and glorie
of the Commonweale: and then after them all the Magistrats ministers, as
Sargeants, Vshers, Secretaries, Notaries, all whom he calleth by the common
name of Magistrats: euen as he doth them which have power to commaund: and so
passing on further, saith, such ministers to
have also power to commaund, . And yet for all that in an other
place lib. 3. Politia. he maketh question, whether
that the Iudges and Orators are to be called Magistrats: whereunto he
aunswereth, that a man may say them to be no magistrats, hauing no part of the
commaund of the Commonweale; And therefore Cato
Vticensis chastising the Registers, Comptrollers, and Receiuers, you
ought (saith he) to remember your vocation, and that you are but ministers, and
not Magistrats, as Plutarke reporteth. As for Preachers
and Orators whom he calleth , if so it be that they have no commaund
or ordinarie power, it is right certein that they are no magistrats at all: but
yet often times they are also Magistrats, I meane such as in Popular and Aristocratique estates and Commonweales have power
to perswade or disswade the people, to or from such things as they thought to
be for them vnprofitable or disprofitable, whom they called Rhetoras. Howbeit
that in Athens every particular man, (so that he were fiftie yeres old) had of
himselfe power to speake; and the rest by the magistrats leaue: whereas in Rome
it was not lawfull for any man to deliver any speech unto the people, but by
the leaue of the chiefe Magistrat in the assemblie. And as for the doubt that
he maketh of Iudges, as whether they be Magistrats or not, the resolution is
easie, if we will graunt the diuision of judges set downe by Iustinian the emperour to be good: which is, that some of them be
Magistrats, and some of them be not. We must therefore
now confesse, that amongst them which have publique and ordinarie charge; that is to say, of Officers, some of
them are Magistrats, (viz. such as have power to
commaund) and some of them not, (as hauing no such commaundingWhich officer be also
magistrats. power) but seruing onely as the magistrats ministers:
which diuision seemeth unto vs necessarie for the auoyding of such businesse as
might arise of a diuision of it selfe imperfect. Wherefore we have said that
such publique persons as have an ordinarie charge limitted unto them by lawes,
or by edicts, without any commaund at all, to be simple officers, whom the
Emperours of latter times often times in their lawes call officiales, being indeed but ministers unto the magistrats. The
auntient Doctors of the law have for most part followed the opinion of Accursius, who set downe neither any definition nor
distinction of Officers; nor of Commissioners, nor of Magistrats; but simply saith, That there are foure sorts of
Magistrats, viz. them whom they called Illustres, the Spectabiles, the Clarissimos, and the Perfestissimos, to whom he giueth all commaund. All which are rather
honorable qualities and titles attributed unto the magistrats and Officers,
according to the conditions of their persons. Howbeit that in this diuision of
them also according to their titles and qualities, he hath left out the Patricij, who were of greater reputation and dignitie
than the rest: as also the Augustales, who were
superiours unto the Clarissimos: for why Iustinian the emperour appointeth these degrees of
honour, the Patricij, Illustres, Spectabiles,
Clarissimi,Acurs and Bartholus
censured.siue Speciosi, and the Perfectissimi, all which honors and titles were giuen aswell vnto
priuate men as unto magistrats. But as for that which Bartholus saith, That there are some
which have honour without charge; as Counties and Marquises, unto whom for all
that he attributeth power to commaund, and the administration of justice, it
deserueth not aunswer; for that he therein is most manifestly contrarie vnto
himselfe. So also is there small probabilitie in that he saith, Scholmasters as
magistrats to have iurisdiction over their schollers, and power to establish
lawes and ordinances: for so domesticall power and the discipline of families
should be also altogether confounded with the publique iurisdiction, which we
have before shewed to be a thing impossible. Alexander
Imolensis the greatest lawier of his time, hath touched much neerer the
true definition of a Magistrate: in that he saith, None to be Magistrats but
they which are ordinarie judges; And yet is not this enough: for why they are
such magistrats as have power to commaund, and
yet have not any ordinarie iurisdiction: as the Censors, and the Tribunes of
the people. And so to the contrarie some there be (which being no magistrats)
have an ordinarie iurisdiction, but without any commaunding power, without
Pursiuant or Sargeant, as had in auncient time, and now also in every place the
Bishops, who have the hearing and determining of all sacred and religious
things, and yet were neuerthelesse no magistrats. The Bishops saith Lentulus are judges of Religion, and the Senat are judges
of the law. So one may see neither the auntient nor late writers to haue
handled this point, or yet so much as touched the difficulties or differences
of Officers, Magistrats, and Commissioners, as the matter well deserued. And
albeit that the true definitions of Magistrats, officers, and commissioners
be not to be found in the papers and
writings of Lawyers, yet are the same to be gathered from them, and from the
discourse of good histories. For Vlpian writeth it to be
lawfull for all magistrats, excepting the Duumuiri, by inflicting of iudiciall
pains to defend their iurisdiction: which extendeth not onely unto the imposing
of fines upon the offendors, but euen to the attaching of their goods and
bodies, and casting of them into prison. And yet it appeareth (may some say)
that Vlpian hauing excepted these Duumuiri (who were in
like power that the Sherifes were in townes without any iurisdiction at all)
yet neuerthelesse accounteth them in the number of Magistrats▪ and seemeth also to say, these Duumuiri to have also had
iurisdiction: For otherwise in vaine were they
excepted, if they had not such authoritie and power. And yet the same lawyer in
another place saith, these Duumuiri to have had no iurisdiction nor the hearing
of any causes whatsoeuer, but were onely to receiue needfull cautions, and to
deliver possession: which sauoured more (as saith he) of power than of
iurisdiction. And yet in this case (saith he) they were but simply the Praetors
deputies, who in their absence gaue them this commission, for preuenting gf the
daunger which might in the meane time happen, if men of necessitie must be
driuen to runne still unto the Praetors: who in like case also afterwards gaue
them power to appoint tutors unto the poorer sort of orphanes for the
preseruation of their goods. Whereby it is euident them to have had no
iurisdiction or power by vertue of their owne magistracie, but onely part
of the Praetors iurisdiction, and that also
by leaue and sufferance. But they which have nothing but such deputed or
precarie iurisdiction, can of right call nothing thereof their owne: Wherefore
whether the power of the Duumuiri consisted onely in hauing power to commaund,
or in iurisdiction, it was vndoubtedly but by leaue and sufferance: whereby it
is to be vnderstood, these Duumuiri not properly to have bene at all
magistrats. But they which have power to commaund, together with iurisdiction,
may call men before them, attache them, and with penall iudgement defend their
iurisdiction, & also put their iudgements in execution: wheras they which
have power only to command without any iurisdiction, may well cause a man to be
apprehended, but not proceed further. And in that some are deceiued, who for
that by the old law Alteria Tarpeia power was
giuen to all magistrats, to impose fines unto the summe of threescore six
shillings, therefore suppose all magistrats to have had iudiciall power also.
For if the fine were by the magistrat imposed for publike iudgement sake (as by
a Tribune of the people,) it was lawfull for the partie that was so fined
either to pay the fine, without further examination of the matter, or to
appeale unto the people, and so to trie the cause of his fine, as is in Liuie oft times to bee seene: which was done by the law
Icilia. For why the fine of it selfe inflicted not any infamie upon the partie
so fined, but for the publike crimes sake: as the punishment of beating with
staues impaired not any mans reputation, but the cause wherefore he was so
beaten. But if a fine were set upon him that
had not obeyed the magistrat sending for him, or for not aunswering being
asked, or for any other cause, not impairing his credit; it was lawfull for the
magistrat by taking of distresse to exact the fine, without appeale: For that
by the law Tarpeia, there was a certaine stint and measure for fines appointed
and set downe unto the magistrat, that so the disobedient citisens might
without any trouble of the state be kept in order, and their insolencie
restrained.
Now the least fine upon any man to be imposed, was one sheepe; and the
greatestThe auntient fynes that the Romaine magistrats
were to impose upon offenders. two oxen, or thirtie sheepe: which for
that according to the diuersitie of the cattell it made the penaltie either
lighter or heauier, and for that they could hardly be brought and looked unto in the citie, a sheepe was valued at ten
asses, and an oxe at an hundred, that is to say, at so many pound of brasse.
But afterward the riches and territorie of the Romans encreasing,
extraordinarie and greater fines were imposed, if greater cause so required. As
Liuie writeth of Fuluius, who
for that hee being Praetor and generall against the enemie, the Roman armie was
put to flight, and he the Praetor reported to be the first that fled; the
Tribunes of the people fined him at thirtie thousand peeces of brasse, when as
before the greatest fine was but two oxen, or thirtie sheepe: howbeit that the
fine was oftentimes forgiuen, for that the sentence of the people condemning a
man unto a fine, carried alwaies with it the note of infamie.
And for that we are by way of discourse drawne thus farre, wee will here amend
an errour in Aulus Gellius
(about this matter) not as yet corrected. For hee in his NoctesAulus Gellius amendd▪Atticae, speaking hereof, writeth, The greatest fine to
have bene of thirtie oxen, or two sheepe; in stead of thirtie sheepe, or two
oxen: and thereof gathereth, that as then there were moe oxen than sheepe in
Italie, and that it was thereof called Italie: the word with the Greekes, and with Varro signifying an oxe. But Dionysius
Halicarnasseus, Varro his domesticall friend, writeth, That by the law
Tarpeia, it was permitted to all magistrats, to impose fines: and yet a measure
thereof to have bene by the law appointed, viz. That the
fine should not exceed two oxen, or thirtie sheepe at the most. In like errour
offendeth Festus Pompeius, and in the same words with
A. Gellius; so that the one of them seemeth to haue
bene deceiued by the leading and authoritie of the other. Both of them also
writ, a sheepe in auntient time to have bene called Ouis, in the masculine gender, which
yet you shall no where find; although wee see Boues for
oxen, to be oft times used in the feminine gender: But it may bee that they
mistooke Duos Oes, that is,
Two Sheepe, for Duos Boues, which is, Two Oxen. And
least any man should thinke me to attribute more to Dionysius
Halycarnasseus a Grecian, than to Au. Gellius,
or to Festus, both citisens of Rome, they themselves are
of themselves refuted: For both of them confesse, the least fine to be imposed,
to have bene a fine of one sheepe; and the greatest, of thirtie oxen, or two
sheepe: whereas (if they would have agreed with themselves) they should haue
said, the least fine to have beene of one oxe. Neither do we as yet see whome
we may preferre in the searching out of the Roman antiquities, before this Dionysius Halicarnasseus, excepting Varro, whose domestical and familiar
friend this man was, out of whome he had many good things: For as for the books
which are in his name carried about in the Latine tongue, as wel the
foolishnesse thereof declare them to be none of Varroes,
as for that in them it is read, many things to be in them spoken by contraries.
But Au. Gellius writeth, Varro in
his one & twentieth booke Rerum Humanarum, to call
Mulctam a Sabine word: but the latter Grammarians to
take it to be so called by the contrarie: whereby it is cleere those bookes not
to have bene Varroes. Yet these things which we haue
written concerning the estimation of the cartell exacted for a fine, are
confirmed by the authoritie of Demetrius Phalerius: For
he writeth, a dramme of siluer to have bene appointed by Solons laws, for a reward to him that had killed a
shee wolfe; but five drammes unto him that had killed an hee wolfe: for that a
shee wolfe easily killeth a sheepe; but that the he wolfe being stronger,
killeth an oxe. Whereby it is manifest, oxen to have beene thrice as cheape in
the countrey about Athens, as in Italie. For ten Asses, or the Roman Denarius
ouer-weigheth the Greeke dramme. And in the same place in Au▪
Gellius there is another more notable fault, where he saith, Mulctam, quae suprema dicitur, in singulos dies institutam
fuisse, The fine which is called the greatest, to have bene imposed
euerie day: where the word dies, or daies, is to bee put
out; for the meaning of the law was, that the greater fine might be exactect of
euerie citisen in particular, if so be that many of them had in the same fault
offended: for otherwise it had not bene lawfull for the magistrat the same day
to impose diuers fines, if many had offended:
whereof the impunitie of offences, and contempt of the magistrat should ensue.
For proofe hereof let that example of Au. Gellius serue,
Marco Terentio quando neque citatus respondit, ne{que}
excusatus est, ego ei ouem mulctam dico, Forasmuch as Mar. Terentius, being summoned, aunswered not, neither made his
excuse, I set the fine of a sheepe upon him. Another errour also there is in
Festus, where he writeth T.
Menenius Lanatus, & Sestius Capitolinus the
Consuls, to have made the law concerning fines: for it is a thing not heard of,
lawes to have bene made by the Consuls: and as for that law it was made in the
yeare 297, after the building of the citie: in which yeare Sp. Tarpeius▪ and Au. Aterius were chosen
Consuls: but true it is, that about six yeares after The auntient manner of fynes imposed upon offenders in Rome
in Cartel, conuerted into fynes in money.T: Menenius, and Pub. Sestius
Capitolinus, being Consuls, made a request unto the people, That the
fine before imposed in cartell, might be conuerted into money, valuing euerie
sheepe at ten Asses, and euerie oxe at an hundred. But whereas Dioxysius writeth it to have bene lawfull onely for the
Consuls to impose a fine, ought not to seeme strange; for that at such time as
the law was made, there was neither Praetor nor Aedile in Rome, the first
Praetor being there made 386 yeares after the foundation of the citie. And Cicero hauing as he thought best, made lawes for his
Commonweale, which he to the imitation of Plato had
conceited, amongst the rest made one, whereby he giueth unto all magistrats
iurisdiction and diuination. But they which thinke the same to have bene the
verie Roman lawes which we see in Cicero, are much
deceiued; as we will hereafter show, all
magistrats not to have had also iurisdiction, which yet seemed unto Cicero both good and profitable. And yet the magistrat
that hath iurisdiction (to speake properly) whether it be that he have it in
his owne right, or from others, hathPower to commaund stil
annexed to iurisdiction. also (saith a certaine lawyer) all such
things as without which he cannot exercise that his iurisdiction; that is to
say, power to commaund: which is still said to be annexed unto iurisdiction,
and without which iurisdiction is but vaine and to no purpose. Whereof it
followeth, that the iurisdiction of the auntient bishops, and of our bishops
also, without power to commaund, was not properly a iurisdiction, but onely a
simple hearing and understanding of matters. For that which Lucullus the bishop said in the Senat, The bishops to have bene the
judges of religion, and the Senat of the law, tendeth to that end, and is so to be vnderstood, as that when question
is of religion, credit is to bee giuen unto them, as is unto other men skilfull
in their professions and trades; or as unto iudges appointed either for the
bare examination of the fact, who are properly called Recuperatores (or as we terme them Delegates:) or for the
understanding of that is iust and right, who more truely are arbitrators by law
appointed, and not by the agreement of the parties, and yet are often called
judges. And therefore wee see the Vestall Virgins (in Liuie) which had polluted their viginitie,
to have beene alwaies chastised and punished by the Praetors of the citie, but
neuer by the bishops. And so when Publius Clodius was
about to have committed adulterie with Pompeia Caesars
wife, in the temple of the goddesse Bona Dea, the full
Senat had the determining of the matter, concerning the religion and sacrifices by him polluted. So in the
beginning of the Christian religion, the Christian bishops (as Augustine, Nicephorus, and Iustinian do witnes) had not so much as the least iurisdiction of any
matter, or the examination of the priestes themselves: howbeit that Iustinian graunted to them the examination of them that
were of their owne order and calling. Neither would our auncestors have any
part of commaunding power to be giuen unto bishops, and that the court of the
parliament of Paris, hath oftentimes by the decrees and ordinances thereof
witnessed. But why then (might some man say) do we see consistories, prisons,
examinations, and fines to be permitted unto bishops? What other thing else do
all these things declare, but a meere
commaunding power? Yea Philip the Faire, and king Lewes his sonne, granted unto the bishop of Paris power
to apprehend and arrest men offending in his Diocesse. Howbeit I suppose those
former things to belong rather to their vocation, than to their power to
commaund: for that the execution thereof belongeth unto magistrats: and yet
such power of staying and apprehending graunted to the bishop of Paris was by a
decree of the Senat forthwith againe from him taken. And although that not long
since Henrie the second had graunted unto all bishops
the power to stay and apprehend men for heresie and impietie: yet neuerthelesse
was that law shortly after againe abrogated. Yea the bishops themselves do in
their owne decrees professe themselves to have no
power for the execution of any thing: yet is it with vs permitted unto them, to stay and apprehend offendours, within
the boundes of their consistories and courts; so that they go no farther.
And when as fines contrarie unto the lawes were by the Bishops upon men
imposed, the Parliament of Paris receiued every mans free appeal from them: yea
and afterwards power was taken from them also, for calling of men before them;
which they call, A lively summoning or Citation. For there is an old decree yet
extant, whereby the Bishop of Paris was grieuously fined, for that he had vsed
such calling of men beforeThe authoritie of the bishop of
Rome not to be preferred before the authoritie of other princ. him. But when as the Bishops under the
colour of ministring of oathes, and of the contempt of Religion, had with vs
drawne unto themselves the hearing almost of all matters, (for Alexander Immolensis was of opinion, the power of
administring an oath to be sufficient to giue
unto the Bishops iurisdiction also) the greater Courts forbad them under the
colour of ministring an oath, to take unto them the hearing of any matter. And
at length it was forbid them also to have the hearing of the causes concerning
the possession of benefices: and so after much, long, and hard sute, prouided
for by the decree of Martin the fist Bishop of Rome;
which decree is yet extant in the publique records. Yea the Spaniards truely,
the most earnest defendours of the See of Rome, would not that their Bishops
should have to doe with any publique or priuat iudgements: except it were for
Religion and Church matters, of which opinion I see Felinus (a man skilfull in both the lawes, and a most subtill
interpretor of the Popes decrees) to have beene. And albeit that certain
ambitious decrees do giue unto the Bishop of
Rome more authoritie and power than to all other princes and people: yet pope
Innocentius the fourth, and every other good
expounder of the law, have long since reiected these decrees: with all such
others as have preferred the bishop of Rome before the Councell of other
Bishops and Princes. And Bartholus himselfe when he had
fearfully written, The subiects not to be guilty of treason, which for the
honor and wellfare of the Bishop of Rome had taken up armes against their
prince; craued pardon for that his errour. Trulie in mine opinion it were
better and more profitable also for the Commonweal, commaunding power to be
giuen unto Bishops together with so great iurisdiction as they haue: or else
that their iurisdiction, to be restrained unto the hearing of matters of
religion onely; as we see the auntient Romans, the Swissers, them of Geneua, and the Germans to have done. And yet the
censuring of manners is of necessitie to be giuen unto the Bishops: which
beeing once taken away, I see not what course would be taken for the punishment
of secret wickednes & villanie, whereof we will in place convenient
hereafter speake. Howbeit for all that, the imposing of fines is not to be
permitted unto bishops, or yet commaunding power to bee giuen them: For why
should the magistrat be enforced to put into execution the vniust sentence of
the bishop? for it is vtterly forbidden magistrats to enter into examination of
the bishops proceedings: except appeale be made as from the bishop abusing his
power, unto the more higher courts; which with vs is seldome done, for the
heauines of the penaltie, if it shall be found the appeal to have bene made
without iust cause: for so the interpretors of
both the lawes determine the acts of magistrats which have taken upon them the
determining of things belonging unto the bishops, to be of none effect: as also
if such things chaunce to be discided in the bishops consistorie as belong vnto
the magistrat, they confesse them to be to no purpose. So that if a Priest be
conuicted of incest, or of forgerie, before the magistrat, and confesse the
same, in the bishops consistorie no regard is had of such his confession made:
for so it is in the Popes decree expressed. But when this case had happened,
wherein the Popes Legat called before himselfe the acts and things done before
the magistrat, & disannulled the same: appeal was
made unto the parliament of Paris, where I remember it was long time
doubted, whether the euident proofes
wherupon the priest was before the magistrat conuicted, ought to be void or
not; for of the rest of the acts it was lesse doubted: wherein the court at
last iudged, That it was in the Councell to be discided. And againe when the
like case was in question before the criminall iudges, I my selfe being
present, the same court delayed againe the cause, and referred it unto the
Councell: least it should have seemed either to abrogate the ambitious decrees
of the Pope, or to giue unto the wicked licence to offend. For what could be
more absurd, than to suffer a priest by the law Cornelia conuicted of forgerie,
and by witnesses published, by retracting the cause, to reiect the witnesses;
and so when as no moe could iustifie the matter, freely and without punishment
to commit villanie euen in the middest of the Commonweale? Our auncestours neuer handled the publique iudgements of
priests, with divided examinations: But the Court of Paris, although it often
times by iust decrees either quite abrogated, or with equitie tempered the
Popes decrees and ordinances, yet neuer more iustly than in this case: which
when it had often times beene delayed, at length by a law made at Molines, that
decree of the Popes law was with vs taken away. So by little and little are the
Popse lawes to be cut short and abolished. For at first in the beginning of the
Christian Church, the authoritie of Bishops was shut up within verie strait
bounds, which Iustinian would have to extend farther by
this law by him made. Si quis aduersus Clericos, Monachos,
Diaconos, Asceterias, actionem habeat Episcopus iudex esto: sententiam vero
episcoporum magistratus exequitor: If any man have any sure against Clarkes, Monkes, Deacons, or other
the religious persons, let the Bishop be the judge, but let the Magistrats haue
the execution of the bishops sentence: but the words of the law following▪ do
giue leaue unto the magistrat to examine the bishops sentence, except there bee
an other judge by the prince appointed. Which words have troubled many,
doubting whether they ought to put in executionWhether the
uill magistrat be to put the Bishops sentence
into execution, before he vnderstand of the equi
therof or not? the bishops commaund or not, before they haue
vnderstood of the equitie of the sentence. Now if no appeal be made from the
sentence, most are of opinion, That it is without farther examination of the
magistrat, to bee put in execution: but if appeal be made, that then enquirie
is to be made of the equitie of the appeal, which yet some denie to be lawfull. Yet in mine opinion, if question be of
the thing it selfe, or of the matter of the iudgement, and that the iudgement
be not giuen contrarie to the Popes decrees, that then the magistrat ought not
farther to enquire of the cause. But if the bishop shall by his sentence go
about manifestly to infringe the popes lawes, whether the errour be in the
matter it selfe, or in the forme of the iudgement; that then the magistrat may
farther enquire of the sentence; that is, in case he abuse the popes authoritie
and decrees. The magistrat may also farther examine the sentence, if the bishop
shall in iudgement giue sentence contrarie to the lawes of the kingdome,
although he seeme to have grounded the same upon the popes decrees: as indeed
many of their decrees are quite contrarie unto the positiue lawes of
Commonweales: in which case, the magistrat
shall not suffer the lawes of the kingdome to be infringed by the Popes
authoritie. In all other cases it is ment that the magistrat should faithfully
put the bishops sentence in execution: and so with vs we vse. The same law, and
like maner of proceeding the Easterne people vse also: with whom their Bishops
have the bare hearingThe positiue laws of a kingdome not to
be infringed by the Popes authoritie. of matters, and the magistrats
the execution: for which cause the bishops have neither sargeants nor
pursiuants, the chiefe tokens and marks of authoritie and magistracie.
But yet question might be made whether all magistrates have iurisdiction and
power to commaund or not? for that M. Messala the
lawier, and M. Varro have left in writing, That some
magistrats had power to call men before them, and also to lay hands upon them: othersome had power also onely to lay hands
upon men: and other which had power to doe
neither the one nor the other: and that they which had power onely to lay hands
upon men, had also onely a Sargeant and nothing else: and that they which had
power to doe both, had both Sargeants and mase-bearers: whereas they which had
neither power to call men before them, neither to lay hands upon them, had
neither sargeants nor mase bearers. When I say power to lay hands upon men, my
meaning is to have power to seise upon the bodie or goods of men; for by our
customes many hauing praediall iurisdiction, (or as we tearme them mannours)
may lay hand upon mens lands, but not upon their bodies: which was not by the
auntient Roman lawes permitted; of whom it is needfull here to speake, and in
briefe to declare their power, the more manifestly to show the power of all
sorts of Magistrats, in every kind of
Commonweale. For the great magistrats, that is to say, the Consuls,The power of the Consuls a other the
great magistrats in Rome. Praetors, and Censors; and amongst the
commissioners, the Dictator, and he whom they called the Interrex; then also
the Proconsuls, the Propraetors, and in generall all the Lieutenants &
Gouernours of countries, had power to call before them not onely the priuat
citisens particularly, but euen the lesser magistrats also: excepting the
Tribunes of the people, whose bodies (for that they were most sacred) it was
not lawfull to violate. Neither might these aforesaid magistrats onely summon
and apprehend men, but it was lawfull for them also to punish and imprison
them, and in briefe to pluck downe and raze their houses and pallaces, who
refused to obey these magistrats commaunding them. But the Tribunes of the
people had no power to call men before The the Tribun of the people in Rome. them, yet had they
authoritie to commaund any citisen to prison, yea euen the Consuls themselves.
So L. Drusus Tribune of the people cast in prison Philip the Consull, for that he had interrupted him as he
was speaking unto the people: which then by the law was death. Beside that it
was also lawfull for them to oppose thēselues not only against all the
magistrats, and the whole bodie of the Senat, but the opposition euen of one of
the Tribunes was of power to stay all the proceeding of the est of the Tribunes his fellowes in office: On which
great power they presuming and bearing themselves, doubted not contrarie vnto
the law to call men before them, and to take upon them authoritie and
iurisdiction. Which thing Labeo the lawier gaue them
well to vnderstand, who being by one of them
summoned, refused to make his apparance before him, openly protesting for
defence of himself, That the Tribunes were not ordained or appointed for the
administration of justice, or to have iurisdiction, but onely to oppose
themselves against the violence and abuse of other magistrats, and to giue ayde
and succour unto such as appealed being vniustly oppressed, and to imprison
them which would not yeeld and giue place to their opposition. So the Tribune
Sempronius, seeing that the Censor Appius would not giue up his office, after that he had bene eighteene
moneths Censor, (according to the law Aemylia, which had brought the tearme of
five yeares before prefixed to the Censor, unto the tearme of eighteene
moneths) told him that he would thrust him into prison, if he obeyed not that
law (which he did by consent of six others of the Tribunes his fellowes in
office▪) but Appius hauing practised with three other of the tribunes to oppose
themselves against the commaundement of the other seauen, by that meanes held
still his office: for why, the opposition of one onely of the Tribunes suffised
to stay the proceedings of all the rest, if order were not otherwise taken by
the people, by taking from him his power and office; as by the request of Tiberius Gracchus, it was taken from Marcus octauius the Tribune, opposing himselfe against the law
Agraria, that it might not take place. And this is it for which a Tribune of
the people, speaking to the nobilitie said, Faxo ne iuet vox ista VETO, qua
Collegas nostros concinnentes tam laeti auditis, I will make (said he) that this word VETO shall not helpe,
wherewith you so merrie heare our fellowes in
office singing in accord together. And but a little after, Contemni iam Tribunos Plebis, quippe quae potestas iam suam ipsa vim
frangit intercedendo, non posse aequo aure agi, vbi imperium penes illos,
penes se auxilium tantum sit, nisi imperio communicato, nunquam Plebem in
parte pari Reipublicae esse, The Tribunes of the people (he said) now
to be contemned, as whose power did now of it selfe breake the strength of it
selfe, by opposing of it self against it self, that things could not be there
indifferently ordered, where the commaunding power was with the nobilitie: and
onely the power of giuing help with the Tribunes. And that the people could
neuer have like part in the Commonweale, except the power to command were made
common unto both. The Tribunes complained the people to have no magistrats
which had power to commaund: the Tribunes
(they said) to have power to oppose themselūes, and to yeeld the people
releefe, but yet to have no power to commaund; neither that the comminaltie
could be made equall with the nobilitie, except the offices and power to
commaund were made common unto both: and therfore they made request, That the
Consuls might be chosen as well out of the comminaltie, as out of the
nobilitie: which when it could not be obtained of the nobilitie, it was agreed,
certaine Tribunes of the souldiours with the power of Consuls, to be
indifferently chosen out of both sorts: which manner of government continued
fortie five yeares, without any Consull, vntill such time as that it was
agreed, That one of the Consuls should be still chosen out of the people.
Howbeit a man might say, That the Tribunes in so saying made their power lesse
than indeed it was, they hauing power to
oppose themselves, and to commaund men to prison; which is a part of power. For
so Vlpian speaking properly and as a lawyer, aith, That it is not lawfull without leaue and
commission from the magistrat, to call into iudgement the Consuls, Pretors, or
Proconsuls, or generally any of them saith hee, Qui imperium
habent, & iubere possunt in carcerem duci, which have power and can
commaund men to be laid in prison. And so wee conclude, that they which haue
power to commit men to prison, although they have no iurisdiction, are in right
magistrats, as the Tribunes in Rome, the kings atturneyes in Fraunce, and the
three Auogadours at Venice. Neither do I in that agree with Plutarch, who saith in his Problems, That the Tribunes were no magistrats, for that they had neither
mase-bearer nor seat of Iuorie, the true markes (as he saith) of magistracie:
for why, they had sergeants, the token of their commaund; as M. Messala affirmeth. And lesse is it to the purpose, that hee
alleageth of Appius the Consull: of whom, contending
with one of the Tribunes in the assemblie of the people, Liuie thus writeth, Tribunus viatorem mittit ad
Consulem, Consul Lictorem ad Tribunum, priuatum esse clamitans, sine
imperio, sine magistratu, The Tribune sent a sergeant unto the Consull,
and the Consull sent a Lictor unto him again, crying out, That he was but a
priuat man, without power, without magistracie: For so the Consull said but to
impaire the power of the Tribunes. Which for all that was so great, as that Licinius Stolo one of the Tribunes, was so bold, as by
force to constrain Manlius the Dictator to depose himselfe of his
Dictatorship. Another of them also committed both the Consuls to prison, for
that they would not at the request of the Tribunes discharge ten souldiours
from going to the warres. Yet true it is, that the power of the ten Tribunes of
the people was shut up and contained within the walles of Rome. And therefore
Mar. Fabius, and Luc. Valerius
the Consuls, seeing that theyThe power of the tribunes shut
up within the wals of Rome. could not leuie their souldiours; for
that the Tribunes opposed themselves against them, commaunded their chaires to
be carried out of the citie, and so did there what they saw good. Yet
oftentimes the Tribunes tooke upon them more than belonged to their place, or
than was by law permitted them, oftentimes propounding their edicts and prohibitions. Whereof Liuie
speaking saith, Communiter edicunt Tribunine quis Consulem faceret: si quis fecisset so id suffragium
non obseruaturos, The Tribunes generally forbad any man to giue his
voyce to the making of a Consul, but if any man so did, that they would have no
regard of any such voice giuen. Which was but an abuse, and presumption upon
the power of the people, to forbid them the free and entire choice of their
magistrats: over whome in generall, albeit that no man could commaund, yet did
the Tribunes so do over euerie one of them in particular, although they could
by no right so doe. Moreover they tooke upon them the administration of
iustice, to all such as came unto them, as is if they had had power to call men
before them: as it is to be seene in Plutarch, where hee
saith, That the Tribunes administred iustice in the place which was called Basilica Porta. And Aesconius
Paedianus saith, Tribunos, Quaestores,
Triumuiros▪ Capitales non in sellis Curulibus sed in subsellijs iura
dixisse, The Tribunes, the Questors, and Triumuiri, judges of criminall
causes, to have administred iustice not in Iuorie chaires, (as the manner of
the great Roman magistrats was) but upon their benches. And Appian also saith, Liuius Drusus the Tribune,
to have bene most diligent in the administration of iustice, and doing of right
to euerie man. Pomponius also reckoneth the Tribunes of
the people amongst the Consuls, Pretors, and other magistrats which administred
iustice unto the citisens and strangers in Rome. Wherefore Cicero saith them to have bene called Tribunes of the people, for that
they might examine the wrong done by the Pretors: which what manner of
examination should it have bene, if they had wanted iurisdiction? Yea they had
not onely taken upon themselves
iurisdiction, but appointed also commissioners: and in many causes made them
whome they called Aediles aedituos, their deputies or
Lieutenants; which they could not have done, had they not had authoritie and
iurisdiction: For why, that authoritie thou thy selfe hast not, thou canst not
giue unto another. Howbeit yet all this their presumption was but vsurpation
and abuse; as Labeo the lawyer well shewed them, who
being sent for by them, would neuer (as we said) come before them.
The same opinion we are to have of those officers or magistrats whome they
calledThe power of the .Aedules Curules, who had neither power to call men
before them, neither to attache any mans bodie; and therefore neither had
mase-bearer nor sergeant, (as Marcus Varro and Messalla haue
noted) and yet by the sufference of the Pretors vsurped a great part of their
authoritie and iurisdiction. Which the Pretors of the citie oppressed with the
multitude of causes easily suffered, at the first committing unto them causes
concerning the sale or alienating of things mouable: who afterward tooke upon
them to have to do with lands and things immouable also: and after that drew
unto them also the heating of courtisans and common harlots causes, who might
by no meanes set up that base and filthie trade of life, but that they must
first openly professe the same before the Aediles, and that they would
prostitute themselves. Which the auntients did, to the intent that such women
as reason could not keepe within the bounds of modestie, should yet for shame
of such publike profession (of so lewd a life before the magistrat) be restrained. But after that in latter times many
euen of the most noble dames in Rome (hauing together with their chastitie also
lost their modestie) a shamed not right impudently to make such open profession
before the Aediles, That they would prostitute themselves. The emperour Tiberius tooke order, that from thenceforth the
magistrats should proceed against them by way of iustice: & at the same
time also to represse the presumption and encroaching of the Aediles and
others, by decree appointed unto what summe, and what causes, their authoritie
was to extend: which yet they had not by their auntient institution, and much
lesse to call particular men before them, or to commit
them, although they had power to call a generall assembly of the common
people.
As for the Questors, I see not that they euer had, or yet tooke upon them to
haueThe power of the Questors. had any
iurisdiction or power to commit men: for so Varro saith,
that they had not: albeit that the yeare after their office expired, they had
sometime the government of some prouince bestowed upon them: as Gracchus the younger after his Questorship had the
government of Sardinia giuen unto him. From which time they had as much and
more power in the government of the prouinces committed unto them, than had all
the magistrats in Rome: but that was not by way of commission, as had all the
rest of the gouernours of prouinces.
As concerning Censors, Fr. Ottoman, and Carolus Sigonius (both of them most skilfull The power of the Censors. antiquaries) say, That they
had well as they writ, Potestatem, sed non Imperium,
(that is to say) power, but not commaund a thing altogether impossible: for
that the word Potestas (or power) in termes of law, or
in the person of a magistrat, importeth alwayes with it power to commaund. And
namely Vlpian, where he saith, That the gouernour of a
prouince had almost ample iurisdiction and power of life and death; calleth it
properly by the name of Potestas. And wee oftentimes in
antiquities read, the Censors Edicts, that is to say, their commaundements and
lawes. Varro also and Messala
call the Consuls, Censors, and Pretors, Maiores
Magistratus (that is to say) greater Officers; and the rest, Minores, or lesser. And saith moreouer, That it was not
in the power of the Pretors (who yet had both iurisdiction and commaund) to
assemble the armie of the citie, which the
Censors might, Praetori exercitum vrbanum conuocare non
licere: Consuli, Censori, Interreg, Dictatori
licere, He said it not to be lawfull for the Pretor to call together
the armie of the citie; but yet to be lawful for the Consull, the Censor, the
Interrex and the Dictator so to do. And at such time as Hannibal besieged Rome, there was an edict made, That all such as had
bene Dictators, Consuls, or Censors, should have a commaunding power, vntill
such time as that the enemie had raised his siege. Placuit (saith Liuie) omnes qui antea Dictatores,
Consules, Censoresue fuissent, cum imperio esse donec hostis a muris
discessisset. Which they would not have done if the Censors had not had
a commaunding power, whilest they yet were in their office; especially seeing
that they which had bene Pretors, had no such power giuen them. Besides
that, if the Tribunes (whom Varro putteth in the number of the lesser magistrats) had
power to command, why should not then the Censors so haue, whome he calleth the
Greater Magistrats? Yea that more is, Plutarch giueth
more authoritie and powerPlutarche noted. unto the
Censors, than to any other of the Roman magistrats: yet attribute I no so much unto his writings, but that I see him being a
Grecian, to be oftentimes deceiued in the antiquities of the Romans. Wherefore
that is it which hath deceiued many, that the Censors, although they had power,
yet had they no iurisdiction: albeit that Onophrius
writ, That the Censors in some cases, and for some crimes had power to condemne
men: but what those cases or crimes were, hee sheweth not. For either
they must have bene publike crimes, or
priuat crimes: of priuat crimes the Pretor of the citie iudged, but of publike
crimes the Pretor of the publike iudgements, and Triumuiri of criminall and
capital causes determined. True it is, that the Censors were controllers of the
peoples manners: but there is great difference betwixt the iudging of criminall
causes, and the reprehending of mens manners and behauiours. And therefore Cicero said, The Censors iudgement, no farther to touch
the partie by them condemned, than to make him blush. And that therefore, as
all that the Censors iudgement concerned onely a mans name and credit, so it
was called an ignominie or discredit, but not an infamie. For why, he saith
not, That the Censors touched any mans honour, to the intent to note it with infamie, but rather with a certaine ignominie,
or kind of disgrace,Ignominie is a kind of disgrace; but not the same that
infamie is. which many have rashly abused for infamie; howbeit that
there is great difference betwixt infamie & ignominie. Carolus Sigonius hath therein erred defining ignominie to be an
infamie: and in the same place saith, That there are certaine capital causes,
which draw infamie with them, and yet without crime, contrarie to the
principles of the law: Whereby we are taught, that he which is by publike
iudgement for any crime condemned, is thereby become infamous: And that the
souldiour for his fault worthily by his captaine cassired, was thereby become
ignominious, but not infamous, vntill that by the Pretors expresse edict he
were so declared. The auntient doctors of the law have called Ignominie, the
infamie of a fact done: Whereof Cassius the lawyer
saith, That he thinketh that a Senator put out of the Senat, can neither bee
judge, nor beare witnesse, vntill he be againe
restored: howbeit he doth say, That hee doth but thinke so. Which phrase of
speech Vlpian also vseth, when as he saith, Se putare ei quae in adulterio depraehensa est & absoluta:
notam obesse, That he did thinke, that unto her that was taken in
adulterie and acquited, yet the note thereof was a blemish. For certaine it is,
that he which is by iudgement acquited, is safe from the infamie of the law,
but yet not from the ignominie of the fact. And Calistratus saith, That hee did also thinke the honour and reputation
of a man to be impaired, Quando quis ordine mouetr, when a man is put out of his place. Festus Pompeius also setteth downe three sorts of
militarie punishments, viz. Deprehensa, castigatio,
ignominia, Deprehensa, saith he, is greater than castigatio, and lester than ignominia; and
aboue all these the law addeth infamie. For
otherwise if infamie, and the Censors note of ignominie were all one, the
threescore and foure Senators by Lentulus and Gellius the Censors at once displaced and thrust out of
the Senat, as also the foure hundred knights, who by Valerius andThat men may be noated with ignominie
and so disgraced, and yet not thereby become infamous.Sempronius the Censors were cassired, and their horses
and publike wages taken from them, had bene also infamous. Yea that more is,
all the people of Rome had beene noted with infamie, by the censure of Liuius Salinator, who rased and noted all the tribes, and
as Valerius Maximus saith, Inter
aerarios retulit, put them all from their freedome, and made them to
pay all duties as straungers; For that they had by publike sentence first
condemned him, and afterward made him Consull and Censor: only the tribe Metia he excepted, which had neither condemned
nor acquited him, neither thought him worthie of those so honourable offices in
the Commonweale. Hee also afterward noted Claudius Nero
his companion in the Censorship, who also requited him againe with the like.
VVherefore Cicero speaking of the Censorship, thus
saith, pro Cl▪Illud commune proponam, nunquam animaduersionibus Censorijs
hanc ciuitatem ita contentam, vt rebus iudicatis fuisse, I will (saith
he) set before you that common matter, this citie neuer to have bene so
contented with the Censors animaduersions, as with iudgements. And bringeth for
example C. Geta a Senator, who by the Censors thrust out
of the Senat, was afterwards himselfe made Censor. And after that he addeth,
Quod si illud quoque iudicium putaretur, vt caeteri turpi
iudicio damnati in perpetuum omni honore ac dignitate priurentur, sic hominibus ignominia notatis, neque ad
honorem, neque in curiamreditus esset: timoris enim causam non vitae poenam in illa
potestate esse voluerunt. Quare qui vobis in mentem venit haec appellare
iudicia, quae a populo Romano rescindi, ab iuratis iudicibus repudiari, a
magistratibus negligi, ab ijs qui eandem potestatem adepti sunt solent
commutari? If that (saith he) should also be thought a iudgement, as
others with infamous iudgement condemned, they should for euer be depriued of
all honour and dignitie: so unto men (by the Censors) noted with ignominie▪
should bee no meanes for them againe to returne unto their honour, o into the court: For why, our auncestors would cause of
feare, but not danger of life to be in the Censors power. Wherefore how came it into your mind, to call these iudgements, which may
by the people of Rome be reuoked, by the
sworne judges be reiected, by the magistrats bee neglected; and of them which
have obtained the same power be vsually changed. Wherby it euidently appeareth
the Censors to have bene without all manner of iurisdiction. For the Pretors
had the hearing and examination of the suits of the farmars of the publike
reuenewes of all such things as concerned tributes, rents, writings,
repairations, and farming out of publike things, made or done by the Censors:
for that the power of the Censors was quite different from the iurisdiction of
the Pretors. And so with vs (here in Fraunce) power is giuen unto the
gouernours of prouinces, but yet without iurisdiction: except it be, that they
by consent of both the parties, take upon them to decide or determine any
matter. And so we may in like sorsay, That the
Censors had power to commaund, but without any
iurisdiction.
There were also other magistrats in Rome, which had power to command, and
iurisdictionThe power of the Triumuiri Capitals in
Rome. also in criminall causes, as those whome they called Triumuiri Capitales, whose power and authoritie extended
yet onely unto straungers or slaues: except perhaps such were the vnworthiuesse
of the magistrats, and their corruption, or offence so great, as that the other
magistrats did willingly winke at the proceeding of these Capital Triumuiri,
& at the publike punishment by them taken upon such notorious offendors.
These Triumuiri beside this had also the putting in execution of all the
capitall iudgements of the people, or of the other magistrats.
Now by this discourse of the Roman magistrats and their power, it appeareth,
that in Rome there were some magistrats, who
at the beginning of their first institution had no power or commaund, or els
power yet without iurisdiction; and yet to have atNo
magistrat without power length vsurped both. Howbeit I deeme not them
to be called Magistrats, which have no power; well they may enioy some publike
honour or charge, but no magistracie. For the true proprietie of the word
Magistrat, importeth and draweth with it a power to commaund. And he that will
have regard unto the phrase and manner of speech of the auntient Latines, and
especially of the lawyers, shall find them to have called the offices with
honest charges in the Commonweale, by the word Honores,
Honor (saith Calistratus) est
administratio Reipublicae cum dignitate, Honour is a government of the
Commonweale with dignitie or reputation: and those which beside their honor had
power also to commaund, them they noted by
the word Imperia. As in Liuie we
see the nobilitie to complaine in this sort, Salios, ac
Flamines sine Imperijs as potestatibus relinqui, The Salij and Flamines
to be left without command, without power: understanding by the word Imperia, the great estates of the citie, whether it were
by commission, or by office, such as had Mase bearers and power to commaund
allowed them. And by the word Potestates, meaning the
gouernours of prouinces, whome Vlpian the lawyer in
proper tearmes calleth also Potestates. VVhich also Alexander Seuerus the emperour meant, when he with a loud
voyce saith, Non patiar mercatores potestatum, I will
not suffer the buiers of the governments of prouinces.
Now as a man may have a publike charge without honour, as Criers, Sargeants,
Trumpetors, (which in auntient time were slaues, & of the magistrats
familie without title of office) and especially the towne clarkes and notaries
unto the magistrats, or Commonweale, vntill the time of Valcntinian, who forbad slaues any longer to have that charge. So a
man may say also, That there are publike charges with honour, without power to
commaund; as ambassadours and priuie councellors, secretaries of estate, and
treasorours; the auntient Ediles and Questors, and our Receiuers. So also some
other there be which have honorable charge, hauing also the hearing of many
causes, and yet without commaund: as the auntient Roman Bishops, and our great Prelats. Others have honorable charge, with power
also to commaund, and The great diuersitie of magistrats in their honor, power,
and authoriue. yet without iurisdiction: as the Tribunes of the
people, the Censors, and our Gouernours of countries, together with the kings
Attourney. Some others there bee also which have ordinarie, and honorable
publique charge, and power to commaund with iurisdiction: and those are they,
whom properly we call Magistrats: such as were the two Consuls and Praetors;
who were encreased euen to the number of sixteene. As for the Dictators,
Gouernours of prouinces, and those whom the Romans called Interreges: and Praefectos vrbi Latinarum feriarum
causâ: they had more power and authoritie, then all the other
magistrats we have spoken of: yet were they not magistrats, but commissioners
onely, as we have before showed: albeit that some called them by the common
name of Magistrats; but yet not they which knew how properly to speake. And so oftentimes it happeneth that they which
have the greatest honors, are yet destitute of all power and commaund: as
amongst the Venetians the Chauncelour is created out of the people, which is
with them the greatest honour; and yet without any power. So the Procurators of
S. Marke, are also (with them) highly honored, and in all Commonweales the
counsellors of estate, Embasladours, Bishops, and prelates, who have no
commaund, and yet are more respected, than the other little Prouosts, and
diuers other judges, which have power to commaund, and iurisdiction to discide
controuersies, with administration of justice both high and low.
There are also publique charges, who have neither honour nor commaund, but
rather Certaine publi charges
dishonorable. to the contrarie draw after them a certain kind of
dishonour: as the Hangmans office; who after the charge committed unto him for
the execution to death, was by the Praetors edicts commaunded still to lodge
out of the citie: a custome yet obserued in Tholouse, and in diuers other
cities also. Other publique charges also there be, not much more honest, and
yet neuerthelesse necessarie unto the Commonweale, and profitable unto them
that have execution of the same: to the end that the profit arising thereby,
might in some sort cover the dishonour thereof. And under this diuision are
generally comprehended all publique persons placed in title of office, or in
commissions, or in simple dignitie without power to commaund. And in like maner
we might diuide all publique officers & magistrats, according to the
diuersitie of the publike charges, which
euerie one of them hath: some in matters of religion, other some in the
affaires of state; these have the administration of iustice: others have the
charge of the publike reuenewes, some of the fortification and repairation of
publike places, and others the prouision of victuals, and other things
needfull: these have the mannaging of the warres, for the defence of the
subiects against their enemies: these the care of the publique health and
welfare of the people, and these the ouersight and charge of the high waies,
riuers, forrests, ports and passages: all which publicke charges may bee giuen
either in title of office, or in commission, or simple dignitie without
commaund: or els with a commanding power also, or only by way of the execution
of the commaunds of others, such as are the magistrates ministers, towne clarkes, notaries, vshers, surueyers, sergeants,
cricrs. Which so great a mulritude of honours, offices, and publicke charges,
to comprehend under the simple name of magistrates, or as the Greekes call it
, were but to
confound the whole discourse of publicke honours and offices, of all
magistrates and commissioners together.Three things
especially to be respected in the creating of Magistrats & officer in euerie Commonweale.
Wherefore in euerie Commonweale for the creating of magistrats and officers,
and such as are to be imploed in common charge, three
things are chiefly to bee respected: First them that have the choyce and
creation of them: then of what manner of persons
choice is to be made: and thirdly in what maner and forme they are to be
created or chosen. As for the first, it is a
thing belonging onely unto the soueraigntie, as we have in due place declared.
And the second, although it most properly belong also unto soueraigntie, yet
for the most part it ordinarily followeth the lawes to that end and purpose
established, and especially in the Popular and Aristocratike estates: wherin
(as generally in all sorts of Commonweales) offices, and publike charges are
giuen unto men, either for their vertue and wisedome, or else for their wealth,
or for their nobilitie; or indifferently for all these things together; for why
there is no Commonweale so barbarous, which hath not some regard of these
things in bestowing of the offices and publike charges of the state: but which
of these considerations were most to be respected, belongeth not to this place
to discusse. And as concerning the third
point, which is the manner and forme for the choice and creation of magistrats
and officers, it is of three sorts: For either it is done by election, or lot;
or by a mixture of both together. Election is made either by lively voyce, or
by holding up of hands, (which the auntient Greekes called ) a thing yet vsed
amongst the Swissers: or else by tables or billets, by beanes or stones, and
that in two sorts, viz. by open, or by secret suffrages.
By lot choice is made of one, or mo of the citisens to be magistrats, or out of
all sorts and degrees of the people, at a certaine age, by the laws appointed.
Now as for choice to be made by election and lot mingled together, although it
be a thing not much used in auntient time, yet is it now at this present a a
thing most common in Aristocraticall estates, and especially in Genes and
Venice. As the Romans alwaies also did in
making choice of the judges of capitall causes, concerning life and death; who
were by lot drawne onely out of the order of the Senators, before the law
Sempronia, or out of the orders of the Senators and the knights by the law
Sempronia also; or out of both those orders, and the Tribunes of the common
treasure, by the law Aurelia, the people being still excluded. But in a Popular
estate, either must all the citisens together iudge of euerie one in
particular, or of the lesser part together, and that without lot or election.
(For where the whole multitude of citisens have authoritie and power, there is
no place left for election or lot:) or else must some citisens by lot, or
choice, or both drawne out, iudge of every man in particular: or
some, of some chosen by lot or election
onely, or by both together; or else some partly by lot, partly by election
taken our of all the estates of the Commonweale, to iudge of some of the other
citisens; or else some by lot drawne out of all, with some other taken out of
one or many estates of the Commonweale: or part by lot and election drawn out
of all, and other part out of a certaine order of the citisens. And thus much
concerning all the meanes that can be imagined concerning the varietie of them
which have any publike charge: and for the estate, qualitie, and condition of
euerie one of them, with the forme of their calling and imploiment.
Aeschines the orator, diuiding the offices and publike
charges of the Athenians, hath cut them much shorter, and more obscurely
reckoned them up, than was fit for so great a
citie, considering that therein were moe magistrats and officers, than in any
other Commonweale that then was, for the greatnesse thereof. Hee said, That
there were therein three sors of officers: one sort of them which were taken by
lot or choice; another of them which had publike charge aboue the space of 30
dayes, such as were they which had the ouersight of publike repairations and
buildings; and the third sort, of such as were by the auntient lawes appointed;
as commissioners chosen for the warres, or for the administration of iustice,
such as were the magistrats. But by this diuision cannot the diuersitie of
magistrats and officers be iudged, no more than by that of Demosthenes, (altogether different from that of Aeschines his aduersarie.) For hee saith them
onely to be magistrats, which were by lot drawne in the temple of Theseus: or they to
whome the people had giuen extraordinarie power to commaund, or made choice of
for captaines. The diuision also of Varro, and Messala, is also too short, who make but two sorts of
magistrats in Rome, viz: the great and the little. The
great magistrats they called the Consuls, the Pretors, and Censors, as chosen
by the great estates: and the other they called the little, as chosen by the
common people; the ceremonie of their soothsayers diuination being more solemne
in the choice of the greater, than in the choice of the lesser. But better it
were to search and find out the essentiall diuisions of magistrats, and such as
might serue in euerie Commonweale; as are those by vs alreadie set downe,
concerning the charge of magistrats. VVee may also otherwise diuide magistrats
into three sorts, in respect of their power. The first may bee called
Soueraigne Magistrats, as owing obediēce
unto none, but unto the soueraigne maiestie onely. The second are lesser
Magistrats, who owe obedience unto the soueraign Magistrats, and yet haue
commaund over other magistrats also. The last sort are they which owe obedience
unto other superiour Magistrats, and yet have no commaund but over particular
persons onely. Let vs then in order speake of these three sorts of Magistrats,
and first of the obedience of Magistrats towards their Soueraigne Prince.
CHAP. IIII. ¶ Of the obedience that the Magistrat oweth
unto the Lawes and Soueraigne Prince.
SEeing that the Magistrat next unto the Soueraigne
Prince, is the principall person in the Commonweale, & upon whom they which
have the soueraigntie discharge themselves, communicating unto him the
authoritie, force, and power to commaund: it is good reason before we passe
further, briefly to touch what obedience he oweth unto his Soueraigne Prince;
which is the chiefe part of his dutie. Now in this the Prince and Magistrat,
and both of them do most differ from a priuatHow much a
prince differeth from a magistrat, and both of them from a priuat an. man: for that the Prince seeth no man in
the state or Commonweal, whome he may compare
or preferre before himselfe; but as one placed in a most high degree, and next
unto the immortall God, beholdeth all his subiects set a great way beneath him:
wheras the priuat man cannot by any publike right commaund over any other
subiect, although that he by priuat and domesticall commaunds rule and gouerne
his owne familie. As for the Magistrat, for that he is to regard many persons,
hee must oftentimes change his port, his gesture, his speech and countenance,
for the good performance of his dutie towards all: which no man can well
discharge, except he first know his duty towards his Soueraigne prince, as also
how to submit himselfe unto the other Magistrats his superiours, how to respect
his equals, and how to commaund his inferiours, how to defend the weake, to
withstand the great, and to doe iustice to all. And that is it, for which the auntients commonly said, Magistracie or authoritie to declare what was in a man, hauing as it
were upon the stage in the Theatre, and in the sight of all men, to performe
the parts of many persons. And so also may we say, A man to show what his
office is: For if he be such an one as he ought to be, hee graceth his place:
whereas if he bee otherwise, hee debaseth not only the authoritie of his place
and office; but euen of the maiestie of the state and Commonweale. So Liuie speaking of Quintus
Flaminius, a man vnworthy his high place, saith of him, Non qui sibi honorem adiecisset, sed indignitate sua vim ac
ius Magistratui quem gerebat dempsisset, That hee had not (by his office) encreased his honour; but by the
vnworthinesse of himselfe, impaired the force
and power of the office which he bare.
Now the better to know what obedience the Magistrat oweth unto his Soueraign,
it is needfull first to vnderstand, what it is that a Soueraigne Prince may of
right commaundThe lawful commaunds of soueraigne princes
right diuers. every Magistrat to doe. For why, the lawfull commands
of Soueraigne Princes are right diuers, and vnlike themselves. Some of them
seruing for perpetuall edicts or lawes concerning all persons, of what
condition or qualitie soeuer they bee; or but for certaine persons, and for a
certaine time, by way of prouision: othersome containe some priuilege or
exemption contrarie to the edicts or lawes, for some one onely, or for some few
of the subiects: or some graunt not contrarie unto the law, or some reward for
the good, or punishment for the euill, or some office or commission; or else
serue for the expounding of some edict or
priuilege, or for the denouncing of warre, or the making of peace, or for
raising of souldiours, or for the erecting of Faires or Markets, or for the
leuying of taxes, subsidies, fifteenes, new impositions, or loanes: or for the
sending of ambassadours to congratulat the good haps of other princes; or to
mone their misfortunes, or to entreat of marriages, and alliances, or other
such like things; or for the building or fortifying of places to be fortified,
for the repairing of bridges, hie wayes, ports or passages, or for to iudge of
certaine suits and proceedings in the law, or for the execution of some
commaunds, or for the maintenance of letters of iustice, or for the restoring
of such as be under age, or of full age, or of such as be condemned, or for
some particularitie, or for some remission, or pardon, which may bee of diuers
sorts. Of which commaunds so before
declared, some containe diuers kinds, as do priuileges and graunts, whether it
be for some gift giuen, or for exemption and immunitie from all charges, or
from some one: or letters of discharge, or of estate, or to have the freedome
of a citisen, or for to be made legitimat, or for nobilitie, or knighthood, or
for the erecting of corporations or colleges, or other such like things. All
which letters may be divided into two sorts, that is to say, into letters of
iurisdiction or commaund, or letters of iustice or state. Albeit that the word
Iubemus, or we commaund, be as well in the letters of
iustice, as in the letters of grace and favour, as is to bee seene in the lawes
and letters pattents of the Greeke emperours. Yet the letters of grace, or
which proceed from the onely power and authoritie of the prince, are properly
in Fraunce called Mandements, or Commands; and
the secretaries which dispatch them are also called the Secretaries of the
Commaunds: whereas the letters of iustice are most commonly dispatched by the
other secretaries; beside the difference of the great and little seale, and for
the most part the diuersitie of the waxe: or the single or double labell, or
the seale hanging in silke of diuers colours, making the difference of the
letters to be knowne. The auntient Latines called such instructions as were by
princes giuen to their ambassadours, or gouernours of countries, or generals of
their armies, Mandata Principum, or Princes Commands,
which we do call by the name of of instructions: For so the word Mandat is taken in the law, where Iustinian the emperour
saith, That hee had made a booke of Mandats or
Commaundements for the gouernours of prouinces.
But leauing the subtilitie of words, let vs go unto the matter, and examine the
forceThe power and force of certaine clauses commonly set
down in the letters patents, and princes Mandats expounded. of the
clauses commonly set downe in the letters patents and mandates of princes. And
first these wordes, Vniuersis praesentibus & futuris
(To all men present and to come) are ioyned onely unto such letters patents as
are to endure for euer: (howbeit that no worldly thing can so for euer
continue) but not unto temporarie edicts made by way of prouision, nor to
commissions, nor to any other letters of prouision. But this clause, Quantum satis est &c. (so much as shall suffice) is
of much greater importance, & ordinarily ioyned
unto letters which they call letters of iurisdiction or iustice, whereby the prince leaueth unto the discretion of him
to whom such his letters are addressed, to allow of them, or to refuse them, as
his conscience, and the equitie of the cause shall require: which is not in
letters of commaundement which leaue nothing unto him to whom they are
directed, except happily sometimes the examination of the fact onely: as in
these words, Si paret &c. (If it shall appeare vnto
you &c.) In suchThe princes charters or letters of
iustice no commaunde unto the magistrat to whom
they are directed sort that one may say of all sorts of charters or
letters of iustice, albeit that they be granted by the prince, that they import
not any commaund or constraint whatsoeuer unto the magistrat to whom they are
directed: But to the contrarie, that by our lawes and customes it is most
religiously prouided, that the magistrats or judges should unto such charters
or letters have no further respect, than in that they were agreeable with
equitie and trueth. And although that the
same forme of letters of justice, be graunted in England, as also in Spayne,
and other kingdomes; yet so it is neuerthelesse, that it is done rather for the
particular profit of some one, than for the greatnes or increasing of the
maiestie of the king, (who graunted them by way of benefit unto the partie) or
for any necessitie there is thereof: seeing that the whole is remitted unto the
power of the magistrat, after the graunting of such letters, which was not
before the graunt thereof. Which was the cause that the people in the assemblie
of the Estates in parliament at Orleans, presented a request unto the king for
the cutting off of this formalitie of letters: as seruing not but to the
oppressing of the people, without any profit therout of to be drawne unto the
king or Commonweale. The auntient Greeks and Latins also neuer knew this forme of letters of iustice: but the
magistrats upon the request of the parties did as much as do our judges upon
the graunt of such letters of iustice. And the clause, Quantum satis erit quod liqueat (so much as may suffice for the
manifesting of the matter) is the same which was conteined in the Praetors
edicts, in this forme, Si qua mihi iusta causa
videbitur, (if any iust cause shall seeme unto me.) True it is that the
power to correct, supply, and expound the lawes, concerning the civill
iurisdiction, together with the restitution & relieuing of them which had
beene circumuented, or deceiued by the formalities of the lawes, (a power
before giuen unto the Praetors by the vertue of their office) resteth now (I
know not how) amongst the marks of soueraigne
maiestie; and for this cause the Praetors authoritie and lawes were called
honorable; which the interpretors of the law call Nobile
officium. Wherefore as offices are confounded, when as the prince
conuerteth unto himselfe such things as belong unto the magistrat▪ euen so also
are the rights of soueraigntie impaired, when as they are by the magistrats
vsurped. Now as for the declaration, and correcting of the edicts and lawes, we
have before said that it appettaineth and belongeth unto them which have the
soueraigntie: But as for restitutions against the extremitie of the law, and
all that concerneth letters of justice, it greatly appeareth not that the
soueraigne princes have much troubled themselves therewith, but have left them
to the magistrats to be in their name decided. I except only certain letters of
iustice, which passe under the great Scale, and whereunto the aforesaid clause,
If it shall be iust, If it shall be agreeableunto equitie and truth, is inserted: which clause so
much displeased a certaine great personage, holding one of the highest places
of honour in this Realme, (who vnderstood not the force thereof) as that he
would have raced out the same; saying the maiestie of the king to be thereby
impaired▪ howbeit that he was therein to be excused, as being a straunger, and
not well seene in the lawes and customes of a straunge countrey. But how could
the maiestie of kings be in this respect empaired or diminished? seeing that
the auntient kings of Aegipt caused their magistrats solemnely to sweare,A notable neuer to obey their commaundements, in case they commaunded them any
thing that was vniust: as we read in the sayings of
the Aegiptian kings reported by Plutarch. Seeing therefore that the allowance or
reiecting of letters of iustice directed in the kings name unto the magistrats,
dependeth of the equitie and discretion of the magistrats themselves, it
needeth not vs to speake any more thereof. Wherefore let vs now proceed to
those rescripts or letters of commaund, which for that they concerne the state
of the Commonweale, and publique and not priuat causes, are called rescripts of
State; or letters of commaund or state. Concerning which, a double question may
be made: One whether such Rescripts or letters of the prince, containing onely
the simple examination of the fact, without giuing any further hearing of the
matter unto the magistrat, according to the desert thereof; whether (I say) the
magistrat fully informed of the truth of the fact according to the tenour of
his letters, ought to proceed to the further
execution thereof being vniust, or to hearken unto the vniust commaunds of his
prince? The other, whether the magistrat hauing neither power to examine
theWhether the magistrat be bound to obey his princes
vniust commaunds or not? equitie nor truth of a matter, may refuse
the vniust commaunds of his prince: the doubt therein being the greater, if
they shall be thereunto by the prince more straitly vrged, or expresly
commaunded: For sometime princes by their particular and secret letters, vse to
request the magistrats; so with couert requests accompanying their vniust
commaunds: yea oftentimes in their letters patents their requests are ioyned
with their commaunds, because they would not seeme to wrest all things from
them against their wils; but to request many things of them: as when they say,
We pray and commaund you, wherein the prince seemeth
as in nothing more to derogate from his soueraigne maiestie: for if the thing be iust and honest which hee
commaundeth, what needeth requests? if vniust or dishonest, why doth he
commaund it? Now the magistrat is neuer to be requested to doe his dutie, or
intreated not to doe wrong, or that which is vniust or dishonest, as Cato the Censor saith. Besides that, to commaund is a
thing incompatible with request. It is wisely said, ,Princes requests to
have the power of the most strait cōmaund. Tyrants requestes to bee
commaunds: wherefore let vs suppose nothing to be more straitly commaunded,
than that which the prince seemeth by fyled speech or intreatie to persuade.
Wherefore to resolue this point, if the princes letters giue unto the magistrat
neither the examination nor the hearing or disciding of the fact, or of the right and truth of the cause, but that onely
the execution of the princes commaund be unto him committed: the magistrat in
this case may not in any sort take upon him the examination or hearing of the
matter; except the letters of commaund be notoriously false, faultie, or
absurd, and contrarie to the lawes of God and nature (as we read of the
commaunds of Pharao and Agrippa:)
or else to robbe and spoile the poore people; as in our time Albert Marques of Brandeburg, who amongst other his notable cruelties,
set up sundrie gibbets in all such townes and cities as he had taken in,
threatning his souldiours to hang them thereupon, if that contrarie to his
commaund they should spare to robbe and spoile the poore inhabitants: albeit
that he had neither true, nor yet any colourable cause, for his taking up of
armes against his countrey. Now if a man
subiect unto a particular Lord or Iustice, be not in law or right bound to obey
him passing the bounds of his territorie, or the power to him giuen, (albeit
that the thing which hee commaundeth be both iust and honest) but may well
refuse his commaund: how should the magistrat then be bound to obey or to put
into execution the princes commaunds in things vniust and dishonest, the prince
in this case transgressing and breaking the sacred bounds of the lawes both of
God and nature? But some will say, no prince to be found so euill aduised, nor
that it is to be supposed that he would commaund any thing contrarie unto the
lawes of God and nature: and true it is; for why he worthily loseth the title
and honour of a Prince, which departing from reason,
and forgetting the dutie of a prince, breaketh the lawes of God and nature.
We have before (as we suppose) sufficiently enough declared, what and how
muchWhat commands of the prince, and how far the
magistrat eught to execute the same. a prince may doe by the right of
his soueraigntie, from whence many things may be deriued pertinent unto this
question here in hand: for why it is not well to be vnderstood what obedience
is by the magistrat due unto the soueraigne maiestie, except the rights of
Soueraigntie be before well vnderstood and fully knowne. But here the question
is, what commaunds of the prince, and how farre the magistrat ought to execute
the same? for sometime dishonest and vniust thinges are by princes commaunded,
which the euill magistrats themselves do more willingly, and shamefully put in
execution, than they were by the princes commaunded. As not long agoe in the
time of the civill warres, (wherewith all
Fraunce was on a light fyer) the president of the court of Normandie (whose
name deserueth to be buried in perpetuall obliuion) beeing commaunded
extraordinarily to leuie thirtie thousand crownes of them which professed the
reformed religion, extorted from them three hundred thousand; and for so doing
(the calamitie of the time considered) receiued a great reward. Howbeit that
Tiberius the emperour (a man of incredible crueltie)
sharply reproued the gouernour of Aegypt for exacting more of the subiects than
he was commaunded: saying, Tonderioues meas non cutem detrahi
volo, I would have my sheepe shorne, but not flaine. If therefore the
commaundement of the prince be not contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature,
the magistrat is to put it in execution, although it seeme to differ from the
lawes of other nations: which lawes it is not
against nature for the princes to chaunge, for the profit or disprofit of their
Commonweales. For albeit that the princes (as wee have said) ought to keepe the
oath by him made unto his people, if hee have so bound himselfe by oath; and
although hee were not by oath so bound, yet neuerthelesse of duetie ought to
keepe the lawes and customes of the estate and Commonweal whereof hee is
soueraigne: yet for all that wee must not thereof conclude or gather, That if
the prince doe in that case commaund any thing contrarie unto his oath or the
duetie of a Prince, that the Magistrat is therefore to refuse to obey his
commaund. Forasmuch as it belongeth not unto the Magistrat to examine or
censure the doingsThe is noto censure his princes cōmand, beeing not
contrari unto the lawes of God &
nature. of his prince, or to crosse his proceedings concerning mans
lawes, from which the prince may as he seeth
cause derogat. Yet if the Magistrat bee commaunded by the Prince to abrogat an
auntient law, being more upright and profitable to giue way unto another lesse
iust, and lesse profitable for the Commonweale; he may stay the execution of
such a law or commaundement in suspense, vntill he have shewed his reasons
therefore unto the prince, which he is in dutie bound to do, not once, but euen
twice or thrice: and then if the prince notwithstanding his remonstrances, will
not by him be aduised, but refuse his wholsome and profitable admonition, and
will needes have the law to passe further; then the Magistrat (as hauing
alreadie done his dutie) shall put it in execution: which he may also at the
first commaund of his prince doe, if the delaying thereof be daungerous. And to
that end and purpose tendeth that which is by Innocentius the fourth written, before he was Pope, That
Magistrats ought to put in execution the princes commaunds, albeit that they be
vniust: which is to bee vnderstood of civill iustice and vtilitie: but not if
such commaunds bee contrarie to the lawes of nature. Which interpretation may
serue also for the right understanding of that which the lawyers say, That the prince may derogat euen from the law of nature.
VVherinHow it is to be vnderstood that a prince may
derogate from the law of nature. their meaning is, from the law of
nations, and common constitutions of other people: least any deceiued by the
obscuritie of the words, or equiuocation of the law of nature, should thereby
rashly presume to breake the sacred lawes of God and nature.
Now if any man shall obiect and say, That the emperour
Anastasius expresly commaunded, That the judges and Magistrats should not so much as suffer
men to produce the princes rescripts or letters graunted unto particular
persons, contrarie to the generall edicts or lawes: Mine aunswere is, that that
is to be vnderstood, if in such the princes rescripts or letters no speciall
clause be comprehended, derogating from the generall lawes: notwithstanding
which derogation, yet the Magistrat ought neuerthelesse to aduertise the prince
thereof, and to put him in mind of his dutie: who if he be not by the
Magistrats reasons to be remoued from his former opinion, but command the same
the second time, the Magistrat is then to obey his commaund, although the thing
so commaunded be not agreeing with the common profit, and contrarie unto the
lawes. For why, the Magistrat hauing so done his dutie, is not to expect but
the second commaund; as is by the law
prouided. To the example whereof the edict of Charles
the ninth was made, concerning the magistrats admonitions unto their prince. So
long before this Theodosius the Great, at the request of
Saint Ambrose the good bishop of Milan, made a law,
whereby he willed, That the execution of his letters pattents and commaunds,
should be holden in suspense thirtie dayes after the signification thereof,
when he had commaunded any to be more rigorously punished than the vsual manner
and custome was. The occasion of the making of which law was, the execution of
seuen thousand Thessalians, put to death by the commaundement of this Theodosius, for that they had murthered and slaine
certaine of his Receiuers and Magistrats. For which cause Saint Ambrose excommunicated the emperour, neither would suffer
him to be reconciled, vntill he had made
the aforesaid law. And hereof (as I suppose) proceed those rescripts, which are
yet used by the bishops of Rome: the first called Monitorie, the second Iussorie, and the third
Executorie; or as we say in English, Edicts of
admonition, of Commaund, and of Execution.
The same opinion we are to haue, if the prince by his letters patents command
theHow the Magistrat commaunded by his prince to put in
execution old penall lawes, now of themselves or through the negligence of
the magistrats forgotten, is to proceed in the execution thereof.
Magistrat to proceed to the execution of the penaltie uppon them that haue
offended against such his edicts and lawes, as by the antiquitie of themselves,
or by the negligence of the Magistrats seeme to have bene quite forgotten and
abrogated. For why, the long sufferance of the prince, and conniuence of the
magistrats, in the sight and knowledge of
whome the lawes are so broken, remitteth the penaltie due by the law: which
could not otherwise have bene infringed, by the abuse of them which
transgressed the same, had it by the prince or magistrat bene still looked
vnto. And therefore the magistrat ought not rashly to proceed to the execution
of the penaltie of such forgotten or neglected lawes, before he have caused the
same to be againe republished, being by his default before neglected. Yea the
prince ought rather to proceed against his magistrats, who through their
remisse negligence have suffered his edicts and lawes to be contemned. For
otherwise it should be a thing verie vniust and sauouring of tyrannie, to make
edicts and lawes, and after long neglecting of them, upon a sodaine to proceed
against them, who by the example of others, had transgressed against them,
seeing others before them to have escaped
vnpunished. Which was one of the tyrannicall slights of the most cruell
emperour Nero, as of other auntient tyrants also. Wheras
the good emperour Traian to the contrarie commaunded Plinie gouernour of the lesser Asia, of new to publish
such edicts and lawes as were any wise before buried in obliuion, by the
disobedience or errour of his subiects, or the sufferance of the magistrats:
for that a common errour is reputed for a law, if the errour bee not against
the law of nature, against which no errour can probably be pretended.
But some man may aske, Whether the magistrat owe obedience unto such his
princes commaunds, as shall unto him seeme contrarie unto the law of nature,
albeit that indeed they be not contrarie thereunto?
For the equitie and reason which we call The -ture not
cleare and fest. naturall, is not alwaies so
cleere and manifest, but that it findeth impugners. Yea oftentimes the greatest
lawyers and philosophers are therein intangled, and of quite contrarie
opinions, and the lawes of people are therein sometime so repugnant, as that
some of them appoint reward, and some others punishment for the selfe same
fact, whereof bookes, lawes, and histories are ful, all which to prosecute were
a matter infinit. Wherunto I aunswere, that if that which the auntients say may
take place, a man neuer ought to doe that whereof he doubteth, whether it be
iust or not; and much lesse ought hee so to doe, if he be thereof certainly
persuaded that the thing which the prince commaundeth, is of it selfe by nature
vniust. But if question be of civill iustice onely, theThe
magistrate bound in ciuil causes to put his princes commaunds in execution,
although they seeme unto himselfe vniust or contrarie unto lawe.
magistrat ought in such case to verifie and put in execution his princes
commaunds, although he thinke them to be in
civill equitie or law vniust. And therfore the magstrats in euerie Commonweale
were compelled to sweare to obserue the lawes and ordinances; to the end they
should not call into dispute or question, that which they ought to hold, as
before resolued upon. And this was the manner and custome of the Romans when
the old magistrats receiued the oath of the new, before they entred into their
charge: which was commonly done upon the calends of Ianuarie, in the capitoll,
after solemne sacrifices there made: for otherwise the magistrat lost his place
of estate, if hee tooke not his oath within five daies after. Yea sometimes the
Tribunes which held the estate of the people constrained them in particular
which had withstood the publishing of a law, to sweare to obserue the same,
after that it was once published, and that
upon the paine of banishment. So L. Metellus Numidicus
was by a decree of the people banished, for refusing to sweare unto the lawes
published at the instance of the factious Tribune Saturninus. So also after that the lawes of Lewes the twelfth were published in the high court of the parliament
of Paris: for that many disliked of the same, the kings atturney generall there
made a request, That they might be duely obserued, and prohibition giuen for
any man to call them in doubt, and that upon paine of high treason; as is to be
seene in the records of the court. For why, it is lawfull forLawes once established ought not by prinat persons to be againe called into
dispute or question. euerie man before the publishing of the law, to
despute and reason of the equitie thereof: which to doe after the publication
thereof, is not lawfull. And so, before that, when as king Lewes the eleuenth had
commaunded certaine vniust decrees of his to be published in the court of the
parliament at Paris: the court refused to yeeld thereunto, for that they seemed
unto euerie man vniust: but the king neuerthelesse still vrging his former
requests, ioyned thereunto grieuous threats also; as that they should loose
their heads that would not yeeld thereunto. Which thing Lauacre, president of the parliamentA notable example. understanding, accompanied with the
rest of the judges of that honourable court in their red robes, came unto the
king, not to excuse the fault by him and the rest committed, in refusing the
kings vniust decrees, but to show the reasons of their such refusall, and to
request, That he with the rest might rather bee put to death, than enforced to
giue their consent to the publishing of the propounded lawes. The king
beholding the grauitie, the port, and dignitie of these persons, and almost
abashed with the so constant resolution of
such his great magistrats, and withall doubting the power and authoritie of the
parliament, caused those his decrees so much misliked, to bee abrogated, and in
their presence torne in peeces, requesting them to continue so still to
maintaine iustice; solemnly protesting neuer more to send unto them any edict
which should not be both iust and reasonable. It is a wonderfull thing to say
of what power and moment this thing was to keepe the king within the bounds of
reason, who otherwise had alwayes used his absolute power and commaund. As
before hee came unto the kingdome, being as yet Dauphin, he caused the
presidents of the court of Paris to bee called before
him▪ to rase out the clause, De expresso mandato (by
expresse commaundement) which the court had
caused to be put unto the confirmation of the priuileges graunted unto the
countie of Maine, protesting, That he would neuer goe out of the citie, vntill
it were done, or yet take uppon him the charge by the king committed unto him.
Whereupon the court indeed commaunded those words to bee cancelled: but yet
that the cancelling might appeare, commaunded the acts to be kept, which
areHow the wordes de expresso or
expresissimo mandato are in princes graunts,
edicts or decrees to be vnderstood, yet preserued vndefaced. Now
these words, De expresso mandato, and De expressissimo mandato, whereunto these words are also sometimes
annexed, Multis vicibus iterato (or oftentimes repeated)
which are many times to be found in the records of soueraign courts ioyned vnto
the publication of the princes edicts and decrees, have this illation or
meaning, that such edicts and priuileges (graunted by the princes expresse
commandement) should not be so precisely
kept, but that shortly after they might by the sufferance of the magistrats be
againe forgotten and neglected, as not much regarded. And by this secret of the
courts, hath the state of this kingdome bene preserued in the greatnesse
thereof: which otherwise would have bene ruinated by the flatterers of princes,
who by such extorted priuileges scrape unto themselves whatsoeuer they desire:
and the good kings not stil able to satisfie the hungry courtiers, sometimes
wel eased, which have used these restrictions, being so of their subiects well
beloued, the confirmation of such edicts and priuileges not carrying with them
any effect unto the subiect, or disobedience unto the king to giue good words,
or charge of conscience unto the magistrat in not performing it.
But yet farther question might be made, VVhether a magistrat may bee suffered
toWhether a magistrate be to be suffered to giue up his
place, rather than to allow an edict or commaund of his prince which he for
certaine thinketh to be vniust, and contrarie unto reason giue up his
place, rather than he will allow an edict, a commission, or commandement from
his prince, which he for certaine thinketh to be vniust and contrarie vnto
naturall reason, when as the equitie of it is called in question, &
especially if the other magistrats and multitude of the people shall hold it to
be iust, contrarie to the others. For the force of iustice, and power of
upright reason, is not perceiued but of the fewer and wiser sort: and a wise
man being as it were the rule of reason, is of all others the greatest enemie
unto the multitude. VVhich if it be so, why should a wise man bee enforced to
giue his consent unto the multitude of mad magistrats. In which case I say,
that the magistrat is not to be suffered to giue up his place, if it please not
his soueraign prince he should so do, but
ought rather to bee constrained to obey his princes commaunds, if the equitie
thereof being called in doubt, be approued by the greater part of the
magistrats, which have charge to confirme such edicts: For otherwise if they
should be permitted to giue up their places, rather than to passe an edict
approued by others, it would open a perilous gap to all the subiects, by their
example to refuse and reiect the edicts and commaunds of their prince: and so
euerie one in his charge might leaue the Commonweale unto danger, and expose it
unto the tempest, as a ship without a Rudder, and that under the shadow of an
opinion of iustice▪ which may haply be but a deuise of a subtill braine, to no
other purpose than to contradict the more common opinion. And therefore among the most lawdable laws made by Lewes the xij, there is one which importeth, That if the
judges be of three or moe opinions, those which were the fewer in number should
be constrained to conforme and ioyne themselves unto one of the greater
parties, for the concluding of the decrees. VVhereupon the court of Paris of
long time doubted, whether this law should be published or not: for that it
seemed a very hard and a most strange thing unto many, to force the conscience
of the judges contrarie to their owne opinions, and so enforce them to iudge
contrarie to that they ought, and that especially in such things as were
committed unto the wisedome and deuotion of the judges, as are almost all both
publike and priuat iudgements. Yet neuerthelesse after
the court had considered of inconueniences which it saw ordinarily to arise upon the varietie of opinions, and that the
course of iustice, and the concluding of many good decrees, was thereby also
often letted, the court confirmed the aforesaid law, which by processe of time
hath bin found to be most iust & profitable. Hereunto also agreeth the
maner and custome of the antient Romans: for their judges oftentimes to change
their opinions, and to ioine themselves unto the greater part, albeit that they
were not thereunto constrained. As is to bee seene in Plinie, of a iudgement wherin one part of the iudges had condēned the
guiltie person unto death, another part had cleerely and fully acquited him,
and the third part had for a time banished him: in this diuersitie of opinions,
as well they which had before acquited him, as they which had condemned him to
death, consented both to them which would have
him banished. But our law is in that point better, which compelleth the fewer
to ioyne themselves unto the more. For in all corporations & colledges
reason would, that that which pleaseth the greater part should take place and
preuaile, as strengthened with the most voices. Howbeit that in all such
consultations and actions the rule of the auntient wise neuer faileth; which
willeth, That of many honest and profitable things propounded unto vs, we
should chuse those which be most honest, and most profitable: and so of many
inconueniences and daungers, to make choice of the least: for otherwise mens
actions should neuer sort to good end. And a man may also say, That the equitie
of a law is not properly naturall, if it bee obscure or doubtfull; for that
true naturall iustice is more cleere and resplendent than the brightnesse of
the sunne, as not wrapped up in obscuritie,
nor depending of the erroneous opinions of men, but of the most cleere and
immutable wisedome of the euerlasting.
And yet neuerthelesse since the law of Lewes the xij. I
find not that any magistrat hath giuen up his place, as fearing to be inforced
to maintaine or yeeld to any opinion contrarie unto his conscience: and
especially since the places of justice were giuen unto men for vertue, and not
for reward and favour. Neither hath the law of Lewes the
xij. at any time constrayned the judges to iudge contrarie unto their
conscience, but hath rather silently giuen them leaue to giue up their places;
howbeit that it were more equitie so to constraine them, than to leaue it vnto
their will and pleasure. For which cause the kings Attourneyes general haue
oftentimes constrained the Iudges to iudge
according unto Lawes and customes of the land, albeit that all the Iudges were
of contrarie opinion. As I remember that whilest I was at Tholouse, one Bartholomew President of one of the Chambers of Inquirie,
seeing all the counsellours of his court of one and the same opinion in a suit,
and directly against the law: after he had assembled all the rest of the courts
upon the matter, he constrayned them to change their opinions, and to iudge
according to the law; And that iustly also: for who enforced thee to seeke for
thine office? or to accept of it being offered thee? and hauing taken it upon
thee, (being happily got either by suspending of voices, or by sure, or
briberie,) and being sworne, wilt thou now forsweare the lawes, which thou
mightest before have red, or at least wise oughtest to have red? wilt thou by
thy false opinion of the law and iustice,
wrong the place thou bearest? delude the lawes? or forsake thy prince and
Commonweale.
Yet sometime it happeneth that such lawes as of themselves seeme unto every
manWh the magistrate is to
d in case the law
otherwise▪ iust, now upon som soden occutrents
to be har and
vniust. most iust, may upon some suddein occurent appeare and proue
to be most vniust. In which case, whereas the wrong is in the fact presented
plaine and euident, wise magistrats vse to certifie the king thereof, (as I
remember it to have most oftentimes bene done in the parliament at Paris,) who
imparting the matter unto his Counsell, doth as he seeth cause derogate from
the positiue law; or adde some thing unto the same:
(which our men call the exposition or declaration of the law) a thing properly
belonging unto the soueraigntie of a Prince,
as we have before declared. So that in this case, it is not lawfull for the
magistrat to iudge against the law, although he may suspend his sentence vntill
that the Princes pleasure be further knowne. But otherwise the law being cleare
and without difficultie, the magistrat is to iudge according thereunto without
disputing of the equitie thereof: for otherwise if the judge shall wittingly
and wilfully iudge contrarie unto the law, he is by the lawes themselves noted
of infamie: but if he shall so iudge of ignorance, or supposing himselfe to
iudge according unto the law; he is not therefore to be accounted infamous:
howbeit that such his iudgement is of it selfe void, as if it had not beene
giuen at all, in such sort as that a man by the auntient Roman law need not at
all to appeale therefrom.
Now there is great difference whether question be of the lawes alreadie
established, or of those which yet are by the magistrat to be published. For
why, such as be alreadie established, every man is bound to keepe, and
especially the magistrats, who if they wittingly swarue therefrom, (beside the
penaltie appointed by the law) are subiect also unto the note of infamie, as
periurours and forsworne men. But as for such Edicts andGreat care to be had by the greater magistrats in the publication of
lawes. lawes as are not yet published, but are but as yet presented
unto the magistrats to be confirmed and published, of them it behoueth the
greater magistrats (to whom the publication of lawes especially appertaineth)
well to consider, and to show the reasons if they shall dislike of them vnto
the prince, albeit that it concerne but the particular interest of some one
priuat person; but much more, in case it concerne the great harme or good of the Commonweale: which good if it be verie
great, may in some sort cover the iniustice of the law; (as the auntient
states-men say.) Yet must we not proceed so farre in respecting of the publike
profit be it neuer so great, as therefore to forget reason, and to be caried
headlong with wrong and iniustice: as were in auntient time the Lacedemonians,
who measured all iustice by the common profit, whereunto they directed all
their lawes, all their iudgements, and counsels; so that if that were once in
question, neither oath, nor reason, nor iustice, nor yet the law of nature was
by themBetter it is for the magistrat of himselfe to giue
way unto the law contrarie unto the lawes of God and nature. once
respected. But much better it were for the Commonweale, and more beseeming the
dignitie of the magistrat, of himselfe to giue up his office (as did the
Chauncelour of Philip
the second, duke of Burgundie) than to giue way unto a law that is contrarie
unto the lawes of God and nature, or that in every mans iudgement seemeth to be
dishonest or vniust; howbeit the Duke seeing the irremoueable constancie of his
Chauncelour, readie to giue up his office, thought it better to reuoke such his
commaunds, than to want so stout & wise a man. Which so constant
resolutions of the magistrats, hath oftentimes preserued Princes from infamie,
lawes from decay, and CommonwealesThat a princes faults
which cannot be amended ought by all meanes to be of the magistrate coured. from destruction. But when such
constancie cannot heale the diseases of the Commonweale, or faults of
soueraigne princes; and that the prince commaundeth the magistrats, to have his
actions excused unto his subiects; it is much better for the magistrat to obey
his commaund, and in so doing to cover and burie the memorie of a wicked fact alreadie done, than in refusing so to do,
to irritate the prince to the doing of worse; and so (as they say) to cast the
helue after the hatchet. As did Papinian the great
Gouernour of the empire, (and by Seuerus the Emperour in
his will appointed Tutor unto the yong emperours Anthonius
Caracalla, and Geta his sonnes) who by Caracalla commaunded to excuse unto the Senat the murder
by him committed upon the person of his brother Geta,
would therein do nothing, but cut him off with this sharpe and short answere,
saying, That murthers were more hardlie excused, than
committed: which was of him more stoutly then wisely said. For Caracalla with this aunswere enraged, and yet not
satisfied with his brothers blood, in his rage commaunded Papinian also to be slaine: and after the death of him
so great a man, (as who alone might haue
gouerned the furious yong prince, and repressed his rage) neuer ceased without
any contradiction or controulment to kill, murther, and tyrannize, vntill such
time as he had brought himselfe together with the Empire unto destruction.
Which I would not have to bee so vnderstood, as spoken of vs in any respect to
impaire the worthie praises of so notable a man, (for that can in no wise be
done) but that magistrats may hereby vnderstand, how farre they are to beare
with the saults of princes, which once done, cannot by them be amended. For had
Papinian couered that he could not now amend, he had
saued his owne life, and counterpeased the tyrannies and cruelties of the
Emperour, who alwaies before had him in greatest honour and regard. Which fault
in Papinian I have thought good to note, for that many
have right highly commended him for the same▪
without respecting, that such his resistance auailed nothing, but brought an
irrepairable losse unto the affaires of the empire, being so depriued of so
great a personage, as might therein doe more than any other; for that he was a
prince of the blood, and the greatest magistrat in the state. But had the
matter then stood whole and entier, and that the Emperour had commaunded him to
put his brother Geta to death, he had then done both
stoutly and wisely in refusing so to doe, and had had iust cause rather to die
than to consent to that vnnaturall fact, for one brother to murther another.
But Seneca and his companion Burra (the gouernors of Nero) shall be for euer
blamed, as hauing no excuse to pretend for their most wicked counsell,
persuading Nero to kill his mother, who by chaunce had
escaped drowning: which most cruell counsell,
commaund, or fact, shall together with the authors thereof be for euer crowned
with eternall infamie and shame.
But what if the prince shall command any thing to be done, and that the same
thingA princes commaund being begun to bee put in
execution, whether it b by the princes contrary
commaund to giuen ouer. being begun to be put
in execution, he changing his mind shall reuoke his former commaund; shall the
magistrat in this case stay from proceeding any further, or go on with that he
hath begun? Whereunto a man at the first sight would say, That he ought to stay
and to proceed no farther: following therein the maximes of the law. Howbeit to
aunswere rightly thereunto, the matter is by distinction to be opened; that is
to wit, that if the thing so begun may be left off without the publike harme,
it is then so to bee left off according to the
last commaund: but if it be so begun, as that it cannot bee left off, whithout
the manifest hurt of the state and Commonweale; the magistrat in this case is
to proceed on with that he hath so begun, notwithstanding the latter
countermaund, and that especially in matters of warre; as wee have before said.
And to thisGreat things by great men vndertaken, ought also
to be by them performed, or else neuer taken in hand. purpose Marcellus the Consull saith, Multa
magnis ducibus sicut non aggredienda, ita semel aggressis non
dimittenda. As many things are not of great captaines to be at all
taken in hand: so being once by them vndertaken, are not by them to bee againe
giuen ouer. And this in time of warre. But if at home the magistrat following
the commandement to him giuen, hath begun to execute the condemned, or them
that the prince hath commaunded to be put to death, he ought forthwith to
surcease from any further execution, if the commaundement be reuoked: and not
to do, as did the Consull Fuluius, who hauing taken the citie of Capua, as he was
punishing the authors of the rebellion, and had now caused the greater part of
the Senators of that citie to bee beheaded, receiuing letters from the Senat of
Rome, willing him to stay and cease the execution, put those letters in his
bosome, without reading of them, & doubting of the contents thereof,
proceeded to the execution of the rest, vntill he had put to death fourescore
of them. True it is, that the Senat had no power in any thing to commaund the
Consuls (as we have before said) yet for all that, the gouernours of prouinces,
and the generals of the Roman armies, yea ad the
Consuls also, used most commonly to be obedient vnto
the Senate, and to yeelde unto the decrees thereof, as unto lawes. And truely
the principall cause why they of Gaunt put
to death sixe and thirty of their lawyers, after the death of Charles Duke of Burgundy, was for nothing else, but for that they had
condemned a citisen to death, after the death of the Duke; before they were
againe confirmed in their authoritie and office, although it was not a thing
altogether necessarie; as with like examples wee have declared. Yea it is
almost a perpetuall thing, for them which are in authoritie and have power to
commaund, to bee able of their owne right to execute that was commanded them,
yea after that the time of their authoritie is expired, if he that gaue them
the authoritie and charge knowing and wittingly shall dissemble the fact, or
not forbid it when he might.
Now all that we have hitherto said, is to be vnderstood onely of such letters
or rescripts of commaund, as yet carrie with
them no power for the magistrat to examine the fact or matter they concerne.
But then what shall wee say, if such rescripts or commaunds report such things
as certainely knowne and true, which yet are neither publikely, nor unto the
magistrat so knowne to be. Heere we must againe consider, whetherWhether the magistrate b to examine
the trueth of that he is by the prince commaunded,
before he proceede to the examination thereof? the examination of the
matter, be by speciall commaund expresly taken from the magistrat, or else left
unto him: if it be left unto him, there is then no doubt, but that the
magistrat may and ought to enquire of the truth of such things, as are reported
in the princes rescripts or letters: but if al examination of the matter be
taken from the magistrat, then some doubt, whether he may inquire of the truth
thereof or not; and especially if it be expressed in the rescript or mandate,
that the prince being well enformed of the
truth, commaundeth the magistrat to proceede to the execution of his letters or
commaunds: howbeit the best opinion is, that the magistrat both in the one case
and the other, ought to examine the truth of the matter. For when to inquire of
the truth of the cause, is neither forbidden nor commaunded, although it bee
expressed in the princes rescripts or letters, to proceede to execution, yet
ought the magistrat neuerthelesse to examine the truth of the mater. And to the
intent, that the magistrats should not pretend to excuse themselves by
ignorance, the emperour Constantine, prouided by an
expresse law, that the magistrats should inquire, whether these things were
true or not, which were set downe in his rescripts or letters of commaund,
whether it were so in them expressed, or left out. And as for the other point,
if in the rescripts or letters, it be expresly
set downe to proceede to execution, for that the prince is well enformed of the
truth of the matter; yet neuerthelesse ought the magistrat to examine the truth
thereof: notwithstanding the clause which I have said, which ought not to
hinder the examination of the matter, nor to be preiudiciall to any other mans
right; and so much lesse unto the publike, and least of all unto the truth: and
so generally, all such narratiue clauses as are but reported in rescripts,
mandates, commissions, lawes, priviledges, testaments, and sentences, cannot be
any thing preiudiciall unto the truth. And albeit, that during the tyranny of
the Sforces, they made a law, that all faith and
credence should be giuen unto the princes commaunds and letters; yet was the
same law againe disanulled, after that they
were by the French, driuen out of the estate of Milan. And if the faith and
credite must needes bee giuen unto the narratiue clauses of princes rescripts
and letters of commaund, that is to bee vnderstood, onely of such clauses, as
whereby the obscure places of their edicts, and lawes, commissions, mandates,
or iudgements are expounded, which none can better declare, then they
themselves that made them; howbeit, that such their declarations ought rather
to be called decrees, then expositions or declarations. But if the prince shall
in the bestowing of offices, places of charge, or other his grants in his
rescripts or letters, testifie for the fidelity, integrity, wisedome, or
religion of any man, it is so farre from, that the magistrat should rest
contented with that testification, as that hee ought
therefore with greater diligence to inquire Whether the ma gistrate ought to enquire of the sufficiesie of him of whose wisdom and the prince shal himselfe by his rescripts or letters testifie; in the
bestowing of any office or other charge upon him of him, for that the
prince supposed him to be indeede such, and would not have such benefits or
preferments bestowed upon an ignorant or vnwise man. But contrary wise, if the
prince shall simply giue unto any man an office or place of commaund, he is no
farther by the magistrat to bee inquired of, for that the prince in his
wisedome hath thought him worthy such honour and place; if the prince first
giue him not leaue so to doe, or that the custome of the country so require: as
in the latter times they did in Rome; but afterwards, almost ery where: but especially in the appointing of iudges.
So also in antient time, in the raigne of the Gothes, triall was made of the
Senators, before they were to bee admitted into the Senate. For Theodoric, king of the Gothes, writing unto the Roman
Senate, for the receiuing of a new Senator, saieth,Admittendos in Senatum examinare cogit sollicitus honor
Senatus▪ the care (we haue) of the honour of the Senate, causeth vs to
examine such as are to be admitted into the Senate.
But if any man under a false pretensed colour shall encroach uppon the prince
the profits and commodities unto him graunted, being in the princes rescript
expressed, yet is he thereof by the magistrat to be embarred; and the rather,
if the common treasure be with immoderat gifts exhausted: unto which disease
euerie where spreading, remedie might be giuen, if the law of Valois concerning gifts might take place. For Philip
Valois the French king, commaunded those gifts and graunts to bee
reuoked from them, who in the letters of such gifts or graunts, had not
expressed what they or any other for them, had
for the same cause in the letters of their graunts, before obtained; which yet
also is in vse in Millan. For seeing that it much concerneth the Commonweale
what money and profit, what rewards, and priuileges, every man obtaineh, the magistratsIt much conneth the Commonweale what gifts or priuileges be
graunted unto particular men. must thereunto have a most vigilant
eye, and especially in popular estates, wherin as all publike things lie open
unto the spoyle of all men; so for the same cause occasion is ministred vnto
the seditious, to the trouble and oftentimes to the ruine of the Commonweale.
And for this cause it was most straitly prouided by a law in the twelue tables,
that no priuilege or dispensation might in any wise be graunted, and that upon
paine of death, but onely in the great assembly of the whole estate of the
people: the words of the law being these, Priuilegia nisi
Commitijs Centuriatis ne irroganto, quisecus faxit Capital esto,et no priuilege be graunted, but in the great and
general assembly of the people: and he that shall otherwise doe, let him die
the death. And after that Constantine the emperour
writing unto the people, saith, Nec dmnosa fico, nec legibus contraria impetrari
oportet,t is not fit, things hurtfull unto the common
treasure, orPriuileg things odious and unto the
law, how they are to be interpreted.
contrarie unto the laws, to be obtained▪ howbeit that all priuileges are
directly contrarie unto the law; for otherwise they should not be priuileges.
And i it bee so, that they must needs passe after the
second commaund (as we have before said) yet beseemeth it the magistrat to cut
them short, and to interpret them in strictest maner that he can, and to the
least hurt of the Commonweale, as things odious, and contrarie unto the law;
and not by favourable interpretations to encrease their strength, or to draw
them into consequence, as heretofore haue
the judges and the clergie, which by their faire gloses, have drawne the profit
and priuileges graunted onely unto souldiors, unto themselves also; vsing these
faire gloasing words, of worldly Souldiours and heauenly Souldiours: so laying
all the burthen upon the poore countrey man, unto whom the same priuileges
ought of better right to be communicated than to them.
But for that our purpose is not here to enter into the disputing of priuileges,
whichPriuileges to be most straitly examined. were
a thing infinit, sufficeth it in passing by, in generall to aduertise the
magistrat to have speciall regard unto the priuileges by princes graunted, and
most straitly to examine them, what good report soeuer
the prince therin make of him that hath obtained such priuilege: For that every man well knoweth, that the prince oftentimes
knoweth not them to whome such priuileges are graunted; vnworthy men still not
so much obtaining them, as indeed wresting them from princes, euen as it were
against their wils: no craft or subtiltie in this case left vnsought out, to
defraud the lawes, and abuse the prince and magistrats, and that with so many
shifts and quirkes of words, and so much deceit, as that they seeme hardly to
be by the magistrat to be met withal, but by plaine force. Such is that clause,
De motu proprio (of our owne meere motion) which
inuented at Rome, hath from thence crept abroad into all Europe. For why, there
is almost neither king nor kesar, which when question is for the breaking of a
law, or repealing an edict, or for giuing way unto dispensations and
priuileges, ioyneth not thereunto this clause,
De motu nostro proprio (Of our owne proper motion)
howbeit that the same princes have bene importuned, and as it were enforced to
graunt that euen unto vnknowne and most vnworthy men, for whome they have bene
so importunatly requested. There is at Rome a field called Flory, or
Flourishing, not so much for the plentie of flowers, as of witnesses that are
therein; out of which euerie man may take testimonies, for the bestowing of
benefices upon them which dwell euen in the remotest places of Asia and
Affrica, and that with these words, De motu proprio. By
which onely clause, all the fraud and deceit of them that sued for preferment,
be they neuer so bad or vniust, are easily excused: and by vertue of which
words the examination of all slye incommings or craftie intrusions, cease, if
wee will receiue the opinion of some most
pernitious and daungerous unto the state: but such sleights and deceits wee
have long since bid farewell out of our Commonweale. And for that princes and
magistrats circumuented with the wiles of deceitfull men, could hardly, or not
at all escape the same, it was wisely decreed, That the princes rescripts, nor
letters pattents, should be of none effect, except they were presented unto the
magistrat the same yere that they were obtained; neither should be of any
force, before they were by the magistrat approued. And yet it seemeth unto me,
that the law of Milan is better, that is to wit, that the princes mandats and
letters pattents directed unto the Senat, were not to be receiued after the
yeare expired: neither those that were directed unto the magistrat after a
moneth were past: and that not onely the yeare
and day, but euen the verie howre also, should be therein set downe, as the
manner is almost throughout all Germanie; following therein the opinion of many
great lawyers, to stop the suits and controuersies which oft times arise for
gifts, offices, and benefices graunted unto diuers in one day, as it was
decreed by the parliament at Blois, at the request there made by Bodin deputie of Vermandois.
But what if the prince by his rescript or letters pattents, shall expresly
forbid the magistratWhether the magistrat expressely
forbidden to examin the trueth of things contained in the princes grants or
letters, may yet passe beyond such his soueraignes prohibition. to
examine the truth of such things as are contained in them, albeit that they be
false or doubtfull; ought the magistrat in this case to examine the matter? And
it seemeth that he ought so to doe: For we have before said, that hee may, and
ought to examine the cause, and enquire of the
truth of things expressed in the princes rescripts and letters, albeit that the
prince therein declare himselfe to know the truth thereof. Yet for all that, I
say, that it belongeth not unto the magistrat in this case to passe beyond the
prohibition of his soueraigne prince: For there is great difference when the
prince declareth, That he knoweth the truth; and when he forbiddeth to enquire
therof: For in him it is to be presumed, that he hath bene circumuented, and so
mistaking things false for true, and things vnknowne for knowne, to haue
commaunded them so to be put into his rescript, which he would not have done,
had hee beene truely thereof enformed: As if hee should giue a judges place
unto a souldior, or a captaines place unto a lawyer,
neither the one nor the other ought by the magistrat to be admitted or
receiued, although the souldiour were
commonly called a lawier, and the lawier a souldiour, such pretended qualitie
hauing happely giuen occasion unto the prince to be so in his graunt deceiued.
But when the prince shall expresly forbid the magistrat to examine the fact or
matter, it is to be presumed, that he well knoweth that which he doth, and that
he would not that the magistrat should farther enquire thereof. Yet may the
magistrat well vse the remedie by vs before spoken of, and show the prince the
truth, and the importance of his commaund, with the inconueniences and harmes
ensuing thereof, and so in what he may to draw him from his former purpose: and
hauing so discharged his duetie, yet neuerthelesse then to yeeld his obedience,
if he shall be againe so commaunded: for otherwise the maiestie of a prince or
Commonweal should be but a mockerie, as still
subiect unto the controlement of the magistrates. Besides that, it is much more
also to be feared, least that the other magistrates, by the example of one or
two, and after them other priuat men also, should presume to contemne the
princes commaund, to the great endangering and ruine of the Commonweale.
Now if a man should say that a Prince ought not to commaund any thing that is
dishonest or vniust, he therein sayth well: neither ought the prince (if it
were possible) to commaund any thing not beseeming his honour, or that were so
much as subiect unto reprehension or slaunder, or knowing the magistrates to be
of contrarie opinion unto his, to constraine them thereunto: for that the
ignorant and common people is no way more moued unto disloyaltie, and contempt
of their princes edicts and lawes, then to see
the magistrates hardly delt withall, and the lawes by them contrarie to
theirWhether the magistrat commaunded by his prince any
thing contrarie to the common profit, or course of civill iustice, ought to
obey such his princes commaund, or to giue up his place. good liking
published and forced. But now here the question is, what the magistrat ought to
doe, in case the prince forgetting his duetie, commaund any thing contrarie to
the common profit and civill iustice; yet prouided still that it be not against
the law of God and nature: whether the magistrat ought to obey such his princes
commaund, or to giue up his place? And if so it be, that the worldly magistrat
ought to be obeyed, albeit that he commaund such things as are vniust: Ne Praetoris matestas contempta videatur, Lest the
maiestie of the Praetor should seeme to be contemned (as saith the law) how
much more then ought men to obey their soueraigne Prince, of the maiestie
of whom all magistrates depend? Now it is
in many lawes repeated that we must obey the magistrat, whether the thing that
he commaundeth be iust or not, following the counsell of all the wise which
have hereof written. And to this purpose saith Cicero
(albeit that he was a mortall enemie unto the Tribunes of the people) that men
were to obey euen the vniust oppositions of the Tribunes, in these words: Parere iube lex intercessori, quo
nihil praestantius: impediri enim bonam rem melius est, quàm concedi
malè, The law (saith he) commaundeth vs to obey the magistrat that
opposeth himselfe, then which nothing is better: for better it is a good thing
to be crossed then euill graunted. And before he had said: Nihil exitiosius ciuitatibus, nihil tam contrarium iuri ac legibus, nihil
minùs ciuile & humanum, quàm composita & constituta republica
quicquam agi per vim, Nothing is more dangerous unto cities, nothing
more contrarie unto right and law, nothing
more vncivill or inhumaine, then in a well orderedDangerous
unto Commonweales for the the magistrates to refuse to put in execution
their princes Edicts or commaunds. and setled Commonweale to have any
thing done by force. We oft times see the subiects to take up armes against
their prince, the lawes violated, and iustice go to wracke, and all for the
false opinion that the people have of the equitie and integritie of the judges,
refusing to verifie and put in execution the Edicts and commaunds of their
prince. O but say they it is an vniust Edict or law, neither can we, nor ought
we, to obey the same: an honest speech, if indeed thou canst not; but where
learnedst thou that thou oughtest not? from whence haddest thou that doctrine?
wilt thou (being a magistrat) with stripes,
imprisoment, fines, yea, and with death it selfe enforce priuat men to obey, yea euen thine vniust commaunds, and yet
thy selfe not obey the commaundement of thy Prince? But thou wilt denie thine
owne commaunds to be vniust: so doth the prince also denie that which he
commaundeth to be so: shalt thou now be iudge herein, or he? or if thou wilt
needs be iudge, why shouldst thou not thinke to suffer the same in thine owne
decrees concerning priuat men. Besides that, as no man enforced thee to take
upon thee thine office, so no man forbiddeth thee to giue up the same, if the
law thou likest not seeme to thee so vniust: it is therefore the desire of
bearing rule, that maketh thee that thou wouldest beare rule over priuat men,
and yet not obey thy prince thy selfe. Wherefore let vs upon this conclude, it
to be much better in all obedience to stoupe unto the soueraigne maiestie, than
in refusing of his soueraigne commaunds to
giue example and occasion of rebellion unto the subiects; yet still keeping the
respects that we have before set downe, and especially when it concerneth the
honour of God, which is and ought to bee unto all subiects greater, and more
precious than the wealth, the life, the honour of all the princes of the world.
And to know how a man should beare himselfe herein, amongst many examples we
will vse but one or two. Saul commaunded all the priests
of God without iust cause in his presence to be slaine, yet was there no man
which refused not his vngodly commaund, except Doeg, who
himselfe alone performed that so cruell an execution. An other notable example
there is of one Petronius gouernour of Syria, who
receiuedA notable example of a wise gouernour or
magistrat. commaundement to place the image of Caligula the emperour, in the fairest place of the Temple of Hierusalem, as it had beene in all other
Temples of the empire: howbeit that the Iewes had neuer suffered those images
to stand in their Temples, but had still cast them downe, and broken and beaten
them all to peeces, euen to the verie shieldes of the emperours, which they had
there placed. Whereof Petronius aduertised the Emperour,
and that it could not be done without great trouble and slaughter of the
people: wherewith Caligula more incensed, sent more
expresse and strait commaund unto Petronius, to assemble
all the old bands of his garison souldiours in those quarters, and so with a
puissant armie to put his commission in execution. Of whose comming the Iewes
hearing, left their Townes, and the tillage of their grounds, and so in great
companies all vnarmed, went to meet him, if happily they so might by their
humble prayers intreat him; telling him
withall, that they ought not so much to feare any mortall man, as to commit so
abhominable a sinne against the maiestie of the immortall God: and therfore
most humbly requested him to take in good part such their constant resolution,
which was rather to die, than to see so great an abhomination, as the most
sacred Temple of God to be so polluted with the images of men. Neuerthelesse
Petronius told them that it concerned his life, to
performe his commission: and so to terrifie them the more, marched with his
armie unto Tiberias, (as supposing himselfe to doe nothing contrarie to his
owne religion, or to the lawes of God or man) but there the people came running
unto him from all parts, disarmed, and resolued all to die, rather than to see the image set up in the Temple,
humbling themselves, and bowing their heads before the armie wherewith Petronius had beset them round: who seeing the great
constancie of the people, and their exceeding zeale towards the honour of their
God, as to chuse rather to die, than so much as to see the image of 2 man in
the Temple of God; wonderfully moued therewith, and with their pitifull
complaint and teares, (and being himselfe also a man of a courteous and milde
nature, and farre from that crueltie, which the Iewes feared not whatsoeuer it
had beene) he commaunded them all to returne home; promising againe to write in
their behalfe unto the Emperour, and rather himselfe to die than to execute his
commission, accounting his life a worthie ransome for
the sauing of the guiltles blood of so many innocent people. Neuerthelesse Caligula
therewith the more enraged, sent unto him a new commaund, with grieuous threats
to put him unto the most grieuous torture that he could possibly deuise, if he
forthwith put not his commission in execution, according to his commaund. But
the ship, together with them that brought the commission, was by force of
tempest caried an other way, and newes brought into Iurie of the death of the
tyrant, before that the cruell commission could come thither. And so Petronius hauing discharged his conscience towards God,
his duetie towards his prince, and well showed his great loue toward the
subiects, and discharged all the parts of a most wise Gouernour: was himselfe
by the diuine prouidence wonderfully preserued from the cruelties unto him by
the tyrant threatned. But yet this is especially to be considered, that we
That the Magistrat ought not upō a vaine show of religion,
or conscience euill grounded, to refuse to
execute his princes commaunds. pretend not the vaine show of
religion, or rather of superstition, against our princes commaunds, and so upon
a conscience euill grounded open a way unto rebellion: for when the magistrat
maketh conscience, and a matter of religion, about the executing of his princes
commaunds, he seemeth himselfe (and giueth occasion unto others also) to
suspect euill both of the religion and conscience of his prince. Wherefore he
ought to be well assured of the true knowledge of the eternall God, and of the
true worship and seruice unto him due: which consisteth not in vaine and
counterfeit showes of religion or conscience. Diuers other examples I could to
the same purpose produce, were I not afraid lest those whom we call Pagans
should therein ashame vs, with whom the feruent zeale unto the honour of God is
so abated, and by processe of time cooled, as
that it is to be feared lest at length it be altogether frosen. And thus much
for the obedience of the Magistrat unto his Soueraigne Prince. Let vs now also
speake of his power and authoritie over particular and priuat men, and what a
manner of man we wish him for to to be towards them.
CHAP. V. ¶ Of the power an
authoritie of a Magistrat over particular and priuat men, and of his office and
duetie.
WE have before said, That a Magistrat is an officer
which hath publike power to commaund, or to
forbid: Now he hath power so to command or forbid, which hath publike power to
enforce or constraine them which will not obey that which he enioyneth them, or
which do contrarie to his prohibition, and may also ease the prohibitions by
himselfe made. For albeit that the law saith, That the force of the lawes
consisteth in commaunding, and forbidding; in suffering, and punishing: yet is
this power more proper unto the Magistrat, then unto the law, which is of it
selfe dombe: wheras the Magistrat is a liuing andThe
Magistrat a liuing law. breathing law, which putteth all this in
execution, seeing that the law in it selfe carrieth or containeth nothing but
commaunds or prohibitions, which are but mockeries and to no purpose, if the
Magistrat and the punishment were not attendant at the foot of the law, readie for him which transgresseth the same.
Howbeit that to speake properly, the law containeth nothing but the verie
prohibition, and the threats for not obeying the same; considering that he
which commaundeth (inclusiuely) forbiddeth to transgresse his commaund: and as
for sufferance, that is no law: for sufferance taketh away prohibition, and
carrieth with it neither penaltie nor threat, without which the law cannot be,
considering that the law is no other thing, then the commandement of the
soueraigne, as we have before declared: and whatsoeuer threat or penaltie is
propounded by the law, yet the punishment neuerthelesse neuer ensueth the
breach thereof, vntill it be pronounced by the mouth
of the Magistrat. Whereby it euidently appeareth The force of the law to consist in the Magistrate, or him
that hath the power to commaund and constraine. all the force of the
law to consist in them which have the commaund, whether it bee prince, people,
or magistrat, unto whome so commaunding, except the subiects yeeld their
obedience, they have power to enforce or punish them, which Demosthenes calleth the verie sinewes of the Commonweale.
We have said, that the Magistrat ought to have publike power, to put a
differenceWhat power the Magistrat ought to haue?
betwixt this power and the domesticall power. We said also, that the Magistrat
should have power to constraine such as would not obey: for the difference from
them which have the hearing of matters, who may also iudge and pronounce
sentence, & call men before them, but yet have no power to compell or
constraine men, or to put their sentences or commaundements in execution; such
as were in auntient time the bishops, and now
our bishops also: such were also the auntient commissioners, delegats unto the
Magistrats, hauing power to heare the causes unto them committed; as also to
condemne the parties, but yet had no power to constraine them, but sent their
sentences unto the Magistrats, to be ratified or reuersed, and by them to be
put in execution as they saw good: So might these delegates call men before
them, but yet so, as that no man, except he listed, needed to obey them, except
the Magistrats themselves had by vertue of their authoritie so commaunded. And
therefore he was not in danger of the law, who had by force rescued a priuat
man, as he was to be brought before these priuat judges or delegates appointed
by the Magistrats, which he should have incurred, had the delegates had of
themselves any power to commaund. Howbeit that now by our lawes and customes the delegates have with vs power to
command, and to cause their sentences to be put in execution by sargeants and
other publike persons, by vertue of their decrees which they giue out, signed
and sealed with their owne hands and seales: whereas the bishops with vs haue
no such power to constraine men, but send their sentences to be executed by the
Magistrats. As the Cadies, and Paracadies do in all the East, who have the
hearing of all matters, but yet have no power to constraine men, but send their
iudgements unto the Sabbassaes, which have the commaund and power in their
hand.
We have before said, that the first constraint of all them which had power to
commaund,The first constraining power that the magistrat hath.
is the ceising or attaching both of mens goods and persons; which the auntients
called prehensio, or as we say an apprehending or laying
on of hands: for it were to no purpose, for the Magistrat to call a man before
him, to iudge him, or to fine him; and wh all is done
not to have power to seise upon their goods nor person of him that shall
disobey him. Now we have before said, that some there be, which have such power
to apprehend and attache men; which yet have no authoritie or power to call a
man before them, neither to examine a matter, neither to rescue a man, neither
to enlarge them whome they have committed; as we have showed of the Tribunes of
the people, of the eleuen Magistrats in Athens, of the Capitall Triumuiri in
Rome, of the Auogadours in Venice, of the kings Attourneies, and the deputies
of them which have power of the common
treasure in other realmes and Commonweales: and of the Commissioners of the
Chastelet of Paris, who may all imprison men, and seise uppon them, and yet for
all that cannot releeue or enlarge them, which belongeth onely unto the publike
Magistrats, which have power to condemne and acquite, and to iudge, some of
them of mens goods onely, other some of mens goods and honour also, aud other
some of mens goods and honour, with power to inflict corporall punishment also,
butThe diuers power of Magistrats. not death: and
some hauing power to put to death also, and that some of them such power, as
from whome men may appeale; and some others, such as from whom men may not
appeale. But the last and highest degree, is of such as have the absolute power
of life and death; that is to say, power to
condemne to death, and againe to giue life The Lighest marque of soueraign maiestie is to have power of
life aud death. unto him which hath deserued to die; which is the
highest marke of soueraigntie, aboue all lawes, and aboue the power and
authoritie of all Magistrats, as proper onely unto soueraigntie, as we haue
before declared. Whereby it appeareth, that there are two kinds of commaunding
by publike power: the one in soueraigntie, which is absolute, infinit, and
aboue the lawes, the Magistrats, and all other priuat persons: the other is a
lawfull commaund, as subiect unto the lawes and soueraigntie, and is proper
vntoTwo sorts of commmaunding by publique power: the one
in soueraigntie, and the other by lawe the Magistrats, and them which
have extraordinarie power to commaund, vntill it be againe reuoked, or the time
of their commission expired. The soueraigne prince next under God knoweth none
greater than himselfe; the Magistrat under God holdeth his power of his
soueraigne prince, and remaineth alwaies subiect unto him and his lawes: the particular man next after God (whome wee
must alwayes put in the first place) acknowledgeth the soueraigne prince, his
lawes, and his Magistrats, euerie one of them in his place. under the name of
Magistrats I vnderstand also them which have iurisdiction annexed unto their
fees, considering that they hold them also as well of the soueraigne prince, as
do the Magistrats, in such sort, as that it seemeth that there are none in the
Commonweale but the soueraigne princes, which may properly vse these words, Impero & iubeo, I charge and commaund: which in
auntient time signified, I will and commaund, seeing that the will of euerie
Magistrat, and of all others also, which have power to command, is bound and
dependeth wholly of the soueraigne, which may alter, chaunge, and reuoke it at
his pleasure. For which cause there is neither
any one Magistrat, nor yet all together, which can put in their commissions,
Such is our pleasure: or this clause, upon paine of death, for that none but a soueraigne
prince or state, can vse the same in their edicts or lawes.
And hereof riseth a notable question, which is not yet well decided, viz. WhetherWhether the power of the
sword be proper onely unto the soueraign prince or common also unto the
magistrat to whom the prince hath communicated the same? the power of
the sword (which the law calleth Merum imperium, or
meere power) be proper unto the soueraigne prince, and inseparable from the
soueraigntie; and that the Magistrats have not this merum
imperium (or meere power) but onely the execution thereof: or that such
power is also common unto the Magistrat, to whome the prince hath communicated
the same. Which question was disputed betwixt Lothaire
and Azon, two of the greatest lawyers of their time: and the
emperour Henrie the seuenth chosen thereof judge, at
such time as he was at Bononia, upon the wager of an horse, which he should
pay, which was by the iudgement of the emperour uppon the aforesaid question
condemned. Wherein Lothaire indeed carried away the
honour, howbeit that the greater part, & almost all the rest of the famous
lawyers then held the opinion of Azon; saying, That Lothaire equum tulerat, sed Azo aequum (Lothaire had
carried away the horse, but Azon the right)
neuerthelesse many snce have holden the opinion of
Lothaire: so that the question remaineth yet (as we
said) vndecided, which for all that deserueth to be well vnderstood, for the
consequence it draweth after it, for the better understanding of the force and
nature of commaunding, and the rights of soueraign maiestie. But the
difficultie thereof is growne, for that Lothaire and Azon neither of them
well knew the estate of the Romans, whose lawes and ordinances they expounded;
neither tooke regard unto the chaunge in that estate made by the comming in of
the emperours. Certaine it is, that at the first, after that the kings were
driuen out of the citie, none of the Roman Magistrats had power of the sword
over the citisens: yea that which much lesse is, they had not so much power, as
to condemne any citisen to beNo magistrate in Rome after the
kings once driuen out▪ had power o the
sword. whipped or beaten, after the law Portia▪ published at the
request of Cato Tribune of the people, 454 yeares after
the foundation of the citie. By which law the people tooke this power, not from
the Magistrats onely, but dispoyled euen it selfe thereof also so much as it could, giuing the condemned leaue for what fault or
offence soeuer it were, to void the countrey,
and to go into exile: and that which more is, there was not any one magistrat,
which had power to judge a citisen, if once question were but of his honour, or
good name, or of any publike crime by him committed; for then the hearing
thereof was reserued unto the comminaltie, or common people: but if it
concerned the losse of life, or of the freedome of a citisen, none might then
iudge thereof, but the whole estate of the people in their greatest assemblies,
as was ordained by those lawes, which they called Sacred. Which although that
they were not alwaies so precisely kept, but that they were sometime broken;
yet Cicero for transgressing the same escaped not, but
being Consull, and hauing caused certaine of the conspirators with Cateline to be executed, was therefore himselfe
afterwards banished, and his goods all confiscated. Long after the lawes Valeria, Sempronia, and Portia, which
had now remoued the Consuls hatchets and rods from the heads and backs of the
citisens of Rome: Cornelius Sylla the dictator published
his lawes concerning publike iudgements, wherby were appointed a certaine
number of Praetors, as ordinarie officers, which were to iudge of all such
causes as whereof the comminaltie before iudged, or at leastwise appointed
commissioners for to iudge of such crimes, as of murders, of robbing of the
common treasure, of treason, or of extortion; but yet so, as that these Pretors
had their lesson by writing, beyond which they might not passe a iot. For they
by lot drew a certaine number of particular judges out of them, which by the
lawes might in such causes be iudiciarie judges, who before all the people
hauing heard the accusations and defenses both
of the one part and the other, had brought unto euerie one of them the judges,
three little tables of diuers colours, upon one of which was written an A.
uppon another a C. and upon the third N. L. the A. signifying acquited, C.
condemned, and N. L. as much as to say, Non Liquet, or
it is not manifest, or the matter is farther to bee inquired of (which they
called Ampliare, and Amplius
quaerere.) With these tables was also brought unto the judges a vessell
whereinto euerie one of them did cast one of the three aforesaid tables,
without any word speaking: Which done they counted the tables so cast in, and
if there were moe marked with C. cast in, then the Pretor in his purple robe
mounting into an high seat, in open place, and in the sight of all the people
pronounced these words, Reus parum cauisse videtur,
which is to say, It seemeth that the partie
accused, hath not kept himselfe from doing amisse; or else Non iure fecisse videtur, He seemeth not to have done right; or Videtur prouinciam spoliasse, He seemeth to have spoyled
the prouince. This was the Roman grauitie in iudgement mixt withThe great modestie of the Romaines in their iudgments.
modestie, least they should seeme therein to lie, or rashly to affirme any
thing which was not altogether most manifestly tried. Of which sort are these
words also, Si quid mei iudicij est, If my iudgement be
any thing. So presently after the Pretor had pronounced the aforesaid words,
the penaltie of the law was put in execution, the partie condemned voided the
countrie and went into exile, and the receiuers seised upon his goods. If such
penaltie were for the offence of the law appointed, unto which law except
the partie so condemned yeelded himselfe
obedient, he was forthwith by the Triumuirie of causes capitall, apprehended
and cast in prison. VVherefore, might some man say, that these capitall
Triumuiri had power over the citisens: But wee said before them to have had
power onely over straungers, and that truely: and so men condemned to exile,
are but to be accounted straungers, for that they have lost the libertie of the
citie. To like purpose is that which Martian the lawyer
writeth, concerning the decree of the Senat, at the motion of Turpilian, Si iudex pronunciauit haec verba, calumniatus es, condemnauit
eum, If the judge (saith he) hath pronounced these words, Thou hast
slaundered, he hath therein condemned him: and albeit that he say no more
concerning the punishment of the offendor, yet shall
the penaltie of the law neuerthelesse be
executed upon him. Not to speake in the meane time of the inscriptions of their
libels, with the examination of witnesses and writings. This was the manner of
the publike iudgements used by the auntient Romans: VVherby it is easily to be
vnderstood, that the Pretors or judges were but onely the simple executioners
of the law, without power to adde or diminish one iot thereof, hauing not onely
no power of the sword, but not so much as to whip, or yet lightly to punish a
citisen.
Now if question were for the fine of any publike crime, which was not prouided
for by the law, the lesser assembly of the common people or comminaltie, was
called together therefore: But if question were of the life, good name, or the
whole estate of any citisen, the people then in their greatest and most solemne
assemblies gaue iudgement thereof: and that in
both cases extraordinarily, as commonly they vse to doe which have the
soueraigntie in all Commonweals: neither were voyces in these cases giuen by
tables or markes: for that the law it selfe, and not the people, was made iudge
of the punishment to be inflicted. The sentence of which law was almost this,
or such like, Si M. Posthumius ante Calendas Maias non
prodisset, neque excusatus esset, videri eum in exitio esse: ipsi aqua &
igniplacere interdici, If M. Posthumius made not
his appearance before the first of May, neither made his excuse, it should
seeme good that hee should be banished, and decreed, That he should be forbid
the vse of fire and water: all which things are more plentifully and at large
set downe by Liuie Asconius, and Cicero. But if the state of the Commonweale being chaunged, and the
power of iudgement and of giuing of voices,
being taken from the people, yet for a certaine time continued this manner and
forme of iudiciall proceedings, euen after that the forme of the Commonweale
was chaunged from a Popular estate into a Monarchie, as a man may see in the
time of Papinian the great lawyer, who gaue occasion
unto Lothaire & Azon to make
question of the matter, in these words by him set downe as a maxime, Whatsoeuer it is that is giuen unto Magistrats by decree of
the Senat, by speciall law, or by the constitution of princes, that is not
in their power to commit unto other persons: and therefore (saith he)
the Magistrats do not well in committing that their charge
unto others, if it bee not in their absence: which is not so (saith he)
in them that have power, without the limitation of
speciall laws, but onely in vertue of their office, which they may commit
unto others,albeit that they themselves be present. And thus much
for that which Papinian doth say, vsing the words, Exercitionem publici iudicij: as if he should say, That
they which have the soueraigne maiestie have receiued unto themselves the power
of the sword, and by speciall law giuen, but the execution thereof unto the
Magistrats. And this is the opinion of Lothaire. By
which words yet Azon vnderstandeth the right and power
of the sword it selfe to have bene translated and giuen unto the Magistrats.
Now there is no doubt, but that the opinion of Lothaire
was true, if hee had spoken but of the auntient Pretors of Rome, and so kept
himselfe within the tearmes and compasse of Papinian his
rule: but in that he was deceiued, that he supposed that maxime or rule of Papinians, to extend to all Magistrats which have bene
since or yet are in all Commonweals, who yet
for the most part have the hearing of murders, robberies, riots, and other such
like offences, and so the power of the sword giuen unto them euen by vertue of
their offices. For the emperours and law giuers hauing in the processe of time
seene the inconuenience and iniustice that arise by condemning all murtherers,
unto one and the selfeGreat in
commonweals to have now oftentimes the power of the sword committed vnto
them euen by vertue of the offices. same
punishment, or els quite to absolue them: and so the like in other publike
crimes also, thought it much better to ordaine and appoint certaine Magistrats,
who according to their conscience and deuotion, might encrease or diminish the
punishment, as they saw equitie and reason to require. And first of all Augustus unto the three little
tables noted with A. C. and N. L. added a fourth, whereby it was lawfull for
the judges to pardon them, who by other mens
fraud or deceit had offended the law, as wee read in Suetonius. And by little and little the auntient order and manner in
the iudicial or penall laws set downe, was chaunged; the penaltie by every one
of them appointed yet neuerthelesse still remaining, not by any to be encreased
or diminished, but by them which we have before said, what diuersitie of causes
soeuer happened. And oftentimes the emperours committed it unto the Senat, or
some other the great and most worthy magistrats extraordinarily to iudge of
great personages, or of some notable crimes, and to punish them as they saw
cause, or thought best, without binding them unto the ordinarie penall lawes.
But in the time of Papinian, Seuerus the emperour gaue
power unto the great Prouost of Rome, extraordinarily to iudge of all offences
and crimes, whatsoeuer they were, committed
within the citie or within fortie leagues ound about
it. Yea the other Pretors of the citie, who but by the ordinarie course of law
were to iudge of civill causes and priuat crimes, dealt also with certaine
publike iudgements referred unto them, not by vertue of their office, but by
the law it selfe: whereof Papinian sheweth example. And
sometime the Pretor preuenting the great Prouost, so by way of preuention
extraordinarily iudged of extraordinarie crimes, together with the great
Prouost. As for the presidents and gouernours of prouinces, in that they had
power and authoritie of all the Magistrats of the citie, and extraordinarily
iudged of all offences, and according to their owne discretion appointed both
penall and capitall punishment unto all men, except the citisens of Rome; no
man can reasonably doubt, but that they had
the power of the sword, and were therefore called Potestates: for that before the creating of the great Prouost, there
was none but the gouernours of the prouinces which had the power of the sword;
whom they yet call euen to this present in Italie, by the name of Potestats.
Now it is plaine by the maximes of the law, that the Magistrats which had power
extraordinarily to iudge, might condemne the guiltie parties to such
punishments as they would, yet so, as that they exceeded not measure: For so
Vlpian the lawyer writeth, him to exceed measure, who
for a small or light offence inflicteth capitall punishment; or for a cruell
murther imposethAl magistrats hauing thoritie to iudge of capital crimes, to have the
power of the sword. a fine. VVhereof wee may then conclude, that the
great Prouost, and the gouernours of
prouinces, and generally all such Magistrats as have extraordinarie authority
to iudge of capitall crimes (whether it bee by commission, or by vertue of
their office) have the power of the sword, that is to say, to iudge, to
condemne, or acquit; and not the bare execution of the law onely, whereunto
they are not in this respect bound as are the other Magistrats, unto whome the
law hath prescribed what and how they are to iudge, leauing unto them the naked
execution of the law, without the power of the sword.
And thus much briefly, concerning the question betwixt Lothaire and Azon: for the fuller and more
plentifull declaration whereof, it is needfull for vs yet to search farther:
where it is first to be enquired, Whether the Magistrats office be proper vnto
the Commonweale, or unto the prince, or vnto
the magistrat himself that beareth office, or else be common unto the Magistrat
himselfe together with the Commonweale? Then whether the power graunted vnto
the Magistrats be proper unto the Magistrats, in that they are magistrats, or
els be proper unto the prince, the execution therof only belonging unto the
magistrats; or else be common unto them both together? Now concerning the first
question, there is no doubt, but that all estates, magistrats, & offices,
do in proprietie belong unto the Commonweale (excepting in a lordly Monarchie)
theTo whom the proprietie of estats, magistracie, and
offices doe properly belong. bestowing of them, resting with them
whith hane the soueraigntie (as we have before said) and cannot by inheritance
be appropriat unto any particular persons, but by the
graunt of the soueraigne; and long and secret consent of the estates, confirmed
by a long lawfull and iust possession. As in
this kingdome, the Dukes, Marquesses, Counties, and such others as have from
the prince the government of the castles in sundrieDukedomes, earledomes, marquisats, and such like in auntient time but
simple commissions, now for most part are become hereditarie.
prouinces, and so the commaund of them, had the same in auntient time but by
commission onely, to be againe reuoked at the pleasure of the soueraigne
prince, but were afterward by little and little graunted unto particular men
for tearme of their lives, and after that unto their heires males, and in
processe of time unto the females also: insomuch as that in fine, through the
negligence of princes, soueraigne commaunds, iurisdictions, and powers, may
lawfully be set to sale, as well as may the lands themselves, by way of lawfull
buing and selling, almost in all the empires and kingdoms of the VVest, and so
are accounted of▪ as other hereditarie goods, which may lawfully bee bought
and sold. VVherefore this iurisdiction or
authoritie which for that it seemeth to bee annexed unto the territorie or land
(and yet in truth is not) and is thereof called Praediatorie, is proper vnto
them which are possessed of such lands, whether it bee by inheritance, or by
other lawfull right, and that as unto right and lawfull owners thereof, in
giuing fealtie and homage unto the soueraigne prince, or state, from whome all
great commaunds and iurisdictions flow, and in sauing also the soueraigne
rights of the kingdome, and the right of the last appeale.
Other publique officers there bee also which have neither iurisdiction nor
commaund,Some publique offices to be with out any
iurisdiction or commaund at al. but onely a certeine publique and
seruile charge: as the foure offices of the Waxe-chafers in this realme, by
right of inheritance belonging unto certein men, by the graunt of king Lewes. Diuers also
have attempted by processe of time to prescribe the offices of the Constables
both of Normandie and Champagne; as also the offices of the great
Chamberlaines, by right of inheritance to belong unto them: howbeit that in
that their sute they have beene often times by diuers decrees reiected, and
amongst others by one solemne one, in the records of the court made in the
yeare 1272. True it is that the word (Constable) was in auntient time no other
thing than the captaine of a companie, which they called a Constableship, as we
oftentimes read in Frosard. And in the records of the
Chamber of accounts I remember I have red, three hundred Constables to haue
beene at once in the armie. We read also that by the decree of the yeare 1274. Simon Countie of
Montfort was excluded from the successiue right which he pretended to the honor
of the Mareshalship D'la foy, which the lords of
Mirepoix challenge unto themselves in their styles. And forasmuch as certaine
Mareshals of Fraunce would have continued their estates in their posteritie and
successors,The states of the marshalships of Fraunce part
of the demaine of the crowne. they were embarred so to doe by a
decree made in Parliament the xxij of Ianuarie, in the yeare 1361, as is to be
found in the records of the court: wherein it is expresly set downe, That the
estates of the Marshalships of Fraunce should bee as part of the demaine of the
Crowne, and the execution thereof to remaine unto the Marshals so long as they
lived. And albeit that the power of the Mareshals was not of force but in time
of warre, (as was iudged by a decree of the xv of August in the yeare 1459,)
yet neuerthelesse the militarie discipline carried with it the power of the
sword, albeit that it were not giuen unto it
by expresse Edict or law; as in nothing communicating with the decrees and
lawes of civill pollicie, or of other the civill magistrats; which seemeth from
the auntient manners and customes of the Romans to have beene unto vs
translated. For albeit that the power of the sword, yea and of punishing with
rods also was by the law Portia taken from all the Roman magistrats (so that it
was not lawfull for any of them, or for all of them in the citie to beate or
scourge a Roman citisen, as we have before noted,) yet neuerthelesse the
Consull had still full power of life and death over the souldiours and men of
warre, (without which their militarie discipline could
neuer have bene kept and preserued) from whom there was no mean to appeal
Marshal magistrats and Generals must of necessitie have the
power of the sword giuen them. as saith Polybius, and for that cause saith he, the Consuls had royall power:
howbeit he marked not, that the Praetors, Dictators, Quaestors, and other
Generals of their armies, had euen the selfe same power. In like manner the
Constable of Fraunce by his letters of commission hath not the power of the
sword, or of life and death graunted unto him: but hauing the managing of the
warres, and conducting of the armyes, as in his absence the Mareshals of
Fraunce haue: the power of the sword is also left unto them, as without which
militarie discipline cannot possibly be maintained: which martiall power the
simple captaines abused also, putting their souldiours to death, with out any
forme or fashion of iust triall. unto that Henry the
second the French king, at the request of Francis
Colineus the Dandelot, then Colonell of the footmen, by expresse
edict forbid them any more so to do.
If then the martiall Magistrats and Generals have in every Commonweal the power
of the sword without any limitation or restriction unto the forme of proceeding
or of the punishment to be by them inflicted, according to the varietie of
crimes and offences, all being as it were left unto their owne discretion and
iudgement, a man then cannot truely say them to be but the simple executioners
of the law, considering that they have no law whereunto they are in this regard
subiect: and so consequently we may conclude, that the power of the sword is
transferred into their persons, that power now not remayning in the prince
alone. Whereby it also followeth, that they being present, may commit vnto
others, so much of that power and authoritie which they have by vertue of their place and office, as they
please, and retaine thereof unto themselves what shall seeme unto them good,
which they could in no wise doe, if by speciall law they were constrained and
bound, to heare & determine of matters themselves, and from word to word to
follow the solemnitie and paines set downe in the lawes. And this is it for
which the law saith, That the Praetor of the citie, being himselfe present,
might commit his authoritie and power to whom soeuer hee saw good, which the
Praetors for publike causes could not do: for the Praetor of the citie had the
hearing and disciding of all civill and criminall causes, (except such as they
called publique, as belonging to the common state) which fell out betwixt the
citisens of Rome: as had also the Praetor, established for the hearing of
causes betwixt straungers and citisens, who
according to their discretion condemned, or acquited such as were conuented
before them, moderating, correcting, or supplying the rigour or lenitie of the
law as they saw cause, which their power was limited by the will and discretion
of the Pretor so iudging, and not by the necessitie of the law. And yet when as
by the law or decree of the Senat, any particular cause otherwise out of their
iurisdiction was committed unto them, albeit that it were referred unto their
conscience to iudge thereof, yet neuerthelesse could they not in this case
commit the same unto others, as is to be seene by many examples noted by the
lawyers. Which point so manifested leadeth vs unto the disciding of an other
question by vs before propounded: viz. That the
power and authoritie graunted vnto
Magistrats by vertue of their office, is proper vntoThe
power and authoritie graunted unto magistrats by vertue of their office,
proper unto the office and not to the person of the magistrats. the
office, albeit that the honour and dignitie of the office be not proper vnto
the person: for Papinian saying, That Commissioners and
Lieutenants have nothing proper unto themselves, but that they vse the power
and authoritie of them, which have commissionate and deputed them, sufficiently
showeth, that the power is proper unto them which so commissionate and deputed
them, whether they be Soueraigne Princes, or Magistrats hauing power so to doe.
And so in like case the law sayth, That the Gouernour of a countrey or
prouince, hath within his government all power and authoritie next unto his
Prince: wherefore it is not then onely in the prince. But the difficultie of this question dependeth principally on this
distinction, (whereunto the interpretours of
the law have had no regard,) as namely, that it is great difference to say that
the power or authoritie is proper unto the Magistrat in the qualitie of a
magistrat, or in the qualitie of a particular person: for it followeth not,
that if the authoritie or iurisdiction be proper unto the Praetorship, that
therefore the Praetorship should be proper unto the person: but to the
contrarie the law saith, That he hath it in trust, and that he is but the
keeper thereof. So we call the Prouost of Paris the keeper of the Prouostship
of that citie; which is to speake properly, and to show, that the estates and
offices rest and remaine in the possession and propertie of the Commonweale,
asThe proprietie of offices to belong unto the
Commonweale: and to be with the magistrate but as things left with them in
trust. a thing put in trust unto the magistrat. And for that cause
the Bailiffes of cities and townes are so called of the word (Bail,) that is to
say Gardiens or keepers. So also the
Florentines called the Ten men deputed to the keeping of their state and
soueraigntie by the name of Bailifes. And that is it for which the Court of
parliament in the decree concerning the Mareschals of Fraunce (before noted)
saith, That their estate was of the proper demaine of the Crowne, as thereunto
properly appertaining, and the exercise thereof belonging unto them so long as
they lived. And so we may discide theWhen the power and
authoritie lieth in the magistrate, and when not. generall question,
and discusse the controuersie betwixt Lothaire, and Azon, who spake but of the power of the sword onely: and
conclude, that as oft and whensoeuer the Magistrats and Commissioners are bound
by the lawes and decrees, to vse the power and authoritie which is giuen them,
in such prescript forme and manner as is therein set downe, whether it be in
the forme of proceeding, or concerning the punishment; without power for the magistrats to adde or diminish any
thing thereunto, or from: in this case they are but meere executors and
ministers of the lawes and of the princes, from whom they have their
authoritie: yet not hauing any power in this point or respect in themselves,
whether it be concerning civill pollicie, or the administration of justice, or
the mannaging of warre, or treaties to be had betwixt princes, or the charges
of Embassadours: but in that which is left or committed to the magistrates
integritie and discretion, in that case the power and authoritie lyeth in
themselves.
Now as in every Commonweale there are two principall points which the
magistratsTwo things to be alwaies in euerie Commonweale
by the magistrate principally respected. ought alwaies to have before
their eyes: that is to say, the Law, and Equitie: so say we, that there is also
the execution of the law, and the dutie of the magistrat, which the auntients called Legis
actionem, and Iudicis officium: or as we say,
the action or execution of the law, and duetie of the judge; which is to
commaund, to decree, or to put in execution. And as the word Iudicium, or judgement, is properly vnderstood of that which is
ordained by the magistrat following the strict tearmes and tenour of theThe difference betwixt a iudgment & a decree, and so
likewise of magistrats, which have power and authoritie in themselves, and
others which have not. law: so the word Decretum, is likewise properly vnderstood of that which the magistrat
ordaineth or decreeth, following equitie without the prescript law; the law it
selfe being still referred to the strict execution thereof, and equitie vnto
the duetie of the magistrat. And for this cause all the decrees of the Prince
are properly called Decreta, and not Iudicia, Decrees I say not judgements: for why the soueraigne prince
is not subiect unto the law; wherein they deceiue themselves, which take a
decree to be any thing else then the resolute
sentence of the Senat in their consultations: or the decree of a soueraigne
prince, or the voluntarie ordinance of a magistrat, without being bound to law
or custome in the making thereof. Now such proportion as there is of the law
unto the execution thereof, the like there is of equitie unto the office of the
judge. And so likewise of magistrats, who in case wherein they are not subiect
to the law, resemble arbitrators: but being strictly and wholly bound unto the
law, are but as judges appointed to vnderstand of the fact onely, without any
power of themselves to determine of the merit or iustice of the cause,
otherwise than the verie strictnesse of the law
appointeth. Now of these the one is is seruile, the other is noble; the one is
bound unto the law, the other is not so; the
one vnderstandeth but of the fact, the other of the right; the one is proper
unto the magistrat, the other is reserued unto the law; the one is precisely
written in the law, the other is without the lawes: the one is in the
magistrats power, and the other quite without the same. And the better to note
and perceiue this difference, the law saith, That it is not lawfull for a man
to appeale from the punishment set downe by the law, being pronounced by the
magistrat, but onely fromNo appealing from the lawe: and
why? that the judge hath declared and denounced the partie accused to
be guiltie: whereas it is right lawfull for a man to appeale from the
punishment which the judge by his owne discretion appointeth: For he which
appealeth from the law, appealeth from the prince, from whome no appeale is to
be made. And thus much concerning the distinction of the power of magistrats, whereby not onely the question
of Lothaire and Azon is decided,
but many others also concerning the charge and duetie of magistrats, wherewith
diuers have sore entangled themselves, some mistaking the practise, and some
the theorique, but most part, for not hauing vnderstood the Roman estate,
albeit that they were well exercised and seene in all the parts of their lawes,
and yet neuerthelesse in the state of magistrats, concerning their power and
authoritie they found themselves greatly troubled. For Moulin himselfe (the honour of lawyers) not vsing the distinctions by
vs before set downe, hath without reason followed the opinion of Alciat and Lothaire: Whereunto he
addeth the Pretors of cities, whome wee call Bailifes, and Seneshals, by the
lawes of this realme, to have had the power taken from them for the appointing of their deputies: for that they are but
as simple vsagers or occupiers, and that he which hath a thing but onely to vse
and occupie, cannot make any other vsager or occupier but himselfe; which is a
reason without apparance, as we have before shewed. VVhereunto ioyne also, that
it is not past an hundred or six score yeares at the most, since that Charles the seuenth, and the eight, were the first which
made an office of the Lieutenants, or deputies of Bailifes and Seneschals. For
if Moulin his opinion were grounded upon reason, why
should Papinian expresly say, That magistrats may depute
and commit in their presence so much and so long, and with such limitation as
they themselves please, of such things as they have by vertue of their office,
and which are proper to their estate? Now
their magistrats estates and offices in auntient time were much lesse proper,
and lesse appropriat unto the persons, than they be at this present. For with
vs they are perpetuall, and in Rome they continued but for one yeare; and
therefore might with much better reason than they appoint their lieutenants or
deputies. Besides that, the lawyers themselves have made and written diuers
expresse bookes concerning lieutenants and deputies, which were all to no
purpose, if the comparison of him, which hath but the vse onely unto the
magistrat, were to be admitted and receiued. And as for others, the auntient
doctors and interpretors of the law; they have in such sort entangled
themselves, as that it euidently appeareth them to have had no insight into the estate or government of the
Roman Commonweale: without which it is impossible to determine any thing
concerning these questions. For whereas the Romans had properly separated the
office of the Proconsuls Lieutenant, whome they called Legatum, from the office of the Proconsull himselfe: and so of the
deputie tearmed a particular Commissioner, whome they called Iudicem datum, from the Commissioner himselfe, and of him unto whome
power was giuen by the magistrat to commaund, whome they called Eum cui mandata inrisdictio est, the doctors haue
confounded all together under the name of Delegats, which were a thing too
long, and too superfluous to refute, hauing proposed unto ourselues no other
end, but to entreat of that which concerneth the estate and duetie of
magistrats in generall.
It is also worth the noting, that in Popular and
Aristocratique estates, such as were The Magistrates in Popular and Aristocratique estats much
more bound nto the prescript lawes then in a
regall Monarchie. those of the Greekes, and of the Italians, their
chiefe drift was so much as they could, so to bind their magistrats,
gouernours, ambassadours, captaines, lieutenants, and other their great
officers & ministers unto their lawes, as that they should not one iot
swarue or stray therefrom: which the auntients did much more than they of our
time: whereas in a regall monarchie it is quite otherwise, where in publike
iudgements all paines and penalties, and in priuat iudgements that which
concerneth euerie priuat mans right, is left to be iudged and determined
according to the discretion of the magistrat. And albeit that Iustinian the emperour made a law, That euerie mans right should be
tried by the law, so to have kept the magistrats within the power of the lawes:
yet was that his law to no purpose, but much troubled all the judges and
lawyers, willing to obserue the same his law,
being impossible to be kept, and incompatible with the other auntient former
lawes. For why, that which concerneth euerie mans right, consistethWhy in triall of priuat mens right, as also in publique
iudgements, many things are to be left unto the wisedome and conscience of
the magistrat? in fact, and not in the law: by which words Paulus (the great lawyer) seemeth euen by the root to
have cut up all the opinions of all the interpretors of the law, being not only
in number almost infinit, but also altogether inexplicable, thereby giuing men
to vnderstand, that that which concerneth euerie mans right, ought not only in
priuat, but euen in publike iudgements also to be left unto the fidelitie,
integritie, conscience, and wisedome of the magistrat. VVhich with vs is by a
royall constitution prouided for, and by the vse of iudiciall proceedings, in
respect of the infinit varietie of causes, places, times, and persons: which
for that they are infinit, can in no lawes, writings, or tables, be comprised, and much lesse under any certaine rule
be comprehended.
Now I have before said, that there was a new officer erected in Rome, who was
theThe power of the Prouost or Praetor in the citie of
Rome. Prouost or Pretor of the citie, with power giuen him, to
correct, supply, and amend, the lawes and customes, in that which concerned his
iurisdiction, so farre as hee saw good in priuat iudgements: and euerie yeare
the new chosen Pretor in the Tribunall seat appointed for the making of
orations, after he had thanked the people for the honour he had of them
receiued, gaue them there to vnderstand of his edicts, and in what sort his
purpose was to administer the law. VVhich his edicts he caused afterwards to
bee painted, and set up in some publike place: which for al that were not
lawes, neither had the force of lawes, but
were only edicts (that is to say, the magistrats commands) wherunto neither the
people, nor the Senat, nor the Consuls, nor the other Pretors, nor the
Tribunes, not yet the successors in the selfe same office, were not in any wise
bound, but onely particular men, and they also but in that which was within the
Pretors power and authoritie, as concerning their priuat suits, and businesse
betwixt man and man. And therefore Cicero taunting Verres, intemperatly abusing the power and authoritie of
his Pretorship, saith, Quiplurimum edicto tribuunt legem annu
amappellant, tu plus edicto complecteris quàm lege, They which
attribute most unto an edict, call it but an annuall law, but thou
comprehendest more in an edict, than in a law. For the magistrat how great
soeuer he be, cannot of himselfe derogat from the law, and much lesse abrogat
the same: for these things we have shewed properly to belong vnto
soueraigntie. Neither must we vnderstand,
that the * lawyer when he saith, That the Pretor mightPapinian. correct, amend, or supply the laws, that he had therefore
power to derogat from them, or to disanull them, which is the highest point of
soueraigntie: but that hee might by the authoritie of his office expound the
obscure lawes, and in what they might with equitie be extended, yet without
breaking or impugning the same. And that is it, for which the law generally
saith, That the Pretor neuer could giue possession of the goods unto them, who
by the lawes and ordinances could not be the heires. Neither was it also in the
power of the Pretors, nor yet of all the magistrats together, to make an heire of him which by the lawes could be none; for
why, that was to be done onely by vertue of
the law, whereby the magistrat by his definitiue sentence declared, the
succession to belong to such, or such a man, whome the law or the testator had
appoined heire. And albeit that diuers of the
Pretors edicts were more reasonable and indifferent then the lawes themselves;
yet so it was, that the first Pretor that would, might (without regard unto all
the edicts of his predecessors) make all new, or againe reuiue such lawes,
which by reason of their antiquitie, were before buried in obliuion. And this
was the cause that the Tribune Aebutius presented a
request unto the people, which passed in force of a law; which was that the
lawes of the twelue tables, which by long tract of time were then growne out of
vse, might by an expresse law bee repealed and abolished: which law needed not,
if the Pretors by vertue of their edicts had had power to derogat from the positiue lawes. Yea the Pretors
themselves did not alwaies in the administration of iustice follow their owne
edicts, but spared not sometime to giue iudgement quite contrarie unto them,
especially if the equitie of the causes upon some straunge occurrents so
required; sometimes also chaunging them for the grudge or favour that they bare
unto certaine priuat men: which thing Cicero by way of
reproach obiected to Verres, saying, Ille nulla religione motus, contrà quàm edixerat, decernebat, That he
moued with no religion, iudged quite contrarie unto that which hee himselfe had
before decreed. Howbeit that this reproach was but a flourish of the Orators,
and not of any great importance: For as no man was subiect unto the law which
hee himselfe made, so also might he upon good and iust cause derogat from the
same. Yet certaine yeares before it was
enacted by the people at the motion of Cornelius the
Tribune, That the Pretors, and so euerie other magistrat also should bee
constrained in giuing of iudgement, to obserue their owne edicts by themselves
published and set up at their first entrance into their office, and not to
depart therefrom; which cut off many courtesies and favours which the
magistrats before shewed unto such as they thought good. Neuerthelesse this law
being published without the good liking and consent of many: and also contrarie
unto the nature of lawes (which can neuer bind them that made them) was shortly
after abolished. Howbeit that the magistrats for their owne particular, and in
their owne causes, were constrained to endure the same edicts, iudgements, and
decrees, which they themselves had made, and caused to be executed uppon
others: yet that notwithstanding the
magistrats were alwaies at libertie, to derogat from their owne edicts, or to
alter the same, whether they were published for the whole yeare that they were
Pretors, or for a moneth, or for some few dayes or howres. For generally the
law saith, That the magistrat may reuoke that which he hath decreed, andThe Magistrat may reuoke his owne decree or commaunds, but not
his iudgement once giuen. forbid that which he hath commaunded,
although that he cannot reuoke that which he hath once iudged and pronounced
sentence of. For that iudgements and decrees giuen or made upon the hearing of
a cause, cannot without iniurie be reuersed or changed, as also for that
nothing ought to be more firme and sure then iudgements once giuen, as whereby
all civill societie is especially maintained: wherein many interpretors
of the law have deceiued themselves,
calling the magistrats simple commaunds, precepts, and not edicts: whereas an
edict (as saith Varro) is nothing els but Magistratus iussum (that is to say) the magistrats
commaund, and whereof another errour hath risen also, viz. That such the magistrats simple commaunds should bind no man: For
so the auntient doctors affirme. VVhich their opinion, if it were true,
wherefore thenThe Magistrates simple cōmands of right ought
to be obeyed. should the law commaund vs to obey the magistrats bare
commaund, without regard whether it be iust or vniust? Or why should the lawyer
Maetian say, Reipublicae interesse,
vt iniustis & ambitiosis decretis pareatur, It behoueth the
Commonweale, that euen vniust and proud decrees (of the magistrats) should be
obeyed. Yea and all the auntient Philosophers and law
makers, have more religiously recommended nothing unto vs, not onely than the lawes, but euen than the
writings and decrees of the wise. Now it is more reasonable to obey a simple
verball commaund, which is but for a day or an howre (if we doubt or mislike of
the equitie thereof) than to the commaundements which were for a yeare, as were
all the edicts of the magistrats: besides that it was more easie to performe
the one than the other. And that more is, the lawes, the ordinances, the
decrees, and sentences, of themselves bind no man, if the commission (that is
to say, the magistrats commaund) be not on foot. And therefore the Roman
Pretors, and other their great magistrats, seldome times troubled themselves
with giuing of iudgements, but were still occupied in appointing of judges, in
commaunding and the putting in execution of the sentences and iudgements of
such iudges as had by them bene appointed.
Whose verball commands (as these men tearme them) had they bene of no force to
bind men, the decrees and iudgements of such as were by them appointed, should
have bene to no end or purpose, neither should they have bene obeied. And
therefore the law permitteth all magistrats by punishment or penaltie to cause
their commaunds to be obeyed, without distinction whether they bee
commaundements verball, or by way of commission, or by decrees by them made, or
by iudgements by them giuen.
Of this errour (for not obeying the magistrats command) is risen also a farre
greater,Whether priuat men may by force resist the
Magistrate offering them violence or wrong. some defending that it is
lawfull for men in fact, and by force to resist the magistrates, offering them
violence, (for that is the word which they vse) whether it be in the
administration of iustice, or otherwise out of
the same. Howbeit that the difference is great betwixt the one and the other:
for that the magistrat out of iudgement, and out of the qualitie of a
magistrat, is no more but as a particular man, and so if he by word or deed
wrong any man, he may be resisted, in such sort as the law permitteth: but in
the execution of his charge within his power, not exceeding the bounds of his
iurisdiction, there is no doubt but that he ought to be obeyed, whether it bee
right or wrong, as saith the law. But if he shall exceed his authoritie or
power, a man is not bound to obey him, especially if the excesse be in it selfe
notorious, but may defend himselfe by oppositions and appeales: but if he may
not appeale, or that the magistrat will not admit his appeale, but proceed
against him; in this case it is to be considered, whether the griefe be to be recouered, or otherwise irrecouerable: which if
it be to be recouered, no resistance is then to be made against the magistrat;
but if the case be irrecouerable, as in question of life, or of corporall
punishment, and that the magistrat will needs proceed without regard of any
appeale, in this case it is lawful for every man to make resistance, not of
purpose to crosse or offend the magistrat, but onely to defend the life of the
innocent man in danger, yet so farre as that it be done without fraud or
seditious tumult: not for the violating of the magistrat, as we said, but for
the deliverance of him which is with iniurie by the magistrat oppressed. As
when Appius Claudius enflamed with the desire and lust
of the faire maiden Virginia, (wresting the lawes) was
about to giue sentence against her libertie, Virginius
her father to preserue the honour of his
house, and wishing rather the death of his so faire a daughter, than that she
should so loose her virginitie, slew her openly with his owne hand, and so set
all the citie on an uproare. Which desperat boldnes of the man was not indeed
to have beene suffered, neither ought the quiet estate of the Commonweale to be
with suchPriuat men are not to iudge whether the Magistrat
do them wrong or not. outragious facts troubled, what violence soeuer
be done by the magistrat. Howbeit that it belongeth not unto priuat men to
iudge whether the magistrat offer to doe wrong, or not: which to determine, if
it appertaine but unto the greater magistrats, or the Prince onely, in vaine
then it is to aske whether priuat men may by force resist the magistrates, offering them violence? but onely this, whether
Magistrats which go about to put in execution
their sentences of life and death, or for the inflicting of some corporall
punishment, contrarie unto appeales from them made, may of right bee withstood?
which that they lawfully may be, I doubt not, so that it be done without fraud
or tumult, in cases of life and death: but if iudgement be of goodes, or fines,
or imprisonment, I thinke it not to be lawfull, for that all these things may
be amended, either by intercessions, or by appeales, or by actions of
trespasse, or iniurie, or by way of petition. But in other causes lawfull it is
not by the law either of God or man toIn what cases the
magistrates offering wrong, may of right in their iudgements be
withstood? withstand the magistrat offering vs violence: as many
euill taught, and worse instincted in civill pollicie and gouernement most
daungerously affirme: by whose positions (if they will be like themselves) the
estates of all cities and Empires must needs be troubled and confounded. For if it were lawfull for the subiects by force to
defend themselves against the magistrats, they might upon the same reasons and
grounds resist their soueraigne Princes also, and tread the lawes vnderfoot.
Wherefore we see the lawmakers and lawyers to have respected nothing more, than
to keepe all force, and violence, not from the magistrats onely, but euen from
priuat men themselves, hauing violence in so great detestation, as that they
have restored euen theeves andViolence in Cōmonweales, to
be alwaies detested. robbers into places, vniustly by them possessed,
if they were from thence by force cast out, and excluded the true owners
thereof from their rights for proceeding by way of force. And albeit that some
particular men hauing territoriall iurisdiction, may (in the opinion of many)
in a sort in their owne right of themselves lay violent hand, upon the land holding of them: when as the vassall
neglecteth his duetie unto his Lord, yet the truer opinion is that he cannot in
his owne cause so doe, for that it is a thing iniurious and vnreasonable, that
any man should be a judge in his owne cause, or giue sentence for himselfe. Now
the law which forbiddeth priuat men to doe that, which ought to be done by the
magistrat, hath this reason ioyned with it, lest occasion should be giuen of
greater sturre and tumult. The law also of the xij Tables, which saith: Vis in populo abesto, Let violence be from among the
people, is not to be vnderstood onely of violence to be done by force of armes,
whether it be publiquely or priuately done: but also when men would have things
otherwise done then by the ordinarie way of
justice: as when things are done by priuat mens authoritie, which should haue
beene done by the Magistrat or judge. And if it bee not lawfull for the true
lord or owner to put his seale unto his owne things being in the possession of
an other man; how then should it be lawfull unto the territoriall lord of
himselfe to enter or seize upon lands, the propertie whereof belongeth unto an
other man? Wherefore the opinion of Plato is to be of vs
reiected, who in his bookes of lawes hath left the shamefull violence and abuse
offered unto maydens or boyes, to be revenged by their kinsfolke, and not by
the Magistrat.
Now of this question dependeth an other; as whether the Magistrat may
revengeWhether the magistrat may revenge the wrong and
iniurie offered him as he sitteth in place of iustice. the wrong and
iniurie offered him, as he sitteth in place of justice: whereof what to say
the lawiers have not yet determined.
Neuerthelesse without entering into farther dispute, it is and alwaies hath
beene lawfull for all Magistrats exercising their estate or commission, to
condemne or chastice them, which giue unto them rash or contumelious speech,
and to proceed against them by way of fine, or by seizing upon their bodies or
goods, according to the power and authoritie unto them giuen; if the wrong or
iniurie offered be not such as may deserue corporall punishment: for then the
magistrat ought to lay aside his publique person, and to receiue iustice at an
other mans hand. But yet if the iniurie be done unto the whole companie or
bench of Iudges, or Magistrats, in this case they may enquire and iudge of the
crime or offence, and so altogether lawfully do that
which they could not do apart: and the reason seemeth to be, for that in so doing they punish not the wrong done
unto themselves, but unto the Commonweale, which is therein farre more wronged
than are they which bearePriuat iniurie soo nest by
sufferance buried. the persons of magistrates. And albeit that the
law saith, That the action of iniurie is easely to be forgiuen, and that it is
soonest by sufferance buried; that is to be vnderstood of particular men, &
not of publique persons, and especially of Magistrats unto whomThat the person of the magistrat ought to be alwaies sacred and
inuiolat. whosoeuer shall offer
violence, is by the law in danger of treason. And for this cause an outrage
committed against the person of a Magistrate, the indignitie of the fact is
together with the heauinesse of the punishment therby encreased▪ and that not
onely when he exerciseth his estate, but also in what place soeuer it be
wherein he carrieth with him the marks and tokens of his office, or is knowen
to be such a man, he ought to be inuiolable,
and as the auntient Latins say, Sacrosanctus, or most
holy: for that word the law, Horatia (published for the safetie of Magistrats)
vseth, conceiued in these words: Qui Tribunis plebis,
Aedilibus, Iudicibus nocuerit eius caput Ioui sacrum esto; familia ad aedem
Cereris, liberi, liber aequè vaenum ito, He that shall hurt the
Tribunes of the people, the Aedils, or Iudges, let his head be sacrificed to
Iupiter, and his familie and children, male and female, sold at the Temple of
Ceres. Wherein some are of opinion that the word Iudicibus (or judges) is meant or to be vnderstood of the consuls, who
were afterwards the onely judges amongst all the magistrats: whereof they haue
some probabilitie, for they were first called Pretors, and after that Iudges;
and after that their iurisdiction for the citie was giuen to one speciall
Pretor, they were called Consuls. Howbeit
neuerthelesse it seemeth that the law Horatia hauing put the judges after the
Tribunes, and the Aediles whome they called Aedituos
(for why, the great and honourable Aediles, whome they called Curules, were not yet erected) was meant to comprehend all judges;
considering withall, that the law it selfe was not published at the request or
motion of any of the Tribunes, or in disgrace of the Consuls, but at the motion
of Horatius the Consull himselfe. And this law Horatia
was made fortie foure yeares after the sacred law Iunia, made for the safetie
of the Tribunes of the people: whereby they were as by a speciall law, more
religiously prouided for than were the rest of the magistrats. VVhereby it
appeareth this law to appertaine to all magistrats, but especially unto judges,
whose lives and persons are the more subiect to all daungers, in that they are to iudge of the lives, honour,
and goods of all the subiects. And therefore the law saith not, That he that
killeth the judges (shall die therefore) but if hee shall offer them neuer so
little violence; that is to say, Si nocuerit, which is,
if hee but hurt them. And well it is to be noted, that it is not said, as they
are exercising their authoritie and iurisdiction onely, but euen in what other
place soeuer they bee: which otherwise were but to open a gap to have them
slaine in euerie other place where they at not in
iudgement. So when as with vs a certaine noble gentleman beeing called
intoAn heauie sure upon a man
for striking of a magistrat. question, had with his sword wounded one
of the judges of the court of Paris, not as then sitting in iudgement: the
court condemned to have his right hand cut off, his
bodie afterward to be quartered, his goods confiscated, and a most great fine
to bee paid unto the judge. But if the
magistrat disguised, or walking the streets by night to doe any man harme,
shall himselfe chance to be by any man hurt, hee cannot redresse such his wrong
as done unto a magistrat, but as unto a priuat man. So Aulus
Hostilius the Aedile, when as by night hee had attempted to have broken
open a Courtisans doores, was there grieuously hurt: whereof he complaining
unto the people▪ in hope to have found some good remedie, was sent away with
shame enough▪ for that the outrage unto him done, was not to be punished as
done unto a magistrat. VVhich ought not to seeme strange, seeing that one of
the Tribunes, who had vnlawfully abused a boy, and
taken by the Capitall Triumuiri, was by him punished as a slaue or stranger
(the rest of the Tribunes his fellowes
forsaking him, as abhorring his most filthy lust) albeit that the sacred lawes
forbid upon paine of death to offend the Tribune, or to commaund him to be
punished for what thing soeuer. In like case if the magistrats went roaming up
and downe masked, and priuat men went masked also, carrying with them the
markes of magistrats, as in Rome they did during the feast of Cybele: if any
iniurie happened to be so done unto the magistrat, it was not punished as done
unto a magistrat, but unto a priuat person: howbeit that out of these cases the
magistrat is to be holden for such as he is, in what place soeuer he be.
Neither is it not onely vnlawfull to offend or abuse the magistrats by word or
deed,Magistrats to be religeously
respected. but necessarie it is, that we should duetifully respect
and honour them, as them unto whome God hath
giuen this power: which thing we see the auntient Romans (from whom the
fountaines of law and iustice flowed into all the world) to have much more
religiously obserued, than did the other nations. For the Censors disgraced and
degraded from his order a bourgeous of the citie, by taking away from him his
horse, for that he had but coughed and spauled a little too lowd in their
presence. And Vectius a citisen of Rome, for not rising
unto the Tribune of the people, but passing by him, was by the people slaine.
Yea the law it selfe calleth it sacrilege, not to reuerence the magistrat. VVe
vnderstand also not the same, but yet great reuerence to have beene giuen vnto
the magistrats euen amongst the Greekes also, in that it was not lawfull for a
man to laugh in the councell of the Areopagits. VVe read also, that Fabius Maximus his sonne
seeing his father a farre off comming towards him, and that the Lictors or
officers for his fatherly reuerence durst not cause him to alight from his
horse, commaunded him himselfe to alight: which his commaund the father
obeying, alighted and embraced his sonne, making much more of him, than if he
had done otherwise. For domesticall power (as saith the law) ought to stoope
unto publike authoritie. True it is, that in those times and in those places
offices were giuen to vertue, and not to them that offered most: for then
verily was the time wherein rewards were set up for vertue: Howbeit that the
lawes against ambition, and the auntient histories sufficiently declare honours
and offices to have bene oftentimes in Rome, de lapide
emptos, as saith Cicero. But howsoever power and
authoritie be got, whether it be by favour, by wealth, or force of armes, we must not therefore contemne the
magistrat, which cannot bee done without the contempt of God, from whome he
hath his authoritie, in whatsoeuer fo it be. As
witnesseth that speech of God unto Samuel judge of
Israel, now growne weake with age: whose commaunds when as the people did
refuse, It is not thee (saith he) but me, whome they have despised.
Now if these deriders of authoritie and power, be not to be moued either with
the feare of God, or the touch of religion, yet can they not denie, but that it
is more than necessarie for priuat men to obey, respect and honour the
magistrats, for the defence of Commonweales, and of the civill societie of men.
Which the aunrient Poets have unto vs well set
forth in their deuised fables, making the goddesse Pitharchie (which signifieth the obedience of subiects unto their
princes and magistrats) wife unto Iupiter▪ Sauiour: and
of that marriage Eutuchia (that is to say Felicitie) to
have bene engendredThe dutie of the magistrat for the
maintenance of his reputation. and borne. Wherefore the magistrat on
his part also ought to giue a good opinion of himselfe, for his iustice,
wisedome, and sufficiencie, that so the subiects may have occasion to honour
and reuerence him: and not by his vnworthinesse to suffer the honour of the
Commonweale to be troden vnderfoot or despised: for the fault which in a priuat
man is but light, is in the person of the magistrat doubled. And therefore Solo in his lawes gaue leaue to kill the drunken magistrat, without any
daunger of punishment therefore. Truely an
vnreasonable law, for that it was thereby to be feared, least under the pretence of drunkennesse the magistrats life
should be oftentimes endaungered. VVhereby yet we may gather, how much vice was
then detested, as also with what integritie, seueritie, and wisdome, magistrats
ought to excell other men. And yet ought we not to imitat them, who by the
rigour of punishment seeke to bee accounted seuere; or by their too much
lenitie, desire to be accounted gentle, both the one and the other being
therefore worthily reproued by the law. VVherein many have mistakenLenitie of rig neither of them
commendable in a magistrat. themselves, who hauing extraordinarie
power to punish without law, have thought equitie to consist in lenitie and
mercie, repugnant to the rigour of the lawes: howbeit that equitie is of such a
nature, as that it in nothing communicateth either with rigour, or with mercie;
but declining from both the extreames, crueltie (I say) and mercie, keepeth clemencie, the preseruer of them both: not
vnlike the Lesbian rule, which being of lead, yeelded as well unto the one side
as to the other. Now if the offence be greater than the punishment appointed in
the ordinarie lawes, the magistrat hauing extraordinarie iurisdiction and power
may as an upright iudge augment the punishment. So if the fault be lesse, he
may with like equitie mitigat the punishment by the rigour of the law
appointed. And truely the magistrat in seeking to be accountedLenitie more hurtful in a magistrat than seueritie.
pitifull offendeth more, than if he should seeme to be cruell: For crueltie,
although it be indeed to be blamed, yet keepeth it the subiects in obedience
unto the laws, for feare of punishment; whereas too much lenitie giueth
libertie unto offence, and causeth the magistrat himselfe, the lawes, yea and
the prince which established the lawes, to bee altogether contemned. And this is it for which the law of God expresly
forbiddeth to have any pitie of the poore in iudgement. Some others there bee,
which iudge wellGrauitie bst
beseemeth a magistrat. and uprightly, enclining neither unto crueltie
nor mercie, but yet cannot keepe that grauitie and seueritie which best
beseemeth a magistratias in our time one of the chiefe magistrats of this
realme, who in the highest seat of iustice, and euen then when he pronounced
the sentence of death upon the condemned, would with one merrie conceit or
other, minister unto the hearers occasion of laughter. VVhereas Augustus Gaesar did farre otherwise, who albeit that he
was accounted a sincere and upright iusticiar, yet for all that he neuer
pronounced sentence of death upon any, but with deepe sighes fet euen from the
bottome of his heart. Some other to the contrarie, all enraged, threaten and reuile them whom they giue iudgement of: as did
ordinarily the emperour Claudius, who one day with a
countenance more like a beast than an emperour, strucke him in the face with a
pen knife, whom he was to pronounce sentence of death of. Yet blame I not the
graue exhortations, and bitter reproofes of the magistrat unto the offendors,
and then especially, when as hee meaneth to vse more lenitie than the rigour
and extremitie of the law requireth. For why, it is one of the things most
requisit in a magistrat to cause the offendors to have the better understanding
and feeling of the greatnesse of their offences: that so they may the better
also perceiue and see what they have therefore deserued, and so to be the
rather induced to repentance. But it were a kind of iniurie, and not beseeming
the authoritie and wisedome of a magistrat to
charge him whome he hath condemned to death, with opprobrious words also. Papirius Cursor was of all that lived in his time (than
which none is said to have benePapirius Cursor a notable
man. more plentifull of vertues) a man most famous both at home and
abroad in the wars, but so terrible with the maiestie of his commaund, as that
hee caused euen the stoutest of his followers to tremble and quake at the force
of his commaunding speech: which his roughnesse of speech he for all that
wisely tempered with great lenitie in the executing of punishment. As when the
generall of the Prenestines was come unto him with his promised aid after the
battaile fought & the victorie obtained▪ Paperius
with sterne countenance, and such speech as caused all
there present to tremble thereat, hauing first
reproued him, forth with commaunded one of the Lictors to vnbind his bundle of
rods, and to make readie his axe: the fearefull captaine in the meane time
expecting nothing but present death, when sodenly Paptrius commaunded the same Lictor standing readie with the axe in
his hand, to have done execution (as all men thought) but to cut up a stub of a
tree which stood in his walke, and condemned the negligent captaine in a great
fine, which he right willingly paid, with great thankes that hee had so spared
him his life. Whome if he had put to death, it was in daunger least that those
his followers the Romans allies would have thereupon reuolted: which so great a
fault no doubt Papirius would not have pardoned a Roman.
But as there is great differenceMore seueritie to be
required in a Martial magistrat then in a ciuil which seueritie ought not
yet to passe into cruelty. betwixt faults which are committed in
warre, and elsewhere (for that as an antient captaine said, In martial matters men scarcely offend twice) so must
the militarie magistrats vse another manner of fashion of commaunding, of
punishing, and execution of penalties, than must the magistrats in time of
peace. For that the discipline of warre ought to be much more seuere than the
domesticall or civill government. And yet for all that ought not this martiall
rigour to passe into crueltie, nor the generall to exceed the bounds of
seueritie, as many commaunders do, who in nothing show themselves valiant, but
in killing their souldiors without hearing. As Seneca
propoundeth one act of Piso the Proconsull, for an
example of his notorious crueltie towards his souldiours.The
notorious crueltie of Piso the Proconsull. For seeing a souldiour
returning alone out of the field into the campe, from forraging, in a rage
condemned him to death, for that he was returned out of the field without
his companion, charging him, That hee had
slayne him: the souldiour still alleaging, That his fellow was comming after
him: which his excuse for all that Piso would not admit,
but sent him presently to be executed. But lo, whilest that the execution was
about to be done, he sodenly returned who was supposed to have bene slaine.
VVherupon the captaine which had the charge to see the execution done, returned
to the Proconsull with both the souldiours, who embrasing one the other, were
with great applause and reioycing of their fellow souldiours brought before
him: Wherewith the Proconsull enraged, caused them all three to bee put to
death: The first, for that hee was before condemned: The second, for that he
was the cause of his fellowes condemnation: And
the captaine, for that hee had not done what hee was by him his generall
commanded. So that for the appearing of one innocent mant, he put three to
death: which was not iustly to vse, but most cruelly to abuse his authoritie.
VVhich his crueltie was so much the more to be detested, for that there was
there no meanes to appeale, nor prince to flye vnto, nor civill exception to
bee taken, by reason of the rigour of the militarie discipline. And thus much
concerning the power and authoritie of Magistrats over particular and priuat
men: It remaineth now to speake also of the power and duetie of one of them
towards another.
CHAP. VI. ¶ Of the mutuall duties of Magistrates among
themselves, and of the power that one of them hath over an other.
IN every well ordered Commonweale there be three
degrees ofThree degrees of Magistrats in every well ordered
Commonweale. Magistrates: The highest, which is of them which may be
called soueraigne magistrats, and know none greater then themselves, but the
soueraigne Maiestie onely: The middle sort which obey their superiours, and yet
commaund others: And the lowest degree of all, which is of them which have no
commaund at all over any other magistrats, but
onely over particular men subiect to their iurisdiction. Now of soueraigne
magistrats, some have power to commaund all magistrats without exception, and
other some acknowledge no superiour but the soueraigne Maiestie, and yet haue
no power over all the rest of the magistrats which are placed in the middle
& lowest degrees, but over such onely as are subiect unto their
iurisdiction. Of the first sort of soueraigne magistrates which have power ouer
all others, and that know none their superiours, but the soueraigne power,
there are but verie few, and fewer at this present then in auntient time: for
that it is by daily experience found, nothing to be more dangerous in a
Commonweale, then for some oneDaungerous in a Commonweale to
giue power to one Magistrat to command over all the rest. magistrat
to be aboue the rest, who may lawfully commaund all the rest, aswell priuate
persons as magistrats, wanting himselfe but
one step or degree to mount unto the soueraigntie, and that especially if his
soueraigne magistrate which hath such power bee alone, and without a companion,
hauing all in his owne hand: as had sometime the Grand Prouost of the Empire,
whom they called Praefectum Praetorio, who had commaund
over all the Magistrates throughout the whole Empire, and might receiue the
appeales from all the other magistrates and gouernours; but might not be
appealed from himselfe, no not although the appeal were made euen unto the
Emperour himselfe, albeit that the first which were promoted to this dignitie
and honour, were but captaines of the praetorian legions: as Seius Strabo the first that was preferred unto this office under Augustus: and
after that Seianus under Tiberius. Which honour the other succeeding Emperours thought good to
bestow upon such as of whose integritie, fidelitie, and deuotion towards them
they had had good experience and proofe: such as they would in some sort to be
their imperiall Lieutenants, upon whom they for the most part discharged the
mannaging of their greatest affaires, such as were by the Emperours themselves
to have beene discharged: as the hearing of imperiall causes: the receiuing and
dismissing of Embassadours: the hearing of appeales from the Magistrats of all
prouinces; which great charge for that no man could well execute, except he
were skilfull in the Lawes, the Emperours in steed of captaines of their
legions, preferred lawyers to that honour. So did Otho
the emperour promote Martian: Seuerus, Papinian: and Alexander, Vlpian. And at length under the Greek
emperours, two great Prouosts of the empire
were by the Emperours created, and at last three also, that the greatnes of
their power so divided might be lessened; and yet the honour thereof imparted
to moe. Such soueraigne Magistrats were with our auncestours: the Master of the
Pallace: and he whom they called the Prince of Fraunce: and of late Henry duke of Aniou, king Charles
his great Lieutenant: and the chiefe Bassa in the Turkes
empire: and the great Edegnare or Diadare in Aegypt under the principalitie of the Mamaluke Sultans. Yet
in this they differ, that in the Turkish empire the Great Sultans children in
the absence of their father commaund aboue all the Bassaes, and had the preheminence and precedence before them: and in
Aegypt the great Edegnare commaunded over all
the rest of the Magistrates, excepting such onely as had the keeping of the
castles & fortresses of the kingdom committed to their charge, over whom he
had no commaund. Which manner and custome whether the Princes of the East tooke
it from ours, or our Princes from them, we still keepe together with the
Italians, Germaines, Spaniards, and most of other Nations also. WhereforeSoueraign power to commaund over al magistrats not to be giuen
to one alone, but in the most daungerous times of the commonweal the
soueraigne power to commaund over all Magistrats and officers without
exception, ought not to be giuen to one alone, but in case of necessity; as
when the Commonweale cannot otherwise be preserued: and yet then not with the
authoritie and countenance of a standing office, but by way of commission
onely, such as were in auntient time graunted unto the Roman Dictators, the
Archo of the Thessalians, and Azymnets of the
Lacedemonians: and now with vs are giuen unto Protectors and Regents, in the
absence, furie, or minoritie of soueraigne Princes. In the absence I say of the
soueraigne prince, for that in his presence all the power & commaund of
magistrates andIn the presence of the soueraigne prince, all
the power of the magistrats holden in suspence. commissioners cease:
For as the force and strength of all riuers and flouds is together with their
names lost and swallowed up when they once fall into the Sea; and as the other
heauenly lights, as well the planets as other starres, lose their light in the
presence of the Sunne, or as soone as he approacheth the horizon, in so much as
that they seeme againe to render unto him the whole light that they had before
borowed of him▪ euen so likewise all the authoritie of the Senat, and all the
commaund and power of Magistrats cease in the presence of the prince. So we see
that he which delivereth the soueraigne
princes mind, whether it be in counsell, or in soueraigne court, before the
states, or unto the people, still vseth these wordes, So and
so the king commaundeth, or saieth. But to the contrarie, if the prince
be absent, the Chauncelour or President keeping the kings place aboue the other
princes, pronounceth sentence or iudgement according to the opinion and mind of
the Senat or Court wherein he sitteth, hauing ordinarie iurisdiction and power,
and not in the name of the king. And for asmuch as William
Poyet Chauncelour of Fraunce, and President of the great Counsell, in
the absence of the king, oftentimes in iudgement used this forme of speech, The king saith so and so unto you; he was therefore
charged with treason, besides the other points of his accusation. Wherefore
many are deceiued which thinke those lawes or Edicts which are published or ratified in the councell or court, in the
presence of the prince, to be so published or confirmed by the Court or
Councell: seeing that the Court hath then the hands bound, and that it is none
but the king that so commaundeth, the motion or consent of his Attourney, the
prince himselfe being then present, seruing to no purpose at all. And in
Popular estates, the greatest magistrats as well as the least, in token of
their humilitie, laid downe their mases and other tokens of honour before the
people, and so standing, spake unto the people sitting: showing, that in their
presence they had no power at all to commaund. So all the motions made by the
magistrates of Rome, were by way of humble request, as in this forme, Velitis, Iubeatis, May it please you, or commaund: VVhereunto the people there present,
giuing their consent with alowd voice, before the law Cassia
Tabellaria, used these words, Omnes qui hic assident
volumus, iubemusque, All we that here sit will and commaund. And after
the lawes called Tabellarias, the letters A. and V. R. written in the tables,
signified Antiquo, (or, I repeale the law) and Vti Rogas (or, as you request). And in like manner the
people of Athens gaue their voyces sitting, the magistrat in the meane time
speaking unto them standing, so long as they had any thing to say vnto
them.
But then might some man say, If it be so, that the magistrats had no power to
commaund particular men, nor yet one another, in the presence of the people
which had the soueraigntie. VVhy did the Tribune of
the people send his vsher unto AppiusClaudius the Consull, to commaund him to silence? And
why did the Consull o requite him with like, send his
sergeant unto him likewise, crying with a lowd voice, That the Tribune was no
magistrat? VVhereunto I aunswere, that such contention and debate▪ oftentimes
fell out amongst the magistrats, and especially betwixt the Consuls and the
Tribunes: yet may we not thereof conclude, that either of them had any power to
commaund the one the other, in the presence of the people, both their
authorities then ceasing. So a controuersie arising betwixt the high court of
Paris, and the court of Aids, for wearing of their purple robes, and
accompanying the king, not farre from Henrie the second
the French king, the president of the greater court of Paris sent a sergeant
unto the judges of the court of Aides, to forbid them to go any further: (and
albeit that the king was not so nie as that he
could heare such the presidents commaund) yet receiued he such aunswere from
the judges, That hee had no such power to commaund over the court of Aids, and
if he had, that yet he could not rightly there vse the same in the presence of
the king.
But yet some man might obiect and say, That if the magistrats had no power to
commaund in the presence of the prince, they were no more magistrats, neither
should so great regard be had of their honours and dignities the prince being
present, so as we see there is. VVhereunto mine aunswere is, That the
magistrats by the presence of the prince loose nothing, but still continue in
their offices, and so consequently in their dignities and honours, their power
to commaund being but suspended. As in like case the Dictator being created, all the magistrats continued in their estates
and offices, howbeit that all their commaunding power was then holden in
suspence: but so soone as the Dictators commission was expired, and he once out
of his office, the magistrats againe commaunded by the same right they had
before: which they could not have done, if their magistracies and offices had
so, & indeed bene from them taken. Which may serue for aunswere to that
which might be alleaged of these words, which are oftentimes to be read in the
writings of the auntient Romans, viz. Creaeto Dictatore
magistratus abdiaht, Whereby it might seeme
that the Dictator being created, the magistrats were out of office: which is
not to be vnderstood of their offices, but of their power, as we have before
said, which was so for a while suspended. For otherwise the Dictator yeelding up his office, the magistrats must haue
sought for new power and authoritie from the people, their former power being
before together with their officeWhy the power of the suspended. expired. And the reason is
generall, that the power of the inferiour should be holden in suspence, in the
presence of the superiour: for otherwise the subiect might command contrarie to
the will of his lord, the seruant contrarie to the good liking of his master
and the magistrat contrarie to the will and pleasure of his soueraigne
prince o might at
leastwise oppose himselfe against him, and by the vertue of his office forbid
the inferiour persons to performe the commaunds of their superiours: which can
in no wise be done, without ineuitable preiudice unto the soueraigntie▪ except
it be that the prince laying aside the soueraigntie of his person, goeth to see
how his magistrats commaund; as the emperour
Claudius ofttimes went openly to see the doings of
his magistrats, and without disguising himselfe sat beneath them, foolishly
giuing to them the more honourable place: or else in case tha the prince, his maiestie in a sort set aside, giue
leaue to the magistrat to iudge of his cause. For the maxime of the law, which
saith, That the magistrat of equall or greater power may bee iudged by his
companion or fellow in office, or by his inferiour also, when he snbmitteth
himselfe unto his power, hath place not onely in priuat persons and magistrats,
but euen in soueraigne princes also; whether it please them to submit
themselves or their causes to the iudgement of other
princes, or of their owne subiects. And albeit that they may bee judges in
their Much more honorable for soueraign princes to referr the
hearing of their own causes unto the magistrats than to iudge thereof
themselves. owne causes, unto whome power is by God giuen to iudge,
without beeing bound to the law, as Xenophon saith; yet
neuerthesse it is much better beseeming their maiestie, and more indifferent
also for them in their owne causes to abide the iudgement of their magistrats,
than to become judges thereof themselves. But to the intent that the soueraigne
maiestie of princes should not in any thing be impaired of the greatnesse
thereof, and yet that the brightnesse and glorie of the royall name should not
dazle the eies of the judges, it was wisely in this realme ordained by our
auncestors, That the king should not plead but by his atturney; and that in all
publike causes wherein the king or Commonweale were priuatly interessed, the
kings name should be still cancelled, and the matter pleaded but in the name of
his attourney. Which thing the rest of the
princes and others hauing territorial iurisdiction, have afterwards imitated
and followed. So Augustus the emperour writ unto the
lieutenants of his prouinces, That they should not suffer his name to be
debased with being too common in their commissions, as Tranquillus reporteth. Yet is it by a certaine speciall custome by our
auncestors receiued, that if the king will in priuat iudgements against priuat
men, be restored, the kings attourney shall not in demaunding thereof hold his
seat and place, but chaunge the same, least he should seeme to plead a publike
and not a priuat cause. But whereas we have said, the power of the magistrats
to be suspended in the presence of the prince, belongeth unto the whole princes
familie, so long as they waite uppon the prince: for over them the ciuil
magistrats have no power, except such magistrats as the prince hath appointed for the executing of the iurisdiction of the
court.
Yet a man might demaund, Whether the magistrat might forbid a subiect or
priuatWhether a magistrat may for a subiect to come unto the being as then within
the iurisdiction of his territorie? man to come unto the court, being
within the iurisdiction of his territorie? Which is not without some
difficultie: howbeit without entring into farther dispute, I say, that the
magistrat banishing the guiltie subiect out of the territorie of his
iurisdiction, where the prince may then be, secretly also forbiddeth him to
approach the court, albeit that he cannot expresly forbid him to come unto the
princes court. Wherein the rule of Vlpian the lawyer
taketh place, which saith, Expressa nocent, non expressa non
nocent, Things expressed hurt, but things not expressed hurt not. And I
remember how that it seemed a thing right
strange unto the court, and especially unto the chauncellours of the houshold,
that the Commissioners deputed by the prince, for the triall of the president
Allemand (who familiarly used my councell) hauing by
their sentence condemned him, forbad him also to come within ten leagues of the
court. Which thing the councell understanding, decreed, That it was lawfull for
no man but the prince only to make any such prohibition. And haply was the
chiefe cause that the president (of whose councell I was) obtained of the king,
to have the iudgement reuersed. For it were not onely an hard and inhumane
thing, to keepe the subiects from hauing accesse unto the prince, to deliver
unto him their petitions (as well agreeing with the lawes both of God and
nature) but it should also be a thing much preiudiciall unto the maiestie of a
soueraigne prince, as I have before said. And
albeit that the superiour courts of this kingdome have used to banish men out
of the realme, and so out of the bounds of their iurisdiction, yet should such
their iudgement take none effect, if the king in whose name the courts of
Parliament giue iudgement, gaue them not commission so to do, and that his
royall commaunds were not unto such their sentences subscribed: So their
decrees also in forme begin in the kings name.
Now as the presence of the Prince holdeth the power of all Magistrats in
suspence,The power of the lesser magistrates to cease in
the presence of the . so is it also to be
deemed of the power of the superiour magistrates or commissioners over the
inferior. As a man may see in Fraunce, where the Presidents & Councelours,
every one in his iurisdiction, and the Masters of
Requestes in all seates of iustice, (except
the soueraigne courts) have power to commaund the Seneschals, Bailiffes,
Prouosts, and other inferior magistrates, when they come into their prouinces,
and sit in their places of justice, and there may iudge, ordaine, and commaund
as superiours unto their inferiours, and prohibit them to proceed any further,
which is generall to all superiour magistrats towards their inferiours, as
saith the law: Iudicium soluitur, ventante eo qui iudicare
iusserat, vel qui maius imperium in ea iurisdictione habet, The
iudgement is stayed, he forbidding it which commaunded it, or he which hath
greater power in the same iurisdiction. Where the word, Imperium, or power, signifieth not onely the power to commaund, or
forbid, but euen the magistrat himselfe: As when Cicero
saith: Maius imperium à minori rogari ius non est,
Lawfull it is not, for the greater power to be
examined by the lesse; he would say, that the magistrat or commissioner equall
or superiour in power, is not bound to answere before his companion, or one
lesse then himselfe, which is a Maxime of the auntients, which Messala the Lawyer declareth by example, as thus: A minore imperto, maius, aut a maiore collega rogari iure non
potest: quare neque Consules aut Praetores, Censoribus, neque Censores,
Consulibus aut Praetoribus turbant, aut retinent auspicia, at Censores inter
se; rursus Praetores Consules{que} inter se, & vitiant et obtinent,
The greater power cannot by right be examined by the lesse, or a fellow in
office, by an other his fellow officer though greater then him selfe: wherefore
neither the Consuls or Pretors trouble, or keepe the south-sayings from the
Censors, neither the Censors from the Consuls or Pretors, but the Censors
amongst themselves; and so againe the
Pretors and Consuls among themselves, do one hinder an other, and so preuaile.
And these be the words of Messala, which hee saith
himselfe to have writ out of the xiiij booke of C.
Tuditanus, but hath failed in that which he saith after: Praetor etsi Collega Consulis est, neque Praetorem, neque
Consulem iure rogare potest, The Pretor although he be the Consuls
companion, can by right examine neither the Pretor nor the Consul, which was
happely done by the errour of him that write it: For he should have said: Praetor etsi Collega Praetoris est, The Pretor although
he be the Pretors companion, and not, Consulis, or the
Consuls: except we should salue the matter, in saying that the Consuls,
Pretors, and Censors were all fellowes and companions: Quia
soli ijsdem auspicijs, ijsdem comitijs, id est maioribuscreabantur, caeteri magistratus minoribus auspicijs &
comitijs, for that they alone were created and chosen, by the same
diuinations and assemblies, that is to say the greater: whereas the other
magistrats were chosen by the lesser, for otherwise the Latins neuer abused the
word (Collega) in that sence; Besides that the Pretor
was neuer the Consuls companion or fellow: but well to the contrarie, appeal
might lawfully be made from the Pretor to the Consul. As we read that Aemylius Lepidus the Consul receiued a man appealing from
the Pretor Orestes; and by a contrarie decree reuersed
the Pretors decree. So we read also that Luctatius the
Consull tooke the triumph from Valerius the Pretor, for
that he being Consull was the generall of the armie, although he were that day
from the armie wherein the victorie was got. That showeth also the power of the Consull to have beene greater then the
Pretors, for that the Consull had twelue Lictors, and the Pretors but two in
the citie, and sixe at the most if they were sent into the prouinces, whom the
Greekes therefore called , for so it is by the law Lectoria prouided, which was made concerning the
power of the Pretor of the citie; who was of all other Pretors the greatest:
Praetor Vrbanus duos Lictores apud se habeto, isque ad
supremum solis occasum ius inter ciues dicito, The Pretor (or Prouost)
of the citie, let him have with him two Lictors, and let him administer justice
amongst the citizens unto the going downe of the sunne. Wherefore let this
stand for good, not onely fellowes and companions in
the same power, but also magistrats of like and equall power, not to have power to examine one another, and therefore much
lesse them which have greater power than themselves.
But yet question may be, whether a companion or fellow in office, or one of
lesserWhether a companion or fellow in office may stay
the proceedings of his equall or superiour in authoritie. power, or
he which is no fellow in office at all, yet hauing power in his owne
iurisdiction, may therein stay the acts or proceedings of his equall or
superiour in authoritie? For oftentimes great cōtrouersies have fallen amongst
magistrats about such prerogatives. And the difference is right great betwixt
commaundement, and empeachment or opposition: for companions or fellowes in
office have no commaunding power one of them over an other, and yet
neuerthelesse they may in publique actions one of them oppose themselves
against an other, and so hinder one an others proceedings.Fellowes in office although they have no power one of them
over an other, yet may they well hinder one an others proceedings, and
why? As Piso the Pretor or judge betwixt
straungers and the citisens of Rome, oft times troubled Verres the Pretor of the citie, sitting in iudgement of causes betwixt
citisen and citisen: causing his tribunall seat to be brought neere unto the
tribunall seat of the Pretor of the citie, so to hinder the vniust and
iniurious decrees of Verres; and so administred iustice
unto the citisens flying from the tribunall seat of the citie, unto him, as by
the law they might. And therefore Cicero in one of his
lawes sayth: Magistratus nec obedientem, & nociuum ciem, mulcta, verberibus, vinculis coerceto, nisi par
maiorue potestas prohibessit, Let the magistrat restraine the
disobedient and hurtfull citisen, with fine, stripes, and bondes, except an
equall or greater power forbid it to be done:The Magistrat
can do nothing in the presence of his companion equall in power with himself
without his expresse consent. neither sufficeth it to say prohibessit, or forbid it, for that the magistrat can do
nothing in the presence of his companion
equall in power with himselfe, without his expresse consent, or else that he
submit himselfe unto his power. As it appeareth in that which Paulus the lawyer saith: Apud eum cui par imperium
est manumitti non posse, & Praetorem apud Praetorem manumittere non
posse, Before him which hath equall power (with himselfe) a man cannot
manumize, and a Pretor before another Pretor cannot manumize. Neither doth that
saying of Vlpian contradict or impugne the same: Consulem apud Consulem manumittere posse, which is, That
one of the Consuls may manumize before the other Consul: seeing that that is to
be vnderstood that he might not doe it upon the same day that hee which did
manumize or enfranchise had the bundels of rods and power to commaund; for that
they both neuer had power upon the same day,
as saith Festus Pompeius, as is in many places to be
seene, whether they were at unitie betwixt themselves or not. And therefore Liuie surnamed the Salter, carried away the triumph from
Claudius Nero his fellow and companion in the
Consulship, for that he commaunded that day wherein the victorie was obtained
(as saith Liuie) albeit that the battell were giuen
against Hasdruball by consent of them both; For Lucius Caesar (as Festus Pompeius
writeth) deemeth him to be called the greater Consul, which had the bundels of
rods or maces; or him which was first made Consul; which Paulus himselfe confirmeth. And all this wisely, for if both of them
should at once have had the power, nothing could have beene peaceable, nothing
firme or sure in the great affaires of the
Commonweale. Wherefore the Decemuiri beeing created at Rome for the reforming
of the Commonweale, and making of the lawes of the xij Tables; it was added
unto the law, That they should by turnes have the maces with the power to
commaund. Now if any man aske the reason why a fellow in office may impeach or
stay his fellow officer in his proceeding, if they both have authoritie and
power at the same time: it is grounded upon the reason generall, of all them
which have any thing in common, wherein he which forbiddeth hath most force,
and his condition in that case is better than his which would proceed on
further. Which reason preuaileth also, when question is of the force &
power of laws, wherein the force of the law which
forbiddeth, is greater then of that which commaundeth.
But whereas we have said Magistrats of like power or fellowes in office not to
beMagistrats of like power, or fellows in office, bound
to the power or commaund of their fellowes, being▪ In number more.
bound to the power or commaund of their companions or fellowes, that is so true
if that they both be in number equall: for in all Corporations and Colleges,
they which are in number most, are also superiour in power: and therefore the
lesse part of magistrats fellowes in office, cannot forbid the greater. But if
all the Magistrats were of one mind and opinion, these words were wont to be
written upon their decrees and edicts, Pro Collegio, for
the Colledge, (which shall in their place be expounded.) But if it be true that
we have said, why did then Messala say? Consulem ab omnibus magistratibus concionē auocare posse▪ ab
eo neminem: deinde Praetorem ab alijs preterquàm a Consulibus: minores
magistratus nusquam nec concionem nec comitatum auocasse, That the
Consull might call the assemble of the people
from al the Magistrats, but none might call them from him, and so next after
him that the Pretors might call them from all others, excepting from the
Consuls: but that the lesser magistrats could no where call away, neither the
assemblie nor sessions of the people. Wherof it followeth, that the impeachment
& opposition of the lesser magistrats could not in any sort let or hinder
the actions or commaunds of the greater. Whereunto I aunswere, that to call
away belongeth to power and commaund, which opposition doth not. Now there is
great difference, whether you commaund, or otherwise hinder any thing to be
done, as we will hereafter more plainely declare. But first it is to be noted,
that that which Messala saith is true in other
magistrats, but not in the Tribunes of the people: whome wee have showed to have had the title of magistrats, with power
to assemble and call together the common people, and to constraine the Consuls
to giue place unto their opposition, not so much by the power they had to
commaund▪ as by imprisoning of their persons, and seising of their goods: for
if they commaunded any thing, and the magistrat refused or reiected their
commands, they forthwith for such their contempt, commanded them to be cast in
prison: For so Seruilius the Senator directing his
speech unto the Tribunes, saith, Vos Tribunt plebis Senatus
appellat, vt in tanto discrimine Reipublicae Dictatorem dicere Consules
provestra potestate cogatis, Tribuni pro collegio pronuntiant, placere
Consules Senatus dicto audientes esse, aut in vincula se duc iussuros, The Senat calleth upon you the
Tribunes of the people, that in so great a daunger of the
Commonweale, you for the power you haue,
would compell the Consuls to nominat a Dictator. The Tribunes in the name of
the colledge of Tribunes pronounced that their pleasure was, that the Consuls
should be obedient unto the commaund of the Senat: threatning otherwise to
commaund them to bee cast into bonds. And it was so farre from being lawfull
for the Consuls to have power to hinder the assemblies of the common people
called together by the Tribunes, as that it was not in their power so much as
to interpret them in speaking unto the people, and that uppon paine of death by
the law Icilia, if he that had so interpreted the Tribune in his oration or
speech, paied not the fine or amercement imposed upon him by the Tribune. As
the Tribune Drusus well caused Philip the Consull to vnderstand, whome he made to be cast in prison
for interrupting him in his speech unto the
people.
That also which we have said, the greater part of a companie, or colledge of
magistratsThe opposition of one of the Tribunes of the
people, sufficient to hinder the proceedings of all the magistrate in Rome,
as also the proceedings of the rest of his fellow Tribunes. to
preuaile against the lesser, taketh not place amongst the Tribunes of the
people, one of the Tribunes voices being able of it selfe to stay all the
proceedings, not of the Senat onely, but of all other the magistrats, yea &
of the rest of his fellow Tribunes also: whereas to the contrarie, the acts of
one Tribune alone, were of force, except some of his fellowes and companions
openly opposed himselfe against the same. As is in Liuie
to be seene, where he saith, The farmers of the publike demaine to have beene
discharged by a decree published under the name but
of one of the Tribunes only. And that the
power of the greater part of the Tribunes might bee withstood by the fewer
opposing themselves against them, it is manifest by that, that at such time as
Appius the Censor by force held his power and
Censorship longer than he should have done, and the time thereof being now
expired, contratie to the law Aemilia, Sempronius the
Tribune of the people in the open assemblie of the people, said unto him, Ego te Appi in vincula duci iubebo nisi Aemiliae legi
parueris, approbantibus sex Tribunis actionem collegae, tres auxilio fuerunt
summaque inuidia omnium or dinum solus Censuram gessit, I will commaund
thee, O Appius (saith he) to be cast into bonds, except
thou obey the law Aemilia; and six so of the Tribunes allowing & approuing
the doing of their companion and follow Tribunes, three others of them tooke
part with Appius, and so hee alone held his Censorship, with the great enuie and hart-burning
of all sorts of men. So likewise at such time as Cicero
then Consull (the armie of Cateline beeing discomfited
and ouerthrowne, by the conduct of C. Antonius the other
Consull) bare all the sway in the citie, and had turned all the favour of the
people unto himselfe alone, nine of the Tribunes of the people to restraine
such his immoderat power, were all of opinion to send for Pompey with his armie; and had so done, had not Cato one of the Tribunes of the people alone opposed himselfe in Ciceroes behalfe, and so hindered the proceeding of his
fellow Tribunes. So when Scipio Africanus accused of
extortion, was to have bene cast in prison, he was saued onely by Sempronius one of the Tribunes, and father of the Gracchies, opposing himselfe against his
fellowes.
But how (might some man say) could one Tribune alone let the actions and
proceedings of the Senat, of the Consuls, yea and of all his companions and
fellowes in office also? Yet most certaine it is that he might so do, if the
other Tribunes preferred not a request against him unto the people, to have him
put out of his office and authoritie. And therefore at the request of Tiberius Gracchus the Tribune, Marcus
Octauius another of the Tribunes, withstanding the profit of the
people, and the enacting of the lawes for the diuision of lands, was of
necessitie to be thrust out of his office of the Tribuneship, before the law
Sempronia for the diuision of lands could bee established. And to that end
tendeth that speech of the Tribune unto the Senators, in Liuie, Faxo ne iuuet vox ista veto, qua collegas nostros tam laeti
concinentes auditis, contemni iam Tribunosplebis, quippe potestas Tribunitia suam ipsa vim frangat
intercedendo, I shall make (saith he) that this word Veto, (or, I forbid) which you now so merrie heare our fellowes
together singing, shall helpe you nothing, the Tribunes of the people must now
needs be contemned, for that the Tribunitial power doth weaken the power of
itselfe, by opposing it selfe against it selfe. But this power and opposition
of the Tribune, was ordained and prouided for the libertie of the people, and
against force offered them, and not for the priuat profit of the Tribunes
themselves: who if question were of any particular of theirs, whether it were
in civill or criminall causes, were not in any thing respected, but suffered
iudgement, as other men did, if some one or other of their fellowes in office enterposed not themselves, and so letted the
proceeding. As when Lucius Cotta one of the Tribunes of
the people, being sued, would neither answere nor pay his creditors, Fiducia sacrosanctae potestatis, as bearing himselfe upon
the reputation and credit of the most sacred power of the Tribuneship; his
companions in office openly denounced unto him, That they would aid the
creditors against him, except hee made them payment. Yet at length by little
and little it was agreed, That the colledge or companie of Tribunes, should be
also bound unto the same lawes and customes that other colledges and companies
were, viz. That decrees made by the consent of the
greater part should bind the rest. As is easily to be gathered of that which
Liuie saith, Ex auctoritate Senatus latum est ad populum, ne quis templum
arcemue iniussu Senatus, autTribunorum plebis maioris partis dedicaret, It was by
the authoritie of the Senat propounded to the people, That no man without the
commaund of the Senat, or of the greater part of the Tribunes of the people,
should dedicat a temple or a castle. And afterwards by the law Attilia it was
ordained, That the Pretor of the citie, and the greater part of the Tribunes of
the people, might appoint tutors unto women and fatherlesse children. Which
custome grew into such force, as that the Senat commaunded Quintus Pompeius Rufus a Tribune of the people to be cast into prison,
for that he being but one, went about to forbid an assemblie of the states to
bee called. Whereas otherwise the wilfull rage of one furious Tribune might
have troubled the whole state of the Commonweale. And this was the cause why
the Consull being about to assemble the great
estates of the people, by sound of trumpet caused an edict to bee proclaimed,
forbidding all magistrats lesser than himselfe, to have regard unto the Auspicia, that is to say, unto the disposition of the
ayre, or the flight of birds, for the coniecturing thereby, whether the thing
which was then taken in hand, were agreeable with the wil and pleasure of their
gods or not. For if it thundered or lightned neuer so little, or if the birds
were seene to flie on the right hand, or if any of them there present fell of
the falling sicknes, (which was therefore called Morbus
comitialis) or if any other monster were borne, the assembly was
accounted thereby polluted, and so the people presently broke up and departed
without any thing doing: the sooth-sayers thereby denouncing unto them, That
the gods were then angrie, and not well pleased with their doings. Which was the charge of the Augures or soothsayers so
to denounce unto them, but yet might not lawfully oppose themselus against that
was to be done, as might the magistrats of equall power, or greater: but if the
magistrats were inferiour unto him that held the assembly of the estates, their
opposing of themselves could not let the further proceeding of the superior
magistrat, howbeit that such acts or proceedings were thereby defectiue, and so
subiect to reuocation. In such sort, as that Caius
Figulus the Consull with his companion, after he had bene chosen, taken
his oath, and transported his armie euen into Spaine; yet was he neuerthelesse
with his fellow Consull, by a decree of the Senat, called backe againe home and
enforced to giue up their power and authoritie: For that the soothsayers had
before declared unto Tiberius Gracchus the Consull (then holding the great assemblies for the
choyce of the Consuls) That the signes and tokens whereby they tooke their
predictions were vnfortunat and contrary. Wherefore the lesser magistrats could
not trouble the assemblies of the greater, or cal the people alreadie assembled
from them, but such magistrats onely as were equall and of like power with
them. But the Tribunes of the people although they might not interrupt the
assemblies of the greater magistrats, or cal the assembled people from them,
yet might they by opposing of themselves hinder their other actions and
proceedings: and in case that the magistrats would yet needs proceed contrarie
to their oppositions, the Tribunes would then vse plaine force against them; so
that ostentimes murthers were thereabouts committed. For so Asellius the Pretor, or Prouost of the citie, for favouring the debtors against their creditors, was as he was
doing sacrifice slain by atumultuous company of the creditors, hauing for their
leader one of the Tribunes of the people. In like sort Appius
Saturninus Tribune of the people, slew Munius
the Consul,Appeals to be still made from the lesser
magistrats to the greater; and not from the greater to the lesser, or to any
other, but equal in authoritie with them. in the verie assemblie of
the people.
And as publike actions are troubled or letted by magistrats equal or greater in
power than they by whome they are done, opposing themselves against them: so
beeing once done, appeale is to be made from the lesser magistrats unto the
greater, sauing unto euerie man his iurisdiction and power. Now if it bee not
in the lesser magistrats power to commaund the
greater, or to stay his proceedings, much lesse can he vndoe what he hath alreadie done, reuerse his iudgements, or
receiue appeales made from him, which are not lawfully to be admitted from the
greater magistrats unto their fellowes or men equall in authoritie with
themselves. But euen to the contrarie, if a magistrats deputie or lieutenant be
preferred to like estate or degree with the magistrat whose deputie or
lieutenant he is, his commission of deputation or lieutenancie ceaseth, and the
acts by him begun are interrupted and broken off. Wherefore if the equall or
lesser magistrat, shall receiue one appealing from the equall or greater
magistrat, an action of iniurie may be commenced against such a magistrat, as
also against him who hath so appealed unto the lesser magistrat, or fellow in
office with him from whom he hath appealed. For so Caesar as then but Pretor, beeing accused before one of the Questors, as hauing an hand in the conspiracie of Cateline, caused both the accuser and the Questor being
both grieuously fined to bee cast in prison, and especially the Questor, for
that he had suffered a greater magistrat than himselfe to be accused before
him, as saith Suetonius. So the court of Paris by a
seuere decree forbad the judges or magistrats of them which have territoriall
iurisdiction, to bind the kings magistrats or judges with their edicts or
prohibitions: and that if they did otherwise, the kings magistrats or judges
might by way of iustice proceed against them for so doing.
But here a man might doubt, Whether the inferiour or lesser magistrat, who
mayWhether the inferiour magistrat which may be
commaunded by the superior, may also be commanded by the superiour
magistrates Lieutenant or deputie. be commaunded by the superiour,
may also be commaunded by the superiour magistrats lieutenant, or deputie?
Which most have thought to be a thing without doubt, considering that the lieutenants, or deputies, command
nothing in their owne names, neither can do any thing but in the name of the
magistrat whose place they hold, and unto whome the inferiour magistrat oweth
obedience. For otherwise if it were lawfull for the inferiour magistrats to
disobey the lieutenants or deputies of their superiours, other particular men
by the same reason might likewise withstand them, which were the way to ruinat
& ouerthrow the whole estate of the Commonweal. Howbeit that it might also
be said, that magistrats lieutenants erected in title of office have power and
authoritie by the law, and so also power to commaund in their owne names, and
in that qualitie to constraine the inferiour magistrats to obey them. Yet
neuerthelesse I say, that in that they are lieutenants or deputies unto other
the superiour magistrats, they cannot commaund
or giue our commission in their owne names; which if they do, the inferiour
magistrats are not bound to obey them: As was adiudged by a decree of the
parliament of Paris, at the suit of the Seneschal of Touraine against his
lieutenant, who published edicts and decrees in his owne name, which should
have bene set forth in the name of the Seneschall himselfe. Which was a thing
without all doubt before the edict of king Charles the
seuenth that the lieutenants should bee placed and displaced by the Seneschals:
but the doubt arose after that they were by him erected in title of office, as
hauing then their power from the king, and not from the Seneschals. But we must
not thereupon presume, that the purpose and intent of the king
therein, was to take away the power from the
Seneschals or Bailifes (which could not be done but by an expresse edict for
the suppressing of those offices) but contrariwise the erection of their
lieutenants in the title of lieutenants, was much more to establish the honour
of the Seneschals and Bailifes, and yet so to diminish their power. As first
the Senators at Rome, and after that the emperours themselves, were woont to
appoint lieutenants unto the Proconsuls (or gouernours of their prouinces) who
yet for all that had not their power to commaund from the Senat or the
emperour, but from the Proconsuls or gouernours themselves. Wherefore the law
saith, Apud legatum Proconsulis non est legis actio,
that is to say, that he might do no exploit or act of iustice, but in the name of another man: not for that▪ it was not
lawfull for the Proconsuls lieutenants, as it
was for the lieutenants of al other magistrats to manumise or enfranchise
within the precinct and territorie of the prouince of those magistrats whose
lieutenants they were. Which the doctor Cuias hath
denied, and in the auntient reading corrected these words, Ex
quo prouinciam ingressus est: Which his correction if it were to be
admitted, thereof should follow diuers ineuitable absurdities, these words (as
hee would have them) being left out: for so the lieutenants could not in the
territorie of their magistrats, ordaine, decree, commaund, or do any thing;
which is all that the law properly calleth Legis
actiones, or the actions of the law; all which we read lieutenants to
have still done in their owne prouinces: and yet neuerthelesse the Maires, and
Duumuirs, or Consuls of villages & townes, had power to manumise or
enfranchise, and to appoint tutors by
commission within their owne iurisdiction. Wherfore the execution or action of
the law, is not in the magistrats lieutenāts or deputies, but in thē which so
appointed the lieutenants or deputies. Yea the magistrat himselfe, who doth but
exercise another mans iurisdiction, can in his owne name commaund nothing.
Wherof it commeth, that a man cannot appeale from a lieutenant or deputie, vnto
him whose lieutenant or deputie he is: for so appeale should be made from the
same man to himselfe. Howbeit that the magistrat may examine the iniurie and
wrong done to priuat men by his lieutenant or deputie; and that because the
lieutenant or deputy hath not all the iurisdiction and power of the magistrat,
whose lieutenant or deputie hee is: and yet lesse in auntient time, than at
this present, when as the lieutenants of the Proconsuls or gouernours of countries, had no power to inflict
corporall punishment upon any. The princes lieutenants generall also in the
wars, albeit that they have a most high commaund and power over all souldiors,
of what degree or condition soeuer, yet if any of the princes of the blood
offend against the lawes militarie, the hearing and triall thereof belongeth
not unto the lieutenants generall, but unto the soueraigne prince himselfe; or
at least wise unto the chapiter of the knights of the order, especially in case
it concerne either honour, or life. And in much more strong tearmes, if
question be of ecclesiasticall discipline, onely the bishops are not bound to
aunswere before the archbishops officials, or vicars generall; as it was by a
decree of the parliament ofThe power of the superior
magistrats over the inferior▪ extendeth not farther than their owne
terriory seat and iurisdiction. Paris,
adiudged for the bishops of Troy, and Neuers: Whereby it was said, that they
were not bound to obey, but onely unto the
archbishops in person themselves. But that which I have said of the power of
the superiour magistrats over the inferiour, is to bee vnderstood in their owne
territorie, seat, and iurisdiction▪ out of which they are but as other priuat
and particular men, without power or commaund.
But now the question might be asked, Whether that magistrats equall and
fellowsHonour and dignitie in nothing to communicate with
authoritie and power. in authoritie and power, be also equall in
honour and dignitie? Whereunto I aunswere, that honor and dignitie doth in
nothing communicat with authoritie and power: yea oftentimes it chaunceth and
commeth to passe, that hee which hath most honour, hath so much the lesse
power: than which secret none is almost greater, or more profitable for the
maintenance & preseruation of the Aristocraticall or Popular
Commonweales, or that is in any place of the
world better kept than in Venice. Of the Consuls he that was first chosen
Consull, was also first named in all their publike acts and fastes, and so had
the honour of precedence: but if they were both at once chosen, he that was the
elder was in honour also aboue his fellow, vntill the law Pappia Poppeia, which
gaue the prerogative of honour unto the married Consull: or if they were both
married, then unto him that had most children, which supplied the number of
yeares. So amongst the Pretors, who were all of one colledge or companie, and
their power all one; he which was called Vrbanus (or the
Pretor of the citie) was in dignitie and honour aboue
the rest, and so called the Greatest Pretor, for that he was first of all
chosen, and in the absence of the Consuls
held their places, assembled the Senat, and called together the greatest
estates, with such other like things belonging to the office of the Consuls.
And amongst the ten Archontes of equall power in Athens, there was one, who yet
in honour exceeding the rest, had the publike acts authorised in his name, and
gaue himselfe names also unto the Annales and publike acts and decrees, and was
thereof called . So
amongst all the parliaments of Fraunce (beeing almost all of like power) the
parliament of Paris hath the prerogative of honour aboue the rest, as more
auntient; and by a certaine singular right is yet called the Court of the
peeres of Fraunce, as hauing the triall and iudgement of the peeres, which none
of the rest of the courts of parliament haue. And albeit that in the time of
Charles the viij, the great Councell mannaged the affaires of state, yet so it is, that the king
by expresse edict ordained and appointed, That in all edicts and mandats,
wherein mention should bee made of the court of parliament, and of the great
Councell, the Court of parliament of Paris should alwayes be set formost. So
whereas the kings Attourneies are almost in number infinit, he of the
parliament of Paris hath alwaies the prerogative of honour aboue all the rest
of the kings Attourneies, who all are sworne unto the judges of the soueraigne
courts (wherein they are Attourneies) except the Attourney generall of the
Parliament of Paris, who is not to bee sworne but unto the king onely. So wee
see that the Constable of Fraunce, and the Chauncelor, albeit that they haue
not power or commaund one of them aboue the other, but are equall in
sitting, and in going side by side, yet
neuerthelesse the more honourable place is reserued unto the Constable▪ which
is on the right hand of the king, and the Chauncellor on the left: except some
haply may say him to have that place for to beare the kings sword upon the
kings right hand: yet besides that, at the consecration and coronation of the
king, and other ceremonies wherein place of precedence is, the Constable goeth
before the Chauncellour, and next unto the Chauncellour followeth the Grand
Maister of Fraunce. Which I would have vnderstood to be of me so spoken, not as
if my purpose were to determine any thing of honours, but as an example by the
way whereby to perceiue how much honour differeth from authoritie or
power.
But forasmuch as we have said, that magistrats equall in power, or which hold
nothingWhether equall lords or cōpeeres of the same
territorie and iurisdiction, may chastice or reforme one another. one
of them another, cannot be commaunded one of them by another; a man may doubt
whether if amongst many princes or coequall lords, one offend, hee may be
restrayned or corrected by the other princes or lords his equels? For why,
iurisdiction is of it selfe by nature indiuisible: and lords of one and the
same iurisdiction have one of them as much power as the other; and euerie one
of them hath entire power for all: which is not so amongst princes or
magistrats which have their charges or territories divided, and which have not
any thing to commaund one of them the other; and much lesse when many
magistrats in one bodie or colledge have one and the same charge together;
where no one of them hath of himselfe any
power or commaund, except it be by commission from the whole colledge giuen
him. Yet many there be which hold, that one of these lords may be restrained
and corrected by the other lords his compeers and coequals, as hauing by his
fault lost his iurisdiction and right, as it hath bene iudged in the court at
Rome. Which iudgement may well be borne with, howbeit that the reason thereof
is not good; for to say that hee offending hath thereby forthwith lost his
power and iurisdiction, were to do execution before iudgement, and to spoile
the lord or magistrat of his estate or place before he were heard. And albeit
that the threats, penalties, edicts, and decrees, expressed and set down in the
lawes, had the force of a thing alreadie iudged, as some have thought them to
haue: yet so it is, that the fact in question is
alwaies in iudgement to be tried, whether it
were done or no; and in case it be confessed, yet before the execution, must
the sentence be pronounced by the mouth of the judge, who can have no power
over his compeere, who hath equall power and authoritie in the same territorie
with himselfe, as we have before declared, following therein the sounder
opinion of the greater part of lawyers, not much regarding that others say,
That euerie man is there to be iudged where he hath offended: which is so true,
if there be no lawful cause which may hinder iudgement to be in the same place
giuen. In a colledge or companie of magistrats, orIn a
colledge or companie of magistrats or judges the greater part agreeing in
one, may iudge or chastice any one or the lesser part of their fellowes. A
difference betwixt seruice and iurisdiction. judges, if the greater
part of them agree in one, there is no doubt but that they may iudge or
chastice any one, or the lesser part of their fellowes: as they did in the
Senat of Rome, after the law which Adrian the emperour
made for the iudging of Senators; and as they
doe in all the courts of this realme. But betweene many equall lords or
compeers of the same territorie, the reason is farre otherwise; for that euerie
one of them hath himselfe the whole iurisdiction and power, nor cannot iudge
but by turnes, one of them after another, neither have more than one seat of
iustice, in one and the same iurisdiction, but by the new grant of their patron
or predominant lord. And in this, seruice differeth from iurisdiction; for that
seruice suffereth it selfe to be at once & together enioyed of euerie one
that hath right thereunto: but iurisdiction not so, as many have thought,
hauing excepted dutchies, marquisats, and counties; which by the auntient lawes
of fees are of an indiuisible nature. But it is neither for vs needfull,
neither doth this place require vs by reasons to refute the opinion of them
which affirme iurisdictions so to cleaue vnto
the territories, as if they were indeed seruices; least in so doing we should
passe without the bounds of our purpose. Sufficeth it in passing by, to say,
Iurisdiction to hold so little of fee, as that the soueraigne prince selling or
giuing a fee, of what nature soeuer it be, is not therefore to be reputed to
have giuen or sold the iurisdiction thereto belonging; as it hath ofttimes bene
iudged, & at length because it should no more be doubted of, was by an
edict of Philip the faire more straitly prouided for:
yea although the donation were by the soueraigne prince made to religious or
deuout vses; which many (but without cause) have excepted, the law being made
generall. Seeing therefore that magistrats in power equall, or which hold not
any thing one of them of another, cannot be commaunded or corrected one of them
by another; much lesse can the equall lords or
compeers of the same territorie and iurisdiction commaund or reforme one
another, but the superiour magistrat or predominant lord is to have the hearing
and determining of the matter. By our customes the superiour courts haue
reserued unto themselves, the controuersies of the kings magistrats and
officers amongst themselves, concerning their power and iurisdiction. But if
question be for the executing of the decrees or iudgements of one of them in
the territorie of another, it is to be done by honest request and leaue before
obtained: howbeit that by a new law, that custome is taken away out of this our
Commonweale, and power giuen unto pursiuants to put in execution all the
magistrats commaunds, almost throughout all the kingdome. As for soueraigne
princes, not subiect to the power or commaund
of others, they must in such case, of necessitie vse requests one to another,
for that they cannot be compelled by the command of any greater power, as
magistrats may, who without any leaue asked, suffer the iudgements of other
magistrats to be put into execution in their prouinces: or in case they refuse
so to doe, are to be constrained by the superior powers. Which asking of leaue
of the greater or equall power to execute or suffer iudgement giuen out of
their territories, to bee executed therein, offering to do or suffer the like
to be done in theirs, as occasion shall require, hath of all antiquitie beene
obserued and kept. Howbeit it seemeth the Roman empire
yet florishing, that to put in execution a mandat or iudgement out of ones owne
territorie, it was needfull first to obtaine
the Emperours letters of commaund, seeing that the law saith, Sententiam Romae dictam, possunt Praesides in prouincijs, si hoc iussi
fuerint exequi, The Presidents in their prouinces may put in execution
a sentence (or iudgement) giuen at Rome, if they be thereunto commaunded: yet
much more seemely it were by the good leaue of the magistrat to obtaine the
same, than by force to extort it against his will. As in like cause the
Emperour said unto him which complayned of his companion, without hauing before
spoken unto him, Alloquere illum, ne rem iniustam
faciat, Speake unto him, that he do thee not wrong: forasmuch as the
princes commaund, or constraint of the superiours in such case, giueth
occasions of quarrels and iealousies amongst Magistrats, seeing the decrees of
their equals, or of their inferiours, against
their wils to be put in execution in their owne territories: which oft times
turne to the great hurt of the subiects, and dishonour of the Commonweale, one
of the magistrats, or of such as are in authoritie, in dispite of the other
discharging their cholerique passions upon the poore innocents: As did the
Consul Marcellus, who inContention
betwixt great magistrats or courts, about their power and iurisdiction,
alwaies unto the poore subiect hurtfull. despite of Caesar caused certeine of the citisens of Nouocome to be whipped, to
make them to know (as he said) that Caesar had no power
to giue unto them the right and freedome of the citisens of Rome. But much
greater is the poore subiects harmes if such contention and difference for
power and authoritie, fall out amongst the greatest magistrats, or highest
Courts. As I remember such a difference fell out betwixt the parliament of Paris, and of Burdeaux, about the execution of
an arrest giuen in the parliament of Paris; which the parliament of Burdeaux
upon the princes commaund suffered to be executed within the iurisdiction
thereof, but with condition, that if any opposition or appeale were in the
doing thereof made, the parliament of Burdeaux should have the hearing and
disciding thereof. He which had the execution of the matter, willing to proceed
farther, notwithstanding the opposition of the defendant, appeal was by the
partie made unto the parliament of Bourdeaux, whom the plaintife preuented in
the parliament of Paris. This contention betwixt the two parliaments was by the
king referred unto the great Counsel; where it was decreed, That to receiue and
heare the appeale belonged unto the parliament of Paris; for that every man
ought of right to be the interpreter and
expounder of his owne meaning: and as none but the prince may declare his lawes
and commaundements, so it belongeth to the magistrat to declare the meaning of
his owne sentence. Now here question was of the right meaning of a thing
alreadie iudged, at such time as the partie guiltie offered his opposition vnto
the officer, putting into execution the decrees of the higher Court, from which
a man may not by the lawes appeale▪ unto which opposition of the partie
guiltie, if the officer giue not way, then it is vsuall to appeale, not so much
from the sentence of the higher Court, as from the iniurie of the officer which
would not heare the opposition, which he must needes, except the Court haue
commaunded the iudgement thereof to be put in execution, notwithstanding any
opposition.
But what if the Magistrat shall have no respect or regard unto the requestes or
decreesWilful magistrats by the prince or their superiors
to be enforced to suffer iustice to bee done within their
iurisdiction of his equall, or of the inferiour magistrat, nor suffer
their commaundements to be put in execution within his iurisdiction. Truely in
this case he is to be thereunto by the superiour magistrats compelled: or if
they be of the higher sort of magistrats which are at controuersie among
themselves about their iurisdiction and power, they are by the princes
authoritie to be enforced: for so these wordes of Vlpian
the Lawier are to be vnderstood, Si hoc iussi fuerint,
If they shall be so commaunded: viz. by the prince, (but
not by the magistrats) at such time as the Presidents or gouernours of
countries, every one of them in his own prouince had the chiefest power and
authoritie next unto the Prince, by whom onely they
were to be commaunded. And whereas in the Edicts or lawes any thing is commaunded to be done, it is thus to be vnderstood,
that every Magistrat in his owne prouince is to be obeyed, for that the
magistrat hath no power to commaund out of his owne territorie or iurisdiction.
In auntient time the kings Pursuiuants or officers, if they were to put in
execution the commaunds of the royall magistrats in the territorie of such
lords as had therein territoriall iurisdiction, were first to aske them leaue;
vntill that afterwards it was by the most strait decrees of the highest courts
forbidden them so to doe, for that therein the soueraigne maiestie of the king
seemed to be something empaired.
But yet it might be demaunded, whether the inferiour Magistrats might cause
theirWhether the inferiour Magistrat be to have leaue
from the superiour, unto whom appeale was made, to put his owne sentence in
execution, the appeale being now let fall. commaunds to be put in
execution, without the leaue of the superiour magistrat, unto whom appeale was made? and that after the same appeale let
fall, and the time past, appointed for the prosecuting thereof; which the
Lawiers to no purpose call Fatalia, enduced thereunto by
an old errour and inueterat fault of them which have translated the Code, and
authentiques out of Greeke into Latin, wherein for , they have red , which is to say, fatall daies, for daies
prefixed and of assignation: which the law of the twelue Tables called Statos des, daies appointed; as
in this law, Si status dies cum hoste, that is to say,
If the day appointed with a straunger. Neither euer did lawier or man that
could speak Latin, vse this forme of speaking, neither hath any of the Latins
or Greeks called them for or Fatales. The
Lawiers have oftentimes divided Dies sessionum, a diebus
continuis, Daies The errour of the word Fatales. of Session, from daies of Continuation. And if any thing were by the
magistrat commaunded to be done within a certaine time, the Lawiers called it
Statutum tempus, and edictum
peremptorium, a time appointed, or edict peremptorie: but when the time
wherein the sute ought to be determined is expired and past, or that the sute
is let fall, we say, Litem mori, the sute to die; or instantiam perimi, the instance to be lost: as before, we
say, Litem viuere, or, the suit to live: but none of the
Lawiers hath vsurped Fatalem diem, or Fatalia tempora, a fatall day, or fatall times. But all this errour is
deriued of the chaunging of this one Greeke letter into , for seeing that by the word , or , the Greeks aswell as
the Hebrewes signifie Fatum, or destinie, they must
needes translate , fatalem diem, that is to say, a fatall day. Demosthenes oft times calleth it , which the Latins call statum diem; and we in our practise, praefixam,
that is to say, an appointed, or prefixed day: for so Demosthenes saith against Media,, & against Stephanus,: and sometimes also he
saith, , as to Nicostratus: and the later Greeks have called it , & , but neuer called it
. And so pope Synesius metaphorically calleth the last day of a mans
life , because he would
not call it , or
Fatall; a word unto Christian men and true religion straunge. Wherefore for
Fatall daies of appeales, we shall more truely and better vse the tearmes of
Appointed times, for so the lawyer calleth them. But that Iustinians lawes were written in Greeke before they were written in
Latin, I suppose no man to doubt. And that the
Theodosian and Hermogenian
Codes, out of whome Iustinians Code was almost all
compiled, were as well written in Greek as in Latin, it is plaine: and so the
law Properandum to have beene translated rather by a
Greeke than by a Latinist, being altogether writ in the Greeke phrase, as
namely calling the defendant fugientem, or the partie
flying away; which is the proper Greeke word ▪ Neither ought it to seeme straunge, that
the Greekes translated the Roman lawes, and euen Iustinians Iustitutions into Greeke; seeing them to have translated
most of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as also the
latter bookes of Aristotles Metaphysikes out of Arabike
into Greeke, the Greeke copie being before lost.
But to returne againe from whence we haue
digressed, and to resolue the propounded question; I say, that it is not
needfull for the inferiour magistrat, the appeale being let fall, to have leaue
of the superiour magistrat (unto whome the appeale was made) for the putting in
execution of their owne iudgements: as in the time of our auncestors, the
manner was, by letters of iustice (as they tearmed them) which by a decree of
Charles the seuenth, were vtterly abolished and taken
away: sufficeth it the appeale being once giuen over before the iudge that gaue
the sentence, to request, that the same may now be put in execution, except the
superiour magistrat unto whome the partie condemned hath appealed, hath
expresly before forbid the executionto be done. In which case it is needfull,
that such prohibitiō be taken away, before the inferior magistrat proceed
further. For otherwise it is not requisit,
that the appeale should by the superiour magistrat be declared to be let fall
or giuen ouer, that the sentence may be put in execution; for that the benefit
of the appeale let fall, is obtained by the law, & not by vertue of the
magistrats sentence. Neither is the honour or reputation of the superiour
magistrats impaired by the inferiours, not hauing from them expresse
prohibition: in reuerence & respect of whom, the inferiour magistrats ought
to stay the execution, if the stay thereof bee not perilous unto the
Commonweale. In which case they may proceed, although it were in question of
life, and afterwards write back their aunswere; whereas otherwise, in causes
concerning life and death, if the magistrat giue not way unto the appeale, he
himselfe is in danger of capitall punishment. Yea and in this case, the
magistrat for not yeelding unto the appeale,
is guiltie of treason, albeit that question were but concerning the whipping of
a citisen.
Now all that which we have hitherto said concerning magistrats, and of the
obedience that one of them oweth unto another, is to be vnderstood of
magistrats that be of the selfe same Commonweale. But what shal we then say of
magistrats of diuers Commonweales? As if a man by the magistrats condemned in
this kingdome shall flie into Greece, whether shall the Grand Signior of the
Turkes, at the request of the French king, or of some other priuat man whome
the matter doth concerne, cause the iudgement to be put in execution, without
further enquirie of the equitie of the cause? The like question whereunto I remember to have hapned in the
parliament of Paris, concerning a French marchant condemned by default and
contumacie at Venice, at the suit of a Venetian marchant; who came into Fraunce
to demaund execution of the iudgement giuen in Venice, hauing before obtained
letters of request frō the seigneurie to that purpose, as the vsuall manner
& custome of soueraigne princes & lords in such cases is: For a mutual
respect and care which all princes have unto iustice, wherof they hold their
Scepters and Crownes. The French marchant excepteth against the Venetian, and
no regard being had to his exception, appealeth unto the court of parliament.
Where most were of opinion, that the sentence so giuen was to bee put in
execution, without any farther examination, whether it were rightfully iudged
or not: which otherwise might▪ seeme a wrong
offered unto the Seigneurie of Venice, which might vse the like circumstāce,
& examine the iudgements of the magistrats of France, and also reuerse
them, rather in revenge of their wronged maiestie, than for the iniquitie of
the same. Yet for that the marchant was condemned by default, it was thought
meet to have it enquired, whether he had by couenant in this point submitted
himselfe unto the Venetian Seigneurie and iurisdiction or not? And then,
whether the iudgement were duely giuen, after certaine peremptorie edicts and
appointed times, according to the laws and customs of the Venetians? Which
being found to be so, the court adiudged the sentence to be put in executiō.
And this is the course in priuat iudgements. Howbeit
if question were of the honour, or life, not of one of our owne subiects
only, but euen of a straunger flying vnto
vs, the iudgement of a straunge magistrat is not to be put in execution, before
the truth of the matter be againe of fresh and throughly examined and tried.
Yea Adrian the emperour commaunded the gouernours of his
prouinces, to vse (for
that word the law vseth) that is to say, to iudge againe of them which had
beene condemned, by the justices of peace euen of the same Roman empire. And
that which I have said, is right straitly obserued and kept in the Commonweales
of the Swissers, of Geueue, of Venice, Lucque, and Genes, who cause the
condemned straungers flying unto them, to be againe of new tried, before they
restore them unto forrein princes, demaunding from them such their
condemnedWhether soueraign princes be bound to restore
straungers flying unto them, unto their owne princes demaunding them
againe. subiects againe. For so all lawiers almost with one consent
say; Soueraigne Princes not to be bound to
restore Straungers flying unto them, unto their owne Princes demaunding them
againe. Which is true that they are not bound in any civill obligation, from
which all soueraigne princes are exempted: but they without any distinction of
the Law of nations or nature, altogether denie that a forrein subiect is to be
restored unto his prince requiring him againe. Onely Baldus addeth this condition therunto, Not to restore him to be right,
so that the prince unto whom the condemned or guiltie person is so fled, do
upon him iustice. But if they will confesse every Prince by the lawes both of
God and nature to be bound to doe iustice; they must also confesse that he is
bound to restore another mans subiect unto his owne natural prince, demanding
him: not onely for the more manifest trying out of the truth, and discouering
of the conspirators their partakers, for which
their personall presence and confrontation is most necessarie; but also for
exemplarie punishment to be done, in the same places where the offences were
committed: which of all other things seemeth most to belong unto the profit to
arise unto the Commonweale by punishments, as examples of common revenge, the
death of the offender, being one of the least thing that in matter of iustice
is to be sought after. And if Magistrats in the same Commonweale are by mutuall
obligation bound to helpe one an other, and so the Commonwealth, (whereunto
next unto God we owe all our endeuours) for the prosecuting and punishing of
malefactors and offenders; why then should Princes be exempted from theA notable of Mahomet the Great, first
emperour of th Turkes. like bond, so well
agreeing with the lawes both of God and nature? Wherein the notable act of Mahomet (the second of
that name) emperour of Constantinople, euen he which was surnamed the Great, is
tight worthily commended; in that he caused the murtherer, who had most cruelly
slaine Iulian de Medices in the Church before the
Aultar, to be apprehended at Constantinople whether he was fled, and so bound
hand and foote, to be restored to Laurence de Medices
and the state of Florence, requesting of him: which he did not as respecting
the power of the Florentines, being then but small, but as fearing the hand and
power of the immortall and almightie God. And in this Realme the custome hath
alwaies beene to restore the guiltie fugitiues unto their owne Lords and
Princes demaunding of them, except therein question be made of the maiestie,
boundes, or state of the kingdome, which hath beene by their decrees determined. One of the parliament of Paris: Another of
the court of Rome against the king of England, who demaunding his fugitiue
subiect, was denyed him: And the third of the parliament of Tholouse: that of
Rome being then grounded upon the soueraigntie of the See of Rome over the
realme of England. But out of tearmes of estate, and where question is but of
publique punishment, there is no Prince which is not bound to restore another
mans subiect unto his Prince demaunding him, as hath beene solemnly iudged by
the parliament of Bourdeaux: howbeit that the same hath beene also expresly
articulated in diuers treaties of peace. As in the treatie which the Swissers made with the emperour Charles the fift, as Duke of Millan, the vij article caried an expresse clause, for the restoring of guiltie
fugitiues. And for this cause king Henry the second,
after he had by his Embassadour requested the Lords and people of Geneua, to
restore unto him Baptista Didato an Italian, his
Receiuer generall of Roan, who was thither fled with all the money of the
receipt: which they being thereto oftentimes requested, refused to doe: At
length the king protested unto the Lords of Berne, in whose protection the
Seignorie of Geneua then was, that he would vse the law of Reprisall against
them of Geneua; who before had resolued in their grand Councell of two hundred,
in no wise to restore him: but afterwards being by an Herault sent from them of
Berne, willed to deliver him unto the king, they chaunged that their former
opinion for the detaining of him: So at length the robber of the
cōmon. treasure was forsaken by them of
Geneua, lest they in doing otherwise should have stirred up the displeasure of
a most mighty king, or of the Swissers against them, as also seeme to haue
opened a sanctuarie or place of refuge for the eues, and other such like wicked
men. And this we have gathered out of the letters of the French embassador to
Anne Mommorancie Constable of Fraunce, so that they
are to be blamed which otherwise either thinke or write. Wherefore I hold it to
be an iniurie unto the estateA guilty fugitiue is not by
another prince to be detained, but restored after he is by his owne prince
demaunded. of another man, to detaine a guiltie fugitiue after he is
demaunded to be againe unto his owne prince restored; and much more if he
should be so detained by the subiects among themselves. For which cause all the
Tribes of Israel combined themselves against the Tribe of Beniamin, which was
so vtterly destroyed, except sixe hundred
persons, for refusing to restore the guiltie persons demaunded of them. And for
the. Iudic. 20. cap. same cause we find that the Hippotae were all destroyed, and their
citie vterlie razed by the Thebaus; for that they
chose rather to defend the murtherers of Phox the
Baeotian, and for them to take up armes, then to restore them unto the Thebans,
demaunding them. But if the Prince unto whom the fugitiue is retired certeinly
know himA guilties and innocent fugitiue tiue, is not to be
restored unto his angrie prince demanding of him. whom he hath so
receiued, to be an innocent and guiltles man, and to be vniustly pursued and
sought after, as hauing but escaped the crueltie of a tyrant, it is not onely a
shamefull and iniurious thing to betray the poore innocent and straunge man
unto the cruell tyrant: but he should rather for the miserable mans defence,
and safegard of his life take up armes, seeing that by the law of God, we ought
not to restore a fugitiue Deut. 16. 23. seruant
unto his angry master, from whose furie he is fled into anothers mans
house.
And thus much concerning Magistrats; and the obedience that they owe vnto
Princes, and of the power that they have over particular men, and of the
respect that they ought to have one of them towards an other. But to compare
the Magistrats of auntient time, with ours now, belongeth not to this our
purpose, considering that they are still in chaunge, howbeit that wee see them
to be like in effect, although that they differ in names. As we read in the
booke of the kings, where it is said, That Azarias the
sonne of the high priest Tsadoc was neere unto the
person of Salomon to instruct him in matters concerning
Religion; that Iosophat was chiefe of his councell, or
his Chauncellour; that Eliphore, and Aiah were his Secretaries for the
estate; that Banaia was his Constable; and Azarias the sonne of Natan his
Lieutenant generall over the governments of the twelue Tribes, which are and
have beene as it were like in all Monarchies. So in like maner we see in the
Turkish Empire, that the first and principall Bassa is
Generall of the armie, as Constable or chiefe Mareschall; and Beglerbegs are
gouernours generall of Prouinces; the Zanzacks are as more particular and
inferiour gouernours; the two Cadilesquires are the Chauncelours, attendinding
unto the administration of justice, the one in Asia, the other in Europe; the
Sabbassaes and Cadies are the ordinarie magistrats and judges; the Mophti is
the great Bishop. So in the kingdomes of Thunes, of
Fes, and of Maroch, the Munafide is as Chauncelour, the Admirall is Generall of the armie at Sea, a word or name
which we have borowed from the Arabians. So we see the charges and offices to
be as it were like, although their names be diuers, as the Great Master of
Ethiopia is called Bethudere, which is an Hebrew word, signifying Master of the
houshold. But forasmuch as Magistrats in every Commonweale are divided into
Corporations and Colledges, and that there are more Corporations and Colledges
of priuat men than of Magistrats, let vs also say somewhat of such Corporations
and Colledges.
CAAP. VII. ¶ Of Corporations, and Colledges, Estates,
and Communities, and what profits or
inconueniences ensue thereof unto the Commonweale.
NOw after that we have spoken of a Familie, and of
the parts thereof, of Soueraigntie, and of Magistrats; we must speake of
Corporations and Colledges also: wherefore let vs then first speake of the
cause of Corporations and Colledges, and after of their power and priuileges in
generall, and of the maner of punishing of them, if they offend: and last of
all whether the Commonweale can be without them. The difference of a Familie,
from Corporations and Colledges, and so of them from a Commonweale, is such as is the difference of the parts
from the whole: for the communitie of many heads of a familie, or of a village,
or of a towne, or of a countrie, may be without a Commonweale, aswell as a
familie without a colledge. And, as many familiesThe
difference betwixt familie, a colledge, and a
Commonweale. by amitie alyed, are members of one corporation and
communitie; so many corporations and communities allyed by a soueraigne power,
make one Commonweale. Now a familie is a communitie naturall; a colledge is a
communitie civill; and a Commonweale hath that moreouer, That it is a
communitie gouerned by a soueraigne power, and may be so strait, as that it may
have neither corporation nor colledges, but onely many families in it. And so
the word Communitie is common unto a familie, a colledge, and a commonweale.
And properly a Corporation is vnderstood to
consist of diuers families, or colledges, or of many families and colledges
together. But the beginnings of all civill societies are deriued from a
familie, which isA Familie the beginning of all civill
societies. (as we say) it selfe a naturall societie, and by the
father of nature it selfe first founded in the beginning together with mankind.
But when reason, by God himselfe ingrafted in vs, had made man desirous of the
companie and societie of man, and to participate together both in speech and
conuersation; the same so wrought, as that proceeding farther from the loue of
them that were domesticall & their owne, it extended farther, to take
pleasure in the propagation and encrease of families. So also families by
little and little departing from their first beginning, learned by civill
societie to imitate the naturall societie of a familie. For why, a Commonweale
is a civill societie, which can of it selfe
stand without corporations or colleges; but not without a familie: besides
that, Commonweales may be dissolued, for that they are deriued from the Lawes
and institutions of men: whereas families cannot altogether perish, but that
all mankind must before perish also. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, From the
roote of one familie, by the euerliuing God himselfe planted, at the first to
have sprung up as it were certeine plants, who by necessitie constrained, built
for themselves houses and dwelling places, so to be the safer from the iniurie
of the weather, and the rage of wilde beasts: and after that Hamlets and
villages, which in processe of time became Boroughes and Townes. But being growne to such a multitude, as that they could not longer
be contained within the compasse and precinct
of the same countrie, they were driuen to depart thence also, and to seeke out
new dwelling places. So that now thus divided in places, in regions, and
kinred, being bound unto no law or commaund, as every one of them exceeded the
other in strength and power, so he forced himself to thrust them that were
neere unto him, and weaker than himselfe, out of their houses and dwellingThe beginning of strong townes and cities. places; or to
take from them their springs, their fountaines, or pleasant places; or to driue
them from their pastures or feedings: which violence so offered by the
stronger, enforced the weaker either to seeke out places by nature defencible
and strong, or else by art or wisedome to fortifie themselves, their children,
wiues, and families, with ditches, trenches, and walles, whereof strong townes
and cities arise. For so Dionysius long since writeth king Seruius to have placed certeine places of refuge in the mountaines
& strongest hilles, whether the poore countrie men might retire themselves
out of the fields, so to saue themselves from the incursions of their enemies.
And yet could not the enemies force be so kept off with walles and other
fortifications, but that they which had so shut up themselves therein, were yet
neuerthelesse besieged by the stronger. For why, the first sort of men was most
giuen to rapine, murther, and theft, delightingThe first
sort of man, most delighted in theft and murther, and oppressing of others
weaker than themselves. in nothing more, nor accounting any honour
greater than to robbe and kill, and to oppresse the weaker sort as slaues: as
Plutarch well agreeing with the sacred historie most
truely writeth. And long before Plutarch, Thucidides the
most famous historiographer of them that florished among the Greekes reporteth,
all Greece but a little before his time to
have beene troubled with the robberies and outrages committedTheft and robberie in auntient time no disgrace nor shame. by the
mightier sort; and then robberie & theft to have bene no disgrace or shame.
Yea such as traueiled by Sea or land (as the same authour reporteth) when they
met, before they came neere together, used commonly (and that without any
reproach or imputation) to aske whether they were Robbers or Pyrates or not.
And not onely Plato, and his disciple Aristotle, have put robberie among the kinds of hunting, but the
Hebrewes also▪ who call theeves and Robbers, mightie hunters, as they did Nimroth. And by the lawes of Solon
it is plaine, that men might lawfully ioine in fellowshipTheft in auntient time lawfull both amongst the Greekes and Latins.
to robbe and steale, (prouided alwaies that it were not from the subiects of
their owne estate) as appeareth by these
words, , which the
Latin interpretour thinking to be absurd and false, hath wrested them another
way: For what other thing is , than to robbe? And what other thing is
, but ? Neither were robberies
lesse allowed of the auntient Latines than they were of the Greeks and
Hebrewes, as it is to be perceiued by the first league made betwixt the Romans
and the Carthaginensians: wherein it was thus expresly set downe: * Vltra Promontorium pulchri praedae aut mercaturae gratia
Romani ne nauiganto,Polyb. Lib. 3. Beyond the faire Promontorie,
the Romans shall not saile either for bootie, or in trade of marchandize. From
which kind of robberies long it was before other people also abstained: for so
Caesar speaking of the Germaines in his time
saith,Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam, quae extra fines
cuiuscunque ciuitatis fiunt, atque ea iuuentutis exercendae, ac desidiae
minuendae causa fieri praedicant, Robberies done without the boundes of
every citie, have with them no infamie; and those they say to be done for the
exercise of the youth, and auoiding of slouth. This licence and impunitie of
robbing and reauing, constrained men which as yet had no Princes nor
Magistrats, to ioyne themselves in societie and amitie for the defence of one
an other, and to make Communities and Fraternities, which the Greekes called
, and , as brethren which drew
water of the same well, which they called , as also , which are rurall and countrie people
vsing the faire fountaine, which the Dorians called
, and whereof such
countrie villages were called Pagi, as the Latines also said them Commessari, who in the same countrey villages, which the Greekes
called ▪ did ordinarily
eate and drinke together: as Festus in verbo pagi. The societies of men, why they
were first sought out.Festus writeth. Whereby it is plainely to be seene, the
societies of men among themselves, to have bene at the first sought out for the
leading of their lives in more safetie and quiet: and them first of all to haue
sprung from the loue which was betwixt man and wife: From them to have flowed
the mutuall loue betwixt parents and their children: then the loue of brethren
and sisters one towards another: and after them the friendship betwixt cosens
and other nie kinsmen: and last of all, the loue and good will which is betwixt
men ioyned in alliance: which had all at length growne cold, and bene vtterly
exstinguished, had it not bene nourished, maintained, and kept, by societies,
communities, corporations, and colledges:
the vnion of whome hath for long time in safetie maintained many people,
without any forme of a Commonweale, or soueraigne powerThe
happy estate of the people of Israel before they had any king, or other
forme of Aristocratique or popular commonweale. over them. So the
people of Israel for a long time florished in great tranquilitie without kings,
and without any Popular or Aristocraticall estate, euerie man liuing at his
pleasure in all libertie, euerie Tribe being in it selfe vnited by the bond of
bloud and kindred, and all of them together by the communitie of their law and
sacrifices. Who when they were by any enemie to be assailed or inuaded, the
estates of their Tribes and communities assembling together, made choyce of a
chieftaine, unto whom they gaue soueraigne power; and namely of such an one as
God had with his spirit enspired and stirred up amongst them. So of many Tribes
and families together vnited, was made Commonweale, by meane of a soueraigne power set ouer
them. And for this cause the princes and lawgiuers which first founded
Commonweals, who had not yet discouered the difficulties they were to proue, to
keep & maintaine their subiects by way of iustice, ordained and maintained
fraternities, communities, and colledges; to the end, that the parts and
members of the self same body of a Commonweale, being at accord among
themselves, it might be for them the more easie to rule the whole
CommonwealeFraternities, communities, and colleges, why
they were first instituted and ordained▪ together. So we see that Numa Pompilius, king and lawgiuer unto the Romans (after
he had abolished the name of the Sabines, which some thing divided the Roman
state) established certaine fraternities, and colledges, or companies of men,
of all maner of occupations; appointing unto euerie fraternitie certaine
patrons, priests, and solemne sacrifices,
which were kept on certaine appointed dayes of the yeare. And afterwards also
ordained a fraternitie of marchants, to whome he gaue Mercurie for their patron: which he seemed to have done to the
imitation of Solon, who by a positiue law permitted all
manner of fraternities and communities whatsoeuer, with power for them to make
such lawes and statutes among themselves as they should see good, so that they
were not contrarie unto the publike positiue lawes of the state. Lycurgus also did not onely permit, but straitly commaund
also to maintaine and cherish such societies and communities, as well generall
as particular; and that all his subiects should take their refection and diet
in companies of fifteene and fifteene together: which for that they were kept
for friendship sake, were called , of the friendship that they had
one of them with another. As also in almost
all the other townes of Greece, there were the like fraternities and companies,
whome they called , as
in Italie the same colledges and companies were called Sodalitia; for the unitie, companie, andAmitie and
friendship the foundation of l humane and ciuil
societies and more requisite for the keeping and maintaining thereof than
iustice is selfe. friendship they had among themselves, eating and
drinking together for the most part: and hauing no judges but themselves, if
any difference or strife chaunced to fall out amongst them, being such
companions and fellowes; as knowing that amitie and friendship was the onely
foundation of all humane and civill societie, and much more requisit for the
keeping and maintaining thereof, than iustice it selfe: For that iustice neuer flexible, but alwayes keeping the uprightnesse of
it selfe, by iust iudgement well endeth suits;
but not hatred, making oft times of friends foes: whereas amitie and
friendship, which is by company nourished, yeelding of the right of it selfe,
best establisheth the true naturall iustice, and plucketh up all controuersies
by the root, with great quietnesse and loue reconciling subiects among
themselves, together with the Commonweale. Now the principall end & scope
of all laws, both diuine and humane, is to keep and maintaine the loue of men
one towards another amongst themselves, and them altogether in their dutie
towards God; which cannot better be done, than by ordinarie and orderly
conuersing and combining of men themselves together.
Wherefore the Cretentians in auntient time did all eat and drinke together,
young and old, men and women; for to maintaine the loue and amitie which we
have before spoke of amongst them: Howbeit
that afterwards to auoid confusion, the ages and sexes were into certaine
orders divided. So we see in the law of God, the feasts of Passeouer, to haue
bene commaunded to be holden by companies of ten and ten persons together:
beside the feasts of Tabernacles, and the ordinarie banquets of sacrifice,
which God commaunded to be solemnised with all ioy and gladnesse: and that for
no other cause, but that so men might be together vnited in religion towards
God, and mutuall loue and friendship one to another among themselves. The same
was also well obseruedOrderly feasts and meetings of old
time instituted to maintaine loue and amitie amongst men. & kept
in the Christian primitiue church, who oftentimes made such feasts, which they
called , for the deuout
kissings, and charitable embracements one of them (in the feruensie of their
zeale) gaue to another, in the ending of them, besides their ordinarie
behauiour and communication. And albeit
that many things are long since by tract of time growne out of vse, yet
neuerthelesse a resemblance of those old feastes is yet shadowed in our holy
feasts and banquets: which not faigned but true feasts the Venetians do with
most great care and solemnitie keepe: but the Swissers better than in any place
of the world, where the fraternities and companies in euerie towne have their
common houses or halles▪ wherein they oftentimes make their feasts and bankets,
neither is there any village so little, which hath not a common house in it for
that purpose. Where if any strife or contention shall arise amongst them that
be of the fellowship or companie, it is by the common consent there ended, and
the definitiue sentence there written, not in paper, but upon the verie table
whereon they have banqueted, and that not with
inke, but with chalke. And as in auntient time artisans, marchants, priests,
bishops, and all sorts of men had their fraternities, and companies: so had
also the philosophers, and especially the Pythagorians,
who ordinarily met together, and lived for most part of their time in common.
And thus much concerning the cause, the beginning, and progresse of
corporations, and colledges, communities, and companies: which afterwards by
succession of time have in all Commonweales beene better ruled by lawes,
statutes, and customes.
But that all things which are to be said of corporations and colledges, may in
order be declared: Let vs first orderly set downe and show, what power every
corporation or colledge is of, and what
priuilege is to euerie one of them giuen; then how they are to be gouerned, and
kept within the bounds of their dutie; and last of all, whether aThe diuisiion of colleges and companions. Commonweale
can be without colledges or companies, and what colledges are most necessarie
and best fitting a Commonweale. Which the better to vnderstand, we may say,
that all colledges and companies are ordained either for religion, or for
policie, and so concerne but worldly things. If they be instituted but for
policie, either they have iurisdiction, or are without all iurisdiction.
Colledges without iurisdiction, are such as are ordained for the bringing up of
youth, or for fellowship of physitians, or of other schollers, or of marchants,
or of handie craft and trades men, or of companies of husbandmen: but such as have iurisdiction, are colledges of magistrats, and
judges, such as of whome we have before
spoken. Colledges ordained and made for religion, or for publike deuotion, are
growne into number almost infinit; differing as wee see, in lawes, manners,
life, attire, orders, fashions, and apparell. And it may be, that a colledge
may be particular to one occupation, or to one science, or to one companie of
marchants, or to one iurisdiction: and it may also be, that two or moe
colledges, may bee vnited into one bodie, as all manner of occupations
together, all sorts of marchants, or all maisters of sciences, or all the
magistrats; which ought not of right to bee called a colledge, but a bodie
politique, or corporation: albeit that by the ambiguitie of words they be
oftentimes together confounded. For there was one colledge of the Tribunes,
another of the Pretors, and another of the Questors: but when these three
colledges meet together into one and the selfe
same bodie, it is foolishly called a colledge: and yet can it not rightly be
tearmed an Vniuersitie, which consisteth of the companie and assemblie of all
the citisens, colledges, and corporations, yea and sometimes also of the
villages of the same countrey. Wherefore we shall rather call it a bodie
politique than a colledge: which so together groweth of many colledges, or
persons of vnlike condition. And it may be also, that all the particular
colledges may have the right of a generall communitie, or of an vniuersitie.
And that not onely all the colledges and communities, but that also all the
inhabitants ioyned together with the corporation & colledges of a towne, or
of a countrey, or of a prouince, may have the right of a communitie for to hold
their estates. Moreover the right of a colledge or companie may be giuen
to euerie mysterie or occupation in
particular, and yet forbidden them in generall.What a
corporation or college is. And euerie one of them may have diuers
rules, statutes, and particular priuileges. So that we may say, that euerie
corporation or colledge, is a lawfull communitie or consociation under a
soueraigne power. Where the word Lawfull importeth the authoritieNo corporation or college to be suffered without the leaue of
the soueraige. of the soueraigne, without whose permission there can
be no colledge: and is referred not onely unto the power of meeting together:
but unto the place also where it ought to meet, unto the time and manner of
meeting, and to what things ought to bee entreated of, in their assembly. And
the word communitie, or consociation, signifieth that there ought some thing to
be common to all that be fellowes of the colledge orevery
college of societie must have somthing common to al the fellowes thereof,
being otherwise no college. societie: For where there is nothing
common, there is no colledge: sufficient it is for them to have their meeting common, their attourney or agent
common, and the priuileges giuen unto the colledge common unto all the fellowes
thereof: albeit that they have neither common treasure, neither ordinarily live
or conuerse together. So that they have not well defined a colledge, which haue
said it to bee a fellowship of three persons dwelling together, hauing their
goods and substances in common. Wherein they are two wayes deceiued, for it may
be, that three persons or moe may have their goods in common, and live
together, and yet be all no colledge, but a societie of themselves, contracted
for the getting of goods, and liuing together: as also to the contrarie,
fellowes of the same colledge may dwell separat in houses, not hauing their
goods in common, nor any common treasure; neither yet commonly liuing together:
and yet enioy indeed the right of a colledge
or companie, as hauing by law and the princes graunt, power to assemble
themselves and meet together at certaine places, and times: and to intreat of
certaine their affaires, such as are the fraternities or companies of
artificers and trades men, whome the law calleth Collegia, or colledges. Yet some colledges there be, which have almost
all those things among themselves common, as weeWhat number
of fellowes ought to be in college or
societie. see those to haue, which are together ioyned for studie,
religion or deuotion sake.
As for the number of fellowes in a colledge or societie, it is no matter what
it bee, so that they be not fewer than three: for that otherwise it cannot be a
colledge. Wherefore the Romans called it not a
colledge of their Censors, or Consuls, as they did of What number of fellowes ought to be in a college or
societie. their Pretors, Tribunes, and Questors. And as for the
fellowes themselves, my meaning is, that they should be equall of power, in
respect of their communitie or fellowship, hauing euerie one of them a
deliberatiue voice in their affayres: howbeit that it may be, that the
colledge, or prince, may make choyce of one of the fellowes to commaund,
reforme, and chastice euerie one of the fellows in particular, but not all of
them in generall: such as are our bishops and abbats, hauing power to chastice
their religious and chanons But if this head or chiefe have power over the
whole body of the societie or colledge in grosse, it is not then rightly a
colledge, but rather a forme of familie, such as are colledges or schooles
ordained for the bringing up of youth: wherein there bee no bursors or
fellowes, which have therein any deliberatiue voice: For if it have in it
any such bursors or fellowes, hauing the
right of the societie or colledge, and deliberatiue voice in their assemblies,
it is then a colledge, albeit that the rest of the yonger sort be under the
power and correction of the principall.
And hereof ariseth a question, Whether a bishop in the companie of his priests,
or an abbat amongst his religious, be to be accounted fellowes, hauing the
verie title andWhether the head or principal of a college be
to be also accounted a fellowe thereof right of a fellow, and
himselfe making a part of the colledge, without the qualitie or title of a
bishop or abbat? Which question being by the learned on both parts disputed,
yet remaineth vndecided. But to leaue the disputation apart, it seemeth, that
he which is chosen by the colledge or prince to commaund all the fellowes in
particular, hath a double qualitie; one in
respect of euerie one of the fellowes, and another in respect of the whole
colledge or societie: where in regard of the fellowes he is called Principall,
Bishop, Abbat, Prior, President, or such like, hauing power and authoritie to
command euerie one of them in particular: howbeit that in the bodie of the
colledge or corporation, he is no more than a fellow, although he have the
place of precedence: and that is it for which they put their titles divided,
as, the Bishop, Chanons, and Chpite; the Abbat,
Religious, & Couent; the Principall, Bursors, & Colledge. Wherein one
of the chiefest lawyers hath bene deceiued, saying, That the Philosophers haue
called the persons of a colledge, the colledge: showing indeed no Philosophie
in so saying, consideringThat a college is a name of right:
and consisteth not in the persons of the fellows, but may stil remaine, all
the fellowes thereof being dead. that a colledge is a name of right,
and that all the reuenew and right of a colledge may remaine in one person, the rest of the fellowes being all dead. And in
case that all the fellowes of a colledge were dead, yet doth the right of a
colledge remaine: neither can the lands or goods thereof be confiscated, except
the right of a colledge be before by the supreme authoritie suppressed. For one
of the principall priuileges of corporations and colleges is, that legacies may
be unto them giuen by testament: wheras societie by the law forbidden, are not
colleges, but vnlawfull assemblies, unto whom it is not by the law permitted,
to leaue any thing by testament, albeit that legacies may be giuen unto euerie
one of the colledges. But to the intent such vnlawfull companies and assemblies
might be repressed, I thinke it needfull, that it should by law bee
forbidden, any lands or legacies to be vnto
al or any of them left by testament, as unto fellows of such corporations or
colledges.
And whereas we have said, that a colledge or societie may be without any
commonAntoninus first that gaue leaue for legacies to be
giuen to colleges stocke or treasure: that it also to be vnderstood,
that a colledge or societie may bee ordained with such prouiso, that nothing
shall be left unto it by gift or legacie. Antoninus the
emperour was the first which gaue leaue for legacies & donations to be
giuen to al colledges, except to the colledges of the Iewes, unto whome it was
yet lawfull to meet together for religion sake, and to have their Synagogues:
as is to be seene in the oration of the ambassadour Philo, unto the emperour Caligula. And Augustus himselfe by letters pattens directed unto the
gouernours of the prouinces of the empire, commanded,
That they should permit and suffer the Iewes to enioy their colledges.
Whereupon Augustus a great fauorour of th
Iewes.Narbanus Proconsull of Asia, forbad the magistrats of
Ephesus in any sort to let of disturbe them. Yea that more is, Augustus himselfe commaunded a dailie and perpetuall
sacrifice of a calfe, a goat, and a ram, to be made at Hierusalem for the
welfare of himselfe, and of the Commonweale: and willed an ordinarie almes or
doale to bee giuen unto the Iewes, of his owne proper costs and charges, for
the reliefe of their necessitie. There be also corporations and colledges of
judges and magistrats, which yet are not capable of testamentarie legacies, if
they have not expresse leaue by their erection and institution so to doe. As
was iudged against the Senat of Rome: whereunto Russius
Caepio one of the Senators, had giuen by legacie a certaine summe of
money, which he willed to be still distributed to them onely which came vnto
the councell: which legacie the Senat
demaunding, Caepio his heires denied it to bee unto the
Senat due: in which controuersie Domitian the emperour
gaue sentence for the heire, and excluded the Senat, although it were the most
auntient, and most necessarie corporation of all the Roman Commonweale.
And thus hauing set downe and declared the beginning and definition of
colledges, and communities: let vs now also speake of their power in generall;
which is not determined by their particular foundations, statutes, and
priuileges, which are diuers andThe colleges of iudges and
the chief colleges in a Commonweal. almost infinit, according to the
diuersitie of the particular colledges and communities themselves. Now the
chiefe corporations or colledges, and which have most power in a Commonweale,
are the colledges of judges and magistrats: who not onely have power over euerie one of their fellowes, and the lesser part
of their owne colledge, but over other particular colledges also; and so ouer
others subiect to their iurisdiction, and yet without their colledge. And in
this the colledges of judges and magistrats notably differ from other
colledges: for that other colledges are established euerie one of them for the
good government of that onely which is unto themselves common; whereas the
colledges of judges and magistrats, are principally erected for the good of
other subiects, and to rule the other colledges, as also to chastice them if
they shall transgresse their lawes and statutes. But as a wise man ought first
to be wise for himselfe, and then for others; as also to looke first into
himselfe, before he can rightly iudge of others; or as the Hebrewes in their
prouerbes say, That charitie ought first to begin of it selfe, if it be well ruled: So ought the colledges of
judges and magistrats, first to establish iustice amongst themselves, euerie
one of them in particular, and to themselves all in generall, the better to
distribute the same to the other subiects.
But question might be made, Whether it were more expedient that the
colledgesWhether it w more
expedient the colledges of magistrats and judges to be iudged and reformed
by their fellowes of the same societie, or by others. of magistrats
and judges, should be iudged by their fellowes, or by others? for some
particular reasons, which in due place we shall hereafter set downe. But here
to make the matter short, If the colledge for the most part be composed of
euill and naughtie men, it is not to be left unto themselves, to iudge of their
owne misdemainers; but they are to be iudged by the superiour magistrats, if
they have power over them; or by the prince, in case they be not by any other
superiour magistrat to be reformed. But if the
greater part of them be good and honest men, there is then no doubt but that it
is better and more expedient both for the colledge and the Commonweale, that
the fellows should be iudged by their fellowes, rather than by other iudges:
For that euerie colledge I know not how hath in it some particularitie which
cannot so well bee vnderstood or iudged, as by the fellowes of the same
corporation themselves. Ioyning hereunto also, that by this meane the loue and
unitie of the fellowes among themselves, is in their colledge and societie the
better maintained. And for this cause chiefly the emperour Adrian decreed, That the Roman Senators should be iudged by the Senat
onely. And for the selfe same reason the civill
iurisdiction of marchants, and for the trade
of marchandise hath bene wisely in all Italie, and since that in Fraunce
committed and giuen to certaine magistrats and Consuls of the corporation and
companie of marchants, summarily to decide the differences arising about the
contracts of marchandise, which have in them I know not how certaine secrets,
not to others well knowne.
As for other corporations and colledges, as of physitians, and tradesmen,
albeit thatColleges not hauing any iurisdiction but only a
restraining power, how they are to vse the same. by their foundation
they have not any iurisdiction or commaunding power; yet neuerthelesse so it
is, that they alwayes have a certaine restrayning authoritie and power by their
statutes and priuileges, limited and allowed them; and sometime without any
limitation at all left unto the wisdome and discretion of the corporation or
colledge, or of the head thereof: which ought
to be used with such moderation, as the father is to vse towards his children:
which ought not to be with crueltie or rigour. For if the law condemne him to
pay the price of the slaue, slaine by him that hath taken uppon him to teach
him, albeit that it were in correcting of him: of much greater reason were he
to be condemned, which hauing but the moderat correction of men of free
condition, should vse such rigour as that death should thereof ensue? As it
sometimes happened in Lacedemonia, where yong children were by the Great
Maister of the youth so rigorously whipt, a that
sometimes they gaue up the ghost upon the altar of Diana
whilest they were yet in whipping; most part of them not daring so much as to
sigh or grone, for feare they had to be accounted faint harted cowards. And
albeit that the emperour Frederike the second gaue power and authoritie unto the rectours of
Vniuersities, and that the principals of schooles and colledges have alwayes
had the correction of their disciples and schollers: yet that is to bee
vnderstood but of light matters, and not of such chastisement and correction as
the magistrat hath by the princes graunt over priuat offendors; as many haue
beene of opinion. For why, neither the German emperour, no the pope can giue any such power unto the principalles
of colledges, or to the colledges themselves: but in such countries as are vnto
themselves subiect. For albeit that pope Gregorie the
eleuenth in a Bull graunted for the confirmation of the priuileges of the
Vniueritie of Paris, before graunted by the popes
Vrban the fift, and Innocent
the sixt, in one article prouided, That if a scholler committed any thing deseruing punishment, the hearing
thereof should belong unto the bishop of Paris onely: and in another article
also, That no scholler should from thenceforth bee imprisoned for whatsoeuer
debt. Yet the French kings and magistrats have oeentimes well declared themselves not to bee bound to any such the popes
Bulles. Yet true it is, that colledges instituted for religion, have ordinarily
the correcting of them that are therein professed; and that so much the more,
as their rule and order is the straiter: For which cause such as have therein
taken uppon them such profession, are exempted from the power and correction of
their owne fathers: albeit that many hold the contrarie: whose opinion for all
that is not in that point followed. And yet
neuerthelesse certaine it is, that the naturall dutie and reuerenceWhether children hauing taken upon them any vowe of religion,
be yet neuerthelesse bound to honor and obey their parents. of
children towards their parents, remaineth alwaies in force and power,
notwithstanding whatsoeuer bond and vow they have made to any corporation or
colledge. For why, neither mans lawes, nor the statutes or priuileges of
princes can derogat from the lawes of God and nature, which hath expresly bound
children unto the obedience of their fathers and mothers; from which they can
by no otherwise free, or yet deliver tthemselves, than by lawfull emancipation:
or their fathers silence, who in saying nothing, seeme to have consented vnto
their childrens vowes, which by speaking they might have letted: which cōsent
for all that excuseth not children from doing the
honour and reuerence due unto their parents, although that they being so
professed, be from thenceforth accounted
children of the colledge; unto whome also their colledges in right of
inheritance succeed, they themselves beeing accounted of seruile estate &
condition. For which cause the canonists giue unto the abbies power and
authoritie over their owne religious, exempt from the bishops, which hath
oftentimes by the decrees of the parliament of Paris bene confirmed. In such
sort, as that they which are once entred into such religious orders, may not
from that time be called to account or into questiō for any thing by them
committed before they entred into the monastery: which yet is to be vnderstood
but of light & youthful faults; which otherwise were but to open a way to
theeves and murtherers, to retire themselves into such colledges, as into
forrests, for the auoiding of due punishment; as indeed it ofttimes
happeneth: wherewith the wise magistrats
ought to meet, & according to the law of God to draw the murtherers from
the altar to doe upon them iustice. As the court of parliament of Thoulouse
(not long agoe) condemned two religious monks of the order D'aurade, to be in their habits shamefully drawne upon a hurdle to the
place of execution, and there to be quartered, without disgrading of them, for
hauing most cruelly murtheredThat Monks may conuent their
Abbot before the ordinarie iudge: and also appeale from the inust sentence of their Abbot. the head of
their monasterie, whose seueritie they could by no meanes endure. Yea the abbat
himselfe may by his monkes be conuented before the ordinarie judge, and that as
well in criminall as civill matters: who may also freely appeale from the
sentence of their abbat unto his superiour, as it hath oftentimes beene iudged
by the decrees of the parliament of Paris; & that without leaue, as
witnesseth Panormitan the Abbot. the abbat of
Palermo; and hath also bene iudged by the
parliament of Bourdeaux. And for the same reason if the colledge would without
cause thrust out or depriue one of the fellowes of his right, priuilege, and
libertie in the colledge, the hearing of the cause belongeth to the ordinarie
judge of the colledge. Howbeit that in auntient time the corporations and
colledges of Artisans, Marchants, and other such like, had this power (for the
remouing of their fellowes) as we read in Cicero of the
Roman marchants, Mercuriales & Capitolini, M. Furium
hominem nequam, equitem Romanum de collegio deiecerunt, The Mereuriales and Capitolini (saith
he) thrust M. Furius a naughtie man, and yet a gentleman
of Rome, out of their colledge or companie. And in Lacedemonia (as Plutarch writeth) it was lawfull for to thrust out of
their colledges or companies, him that had
discouered or reuealed the secets of their companie.
As in like case Panormitan the abbat writeth, That in
abbies or colledges erected for deuotion, the chapiters have power to thrust
out any of the fellowes, or to depriue him of his ordinarie diuidents, but not
to beat him, or to vse senre correction upon him, or
yet to imprison him; as hath bene iudeged by a decree of the parliament of
Paris.
But yet here a man might aske, Whether a colledge may make a decree, That none
of the fellowes shal conuent or sue another of his fellowes, before any other
judges but the colledge? And in case it be so decreed, whether hee that shall
breake the decree so made and sue his fellow before another judge, shall be
bound unto the civill penaltie in the decree set downe? Wherein Sceuola the lawyer is of opinion, the decree to bee
good; and that the fellow of a colledge or
societie cannot have recourse unto other magistrats, contrarie unto the decree
of the colledge, but in paying the penaltie in the decree of the colledge
expressed. Howbeit (in mine opinion) this decree is not general, neither can
take place in causes criminall, no more than the conditionall penalties set
downe in arbitrements, which have no place if they concerne matters of crime.
Secondarily mine opinion is, That the decree of a colledge or companie, euen in
civill causes hath no place, if all the fellowes of the colledge or societie
giue not thereunto their consents, as they do in arbitrements, whereunto no man
is bound that would not. For in all communities,
corporations and colledges, and so generally in How decrees are in colleges and societies to be made, to
bind every one of them to that is common to every one of them in particular,
as also to that which is common to them all iointly and indiuisibly
together. euerie societie and companie, if question be of any thing
which is common to them al in particular & apart from the community, the
expresse consent of every one of them is therin requisit, if any thing be
therin to be done. But if question be of that which is commō to them all
iointly & indiuisibly, it sufficeth that the greater part be of one
opinion, for the binding of the rest: Prouided alwaies, that nothing be
ordained or decreed, contrarie to the statutes of the colledge, established by
the soueraigne prince, or by the founder of such corporation or colledge,
authorised by the prince. Wherfore the laws of the Commonweale, and the
statutes of the colledge standing whole and entire, the colledge may make
decrees which may bind the lesser part all together, and all the fellowes in
particular: yet still prouided, that two third parts of the fellowes consent
unto the making of the decree: albeit that
they be not all of one aduise or opinion, in matters concerning their common
society, although that such decrees so made cannot bind the greater part of the
fellows collectiuely, and much lesse the whole corporation and college: no more
than the prince is bound to his owne law, or the testator to his owne will, or
particular men unto their owne agreements, from which they may by their common
consent reuolt, nothing beeing more agreeing with reason and nature, than
euerie thing to be dissolued, by the same meanes that it was made.
But yet it might be doubted, Whether decrees made by the consent and good
likingWhether decres made by the consent of an whole
college or societie: may by the greater part thereof againe be abrogated or
repealed. of an whole colledge or societie, might bee againe repealed
and abrogated by the greater part, or two third parts of the same societie or
colledge? Which I doubt not but that they may
in al common estates, corporations, and colledges, if question be but of things
common to them al in generall (as they are one vnited body:) but if question be
of euerie mans right by himselfe particular and apart from others, then euerie
man is to giue his consent thereunto. Wherefore if the assemblies of the
estates in a Commonweale consist and be of diuers bodies, as in the diets of
the empire, and in all other Commonweales are composed of three orders and
degrees of men, viz. of the Clergie, the Nobilitie, and
Comminaltie, nothing can be done or decreed by any two of the orders, to the
hurt or preiudice of the third, especially if the matter concerne every one of
the orders by themselves apart. By which reason I caused two of the orders of
Fraunce, to chaunge their opinions in
matter concerning the third. For at such time as I was sent deputie for the
prouince of Vermandois to Blois (whither king Henry the
iij had called an assemblie or parliament of al the kingdome of France) a great
and weightie question was moued amongst the three estates, Whether it were more
indifferent, and better also, the requests of the people to bee before the
prince iudged and determined by 36, men which euerie one of the three orders
should by voice chuse, than by the prince himselfe with his councel? And now
the Clergie and Nobilitie had not onely so decreed, but had drawne a great part
of our sort unto their side also, hauing with hope of great rewards gained
their voices. At which time I perceiuing the drift and purpose of certaine
ambitious persons that were dealers in the matter, aunswered, That the matter was further to bee considered of. For why,
it was laboured, that such things as could not bee obtained of the people in
generall, might so be from a few in the name of the whole extorted. Wherefore
the question being more throughly debated, I denied that the matter could so by
vs bee passed, without a more speciall commission from the people. Neither that
if wee had any such speciall commission from the people, could it yet by vs bee
done, without the great daunger of the whole Commonweale; and that for many
reasons, by me then discouered: whereby I drew the rest of my fellowes backe
againe to mine opinion, who laied this charge uppon mee to remoue also the
other two orders of estate from their former receiued
and setled opinion. But when the Archbishop of Lyons (President of the Ecclesiasticall estate) earnestly
withstood me, seriously alleaging that the Clergie and Nobilitie had before so
resolued; I showed him, that such a prerogative had from all antiquitie beene
kept to every of the three Estates, as that no two of them could decree any
thing to the preiudice of the third: as it had before without any difficultie
passed in the parliament at Orleance; and as it is also used in the diets of
the Empire, and the Parliaments of England, and of Spayne. For which cause, and
other reasons then alleaged, I requested the other two orders of Estate, to
take it in good part, in that they were by me hindered, as hauing the charge of
the third estate. Which was the cause, that the thing beeing againe called into
consultation, both the estates chaunged their opinions. Which the king hearing,
and dissembling his griefe, said in the
presence of Ruze Bishop of Angiers, and other Lords,
That Bodin at his pleasure had over ruled the
Estates.
But if question be of a thing common to all a corporation or colledge, and
whichThe greater part of a Colledge or Communitie alwaies
reputed for the whole, and therefore may as it seemeth good, determine of
any thing which concerneth the whole corporation or colledge.
concerneth not any the particular members apart from the whole bodie, but the
whole and entire bodie onely; the greater part of the societie, may at their
discretion thereof determine: albeit that the whole communitie have determined
that their Statutes and orders should not be infringed, but by the consent of
all the fellowes. For why, The greater part of a Communitie is alwaies reputed
for the whole. Yea the law willeth, that he which is chosen of a communitie or
colledge to entreat and discide of their common affaires, may bind every one of
the colledge. Wherefore they are deceiued
which write the greater par, or two third parts of a
Colledge, to be able to do nothing, if the colledge have made a statute, That
they must all thereto consent: for if that might take place, then any one of
the fellowes himselfe alone might empeach and stay the aduise, decrees, and
resolutions of the whole societie; which is contrarie to the formall
disposition of the law, which willeth, That in all acts concerning a communie
or corporation, the greater part should be the stronger; and that the more part
of two third parts, may giue lawe to all the fellowes in particular, whether
the rest of the fellowes be there present or absent. For why, it is not
needfull that they should all be present, that the decrees should stand good,
and that especially in light matters; prouided yet that they be all thereunto
summoned or called. Howbeit that in matters of waight & consequence, it is needfull that two third parts be there
present, albeit that they all giue not their consents, except it be by a
speciall law prouided that the two third parts must of necessitie agree in one.
As by the iudiciall lawes of Lewes the xij the French
king, it is ordained, That two parts of the Iudges, and no fewer, may in the
higher Courts end any civill cause: whereas in criminall causes, equall voices
acquite the partie accused; who yet otherwise is to be condemned, if the
greater part do but by one voice exceed the lesser. So also by a decree of Gregorte the x, concerning the election of the Pope, he
must have two third parts of the colledge of Cardinals that is to be chosen
Pope. As also in many elections of the heads of Colledges, it is necessarie
that two third parts of the colledge should agree in one. Yea sometime it is
necessarie that all the fellowes should be of
one and the selfe same accord. As in Rome it was by the Tribunitiall law
requisite that all the ten Tribunes should be of one opinion and mind, or at
least wise not openly to discent, for that otherwise one Tribune alone might
empeach and stay the proceedings of the whole Colledge. Now if they all agreed
in one, then unto the decree were ioyned these words, Pro
Collegio, for the Colledge: otherwise if there be no speciall statutes
or law to the contrarie, the greater part of two third parts sufficieth in all
acts concerning the communitie of corporations and colledges.
It is also necessarie, that the consent whereof we speake, bee giuen in the
common assembly of the corporation or colledge: for
albeit that all the fellowes had seperately For the making of a decree in a colledge, or corporation,
the consent is to be giuen in the cōon assembly
of the same, & that in time & plac by the
statutes theeof appointed. and apart
consented unto any thing concerning that which is common to all the Colledge,
yet so it is that such act is not to any effect or purpose, neither for nor
against them which have so giuen their consents, although it were done euen
before publique notaries: for that it is not done by the Colledge, which is
done by all the fellowes apart. Neither sufficeth it that all they of the
Corporation or Colledge were called together, if it were not in time and place,
by the Statutes appointed. Wherefore two parts of the fellowes gathered
together, can do more, than all the fellowes consenting apart.
But here some man may aske, who shall call the fellowes together? Wherein many
are of opinion, that the most auntient fellow of the Colledge or Societie, hath
power To whom it belongeth to call the fellowes together in a
colledge or societie. to call the rest together; as also to condemne
them of contumacie for not comming▪ and yet for all that not to have power to
fine them, which is but a ridiculous thing, if such contumacie cannot be
punished, neither by him, nor yet by the colledge; as certein it is that it
cannot: wherfore such calling of the fellows together, by the most auntient
fellow, is but vaine, except that the fellowes of their owne accord be content
to obey the same. And therefore the Senat during the Consulship of Caesar could not be assembled or called together, Caesar the greatest magistrat forbidding the same, as is
afore said. Othersome are of an other opinion, and hold, That two third parts
of a Colledge may of right call together the rest: but yet who shall then call
together those two third parts they say not. Howbeit is two third parts suffice
to do and determine the affaires of a
corporation or communitie, we need not to trouble our selues with the rest, all
the fellowes being called. Howbeit the custome kept almost in all corporations
and colledges is, for the elders by their seruants or other ministers to call
together the rest; or else for them of them selues to come together at the
tolling of a bell, or the sound of a Trumpet; as in auntient time they did in
Graece and Rome, when as the magistrats which had power to assemble the people,
or the Senat, caused their commaunds by the sound of a Trumpet to be published
to the people in particular, but not to all in generall, for that they could
not be so in that sort commaunded. And who so obeyed not but refused to come,
him the magistrat had power to fine, or seize upon his goods. As we see how
that Marcus Antonius being Consull, threatned Cicero to pull downe his house, if he came not to the
Senat being called. So that there is no question where he that calleth together
the fellowes, hath power to commaund. But if the Colledge or societie be
destitute of an head or magistrat which hath power to commaund, or hauing
power, yet is not willing to constraine them which will not obey him; then he
whom it concerneth to have the societie assembled, is to obtaine commission
from the magistrat to constraine them to come together, and so we vse to doe.
Yet may the greater part of the fellowes together, depriue every particular
fellow of part of the profit and commoditie he is to have of his Colledge, if
being orderly called he shall refuse to come, it being so decreed; yet so that
it be moderately That it is lawful for all colleges & corporations to
make such orders as they shal thinke best for themselves, not derogating
from such orders as were giuen them from their soueraigne prince, or from
the lawes and ordinances of the commonweale. done. Wherefore to
conclude this question of the power of Communities, Corporations, and
Colledges, we may say Solons law to have generally place
in every Commonweale, and to be approued by the Interpretors of both the lawes:
that is to say, that it is free for all lawfull communities, corporations, and
colledges, to make such orders as they shall think for themselves best, so that
therby they do not derogate from the statutes of the Colledge, made or
established by the Soueraigne Prince, or that they be not repugnant or
contrarie to the lawes and ordinances of the Commonweale. And in auntient time
it was not forbidden corporations and colledges to make decrees and ordinances
within themselves, without derogating from the publique lawes; as also to put therunto such and so great a penaltie and punishment,
as pleased the Colledge. But since that time
by the statutes and ordinances of every Colledge & Commonweale, that power
hath beene ordinarily cut short, and brought unto some small fie. Neither am I of their opinion, which hold that a
Colledge may make ordinances and decrees without any penaltie annexed vnto
them; for that such an ordinance, degree, or statute, should be but
vnprofitable and ridiculous, if no punishment were thereunto apposed against
them that should disobey the same, especially if he that maketh the orders or
decrees have not power by arbitrarie punishment to cause them to be obserued
and kept. We see also in many places the Corporations of artificers and such
like, which have the right of a communitie, to have also a certeine forme of
restraining, and visiting of the workes and wares of their occupations or
trades, with power to seise upon them, or
to breake or confiscate them, if any thing be done contrarie to their decrees
and orders: sauing yet alwaies the Magistrats authoritieWhat
things Corporations and colleges are in their assemblies & meeting to entreat and consult of? for the hearing
of the matter, if it be so reserued unto him. But whereas we said that a
lawfull Corporation or colledge may make ordinances and decrees, not derogating
from the lawes of the Commonweale: that is so yet to be vnderstood, as that
they in their assemblies and meetings entreat onely of that which is vnto
themselves common, and not of such things as whereof they are by the law
prohibited not onely to determine, but euen to consult also: lest in so doing
they incurre the penaltie appointed against vnlawfull Colledges and
Companies.
And thus much concerning the power, rights, and priuileges of Corporations and
How Corporations & colleges are to be corrected and
punished when they shall offend. Colledges in generall. Let vs now
see also how and in what sort they are to be corrected and punished when they
shall offend. Howbeit that one might say that where no offence is committed,
there no punishment is to be inflicted. Now so it is that a colledge or
corporation cannot offend, nor so much as consent, or doe any thing by fraud or
deceit (as the law saith;) and therefore there lyeth no action of fraud or
deceit against a colledge or corporation, although all the fellowes of the same
colledge, or all the inhabitants of a citie, or all the estates of a countrie,
had particularly and every one of them apart consented thereunto: a thing yet
altogether impossible in corporations and communities of Townes, Countries,
Prouinces, & Commonweales, considering that the children and furious
persons which therein are, cannot yeeld their consent thereto. But forasmuch as things done by the greater part of
the fellowes of a colledgeHow Corporations and Colleges are
said to offend. collegiatly assembled, or by the greater part of the
inhabitants of a towne or citie in a lawfull assemblie, are supposed to be done
by them all, therefore the whole colledge or corporation is punished: as in
rebellions of Townes, and seditions of communities, which are punished in their
Corporations by losse of their priuileges, or of the right of their communitie,
by fines, charges, seruices, and other punishments, according to the qualitie
of the offence: which punishment yet ought not to take place, if the rebellion
or other crime be not committed by the consent of the communitie or
corporation, and decree for the doing thereof made in their common assemblie:
as it was iudged by a decree of the parliament of Paris, for the communitie of
the citie of Corbeil. And yet neuerthelesse,
if the corporall punishment be for the offence committed, to be inflicted, as
whipping, torture, or death, none of the societie or corporation are so to be
punished, but they which were therein partakers, or at least thereunto priuie,
although the whole bodie of the communitie or colledge be therefore condemned.
As in priuat offences done by many being of no colledge or communitie, there
lyeth not an action but against every one of the offendours in particular, and
for the whole, in such sort, as that one of them hauing made satisfaction, the
others are thereby acquired. But if such fact or offence be done by any one,
following therein the aduise, counsell, and
deliberation of all, they may be all therefore conuented, and every one of them
apart for the whole, neither one of them
making satisfaction, are the others thereby discharged. But happely it may
seeme a thing verie vnreasonable and absurd, that many, yea the greater part of
the same colledge or corporation, should be found innocent, and yet to be
altogether punished in the whole bodie, as in the cases by vs before rehearsed.
Whereunto I answere, That it is yet more straunge, that the innocents should by
lot be drawne together with the offendours, and that these should be punished,
upon whom the lot should fall; as the maner was in the Decimation (or as it
were tything) of the armie, for hauing borne it selfe cowardly against the
enemie, where the most hardie & valiant, were oftentimes by lot drawne out,
and for cowards executed. Which example the Senator Cassius vsed, at such time as he in full Senat, persuaded the Senators to put foure hundred Slaues to death,
although that there was one (and he vnknowne) amongst them guiltie of the
murther committed in the person of their master, ioyning thereunto these
wordes: Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquidA notable saying.ex iniquo, quod publica vtilitate compensatur, every
great example sauoreth something of iniustice, which (yet for all that) is with
the common profit againe recompensed or requited. But this is not (may some
say) to pay the debt, to alleage one inconuenience in defence of an other, and
of one absurditie to conclude an other. Whereunto I say, that the best iustice
that a man can doe is, of diuers inconueniences at onceOf
diuers inconueniences at once propounded, it is alwaies best to shunne the
greatest. propounded, to shunne the greatest, especially when
question is of such offences as may in no wise be left vnpunished. For we see
that the wisest, & most aduised Lawiers
have descided, That if there be any one slaine, or beaten, or robbed by many,
they are all bound for the whole, albeit that happely it was but one of them
which gaue to him the mortall wound: but if it shall appeare, which of them
killed him, and that it was done without the conspiracie of the rest, onely he
is bound that so slew him: But if it appeare not at all by whom he was slaine,
neither that they had conspired against him, they are all acquited from
corporall punishment; but yet are to be therefore fined: For nothing is more
effectuall for the finding out of that which is true and iust, then that in
doubtfull things it is admitted, still to shunne those things which are more
absurd and vniust. As if a felonie bee done which cannot by one man be
performed; as if many have caried away an other mans timber log, and amongst
those many it appeareth not who it was that
did it, none of them is guiltie of the theft, if we will sticke unto the
subtillitie of the words of the law; and yet are they all indeed guiltie:
whereof the Lawiers have no other reason, but that the inconuenience falleth
greater on the one side, when they would shunne it on the other, which is (as
we said) the greatest reason that a man can haue, to find out the truth of all
things, when all other reasons faile. We speake not here of that which enemies
do to townes besieged, and by force taken, pilling, killing, sacking aswell the
good as the bad; and where the better that a man is, the worse commonly he
fareth: but what a prince ought to do against his rebellious subiects. Howbeit
that the Romans, although accounted the most iust people of the world, have not alwaies followed that rule of equitie
and iustice which we before spoke of, but sometimes punished not onely in
generall, but euen in particular,The seueritie of the Romans
against their rebellious conspitors. all the inhabitants of their
rebellious Townes after that they had taken them: and yet alwayes obserued this
point, to punish the heads more seuerely than the rest, and to preserue them
that had resisted the seditious; hauing still aspeciall regard whether the
rebellion were consulted of and decreed in the Corporation and communitie or
not. So Liuie saith: Valerius Leuinus
Agrigento capto qui capita rerum erant, virgit caesos securi percussit,
caeteros proedamque vendidit, Valerius Leuinus hauing taken Agrigentum
beheaded them that were the chiefe authours (of the rebellion) being before whipped, the rest and the prey he sold. And in
an other place: Quoniam defectionisauthores merit as poenas a dijs immortalibus, & a vobis
habent P. C. quid placet innoxia multitudine fieri? tandem ignotum est
illis, & ciuitas data, For that the authours of the rebellion
(saith he) have from the immortall Gods, and you the appointed fathers,
receiued their deserued punishment, what is it your pleasure to be done with
the rest of the guiltlesse multitude? at length they were pardoned, and the
freedome of the citie giuen them. The Consull Fuluius,
hauing after a long siege taken the citie of Capua, beeing renolted from the
Romans, beheaded fourescore of the Senatours, beside xxvij others which had
before poysoned themselves, and caused three hundred moe of their chiefe
gentlemen to be in prison starued, the rest of the inhabitants he sold for
slaues. As for the other Townes which were under the obedience of them of Capua, there were none but the chiefe men
punished. Atella, Calatia{que} in deditionem acceptae, ibi
quoque in eos qui capita rerum erant animaduersum, Atella and Calatia
(saith Liuie) were taken in by composition, and there
also execution was done upon such as were chiefe doers in the rebellion. The
other Consull Appius more seuere than his fellow Fuluius, would have enquirie made also of their allyes,
who had had secret part in the same conspiracie: Whereunto Fuluius would not agree, saying, That so to do, were but to prouoke
their faithfull and loyall allyes to rebell, in giuing credit unto the
traiterous Campanians▪ Whereby it is manifest withThe
notable clemencie of the emperour Aurelianus. what seueritie the
Romans thought it good to punish their rebellious conspirators, during the time
of their popular government. And as for the Roman Emperours, some of them used towards such offendours gratious favour,
and othersome extreame ctueltie. The emperour Aurelianus
for his clemencie deserueth to be for euer commended, who laying siege unto the
citie Thyane, swore that there should not a dog escape alive, if he should take
the citie: but hauing by force wonne it, chaunging his mind, as with compassion
moued, he straitly forbid any man to be therein slaine; and when some to
prouoke him unto wrath, put him in remembrance of the oath he had made: he said
it concerned but dogs, which hee commaunded to be all forthwith killed. The
like clemencie Henry the fift the Germaine Emperour,
hauing condemned the citie of Brixia to bee vtterly rased, and laid euen with
the earth; yet when he had wonne the same, pardoned the citisens neuerthelesse,
least the innocent people should so haue
perished together with the offendors; following therein the mercie of God, who
would not onely the good not to perish together with the euill and wicked, but
promised to be mercifull unto certeine cities, and a multitude of wicked
persons, for some few good men to bee found amongst them. Some others of the
Emperours have contrariwise used most barbarous cruelties, without discretion
killing the good and bad together, and that for the fault of some few. As the
emperour Antonius Caracalla, who in revenge of certeine
rymes and songes made and sung against himThe great crueltie
of Antonius Caracalla, Theodosius the great, Xerxes, and Sylla. at
Alexandria, caused certeine of his garrison souldiours and Praetorian bandes to
bee entermingled with the people as they were there beholding playes: who upon
a signall giuen, slewe an infinite number of the poore Citisens one with an
other without respect, as they came to hand.
The like whereof hee had also before commaunded to bee put in execution at
Hierusalem. And afterward at Thessalonica, where the Emperour Theodosius the great caused seauen thousand of the inhabitants to bee
slaine one with another pell mell in revenge of certaine of his Receiours and
other his magistrates and officers there slaine, without any deliberation or
decree for the doing thereof, before made in their Communitie or Corporation.
Xerxes king of Persia used an other manner of
revenge, not in deede so cruell as the other, but yet farre more ignominious
and despirefull, causing the noses of all the people
of a citie in Syria to bee cut off (which citie after that was of that euent called Rhinocura) for
the like fault done by some few of them. But of all cruelties that of Syllaes passed, who beside three score thousand citisens
of Rome by him slaine, caused also all the inhabitants of Preneste to bee put
to death, pardoning none but his hoast, who would also needs die with the rest,
saying, That he would not be beholden for his life, unto the murtherer of his
countrey. Which cruelty may yet be borne with, when the vanquished shal chuse
rather to die than to become subiects; as in all ages there have bene such: but
not if they shall bee content to serue and obey them, by whome they are
ouercome and vanquished. So the Pisans (in the memorie of our fathers) not able
to endure the iust government of the Florentines their lords, by the favour of
Charles the eight the French king, yeelded themselves
to Countie Valentine
Borgia, who beeing not able to protect them, they in vaine offered
themselves first to the Genowayes, and then to the Venetians: By both which
states they being reiected, after that they had for a long time beene most
straitly besieged, they yeelded themselves subiects unto the Florentines their
old lords, of whome they easily obtained pardon, and so afterwards continued
their good and faithfull subiects. But Lewes eare of
Flaunders, and the last of his house (for after his death that earledomThe great mischeite which befel earle of
Flaunders, in seeking to ke too sha reueng uppon the Gantoies his rebellious
subiects. fell into the house of Burgundie) hauing brought the
Gantois rebelling against him to such extremitie, as that they were glad to
craue of him grace and pardon, would not so receiue them, but propounded vnto
them most hard conditions, and not beseeming a free people to accept of: as
that they should all come unto him out of the citie to craue pardon with halters about their neckes; and that then he
would consider what he were to do with them. Which put the poore distressed
people into such a desperat feare, as that they went out being in number but
five thousand (but all armed with dispaire) against the earle, who then was
fortie thousand strong, whome they in a great battell ouerthrew; and so brought
under their obeysance all the townes of Flaunders, except Audenard. The earle
flying out of the ouerthow hid himselfe under a poore womans bed; who
afterwards found meanes for his escape, by couering him in an heape of apples:
but being so escaped▪ for euer lost his power, together with his honour. With
which so great an ouerthrow giuen, the Gantois became much more arrogant than
before,No more cruel enemie against the prince, than are his
desperate Some princes unto crueltie to hae also added contumelie, in revenge of their
rebellious subiects. & neuer afterwards willingly endured their
princes commands. Whereby it was then perceiued, No more cruell enemies to be
found against the prince, than his desperat subiects, Nor any war to be more
iust, than that which is by necessitie imposed; as said an auntient Roman
Senator. But that the aforesaid warre was such, it is euident & plaine,
seeing that together with their most shamefull yeelding, most cruell death did
hang over all their heads, and a reproach heauier than death it selfe; reproach
and disgrace being alwayes more dreadfull unto men of honourable minds, than
most cruell death. But in that time it should seeme, that princes tooke
pleasure to encrease their crueltie with reproach and despight against their
disobedient and disloyall subiects. For so This
Frederike hauing sharply chastised the rebellions Millanotes his subiects,
afterwards in dispite caused such of them as would have their lives spared
with their teeth to drawe a figue out of a mules taile: whereof grewe the
dispite ful mocke yet used by the Italians, by showing the thombe betwixt
two fingars, with these words: Eco, la .Frederike the second, the German emperour, to revenge
the miurie done unto his wife, with great
disgrace at Milan, hauing besieged and taken the citie, after he had put to
death the chiefest of the citisens, and rifled and rased the citie, used a
contumelie and despight towards the rest that had escaped the souldiours furie,
as was unto them more despightful than cruel; & yet worse than death. So
Dagobert king of France, not cōtented to have slaine
the inhabitants of Poitiers, for ayding his enemie against him, caused also the
towne to be rased, and the ground to be plowed with an eternall curse, and salt
to be sowne upon it to make it barren: whereof they are yet called Salted men
of Poitiers. But as princes which with sufferance passe over the seditions
& rebellions of the corporation or communitie of any towne or prouince,
giue example to others to doe the like: so those
princes also which without measure exercise crueltie upon their vanquished
Seueritie in punishing of rebellion ought stil to be
tempered with gitie. subiects, get vnto
themselves not onely the title of most barbarous and cruell tyrants, but in so
doing sometimes also hazard their whole estates. But hee shall deserue the
prayse and commendation of a iust prince, and preserue also his estate, which
shall keepe the meane in punishing the authors and ringleaders of rebellions,
tempering seueritie with lenitie. As did Charles of
Fraunce king Lewes the ninth his brother: (afterwards
king of Naples) who hauing commission from the king, to chastice the
inhabitants of Mont Pelier, who had slaine certaine of the kings receiuers
& officers: tooke from them all their liberties and priuileges, appointed
the walles of their citie to be rased, their steeples pulled downe, and a fine
of six score thousand crownes to be set upon them: or as some write, caused
halfe the goods of the citisens to bee confiscated, and of six hundred of them one part to be drowned, another
part to bee hanged, and the third part burnt. And so indeed the iudgement was
to the terrour of them giuen, and the decree set downe: how bei that it was afterwards by the good prince moderated,
in such sort, as that none but the offendors themselves were executed: for that
the kings officers and magistrats had bene so murthered by no publike councel,
or assembly of the citisens orderly called, but by the insolencie of the rash
tumultuous people onely. With like lenitie Charles the
sixt the French king disarmed the Parisians risen up in rebellion against him,
and executing the authors thereof, restrayned the rest of the whole bodie of
the citisens, by imposing upon them a great fine. And admit all the citisens of
a citie, by their common consent, and the matter being before well
debated, to have all together with one mind
rebelled, and chosen unto themselves a new prince: Yea and to have augmented
their wickednesse with contumelie and despight against their soueraigne: yet
were it not the part (I will nor say) of a good prince, but euen of a wise
prince, to take revenge of all of them of whome he might, for blemishing
thereby for euer of his fame and reputation; than which nothing ought to bee
unto a prince more deere: albeit that he might so doe (which yet were a most
hard thing) the state of the Commonweale reserued whole. Wherefore T. Quintius the ConsulThe wisdom of T.
Quintus and▪ Scipio Affricanus in chastising of
their mutinous souldiours. did wisely, who when he could not with the
safetie of the Commonweale chastice the armie which he then had under his
conduct and leading, for their rebellious mutinie, after he had appeased all
matters, and yet thought it not safe for the souldiours so in danger of the law to returne into the citie, he himselfe came
first to Rome, and there by consent of the Senat presented a request unto the
people, Ne cui militum fraudi esset secessio, That the
mutinous reuolt might not be daungerous to any of the souldiours: which he with
the great good liking both of the Senat and of the people obtained. With like
wisdome Scipio Affricanus the father, repressed the
mutinie of his army at Seuerone, with the execution of thirtie five of the
souldiours onely: Certabatur vtrum in authores tantum
seditionis xxxv animaduerteretur, an plurium supplicio vindicanda defectio
magis esset quam seditio: vicit sententia lenior, vt vnde culpa orta esset,
ibi poena consisteret, ad multitudinis castigationem satis esse,
Question was (saith Liuie) whether execution were to be
done onely upon thirtie siue, the authors of the sedition: or that so
great a reuolt rather than a sedition, were
to be revenged with the execution of moe: wherein the milder opinion preuailed,
That from whence the offence was begun, there should the punishment rest: and
that to suffice for the chastising of the whole multitude. And shortly after in
the oration which Scipio made unto the armie, he vseth
these words, Se non secus quàm viscera secantem sua cum
gemitu & lachrimis xxx hominum capitibus, expiasse octo millium
noxam, Him no otherwise but as a man cutting his owne entrels, with
sighes and teares to have made satisfaction for the offence of eight thousand
men, with the heads of thirtie. So when Appius the
Consull (with great rashnesse should I say, or pride)
would by strong hand have restrained and corrected his armie, then all in a mutinie, he was by the Colonels and captaines
staied from so doing: who all with one voice told him, Nothing to be more
daungerous, than to seeke by force to chastice them, in whose loialtie and fide
litie the whole force of the empire consisted. And albeit that nothing were to
bee feared in the punishing of an whole armie, orA notable
regard to be had in al general and popular punishments. of a citie,
yet such generall and popular punishments are not to be vsed: but in chastising
of such offences, an especiall regard is to be had, Vt poena
ad paucos, metus ad omnes perueniat, That the punishment it selfe
should touch but few, but that the feare thereof should come unto all; Tullie. That it beseemeth not a soueraign prince to
be the executor or to behold the general execution of his rebellions
subiects. as an auntient orator no lesse eloquently than wisely
said.
Yea moreover it beseemeth not a soueraigne prince to be the executor or
beholder of the execution of such generall punishments; (if otherwise it may
bee in his absence done) to the intent his
subiects minds should not so be alienated from him: but to the contrarie it is
needfull for him with a convenient lenitie to moderat euen the iust and
necessarie seueritie of his deputies and magistrats, to the imitation of Antiochus theThe wise moderation of
some great princes in chastising of their rebellions subiects. great
king of Asia, who hauing giuen commission to Hermeas his
constable, to punish the rebellion of them of Seleucia: and he condemning the
corporation of the citie in a fine of six hundred thousand crownes, and
banishing also a great number of the citisens, and taking away the liberties
and priuileges of the citie: Anoiochus called home
againe the banished; and contenting himselfe almost with the tenth part of the
fine, restored againe unto the citie the auntient liberties and priuilegs
thereof. But not to goe further, Henrie the second the
French king, hauing giuen commission to the duke Mont-morencie constable of Fraunce, to chastise the
rebellion of the countrey of Guyenne, and especially of the inhabitants of
Bourdeaux, graunted them afterward a generall patdon, and forgaue them the
rasing of their towne hall, wherein they had made their assemblies, with the
fine of two hundred thousand pound, and the charges of the armie brought
against him: in all which the inhabitants of Bourdeaux were by the duke
condemned; restoring unto them also the right and freedome of the corporation
of the towne, excepting them only who had laid hands upon his officers, and
some few priuileges and demaines of the towne, which were then abridged and cut
off. But the emperour Charles the fift, not so cruelly
as wisely, by one and the selfe same iudgement,The wisdome
of Charls the fift in the seueritie by him used in chastising the rebellious
Gaunties: and in the lenitie to the contrarie by him used towards the
Spaniards rebelling against him in Spaine. revenged the often
rebellions and iniuries which they of Gaunt had of old used to doe against his auncestors, and which till then remained
vnpunished: partly by the sufferance, and partly through the weakenesse of the
earles of Flaunders. For when the citisens of Gaunt had now compelled the
Bourgamaster openly to teare in peeces the emperours edicts, and had sent
ambassadours unto Frauncis the French king to receiue
them with their citie into his protection: and he refusing them, had solicited
his other subiects, their neighbours to rebellion: the councell of Spaine
decreed, That the citie should be rased and laid euen with the ground, and all
the goods of the citisens confiscated. Howbeit the emperour hauing it in his
power, spared the countrey and citie wherein he was borne and brought up: but
executed thirtie of the chiefe authors of the
rebellion, tooke away all their corporations and colledges, depriued the citie
of part of the publike lands thereunto belonging, as also of all the
priuileges; and caused a most strong castle to be there built, and a garrison
therein to be kept and maintained, and all at the citisens charge. This the
emperours sentence I receiued of them of Gaunt, at such time as I was of
councell to Frauncis duke of Aniou, and of the Low
countries. And not long after king Frauncis, who had
refused to protect the Gantoies going in person himselfe to represse the
rebellion at Rochell, raised for the custome of salt, with the maiestie of his
speech terrified them of Rochell, and fined them, but yet put no man to death:
yea he left unto the citie the liberties and societies thereof whole, yet protesting himselfe to have had no lesse occasion
to revenge himselfe than had Charles the fift, but that he had rather to encrease his
commendation, by sauing, than by spilling of his subiects, and by gentlenesse
rather than by crueltie. By these examples before set downe it is well to be
vnderstood, what is to bee determined for the punishment of Communities,
Corporations, and Colledges: wherein they which affect lenitie, do giue
occasion unto the same citisens oftentimes to rebell: which in a Commonweale is
of a prince especially to be taken heed of. In which thing no man seemeth to
have behaued himselfe more wisely than Charles the fift.
Yet he that seemed to have bene so seuere against the Gauntois, used the
greatest lenitie that might bee towards the Spaniards of all sorts, at such
time as they had not only rebelled against him, (when he went to take
possession of the empire) but also chosen the duke of Calabria for their king, who refused that so daungerous a preferment.
Of which so great a multitude Charles thought it not
good to punish one, and that right wisely: for that in so doing he should haue
launced all the members of the Commonweale. For albeit that it is an wholesome
thing to cauterise or cut off a mortified member for the preseruation of the
whole bodie; must we therefore if all the members of the bodie bee in a
consumption, or taken with a Gangrena vse sections or cauterisations? Hypocrates the great physitian saith no, forbidding vs to
apply remedies to desperat diseases, and so much the lesse, if a consumption
shall take hold of the chiefe and principall members of the bodie.How a communitie or corporation offending is to be
punished. Wherefore to conclude this question, if the offence be
committed by the councell or deceit of a communitie or corporation, that which
belongeth unto such a communitie or
corporation so offending, is therefore to be confiscated or forfeited: but if
there be no such thing thereto belonging that may so be forfeited, then a fine
in money is to be set thereupon, but yet to be exacted onely of them which gaue
counsell or aid to the committing of the offence: for as much as it could not
bee committed by the whole communitie or corporation it selfe: but if the
guiltie parties be not to be known from the guiltles, then are they altogether
to be fined: but as for any corporall punishment, it is not to be inflicted,
except that euerie one of them, and all of them together, have most grieuously
offended. Neither yet are they to be thought all to offend, although they
follow the ensignes displaied, except that they altogether and euerie one of
them apart gaue their councell or consent thereunto before: but the communitie
or corporation being punished, doth not
therefore exempt them that are guiltie of the offence committed, from their due
deserued punishment.Whether a commonweale can be without
communities, corporations, or colleges.
But these things being thus declared, concerning the punishments of Communities
aud corporations: it remaineth for vs to see, whether that a Commonweale can
bee without such Communities, Corporations, and Colledges. Wee said at first,
men every where to be, and alwaies to have bene desirous of the societie and
companie of men: and so out of a familiar and naturall societie by little and
little to have growne into a colledge, into a corporation, into a communitie,
and so at length into a citie: and so to have made these empires and kingdomes,
which we here in the world see, hauing no surer foundation wherupon to rest
(next unto God) than the loue and amitie of one of them towards another: which can in no wise be maintained, but by
alliances, societies, estates, communities, fraternities, corporations, and
colledges. So that to demand, whether communities and colledges be necessarie
in a Commonweale? is as much, as to demaund, Whether that a Commonweale can be
maintained and upholden without loue and amitie? without which the world it
selfe cannot long stand. Which I have said, for that there have bene, and yet
are some of opinion, That all corporations and colleges are out of a
Commonweale to bee excluded and banished; not considering that a familie, and
the verie Commonweale it selfe, are nothing else but communities. Which is an errour whereat the greatest spirits have oft times
stumbled; for one absurditie or incommoditie
which ensueth of one good custome or ordinance, willing to have the same
custome or ordinance abolished and quite taken away, withoutGreat harms ensuing of corporations or communities euil gouerned.
regard of the great good which otherwise ensueth thereof unto the Commonweale.
I confesse that colledges and communities euill gouerned, draw after them many
factions, seditions, part-takings, monopolies, yea and sometime the ruine of
the whole Commonweale also: and that in stead of sacred loue and amitie, there
ariseth of them coniurations, and conspiracies of one of them against another.
And that more is, it hath bene seene, that under the shadow of religion diuers
colledges have couered some most detestable and execrable impietie. Whereof no
better example can bee giuen, than of the fraternitie of the Bacchanals in
Rome, which deuised under the colour of
religion, so long couered the most execrable and detestabble filthinesse of
both sexes, vntill that the secrets thereof opened, polluted the citie then
mirrour of the world, and all Italie with the loathsome sauour thereof, aboue
seuen thousand persons beeing partly accused, attainted, conuinced, and many of
them execured and banished,Religion the fairest cullour for
a foule matter. for the abhominable villanies by them committed vnder
the colour of that religion, which hath alwaies the fairest and most glorious
show that can bee deuised, to bee set uppon a fowle matter; as said Flaminius the Consull speaking unto the people of Rome,
concerning the impieties by him found out, Nihil in speciem
fallacius praua religione; vbi Deorum numen praetenditur sceleribus, subit
animum timor, Nothing is in show more deceitfull than corrupt religion:
For where the maiestie of the gods is
pretended for the cloaking of villanies, there feare pierceth the mind. Which
was the cause that the fraternities of the Bacchanals was by a decree of the
Senat put downe through all Italie: VVhich decree of the Senat confirmed by the
people, passed into the force of a law, That from that time forward no moe
sacrifices should bee made by night, but alwayes done in publike. VVhich thing
Damonax a wise Grecian had long time before attempted
to persuade the Athenians of, saying, ThoseNightly
conuenticles under the cullour of religion suspitious and in euerie
Commonweale daungerous. night-sacrifices to have alwaies seemed vnto
him verie suspitious. And better it is in euerie Commonweale openly to suffer
whatsoeuer assemblies or sacrifices to bee done by day, in the sight of all the
people, then nightly assemblies to bee made under the colour of religion▪ VVhereof Cato
the Censor most grieuously said, Ab nullo genere non summum
periculum est, sicaetus, & consilia, & secretas consultationes esse
sinas, There is no sort of men from whom the greatest daunger is not to
bee feared, if you shall suffer conuenticles, and secret councels and
consultations to be kept amongst them: VVhich can so much the lesse be auoided,
when as the false opinion of religion is pretended for to colour villanies. For
that there is no conspiracie, which may not be contriued and made in such
secret assemblies: which growing by little and little, and not perceiued vntill
they bee growne great, at length bursting like to a rotten impostume, infecteth
the whole bodie of the Commonweale. As for proofe thereof in our remembrance,
whereas there have alwaies beene many conuenticles and meetings of seditious persons, under the pretensed show of
religion, so a more daungerous companie of filthie fellowes neuer more sodenly
in any place brake out, than did that of the Anabaptists in Munster, the chiefe
citie of VVestphalia, who there secretly multiplying, uppon the sodaine tooke
up armes, and by the leading of a Taylour draue out the bishop and magistrats,
and so possessed the citie wholly to themselves, which could not bee againe
recouered from them, not those phantasticall seditions repressed, but by a
strong armie of the whole German empire. The Colledges and Fraternities of the
Pythagorians dealt more moderatly in Italie, who professing the studie of
wisedome, and hauing drawne unto them so many
disciples, as that many the greatest lords & princes, both of Italie and
Greece, moued with the admiration of their
doctrine, were now become both their auditors and followers: they bearing
themselves thereupon, went about to have euerie where ouerthrowne the popular
estates, and tyrannicall governments, and for them to have established
Aristocraties, and the governments of wise men. But that their so good a
purpose was ouerthrowne by certaine ambitious and popular men, who setting the
people in an uprore with fire and sword, destroyed all the Pythagorians. Which
(as saith Polibius) troubled almost all the estates both
of Italie and of Greece. And for this cause the emperours, and almost all other
princes, popes, and councels, giuing the Iews leaue to have their meetings
& synagogues (which Tyberius, Claudius, & Domitian) the emperours, had of antient time taken from
them) commaunded yet, That they should alwaies
do their sacrifices, and have their prayers openly, and in publike. Which
libertie Pharao king of Aegypt (terrified with the
iudgements of God) would have also graunted them, but was by Moyses refused, alleaging, That it was to be feared least the
Aegyptians should ouerwhelme with stones the Iewes, vsing a strange religion,
and by the lawes of the countrey forbidden. And to say the truth, it is a thing
most hard andThe common people hardly to endure any religion
contrarie or repugnant to their owne. difficult to maintaine
colledges or corporations in a Commonweale of what religion soeuer, either
publikely or priuatly, being contrarie to the religion of the people, or of the
greater part of them: For that the people every where most iealous of their
religion, cannot but most hardly endure any rites and ceremonies, differing
from the religion by themselves generally receiued: neither are by the lawes,
or by the magistrats commaund, or bands of men
so to be restrained and kept in, but that their rage will ofttimes most
furiously breake out, not against the weaker sort onely, but euen against the
most mightie ones also. For so Thomas emperour of
Constantinople, pulling downe the altars and images of the saints, was by the
angrie people most cruelly slaine in the verie temple of saint Sophia. We have also seene in the citie of Franckford
foure corporationsThe Iewes, and Catholiques by the protest
nts borue within Franckford, and they of the
confession of Geneua forbidden. and colledges of diuers religions, to
have bene publikely allowed and exerci sed, namely those of the Iewes, of the
Catholikes, of the Protestants, and of the Confes▪ sion of Geneua: But it so
fell out in the yeare 1562, in the moneth of May, that the Protestants assuring
themselves of the strength of their partakers, fell upon them of the Confession
of Geneua, (who in their profession came neerest unto them) and bearing
with the other which more differed from
them, cáused that of the Confession to bee there vtterly forbidden. Which is
lesse to be feared in such religions and sects as have bene of auntient time
receiued, and which as it were in their owne right defend their profession:
such as is the religion of the Iewes, from which all other religions, except
, seeme to haue
taken their beginning: which Chrysostome therefore
calleth The mother of the Gentiles: the princes of Europe and of Barbarie
hauing alwaies granted unto the Iews, their antient priuileges, corporations,
& colledges, for the exercising of their religion, in paying unto them
certaine tribute, as they did unto the Roman emperors, which was called Aurum Coronarium; which the German emperours ordinarily
giue unto the emprises, for the confirmation of the Iewes priuileges, which are yet greatet in Polonia and Lituania than in
any other place of the world, since they were by Cazimir
the great king of Polonia graunted unto them, at the request of a Iewish ladie,
called Hester; such as had of antient time by a Persian
king bene unto this nation giuen, at the instance of another Iewish ladie of
the same name. Where they so mightily encreased, as that there was no prince in
the greater Asia, which had not in it one or other Collonie of the Iewes; as we
read in Iosephus, and Philo.
Wherefore the most auntient antiquitie of that the Iewish religion, together
with the great pouertie of the Iewes themselves, who in no place of the world
may possesse any lands, maketh that they need the
lesse, and are indeed the lesse able to sight for their religion and libertie.
But it may be, that the consent and agreement of the nobilitie and people in a
new religion or sect, may be so puissant & strong, as that to represse or
alter the same, shouldThat a sect or religion grown so
strong, as that it cannot without the extreame perill of the state and
commonweale be altered, is of a wise prince to be suffered. be a
thing impossible, or at leastwise maruelous difficult, without the extreame
perill and daunger of the whole estate. In which case the best aduised princes
and gouernours of Commonweales do imitat the wise pilots, who when they cannot
attaine unto the port by them desired, direct their course to such port as they
may: Yea and oft times quite chaunging their course, giue way unto the stormes
and tempests, least in seeking too much to put into the desired hauen, they
suffer shipwracke. Wherefore that religion or sect is to be suffered, which
without the hazard and destruction of the
state cannot be taken away: The health and welfare of the Commonweale being the
chiefe thing the law respecteth. Wherefore Constans the
emperour suffered the companies and colledges of the Arrians, not so much for
the loue and affection he bare towards them, as diuers have written but so in
quiet to preserue his subiects, and estate. And Theodosius the Great being himselfe a Catholike, and alwaies contrarie
to the Arrias opinion, yet bare with their religion,
which hee could by no meanes suppresse, maintaining both the one sort and the
other in peace and obedience. And after him Zeno the
emperour, to reconcile the companies of all sorts of religions among
themselves, and together with the Commonweale, commaunded an edict, which they
called , which is to
say, of vnion and tranquilitie or quietnesse to be published. After whose example Anastasius caused
the law of forgetfulnesse to bee set forth, cherishing the graue and modest
preachers, and remouing such as were of vehement and turbulent spirits.
And yet no doubt, but that a prince favouring one sect or religion, and
disliking another,How a prince favouring one sect or
religion and disciding an other, may without force or fur suppresse that religion he disliketh, and
aduaunce the other which hee better liketh of. may if he will without
force or constraint, or any violence at all, suppresse that which he liketh not
(except it be by the hand and power of the almightie supported) & that by
keeping the maintainers thereof from all preferments and places of command; and
by shewing himselfe in deeds rather than in words, to abhorre that religion
which he desireth to have extinguished, For the maner of men is, to loue such
things as their princes embrace: and minds resolued, the more they are crossed,
the stiffer they are, which otherwise of
themselves grow weake and feeble, if they be not at all resisted. Besides that,
there can be nothing more daungerous unto a prince, than to make proofe of his
forces against his subiects, except he be wel assured to preuaile against them:
which otherwise were but to arme a lion, and to show him his clawes wherewith
to teare his master. But if the wiser sort of princes do in the varietie of
religions right, hardly keepe the concord and unitie of their subiects: what
then is to be hoped for of such princes, as have no experience of gouerning of
the state, on euerie side beset with their flatterers? pressed by their false
enformers, thrust forward by their furious followers: aiming only at this, how
to fill themselves with other mens wealth and blood. So in the beginning
A daungerous practise of such as are neere unto great
princes: to deuise false calumnies against the professors of any religion,
so to bring them into hatred, and to enrich themselves with their
wealth. of the Primitiue Church, under the first emperours, so many
grosse and impudent calumnies, and slaunderous reports, were deuised and put in
writing against the Christians, for the taking away of their assemblies and
meetings, as the like whereof were neuer before deuised, and would indeed seeme
incredible, were they not yet in writing extant. As witnesseth Anaxagoras the orator, in his apologie to Antoninus: Tertullian in his apologie for the Christians:
and Origen against Celsus,
certaine of whose writings are yet extant. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that
it was commonly obiected unto the Christians, that they were Atheists,
irreligious contemners of all gods, incestuous murtherers: and such as in their
secret assemblies and meetings used to kill yong
infants conceiued of their mutuall incests, and after that they had so killed
them, to eate them. Which thing indeed Epiphanius reporteth of the heretiques called Gnostic: as that they should in
their meetings beat in a morter their new borne children, begotten in incest,,
with the yeolkes of egges, flower, honie, and certeine spices mingled together,
and so to make cakes of them, and to bake them, and eate them: and that to haue
beene with them accounted a sacrament of the bodie and blood. Which slaunders
so falsely obiected against the Christians, might seeme altogether incredible,
if in the time of our auncestours the like accusation had not beene commenced
against the Templers, viz. under the raigne of Philip the faire; for which theThe
Templers falsely accused, and for their great wealth wrongfully
suppressed. Colledges in Fraunce before graunted unto the Templers,
at last by a decree of pope Boniface the viij were taken
from them, the master with a great number of his fellowes most cruelly burnt, and the order quite suppressed. All
which for all that, the Germans by their writings have since showed to haue
beene but a malitious false accusation, inuented for the taking away of their
great lands and wealth from them. The like practise was also used against the
Corporations and societies of the Iewes, aswell inThe Iewes
in like manner wronged. Fraunce under Dagobert,
Philip Augustus, and Philip the long: as
afterward in Spaine under Ferdinand king of Aragon and
Castile, who of a mercilesse deuotion driue them quite out of their countries,
and enriched themselves with their goods, it being giuen out, that they had
crucified boyes, and poysoned wels with the blood of their leprous persons.
Wherefore, to discide the question before propounded, as whether
Communities,Communities, Corporations, and Colledges, necessarie in
every Commonweale, but especially in a popular estate. Corporations,
Societies, and Colledges be good in a Commonweale, or no? or that the
Commonweale may well be without them? Truely in mine opinion nothing could euer
have beene deuised more effectuall or better for the keeping & mainteining
of popular estates, or for the ouerthrow of tyrannicall gouernements, than
corporations and societies: For why, the Commonweales and estates being one
unto an other contrarie, doe by quite contrarie meanes both mainteine and
ruinate themselves. And therefore the people and popular estates, accept and
embrace all manner of communities, corporations, and colledges; as we said that
Solon did, in establishing the popular estate of
Athens. All which tyrants in their tyrannicall governments seeke vtterle to
ouerthrow, as well knowing, the unitie and amitie of subiects among
themselves, to be the tyrants ineuitable
ruine and destruction: the iust royall, and Aristocraticall estates, euen for
the same reasons still holding the meane betwixt both, neither accepting nor
reiecting of all communities and colledges, but admitting onely such as they
see needfull for the state and Commonweale; which with good lawes and orders
they still keepe within the compasse of duetie and obedience. The good king Numa was the first that ordained Societies and
Fraternities of artificers and men of occupation; and so Tarquin the proud was the first that tooke them away, and that forbid
the assemblies of the people, and that had in himselfe a purpose also to haue
suppressed the bodie of the Senat, by the death of the Senatours, not suffering
any new to be chosen in the roomes of them that died But he was no sooner by
his subiects driuen out, but that the popular
estate was established, the number of the three hundred Senatours supplied, and
the colledges and companies before abolished againe restored. But when the
people by the helpe of their Tribunes began more insolently to rule, and that
in the bodie of the Senat were almost six hundred of the nobilitie and chiefe
men of the citie, who had almost drawne unto themselves the soueraigntie, the
colleges, and companies of the citisens, were by a decree of the Senate, for
the most part suppressed and put downe: Howbeit shortly after Clodius the Tribune to be the more gracious with the people, and to
maintaine them in iarre and discord with the nobilitie
(which he had renounced, causing himselfe to be adopted by a base fellow, so to
become Tribune) not onely restored all the
Colleges and companies by the Senat before suppressed, but ordained and erected
a great number moe: which Caesar being got to be
Dictator, to maintaine his owne power and weaken the peoples, put downe; but
were afterwards by Augustus hauing assured his estate,
by an expresse edict againe restored. All which Nero the
the tyrant againe suppressed. Whereby it appeareth, Tyrants alwaies to haue
hated the corporations and communities of the people, andCommunities, Corporations, and Colleges, alwaies hatefull vnto
Tyrants. by all meanes endeuored to have them vtterly extinguished:
Insomuch that Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie would not
that euen neere kinsfolks should so much as visit one an other, but as they
came late from supper from their friends, caused them to be robbed and spoiled.
As in like manner did Nero, who oft times by night
walking the streats, spoiled and slew such as
he met, which returned late from supper with their friends; so much he feared
the assemblies of his subiects, for the conspiracies they might so make against
the tyrannie of him so wicked a prince. And yet for all that the iust
Monarchie,The great benefit and vse of Communities,
corporations, and colleges, in a iust Monarchie or royall estat. hath not any more assured foundation or
stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges:
For if need be for the king to leuie money, to raise forces, to maintaine the
Estate against the enemie, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the
people, and of every Prouince, Towne, and Commutie. Yea we see that they
themselves which would have these estates of the communities and societies of
the people suppressed and abolished, have in time of their necessitie no other
refuge or stay to flie vnto, but euen to these estates and communities of
the people: which being together vnited,
strengthen themselves for the defence and protection, not of their Prince
onely, but euen of themselves also, and of the whole estate and subiects in
generall, especially the Prince himselfe there being in person present. For
where can things for the curing of the diseases of the sicke Commonweale, or
for the amendment of the people, or for the establishing of lawes, or for the
reforming of the Estate, be better debated or handled, than before the prince
in his Senat before the people? There they conferre of the affaires concerning
the whole bodie of the Commonweale, and of the members thereof; there are heard
and vnderstood the iust complaints & greeuances of the poore subiects,
which neuer otherwise come unto the princes
eares; there are discouered and laid open the robberies and extortions
committed in the princes name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests
of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible
to say, how much the subiects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to
see their king to sit as chiefe in the assemblie of the estates, and to heare
him discoursing; how every man desireth to be seene of him, and if it please
him to heare their complaints, and to receiue their requests, albeit that they
be often times denied the same; yet O how it pleaseth them to have had accesse
unto their Prince, yea sometime they goe away better pleased with such a
deniall, than if they had had that they requested, being by their prince
altogether contemned. All which is better obserued and kept in Spayne, than in
any place of the world, where the assemblies
of the estates heretofore have beene holden every two or three yeares one. And
in England also, for that the people graunt no payments, if the Estates be not
assembled: as I remember was done, when as I passed over into England
embassadour from Frauncis duke of Aniou. Our kings do
not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as doe the kings of
England. But whereas there are accounted sixteene Prouinces in this kingdome,
whereof six have their particular assemblies among themselves, (namely
Bretagne, Normandie, Bourgundie, Languedoc, Dauphine, and Prouence) some there
were, who for feare their villanies and extortions should in those assemblies
have beene found out, laboured to the vttermost of
their power to have had the same assemblies and meetings of the Estates of the
aforesaid prouinces, in any wise taken away
and changed into elections. As also in the beginning of the raigne of Charles the eight, at such time as it was with one
generall voice called upon, that a generall assemblie of all the Prouinces
might be had; there wanted not some who threatned it to be Treason to such as
in the counsell should consent with the people for the calling of such an
assembly: whose opinion Philip de Commines (a most
worthy counsellour and a man of great experience) most earnestly withstood. But
how necessarie the assemblies & meeting of the whole people for to
consultThe generall assemblies & meetings of the
people to consule of matters, necessarie for the good of the Common
weals. of matters, are, is hereby perceiued; in that the people which
may so call together such their counsels, with them all things go well: wheras
others which may not so do, are oppressed with tributes & seruitude. For as
the shot of many pieces of artillerie delivered one after another, is not of so great force and power for the battering of a
fort, as when the whole tyre of the great ordinance is together discharged, so
the particular requests of men often times vanish but into smoake. But when
whole Colleges or Communities, or the estates of a prouince, or of a people, or
of a realme, shall make their requests unto their king; the voice is so loude,
and the requests so effectuall, as that it is hard for him to refuse it.
Howbeit that there is a thousand other commodities & vses of the generall
assemblies of the Estates in every prouince and countrie, for the common good
therof. As if question be for the leuying of forces, or of money to withstand
the enemie, or for the building of fortresses, for the mending of high waies,
repairing of bridges, or for the scouring of the countrie of theeves, or
withstanding of the great; all these things
which can in no wise be done by particular men, are best of all performed by
them all in their generall assemblies. As to passe over the rest, all these
things have beene better done in the prouince of Languedoc by their assembled
Estates, than in any other prouince of this Realme. They within a few yeares
erected a Schole, and appointed twelue hundred pounds yearely pension for the
instruction of all the youth of the countrie. In the Towne of Nismes, beside
the other particular Colleges, they built the fairest fortresses of this
realme; and caused Buzac to be executed, the most
notableBuzac a notable theefe and robber. robber that
euer was in our remembrance, of whom neither judge, nor magistrate, no nor yet
the parliament of Thoulouse it selfe, could take punishment, he being growne so
strong as to doe his robberies in forme of iustice, and yet no man so
hardie as to dare to lay hands upon him: of
whose execution I was a beholder, & saw the people wonderfully reioycing to
see themselves delivered of a theefe and robber, of all others the greatest:
albeit that I remember ten thousand crownes to have bene before laide out about
the same matter. And to keepe that prouince the safer from theeves &
robbers, they appointed farre greater rewards for the Prouost Marshal than did
any other prouince, as twelue hundred pound for his maintenance, and xxv pound
for every processe he should bring of the execution by him done. I have bene
willing in passing by, thus the rather to note these particularities, to show
the great good which ariseth unto Cōmonweals by the assemblies of their
Estats: which are yet better ordered in the Commonweals of the Swissers, &
the Germaine empire, than in other the Commonweals of Europe. For the Swissers beside the assemblies of Estate,
in every Towne and Canton, have their generall assemblies of their Estates
also; and the ten Circles or Circuits of the Empire have their assemblies of
their Estates separate, unto whom the particular estates of the Imperiall
Townes & Countries referre themselves: and so likewise the estates of the
circuits refer themselves and their decrees unto the assemblie of the
estatesA measure to be had for the number of Corporations
and Colleges in a Commonweale. of the Empire, which without this
pollicie had long ago bene ruinated & fallen.
We said that the meane and measure which is in all things commendable, ought
also to be kept in all iust Monarchies and Aristrocraties, in regard of the
number of Corporations and Colleges to be had in their
kingdomes and Commonweales: For as quite to
take away all Corporations and Communities were to weaken or ruinate the
estate, and to establish a barbarous tyrannie, or tirannicall government; so
likewise to permit and suffer all assemblies, and all fraternities, is not also
without danger, as not easely to be ruled by the princes power, or nobilities
commaund. In them also oft times are couered conspiracies, and secret
Monopolies, whereof we have many examples, which hath bene the cause often
times by expresse Edict in this Realme to take away these fraternities; which
for all that could neuer yet be put into execution. Howbeit much better it were
to take away the abuse, than the thing it selfe that is abused, and toThat it is better or the Commonweale, that men of one trade or
occupation should be divided into diuers streets, and quarters of the citie,
the to dwell all in one street together.
pluck up the weeds alone, rather then both the good and bad together. And to
auoid Monopolies amongst artificers and trades men, it is good to diuide them
into diuers streets and quarters of the citie,
and not to seat them in one street or quarter together, (as they do in
Affricke, and also in many townes and cities of Europe) except th place for the hauing of water, or some other such
common respect so require: For besides the incōmoditie that it is in great
cities not to have artificers which are ordinarily required in every quarter
thereof, there must needs either be secret monopolies amongst them so to sell
their marchandize and waes the dearer, or else
iealousies and quarels, if one of them shall sell better cheap than another,
before his face that hath refused to take the money. I said artificers
ordinarily required, for that it is not fit in their dwellings to mingle men
giuen unto their studie and quiet, together with Fishmongers, or Armorers, or
Curriors with Schollers: for as for such as are lesse requisite as
hammermen, they may well enough be raunged
in the same street or quarter of a citie together, and that better than to
trouble the quiet of others. But as there is nothing better for the maintenance
of the strength and unitie of the subiects, than Corporations &
Communities: so is there nothing which can so much weaken & keepe vnderfoot
a Commonweale, as by the vtter taking away of Communities, Corporations, and
Colleges, or Societies: Which the Romans well knowing, wisely put in practise,
who after they had vanquished the kings of Macedonia, and conquered the
countrie, vtterly forbid all assemblies and meetings together of the people
there to consult of matters. And so afterwards also the Achaeans being ouer
come, the consul Mummius as saith Liuie: Concilia omnia singularū Achaiae nationum, & Phocensium, &
Baeotorum, aut in alia parte Graeciaedeleuit, Suppressed all the councels of all the
particular nations of Achaia, and of the Phocensians, and of the Baeotians, or
in what soeuer other part of Graecia else: But after that they were once become
good and obedient subiects unto the Romans: Antiqu concilia genti cuique restituta, The auntient
councels were unto every nation againe restored, as saith Strabo.
CHAP. VIII. ¶ Of the orders and degrees of
Citisens.
NOw forasmuch as we have alreadie spoken of
Corporations A convenient and decent order to be in all things fit and
requisite. and Colledges, it remaineth for vs also to speake of the
orders and degrees of Citisens. For if so be that in all things wee desire and
seeke after a convenient and decent order, and deeme nothing to be more ougly
or foule to looke upon, than confusion and broyle: then how much more is it to
be sought for in a Commonweale, so to place the Citisens or subiects in such
apt and comely order, as that the first may be ioyned with the last, and they
of the middle sort with both; and so all with all, in a most true knot and bond
among themselves, together with the Commonweale? For why, it is a most antient
and receiued opinion of the wise, Almightie God
himselfe the great and supreme workemaster and
creator of this great and wonderfull Fabrick of all things, in the creating
thereof, to have performed nothing either greater or better, than that hee
divided the mingled and confused parts of the rude Chaos, and so setled euerie thing in his due place and order. Neither
can there be any thing faiter to behold, more delightfull to he mind, or more
commodious for vse, than is order it selfe. But they which goe about so to make
all subiects or Citisens equall one unto another in dignitie, order, and and
place, as that there shall be nothing in a Citie or Commonweal first, or in the
middest, but will have all degrees so mingled together and confounded, without
respect of sexe, age, or condition they seeme to mee to do as they doe which
thrust barly, wheat, rise, mill, and all other kind of pulse into one heape
together; whereby they loose the vse both of
euerie kind of graine in particular, as also of the whole heape together.
Wherefore there was neuer any law-giuer so vnskilfull, but that he thought that
there ought still to bee some diuision, ordering, and sorting of the Citisens
or subiects in a citie, or Commonweale. Here by ordering and sorting of the
Citisens or subiects, my meaning is, that there should be a part of the
citisens divided from the rest in condition, state, or sexe: in condition, as
the nobilitie from them that were but from the Senators descended, the knights
and gentlemen from the common people in sexe: as women from men: in state, as
free borne men from them which are but of manumised slaues made free; and they
which are by state free, are divided from them both.
As for slaues we have before said, them by the generall conent of almost all people,Slaues accounted no citisens and yet indeed worthie to be so
reckoned of▪ though in the lowest and basest degree of citisens to
have bene still exempted out of the number of Citisens. Yea Aristotle hath tearmed slaues, but instruments for other mens vses;
whereas some others have accounted of them, but as of beasts, or rather worse:
and yet the question resteth vndecided, Whether that slaues are to be accoūted
in a mans goods or substance, or not. But if the determining hereof might be
unto me referred, surely I should wish the right and libertie of the citie to
be set open, as well unto the slaues as unto the free borne men. For what is
this so arrogant temeritie (should I say) or impietie of men, that forgetting
mens conditton and state, they should enforce this so diuine a creature, hauing
his libertie shamefully taken from him, not onely to serue their lust, but also
to make no more account of him, yea and
peraduenture lesse too, than of a verie beast? But bee it that slaues be indeed
of the basest sort of men, do they therefore not deserue to be tearmed by the
name of citisens? There be in mans bodie some members, I may not call them
filthie (for that nothing can so be which is naturall) but yet so shamefull, as
that no man except he be past all shame, can without blushing reueale or
discover the same: and doe they for that cease to be members of the whole
bodie? The feet themselves, with perpetuall labour hold up and carrie about the
whole bulke of the bodie, and are oft times foule with durt, filth, and dust,
but yet who is so mad, as to thinke them therefore worthy to be cut off from
the bodie? Now if these baser members indeed bee and are still called parts of
the whole bodie, why shall wee not by the same reason suffer slaues, who are
still pressed and kept under with the most heauie burthens and commaunds
of the other citisens, to bee called and
accounted members of the same citie with them? But if we thinke this to be an
absurd thing, then are they to bee driuen out of the citie, and as rotten
limmes to be cut off: but if we will still retaine them in a citie, in a
familie, and so in our obedience and seruice, we must also make them partakers
of the citie with vs. For seeing they be subiects and not straungers, they must
needes make up a part of the citisens, and bee accounted in the number of them.
Which I would have vnderstood to be of me so spoken, not for that I should
desire slauerie long since taken away out of our Commonweale, to be thereinto
againe restored: but that forasmuch as the force and
boldnesse of men is so farre broken out, as that wee see seruitude and slauerie by little and little to creepe in,
and to returne againe: it might be forseene and prouided for, that such slaues
might not hereafter bee more hardly vsed, than the state and condition of man
requireth, and might also have their certaine place and order in the citie.
Wherefore let the order of slaues bee of all others the lowest in degree in a
citie; and of them wee will begin first to speake. For as for that which Cicero obiecteth unto Antonius,
That he had so contracted affinitie, as that hee might thereby the better
commend himselfe unto them that were of the meanest degree: hee ment it by them
which had bene mannumised men, and not by the slaues indeed: for that in the
citie Rome, slaues indeed had neither place nor degree. Neither did Metellus his speech concerning marriages to bee made in
degrees together belong unto slaues, to whome
the rites and rights of marriage were altogether forbidden, hauing onely their
mutuall conuersing and companie one of them of another; as Paulus the lawyer writeth in the second booke of Sentences, albeit not
altogether aduisedly, for that they held the right of blood, as did other
citisens, and were forbidden incestuous marriages as well as others; although
that they had not the other rights of marriages. And for that slaues were
oftentimes borne of vncertane fathers, their children were also accounted
vncertaine: and therefore slaues and manumised men were not said to be of any
familie, stocke, or house; onely they which were of the nobilitie descended,
boasted themselves to have stocke, or house from whence they came. Hereof came
that speech of Decius against them that were descended
from the nobilitie, Semper istaaudita sunt, vos solos gentem habere: an hoc, si Claudiae
familiae non sim, nec ex Patricio sanguine ortus, sed vnus Quiritium
quilibet, qui modò me duobus ingenuis ortum sciam, reticere possim?
These things have alwaies bene heard, you alone to have a stock & house,
But if I were not of the house and familie of the Claudians, neither borne of
noble blood, but some one of the common people, which but knew my selfe to bee
borne of two free borne pesons, could I in this hold
my peace? Whereby he sufficiently insinuateth neither slaues nor mannumised men
to have had any stocke or house from which they might account themselves
descended: and them onely to have beene accountedWhy we call
such as be noble borne by the name of gentlemen? so to haue, which
had their beginning from them that were free borne: and hereof it commeth that we call such as be nobly borne by the
name of Gentlemen, as hauing an house or familie from which they are descended.
Howbeit that they which were so nobly borne, went yet further, vaunting them
onely to have an house and familie, from which they might produce their
discent, none of whose auncestors had at any time serued as slaues: For why,
the multitude of the vulgar and common sort of the people, was thought almost
all to have taken their beginning from such as hauing bene slaues, were by
mannumission become free.
Next unto slaues are they whome they call State-free men, and after them the
Libertines,Foure kind of libertines or of manumised men
in Rome. or as we may tearme them the manumised men, who were every
where of diuers sorts and condition, as there were also diuers sorts of slaues.
And to let other cities passe, wee see in Rome
to have bene foure sorts or kinds of these Libertines, or enfranchised men; viz. those whome they called Romani,
Latini, Iuniani, and Dediticij: whome for that
they be vsuall and common, I let them passe: sufficeth it as it were with the
finger to point out the fountaines of them, least in a citie these diuers
orders of enfranchised or mannumised men might bee together confounded. Now the
order or degreeof state free men, was in a meane betwixt slaues and the
Libertines or manumised men, for in that their libertie was yet holden in
suspence, they were in betterState free men better then
slaues and worse then libertines. case and condition than were the
slaues, and yet withall in worse than were the libertines, or men alreadie
enfranchised. And these orders euerie one of them according to the qualitie of their condition and state, were also
likewise in their degrees placed.The nobilitie alwaies divided from the vulgar and common
people.
The rest of the citisens are divided according to the varietie of their
conditions and estates, and diuersitie of their manners and customes. Yet that
is common almost to all people, that noble men should in order and dignitie be
divided from the vulgar and common people, since first Nimrod the great robber, most notably attended uppon with a great
power of wicked companions, and such as himselfe was, with cruell seruitude
oppressed them that were too weake for him, and so first tooke upon him the
governmentThe first nobilitie grounded upon violence and
oppression. of the Assyrians, as we have before said. So left his
nobilitie got by villanie, for his posteritie to imitat: which opinion further
spreading, tooke such deep root, as that euerie man as he was the mightier in
violence and murthering of others, hee was True nobilitie grounded upon vertue. thought to be so
much more the nobler: vntill such time as that the people by good lawes and
ciuilitie better instructed, deemed, that the true nobilitie, was by vertue and
not so by villanie to be sought for.
But forasmuch as one man excelleth another in some one or other vertue: and
forNobilitie in diuers places diuesly accounted of, and neither in al places
alike. that such vertues as are in one citie or place most highly
commended, are in some other no lesse contemned. Hereof it commeth, that no one
definition of nobilitie could euer yet be made agreeable unto the nobilitie of
all the people: honour and infamie being still deemed and reputed of, according
to the manner and custome of euerie countrey. For by the customes of the
Perusines and Florentines, he which but now began to beare arms and serue in warre, was of one before vnnoble,
now thereby become noble: whereas with vs he is not so by and by: but if his
posteritie shall follow the wars, they are reputed to have gotten nobilitie as
it were by the continuance of time. But not so at Venice, who still measure the
nobilitie of their gentlemen, by the honourable antiquitie of such houses and
families as have alwaies attended their publike councels and affaires. And
albeit that the Decurions or pettie captaines by the Roman law, bee reputed of
by the name of gentlemen: which law is also receiued with them of PoitiersWhether the bearing of ares in the
warres make a man therfore a gentleman or not? by the consent of all
the three estates, yet is it no where els with vs so found. But that the
bearing of armes should of it selfe make a gentleman, I see it to have so
pleased not onely the Florentines and Perusines, but diuers interpretors of the
law also, and especially Alciat, who hath not doubted to
cite Triuultius the great captaine as author
therof. Truely amongst the Aegyptians it was
not lawfull but for the Calasyres: and many worlds of
yeres after, for the Mammalukes in the raigne of the Sultans, to serue and
beare armes: who therefore enioyed most great priuileges. Yet other people haue
divided gentere from warre, neither have therefore
reputed any one to be a gentleman, for that he was a souldiour: unto which
opinion all the greatest lawyers together with Plato
have almost with one voice consented. And albeit that the Romans farre exceeded
all other people in martiall honour, and bestowed the greatest priuileges uppon
souldiours: yet for all that they bound not gentrie unto martiall seruice:
seeing that it was lawfull for the Libertines or manumised men to serue in the
warres, and that men for the filthinesse of their lives, and iudgements,
therefore upon them passed, infamous, who were
therefore embarred from all honours, had yet no exemption from the warres.
But forasmuch as all citisens after they had taken upon them the manlike
atttire, were bound to beare arms, so by that reason al the citisens should
have bin therby ennobled, which were a thing absurd: for were all the citisens
noble, none of them were indeed in that vulgaritie of nobilitie to be accounted
at all noble. Wherefore Lucius Siccius Dentatus is of
Dionysius Halicarnasseus, called a common and
ordinarie man, whose speech against them of the nobilitie and gentrie is yet at
this present extant: Wherein he boasteth himselfe to
have bene in pay fortie yeares in the seruice of his Lucius Sicius Dentatus, a
most worthie and Famous souldiour, and yet not therfore accounted any
gentleman. countrey, to have fought in an hundred and twentie set
battels, to have receiued 45 wounds, and twelue of them in one day, all of them
in the fore part of his bodie: and in token of his good seruice, to haue
receiued fourteene Ciuic or oken crowns (the honourable rewards due unto him
that had saued so many citisens) three others the rewards of his good seruice
done in the besieging of townes, fourescore and three gold chaynes, an hundred
and threescore bracelets of gold, ten faire launces, and thirtie five faire
furnitures for horses. And yet this so worthy & valiant a man, adorned with
so many trophies in reward of his valour, was by the Roman lawes no more but as
a common person. For they accounted him first a gentleman, that was the sonne
of a new raised man: and him they called a new man, who was the first in his
familie that Whom the Romaines first accounted a gentleman. had
borne some honourable charge or office, and so had power to erect unto himselfe
his statue or image; such as were Caius Marius, and M Tullius Cicero of Arpine, both of them beeing but new
men. Of whome the one beeing first made Quaestor, and then Aedilis, and
afterwards Pretor, at last came to bee Consull; who in the time of his
Consulship, in an oration which hee made unto the people, boasting therein of
his newnesse, thus said, Ego nous
homo primus omnium claustra nobilitatis refregi, &c. I beeing but a
new man, was of all others the first which brake open the barres of nobilitie.
The other hauing beene seuen times Consull, in an oration which he made against
the nobilitie, said, Contemnunt nouitatem meam, ego illorum
ignauiam: mihi fortuna, illis probr a obiectantur. Quod si me iure
despiciunt, faciantidem maioribus suis, quibus vti mihi nobilitas ex virtute
caepit. Nunc videte quàm iniqui sunt: quod ex aliena virtute sibi arrogant,
id mihi ex mea non concedunt: scilicet quia imagines non habeo, & noua
nobilit as est, quam perperisse melius est, quàm acceptam corrupiss, They contemne (saith he) my newnesse, I their
cowardise: my fortune is to mee obiected, but unto them their vices. But if
they therefore of right contemne and despise me, let them so also doe their
owne auncestours, whose nobilitie begun of their owne vertues, as doth mine.
Now but see how partiall they are in their owne cause; that honour which they
arrogat unto themselves by other mens vertues, that they will not graunt vnto
me for mine owne: and all forsooth, because I have no images of mine
auncestours to show, and for that my nobilitie is but new, which yet is better
for me to have of my selfe raised, than hauing
receiued it from mine auncestors, to have my self stained the same. For Cicero had six competitors in his Consulship, wherof two
were noble men, two other of them were the first of their familie which had
borne office, onely Cicero himselfe was a gentleman
borne: whose father, as also the father of Marius, of
Cato the Censor, of Q.
Pompeius, of Curius, of Philo, and of Genutius, were all base persons
of the comminaltie, but yet their sonnes were accounted of as new menThe Patritij who they were in Rome. and gentlemen. But
such as were descended from the Senators, by Romulus in
the beginning of his raigne appointed, or from them which were afterwards by
the Consull Publius Valerius ioyned unto them, were
called Patricij (as hauing their beginning from
the Senators, whome they called Patres) all the rest were common men, or else men of some
better note, whome they called Equites, or Gentlemen;
who were in the middestThe Equites or gentlemen in Rome what
place they held▪ betwixt the Senators & the cōmon people, being
partly dissended from the Senators, and part of them risen out of the
communaltie: who if any of them were chosen into the Senat, they were no more
to be accounted amongst those Equites or gentlemen: as
is to be seene by Lucius & Nero the Censors, who yet seruing upon publike horses, were one of
them by the other commaunded to sell them: for after the ouerthrow by the
Romans receiued from the Veians, the gentlemen began to serue upon horses
prouided for them of the publike charge. Now I find that there were of the
Patrician Families in Rome, about fortie: but of such
as by their valour left nobilitie to their posteritie The Patritian families in Rome: Sylia, Pomplia, Ptitia, Maria, Hostilia,
Tulla, Tarqu, Fabia,
Antonia, Iunia, Sergia, Iulia, Gegania, Matia,
Aemylia, Choelia, Valeria, Horatia, Posthmia, Meneia, Virginia,
Sulpitia, Furia, Lucretia, Quinctia, Papiria, Claudia, Serilia, Cormlia, Manilia, Cassia, Aebutia, Pinaria,
Vturia, Sempronia, Mutia, Aquila, Quintilia,
Hortensia. in Ciceroes time scarcely thirtie:
of which families, or houses, seuen were of the same name with the Patricij, viz. Pompilia, Martia, Tullia, Iunia, Mutia,
Claudia, and Sempronia. And for that the
entrance and way unto the honourable preferments in the state, before the law
Canuleia, was kept shut up and stopped by the Pratricij
(or them that were of the Senators descended) against the common and vulgar
sort of the people; and yet for all that none of these Patricij was accounted noble, except some of their auncestors had
borne the honourable offices of the state: many of the Patricij, who were descended from the Senators, and yet could not cite
such their auncestors as had borne such honourable charge in the estate, (which
was well to be vnderstood by their statues or images) were accounted of as of
men of base & low degree. So it came to
passe, after the law Canuleia was made, that some euen of the common sort of
the people became noble, and some of the Patricij
vnnoble, that is to say, obscure and vnknowne. As Marcus
Aemylius Scaurus, a man descended of the Senators rase, had his
auncestours base and obscure men: whereas he himselfe being but a new man, came
to be Pretor, Consull, and Censor, and at last being made chiefe of the Senat,
raised nobilitieThe noble Families in Rome. Licinia, Aurelia, Decia,
Caecilia, Aelia, Domiia, Cladia, Mtia, Prlia, Curia, Fabritia, Cocania, Acilia, Maria, Pompeia, Liuia, Iunia. Tullia, Fuluia, Sempronia,
Atilia, Calpurnia, Marcia, Pompilia, Luctatia, Platia. to all his
posteritie. Wherfore the Roman nobilitie lay in the voyces and iudgement of the
people, which as they thought best, bestowed the honourable preferments in the
estate and Commonweale. Yet was it an absurd and most vnreasonable thing, that
any most wicked murtherer and manquellar, were he neuer so basely borne, might
by the benefit of bearing of some great place or office in the estate, leaue
nobilitie unto his posteritie: whereas he
which excelled in wisedome, iustice, fortitude, and temperance, and so in all
other vertues, godlinesse, and learning, yea and was descended also of the
Senators race, if he could not show his auncestors statues, was euen therefore
accounted but as base and obscure. For such is the force of this word Ignobilis with the Latines, which in the selfe same sense
is of the Greekes called , and ; that is to
say, such as either by some foule or notable fact or deed done, came into the
knowledge of men: which is yet oftentimes taken in the better part, for they
which are called ,
refer it unto the honor of their house & stock: which amongst the Romans
did especially appeare amongst the Patricij or
posteritie of the antient Senators: which for that they were almost dead and
worne out, Caius Caesar by the law Cassia, and after that Augustus by the
law Seruia, chose many of the more noble families into the order of the Patricij. For before the law Canuleia it was lawfull
onely for the Patricij to be bishops and priests, and
for them alone to make sacrifices, and to keep the Auspicia or diuine
obseruations. But after that Genutius (first Consull
that was made of the people) was in battell with the great slaughter of his
armie under his conduct ouerthrowne, Patres non tam publica
calamitate maesti, quàm feroces infoelicis Consulis plebei ductu, fremunt,
omnibus locis, irent, crearent Consulem explebe, transferrent auspicia quo
nefas esset, The fathers (as saith Liuie) not so
heauie for the publike calamitie, as become insolent with the euil conduct of
the vnfortunat Consull chosen from amongst the people, murmured and fretted in
all places, that they should go and againe create a Consull of the people; and thither to translate the
Auspicia or diuinations, whither it was not lawfull for them so to doe. And Appius Claudius the Consull, before that answered one of
the Tribunes, asking him in an assembly of the people, Why one of the Consuls
might not be chosen out of the people? Because (said he) none of the vulgar and
common sort of the people can hold the Auspicia or diuinations; and that
therefore the Decemuiri had appointed a certaine order of mariage, least the
sacred diuinations should have bene polluted with persons vncertainly
descended. At which answere, the people was with indignation exceedingly
enraged, to heare it denied them to hold the
diuinations, as if they were unto the immortall gods, more hatefull than
others. And albeit that the people at
length had all things common with the Senators, viz.
honours, commaunds, iudgements, diuinations, cures, priesthoods, councels,
powers, statues, triumphs, and all other the greatest preferments in the
Commonweale; yet could it neuer be obtained, that any one of the common sort of
the people, should nominat the Interrex, or pronounce who should be the
Archpriest, the Priest of Mars, or of Romulus: or yet be chosen into the colledge of the Salij. But as a
statue or imageCertaine honors in Rome neuer communicated
unto the people. was among the Romans the signe of nobilitie
obtained: so in antiēt time with vs arms, with Cognisances set over them, were
the tokens of nobilitie. Lawfull it hath alwaies bene, and so still will be,
for euerie man to deuise unto himselfe his Cognisance to beeStatues the signe of nobilitie amonge the Romaines: as are armes with
vs. known by, but yet not to vsurpe the Cognisances, or beare the
armes of other noble families. But the antient
Grecians deemed not of nobility by the obtaining & bearing of great
offices; which euerie man among the Athenians (after the law of Aristides, and the seditious declamations of Ephialtis) might by lot, and few by voyces obtaine:
butHow the auntient Graetians demed their
nobilitie. nobilitie with them was still to be deriued from the stock
of their kings, or race of their great worthies, as from the Heraclide, the Aeacidae, or Cecropidae, or from such other like: or else from such, as who for the
worthie acts, either by themselves, or by their auncestours done, had by the
generall good liking, and publike decree of the people, and of the nobilitie,
with commendation obtained a crowne of gold, extraordinarie priuileges,
statues, to sit in the highest places, or to have their diet allowed them in
the Prytanaeo, or other like publike places: Such as is
that decree of the Athenians (whereof PlutarchThe Ptaneion was a place in
Athens, wherein the iudges and magistrats sate to consult of the great
matters of state. writeth) concerning Lycurgus
the sonne of Lycophron, It pleased the people of Athens
(saith he) that requitall should bee made unto such as had well deserued of the
state, as to praise Lycurgus the sonne of Lycophron for his vertue and iustice sake: and in the
honor of him to erect a brasen Statue for him in the market place, except in
such place as where the law forbiddeth any statue to be erected, and diet in
the Prytanaeo to be for euer allowed unto the eldest of the posteritie of Lycurgus. So in like maner Isaeus
the orator writeth publique diet, the first places, and priuileges, to haue
bene graunted unto the posteritie of Harmodius the
tyrant queller. Which thing Aristotle reporteth to hane
bene a thing common unto all the cities of Graece, to allow diet of the
publiqueThe lenitie of the graetians in bestowing their
honors. charge unto the children of such as had valiantly dyed for
their countrie. Howbeit that the Grecians with
too much lenitie (should I say) or rather leuitie erected statues for such as
had of them well deserued, which they uppon the least displeasure againe cast
downe, and that with greater despite than they had with honor before set them
up. So when the Athenians had appointed 365 statues to be set up in euerie
place of the citie in honor of Demetrius Phalereus, they
againe in a moment caused them all to bee cast downe: & not yet so
contented brake them also with such furie, as that no fragment of them was
left, except that onely which was kept fast shut up in the tower of Pallas.
Amongst the Hebrewes were two sorts of noble men; the one descended from
theThe nobilitie of the Iewes: in whom it especially
rested. stock of Aaron, who only were priests:
the other from the stock of the kings. For why,
that nation wisely reposing their chief felicitie in the sinceritie of their
religion, and the true worshipping of God, so likewise deemed their priests,
which came neerest unto the power of the immortall God, to be of all others
most noble. Yea God himselfe had an especiall regard in making choice of Aaron, & in establishing of him after the most
grieuous reuolts & miserie of his people. And therefore as often as he
cōmandeth extreame destruction to be denounced & threatned unto his
people, he oftentimes doubleth that , which is to say, That the state of the
priest and of the common person, should bee all one. And therefore when the
Iewes had cast off from the seruile yoke of Antiochus
the Noble: the Familie of the Aesmonaeans being of the
stocke of Aaron, held the high priesthood, together with
the kingdome about two hundred yeres, that is to say,
euen unto the raigne of Herod the Great. Wherein the
Hebrewes did well: for if great offices in
Rome, got oft times by corruption and briberie, left nobilitie unto their
posteritie which had so got them: what let is there why the priesthood of the
eternall God, should not much more also ennoble men, especially if we
measurePriesthood honorable. nobilitie by the
places men hold, and not by their persons. Truely all the best learned lawyers
are of opinion, That the priestly dignitie is to be preferred before all other
honours and vocations: and that the ministers of diuine things, &
moderators of the most sacred rites, are not to be accounted among the nūber
of the vulgar & common people:The most auntient kings to
have bene also preists. which is no new or strange opinion, but drawn
& deriued euen from the most antient antiquitie. For the most antiēt
kings, to make their roial power the more reuerend and stately, exercised also
the priestly dignitie. Neither did the Greeks only, but the Roman kings also, yea and the greatest emperors themselves,
stile themselves high Priests or Bishops, whome the chiefe Arabian princes
being also bishops, seeme therein to have followed. And so the Christian kings
beeing by their religion forbidden to mingle prophane things with sacred or
armes with religions; yet tooke that which was next; that is to say, in
preferring a sacred, order of the Clergie, not only before the common and
vulgar sort of the people, but before the Senators, yea and not before them
alone, but euen before dukes, earles, and other magistrats whatsoeuer: giuing
unto them the highest roomes, and first places next unto the kings themselves,
in all assemblies, councels, enacting of lawes, and graunting of liberties and
priuileges. And why not? when as the most antient people of the Celtes,
accounted their Druides, who were the princes
of their religion and iudgements, superiours not unto the common sort of the
people onely, but euen unto their captaines and rulers also. For which cause
Caesar in recounting of their degrees, first
reckoneth up the Druides, then their knights or horsmen, and after them the
common people. For the order of knights in the time of their auncestors, with a
most strong power of horsemen excelled all people; as witnesseth Caesar himselfe, as also Marcus
Antonius: so that therefore I suppose them to haueThe great honor the Turkish and Arabian princes do unto their Musties or
high preists. bene called ; for the Greeks call him , whome the Latines
called Sellarium, and we an horseman. We said before the
Turkish and Arabian princes yet in all their kingdomes and empires, to honour
and obserue their Mufties, or high Bishops, with the greatest honour and
respect possibly to bee giuen unto them, still referring unto them the greatest and most doubtful questions of their
law, to be by them decided. Yet the Venetians vse to exclude their priests from
their councels, from allThe order of the Venetian
Commonweale. places of commaund, and from all offices, least haply
they should bewray the secrets of the citie unto the pope, to whome they are by
dutie & oath bound. Wherfore amongThe Florentine how
they divided their citisens the Venetians, the order of the Senators
is first and chiefe of all others, for that in it is the soueraigne power of
that state: next unto the Senators follow the gentlemen, who are not accounted
of the number of the Senators▪ and last of all the cmmoners, who yet are both by one name called Citadinia, or Citisens. But the Florentines before that all was swayed
by one mans commaund, divided not onely the nobilitie from the clergie, but
euen from the common people also; and the common people they divided againe into three sorts, of whome such as exceeded in
wealth were called the Great ones, others of meaner wealth were called Popular
Commoners, and they of the third sort, the refuce of the whole people. The
auntient Aegyptians much better dividedThe auntients,
Egiptians how they divided their citisens. their whole multitude of
citisens, into Priests, Souldiours, and Labourers: setting the Priests and
Souldiours, whome they called Calasyri, free from all
taxes and payments. Hyppodamus, who gaue lawes unto the
Melesians, did a little otherwise diuide the people into Souldiours,
Artificers, and Husbandmen: whose writings Aristotle
seemeth either not to have well vnderstood, or else not so wisely reproued, as
is euidently to be gathered of those fragments which
are yet to be seene extant in Stobaeus. I know not
also how it came into Plato his mind, that hauing made a diuision of his citisens into
Keepers, Souldiors, and Husbandmen, he separateth the Souldiors (under whose
bucklers and defence the citisens ought to rest) I know not how, from keepers.
But in briefe, he would have the keepers of his Commonweale to excell all
others in wisedome and experience: and so to rule over them, without any
respect to bee had either to the honour of their dissent, or to the greatnesse
of their wealth or substance. Truely it was wisely so set downe by that most
wise man: who although he were himselfe descended of the most auntient stocke
of the Senators, and deriued his pedegree by the mothers side euen from Solon himselfe, the Athenian law-giuer, vet thought the
true glorie of nobilitie and soueraigntie to consist in vertue onely: Which
thing Euripides had before also wittily said, . Wherefore let vs measure true nobilitie
by vertue, for that therein not onely Philosophers and Diuines, but also Poets,
Historiographers, and almostTrue nobilitie to be measured by
vertue. all lawyers, do with one consent in mine opinion agree,
denying any place to bee left for nobilitie without honestie. And two things
propounded, to wit, Noble discent, & Vertue, they have decreed, That the
more higher & more honorable place is to bee giuenThe
knowledge of secret and most excellent things, the second cause of
nobilitie. unto vertue, whether question be of bearing of rule, or of
honour, or concerning the grauitie and weight of their testimonies and
witnesse. The next cause of nobilitie unto vertue, many have appointed to be
the knowledge of hidden and most excellent things, whome they which haue
attained therunto, the law it self expresly calleth most noble▪ whom (saith the law) Knowledge
maketh most noble: or els as Cassiodorus saith,
ex obscuro nobilem efficit doctrina, Learning maketh
of an obscure man a gentleman. But then how much more noble is he than both of
them, whome morall vertue concurringIntegritie to be
preferred before knowledge. with the vertues of the mind and
knowledge, hath together obled? But yet if integritie
be divided from such knowledge of most secret and most excellent things, the
prioritie in this case is of right to be giuen unto integritie and vertue:
except in such vocations and callings, as wherein such excellent knowledge is
of necessitie required: For why, it is better and more agreeing with reason, to
have a Generall skilfull in martiall affaires, although he be otherwise a
naughtie man to gouerne an armie, than a good
man which is no souldiour at all: but of these things more shall in due place
be said.
But yet that which Plato setteth downe, That they which
are but obscurely borne,Vertue ioyned▪ with noble discent to
be preferred before nobilitie for vertue only. excelling in vertues,
are to be preferred before them which are nobly descended, excelling also in
the same vertues with them; seemeth to me a thing verie absurd and
vnreasonable. And truely these two things thus propounded, it is right that
some regard should be had of the vertue and nobilitie of a mans auncestours,
and on that opinion the Lawiers have alwaies been, whether question be for the
obtaining of honours, or for the taking of places in solemne assemblies &
meetings, That they are stil to be preferred, which both for their owne vertues
and the nobilitie of their auncestours together, are to be cōmended. But he
whom the prince hath made noble, although he be not of any account or worth, either for his own vertue, or for
the vertues of his auncestors,Ciuil nobilitie by the prince
vnworthily bestowed, no true nobilitie. or for his learning &
knowledge: yet by the consent of all the Lawyers he is to be accounted in the
ranke and order of the Nobilitie. And therefore Plinie
writing to Traian said: Caesaris esse
vt nobiles efficeret ac tueretur, That it was the Emperors part to make
noble men, & also to defend thē. But this nobilitie Bartholus, not vnfitly hath called Ciuil nobilitie; declaring therby
them to have so gotten a certein counterfeit kind of nobilitie in the opinion
of men, but yet indeed to have no part of the honor of true nobilitie, without
vertue. Wherefore let vs graunt them to inioy the fruits of such their civill
nobilitie, unto whō they are so by the princes gift & grant conferred▪
whether that such their nobilitie be for money or
reward, or for the pryme of their youth, or for some other their most foule and filthy seruices, by the princes
bestowed upon them. But to bestow such nobility belongeth onely to them which
have the power in soueraigntie: and to them also whome Bartholus writeth to have but the principalitie, especially if they be
subiect unto the commaund of superiour princes, or have fellowes or companions
in their government: who cannot so much as make a man base borne to bee
legitimate. Much lesse true it is, that some have written, the minions and
domesticall attendants of princes to be therefore become noble: for albeit that
they thereby enioy certaine priuileges and exemptions from other seruices, yet
are they not therefore to be accounted noble, except they have borne the
greater and more honorable offices and places of commaund.
Yet question is, and I see it to have often times beene before demaunded,
whetherWhether an honorable fe,
make a man noble or no▪ he which by some
chaunce or casualtie hath obtained some great place of seruice, or other fee,
be thereby made noble? which I see to have so pleased many, so that an
honorable power and commaund be knit and ioined to such fee; such as are those
of Dukes, Counties, and Marquesses, or that the title of nobilitie be by the
soueraigne Prince expresly set downe in the charters and graunts of homage and
fealtie, and so giuen unto the things themselves, and the professors thereof.
And hereof rise that beginning of noble and vnnoble fees. But by the custome of
our countrie, wherein fees are deemed by of the same right and nature that
other lands and possessions be: as concerningNobilitie not
to depend of lands or fees. the right of the persons that had them,
the Artificer which by inheritance, or by
purchase possesseth a Dukedome, is nothing therefore the more noble, then if he
possessed other tributarie lands: For why it seemed unto our auncestours an
absurd thing, out of the right of the land to fish out that honour which they
otherwise had not▪ and the persons themselves to giue place unto the things as
a picture unto the table where on it is painted, and much more indignitie that
the right of nobilitie should beOf vertue and nobilitie do
trafique is to be made. so bought and sold. For of two of the
greatest things, namely, of Vertue, and of Nobilitie, as Euripides plainly witnesseth no trafique is to be made, .
Wherefore seeing that by our customes, aswell as by the customes of the
Germans, the Spanyards, the Brittons, and Italians, all these fees, whether it
please you to tearme them priuileges or
seruices by chaunce obtained are to be bought and sold, who can of right thinke
himselfe any whit the more noble for the hauing of such mercenarie things? And
yet it is lawfull for every most base Cobler hauing got such fee, to create his
vassals to hold of him; as it is also for every most honorable person to
receiue his owne base vassall. Whereby it appeareth, that wealth and riches be
they neuer so great, can neither get nor bring forth any true nobilitie at all.
Howbeit thatWealth & riches be they neuer so great to
bring forth no true nobilitie.Euripides bringeth in a person according to the opinion
of the common people thus speaking: , Nobilitie is in riches. And in Aulide:.
And yet we read not onely the vulgar add common sort of men, but euen * AristotleLib. 4. poli. also himselfe to have placed the first degree
of nobilitie in wealth; the second in honorable discent; and the third in
vertue, placing that last which should have beene in order first. Solon also in like maner made choice of the Citisens of
Athens by their wealth and riches, unto honors and places of commaund: the
cause whereof we will in due place declare. Which opinion hath taken so deepe
roote, that many thinke wealth, riches, and great substance, not onely to beget
nobilitie, but that all the glorie of nobilitie is by pouertie & want of
wealth quite extinguished and blotted out, howbeit that they which so say are
themselves but men of small authoritie and credite.
Truely Augustus the emperour supplied the wants of the
poorer sort of the Senators, lest that most
honorable order should have beene with pouertie oppressed. But Bartholus hath expresly written, True nobilitie to be
neither got by wealth, nor lost by pouertie. Neither did M.
Aemylius Scaurus deeme the honour of his house to be takenTrue nobilitie to by neither got by wealth, not lost by
pouertie. from him by his pouertie: yea the nobilitie and glorie of
his familie delivered him from the power of his most gratious and mightie
accusors. Now then if there be a most shamefull villaine, and thereto rich
withall; shall he therefore be in degree superiour unto the honest poorer sort?
men I thinke will not so say: then how much lesse ought we to iudge murtherers
and men polluted with all kind of villanies, because they abound with wealth to
be therefore the more noble? For why the Romans alwaies divided wealth from
nobilitie, for so Tacitus reporteth of Cassius and Syllanus, the one of whom saith he excelled in auntient wealth, & the
other in the honour of his auncestours. And so Cicero
called Rossius for nobility and wealth the chiefe man of
the towne wherein he dwelt. Wherefore our kings at such time as they, troubled
with warres and pressed with want of coyne, had set nobilitie to sale, and that
many men for their bad lives infamous, were yet for their money become noble▪
the Prince by a law made, declared none of them to be therefore so to be deemed
noble, but that he might still be accounted amongst the number of the meaner
sort, and beare offices amongst them. For what can be more absurd or
pernitious, than to measure reputation by gaine, degree by money, and nobilitie
by wealth? whereas these things often times by theft and robberie, or immoderat
lauash prodigalitie of tyrants are bestowed upon every bad fellow, or by some other chaunce, (although in truth nothing
be by chaunce done) or fortunes frailtie (whereof they be called the goodes of
fortune) giuen unto men, and so also againe from them taken. Whereas honestie
doth in nothing participate with fortune, nor the true possession of vertue and
nobilitie can by theft be taken away, nor by fire be consumed, nor by the
inundation of waters drowned, nor by any other force extinguished. But for
asmuch as we are for the most part led by the vaine opinion and popular errours
of men, whereof both all publike and priuat lawes consist; it hath also
preuailed, that hee which hath either by the Princes graunt, or by his owne▪
vertue, or wealth, or learning, or seruice in warres obtained nobilitie, may of
right transferre the same not onely unto his
posteritie, but euen unto them also whom he hath adopted. And that contrarie to
the decrees as well of the Diuines, as of the Philosophers: Whereby it is
sufficiently vnderstood all sorts of men to have had their beginning from the
rotten earth, as it is said, . But it is one thing to reason of degrees
and dignities in the assemblie of wise men; and another thing to doe it in the
presence of the vulgar sort, and scumme of the people. And yet neuerthelesse it
not onely is, but alwaies also hath beene a thing both honest and necessarie,
for every man to yeeld and consent unto the Lawes and customes of his owne
citie and countrie. And yet for all that some would not that the vertues,
deserts, and honourHow farre the honor of the auncestours
should extend unto their posteritie. of the Grandfathers should be
extended farther then unto their Nephues sonnes, and that also unto such as were of themselves lawfully descended, and not
unto their bastards or base borne. True it is, that by the customes of the
Turkes, every mans degree & reputation is esteemed by his owne worth and
vertue, neither doth the grandfathers valour or nobilitie reach farther then
their nephues: wherein they doe alsoA good custome of the
Turkes, whose reputation still dependeth of their owne worth and vertue, and
not of their auncestours. wisely, to the intent that every one of
them should endeuour themselves by their owne vertues to renew the declyning
honour of their stocke and kinred; being otherwise, to be accounted in the
number of the base and common sort of people. Howbeit that by our depraued and
corrupt manners, the farther that a man is in discent or degree from the vertue
of his auncestors, from whom he tooke the beginning of his honour, the more noble he is therefore reputed: neither if he shall
by all manner of villanies, or loosenes of
life dishonest himselfe, doth he therefore loose his degree or honour, except
hee be in publique iudgement noted with infamie: in which case although hee
leaue his lewde life and the companie of wicked men, and ioine himselfe with
the good, yet shall he not againe recover his nobilitie▪ so by iudgement once
lost, but by the Princes restoring of him, and by speciall rescript. And as hee
himselfe from his auncestours receiued nobilitie, so doth he also unto his
posteritie deriue the note of infamie, whether he were by right or wrong
condemned: for that a thing by iudgement passed, is still accounted to be
indeed a thing true. And what maruell? seing thatNoble men
by exercising of base trades, to loose their nobilitie thereby. he
which exerciseth base trades, and not beseeming a noble man, is euen without
any such publique iudgement to be thrust into the order of common persons. But
which be such base trades is an high question,
by reason of the diuers Lawes of diuers nations, in that point one of them most
vnlike another. Herodotus writeth, That in his time they
were by the customes of all people accounted base, which vsed
handycraftes:Handycrafts accounted base trades. of
which opinion we read Xenophon also to have beene, who
yet yeeldeth a reason thereof not beseeming a philosopher; as forsooth that men
of such occupations were still busied, and led a close and sedentarie life: for
what can bee more painfull or troublesome than the Generalls life? or more
close and sedentarie than the judges calling? And yet what can bee more
glorious or more noble than they both are in every Citie and Commonweale? But
Aristotle said better, who writ all MechanicallHandycrafts men why hey commonly are
basely minded. or handiecraftes men in the cities of Graece to haue
beene still kept from councell, from all
commaund, and honours: for that they beeing mercenarie men, and to be hired for
wages, had quite lost the strength and power of a noble and heroicall minde.
And truely the * Master of wisedome it selfe repelleth husbandmen,Eccles. cap. 38. Smithes, Potters▪ Image
makers, and such other handycrafts men from bearing of authoritie and rule,
from honors, and from taking places with the judges. LycurgusThe Lacedemonian and Roman citisens by Lycurgus and Romulus their lawgiuers
forbidden to exercise mechanicall or handycrafts. also and Romulus seperated their citisens farre from all
handycrafts; yet Romulus permitted his citisens to vse
husbandrie, and to beare armes: whereas Lycurgus gaue
his leaue onely to exercise armes. And to the end it may be the lesse doubted
of, Dionysius Halycarnasseus repeating the same thing
saith: Hoc lustro, qui puberes essent supra centum millia
censa: mulierum autem, seruorum, mercatorum, artesque sordidas
exercentium(siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam artem, aut vlla
opificia tractare licet) triplo plus quàm turbae ciuilis, In this view
were mustered of them that were fourteene yeare old, aboue an hundred thousand:
but of women, seruants, marchants, & such as used base occupations and
trades, (for why it is not lawfull for any Roman to keepe a Tauerne, or to
exercise any other handicraft) were reckned three times moe than there were of
the ciuiler sort or citisens. Yet some there be which think Numa Pompilius to have derogated from the law of Romulus, seeing that he appointed Colleges or Companies of artificers,
as if they might not have beene made of straungers, or of slaues. Which seemeth
to be also confirmed by that which Cicero said, Many to
have beene in Catilins conspiracie, which flockt
together about the Tauernes, in hope that the
minds of the needie might for money be moued to take his part. And by that
also, that the Tribunes of the people had by the companie and rout of the
Artificers, wonted to guard themselves against the insolencie of the Consuls.
But against these repugneth that which Dionysius
Halycarnasseus writeth, viz. that in the
seauenth view were mustered an hundred thousand citisens, beside artificers: By
which words it is manifest, that Numa derogated not from
Romulus his law, for asmuch as king Seruius, the third from Numa, was the first
that so viewed or mustered the people. Neither doth that which is alleaged
conuince them to have bene citisens whom the Tribunes or seditious citisens stirred up to rebellion, seeing that very slaues in
like case were often times called vnto
libertie: as we read they sometimes were by C. Cinna.
Cicero also thus speaketh of the Artificers, whom the conspirators with
Catiline stirred up to rebellion: Etenim omne eorum instrumentum, omnis opera, ac quaestus, frequentia ciuium
sustinetur, alitur otio, For (saith he) all their instruments and
tooles, all their worke and gaine, is maintainedAl Romaine
Citisens bound to beare armes. by the multitude of Citisens, and with
quietnesse nourished. Now it were verie improperlie said, artificers to be
maintained by the multitude of citisens, if they themselves had bene also
citisens. But by the Martiall law of the Romans, the citisens afterToga virilis or the mans gowne was by the Romaine
citisens worne, when they were come to be seauenteene yeare olde.
they had begun once to weare the *mans gowne, were compelled to serue in the
wars vntill they were five and fiftie yeares old. Neither was there any way for
a citisen of Rome to attaine unto any honor, except he had serued in the warres
ten yeares: For which cause it is by Liuie reported, two thousand of the citisens to haue
beene openly sold, for that they had not for foure yeares space serued in the
warres; which could by no meanes have bene done unto artificers: whom Liuie also in one place writeth, to have beene men
altogether vnfit for the warres. That testimonie of Cicero is in this point also of more waight: Illiberales sunt & sordidi quaestus mercinariorum omnium, quorum opera
non quorum artes emuntur, est enim in illis ipsa merces autor amentum
seruitutis, The gaines (saith he) of all mercinarie men are seruile and
base, whose works and not whose skill are of men bought, for in them their
verie wares is the earnest penie of their slauerie. But where he speaketh of
the Roman citisens indeed, he neither thinketh nor writeth any thing of them
which is contemptible or base, or that
soundeth not unto their reputation and honour. Whereby it is to bee
vnderstoodThe base regard that was had in Rome of
artificers and men of occupation. Artificers and men of occupation in
Rome, to have beene either slaues, or straungers, and men of most base and lowe
estate and condition: or if that by manumission they were become citisens of
Rome, yet they were therefore but in the number of Libertines, hauing as it
were in some sort lost the right of the citisens of Rome, no otherwise then
Noble men with vs, which have giuen themselves to base and gainfull occupations
or trades, who as they have thereby left their nobilitie: so have they also
lost their degrees and places: except they have therefore obtayned pardon of
our Prince, as that enforced with necessitie, they have so intermedled in such
base trades.Whether to vse the trade of marchandize be against a mans
credit and reputation or not?
Howbeit concerning the trade of marchandize, it is not well agreed upon betwixt
the Lawiers and the auntient writers amongst themselves, whether it be
repugnant unto a mans credit and reputation or not. We read that by the
Tribunall law Claudia, it was forbidden the Senatours to
have any greater ship at Sea, then of the burthenAmphoras,
the Romaine measure is more then our bushel by 16 pound waight. of
three hundred Amphoras, and that also for the carrying of the fruits of their
landes: Quaestus omnis (saith Liuie)
patribus indecorus visus, All gayning by trade (saith he) seemed vnto
the Senatours vnseemely. Which law Hortensius said to be
in his time dead: as in Cicero we read: Whereby it is
yet to bee gathered, that not onely to have beene lawfull for the rest of the
citisens to doe, every mans credit and reputation saued whole: But also euen
the Senators themselves, not to have altogether abstained from the trade of marchandize, or at least wise to have had their
factors; as wee see the manner is for the Venetian, Spanish, and English
gentlemen to haue. And that it was lawfull for the Romaine knights or gentlemen
to vse the trade of marchandize, or at least wise that it was not altogether
forbidden them, is to be prouedThe Romaine knights and
gentlemen to have used the trade of marchandize. by that which Cicero saith against Verres: Lucius
Praetius splendidissimus Eques Romanus qui Panormi negotiatur, Lucius
Praetius a most worthie Romaine knight, which doth trade at Panormo. And in
another place: Q. Mutius Eques Romanus qui Syracusis, Q.
Mutius a Romaine knight who tradeth at Syracusa. Much lesse therefore was the trade of marchandise forbidden the common
sort of men. And yet although by the old
custome of the Romans, it was no shame for the citisens to trade marchandise:
(yet I say) it seemeth not for all that to have bene altogether lawful for them
so to doe: as is to be proued out of Dionysius
Halycarnasseus, who writeth aboue an hundred thousand citisens to haue
bene cessed: but of women, and marchants, and others of base trades, three
times as many as of the citisens: whereby hee seemeth to have exempted
marchants out of the number of the Roman citisens.
Neither do we see that to have bene the manner and fashion of the Romans
only,The better sorte of citisens in diuers commonweales
forbidden to deale in the trade of marchandize. but of the
Lacedemonians and Thebans also. Howbeit that the vse of gold and siluer, being
taken from the Lacedemonians, there was no place left for marchandise: yet was
it Lycurgus his pleasure, by an especiall law more
solemnly to prouide therefore. As for the
Theban citisens, it was not otherwise lawfull for them either to sue for the
magistracies, or honourable offices of the Commonweale, or to accept thereof
beeing offered them, except they had full ten yeares before abstained from the
trade of marchandise. And at length by the imperiall lawes all entrance vnto
honors, and places of commaund were shut up unto the order of marchants: and
not that onely, but euen to deale in the trade of marchandise was aswell
forbidden the nobilitie, as to intermeddle with martiall affaires was forbidden
marchants. By which lawes the trade of marchandise seemeth unto many either
base▪ or not verie honest or commendable. Truely Plato,
Aristotle, Apollonius, Thyaneus, say, The trade of marchandise to bee
an enemie unto vertue. Yea the law of God seemeth also to have restrained the
holy people from the trade of marchandise, in
these words, Non erit mercator in populo tuo,The people of God forbid to be marchants. There shall
be no marchant in thy people: that is to say, , which word improperly signifieth a
deceiuer, but more properly a marchant: for , is properly to buy & sell; and in
that sence it is almost alwaies vsed. For that diuine law which forbad the
people, but not straungers, to commit vsurie, seemeth also to have forbidden to
buy any thing, to sell the same thing the deerer unto a naturall Israelite.
Wherunto agreeth that which he the * Prince of wisdome
writeth, Mercatorem manus a scelere puras vixEccles. 24. Ezech chap.
82habiturum, A marchant hardly to have his hands cleane
from wickednesse. Wherefore the * Prophets most often, and the interpretours of
holy scripture, more often doeChrysost. Homil▪ 21. in Mateum. so detest the trade of marchants, as that * Chrysostome not obscurely or doubtfully, but euen plainely denieth, That marchants can please God, by
reason of their lies, periuries, and deceits, and for that they are still prone
unto vnhonest gaine, as Vlpian the lawyer writeth.
Yet of that we are to he warned, that whereas the immortall God forbid his
people (whome he by a singular right and choice had consecrated unto himselfe)
to trade in marchandise: belongeth not to other people in like manner also; for
that he would have this his people to excell all others in puritie and
integritie of life. For why, marchandise is not onely unto cities profitable,
but honest also; and not onely honest, but also necessarie. For what if a citie
be built in such a barren soile, or situat in such a place,The trade of marchandize both honest and necessarie. as that men
cannot therin not commodiously, but euen not at all otherwise live? Such
as we have heard the citie of Athens to
have bene, and as our Limoge, and the German Nuremberg is: and Venice also the
beautie of the Mediterranean sea. Which foure cities without traffique and the
trade of marchandise had neuer bene such and so great as they were and are.
Wherefore M. Tullius out of the number of marchants, or
at leastwise of base men, exempteth them which exercise a plentifull and
gainfull, and not a base and bare trade of marchandise, Mercatura si tenuis est, sordida putanda est, simagna & copiosa, multa
vndique apportans, multisque sine vanitate impertiens, non est admodum
vituperanda, The trade of marchandise (saith he) if it be small and
bare, is to be accounted also base, but if it be great
and plentifull, bringing in on euerie side many commodities, and without vanitie commnnicating the same unto many, it is
not much to be discommended. Whereunto I would add that of Platoes, if it bring in but such things as are necessarie, or at
leastwise profitable for the citisens, and carrie out but such things as are
vnprofitable, and to be spared. And therefore many lawyers say, The trade of
marcandise abounding in plentie of all things, in nothing to derogat from the
honour of a mans birth, his degree, or nobilitie. Which haply may be so in
Italie, in England, and in Portugall, but not with vs in France, nor yet in
Germany. Yet that is every whereThe marchants trade in
diuers countries diuersly reputed of. true which Cicero writeth, Sordidos iudicari qui mercantur a
mercatoribus quod eodem loco ac momento vendant, Them to be deemed but
base, which buy of marchants that which they hold euen in the same place, and
selfe same moment againe sell: for why, they
should gaine nothing, except they should lye loudly: whereas nothing is more
foule than vanitie and lying. Whersore they do wisely which forbid not only the
nobility, but euen the magistrats & souldiors also to deale in the trade of
marchandise, least under the colour of such traffique, a way be opened and
giuen to basenesse and rapine: neither is it to be suffered, that he which
cannot by himselfe, should by the help and ministerie of his seruants in that
point defraud the law.
But baser than these are the buyers and sellers of things dishonest, bee they
neuer so precious, and to be placed beneath handie crafts-men and laborers, or
rather so much as is possible to be quite driuen our of all cities: which
cannot yet altogether bee done,The same thing that in one
place is accounted honest or profitable in some other to be reputed
dishonest or vnprofitable. for that the law for things honest and
dishonest, for things profitable and disprofitable, is not euerie where one and the same. We have heard painting
and engrauing to have bene much commended and respected▪ by the estimation that
the Greekes and Latines had of them. For who was more famous than Protogenes? or more glorious than Apelles? one of whose tables, which for that it was most curiously
wrought, preserued the Rhodes from distruction, Demetrius besieging of it: Which table is reported to have bene
esteemed at more than three hundred talents. And as Tully saith, It was giuen as a praise & commendation to Fabius, a most noble gentleman, That he was seene in
painting: which yet the Hebrews account of all other occupations the basest.
And by the lawes and customes of the Turkes, as of all them of the East, and of
Affrike also, it is not onely a base thing, but capitall also, with the needle,
pencill, or moulding, with any pictures or
lineaments to shadow or draw the purtrature of any plant, or liuing creature,
or of whatsoeuer thing else that nature hath created. Wee read also the
profession of Physike to have bene amongst the Romans a seruile and abiect
thing, and Physike it selfe to have bene excluded from the other liberall
sciences; which yet for all that the Hebrewes and Greekes euer had in great
estimation: and begun then to be of our countreymen regarded, when as the
Arabians had first divided Surgions and Apothecaries from Physitians, vsing
them but as their instruments and ministers. And albeit that Physitians be in
cities to be reuerenced, yet is it not toEccles. cap. 38 be suffered them to be equall
with orators and lawyers. For why, the most famous Philosophers have defined the civill and lawfull knoledge of
the law, to bee the moderatour and chiefe gouernour, not of arts onely, but
euen of all liberall sciences also. And Rome (as Marcus
Cato witnesseth) flourished aboue six hundred yeares without
Physitians: whereas no citie can without lawes, and the lawfull knowledge of
the law, any small while endure or stand.
The order and vocation of Husbandmen and Grasiers, is also right
commendable:The vocation of husbandmen and grasiers in
auntient time right commendable, and whie now lesse respected. as
they which by those two most auntient trades, have taught cities, townes,
villages, and families, to releeue and maintaine themselves with things of all
others most necessarie. And truly Cyrus the Greater, of
nothing vaunteth so much, as of the fields set and
planted by his owne industrie and labour. Serranus, also
Curius, Concinnatus, Torquatus, and Cato, men no lesse
famous for their civill than their domestical prayses; were yet for that most
commended, Quod attritis opere rustico manibus salutem
publicam stabilirent: quaeque modo arantium boum iuga rexerant, triumphalis
currus habenas retinerent, That with their hands worne with countrey
labour, they established the welfare of the Commonweale: and that those hands
which of late ruled the yokes of oxen at plow, now held the raines of the
triumphall chariots in the citie of Rome. But these things were chiefly done in
that age when as such men as had before bene Consuls were now from the plow
called unto the Dictatorship. Truly of all things whereby any thing is gotten,
nothing is better than husbandrie & grasing, nothing more plentiful,
nothing more pleasant, and I might say also with Theophrastus, nothing better beseeming a free borne man, : were not these most notable arts, in
seruile manner contumeliously let out unto base men, for wages hired. Now wee
have said those arts to be accounted base, whose wages is the earnest penie of
their slauerie: so that it ought not to seeme straunge, if that husbandmen in
the fall of the Roman Commonweale were put backe from the warres. Whereof it
followeth, both the orders and degrees of husbandmen (I say) and shepheards to
be placed in the rank and number of labouring men. For necessitie it selfe (yea
oft times against reason) enforceth the dignitie of degrees and vocations of
men to be disposed of according to the lawes and customes of euerie citie and
countrey.
The Hangmans office almost euerie where is deemed of all other the basest:
neither The hangmans office in some places respected▪ ▪Deut. 17. and 19. by the
Censors lawes was it for him lawfull to have a dwelling place within the citie:
as in this our age it is not lawfull for him at Tholouse. Whereas by the lawes
of the Hebrewes it was not onely honest, but necessarie also, euen the noblest
of them if they had bene witnesses of capitall crimes, to be also the
executioners therein. Yea andThe author in this custome by
him reported much mistaken and deceiued. in England the neerest kin
to them that be hanged, be it their fathers, their brethren, or neerest
kinsmen, the last kindnesse they can doe them, is to play the part of the
hangman, and to strangle them hanging upon a low paire of gallowes. But by our
customs we see gainfull rewards propounded unto this so base an office, least
wee should bee at any time destitute of an office so necessarie for the cities:
as we have heard say it to have long since happened in Gaunt, where the iudge
for lacke of an hangman commaunded the father
and the sonne, both convicted and condemned for the same offence, to cast lots
which of them should be the others hangman; wherein the lot fell unto the
father, who now growne verie aged, with much entreatie obtained that his sonne,
as by age the stronger, and so fitter to live, might become the executioner;
who without feare hanged his father: the eternall monument of which impietie
and villanie (which I against my will have beholden) the Gantois suffer yet to
stand in statues of brasse, and that in a publike and open place euen in the
middest of the citie.
There is also in cities a great multitude of idle lazie fellowes, who neither
in time ofIdle people to be thrust out of the citie, or
elssetto worke. peace, nor warre, have any occupations to set
themselves to worke, o other trade to busie
themselves withall: whome it is needfull either to banish out of the citie, or
to keepe them in publike workes: for why, they
can in no degree be placed, and so much the more, if they have nothing of their
owne wherewith to maintaine that their idle life. And these kind of men Amasis king of Aegypt put to death, in like manner as if
they had bene theeves and robbers. Wherein they of Paris doe much better, who
thrust the strong and lustie of these idle mates into their publike workes;
courteously eeding and curing the sicke and aged, and
diligently instructing the fatherlesse and poore boyes and maids, some in
learning, some in occupations, in foure diuers colleges, besides a great
hospitall endowed with most faire reuenewes.
But if citisens live idle upon such goods as they haue
themselves before got, or were of old left
them, albeit that they lead a foule and sluggish kind of life, yet are they to
be therein suffered, if it were but that they might with their wealth helpe the
poore Commonweales wherein they live. But if these men feed also their mind
with the contemplation of high and heauenly things, I deeme them then of all
sorts of citisens the happiest, and to be placed in the highest rankes and
degrees of them. But if they had rather lead an actiue than a quiet kind of
life, it is much better to call them than poorer men unto honours and
magistracies, if no dishonestie of life let: for that they are like to bee
cleerer from briberie and corruption, than they which are pressed with pouertie
and want. Wherefore in obtaining of magistracies and honours, the law
commaundeth the richer sort to be oftentimes placed together with the nobler;
yea and some times also to bee preferred
before them, if no staine of their fore passed life let: and that is well
agreeing unto the lawes and customes of the Indians, whom Plinie writeth to preferre still the best and richest man unto honours
and places of commaund.
Wherefore in what order citisens are to be placed, is to be referred unto the
iudgement and discretion of the masters of the ceremonies of euerie citie, for
the vnliknesse ofHow citisens are in a Monarchy to be
ordered and placed. their lawes and customes almost infinit. Yet I
suppose, that citisens in a monarchie might in this order not vnaptly be
placed. That next unto the king himselfe, who out of the number of the
citisens, going farre before the rest should follow the holy order of the
clergie: next unto the sacred order of the clergie, the Senat: after the Senat
should follow the martiall men, and amongst them, first the generall of the
armie, or great constable, & then the
dukes, counties, marquesses, gouernors of prouinces, landgraues, burgraues,
captaines of castles, vassals, and other souldiours, with such others, as uppon
whome the charge of the warres, by the custome of our auncestours lieth. After
them should follow the order of gowne men, which should containe the colledges
of magistrats, and companies of judges, partly divided into their places, with
oratours, lawyers, pleaders, aduocats, attourneies, proctors, scribes,
registers, notaries, sergeants, apparitors, garders, tryers, trumpeters,
gailors, and all the companie belonging to the law. Next unto whome should
follow the order of physitians, surgeons, and apothecaries. And after them
schoole men, such as professed to instruct the youth, or are themselves
instructed; the professors (I say) of diuinitie, law, and physike, natural
philosophers, mathematitians, logitians,
rhetoritians, historiographers, poets, and grammarians. After the order of
gowne men, I suppose are to be placed marchants, agents, farmers of the common
custome, bankers, money chaungers, brokers, and especially they which have the
charge for the bringing in of corne into the citie, and of such other things as
are most necessarie for the feeding of the citisens, such as are the
cornmungers, butchers, fishmungers, fishers, bakers, puddingmakers, cookes,
unto whome we will ioyne husbandmen and grasiers; and unto these all kind and
sort of handycrafts men: which for that they seeme almost innumerable, of them,
they which are the most profitable, ought to have the first place, carpenters
(I say) armourers, masons, metall men, coyners, gold beaters, goldsmiths, metall melters, glasse makers, smiths, bakers,
potters, horners, chaundlers, weauers also, and such as deale in spinning of
silke, wool, beasts, haire, flaxe, hempe, cotten wool, and such other like,
whereof we see cloath, ropes, garments, hangings, sayles, and paper to be made.
Next unto whome follow curriers, skinners, fullers, diers, taylors, shoomakers:
unto which occupations, although printing be not for antiquitie toPrinters to be amongst men of occupations especially to be
regarded. be compared, yet seemeth it for the excellencie thereof,
before al the rest worthily to be preferred. For as for painters, image makers,
caruers, makers and sellers of womens paintings, minstrels, players, dauncers,
fencers, tumblers, iesters, and bauds, are in mine opinion either to be quite
driuen out of cities, or else to be placed in the lowest place of all: so that euen bath keepers, barbers, sailers, hucksters,
ostlers, coach men, carters, graue makers,
sargeants, and hangmen, are to be placed before them: For that these are indeed
necessarie for the carrying out of filth, and the clensing of the citisens and
cities: whereas the other with their most base trades, the ministers of foule
and vaine pleasures, not onely corrupt the citisens maners, but vtterly
ouerthrow euen the cities themselves. But we have so described the orders of
citisens, not so much that the dignitie, as the condition of euerie one of them
might so the better be vnderstood.
Neither are citisens but most seldome, and that also in time of great
necessitie, to beeCitisens but seldome and that also upon
great necessitie to be into orders divided. in orders from other
citisens divided: for that so doing may giue occasion and minister matter vnto
civill sedition: when as some of them divided from other some, shall perceiue
themselves to be noted also with a difference of their order and degree. Yea we
said, that the citisens of one and the same
trade or occupation were not in one street or quarter of the citie to be
together placed: except they were by the straitnesse of the places or
opportunitie of the waters they were to vse, thereto enforced; as butchers,
curriers, felmungers, bath keepers: who for that they are to have the
continuall vse of water for their oft washings, must have their dwellings also
neere unto the riuers sides: so are also armourers, and smithes, to be placed
apart by themselves from schollers and students, as for other handicrafts men,
marchants, and trades men, it is good to have them separated one from another,
and to be divided into euerie part of the citie, that the citisens may more
commodiously vse their helpe in generall, and not in time of daunger be enforced oftentimes to runne from the furthest
place of the citie to the furthest. Whereunto is to be ioyned, that citisens of
the same occupation or trade, divided into diuers parts of the citie, cannot so
easily conspire against the common good, or deludeCitisens
better to be divided into three parts, than into two. the lawes, as
if they dwell together. But if assembly of all the orders and degrees of
citisens, must of necessitie be made (for that degrees must needes in some sort
bee distinguished from degrees, that a certaine dignitie of degrees may be
kept) especiall care is to be had, that the citisens be not divided into two
parts onely, and yet that in such assemblies there be not more than three
degrees or places: for that contention arising betwixt two, they easily breake
out into force; or else upon equall voyces breake off, and leaue the matter
vndecided: when as one thing is contrarie but onely unto one, and that by
nature many things cannot unto one be contrarie, but that the third must
of necessitie ioyne it selfe unto the one
of the two, so to reconcile them together: whereas if there be more than three
parts, and in number equall, the same inconueniences doe follow (that doe of
two) the euen number being easily to bee divided into two parts: but if in
number vnequall the number of opinions diuers will hardly end the controuersies
once moued.
It shall also be more commodious and profitable to have one oratour or
speaker,Whether it bee good for to have one speaker for
all the degrees of citisens, or diuers. for all the degrees of
citisens together, then for diuers orders and degrees, diuers: so that it be
agreed upon amongst all the degrees and orders what is to be requested,
determined of, or done: as heretofore at Thurin and Orleance, when they called their assemblies. But if the
orders and decrees of citisens shall therein differ among themselves, it
is then needfull for every order and degree
of the citisens, to have their owne speaker. As of late in the parliament of
Bloyse, when as the Bishops grieuously complained of the Nobilirie; and againe
the Nobilitie of the Bishops; and the Comminaltie of them both, it was then
needfull to have three Speakers appointed: and yet so could not the good of the
people bee sufficiently prouided for, but that the Speakers were blamed of
falshood and collusion, and that diuers great and grieuous complaints of the
people were thereof giuen out. But these things are especially to be taken heed
of in a Monarchie, wherein one man is judge of all controuersies: Wheras in
other kinds of states, albeit that there be many
speakers, yet the matter is still in the end put to voyces.
But that diuision of the citisens (which we have spoken of) into three degrees
or parts,Better three parts taking in a commonweale than
two. as it is unto all kinds of cities profitable, so is it in an
Aristocratie most necessarie, that two of them disagreeing, the third may end
the strife, or taking part with one, may draw the other whether it wil or no
from the former receiued opinion. For if two factions shall arise, they which
are wise, & wish the good & welfare of the Commonweale, should set up
an head of a third faction, and ioyne themselves unto him: For three leaders of
diuers factions, or part▪takers, are right easily reconciled; whereas two are
most hardly brought to agreement: whereof oftentimes arise seditions and civill
warres, and that especially in the Aristocratike estate: For that in that
estate, betwixt the nobilitie and common people, can be no third degree, all
the right of soueraigntie being in the
nobilitie, and nothing thereof in the people; all the same right in a Popular
citie, or estate, being common to the nobilitie and Senat together with the
people. Wherefore it is an easie matter to create a third degree or order: as
at Rome the order of knights or gentlemen, was in a sort an arbitratour or
vmpier betwixt the Patricij andNot
good in great assemblies to diuide the people into three degrees and
orders. the people, as made of both degrees. But for that both the
Patricij and the knights made scarcely the fifth part
of the whole people, the people did therefore the more imperiously raigne &
rule: which was then especially vnderstood, when as by a law concerning the
Theatres, place for the beholding of playes, was first giuen to the Senat,
& next after them unto the knights or gentlemen, all apart by themselus
from the people: whereof Liuie thus writeth, C. Attilij Serrani, L. Scribonij Libonis Aedilium
CuruliumLudis Romanis primum Senatus a populo secretus spectauit,
praebuitque sermones sicut omnis nouitas solet alijs tandem, quòd mentò antè
debuerit tributum censentibus amplissimo ordini, alijs demptum ex dignitate
populi quicquid maiestati patrum adiectum esset interpretantibus: &
omnia discrimina talia quibus ordines discernerentur, & concordie, &
libertatis aequè minuende esse: ad quingentissimum quinquagissimum Sextum
annum in promiscuo spectatum esse, quid repente factum? Cur non immisceri
sibi in cauca Patres plebem vellent? Cur diues pauperem consessorem
fastidierit? Nonam & superbam libidinem ab nullius ante gentis Senatu
neque desideratam, neque institutam Postremo Africanum quoque ipsum, quod
Consul auctor eius rei fuisset, poenituisse ferunt, At the Roman plaies
of C. Atilius Serranus, and L.
Scribonius Libo, the honourable Aediles, the Senat apart and divided from the people, first beheld the same:
which thing (as euerie nouelty vseth to doe) gaue occasion of speech, some
deeming it now at length to be giuen unto that most honourable order, which
should long time before have of right beene giuen it; other some interpreting
it to be taken from the dignitie of the people, whatsoeuer was added unto the
honour of the Senat: and all such differences as whereby degrees were discerned
asunder to tend alike to the diminishing both of concord and of libertie: that
the people indifferently together had beholden the plaies, now five hundred
fiftie six yeares. What was that now so sodenly done? Why should not the
Senators be contented to have the people mingled with them in the Theatre? Why
should the rich scorne the poore man to sit by
him? A new and proud insolencie, neuer before of the Senat of any nation either
desired or ordained. Last of all it is reported, Africanus also himselfe to have repented him, That being Consull, hee
had beene author of that matter. Thus much he. Whereby it is to be vnderstood,
that for the preseruing of the popular libertie, and concord, degrees ought so
to be placed with degrees, as that al of them may more easily bee ioyned vnto
all in societie and communion together. Wherefore this fact of Africanus was blamed, not onely of the common people, but
euen of the Senators themselves, whose favour he was thought to have gotten:
For so Tullie writeth him to have bene blamed, not onely
of the wiser sort, but euen of himselfe also; for
that, that was by force from the people extorted, which had before vntill then bene willingly graunted unto the Senators:
for that albeit that the seats were indifferent unto all, yet neuer any of the
people would presume to sit to behold the playes before the Senators. About an
hundred yeares after was a law made by L. Roscius Otho,
Tribune of the people, That the knights or gentlemen should sit and take their
places upon the foureteene steps or degrees next unto the stage: For when the
magistrats and the rest of the Senators, by the Censors law, did more
commodiously see and heare from the first and neerest places unto the stage,
the higher degrees and farther off, were accounted of lesse credit: &
albeit that the places of the Theater were of right great receit (as which
contained oftentimes threescore thousand of the citisens) yet could they not
containe them all: & therfore by the law Roscia concerning the
Theater, it was needfull that place should
be kept for the knights, in the fourteene steps and degrees neere unto the
stage: and for that thereby the peoples voyces seemed secretly in some sort to
be taken from them by Roscius the Tribune, whom it
beseemed to have bene a keeper & preseruer of the popular libertie and
dignitie; at such time as he came to behold the playes, he was by the knights
(whose favour he had won) with great acclamation and applause receiued, but of
the people with greater tumult and sturre, in so much that Cicero the Consull was glad to call all the assembly of the people out
of the Theater. And so as a man of great wisedome and eloquence, with a graue
oration repressed the peoples insolencie, and with a reproofe and chiding, well
beseeming the dignitie of a Consull, so appeased the tumult, as that the people
returned againe into the Theatre well pleased.
Hereof came that speech of Plinie in commendation of Cicero, Te suadente tribus Roscio Theatralis legis auctori
ignouerunt, notatasque se discrimine sedis aequo animo tulerunt, The
tribes (saith he) at thy persuasion pardoned Roscius,
author of the law of the Theatre, and tooke it patiently themselves to bee
noted with the difference of their seats and sittings. Now a punishment was set
downe by the law of the Theatre, Ne quis nisi censum
equestrem haberet in xiiij spectaret, That no man except he had a
knights wealth, should stand in the xiiij steps or degrees to behold the
playes. But when many, their patrimonie being by the civill warres wasted,
durst not for feare of this Theatrall law behold the playes from the fourteene
steps or seats, Augustus the emperour decreed, That they
should not be therewith bound, who themselves
or their parents had euer had a knights wealth or abilitie. Now as for the
order and degree of women, I meddle not with it; onely I thinke it meet them to
be kept far off from all magistracies, places of commaund, iudgements, publike
assemblies, and councels: so to be intentiue onely unto their womanly and
domesticall businesse. And thus much concerning the order and degrees of
Citisens. But by what meanes prouision is to bee made against the reuolt and
tumultuous stormes of the common people, wee will in due place more at large
declare.
Finis Lib. Tertij.
THE FOVRTH BOOKE OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.
CHAP. I. ¶ Of the rising, encreasing, flourishing
estate, declining, and ruine of Commonweales.
ALl Commonweales take their beginning either from a
Familie,The beginning of Commonweals. by little and little
encreasing; or els arise at once, as when a multitude of people as a Colony
drawne out of another Citie or Commonweale, doe as a young swarme of bees fly
abroad unto another place: or as a slip or science pluckt off from a tree, and
planted in a straunge soyle, which taking root, bringeth forth much more
plentifull and pleasant fruit, than doe those trees which grow up of small
kernels, or of their owne accord, Yet both the one and the other of these
Commonweales, are established either by the strength of some stronger
than themselves, or by the power of some
others, who voluntarily had subiected themselves together with their libertie,
unto the power and pleasure of others, to be by them disposed of, as by a
soueraigne power without any law at all, or else upon certaine laws and
conditions betwixt them agreed upon. So the Commonweale hauing taken beginning
if it be well rooted and grounded, first assureth it selfe against al externall
force, and then against the inward diseases of it self, and so by little &
little gathering strength, groweth up vntill it be come to the full perfection
of it selfe: which wee may call the Flourishing estate thereof; which cannot be
of any long continuance, by reason of theThe florishing
estate of commonweales endure not long. chaunges of worldly things,
which are so mutable and vncertaine, as that the greatest Commonweales
oftentimes fall euen all at once with the weight of themselves, some others by civill warres, some by popular diseases, but
most by the enemies violence, being as then ruinated, when as they thought
themselves most assured: other some by the wrath of God, being upon the sudden,
and in a moment ouerthrowne: some few by age growing old, and by their inward
sicknesse taking end. But yet no Commonweales, finding or feeling greater
chaunges or falles than the fairest of them: which for all that, are not in
that to be blamed, especially if the change or alteration come by any externall
force, as most commonly it chaunceth, the fairest things being still the most
enuied at. And as Demetrius (he which was called the
Besieger) deemed no man more happy, than him who had longest quietly lived in
the greatest aboundance of al things, neuer hauing
tasted of aduersitie, as a man by fortune deemed most abiect and
vnworthie, with whom shee should contend or
striue: so we see some Commonweales so shamefully buried in pleasures and
idlenes, or else so to be corrupted, as that they might well moue any man
rather to pitie then to enuie at their state. Wherefore the risings and ruines
of the Commonweales are well of vs to be considered, and what the causes be of
every such their conuersion and change before that we giue iudgement of them,
or propound them as examples to be imitated and followed. Now I call that a
ConuersionWhat the conuersion and change of a Commonweale
is. of a Commonweale, when as the state thereof is altogether
chaunged: as when a Popular estate is changed into a Monarchie; or an
Aristocratie into a Democratie; or contrarywise: For as for the change of
customes, lawes, religion, or place, it is but a certaine kind of alteration,
the state and soueraigntie continuing still: which may also to the contrarie it selfe be changed, without any
change of religion, or lawes, or any other things else, besides them which
belong unto soueraigntie. As when in our time the Florentine popular estate was
changed into a Monarchie. Neither is the age or continuance of a Commonweale to
be measured by the long standing of a citie, or of the walles thereof, as Paulus Manutius seemeth to have done: who writethThe age of a Commonweale how it is to be measured. the
Venetian Commonweale that now is, to have stood twelue hundred yeares; which
hath yet suffered three changes, as we shall forthwith declare. Sometime it
hapneth also no change either of the citie, or of the citisens, of the
customes, or religion to be made, or any other force offered, or wrong done to
any man; and yet that the state may perish: as when any soueraigne prince
willingly subiecteth himselfe, his kingdome,
and people unto the power and obeysance of some other Prince, or else by his
testament appointeth some popular Commonweale inheritour of his State and
kingdome: As is reported of Attalus king of Asia; of Coctius king of Alpes; of PtolaemeeKings which made the Romans their heires. king of
Cyrenae; of Eumenes king of Pergamus; of Nicomedes king of Bithynia; of Polemon king of Pontus, who left the people of Rome heires of those so
many their kingdomes: for then those kingdomes were quite taken away, and those
Commonweales brought into the forme of Prouinces, and no change made of their
Monarchies into a popular Estate. And so contrariwise, if of one or many cities
or prouincesDiuers changes of commonweales. be made
one or manie Monarchies or popular estates divided in soueraigntie, that is not
to be accounted any conuersion or change, but euen a verie beginning of diuers
new Commonweales: As when the countrie of
the Swissers and the Grisons reuolted from the Germaine Empire, they became
eighteene Commonweals, every one of them holding their estates (divided from
the other) in soueraigntie. Sometime also of two is made one and the same
Commonweale: as were the Romans and the Sabines, their two kings and people
being in the same power and league ioyned and combyned together, neither of
them subiect unto the Lawes or commaund of the other; but with equall power
both of them growing together into the same citie. And lest the Sabines so
ioyned unto the Romans should have seemed to have accrewed unto another mans
kingdome, it pleased them that the names of both the people being taken away or
suppressed, they should be called Quirites, which name
the Magistrates in their orations unto the
people euer after vsed: Albeit that Romulus (who because he would not seeme to
endure a fellow in the kingdome with him, had not spared his owne brother)
caused Tatius king of the Sabines not long after to bee
also slaine: wherefore the Sabines Commonweale so perished not, either accrewed
unto the Romaines (as some have beene of opinion) albeit that other people
called them neither Sabines, nor Quirites, but Romans: For that that name once
giuen unto the Citie and the people, could neuer more be changed; or for that
the name of the Romans was more stately; or else for that those two people so
grew together within the wals of Rome, yet so as that
the one became not subiect unto the other: as it chanceth when the one being vanquished, yeeldeth it selfe unto the
other, and so suffereth the lawes of the vanquisher. Which may serue for the
disciding of the question of Cuneu the lawier, who doubteth, Whither the subiects of the one
Commonweale, if they be ioyned into one and the selfe same bodie with the
subiects of another Commonwealth, be thereby the subiects of them with whom
they are so ioyned: which thing Bartholus denieth; and
for example thereof alleageth Raimond Countie of
Toulouse, not erring indeed in his resolution of the question, but in the
example by him produced, not hauing good regard unto the treatie made betwixt
the Countie and the estates of Languedoc of the one part, and Lewes the ix the French king on the other part, wherin it was
comprised, That the only daughter of the countie Raymond
should be espoused to Alphonsus countie of Poitiers, the kings brother, with condition, that
if they died without heires of their bodies lawfully begotten, the countrey of
Languedoc should in full right returne unto the crowne; yet for all that so, as
that the customes of the countrey should not be chaunged, neither any
taxe▪imposed without the consent of the estates of the countrey▪ which hath
alwaies beene obserued, the soueraigntie over the country and the inhabitants
of Languedoc remaining unto the kings, as it had before that the countie was
therefrom exempted. But most certaine it is, that an estate subiect vnto
another, maketh not another Commonweale, but onely a part of the subiects.
But that these things may the better be perceiued, it is to be vnderstood, that
al conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales,
are either voluntarie or necessarie, or else mingled of both: and as for
necessitie, it is also either naturall or violent: For albeit that the birth of
things be more faire and pleasing than their death, yet for all that so it is,
that the source and course of flowing nature rauishing all things, giueth vs
also to vnderstand, that the one cannot be without the other: so that all
things which had beginning, although they have stood many hundred yeares, yet
must at length in time take end and perish also. But, as we deeme that death
more tollerable which by little and little creepeth on through the weakenesse
of age, or the course of some long lingering disease, and that almost without
any sensible feeling thereof: so also may wee say the chaunge or fall of a
Commonweale, which proceeding as it were of age, and after hauing endured a long tract of worlds, to be necessarie, and
yet not violent: for that nothing can well be called violent, which is agreeing
unto nature: seeing also that the course of euerie things age is certaine, and
a certaine ripenesse unto euerie age appointed:The naturall
change or fall of a Commonweale. so that in due time to take end
seemeth to bee a thing of euerie thing to bee wished for.
Now Commonweales be also chaunged some times to the better, and sometimes to
the worse, whether such chaunge bee naturall or violent: yet the violent change
still hauing violent motions, and so quickely done; and the naturall chaunging
still be little and little, and so the lesse felt. But of all chaunges of
Commonweales, no voluntarieThe most pleasing and easie
change of a Commonweale. chaunges is more pleasing or easie than that
which is made by the consent and good will of him which hath the soueraigntie,
and of his subiects: when as hee which hath
the soueraigntie, chooseth rather to yeelde the same unto the nobility, or the
people, than to hold it himselfe: as we have heard Sylla, with incredible violence to have taken upon him the
Dictatorship, and that not without the most cruell slaughter of the people, and
so to have turned the soueraignty of the Commonweale from a popular estate,
into a Monarchie; and yet him the same man within foure yeares after,
voluntarily and of his owne accord, dispoiling himselfe of the Monarchy, which
he had couered under the colour of his Dictatorship, to have againe restored
the soueraignty unto the people, to the great
contentment of them all in generall, and the good liking of every one of them in particular. So also the nobilite of the
state of Sienna, by their common consent, yeelded the soueraignty of that state
unto the people, and abandoned the city themselves, which Pandulphus the tyrant, violently afterwards inuaded. And as in mens
bodies diuers changes happen from the qualities of the elements, the
disposition of the body or the minde, the temperature of the humours, as also
from the manner of the education thereof, and diuersity of diet: so also the
Commonweale may suffer an vniuersall change or ruine, from friends or enemies
externall or internall, or from both, whether it be from good to euill, or
euill to good, and that oft times contrary to the good liking of the subiects,
who must sometimes as children and mad folkes, be cured euen against their
wills, as Lycurgus, who changed the lawes and royall
state of his country, into a popular
government, contrary to the good liking of the subiects, or of the greater part
of them; howbeit that in so doing, hee was well beaten of them, and lost one of
his eyes (the reward of his vertue) although hee had before renounced the
claime and right that he and his successours had unto the kingdome, as princes
of the blood, and nearest unto the crowne.
But forasmuch as there are but three sorts of Commonweales, as wee have before
Six perfect conuersions or changes of Commonweales.
declared: there are also but six perfect conuersions or chaunges thereof, viz. of a Monarchie into a Popular estate, or of a
Popular estate into a Monarchie: and so likewise of a Monarchie into an
Aristocratie, and of an Aristocraty into a Monarchie: and of an Aristocratie
into a Popular estate, and of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie. So also of
euerie estate there be six other imperfect chaunges, or rather alterations;
that is to wit, from the Royall estate unto the Lordlike: from the Lordlike
estate unto the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannycall unto the Royall, or from the
Royall into the Tyrannicall: from the Tyrannicall into the Lordlike, and from
the Lordlike into theVnperfect changes of
Commonweale. Royall. So might one also say of an Aristocratie,
lawfull, lordlike or factious: And of a Popular estate, lawfull, lordlike, and
turbulent. I call it an vnperfect chaunge, as the change of a lawfull Aristocratie into a faction; or of a
Royall estate into a tyranny: for that therein is nothing but the chaunging of
the qualities of good gouernors into euil, the Monarchie yet still remaining in
the one, and the Aristocratie in the other. I speake not here of the chaunging
of a Monarchie into a Duarchie (or soueraigne government of two) for that we
have before declared such a Duarchie to bee comprehended under an Oligarchie
(or government of few) otherwise a man might make also a Truarchie of three
princes, ruling together in one Commonweale (as it chaunced in the Triumuirat
of Marcus Antonius, Augustus, and Lepidus) as also a Tetrarchie (or government of foure) and so other chaunges of Commonweals in number
infinit: whereof there is not onely no rule or precept to be giuen, but are
also of themselves most absurd: For when wee once passe the soueraigne
government of one, wee forthwith enter into the popularitie of moe: which as
the lawyers say, is still contained in the number of two.
But besides these conuersions and chaunges of estates, which wee haue
alreadieA Commonweale sometime holden in suspence.
spoke of, it happeneth some time that the estate of a Commonweale is holden in
suspence and sufferance: as after the death of Romulus,
the people of Rome was a yeare without a Monarchie, a Popular estate, or
Aristocratie: For the hundred Senatours which commaunded one of them after
another, had no soueraigne power, neither commaunded but onely by commission:
true it is, that one might say, That the soueraigntie was againe returned vnto
the people, and the charge of commaund unto the Senators, vntill that by common
consent they had chosen them a king.
And some times againe it chaunceth, that the Royall, Aristocratike, or
PopularAn Anarchie. Commonweale being quite extinguished, there ensueth a
meere Anarchie: when as there is neither
soueraigntie, nor magistrats, nor commissioners, which have power to commaund;
as it chaunced the people of Israel after the death of Iephte, when as their. 27. estate was brought to a meere
Anarchie, and upholden onely by the prouidence and power of God alone, the best
and greatest king: for so it is in holy writ reported. So likewise at Syracusa,
after the death of Dion, and in Florence after that the
nobilitie was thence driuen out by the people: which so continued a certaine
time without government, as a ship without a pilot or gouernour. And so after
the death of Abusahit king of Fez, that kingdome was in
most miserable case eight yeares without a king. As also after diuers murthers
of many the Aegyptian Sultans, the Mammalukes made choyce of Campson Gaurus, hauing lived a certaine time in a pure Anarchie. And
in like manner the Russians, being wearie and
spent with civill warres, for lacke of a soueraigne, of themselves made choice
of three of the German princes to rule over them.
Wherefore when an estate is come unto a meere Anarchie, that is to say, when
noA meere Anarchie the verie ruine of a
Commonweale. man either commaundeth or obeyeth, it is to bee
accounted the verie ruine and destruction, and not the chaunging of a
Commonweale: although that the families and colledges therein continue friends
together. But if the nobilitie or people have power to create the prince, and
he being dead the magistrats shall themselves retaine the soueraigne power and
commaund: yet is it not therefore to bee deemed an Anarchyie, for that the
soueraigntie is still like againe to fall either unto the nobilitie, or to the
people.
The last point is, when as an Estate or Commonweale is together with all the
peopledCommonweales sometime together with the people
vtterly extinguished. quite extinguished: as it hapned unto the
people and seigneurie of Thebes, which Alexander the
Great vtterly rooted out, together with their city, sauing only the house of
Pindarus the Poet: upon the entrance whereof was
written▪ , Burne you
not Pindarus his house. So also the Madianites, the
Amorites, the Iebusites, and Phaerezites, were by the people of Israel vtterly
destroyed: which was not the chaunging of one estate into another, but a meere
ruine of the estate with the people together. But yet it may well be, that some
one member of a Commonweale, or that some one prouince thereof may be
destroyed, or a towne rased, and all the people therein slaine, and yet the
Commonweale stand: as it chaunced to the towne of Arzille, in the kingdome of Fez, which the Englishmen rased, and put
all the people therein to the sword: and to Sebastia, in
the kingdome of Amasia, which Tamarlan the Tattar king
used in like sort: and to the towne of Bizance, a member of the Roman empire,
which after it had bene three yeares besieged by the emperour Seuerus, was in the end taken, sacked, rased, and all the people
slaine, and the scite thereof giuen to the Perinthians, who reedified it, being
afterwards called Constantinople, and now corruptly Stamboll, the choyce seat
of the Turkish emperours.
But this is in Monarchies speciall and proper, that the Monarches one of them
oftentimesA thing unto Monarchies speciall. by
force driuen out by another, do not yet therefore chaunge their estate: as in a
few moneths in our remembrance it happened in the kingdome of Telesin, where
the king Abuchemo was
by the people driuen out of his kingdome, and Abyamein
chosen king in his stead: who forthwith after was also cast out by Hariadenus Barbarussa, who long time raigned not there,
but that Abuchemo returning with the forces of the
emperour Charles the fift chased away Barbarussa, and tooke sharpe revenge upon his dissoiall subiects,
making himselfe the emperours tributarie and vassall: but was againe not long
after driuen out againe by Barbarussa: the state of a
Monarchie yet neuer chaunging, no more than did the Roman empire, for hauing
had foure emperours in one yeare; one of them slaine by another: the estate of
the Monarchie neuerthelesse still remaining as the
prise and reward of the victor.
Sometime also rule and soueraigntie is euen thrust upon men by force and
against their will: as first Claudius, and then Gordianus the elder were euen drawne and enforced to take
upon them the Roman empire. And in our remembrance the inhabitants of Tripolis
in Barbarie, after they were reuolted from Iachia king
of Tunes, chose MucamenAn Heremite against his will chosen and crowned king of
Tripolis. for their king: who being shortly after poysoned, they upon
the sudden enforced a religious Hermit to take upon him the crowne and the
kingdome; wherein he raigned against his will, vntil that Peter of Nauarre, by force tooke the citie of Tripolis, together with
the king, whome he sent prisoner into Sicilie: but was afterwards by the
emperour Charles the fift (to his great contentment)
sent backe againe to live in his solitarie cell in Affricke.Some commonweales euen in their beginning destroyed.
But as of men some perish and die in the most flourishing time of their age,
some others in their youth, some in their childhood, and some before they could
bee well borne; so wee also see some kingdomes and cities to bee cut up and
destroyed before they could strengthen themselves with lawes and armes,
othersome as abortiues to be dead and extinguished before they were borne: as
in our time the kingdome of the Anabaptists at Munster (the metropoliticall
citie of Westphalia) was taken away and subuerted before it was well thought to
have bene borne. Iohn of Leiden, a Sadler, and their
ringleader, who had there by the space of three yeares borne himselfe for a
king, and taken upon him the soueraigntie (though still by the imperiall hoast
besieged) being at last together with the citie taken and publikely
executed.
Now when I speake of the flourishing estate of a Commonweale, my meaning
isWhen the flourishing estate of a commonweale is.
not, that it should be come to the height of most absolute perfection: for that
in these transitorie things there is nothing so perfect, and in mans actions
lesse than in any thing in the world: but I call that the flourishing estate of
a Commonweale, when it hath attained unto the highest degree of the perfection
and beautie thereof; or to say better, then when it is least imperfect, and
farthest from all kind of vice: which cannot be wel knowne, but after the
declination, chaunge, or ruine of euerie Commonweale: As the Romans hauing made
proofe of the Royall, Tyrannicall, Aristocratike, and Popular estates and
Commonweales, yet neuer flourished more than in the Popular estate: neither did
that their Popular estate euer flourish more in armes and lawes, than in the
time of Papirius Cursor:
Illa aetate, qua nulla virtutum feracior fuit, nemo erat, quo magis
innixares Romana, quàm in Papirio Cursore staret, In that time (saith
Liuie) than whichThe florishing
estate of the Romaine commonweale to have bene in the time of Papirius
Cursor none was more plentifull of vertues, there was no man on whome
the Roman Commonweale resting staied, than upon Papirius
Cursor. This was the iudgement of the Romans, of the most flourishing
time of their Commonweale▪ for neuer after was the militarie and domesticall
discipline, the lawes and ordinances better executed, faith better kept,
religion more sincerely embraced, nor vices more seuerely punished▪ So that it
ought not to seeme straunge, if there was neuer than then greater store of most
valiant and worthy men.
Now if any man shal obiect and say, That the Romans were then but poore, as not
yet got out of Italie, neither hauing as
yet extended their armes into Grecia, Asia, and Afrike, no not hauing as then
so much as subdued Italie, neither that the Capitoll did as then glister with
guilded vaults, but was couered with shards: I say againe▪ That ver¦tueThe excellencie and perfection of a commonweale how it is to be
deemed. is not to be measured by the foot of wealth and riches;
neither the excellencie and perfection of a Commonweale, by the largenesse of
the bounds thereof, but by the bounds of vertue it selfe. So that I deeme those
their vntrimmed and rough shades and groues, to have had in them more maiestie
and honor, than had afterwards their pleasant greene
woods, with the trees most artificially planted in order of the cuious Quincunx, and
reckon Rome homely and vntrimmed, more stately and replenished with maiestie,
than when it was neuer so well deckt, and with precious ointments perfumed. For
neuer was the power of the Romans greater than in the time of Traian the emperour, who ioyned unto the Roman empire, not onely
Arabia Felix, but many other great prouinces also beyond the riuer Euphrates,
and with incredible workmanshipThe Romain commonweale at the highest in the time of Traian
the emperor, and yet not then in the greatest perfection. hauing
built a bridge over the Danubie, (the remainders whereof are yet to bee seene)
subdued Decebald, with the kingdom of Dacia, & with
the Roman legions danted the most cruell and barbarous nations that then lived;
when as the citie of Rome it selfe, being head of the whole empire, did so
abound and flow with ambition, couetousnesse, pleasures and delights, as that
it seemed to retaine no more but the shadow of
the auntient vertue thereof. Neither was the Lacedemonian Commonweale then most
flourishing, when as it had by force of armes subdued all Grecia, with some
parts of Asia also: for now they contrarie unto the lawes, had giuen way for
gold and siluer to enter into the citie, now the discipline of Lycurgus seemed to have beene almost extinct, and so
indeed not long after that same Commonweale came headlong tumbling downe. And
thus much concerning the differences of the changes of Commonweales, which it
is needfull for vs to note, the better to conceiue such conuersions and changes
of estates, which none have touched heretofore.
Now as for the causes of the chaunges of Commonweales, although they beeThe causes of the changes of commonweales. right many,
and hard to be all reckoned, yet so it is that they may bee brought into
some certaine number, which may suffice
for▪ our instruction. The most common cause of the chaunge of Commonweales is,
that when the posteritie of princes failing, the great men fall out among
themselves, and so take up armes for the government of the state: or for the
too great pouertie of the greater part of the subiects, and the excessiue
riches of some few: or for the vnequall diuision of estates and honours, or for
ambition and the great desire some have to commaund, or for the revenge of
iniuries, or for the crueltie and oppression of Tyrants, or for the feare that
some have to bee punished for their deserts, or for the chaunging of lawes or
of religion, or for the desire of some at full to enioy their pleasures, or for
the casting out of them which with their excessiue and beastly pleasures
pollute and defile the place of maiestie and
honour. All which causes wee will particularly entreate of, and as need shall
bee, manifest the same with examples.
Wee have now here before declared, That Commonweales had their beginningThe first monarchies to have taken their beginnings from
opression and tyrannie. by violent tyrannies: whereof some haue
afterwards continued in the state of Lordlike Monarchies, and othersome in
Royall Monarchies by right of succession: unto whome diuers chaunges have also
happened for the causes by vs before touched. And that it is so, all the
Histories, both sacred and prophane agree, That the first soueraigntie and
forme of a Commonweale had beginning by the Monarchie of the Assyrians, and
that the first prince called Nimroth (which is to say a
Bitter Ruler) whome
the Histories for the most part call Ninus, by force and
tyranny made himselfe a soueraigne prince; and that after him his successours
continued that Lordlike Monarchie, taking unto themselves the whole and entire
disposition of their subiects and their goods, vntill that Arbaces gouernour of the Medes, draue out Sardanapalus, which was the last king of the Assyrians, and made
himselfe king, without any forme of fashion of election at all. The cause why,
being for that Sardanapalus drowned in vaine pleasures
and delights, was more amongst women than hee was amongst men: a thing which
men of courage and valour take most impatiently, to see themselves subiect to such an one, as hath nothing of a man more than the
figure onely. We see also, that the princes of
the Medes descended from Artabazus, the kings of Persia,
of Aegypt, of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Sicionians,
the Athenians, the Celtes, and Lacedemonians, are all come by right of
succession unto their kingdomes and principalities, for most part founded by
force and violence; but afterward by iustice and good lawes polished, vntill
that their posteritieThe beginning of Aristocraties.
failed (which oftentimes drew after it the chaunging of the estate) or that the
princes abusing their power, and euill entreating their subiects, were
themselves driuen out or slaine: and the subiects fearing againe to fall into a
Tyrannicall government, if they should giue the soueraigntie to one alone, or
not willing to endure the commaund of one of their owne companions, founded
amongst them the Aristocraticall estates, little regarding the common people: at which time if there were any of the poorer
or popular sort, which would also have had part in the seigneurie or
government, they sung unto them the fables of the Hares, which would commaund
together with theThe greatest honors and offices euen in
Popular estates still bestowed upon the nobilitie and richer sort of the
people. Lions: Or if it were that the Monarchie chaunged into a
Popular estate, yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the nobilitie or richer sort
still carried away all the great offices and places of state: as for example,
Solon hauing founded the Popular estate in Athens,
yet would not that the poore and common sort of the people should have part in
the estates. Neither the Romans hauing chased out their kings (albeit that they
had established a Popular estate) yet so it was, that the honorable offices and
preferments were still reserued unto the nobilitie onely. Wee also read, that
the first tyrants beeing driuen out, the men
at armes and gentlemen were indeed alwaies chosen unto the honourable places of
estate, and the vulgar people still excluded: vntill that Aristides and Pericles in Athens, and Canuleius and the other Tribunes in Rome, first opened
the gate of honourable offices and preferments unto all the people in generall.
But afterwardsA monarchie of all estates most sure and
durable. when as it was by long experience found out, That Monarchies
were more sure, more profitable, and more durable also, than were the Popular
estates, or Aristocraties; and amongst the Monarchies, them also which were
founded in the succession of the next heires male: these successiue Monarchies
were generally receiued almost throughout all the world, and the Popular and
Aristocratike estates driuen out. Yea the people sometime fearing the death of
their princes, without heires male, persuaded them whilest they yet live, to make choice of their successours: as
diuers of the emperours of Rome did, and as they yet at this present time doe
in many places of Affrike: or else the right of the election of the prince
remaineth in the people, the prince beeing dead without heires: yea and in some
places the people hauing power for the election of their prince, albeit that
their princes have heires male also: as in the kingdomes of Polonia, Bohemia,
Hungarie, Denmarke, Sweden, and Norway, where they have oft times thrust their
kings out of their kingdomes▪ for staining the maiestie of their government
with tyrannie, licentious liuing, or cowardise. So sometimes also the people
hauing had a cruell tyrant, chose for him a iust and courteous prince: or
hauing had an idle, an effeminat, or contemplatiue prince, make choyce of some
valiant captaine: as did the Romans, who after
the death of Numa Pompilius (to rule their religion
together with their policie) made choice of Tullus
Hostilius, a good captaine. Yea mostunto most cruell
tirants oftentimes succede most iust and upright princes. commonly it
chaunceth, that unto the greatest and most cruell tyrants succeeded the most
iust and upright princes, as men ashamed to follow or imitat the doings of them
whose ends they abhorre; or els upon certaine conditions, hauing taken the
soueraigntie uppon them, and so hauing their lesson by writing, have also their
power therein somewhat diminished. So after the vnfortunat end of Marcus Antonius, a man altogether giuen to riot and
voluptuous pleasure, succeeded the great Augustus, a
most wise & sober prince. So after the miserable
death of Nero a most cruell tyrant, succeeded Galba, an emperor most gratious: So after the strange
euent of the most drunken and licencious Vitellus,
succeeded Vespatian the most continent: And unto the
monster of naturePrinces natures much altered by
soueraigntie.Heliogabalus slaine and drawne in the same faction that
was Vitellus, succeeded Alexander
Seuerus the most vertuous: a thing most strange, considering that he
was his cosin germaine, and together with him nourished and brought up: and
that the power to commaund in soueraigntie hath this mischiefe in it, that
often times it maketh of a good man, an euill; of an humble man a proud; of a
mercifull man a tyrant; of a wise man a foole; and of a valiant man a coward.
For what could be more notable then the first five yeares of Nero his raigne? what more excellent then his youth? or who for
modestie was to be compared in the beginning to Tiberius? who so behaued himselfe (as
saith Suetonius) as if he had almost beene a priuat man:
and being of one called Lord, commaunded him, that he should no more by way of
reproach so call him: and against slaunderous and infamous libels made of him,
oft times said no more, but that in a free citie, men ought also to have their
tongues free: but speaking unto the Senat: I have had this good fortune (said
he) to have you for my gratious Masters, and so long as I live I will
acknowledge you for my good Lords: for a good prince (said he) must be the
slaue not onely of the Senat, but also of all the citisens in generall, and
often times of every one of them in particular. Neither did he any thing in the
beginning of his raigne, no not euen in the least things, without the aduise of
the Senat; and yet afterwards hauing well tasted of the power of soueraigntie,
hee became the most detestable tyrant that
euer was for crueltie and voluptuous pleasures. So we read also that Herod the elder raigned six yeares as a good and iust
king (as saith Philo) and one and thirtie yeares as a
most cruell tyrant, who caused seauentie Senators of the the house of Dauid to be all slaine, which was indeed the whole bodie
of the Senate except Semneas, and afterward put to death
his wife a most noble gentlewoman, with three of his owne children: and now
lying at the point of death, gaue commaundement to kill all the best and chiefe
of the Nobilitie of the whole land, to the intent thatThe
fairest beginnings of princes raignes proue not alwaies the best.
great mourning might thereby be after his death. Which examples I have amongst
many other marked, whose beginnings were too faire to continue long: the reason
whereof may well be, for that he which at the first seemeth to be so notable
wise and worthie, must needs dissemble much:
wherein Tiberius the emperour is said to have excelled
all others. Whereas of them which have so curiously learned the art of false
semblant and dissimulation, and have their countenances at commaund, nothing
that good is, true, or honest, is to be expected; but all things vaine, salse,
and fained, ful of hipocrisie and craft: Whereas he which at the first
discouereth his imperfections (albeit that he be not therein wise) yet can he
not possibly be a man exceedingly mischieuous or naught: yea of such an one it
is to be hoped, that he may at length proue an upright and iust man: such an
one as Iohn the French king is reputed to have bene, who
was of such a stomacke, as that he could by no meanes endure to looke art uppon him Why there be so fewe vertuous princes? whome he hated
or liked not of: And yet for all that we read not of
thing by him either dishonourable or wickedly done. Neither ought it unto any
man to seeme straunge, if there have bene but few princes for their vertues
famous: for if every where there be such a scarcitie of good and valiant men,
and that kings are not chosen out of the number of such: and that they to whome
their kingdomes come by succession, commonly have their education polluted with
so many vices, as that hard it is to say which of them is the greatest: it is
almost a myracle if one of them shall bee able to get out of such a gulfe of
all maner of vices. Yet if any such there shall be, as shall for his vertues
become famous, he as a toarch upon an high place or watch tower, filleth al things with the light and brightnesse of himselfe:
neither is onely whilest he yet liveth Euil princes euen for their fathers vertues oftentimes of
their subiects beloued. highly commended: but being dead, leaueth
unto his children and posteritie also, the most fragrant and sweet smelles of
his vertue and worth, who though they shall right wickedly live, yet are they
the rather borne with, for their fathers vertues sake. Cambyses did many most cruell and shamefull things, yet was hee
alwaies both loued and honoured of his subiects, and redoubted of his enemies,
and all for the great loue they bore unto his father Cyrus, which was so well grauen in the harts of the people (as saith
Plutarch) that they loued euen all such as had a
great and rising nose, such an one as Cyrus had. And the
emperour Commodus, albeit that he were a most cruell
tyrant, and had in one day commaunded the great Prouost of Rome to kill all the
beholders of the playes in the Theatre (which were not fewer than threescore
thousand persons) for that they could not
forbeare laughing, to see him in stead of an emperour, so cunningly to play the
Fencer, as if he had bene one inded; yet was hee neuerthelesse of the people
alwaies beloued, for the loue they bare unto the remembrance of Marcus Aurelius his father.A new
prince without great vertues hardly to maintaine his estate.
Wherefore we see kingdomes which come by succession, seldome times to suffer
chaunge or innouation, albeit that a wicked sonne succeed a good father: for
that his kingdome is like unto a great tree which hath taken as deepe root as
it spreadeth branches: whereas he which commeth but newly unto a kingdome
commended nor strengthened with no vertue or power of his auncestours, is
indeed like unto an high tree: which for that it is not well rooted, is with
the wind and tempest easily ouerthrowne. For
which cause a tyrant the sonne of a tyrant, must needs raigne in great daunger,
except he be with great wealth and the power of his neighbor princes
strengthened, or by long discent of his auncestours have obtained his kingdome.
Neither can the verues of a new prince deliver his vngracious sonne from the
conspiracies of his subiects: as it happened unto Hierome a tyrant of Sicilie, who succeeded to Hiero his grandfather, a new prince in his kingdome, which he had by
no right or claime gained, but was yet for his manifold and great vertues, of a
priuat man, thought right worthy of that so great a kingdome, which hee so held
almost sixtie yeares, without force or garrison, to the great contentment of
all men; beloued not of his owne subiects onely, but of all his neighbour
princes also, and especially of the people of Rome, to whome he was most deere: whose nephew, that he might seeme to
excell his grandfather in magnificence and state, thought it better for the
assurance of his estate, to strengthen himselfe with strong garrisons of men,
and so afterwards wholly giuing himselfe over unto riot and excesse, bare
himselfe proudly towards all men, and so drew all mens hatred upon him: and as
for the counsel, the most assured foundation of his grandfathers kingdome, he
altogether set it at naught: & to heape up his mishaps, without any cause
why, renounced the amitie and alliance of the Romans. And so hauing lost both
all the ornaments of his honour, and the stayes of his assurance, was by the
conspiracie of his subiects himselfe with all his friends and kinsfolkes most
miserably slaine, and his Monarchie forthwith chaunged into a Popular estate.
The like end almost had Dionysius the younger, another king of the same countrey
also, and sonne to Dionysius the elder, who by fraud
inuaded the estate, which he of long time held with strong garrisons and
fortresses, without the stay or alliance of any other forren prince: but he
once dead, and this his sonne a man vnskilfull of the government, and
altogether giuen to riot, succeeding in his place, and banishing his vncle Dion, and confiscating his goods, he was by the same Dion, returning out of exile againe into his owne
countrey, with an armie thrust out of his kingdome, and all the fortresses of
his tyrannie ouerthrowne: which Dion not long after
being also slaine, the Monarchie was againe chaunged into a Popular estate. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, new princes
without great vertues hardly to maintaine
their estate: which although it be a thing right, manifest, yet appeareth it
more plainely by the example of Herod the elder, upon
whome Caesar for the valour of Antipater his father, by a decree of the Senat bestowed the kingdome
of the Iewes: who although he were in great favour with Marcus Antonius, and Octauianus Augustus, yet
for the better assurance of his kingdome, built most strong castles, and to
gaine the good will of his subiects, bestowed great masses of money for reliefe
of the poorer sort, and eased the people of a third part of their woonted
tributes: but knowing how little he had for all that gained, he tooke also an
oath of alleagiance of his subiects, seeking to gaine them of the better sort
with extraordinarie favours and good turnes: and yet for all that he could do,
he was so hated of his subiects, that beeing become sickly, the people much reioyced thereat: which he
perceiuing, it had almost driuen him into a phrensie. But he being dead, the
Iewes sent fiftie ambassadors to Rome, that so eased of that regall government,
they might become subiects unto the Romans, and so happily had obtained to haue
bene, had not Herod his sonne bene then in great favour
with Augustus the emperour, unto whome the elder Herod had before by hisThat is nine
hundred Thousand crownes. will left fifteene hundred talents of gold.
Howbeit yet, that all the successours and posteritie of Herod, which were in number many, in lesse than threescore yeares, all
in poore estate perished, as well for that he being but a new man, was not
descended of royall race: as for that his prowesse and valour fayled in his
successours.
But these conuersions and chaungings of kingdomes and Commonweales chance
Couetousnesse, crueltie, and the voluptuous lives of
princes, oftentimes the causes of the change or ruine of their
estates. so much the rather, if the tyrant be too great an exactor,
too cruell, or too much giuen to his voluptuous and vnlawfull pleasures, or be
delighted in all these together: as was Nero, Tiberius,
and Caligula: and yet of these, wantonnesse and
whoredome hath ruinated moe princes than all the other causes: and so is it
also much more daungerous unto a prince for his estate than crueltie: for
crueltie keepeth men in feare and awe, & bringeth a terrour upon the
subiects; whereas wantonnesse bringeth after it an hate and contempt also of
the tyrant; forasmuch as euerie man deemeth the effeminat man to be also faint
hearted, and farre vnworthie to commaund a whole people, which hathVoluptuousnesse more daungerous unto a prince than
crueltie. not power over himselfe. So we see that Sardanapalus king of Assyria, Canades king of
Persia, Dionysius the younger, and Hierosme, kings of Sicilie, Heliogabalus,
Amyntas,Chideric, Periander, Pisistratus, Tarquin, Aristocrates
king of the Messenians, Timocrates king of Cyrene, Andronicus emperour of Constantinoble, Rhoderike king of Spaine, Appius Claudius, Galeace
Sfortia, Alexander Medices, the Cardinall Petruce Tyrant of Sienne, Lugrac and Megal,
kings of Scots, all for wantonnesse to have lost their estates, and most of
them slaine upon the fact doing. Neither is it long since Delmendin and
Delmedin, two of the greatest cities of Affrike, were by rebellion dismembred
from the kingdome of Fez, and brought under the obeysance of the Portugals, for
a maiden by force taken from her husband to whome she was betrothed, by the
gouernour, who was therefore afterwards slaine: as was also Ahusahid king of Fez himselfe with his six children all massacred by a
secretarie of his, for hauing abused his wife. Neither for any other cause did the people of Constantine (a sea towne in
Affrike) chose rather to suffer the commaund of Delcaid
a Christian renegat, than to obey the king of Tunes his sonne. And why in our
time was Muleasses thrust out of his kingdome, and so
lost his estate, but for intemperance? and yet neuerthelesse was so drowned in
delights, as that returning out of Germanie, without hope that the emperour Charles the fift (in whom his greatest trust was) would
afford him any aid, and banished as he was out of his kingdom, yet spent he an
hundred crowns upon the dressing of one peacock, as Paulus
Iouius reporteth: and to the end he might better conceiue the pleasure
of musick, stil couered his eyes, as hauing learned a
double pleasure, not to bee so well perceiued by two sences at once: yet such was the iudgement of God uppon him,
as that by the commaundement of his sonnes he had his eyes put out with an hot
barre of Iron, by little and little drying up the humors of them, and depriued
of his kingdome also.Extreme crueltie oftentimes cause of
the change of the princes estate
But for the crueltie of a prince, the estate easily chaungeth not, if he be not
more cruell than the wild beasts themselves, such as were Phaleris, Alexander Phereus, Nero, Vitellius, Dometian, Commodus,
Caracalla, Maximinus, Ecelinus of Padua, and Iohn
Maria of Millan, who were all slaine, or driuen out of their dominions,
and their Tyrannical estates for the most part chaunged into estates Popular.
Which befell them not so much for the crueltie by them used against the common
sort of people (wherof no reckoning nor account is made in a Tyrannicall
estate) as for crueltie committed in the
person of the great and best friended, who are alwayes of tyrants to bee
feared: unto whome euen contumely and disgrace is oftentimes more grieuous than
crueltie it self: wherof we have a domesticall example of that Bodile, who for that he was by the commaundement of Childeric king of Fraunce whipped, slew not onely the
king, but the queene also, being then great with child. So was also the
emperour Iustinus the third slaine by Atelia generall of his armie, whose sonne he had slaine, and in
despight prostituted his wife unto his seruants. And Archetaus king of Macedon, was likewise slaine by him whome he had put
into the hands of Euripides the poet, to be whipt: as
was his nephew also king of Macedon, slaine by him whome hee had without
punishment suffered to be abused against nature by Antipater, and scorned him crauing of him revenge.
The Aristocratike estate also of them of Mitylen, was chaunged into a Popular,
for that it chaunced certaine gentlemen as they went along the streets with
their bastanadoes, in sport to strike all such of the common people as they
met: Whereupon one Megacles tooke occasion to stirre up
the comminaltie to fall upon the nobilitie, and so to kill them. And not to
seeke for examples farther, Henry, of late king of
Sweden (but now a prisoner) was also thrust out of his kingdome, for that he
not onely disdainfully reiected the request of a certaine gentleman his
subiect, but also with his owne hand most cruelly stabbed him with his dagger:
wherwith the nobilitie and people moued, tooke him prisoner, and enforcing him
to resigne his kingdome, gaue it to his younger brother, who now raigneth. And almost alwaies the tyrants-quellers haue
receiuedRewards still giuen unto the killers of
tyrants▪ either the estate or goods of the tyrants by them slaine, or
the greatest honours and preferments in the state, as rewards due to their
deserts. So both the one and the other Brutus, obtained
the greatest estates in Rome; the one of them for hauing driuen out the proud
king Tarquin, and the other for hauing slayne Caesar. And Arbaces gouernour of
the Medes hauing brought Sardanapalus king of Assyria to
such extremitie, as that he was glad to burne himselfe alive together with his
concubines and treasures, for reward enioyed his kingdome. So Lewes of Gonzaga hauing slaine Bonacolse,
tyrant of Mantua, was by the subiects chosen their prince, his posteritie euer
since by the space of about two hundred and fiftie yeares hauing enioyed that
estate. And the Venetians hauing slaine the
tyrant Eceline, obtained the seigneurie of Padua.
Some others there be, which seeke the tyrants death, and so the chaunge of
theSome for desire of revenge▪ and some for the desire of
honor and the deliverance of their countrie, to have procured the tyrants
deat and so the changing of the estate▪
estate; hauing nothing before their eyes but the desire of revenge, and that
without either the feare of God, the regard of their countrey, or loue of their
neerest and deerest friends: as he which to be revenged of king Roderike, who had rauished his wife, drew the Mahometan
Moores into Spaine, who draue out the king, and there vsing an hundred thousand
cruelties, possessed the kingdome of Spayne, which they held by the space of
seuen hundred yeares after. And some others there bee also, who neither for hope of bearing of rule, of preferment; or of wealth:
neither for revenge of wrongs, nor for any
other priuat iniuries receiued, are yet induced to the killing of a tyrant,
without hope to be able by any means to escape therefore a most sharpe and
cruell death, respecting onely the deliverance of their countrey, and the
honour of the fact: such as were Harmodius; and Aristogiton in Athens, and those which slew Domitian and Caligula the cruell
emperours. A thing which most commonly happeneth in the Popular estates,
wherein the new tyrants by force or fraud hauing oppressed the libertie of the
people, are neuer assured of themselves, or of their estate, without great and
strong garrisons about them. So we see Alexander
Medices, nephew to pope Clement the seuenth,
& sonne in law to the emperour Charles the fift, by
whose forces and power hee obtained the soueraigntie of Florence, and draue out
them also that were of greatest power and
courage in the state, to have compassed himselfe with great and strong
garrisons, and alwaies to have gone armed, in such sort as that it seemed
almost impossible to find the meanes to come neere him, and yet for all that to
have bene slaine by the conspiracie of Laurence Medices,
not onely his neere kinsman, but his most familiar and domesticall friend also▪
when as the said Laurence had promised to prostitute
unto him his owne sister; that so he might the better deliver the man disarmed
(euen as he was kissing and embrasing his sister, who me he thought to haue
rauished) to the murtherer to be slaine▪ which was so couertly done, as that
the souldiours of his guard, whome he kept for the saftie of his person, making
merrie in a dining chamber fast by, perceiued nothing of the murther of their
prince. And yet in so doing, the said Laurence neither
delivered his countrey from tyrannny
(whereinto it by and by after againe fell) neither himselfe from daunger, being
at length by a murtherous fellow himselfe also slaine at Venice. And Cosmu Medices, who after the
death of Alexander, by the helpe of the garrison
souldiours, the supportation of his friends, and fauor of the pope, obtained
the same government▪ albeit that he was reported to have bene one of the wisest
princes of his age, or of long time before him, and a right great justicier,
euen by the report of his enemies themselves, and had diuers strong castles
euen in the citie it selfe: yet neuerthelesse was he an hundred times in
daunger of his person, by the conspiracies of his subiects against him, being
not able to endure a maister over them, albeit that hee were both iust and
vertuous. And he which now raigneth, not long since missed not much to have bene laine by the
conspiracie of Puccinus, neither can bee safe without a
strong garrison, so long as the citisens his subiects shall either remember or
hope for the rewards of their valour and libertie. And for this cause Dionysius the elder of Syracusa, being chosen generall,
and hauing made himselfe maister of all, and chaunged the Popular estate into a
Monarchie, had alwaies forty thousand souldiors in readinesse at his call to
set forward, beside a great garrison still attendant about his person, and
diuers strong holds, onely to keepe the people of Syracusa with a part of
Sicilia in subiection. And yet neuerthelesse was he no tyrant, as we call a
tyrant, that is to say, a cruell, vitious, and naughtie man: neither was he
euer amorous of other mens wiues, but to the contrarie sharply reproued his
sonne (as saith Plutarch) for hauing taken away one
of his subiects daughters, saying, That he
should neuer have one to succeed him in his estate, if he used such fashions:
as indeed it fell out with him, being shortly after his death chased out of his
kingdome.
Now if any man shall obiect and say unto mee, That force and feare are two
euillForce and feare, things necessarie for a new prince,
for the maintenance of his state. masters
for the maintaining of an estate: true it is, and yet needfull for a new prince
to vse, who by force changeth a Popular estate into a Monarchie, a thing
altogether contrarie unto a Monarchy Royall; which the lesse guard it hath, the
surer it is: & therefore the wise king Numa put from
him the three hundred archers which Romulus his predecessour had taken unto him for his guard, saying,
That hee would not distrust a people which had
willingly and of themselves put their trust in him: neither yet commaund ouer
them which should distrust him. But Seruius hauing of a
slaue made himselfe a king, beset himselfe with strong guards, and that wisely,
as beeing forsaken of the Senators, who tooke his seruile government in great
euill part: For as iust, pleasing, & gracious, as he was, yet had it bene a
thing impossible for him without guards, garrisons, and fortresses, long to
have maintained himselfe and his so new an estate, but that he should haue
fallen into the hands of his enemies. There was neuer a more gratious,
magnificent, noble, couragious, or courteous prince then Caesar; and yet notwithstanding, all these his great vertues were not
able to preserue him, but that he was by his sonne Brutus and other the conspirators with incredible consent and
fidelitie combyned against him, in the middest
of the Senat most cruelly slaine: who being before warned to take unto him a
guard for the safetie of his person, frankly answered▪ that he had rather to
die once for all, than still to languish in feare: wherein he did not wisely so
to refuse a guard, hauing pardoned his greatest enemies (whom he suffered still
to live) and desiring to chaunge into a Monarchie the free estate of the most
warlike people that euer was in the world. Which his course Augustus his successour followed not, but first caused to be put to
death all the conspiratours against Caesar, (not so much
in revenge of the death of his vncle Caesar, as he
pretended, as so to prouideThe notable wisdome of Augustus in his government, for the establishing of
his estate. for his owne safetie) after that hee still guarded with a
strong guard about him, easely kept himselfe from the violence of his enemies:
And albeit that hauing quite discomfited and
ouerthrowne Sextus Pompeius, and Lepidus, and ouercome Marcus Anthonius in
battell at Actium, (who afterwards also slew himselfe) and the other citisens
of greatest force and courage, either in battell slaine or otherwise taken out
of the way; he might have seemed to have beene able to have raigned in great
securitie: yet neuerthelesse hee dispersed fortie legions into the prouinces,
placed three legions in Italie, and that not farre from the citie, kept a
strong guard about him for the safetie of his person: forbid the Senators
without leaue to depart out of Italie, and committed the government of his
legions not unto any the great Lords, but to gentlemen onely, or some of the
meanest of the nobilitie. As for the creating of the officers of the citie, he
divided it betwixt himselfe and the people; yet so as that of such as stood
for them, he would bring some of them by
the hand unto the people, and so recommending unto their choice them whom he
wished to have preferred unto the offices and honors: he tooke from the people
their free choice, and had the magistrats still beholden and bound unto him.
Iustice he daily administred, without intermission, receiuing and answering
every mans request, hauing alwaies before him the records of the publike
reuenues of his forces, and of the prouinces, so that he alone seemed to
discharge all the dueties of all the officers. Whereby it euidently appeareth
him to have beene a sole Monarque, and soueraigne Prince, whatsoeuer faire
title of a Tribune of the people, or of a Prince, was by one or other giuen
unto him. That is also reported to have beene of him verie popularly done, in
that he commaunded debts due to the
Commonweale, which were growne by the civill warres, and the records of the
debters to be torne and burnt. And yet this so mightie a Prince, endued with so
great vertue & wisedome hardly escaped the hands of the wicked conspirators
against him, albeit that the most desperat and daungerous sort of them were now
long before dead. But after that the subiects hauing by little and little made
proofe of his justice and wisedome, tasted of the sweetnes of long peace and
assured tranquillitie, in steed of cruell and bloodie civill warres,, and that
they had to doe, rather with a father than with a lord (as saith Seneca) and so began to loue and reuerence him: he againe
on his part discharged his guard, going as a priuat
man sometimes with one man, and sometimes with
an other without any other companie; and so laide the foundation of that great
Monarchie, with the most happie successe that euer Prince did.
Now all Monarchies newly established by the change of an Aristocratie, or
PopularHow Aristocraties or Popular estates are changed
into Monarchies. estate, have as it were taken their beginning, after
that some one of the magistrats, captaines, or gouernours, hauing the power of
the state in his hand, hath of a companion made himselfe Lord and soueraigne,
or else that some straunger hath subdued them, or that those states haue
willingly submitted themselves unto the lawes & commandements of some other
man. As for the first point, and the most ordinarie change of these estates we
have examples enowe. For so Pisistratus, when he had got
the chiefe office in the commonweale, inuaded the libertie of the people: as
did also Cypselus at Corinth, Thrasybulus,
Gelo, Dionysius, Hiero, Agathocles at Syracusa, Panaetius, and Icetes at Leonce, Phalaris at Agrigentum, Phidon at
Argos, Periander at Ambrace, Archelaus in Cadie, Euagoras in Cyprus, Polycrates in Samos, Anaxilaus at Rhegium, Nicocles at
Sicyon, Alexander at Pheree, Mamercus at Catana, the Decemuiri at Rome, and there after them Sylla and Caesar: the Scaligers at Verona, the Bentinoli
at Bolonia, the Manfreds at Fauentia, the Malatestes at Atiminum, the Baleones at Perusium, the Vitelles at Tifernas,
the Sforces at Millan, and diuers others of like sort,
who of gouernors of cities and armies have taken upon them the soueraigntie.
For in matters of estate it may be holden for an vndoubted maxime, that he
isMaster of the forces, Master of the Estate.
master of the estate, which is master of the forces. Wherefore in well ordered
Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, the
greatest honours are graunted without power of commaund, and the greatest
powers to commaund are not graunted without a companion therein: or if it be
dangerous to diuide the power of commaund toOrders necessary
for the maintenance of Aristocratique and popular commonweale. many,
as in matters of warre it is; then the power so graunted unto the magistrat or
Generall ought to be but short. And therefore the Romans made chiefe
commaunders their two Consuls: and the Carthaginensians their two Suffets, who
every other day commaunded by turnes: For albeit that the dissention which is
commonly betwixt them which are in power equall, is sometimes an hinderance for
the execution of good and profitable things: yet so it is that such a
commonweale so gouerned is not so subiect to be turned into a Monarchie, as it
were if it had but one chiefe and soueraigne
magistrat: as the great Archon at Athens, the Prytani with the Rhodians, the yearely Generall with the Achaeans and the Aetolians, and the Duke at Genes. And for the same cause the Dictatorship in
Rome continued no longer then the charge required, which neuer passed six
monethes at the longest; yea and sometime lasted but one day; which time
expired, the power to commaund ceased: and if so be that the Dictator did for
any longer time retaine his forces, he might therefore be accused of treason.
And in Thebes, so long as it was a Popular estate, the law was that the
Generall of the armie should be put to death, if he retained the forces aboue a
day after the appointed time: which was the cause that the great capitaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas were
condemned to death, for hauing retained their forces foure monethes after
the time, howbeit that they were by
necessitie constrayned so to doe, neither could without the great danger of the
State have otherwise done. And so for the same reason almost all the
Magistracies are annuall, in Aristocratique and Popular Commonweales. Howbeit
that in Venice the six Councelours for the estate which are assistant unto the
Duke, continue but two monethes in their charge: and he that had the keeping of
the principall fortresse of Athens, had the keyes thereof but for one day
onely: no more then hath the captaine of the castle of Rhaguse, who chosen by
lot, hath the charge but for a day, and is led into the castle hoodwinkt. It
behoueth also in popular & Aristocraticall
Commonweales so much as possible is, to beware that the lawes To chaunge the lawes and ordinances concerning the
magistrats time, or to prorogue his charge, a thing most dangerous in an
Aristocratique or Popular Commonweale. and ordinances concerning the
Magistrats time be not changed, neither their charge prorogued, if the
necessity be not verie great: as the Romans did to Camillus, to whom the Dictatorship was prorogued for six monthes,
which had neuer to any other person beene graunted. And namely by the law
Sempronia it was straitly forbidden that the governments of Prouinces should be
graunted unto any for longer time than five yeares: which law had it beene
kept, Caesar had neuer inuaded the estate as he did,
hauing the government of the Gaules by the consent of Pompeius and Crassus graunted for five yeares
more than the law allowed of; whereunto in that point was derogated in favour
of him. Which was a notable ouersight, considering that they had to doe with
the most ambitious man that euer was; who so well grounded his power to
continue, that he gaue at one time unto Paulus the Consull nine hundred thousandWonderfull bribes giuen by Caesar in
aspiring to the estate. crownes, to the intent that he should not
oppose himselfe against his enterpises; and unto the Tribune Curio, fifteene hundred thousand crownes to take his part. The people
of Rome moreover allowing him pay for ten legions of souldiers so long as the
warres in Fraunce should last. Which so great a power was ioyned with the
hardiest hart that then lived, and the most valiant that euer was, and
discended of so noble an house, as that in an oration unto the people he
doubted not to say, That by the fathers side he was discended from the gods,
and by the mothers side from kings; and yet withall so modest, as that his
great enemie Cato said, That there was neuer so modest a
tyrant as he, and withall so vigilant: as that Cicero an
other great enemie of his, (who conspired his
death) calleth him in one of his Epistles, The monster of wisdome &
incredible diligence: and moreover so magnificall and popular as euer any was▪
sparing for no cost for the setting forth of playes, iusts, tournies, feastes,
largesses, & other publike delights: In which doing he upon the publike
charge woon the harts of the common people, and gained the honour of a most
gratious and charitable man towards the poore. And yet for all that hauing by
this meanes gained the soueraigntie, he sought for nothing more than by all
meanes to clip and cut off the wealth & power of the people, and to take
from them their priuileges: for of three hundred and twentie thousand citisens
which still lived of the publique corne which they receiued, he retained but an
hundred and fiftie thousand, and sent fourescore thousand over the sea
into diuers Colonies a farre off: and
beside that tooke away most part of their fraternities, corporations, and
colleges. In briefe it hath alwaies beene seene in all changesAristocratique and Popular Commonweals still ruinated by the
subiects, hauing too much power committed unto them. of
Aristocratique and popular Commonweales, them to have beene still ruinated,
which have at any time giuen too much power unto the subiects whereby to exalt
themselves: Which thing Iulian the Apostatament by that
his embleanie or deuise of an Eagle shot thorow with arrowes fethered with his
owne feathers, being before pluckt from her. For so do the soueraigne gouernors
and magistrats of those estates, especially when too great power is giuen to
him which is of too ambitious and hautie a mind. And thus much concerning the
chaunge of a Popular or Aristocraticall estate
into a Monarchie, wherein one of the subiects maketh himselfe Lord thereof.
But the chaunge of a Popular estate into an Aristocratie chanceth commonly
uponThe mutuall chaunge of a popular estate into an
Aristocratie, and of an Aristocratie into a Popular estate. the losse
of some great battell, or other notable detriment of the state, receiued from
the enemie: as to the contrarie the Popular power then most encreaseth when it
returneth from the warres with some great victorie over their enemies. Of which
manner of chaunges as there are many examples, so is there none more fit than
those of the Athenians and Syracusians, two Commonweales of the selfe same
time; when as the Athenians by the default of Niceas
their generall, vanquished by the Syracusians and so discomfited, forthwith
chaunged their Popular estate into an Aristocratie of foure hundred men, who yet bare themselves for five thousand by the
deceit of Pisander: so
that the people complayning themselves to be so spoiled of the soueraigntie,
and comming to giue voice in the councell, was thence repulsed & driuen
backe by the forces which the foure hundred had in their power, wherwith they
slew diuers of the people and discouraged the rest: at which verie time the
Syracusians proud of their victorie (to the contrarie) chaunged their
Aristocratie into a Popular estate. And within a while after the Athenians
hauing heard news of the great victorie of Alcibiades
against the Lacedemonians, tooke up armes against the foure hundred of the
nobilitie, whom they by the leading of Thrasybulus
thrust out or slew, and so againe chaunged the Aristocratie into a Popular
estate. And in like manner the Thebans ouercome by the Enophites, chaunged
their Popular estate into an Aristocratie. And albeit that the Romans hauing lost two great battels unto Pirrhus changed not their popular estate, yet so it was that indeed it
was then a faire Aristocratie of three hundred Senators which gouerned the
estate, and but in appearance and show a Democratie, or a Popular estate, the
people being neuer than then more calme and tractable. But so soone as the
Romans had gained the estate of Tarentum, the people forthwith began to set up
their hornes, demaunding to have part in the lands which the nobilitie had of
long time possessed. And yet neuerthelesse afterwards, when as Hannibal had brought the Roman estate into great
extremitie, the people became as humble as was possible: but after that the
Carthaginensians were ouercome, king Perseus
ouerthrowne, Antiochus put to flight, the kingdome of
Macedonia and Asia subuerted▪ then immediatly
againe followed the sturres for the diuision of lands, and the turbulent
seditions of the Gracchies, wherewith the Tribunes armed
the people in most insolent manner, insulting upon the nobilitie. In like
manner the Florentines ouerthrew their Oligarchie, established by Pope Clement the seuenth, restoring the people againe vnto
their wonted libertie: for so soone as newes was brought unto Florence, That
Rome was by the imperials sackt, and the Pope with the rest of the Cardinals
and Bishops besieged▪ it is not to be beleeued, with what pride the headstrong
people began to rage against them of the house of Medices; with what urie they cast downe
their statues, defaced their armes, and reuersed all their decrees and lawes.
The Popular estates of the Swissers indeed first tooke their beginning from the
pride and insolencie of the gouernours of
those places, but yet had their greatest encreasings after the victorie of
Sempach, about the yeare 1377, at which time the nobilitie being with a great
slaughter ouerthrowne by the rural people, there was no more talking of
Aristocraties, nor of acknowledging of the soueraigntie of the empire ouer
them, in what sort soeuer. But the chiefe cause of these conuersions and
chaunges of these estates, is the rash vnstaidnesse and vnconstancie of the
people, without discourse or iudgement moued with euerie wind; which as it is
with a little losse discouraged, so is it also after any victorie intollerable;
neither hath it any more deadly or dangerous enemie, than too much felicitie
and prosperous successe of the affaires thereof; nor a wiser maister than
aduersitie and distresse, wherewith it daunted and discouraged, learneth to
rest upon the councell of the wiser sort,
leauing the helme of the estate for them to gouerne, which they themselves in
such tempestuous times know not how to hold. Whereby it is to bee perceiued,
nothingNothing more profitable for the preseruation of a
Popular estate than warres. to be more profitable for the
preseruation of a Popular estate, than to have warres, and to make enemies for
it if otherwise it have none. Which was the principall reason that moued Scipio the yonger so much as in him lay, to hinder the
rasing of the famous citie of Carthage, wisely foreseeing, that the people of
Rome being altogether martiall and warlike, if it had no enemies abroad would
at length be enforced to make war upon it selfe. For which cause also Onomadesme generall of the Commonweale of Chio, hauing appeased the civill warres, and driuen out the
most mutinous, would by no meanes banish the
the rest, albeit that he was earnestly persuaded so to doe, saying That so it
would be daungerous, least (that hauing cast ōut all the enemies) they should
fall together by the eares with their friends. Howbeit that this reason which
hath place for the straunge and forren enemies, is not yet to bee receiued for
the maintaining of enemies at home amongst the citisens themselves: and yet in
this case hee did but that which best beseemed him, and was also most
expedient. For he that will have the upper hand in civill warre, if he shall
banish all them that take part with the faction contrarie to his owne, he shall
then have no hostages at all left, if the banished shall prepare new warres
against him: but hauing slaine the most outragious and daungerous, and banished
the most mutinous, he ought still to retaine the remnant; for otherwise hee is
to feare least all the exiled together,
making warre uppon him, without feare of their friends at home, should so by
force ouerthrow their enemies, and chaunge the Popular estate into an
Aristocratie. As it happened unto the Heracleans, the Cumans, and the
Megarenses, who were chaunged from Popular estates into Aristocraties, for that
the people had wholly driuen out the nobilitie, who with their friends
combining their forces, and possessed of these three commonweales, ouerthrew
therein the Popular estates, and againe established Aristocraties.Popular estates most commonly to chaunge into
Monarchies.
Yet amongst other conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales, the chaunge of a
Popular estate into a Monarchy oftenest happeneth; and that either by civill
warres, or through the ignorance of the
people, hauing giuen too much power to some one of the subiects, as we haue
before said. For Cicero speaking of the civill warres
betwixt Caesar and Pompey, saith,
Ex victoria cum multa, tum certe Tyrannis existit, Of
victorie ensue many things, but especially a Tyrannicall government. For that
almost alwaies in civill warres the people is divided: wherein if it so fall
out, that the leaders of the factions bring the matter unto the tryall of a
battaile, no man can doubt but that hee who therein shall carrie away the
victorie, possessed of the forces and powers, shall either for ambition and the
desire of honour, or for the saftie of his person, keepe unto himself theTyrannicall governments most commonly to chaunge into popular
estates. soueraigntie. Whereas contrariwise Tyrannicall governments
(for the most part) chaunge into Popular estates. For that the people which
neuer knoweth how to keep a meane, the
Tyrannicall government once taken away, desiring to communicat the soueraigntie
unto them all, for the hatred that it beareth against Tyrants, and the feare
that it hath to fall againe into tyranny, becommeth so furious and passionat,
as without reason or discretion to fall upon all the kinsmen and friends of the
tyrant, and not to leaue one of them alive: whereof for the most part ensueth
the slaughter, exile, & proscription of the nobilitie; in which case euerie
man of valour, courage, and worth, chuseth rather to shunne the furie of the
most headstrong people, as the raging of a wild beast, rather than to beare
rule over it. As it happened at Athens, after that Pisistratus was slaine; at Rome, after Tarquin
the proud was driuen out: at Syracusa, after Hiero
slaine, and againe after that Dionysius was banished: at
Florence, after that the duke of Athens (who
afterwards died Generall in the expedition of Poitiers) was driuen out: at
Milan, after that Galuagno the tyrant had there lost his
estate, where the people of Milan for fiftie yeares after, held a Popular
estate, vntill that at last it was againe changed into a Tyrannicall government
by the Toresas. Neither did the Swissars otherwise
establish that thei Popular estate (which by the space of 260 yeares hath
continued euen unto this day) but by killing of the tyrannicall deputies of the
empire, tyrannizing over them. The like we see to have happened in Thessalie,
after that Alexander the tyrant of the Phereans was
slaine: and in Sienna, after that Alexander Dichi the
new tyrant, was by the conspiracie of Hierome Seuerin
slaine, and his partakers of the nobilitie De Monte Nouo cast out, slaine, and banished, the people
forthwith tooke upon it the soueraigntie.
Neither is it to be doubted, but that the Florentines, after the death of Alexander Medices the new tyrant, would have taken the
government from them of the house of Medices, and
reestablished their Popular estate, if they had certainly knowne the tyrant to
have beene slaine: but when as almost onely Laurence
Medices with Caracciolus the muttherer were
priuie to the murther (supposed to bee not onely the tyrants familiar and
domesticall acquaintance, but his most inward friend also) no man could by him
be persuaded, that he had slaine the tyrant: but so by present flight making
shift for himselfe, gaue opportunitie to young Cosmus
Medices his cosen (who then had the forces of the estate in his power)
to take uppon them the soueraigntie. But this conuersion or chaunge of
Tyrannicall governments into Democraties, or of
Democraties into Tyrannicall governments, most commonly happeneth, as we haue
said, by occasion of civill warres: for if a strange enemie become lord of any
Popular estate, he commonly ioyneth it unto his owne: which is not then to be
called a change, but a destruction of that Commonweal, so vnited unto the
victors; except the victor (which seldome times happeneth) restore unto the
vanquished their libertie and government: as the Lacedemonians chose rather
that the confederat cities of the Athenians, by them ouerthrowne in the
Peloponesian warre, yea and that euen the citie of Athens it selfe also, should
enioy their wonted libertie, than to be ioyned unto the Lacedemonian estate:
howbeit yet that the Lacedemonians in euerie place established Aristocraties
for Popular estates, quite contrarie unto the manner and fashion of the Athenians, who in all places went about to
ouerthrow Aristocraties, and to establish Democraties or Popular estates. So
that it differeth much, whether the conuersions or chaunges of Commonweales
proceed from a forren and straunge enemie, or else from the citisens
themselves.
Sometime also the people are so fickle and fantasticall, as that it is almost a
thing impossibleThe ickelnesse of
the people oftentimes cause of the change of the estate. for them to
hold any one estate, which it is not by and by againe wearie of: as we may say
of the auntient Athenians, Samians, Syracusans, Florentines, and Genowayes; who
after they had changed from one estate or forme of government, would by and by
have another. Which phantasticall disease most commonly chanceth unto such
Popular estates, as wherein the subiects be too wise and of too subtill
spirits, as were those whome we have before
spoken of: For amongst them euerie man thinketh himselfe worthy to be a
commaunder, whereas where the subiects be more grosser witted, they the more
easily endure to be by others ruled, and more easily yeeld unto other mens
aduises, than doe they whome you must with the multitude of arguments and
subtiltie of wit conuince, before you shall persuade them unto any thing: so
subtillising their reasons, as that oftentimes they vanish euen into smoke;
whereof ariseth an obstinacie of conceit, alwaies enemie unto wise councels,
with diuers changes of Commonweales. As a man may easily see in Thucidides, Xenophon, and Plutarch, the Athenians lesse than in an hundred yeares, six times to
have chaunged their estate; and since them the Florentines seuen times: which
so happened not neither unto the Venetians,
nor Swissers, men not of so sharpe a wit. For who knoweth not the Florentines
to be most sharpe witted men? but the Swissers to have alwaies bene men of a
more dull spirit? And yet when as they both almost at the same time, chaunged
their Monarchie into a Popular estate, the Swissers have therein so maintained
themselves now almost three hundred yeres: wheras the Florentines not long
after changed their estate into an Aristocratie; they which in nobilitie and
wealth exceed the rest, altogether disdaining to be made equall with the common
sort of the people. But theThe fickle and turbulent estate
of the Florentines nobilitie hauing so got the soueraigntie, began
also to striue amongst themselves for the
principalitie: and with mutuall hatred and proscriptions so weakned themselves
and their estate, as that they were by the
people taking up armes against them easily ouercome and put to flight. But the
nobilitie (and so the Aristocraticall estate) thus ouerthrowne, the popular
sort, and they of them especially which were called the Grandes (or great ones)
began to striue and contend among themselves, for the government of the state:
and yet these much more cruelly than had before the nobilitie; for that they
contended not by forme of iustice, or of law, but by verie force of armes, and
dint of sword; who hauing with mutuall slaughters spent themselves, the middle
sort of the people (for they were divided into three sorts) began to take upon
them the mannaging of the estate: but these also falling together by the eares
for places of honour and commaund, the verie basest and refuse of the rascal
people, became too strong for them, filling
all places with the blood and slaughter of them, vntill they had driuen out and
slaine the most part of them. Now these also of the baser sort become masters
of the estate, and hauing no moe enemies left with whome to striue, began at
length to struggle with it selfe, and made such cruell warre upon it selfe,
that the blood ran down the streets, yea & that most part of the houses
were with fire quite consumed, vntill that they of Luca moued with their great
miseries and distresse, comming in great companies to Florence, exhorted them
their neighbours to lay downe armes, and to seeke for peace: by whose good
speeches they persuaded at last, ceased from their slaughters & butchering
of one another. Whereupon to end the matter, they sent ambassadours unto the
pope, to send them some one descended of royall blood, to rule and raigne
over them: where by good fortune there was
then at Rome Charles of Fraunce brother to king Lewes the ninth, who at the request of the pope, and of
the Florentines themselves, came to Florence, and with the good liking of the
people in generall, tooke upon him the government, ended their quarrels, and
reconciled the citisens among themselves, together with the Commonweale: and so
hauing appeased the citisens, and reformed the Commonweale, being inuited to
the kingdome of Naples, he left in the citie of Florence his deputies. But he
was scarce well gone out of the citie, but that the Florentines wearie of the
government of the deputies, came againe unto their popular government, and so
with all renewed their civill warres. For redresse whereof they sent for the duke of Athens, who hauing taken upon him
the soueraigntie, commaunded the citisens to lay downe armes, and for the
safetie of his person, tooke unto him a strong guard, so to keepe under the
seditious and rebellious persons. But the citisens now supposing themselves so
to be spoyled of their libertie, and brought into bondage by the terrour of his
guard, turned their old mutuall hatred all uppon the prince, first secretly,
and afterwards three conspiracies breaking forth into open force, one after
another in the citie: yea at last the citisens altogether burst out into such
hatred against the prince, that they besieged the pallace wherein he lay,
together with the souldiours which guarded him: neither could that so strait a
siege be broken up, vntill the prince was content himselfe with all his familie
to void the city: which for safegard of his
life he was glad to do, not hauing yet a whole yeare gouerned the state. So the
citie delivered of the feare of a master, appointed a forme of an Aristocratie,
not much vnlike unto a Popular estate; deuising new names for their officers
and magistrats, still chaunging and rechaunging them with the manner of their
state and government, oftentimes no better ordered, than if it had bene
committed to mad men, or children without discretion: scarcely twentie yeares
together keeping the same forme of state. But as sicke men in the heat of
burning feuers, desire to be remoued now hither, and by and by againe thither,
or from one bed to another, as if the disease were in the places where they
lay, and not in the verie entrals of their bodies: euen so the Florentines were still turning and tumbling of their estate, vntill
they light upon Cosmus Medices, of all Physitians the most skilfull, who cured
the citie of these popular diseases, by establishing therein a Monarchie, and
building therin three strong citadels, furnished with good & sure
garrisons; so leauing unto his posteritie a well grounded soueraigne state, by
himselfe holden by the space of almost fortie yeares: than which nothing could
have bin wished for of almightie God, better or more wholsome for such a most
seditious citie. And thus much briefly concerning the Florentine state, which
haply might seeme incredible, had they not bene committed to the remembrance of
all posteritie, euen by the * writings of the Florentines themselves. The like
tragedies we see to haueAntoninus Poggius Mbiauellus. bene plaid also by the people of
Affrike (who in sharpnesse of wit are said to passe the Italians) when they
made proofe of Popular estates: whereof I will set downe but one or two examples amongst many: as namely the
inhabitants of Segelmessa, a citie upon the sea coast in the kingdome of Bugia,
reuolting from their king, established among themselves a Popular estate, but
shortly after entred into such factions and civill seditions, as that not able
to endure either the government of their king, or yet the government of
themselves, they by common consent laid all their houses and the walles of
their citie euen with the ground, that so they might euerie one of them as
kings and princes rule and raigne in their owne houses abroad in the countrey.
The people also of Togoda, a citie in the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez,
wearie of their Aristocratie, forsooke their countrey. For which causes the
people of Affrike, not able to endure the Aristocratique or Popular estates,
have almost euerie where established Royall
Monarchies.
Now albeit that Aristocratike estates seeme to many both better and more
assuredDiscord amongst themselves daungerous unto the
gouernours of an Aristocratie. and durable also than the Popular, yet
so it is, that the gouernors therof if they bee not of accord among themselves,
are still therein in double daunger: the one from the faction among themselves,
the other from the insurrection or rebellion of the people, who neuer faile to
fall upon them if they once find them at variance among themselves, as we haue
before shewed of the Florentines. The like whereof happened at Vienna, at
Genes, and diuers other Commonweales in Germanie also. As it also chanced in
the Peloponesian warre, unto all the cities of Greece which were then gouerned
by the nobilitie or richer sort. Which is also yet more daungerous, when the
gouernours giue leaue to all straungers to
come and dwell in their cities or countries: who by little and little
encreasing, and in wealth and credit growing equall with the naturall subiects
or citisens, and hauing no part in the government, if they shall chance to be
surcharged, or otherwise euill entreated of the gouernours of the state, will
upponMultitude of straungers in an Aristocratie
daungerous. the least occasion rise up against them, and so haply
chase euen the naturall lords out of their own countrey: As it chaunced at
Sienna, at Genes, at Zurike, and at Cullen; where the straungers encreasing,
and seeing themselves surcharged and euill entreated, without hauing any part
or interest in the estate, draue out the gouernours and slew most part of them.
And namely they of Lindaw, after they had slaine the gouernors, chaunged their
Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate: as also did the inhabitants
of Strasburg, who in detestation of the
Aristocraticall government, which they had chaunged into a Popular, after they
had driuen out, banished, or slaine their lords and gouernours, solemnly by law
prouided, That no man should have the great estate, or any other publike charge
in the citie, except hee could first well proue his grandfather to have bene
some verie base fellow, and so himselfe to be descended from the meanest sort
of the rascall people. Which yet is no new matter: For we read, that the
straungers in the Commonweale of Corfu encreased so fast, that in the end they
seised upon all the nobilitie, whom they cast into prison, and there murthered
them; chaunging afterwards that Aristocraticall estate
into a Popular government. The like hapned
unto the Aristocratique Commonweales of the Samians, the Sibarites, the
Trezenians, the Amphipolits, the Chalcidians, the Thurians, the Cnidians, and
them of Chio, who were all by strangers changed into popular estates, hauing
with their multitude thrust out the naturall Lords and gouernours. Which is the
thing most to be feared in the Venetian estate, which we have before showed to
be a meere Aristocratie, and receptacle of all straungers, who have there so
well encreased, that for one Venetian gentleman there are an hundred citisens,
as well noble as base descended of straungers; which may well be proued by the
number of them which was there taken 20 yeares agoe, or thereabouts: wherein
were found nine and fiftie thousand three hundred fortie nine citisens, aboue
twentie yeares old; and threescore seauen
thousand five hundred fiftie seauen women: two thousand one hundred eightie
fiueThe number of the inhabitants of Venice in the yeare
1555. Religious men, 1157 Iewes: which are in all, an hundred thirtie
and two thousand three hundred and thirtie persons; whereunto putting a third
part more for the number of them which are under twentie yeares old, (taking
the ordinary age and the lives of men to be 60 yeares, as the law preineth) it amounteth to the number of about an hundred
seauentie six thousand foure hundred and fortie citisens, beside straungers. In
which number the nobility or gentlemen were not comprehended, who could not be
aboue three or foure thousand, accounting as well them that were absent, as
them that were present. And truely I cannot but maruell why the Venetians haue
published, yea and that more is have suffered to be put in print the number
that then was taken. The Athenians long agoe
committed the like errour, and when the citie was most populous, found that
upon the number taken, there were in the citie twentie thousand citisens, ten
thousand straungers, and foure hundred thousand slaues: which open number and
account the Romans would not take of their straungers, and so much lesse of
their slaues: whom they would not either by their countenance or attire haue
knowne from the rest of the citisens: Howbeit that some were of opinion that
the slaues ought to be knowne by their apparell; yet their opinion preuayled
which thought the same to be daungerous, and a thing to bee feared, lest the
slaues entering into the number of themselves, should make their masters their
slaues, for so Seneca writeth. We read in the hystorie
of Cardinall Bembus, that the greatest assemblie
of the gentlemen of Venice in his time
(when as that Commonweale was most populous) was but fifteene hundred; which
their fewnesse they by most certein tokens, and their attire, make still to
appeare. But that which hath most maintained their seignorie against the
commotion of the citisens, Is the mutuall amitie and concord of the gouernours
and gentlemen among themselves; and the sweetnes of libertie, which is greater
in that citie than in any other place of the world: so that beeing drowned in
pleasure and delights, and hauing also part in certeine honors and meane
offices, whereof the gentlemen are not capable, they have no occasion to stirre
for the chaunging of the estate; as had those of whom I have before spoken, who
were not onely debarred of all offices, but by the gouernors of the State
surcharged and euill entreated also.
Now all these changes of Aristocraties into popular Commonweales haue
beeneThe change of popular estates into Aristocraties of
all others most gentle and quiet. violent and bloodie, as it
happeneth almost alwaies: whereas to the contrarie it commeth to passe that
Popular estates chaunge into Aristocraties by a more gentle and insensible
chaunge. As when entrance is giuen unto straungers, who in tract of time by
little and little plant themselves, and multiplie, without hauing any part in
the estate and government, it falleth out in the end that the naturall citisen
employed in publique charges, or in the warres, or by popular diseases wasted,
do so decay; the straungers still encreasing: whereby
it commeth to passe, that the lesser part of the inhabitants hold the soueraigntie, which wee have shewed to bee a right
Aristocratie. Such were the changes of those Commonweals which we have before
noted, from the people unto the nobilitie, and such as have indeed happened
unto the Venetians, the Luques, them of Rhaguse, & of Genes, which being in
auntient time Popular estates, have by little and little as it were without
feeling, changed into Aristocraties: ioyning hereunto also, that the poorer
sort of the citisens hauing much a do to live, & so wholly intentiue vnto
their domesticall and priuat affaires, shun all publike charges without profit:
and so by succession and prescription of time exclude themselves with their
families from entermeddling with the state. And this maner of change in the
estate, is of all others most gentle and easie, and least subiect unto tumults
and sturres: neither can otherwise be letted,
but that it wil in time chaunge, but by keeping of strangers from entring into
the citie: or by sending of them out into colonies, or else together with the
rest admitting them unto the honors and preferments in the estate: and so much
the more if the people be giuen to warre. For otherwise it is to be feared,
that the nobilitie not daring to put armes into the subiects hands, but being
constrained to go to warres themselves, should be all at once ouerthrowne, and
so the people inuade to soueraigntie: as it happened to the seigneurie of
Tarentum, which in one battell against the Iapiges lost almost all the
nobilitie: after which the people seeing themselves the stronger,Aristocraties by some great our
throwe of the nobilitie oftentimes chaunged into popular estates.
changed the Aristocraty into a Popular estate, in the time of Themistocles. And for this cause the nobilitie of the Argiues, being
almost all slaine by Cleomenes king of
Lacedemonia, they that remained yet alive,
fearing the rebellion of the people, of themselves receiued the comminaltie
into the fellowship of the government, and so of their owne accord seemed
willingly to grant that which the people otherwise have taken from them by
force, & whether they would or no: by which means their Aristocratie most
quietly and sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate. So one of the things that
gaue aduantage unto the people of Rome over the nobilitie, was the victorie of
the Vientes, who in one battell slew 300 of the Fabians, all gentlemen of one
house, when as not long after twelue families of the Potitij, who ascribed the
beginning of their houses unto the gods, were in one and the same yere quite
extinguished & brought to naught, as Liuie writeth.
And therefore the Venetians, better citisens than warriors, if they bee to
make warre (which they neuer doe but upon
great necessitie) vse commonly to chuse their generall one of their nobilitie,
their souldiors for the most part beeing strangers and mercenarie men. But this
inconuenience for the changing of the estate, for the losse of the nobilitie,
cannot happen in a Monarchie, if all the princes of the blood beeMonarchies hardly chaunged for the losse of the
nobilitie. not slaine together with the rest of the nobilitie: as the
maner of the Turks is to doe in all places where they have any purpose
absolutely to command, where they spare not so much as a gentleman: whereof
have ensued the destruction of many Commonweals in the East, and great
encreasing of the Turkish empire. But this change, or rather vnion or
encreasement of one estate by another, proceedeth from externall force. So in
France also, when as almost all the nobilitie of France was slaine in the
expedition of Fontenay, neere unto Auxerre, by
the civill warre betwixt Lothaire the eldest sonne of
Lewes the Gentle, on the one part, and Lewes and Charles the Bald on the
other: yet for all that all their three Monarchies stood still firme: and
namely when the countrey of Champagne had lost so much of the nobilitie in
those wars, as that for the restoring therof, the gentlewomen had especial
priuilege to ennoble their husbands with whom they should marrie, and yet for
all that the Monarchy in the state therof felt no change at all. And thus are
the great and notable changes commonly made in Aristocratike and Popular
Commonweales.
But nothing is so much in an Aristocratie to be feared,
as least some gracious man Ambition and the vnworthie bestowing of the great
preferments of the commonweale, thinges most daungerous to an
Aristocrati of the nobilitie, or of the people, desirous of rule & authoritie,
should stirre up the people against the nobilitie, and become leader of them
himselfe. For therof ensueth the most certaine destruction of an Aristocratie,
together with the nobilitie. In this sort Thrsyllus first, and afterward Thrasybulus at Athens, Marius and Caesar at Rome, Fra. Valori, and
P. Sodorin at Florence, armed the people against the
nobilitie: which is also so much the more to be feared, if the great honours of
the estate bee bestowed uppon most filthy and wicked men, and other vertuous
men and such as have well deserued of the Commonweale, kept backe and excluded.
Which thing seemeth not grieuous onely to euerie good man, and not to be borne
withall, but ministreth occasion also unto the seditious and popular, to
enflame the people against the nobilitie. Neither for any other cause did the people of the Orites by force
wrest the power and government from the nobilitie, than for that they had
preferred unto the chiefe honours one Heracleotes, a man
for his euill life infamous. Which thing also was the destruction of Nero and Heliogabalus, for that
they had bestowed the greatest honours and preferments of the empire, upon most
wicked and corrupt men. Which of all other things is most to be feared and
shunned in an Aristocratie Aristocratically gouerned: that is to say, where the
people is kept from all honours and places of commaund: which although it be of
it selfe an hard thing patiently to endure, yet were it the better to bee
borne, if the government were committed to good men: but when it is giuen to
wicked and vnworthy men, euerie audacious fellow uppon occasion offered, will
easily draw the people from the nobilitie, and
so much the rather, by how much the nobilitie shall be at lesse unitie among
themselves. Which plague, as it is in all estates and governments,Discord among the nobilitie a thing most daungerous to the
sta so is it especially in an Aristocratie to be eschewed and fled. Now
discord oft times ariseth euen of most small matters, which as sparkes raise
the great fiers of civill warres, which at length take hold euen of the whole
bodie of the estate of a citie or Commonweale. As it happened at Florence, for
the refusall made by a gentleman of the noble house of Bondelmont, to marrie a gentlewoman to whome hee had before giuen his
promise, gaue occasion to the raising of a faction amongst the nobilitie, who
so wasted and deuoured one another, as that the people to end the quarrel,
easily draueSmall matters oftentimes the caus of great chaunges in commonweals. out all
the rest, and commaunded the state of the citie. And for like occasion arose
great civill warres amongst the Ardeates,
for an inheretrix, whome her mother would have married unto a gentleman, and
her guardions to a base obscure man: which divided the people from the
nobilitie, in such sort, that the nobilitie vanquished and put to flight by the
people, tooke their refuge unto the Romans, and the people unto the Volsians,
who were afterwards vanquished by the Romans. So also the citie &
Commonweale of Delphos, for the same occasion, was chaunged from an
Aristocratie unto a Popular estate. The state of Mitelin was also chaunged from
an Aristocratie into a Popular estate, upon a suit betwixt the nobilititie and
the people, Which of them should have the tuition of two orphans. And the state
of the Commonweale of the Hestiens, for a suit in matter of inheritance betwixt
two priuat men. And the sacred warre which
chaunged not, but euen vtterly ruinated the estate of the Phocenses, was
grounded upon the marriage of an inheritrix, whome two of their great lords
stroue to haue. And that more is, the Aetolians and Arcadians, for a long time
sore weakened one another with mutuall warres, and all but fo a boares head: as they of Carthage and of Bizaque did
also for a small frigot. So betwixt the Scots and the Picts, was raised a most
cruell warre, and all but for certaine dogges, which the Scots had taken from
the Picts, and neuer could be againe reconciled, howbeit that they had for six
hundred yeares before lived in good peace and amitie together. And the war
betwixt the duke of Burgundy and the Swissers, which
could no otherwise be ended, but by the death of the duke himself, was all but for a wagon load of sheepe skins which he had
taken from the Swissers.Great men hardly to be called in
question to giue an account of their doinges, without the daunger of the
estate.
Sometime also the changes and ruines of Commonweales come, when the great ones
are to be brought in question, to cause them to giue an account of their
actions, whether it be for right or wrong: wherein euen they which are
guiltlesse (and especially in Popular estates) not without cause alwaies feare
the calumnies and doubtfull issues of iudgements, which most commonly endaunger
the lives, the goods, and honour of such as are accused. And to leaue forren
examples, wee have store enow of our owne, and that of such as of late have set
on fire all the kingdome with civill wars when it was but spoken of, for
calling them to account for two and fortie millions. And no maruell if they so feared to be brought in question for
embeseling of the common treasure and reuenewes, when as Pericles, a man of greatest integritie, and which had most
magnificently spent euen his owne wealth for the Athenian Commonweale, rather
than he would hazard the account that they demaunded of him for the treasure of
Athens, which he had mannaged, and so generally of his actions, raised the
Peloponesian warre, which neuer after tooke end vntill it had ruinated diuers
Commonweals, and wholly chaunged the estate of all the cities of Greece. Who
alwaies hauing bene a good husband, and had the charge of the common treasure
of that Commonweale, by the space of almost fiftie yeares, was therefore yet
found neuer the richer, as Thucydides, a most true
historiographer, and Pericles his most mortall enemie
reporteth of him: who caused him to be
banished with the banishment of the Ostracisme. And euen for the selfe same
cause the Rhodians and they of Choos had their estates changed from
Aristocraties into Popular estates. And albeit that Caesar was of himselfe most ambitious and desirous of soueraigntie:
yet was he not so much desirous to beare rule, as affraid to be called to
account by priuat men, for such things as he had done, as his enemies had
openly boasted that he should, so soone as hee was discharged of his charge:
not the least cause that moued him to ceise upon the estate. For what assurance
could he have of himselfe, seeing before the two Scipioes (Africanus the honor of his time, and
Scipio Asiaticus) Rotulus and
Cicero, by the iudgement of the people condemned? Now
if good men were to feare, what should the wicked do? who besides that they are in hope the better to escape, the
Commonweale beeing all on a broile, are also resolued, that the common
treasures can neuer more easily be robbed, or good men spoiled and slaine, than
in the time of civill warres: euer taking it for an aduantage to fish in the
troubled water. And although it may fortune such wicked men also to perish (as
oftentimes it happeneth them which have bene the authors of civill warres,
themselves to die a most miserable death) yet have they still in their mouths
that desperat saying of Cateline▪ That the fire
(forsooth) which had taken hold of his house, which he could not with water
quench, hee would yet quench with the vtter ruine of the same. And truly much
he missed not, but that hee had vtterly ouerthrowne the Roman Commonweale, or
stept into the soueraigntie, had not Cicero the watchful
Consul, and Ca.
Antonius his companion (although it were with much a do) slaine him so
desperat a citisen, with all his fellows. Neither ought Cicero (by his good leaue bee it said) to have driuen Catiline out of the citie, but to have oppressed him euen
there, the conspiracie once detected. For it is not to be hoped, but that he
which seeth himself banished from his house, & from his country, if he haue
power, wil forthwith put himself in arms, as he did. And had he gained the
battell against Ca▪ Antonius, hee had put theHow daungerous a matter it is in euerie commonweale to bannish
a great man. whole estate in great danger, being one of the most
noble gentlemen, and best allied of all them that were in Rome. Certeine it is
that by his departure out of the citie, a great and
dangerous sinke of the Commonweale was so well clensed; yet had it beene better
for him to have beene there oppressed, than
armed against his owne countrie. But of such great and dangerous enemies, the
wiser sort aduiseth vs, to make them ourThis was the
Ostracisme banishment. verie good friends, or else vtterly to destroy
them, rather than to driue them out of the citie; except we should for honour
banish them: as they did in the cities of Athens, Argos, and Ephesus, where the
great Lordes mightie in wealth, favour, or vertue, were for a certeine time
(which for all that neuer exceeded ten yeares) constrained to absent
themselves, without any losse of goods or reputation; which was an honourable
kind of banishment. Of whom so banished, not any one of them is reported to
have therefore made warre upon his countrie. But to banish a great Lord with
losse of his good and contumely, is not to quench but
to kindle the fire of warre against the estate: For that oft times such a banished man by the helpe of his
friends aspireth unto the soueraigntie; as did Dion
banished out of Syracusa by Dionysius the yonger,
against whom for all that he yet tooke not up armes vntill he was by him
proscribed. And Martius Coriolanus, who cast into exile,
brought the Romans to such extremitie, as that had he not suffered himselfe to
have beene ouercome with the prayers and teares of his mother, and the other
women whom the Romans had sent unto him, the Roman state had there taken end.
In like manner the banished men of the house of Medices,
and the nobilitie of Zurich in the yeare 133, thrust
out of their cities, by the helpe and power of their friends and allies
besieged their owne natiue countries, and for a long time wearied the citisens their countrymen with a most
doubtfull and daungerous warre. But yet here some man may say, That it is more
safetie to keepe a wicked and a daungerous citisen without the wals, than to
bee troubled with such a plague in the verie entrailes of the Commonweale.
Whereto I yeeld: but yet how much greater a follie is it to let him whom thou
oughtest to kill, to escape out of the citie, who once got out, is both willing
and able to stirre up, and maintaine warre? Artaxerxes
king of Persia had cast in prison Cyrus the yonger,
guiltie of high treason, and had commanded him in princely manner to be bound
with chaines of gold; and afterwards ouercome with his mothers requests
enlarged him: but he had no sooner got his libertie, but that he made most
grieuous warre upon the king, and was like enough by his brothers death to have obtained the kingdome, or else haue
vndone his countrie; had he not by the kings armie beene circumuented and
slaine. I said we must kill such people,Great men enmies unto the estate, are either to be slaine, or by
great kindnes to be made therunto faithfull friends. or make them our
good friends: as did Augustus, hauing discouered the
conspiracie of Cinna against him, and hauing him in his
power attainted and conuinced by his owne letters, yet neuerthelesse pardoned
him; and not so content, tooke him by the hand, and swore a bond of mutuall
friendship with him, and afterwards bestowed the greatest honours and
preferments of the estate upon him, at the time that Cinna expected nothing but the sentence of condemnation, and so
present execution; vsing these words of grace and favour unto him: Vitam tibi Cinna iterum do, priùs hosti, nunc insidiatori ac
parricidae; Ex hodierno die amicitia inter nos incipiat, contendamus
vtrumego meliore fide vitam tibi dederim, an tu debeas, Cinna
(said he) thy life I giue thee againe, being before mine enemie, and now a
traitour and a murtherer; But from this day, let vs begin to be friends, and
from henceforth let vs striue, whether I with greater trust have giuen thee thy
life, or thou with greater faithfulnesse doest ow it. After which time he neuer
had a more faithfull friend; being also afterwards by him appointed heire of
all his goods. Augustus had before put to death an
infinite number of such as had sworne and conspired his death: but now had a
purpose in Cinna to proue if by gentlenesse and mercie
he could gaine the hearts of men, wherein he was not deceiued: for from that
time there was neuer any found which durst attempt any thing against him. So the Venetians also hauing taken prisoner Gonzaga the duke of Mantua, of all others their most mortall enemie, (who had ioyned all his forces and
power with king Lewes of Fraunce for the ouerthrow of
the Venetian state) did not onely set him at libertie, but made him Generall
also of their forces; by which so honorable a kindnesse he bound, for euer
after continued their most fast and loiall friend. And this is it for which Pontius the old capitaine of the Samnites said, That the
great armie of the Romans surprised in the straites of the Appenine mountaines
was either franke and freely to bee set at libertie, or else all to be put to
the sword: for that so it should come to passe, that either the power of the
Romans should by so great a slaughter be greatly weakned, or else hauing
receiued from the Samnites so great a benefit, as the life and libertie of so
many men, they should for euer after keepe good league and friendship with them.
But these conuersions and chaunges of Commonweales do more often happen inSmall Commonweales more subiect unto change than great.
little and small cities or estates, than in great kingdomes full of great
prouinces, and people. For that a small Commonweale is soone divided into two
parts or factions: Whereas a great Commonweale is much more hardly divided; for
that betwixt the great Lords and the meanest subiects, betwixt the rich and the
poore, betwixt the good and the bad, there are a great number of the middle
sort which bind the one with the other, by meanes that they participate both
with the one and the other, as hauing some accord and agreement with both the
extreames. And that it is for which we see the little Commonweales of Italie,
& the auntient Commonweals of Greece, which
had but one, two, or three townes or cities belonging to them, in one age to
have suffered moe alterations and chaunges than are in many ages reported to
have beene in this kingdome of Fraunce, or in the kingdome of Spayne. For it is
not to be doubted but that the extreames are alwaies contrarie one of them to
the other, and so at discord and variance betwixt themselves, if there be not
some meanes which may binde and ioine the one of them with the other; which we
see by the eye, not onely betwixt the nobilitie and base common people, betwixt
the rich and the poore, betwixt the good and the bad, but euen in the same
citie also, where as but the diuersitie of places seperate but by some riuer,
or wast vacant peece of ground without building upon it, doth oft times set the
citisens at odds, and giue occasion to the chaunging Small occasions serue to raise great dissention amongst
citisens, and so the change of the estate. the estate. So the citie
of Fez was neuer at quiet, neither could the slaughters & murthers euer be
appeased or staied, vntill that Ioseph king of Marocco
and of Fez, of two townes standing somewhat distant one of them from the other
by continuate building made them both one, and that now the greatest citie of
Fez, whereby he gained the praise and commendation of a most wise &
discreet prince; for that he so not onely ioyned houses to houses, and wals to
wals, but bound also the mindes of the citisens and inhabitants of both places
(before burning with an incredible hatred one of them against an other, and
alwaies divided in warres) now in perpetuall loue and friendship together.
Which hapned also unto the Clazomenians, where one part of the citie standing
in the maine, and the other part in an Island, there was alwaies discord and
warre betwixt them of the Isle and the
other citisens. And so at Athens they which dwelt by the hauens side commonly
called Piraeus, were at continuall discord and variance with them of the upper
Towne which they called Astu or the Citie, vntill that Pericles with long walles ioyned the Hauen unto the Citie. For which
cause also such tumults and quarrels fell betwixt the citisens of Venice, and
the mariners and other the seafaring men, as had brought the citie into
extreame perill and daunger had not Peter Lauredan with
his great authoritie and wisedome appeased the same.
But most often it hapneth the chaunges of Commonweales to follow after civill
discord, especially if some neighbour prince shall
upon the suddein oppresse a citie or Commonweales most often changed or ouerthrowme by forrein
princes, taking the aduantage of the civill discord of the subiects amongst
themselves. State weakned with the slaughter of the citisens or
subiects, or else the citisens or subiects themselves being by the eares
together: As the Englishmen have often times vanquished and ouerrunne the
French being at variance among themselves: And the king of Fez easely tooke the
citie of Tefza, the citisens being almost all consumed
and spent with civill warre, And in the memorie of our fathers Philip the second duke of Bourgondie ioyned unto the
boundes of his dukedome Dinan and Boines, two cities
in the countrie of Liege (parted in sunder but with a riuer) after that they
had with long warres weakned themselves, which two cities for all that he could
not before by any force subdue; howbeit that in taking of them he did but
marrie the one of them unto the other, as
saith Philip Commines. So also whilest the kings of
Marocco were in armes together for the soueraigntie, the Gouernour of Thunes
and of Telesin dismembred those two prouinces to make himselfe a kingdome of.
And by the same meanes Lachares seeing the Athenians in
combustion, in the time of Demetrius the besieger, stept
into the Seignorie. And that more is, we read that foure thousand five hundred
slaues and banished men inuaded the Capitoll, and missed but a little to haue
made themselves lords of Rome, whilest the Nobilitie and Common people in the
meane time were together by the eares in an uproar in the middest of the citie,
who thereupon fell to agreement among themselves; not vnlike unto two dogges,
who readie to pull one an others throat out, seing a wolfe, fall both upon him.
Wherfore such civill discord is most daungerous unto cities or estates,
especially if there be no societie or allyance
betwixt the State so troubled, and the neighbour Princes: for that the enemie
so at hand, may oppresse the state (the citisens or subiects so at variance
among themselves) before that any helpe can come. Whereat we are not to
matuell, for they to whom neither the huge height of steepe mountaines, neither
the vnmeasurable depth of the botomlesse sea, nor the most solitarie desarts,
nor the greatest and strongest fortifications, nor the innumerable multitude of
enemies can serue for the staying of their ambitious and auaritious couses and
desires; how should they content themselves with their owne, without
encroaching uppon their neighbours, whose frontiers touch theirs, and that fit
occasion presenteth it selfe for them so to do? which is there the more to be
feared where the Commonweale is but little: as is that of Rhaguse, of Geneua, and of Luque, which have but one
Towne, and the territorie vene strait; so that he which shall gaine the towne,
shall withall become master of the Estate also: which so chaunceth not in great
and spacious Commonweale, wherein many castles, cities, countries, and
prouinces are in mutuall helpe together combyned, so that one citie thereof
being taken, or a countrie or prouince thereof spoyled, yet followeth not the
ruine of the Estate, one of them still succoring an other, as many members in
one bodie, which at need helpe one an other.
Yet for all that a Monarchie hath this aduantage proper unto it selfe, aboue
theA Monarchie not so easily changed or ouerthrowne, as
is an Aristocratie or Popular Commonweale. Aristocratique and Popular
estates, That in these commonly there is but one towne or citie wherein the Seigneurie lyeth, which is as an house
or place of retrait for them which have the mannaging of those estates to
retire vnto; which once taken by the enemie, the estate is withall vndone:
whereas a Monarke chaungeth himselfe from place to place as occasion requireth:
neither doth the taking of him by the enemie bring with it the losse of the
Estate. As when the citie of Capua was taken, their estate was also ouerthrowne
by the Romans, neither was there so much as one towne or fortresse which made
resistance against them; for that the Senat and the people which had the
soueraigntie were all together taken prisoners. The citie of Sienna also being
taken by the duke of Florence, all the other townes and fortresses of that
Seigneurie at the same time yeelded themselves vnto
him also. But the king taken prisoner, is most
commonly for his ransome set at libertie; wherewith if the enemie hold not him
selfe content, the Estates may proceed to a new election, or take the next of
blood if they have other princes: yea sometime the captiue king himselfe had
rather to yeeld up his estate, or else to die a prisoner, than to grieue his
subiects with his too heauie a ransome. As indeed that which most troubled the
Emperour Charles the fift was the resolution of king Francis then his prisoner, who gaue him to vnderstand
that he wasThe resolution of Francis
the French king, being prisoner to the Emperour Charles the fift. upon the point to resigne his kingdome
unto his eldest sonne, if he would not accept of the conditions by him offered:
For why, the realme and all the Estate stood yet whole without any chaunge
taking, or any alteration suffering. And albeit that Spayne, Italie, England,
all the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians, and all the Potentates
of Italie had combyned themselves against
the house of Fraunce, ouerthrowne our legions at Pauie, and caried away the
king with the flower of the nobilitie into Spayne; yet was there not any which
durst enter into Fraunce to conquer it, knowing the lawes and nature of that
Monarchie. For as a building grounded upon deepe foundations, & built with
durable matter, well vnited and ioyned in every part, feareth neither winde nor
tempest, but easily resisteth all force and violence; euen so a Commonweale
grounded upon good lawes, well vnited and ioyned in all the members thereofe,
asily suffereth not alteration: as also to the contrarie we see some states and
Commonweales so euill built and set together, as that they ow their fall and
ruine unto the first wind that bloweth, or tempest that ariseth.
And yet is there no kingdome which shall not in continuance of time be
chaunged,The insensible change of estates best and most
tollerable. and at length also be ouerthrowne. But they are in better
case which least feele such their chaunges by little and little made, whether
it be from euill to good, or from good to better; as we have showed by the
example of the Venetian Commonweale: which at the beginning was a pure
Monarchie, which afterward was sweetly chaunged into a Popular estate, and now
by little and little is chaunged into an Aristocratie, and that in such quiet
sort, as that it was not well by any man perceiued that the estate was at all
chaunged. An other example we have also of the Germaine Empire, which
foundedThe insensible stanging
of the Venetian estate, and of the state of the German Empire. by Charlemaigne and discending to his posteritie, so long
continued a true Monarchie under one soueraigne princes government, vntill that
the line of Charlemaigne fayling, the Emperours begun to be created by
election; at which time it was right easie for the princes which had the choice
by little and little to clip the Eagles wings, and to prescribe lawes and
conditions unto the Emperour to rule by; and yet right happie was he which
could thereunto aspire upon any condition whatsoeuer: whereby the state of the
Monarchie began by little and little to decay, and the state of an Aristocratie
to encrease in the Princes and Estates of the Empire, in such sort as that at
this present the Emperours have nothing more but as it were the bare name and
title of an Emperour, the soueraigntie resting in the Estates of the Empire it
selfe. So that had not eleuen most noble Princes of the house of Austria for
their worthy deeds right famous, as it were in a successiue right (one of them
whilest he himselfe yet liveth, still procuring
an other of the same house to be designed Emperour) in some sort maintained the
maiestie of the Germaine Empire, the Emperours for their estate had now long
ago beene like unto the Dukes of Venice, and happely inferiour too. The ke chaunge hapned unto the Polonians, the lyne of Iagellon failing: as also the Danes, after that Christierne their king was by them his subiects
imprisoned, and his brother to be chosen king in his place, sworne to such
conditions as the nobilitie would: and after that Frederike which now raigneth hath beene constrained to confirme the
same, (as I have before noted) whereby it manifestly appeareth, that the
Nobilitie there hold as it were the soueraigntie, and
that by little and little that kingdome will change into an Aristocratie if Frederike
should die without children.
And albeit that the estates of Hungarie, Bohemia, Polonia, and Denmarke, haue
alwayesKingdomes going by election and so indeede but
Aistocraties, long continued in one familie,
easily chaunge at length into Monarchies as by succession discending.
pretended the right of election of their kings, although they have children,
(which prerogative they stil maintaine) yet commonly the kings their parents
appointed their children unto the succession of their kingdomes, who so chosen
in their fathers places, better maintaine the rights of soueraigntie than do
straungers (who have the same oft times cut short, and so their soueraigne
power in them restrained) so that the kingdomes so descending, as it were in
succession from the great grandfathers unto their nephewes, the soueraigne
rights by little and little without violence returne again from the nobilitie
unto the kings themselves: which is both an easie chaunge, & most
wholsome for the Commonweale. For so Cazimir the Great, king of Polonia, worthily defended the
soueraigne rights by him receiued from his great grandfather: but hee dead
without issue, the Polonians indeed called Lewes king of
Hungarie (and Cazimir his nephew) unto the kingdome of
Polonia, but with the soueraigntie therein much diminished; he for the gaining
of the kingdome yeelding to whatsoeuer the estates desired. But Lewes dead also without heires male, Iagello duke of Lithuania marrying one of the daughters and heires of
Lewes, and so with her obtaining the kingdome of
Polonia, yet more impaired the soueraigne rights than they had before bene: the
princes of whose posteritie neuerthelesse as it were in successiue right, for
the space of aboue two hundred yeares, tooke
upon them the government of the kingdome, and notably maintained the rights of
their soueraigntie, vntill the death of Sigismundus
Augustus, last heire male of that house: unto whome by right of
election succeeded Henrie of Fraunce, Charles the ninth the French kings brother: but with oathes and
conditions bound unto the estates, so much derogating from the rights of a
soueraigne Monarch, as that indeed he might have seemed rather a prince than a
king. And to say yet more, I being sent to Mets, to assist them which were
thither sent with the duke, to receiue the ambassadours of Polonia, and to
parle with them, it was told me by Salomon Sboroschi one
of the ambassadours, That the estates of Polonia had yet cut much shorter the
power of the new elected king, had it not bene in the regard they had of the
honor of the house of Fraunce. Thus we see
Monarchies peaceably by little and little to change into Aristocraties, if so
it be that the Monarchie be not by auntient lawes and immutable customes,
maintained in the maiestie thereof. As we see in the creation of the pope,
where the Consistorie (or Colledge of Cardinals) derogat nothing from the
soueraigne maiestie that he hath in all the demaine of the church, and the fees
depending thereon: no more than do the order of the knights of Malta in any
thing diminish the power of the Grand maister, who hath the power of life and
death, and to dispose of the reuenewes, estates, and offices of the countrey,
yeelding fealtie and homage unto the king of Spaine for the isle of Malta,
which Charles the fift the emperour upon this condition
gaue them. And albeit that the colledge of cardinals after the death of
pope Iulius the
second, determined in the conclaue, to moderat the popes power: yet shortly
after they flew from that they had before decreed, in such sort that Leo the tenth, then by them chosen, tooke upon him more
power than had any pope of long time before him.
But that chaunge is of others most daungerous to a Monarchie, when as the
kingThe most daungerous chaunge of a Monarchie.
dying without issue, there is some one who in wealth and power exceedeth the
rest; & so much the more, if he be also ambitious and desirous of rule: For
no doubt, but that hauing the power in his hand, hee will, if hee can, take the
soueraigntie from the other weake princes. For so Hugh
Capet the right line of Charlemaigne ended,
being Prouost of the citie of Paris, and a man of
great wealth, and no lesse favoured of the people, excluded from the kingdome Charles duke of
Loraine, who with his sonne Otho were the onely men left
of all the posteritie of Charlemaigne. Which is also to
bee feared of the great Othoman princes, who although they have their families
of the Machaloglies, of the Ebranes, and the Turacans, of the princes house
and blood, to succeed in the Turkish empire: yet for all that if the Othoman
familie should altogether perish, it is to be thought, that some one of the
Bassaes or other great men, in greatest favour with the Ianzaries, and the
other souldiours of the court will carrie away the estate and soueraigntie from
the other princes of the aforesaid families, being but weake, and far offThese noble families are nowe also al or most of them
extinguished and come to nought. from the Grand Signior, which might
so raise the greatest civill warres in the East, for the great opinion which
the people hath of long conceiued of the valour and maiesty of the Othoman familie. A notable example of such change of
state wee have in the chaunge of the Lacedemonian kingdome: where Cleomenes the king vanquished and put to flight by Antigonus, the kingdome was chaunged into a Popular
estate, which so continued for three yeares: during which time the people made
choyce of five Prouosts, or chiefe magistrats, whome they called Ephori, chosen
out of the people themselves: but newes being brought of the death of Cleomenes, slaine in Aegypt, two of the five Ephori
conspired against the other three their companions and fellowes in office: and
so as they were doing sacrifice, caused them to be slaine: which done, they
proceed to the election of Agesipolis for their king, a
prince of the royall blood. But whereas before Cleomenes
they were woont to have two kings: one Lycurgus a man
gracious with the people, but otherwise
none of the blood royall, by corruption and briberie caused himselfe also by
the people to be chosen king, Chilon, a noble gentleman,
discended from Hercules, being for his pouerty and want
of ability excluded, who not able to endure so great an indignity offered vnto
his house and family, procured all the magistrats to be slaine: Lycurgus himselfe onely escaping, who after great
effusion of blood, held the soueraignty himselfe alone, hauing before almost
quite destroyed the royall race of the Heraclides posterity of Hercules. And thus much concerning the chaunge and ruine
of Commonweales, which whether they may by any meanes be forseene and
preuented, let vs now also see.
CHAP. II. ¶ Whether there be any meane to know the
chaunges and ruines, which are to chaunce unto Commonweales.
SEeing that there is nothing in this world which
commeth to passe by chaunce or fortune, as all diuines and the wiser sort of
the Philosophers have with one common consent resolued: Wee will here in the
first place set downe this maxime for a ground or foundation, That the chaunges and ruines of Commonweals, are humane, or naturall, or
diuine; that is to say, That they come to passe eitheir by the onely
councell and iudgement of God, without any
other meine causes: or by ordinarie and naturall meanes of causes and effects,
by almightie God bound in such fit order and consequence, as that those things
which are first have coherence with the last; and those which are in the
middest with them both: and all with all combined and bound together with an
indissoluble knot and tying: which Plato according to
the opinion of Homer hath called the Golden Chaine, that
is to say, , or by the
will of man, which the diuines confesse to be free, at the least concerning
civill actions: howbeit that indeed it is no will at all, which in any sort
whatsoeuer is enforced and bound. Which will of man is
so mutable and vncertaine, as that it should be impossible to giue Mans will still mutable, and God his iudgments inscrutable,
affoord no meane for man by thē to foresee the changes and ruines of
Commonweales. thereby any iudgement, to know the changes and ruines
which are to fall upon Commonweales. As for the councell of God, it is
inscrutable, but that he sometime by secret inspiration declareth his will, as
he hath done unto his Prophets, causing them many worlds of yeres before to see
the falles of many the greatest empires and Monarchies, which posteritie hath
by experience found to be true. But this diuine power of the almightie most
seldome times showeth it selfe immediatly without the comming betwixt of meane
causes; neither doth he it without greatest force and most sudden violence: as
when he in one and the selfe same moment with wonderfull fire, and reuenging
flames, destroyed the five cities with Sodome and Gomorrha: and so
chaungedGod his inmediate iudgment most suden and most dreadfull. also the place then
full of most sweet waters and aboundance of fish, with a most stinking
& lothsome tast, as that it yet is vnto
all kind of fish pestilent & deadly: and as for the ground it selfe, before
of wonderful fertility, he so couered it with ashes and stinking sulpher, as
that he seemeth in that countrey to have left no place for wholsome plants, or
any kind of graine to grow in. So also he ouerwhelmed Bura and Helice, two
cities of Greece, with such a deluge of water, and that so suddenly, that euen
they also which were about to have fled out of the cities into the ships, being
by the wonderfull rising of the waters, vnable to come to the hauen, were so
all drowed. By the like wrath of God a great earthquake in a moment swallowed
up three and twentie cities in Italie, where afterward the Fennes called
Pontinae burst out. As in like manner twelue cities of Asia are reported to
have bene all at once upon the sudden with an earthquake deuoured.
Wherefore seeing that mans wil is still diuers and mutable, & God his
iudgements most secret and inscrutable: there remaineth onely to know, whether
that by naturall causes (which not altogether obscure, but by a certaine
constant order of causes and effects gouerned, kept their course) a man may
iudge of the issue and successe of Commonweales.By what
naturall causes the chnges and ruines of
Commonweales are to be foresee Yet by these naturall causes hauing in them this power (which are many
and diuers) we meane not civill causes, whereunto the chaunge and ruine of
cities and Commonweales must needs immediatly follow: as when good deserts goe
vnrewarded, and great offences vnregarded, who knoweth not but that such a
state or Commonweale must needs in short time perish and come to naught? For of
all causes none is more certaine, none more
weightie, and in brife none neerer unto the change or
ruine of a citie or Commonweale, than these. But the causes which we here seeke
after, are the celestial and more remote causes▪ yet proceeding from a certaine
naturall course and force: howbeit that it be good also to behold and foresee
all maner of causes what soeuer. For as a painter doth one way consider of a
mans bodie, and the Physitian another: and the naturall Philosopher one way
considereth of the mind of man, & the diuine another: so also the
Politiitan doth one way, the Astrologer another, and the diuine a third way,
iudge of the change & ruine of Commonweals. The Polititian in the ruine of
a citie or Commonweale, blameth the iniuries and wrongs done by the prince
unto his subsects, the corruptnesse of the
magistrats, with the iniquitie of the laws: The Astrologer considereth and
beholdeth the force and power of the heauenly starres and planets, and thereof
thinketh diuers motions to arise in mens minds, for the change and innouation
of estates and Commonweales: But the Diuine constantly affirmeth all plagues,
wars, dearth, destructions of cities and nations, to proceed from the
contemptPsl 10. Leuit. 27. Iob. 12. * of God and of his religion, and God
therefore to be angrie, and to stupifie the wisedome euen of the most wisest
magistrats, and to arme euen his starres against princes. And euerie one of
these have their causes, by the helpe and concourse whereof wise men may guesse
the change or ruine of a citie or Commonweale. In which point we see many to erre and be deceiued, which thinke, that to looke
into the starres, and to Astrologicall pre dictions, not to derogat from the maiestie
and power of God. search after their secret influencies and vertues,
is in some sort to diminish the maiestie and power of almightie God: whereas to
the contrarie it is thereby made much more glorious and beautifull, to do so
great things by his creatures, as if he did then immediatly by his owne mightie
hand, without any other meane at all.
Now what man is there of sound iudgement, which feeleth not the wonderfullNothing done by the necessitie of nature, it selfe be ing still
subiect to the power of God: force and effect of the celestiall
bodies in nature in generall? Which yet for all that no necessitie of nature
worketh, for that it may by almighty God be stil kept back and restrained,
being himselfe free from the lawes of nature, which hee himselfe hath
commaunded; not as by a decree of a Senat, or of a people, but euen of
himselfe: who being of all others the greatest, can do nothing but that which
is right and iust, for that he is himselfe the
best, and hath a Esay. 19. perpetuall care of all people and
nations, but yet therof himselfe secure, for that he is himselfe the greatest.
But as all things which had beginning have also a loose and fraile dissoluable
nature (as by most certaine and vndoubtfull demonstration is to be proued) it
must thereof needs follow also, not onelyAll worldly things
still subiect to mutabilitie and change. cities and Commonweals, but
euen also other things, which from their first beginning have innumerable
worlds of yeares flourished, must at length in tract of time fall also and take
end. And albeit that Plato the prince of Phylosophers,
hauing not as yet the knowledge of the celestiall motions, and so much lesse of
their effects (which as then was couered in most thicke darknesse and clouds)
when as he with a notable inuention had conceited such a forme of a
Commonweale, as seemed unto many to bee
euerlasting, if it erred not from the lawes and orders by him set downe; yet
for all that he said, That it should in time perish: as he which most
manifestly saw the vanitie of all things, which as they had a beginning, so
were they also to take ending; nothing being still firme and stable, besides
him which was the father of all things. Which being so, there be no so notable
orders, no so religious lawes, no such wisedome or valour of man, which can
still presetue estates or Commonweales from ruine and most certaine
destruction. By which reasons, Secundus (a Philosopher
of the Stoike sect) greatly comforted Pompey,
discouraged and almost desperat after the Pharsalian ouerthrow. Neither yet
therefore do they which thinke the course of naturall causes to concerne the
changes and ruines of cities and Commonweals, thereby bind the free will of
man, and much lesse almightie God himselfe
unto a fatall necessitie: no not if we should deeme all things to be done by a
continuat and interlaced course of forerunning naturall causes; seeing that
euen nature it selfe is by the power of God kept in & restrained. Wherfore
we oftentimes see both plants, and other liuing creatures, which by nature haue
a certaine period of their lives, by some externall force to hasten or preuent
the tearmes by nature prefined, and so sooner to die than by nature they
should. And as for mankind, we have it oftentimes in holy writ recorded, That
they which lead an upright & vertuous life, shall live long: whereas the
wicked should shorten their dayes, and bring themselves unto a most speedie
confusion and end. Whereby it appeareth certaine prefixed bounds of euerie mans
life, to be by God appoined, which by sinne may bee cut shorter, and by vertue extended farther. So kingdomes
also have their beginnings, their encreasings, their flourishing estates, their
changings, and ruines: yet when these chaunges shall be, or ruines, or
destructions betide them, we see it by no learning to bee perceiued or
vnderstood. For as for that which Plato hath written,
Kingdomes then to fall and take end, when as the sweet consent and harmonie of
them should perish and decay; is a thing not worth the refutation: whereof yet
for all that more in due place shall be said.
Now many there be, which have thought the conuersions and chaunges of estates
and Commonwealas, to depend of the force, power and
motion of the superiour celestiall bodies:
which to discouer, were a matter of infinit difficultie, which yet for all that
should not be so great, if Commonweales should as men and other things take
their beginning. And albeit that the state and ruine of Commonweales should
wholly next unto God depend of those eternall lights, and of their mutuall
coniunctions and oppositions, yet could thereof no certaine doctrine be
delivered or gathered, for theThe notable tors of the Astrologers great varietie and
inconstancy of them which have obserued the force and course of the celestiall
stars & orbes; insomuch, that some one hath written the same star in the
selfe same moment to have beene in his direct motion, and another hath likewise
written the same to be retrograde, which yet for all that, was to bee seene in
the heauens stationarie and immoueable. So that they are by their owne
rashnesse to be refelled, which vaunt
themselves to be able without error, to foretell the force and power of the
starres, upon cities and Commonweales; as also what effects they shall for many
yeares to come produce, when as in the very motion of the moone, which of all
the other planets hath in it least difficulty there is not one of them which
well agreeth with one another. So Cyprian Leouicius,
following the table of Alphonsus, (the euident error of
whom Copernicus hath declared) hath made so apparant
faults, as that the great coniunctions of the superior planets were seene one
or two moneths after his calculation. And albeit that Gerardus Mercator have endeuoured by certaine eclipses of the sun
& of the moone, by antient writers set downe, more curiously than any
other, to iudge of the course and order of
the whole time from the beginning of the world; yet so it is, that all his
obseruations threaten a fall, as grounded upon a false supposition: which can
in no wise be true, For he supposeth that in the creation of the world, the
sunne was in the signe Leo, without any probable reason, following the opinion
of Iulius Maternus, contrary to the opinion of the
Arabians, and of all other the Astrologers, who write, that the sunne was then
in the signe Aries▪ being yet both therein deceiued▪ these, six signes; and Mercator too. For why it is manifestly to bee proued, not
onely by the most antient orders and customes of all people, but by the most
diuine testimonies of holy scripture also, The sunne in the creation of the
world, to have beneThe sunne in the creation of the world to
have bene in the sign Libra. Exod. 23. ver. 16 Exod. 11. ver. in the signe Libra: wherby the Feast of the gathering of the fruits is
commanded to be kept the last day of the yere,
that is to say, the two and twentith day of the seuenth moneth; which Moses hath expresly written to have bene the first,
before the departure of the people out of Aegypt. Which to the intent it might
be the lesse doubted of, wee reade to be oftentimes by him repeated: for when
he had cōmanded the feast day Abib, that is to say, The feast of weeks, which
the Greeks call : he
ioyneth herunto these words, , that is to say, And the feast of the
gathering of fruits in the end of the yere. But the last moment of the yeare
past, is the beginning of the yere following; as Orus
Apollo writeth, the Aegyptians to have declared the reuolution of the
yeare, by a dragon turned about into a circle. But Iosephus, the best interpreter of antiquity, declareth the moneth
Abib, which of th Chaldaies is called Niscan, and of vs before, March, but now Aprill, to have beene in order the
first for the deliverance of the people out of the bondage of Aegypt: but yet
the moneth which of the Chaldeis is called Ethanim, of the Hebrewes Tisri,
which was our October, but afterward fell into our September, to have bene by
nature the first. All which, not onely Iosephus, but
almost all the Hebrew Rabines also, namely Eleazar, Abraham,
Ezra, Ionathas the Chaldean interpreter, with almost all the rest,
constantly affirme. Which for that it hath great force for the discerning of
the ruines of Commonweales, is of vsThe world to have taken
beginning in Autumne. more manifestly to be explaned. The antient
schoole of the Hebrewes, begin the reading of Moises his
bookes, the Genesis, in Autumne: and Samuel, the most
antient Rabine of the Hebrewes, appointeth the first
Tecupa, or yearely conuersion of the yeare, in
the Autumne equinoctiall: whereby it is manifest, the doctrine and customes of
that most antient nation, to concurre and agree with the law of God. The same
was the doctrine of the old Aegyptians and Chaldies also, concerning the
beginning of the yeare, from whom all the mathematicall scienses tooke not
onely their beginning, but were from them to all other nations of the world
deriued also. So Iulius Firmicus writeth, the Aegyptians
hauing receiued it from their ancestors, to have delivered it unto posterity,
The sunne in the beginning of the world to have bene placed in the last part of
Libra. The same was also the opinion of the Indians, who are yet worshippers of
the Sunne, & of the Moone, as the Spaniards have reported. And although the
yere of the Grecians, tooke beginning from the summer Solstitium, yet
neuerthelesse the people of Asia beganne their
Olimpiades and the beginning of the yere from Autumne. The Romans also from the
remembrance of most auntient aniquitie, began the yeare fromThe auntient Ro maines to have begun the yeare in September. the
Ides of September, Lex vetusta est (saith Liuie) & priscis scripta literis, vt qui Praetor maximus
sit, Idibus Septembris cluum pangat, It is an
old law (saith he) and written in old auntient letters, that he which was the
great Prouost, should euer the Ides of September driue or fasten a naile. This
naile Festus calleth annalem, or
an annuall naile, Qui quotannis figebatur in dextra parte
capitolij vt per eos clauos numerus colligeretur annorum▪ Which was
euerie yeare fastned in the right side of the Capitoll, that so by those nayles
the number of the yeares might be gathered. Augustus
appointed also the Olympic games in the moneth of September. And albeit that
the Astrologers (as other people also for the
most part) follow a new manner of account of the yeare, set downe by Moyses, and begin their account of the spring diuision,
yet neuerthelesse they begin their tables of the celestiall motions receiued
from the Aegyptians and Chaldeies from the Autumne diuision. VVhich
antiquities, with the authoritie of so many and so worthy men, although they
make the matter manifest enough and out of all doubt▪ yet euen nature it selfe
leadeth vs thither also, as that wee must needs confesse the beginning of the
world to have bene in Autumne. For if we grant, as we must needs, man as all
other liuing creatures also, to have bene by almightie God created in such
state and perfection as that they should need no nurses; so also is it to be
thought him to have prouided for all liuing creatures, and especially for
mankind, ripe fruits for him to feed upon, and
most beautifull to behold, planted in most faire gardens, as is in the sacred
booke of Genesis to be seene: which can in no wise be done, but that the world
must be created in the beginning of Autumne. For why, Adam was created about Iordan, whereas corne in the spring time yet
shooteth not on eare; and the moneth Abib is so called, for that the corne in
the spring time in those places runneth but up in spindle, and the trees but
scarcely bud: neither is the law of nature, or the season of the spring, or of
Autumne, from the beginning of the world chaunged. Wherefore Plutarch in his Symposiaques, when he pleasantly questioneth, Whether
egges or birds were first? resolueth birds to have bene first created: and so
whatsoeuer things els are contained in the whole world, to have bene in all
parts created perfect For otherwise if God
should have created man a crying child, or calues for oxen, or egges for birds,
he must also have created nurses to have suckled them, and birds to haue
hatched them: which if it be absurd and foolish to say, so must also of
necessitie those things bee absurd, whereof these things follow, viz. the world to have bene created in the beginning of
the spring, and young shoots to have bene made for fruitfull trees, and so
likewise other things to have bene created young, and not in their perfection.
Whereby it is euident them greatly to erre & be deceiued, which accounting
& taking the beginning of the world from the spring, and the beginning of
the day from noone, doe with their vaine coniectures
go about to blot out and extinguish the authoritie of the sacred scriptures, as also the most auntient records of the
Indians, the Chaldes, the Aegyptians, and Latines, and all forsooth because
cold weather still followeth after Autumne: they fearing (as I suppose) least
Adam being a naked child, should have taken cold.
Seeing therefore the Astrologers, euen as these men also to have laid false
principles and grounds, of the celestiall motions, and much to differ amongst
themselves, concerningAstrological predictions
vncerten. the course of the starres and planets, they can therefore
(I say) set downe nothing certaine, concerning mans affaires, or the ruines of
cities and Commonweals.
But yet it hath lesse probalitie by the foundation of townes and cities, to
iudge ofThe rising or falling of commonweales not to be
iudged or deemed of by the foundation of the townes or cities
therein. the rising or falling of Commonweales: as many do also of
houses before they lay the foundations of them, to foresee and let that they
should not be burnt or rased, or sicke of the
falling sicknesse: which to doe is a meere folly, differing little from
extreame madnesse, as though natures most constant order should depend of mans
lightnesse, and the force of the celestiall Spheres, of the will and pleasure
of a base carpenter or mason. Indeed by the law it is prouided, That the value
of houses burnt should bee deemed by their age and continuance, for so it is
read in the old Hetruscian copie: although that D. Cuias
a most diligent interpretor of auntient readings, be of their opinion, which
for aetatibus, thinke it ought to be read quantitatibus (as who should say by their quantities,
rather than by their age) whereunto the lawyer neuer had respect. For his
meaning was, That houses according to the stuffe and matter they were built of,
were to be esteemed of longer or shorter continuance: as if an house were built
of clay or morter, it was esteemed to be able
to last some fourescore yeares: in such sort as that if it had cost an hundred
crownes at first to build, being burnt fortie yeares after, there should halfe
the price thereof be abated in the estimation thereof: For as for houses built
with bricke (they as Plinie saith) if they be built
upright are euerlasting. And so Victruuius, and all
other builders were woont to esteeme of the losse sustained, by the age and
continuance of the houses burnt. For to esteeme of them by the elle, or by the
greatnesse, so a barne built of clay or straw should be esteemed more worth
than smaller buildings built of marble or of porphiree, as the temple of
Porphiree at Sienna, one of the least, but most costly buildings of Europe. But
the deciding of such questions we must referre to Victruuius, and other builders. And as for that some thinke we are
by the foundations of cities and other
buildings, to iudge what shall be the state or successe of a kingdome or
monarchie should lesse need the refutation: but that M,
Varro (whome Tullie writeth to have in learning
excelled all other Greeks and Latins) commaunded Tarentius
Firmianus to declare unto him the Horoscope of the citie of Rome: for
so Plutarch and Antimachus Lyrius
report. Whereupon he by the progresse of that Commonweale gathering the causes
thereof; and by things ensuing after, gessing at things forepast, & so by
retogradation iudging the causes by the effects,
by most light and vaine coniectures affirmeth the foundation of the citie to
have bene laid in the third yeare of the sixt Olympiade, the one and twentieth
day of Aprill, a little before three of the
clocke in the afternoone, Saturne, Mars, and Venus, being as then in Scorpio, Iupiter in Pisces, the sunne in Taurus, the moone in Libra, Gemini
holding the heart, or middle of the heauens, and Virgo rising. But seeing that
the chiefe points of this figute belonging unto Mercurie, and that this whole celestial Scheame betokeneth men of
traffique, or otherwise studious of Philosophie, and all kind of learning, how
can it come to passe, that these things should agree, or bee applied unto the
Romans, a people of all others most couragious and warlike? Howbeit that Taruntius in this his figure, or Horoscope of the
foundation of Rome, is most shamefully deceiued, as hauing therein placed the
celestiall orbes in a situation quite contrarie unto nature, viz. Venus opposit unto the Sunne: which yet can neuer
be aboue eight and fortie degrees Taruntius Firmianus deceiued in his horoscope or figure of
the foundation of Rome. at the most distant from the Sunne: which yet
were a thing excusable and worthy to be pardoned, if it had bene by him done by
forgetfulnesse: as it happened to Augerius Ferrerius an
excellent Mathematician, who in his booke of Astronomicall iudgements, hath set
Venus and Mercurie, one of
them opposit unto another, and both of them opposit unto the Sunne: a thing by
nature impossible, and hee himselfe acknowledging that Mercurie can neuer be six and thirtie degrees from the Sunne. Yet true
it is, that Iohn Picus earle of Mirandula, grounding
upon this demonstration of the celestial motions, without cause blameth Iulius Maturnus, for that he placed the Sunne in the
first house, and Mercurie in the tenth, which cannot be
(saith he) except the sun should be from Mercurie the
fourth part of the circle (or three signes distant:) not hauing regard, that the globe may so be placed, to encline
unto the North, as that the sun rising, Mercurie may
come unto the meridian, yea unto the tenth house two houres before noone, and
yet not be thirtie dgrees from the sunne. But Plutarch
writeth Antimachus Lyrius to have left recorded, the
Sunne to have bene then ecclipsed, which yet he saith to have bene the diametre
of the circle distant from the Moone. And yet there is another greater
absurditie in that theame of Taruntius, in that hee
placeth the sunne in Taurus the xxj day of Aprill, which then entred not
thereinto vntill the thirtith of April. Howbeit also that Lucas Gauricus, who collected the celestiall theames of many most
famous cities, differeth altogether from this theame of Rome, by Taruntius before set downe: for he placeth Libra in the
East, as doth also Manlius. But of all absurd things none is more absurd, than by the ouerthrow of
cities to measure the destruction of the estate or Commonweale, whereas before
we have declared, that a city oftentimes may be ouerthrowne and laid euen flat
with the ground, and yet the state and Commonweal therof remaine, as we haue
before shewed of the citie of Carthage: as oftentimes to the contrarie the
estate and Commonweale may perish, the walls and other buildings yet standing
all whole.
Wherefore then I rest not upon such opinions, and much lesse upon that which
Cardan saith, who to seeme more subtilly than others
to handle these hidden and obscure matters, & to raise an admiration of
himselfe with men vnskilfull of these things, maintaineth the beginnings and
encreasings of the greatest cities and Empires to have come from that Starre which is the last in the taile of Vrsa
Maior, which he saith to have bene verticall unto the great citie of Rome at
the foundation thereof, and from thence euen by the helpe and working of the
same Starre translateth the Roman Empire to Constantinople, and so afterwards
into Fraunce, and so from thence into Germanie: which although they be so set
downe but by a most brainsicke man, yet doCardan his error
detected and his opinion reiected. men ignorant of the celestiall
motions wonderfully admire the same, and are therfore by vs to be refuted. For
perceiuing that last starre of Vrsa Maior to be daily unto manie people
verticall, though perpendicular unto them onely which are subiect unto the
circle which that starre describeth, Cardican saith it
should be verticall at such time as the Sun toucheth the Meridian circle: in
which state he supposeth it to have beene, at
such time as Romulus the founder of the citie laied the
foundation thereof: which could not by nature so be, viz. that the last starre of Vrsa maior in the same howre, that is to
say at noonetide, should together with the Sun touch the verticall circle: For
that starre being now in the xxj degree of Virgo, by proportion of the motion
of the fixed statres, by reason of the motion of the eight Sphere, it must
needs have beene in the xix degree of Leo at such time as the foundation of the
citie of Rome was laied, and the Sun in the xix. degree of Aries, as the
foregoings of the Sun declare. So that that starre was the third part of the
circle, or foure signes and twentie degrees distant
from the verticall, when as it ought to have beene in the same signe, and in
the same degree of the signe wherein the Sunne
was, if Cardan his doctrine were true: who yet when he
knew the same starre to have beene verticall unto many great cities at the time
of their foundation, since the beginning of the world, the Sun also then being
in the Meridian; he to meet with that obiection, said the Monarchie to be due
but to one of them. But why that to the Romans from whose verticall it is
distant twelue degrees, rather then to the Scottish fishermen which dwell neere
unto the Orcades? or unto them of Norway, and other the Northren people? vnto
whom the same starre is not onely verticall, the sun touching the Meridian in
September, but is also directly perpendicular? Yet is it also more straunge, to
say the same starre to have giuen the Empire to Constantinople, considering
that that citie was built nine hundred yeares
before that the Empire was thither translated. Ioining hereunto also that the
horoscope of the citie of Constantinople found in the Popes librarie in the
Vatican written in Greeke letters, calculated by Porphyrie (as some affirme) and copied out by Lucas
Gauricus the Bishop, declareth the Sunne then to have beene in the xvij
degree of Taurus, the Moone in the v of Leo, Saturne in the xx of Cancer,
Iupiter and Venus coniunct in the same signe, Mars in the twelft, Mercurie in
the first of Gemini, Aquarius holding the verticall of heauen, and the xxiij of
Gemini in the Leuant; which he setteth downe to have beene in May upon a
Munday, two howres after the sunne rising. An other celestiall Theame of the
same Citie is also taken out of the Vatican,
calculated by Valens of Antioch, later than the former
by fortie minutes. But yet that is verie absurd which Gauricus the good Bishop to come to his acconut supposeth the citie of
Constantinople to have beene built in the yeare of our Lord 638, three hundred
yeares after the death of Porphyrie: which yet it is
manifest to have flourished aboue 500. yeares before Christ: which he thinketh
also to have beene afterwards taken by the Turks armie in the yeare of Christ
1430. when as in truth it was by them woon and sackt in the yeare of our Lord
1453, the xxix day of May, being 1800 yeare before taken by the French men:
wherein they raigned vntill the time of Clyarus king of
Thracia, as Polybius (tutor unto Scipio Affricanus) writeth; at which time it was called Bizance. And
againe afterwards also was taken by Pausanias king of
Lacedemonia in the Median warre. And yet more,
afterwards also was besieged by Alcibiades generall of
the Athenians. And long time after, three yeares together againe besieged by
Seuerus the Emperour, who after he had sacked it,
razed it also downe to the ground, and carrying away the rest of the citisens
into captiuitie, gaue the ground whereon it stood unto the Perinthians about
the yeare of our Lord two hundred: which yet not long after was againe
reedified, and by Constantine the great wonderfully
enriched after that he had thither translated the seat of his Empire. And yet
againe after that, was with fire and sword most cruelly wasted by the armie of
Galienus the Emperour, all the citisens therein being
either slaine, or else caried away into captiuitie. Yet ceased it not for all
that to be still the seat of the Greeke empire, vntill that the Frenchmen and Flemings under the conduct of Baldwin Earle of Flaunders seized thereon; which they
held together with the Empire, vntill that about fiftie yeares after they were
by the Palaeologi againe driuen out: who hauing so
recouered the citie there raigned, vntill that it was by Mahomet the great Turke woon. All which changes of the Empire, and
ruines of the citie, Gauricus neuer touched; neither did
Cardan himselfe so much as suspect them: otherwise I
suppose he would neuer have written things so absurd, and so disagreeing with
themselves. But great maruell it is that this Cardans
starre hath had such power as to graunt the Empires of the world to Italie,
Greece, Fraunce, and Germanie, when as it was to them but verticall, and yet
hath had no power at all upon the realmes of Norway
and Sweden, where it is not onely verticall,
the Sunne being at the Meridian in the moneth of August, but is also
perpendicular: and yet neuerthelesse distant from Rome and Constantinople in
latitude twelue degrees at the least. Besides that, why should he giue vnto
this Starre (which some foolish Astrologers take to be Saturnia) more power
than to others, both for their greatnesse & nature more notable? why doth
he exclude from the government of the world Regulus the greatest of all the
sixe starres? whie Medusa, Spica, the great Dog, the Vultur, all most faire and
beautifull starres? whie in briefe a thousand and threescore others, (for so
many there are accounted beside the wandering starres) unto whom the Hebrew
Mathematicians had added thirtie six mo also? Sufficeth it for this time to
have reiected these errours so grosse, as the day it selfe is cleere.
But for asmuch as it were a thing infinite to refell all mens errours in this
kind ofThe errour of Peter Cardinall
of Arliac. matter, I will onely touch theirs, who have thought
themselves wiser than the rest, and have beene had in reputation as best seene
in the iudgement of the heauens for the chaunges of Commonweales: such as was
Peter of Arliac Chauncelour of Paris, and afterwards
Cardinall in the yeare 1416: For he writeth the beginnings, channges, and
ruines of religions and Commonweales, to depend of the motion and coniunction
of the superiour Planets. And to mee it seemeth right straunge, whie Iohn Picus Earle of Mirandula hath without farther
search; accounted of the shamefull errours of this man, concerning the
knowledge of the Celestiall Spheres, as of most certeine & approued
demonstrations; who hauing noted six and thirtie great coniunctions of
the superiour planets, Iupiter &
Saturne, since an hundred and fifteene yeares after the creation of the world,
unto the yeare of our Lord Christ 1385, there are not of them six true, and
scarce any of them set in such place and time as they ought to be. Leupold, Alcabice, and Ptolomee
were also of the same opinion, viz. the remouings of
people, warres, plagues, deluges, plentie, dearth, the chaunges of Estates and
Commonweales, to depend of the motion and coniuction of the Planets, and
especially of the superiour planets Saturne I say and Iupiter, and so much the
more if Mars be also in coniunction with them both. And so indeed as oft as
they are in coniunction together, such things thereof ensue as often times draw
euen the wiser sort into admitation: howbeit that no necessitie be imposed upon
man kind by the influence of the heauens. But
howsoever that be, it is manifest the Cardinall of Arliac to have beene most
grieuously deceiued, who reckning up those great coniunctions from the
beginning, supposeth it by his account to have beene seauen thousand yeares
since the creation of the world, following therein the errours of Alphonsus, Eusebius, and Beda;
which the great consent not of the Hebrewes onely, but of all Christians also
hath long ago reiected: so soone as by the old interpretation of the Bible it
was perceiued them to have erred in their account aboue a thousand five hundred
yeares: whereas all Churches at this present follow the more certeine account
of Philo the Iew, who followed almost the mean betwixt
Iosephus and the later Hebrewes: for Iosephus differeth 342 yeares, and Philo but an 160 from the other Hebrewes. Whereof it is to be
gathered this present yeare, which is from
the birth of our Sauiour Christ 1583, (wherin Bodin writ
these things in Latin) to have beene 5531, or at most 5555 since the creation
of the world. Wherefore Arliac is deceiued, who put the
coniunction of the superiour Planets seauen thousand yeres ago, in the 320
yeare after the creation of the world: which after that computation must haue
happened twelue hundred yeares before that the world was made. The same man
doth suppose also that at the creation of the world, the Horoscope whereof he
discribeth, the first degree of Cancer to have beene then rising, the Sunne
then to have beene in Aries, (which to be false we have by necessarie arguments before proued) the Moone and Venus in Taurus,
Saturne in Aquatius, Iupiter in Pisces, Mars
in Scorpio, Mercurie in Gemini: which is all false and quite contrarie unto the
nature and motion of the celestiall Spheres, which is manifest unto every man
which shall more narrowly looke thereinto, or take account of the motions of
the Planets from thence unto these times: not to speake of that, that he placed
the Sunne in the xix degree of Aries, and Mercurie in the xv of Gemini, hauing
so against nature divided the one of them from the other six and fiftie
degrees, as we have before declared: viz. that Mercurie
when he is farthest from the Sunne, neuer to be farther off than six and
thirtie degrees. Which may suffice in passing by, ot show that the Hypothesis
of the Cardinal of Arliac and his foundation being false, the rest that is
thereon built cannot stand. But this he had propounded unto himselfe, It to
be a thing contrarie unto the maiestie of
the Planets, if in the creation of the world he should place them other where
than every one of them in their owne throne and chariot: which deuises of the
vnskilfull, are more light and farther from the antiquirie of the Chaldeis,
than that they deserue to be refelled.
But how much more certainlie and better do they, which hauing consideratlie
looked thorow the antiquities of the Hebrewes, and the animaduertions of Copernicus (who most diligently corrected the errors of
Alphonsus, and of the Arabians) going orderly
retrograde from these oppositions and coniunctions of the Planets which we now
behold, unto the verie first beginning, iudge of the reuolution of the time
past, as also of the chaunge and state of Commonweales; if yet by this meanes
any such iudgement, free from impietie and
rashnesse may be made. Neither is it to be hoped (except happelie in an
innumerable sort of worlds) that the three superiour Planets shall meet
together in the first point of Aries, whereof our wisards rashly diuine a
generall destruction of Commonweales, as also of the whole world then to ensue
by fyre from heauen. Howbeit that in the yeare of our Lord Christ 1909, there
shall be a meeting together of the three superiour Planets in the ninth degree
of Aries: which yet for all that is no true coniunction, as not made by the
centers, but by the Orbes and Spheres of the Planets. And in the yeare 1584,
Saturne and Mars shall be in coniunction in the first point and 46 minutes of
Aries, and Iupiter in the same signe, but distant from them twelue degrees,
with the Sunne and Mercurie: which coniunction
shall scarce chaunce againe in the reuolution of eight hundred yeares. And
inHow a man may without offence presage the chaunges of
Cities and Commonweales. this sort it is lawfull for a man looking
into the yearely course of time, by writing to commend unto posteritie the
chaunges of cities and Commonweales, and so by things precedent and alreadie
forepassed to iudge also of things to come: yet sauing alwaies the maiestie of
almightie God, who is himselfe bound unto no lawes of nature, neither hath
thereunto bound any of his seruants. Wherein many greatly offend, who thinke
the power and influence of the celestiall Spheres to be nothing, when as yet
for all that their strength and power hath alwaies beene most great and
effectuall, not onely upon these elements which we here see, and so upon all
other sorts of liuing creatures, but euen upon
them also which live like beasts, as * in sacred writ is to beIoh. 39. and 40. seene,
and yet of the good nothing at all to be feared. So many stood in great doubt
in the yeare 1524, wherein the three superiour Planets, Saturne, Iupiter, and
Mars were in coniunction in the tenth degree of Pisces, the rest of the Planets
together with the Dragons head being in Aquarius & Pisces, both of them
waterie Signes. Which selfe same yeare in the moneth of Februarie were twentie
other coniunctions of theVaine feares often times conceiued,
upon Astrologers vaine predictions. Planets also among themselves,
besides the sixe starres; which of all other things, was a thing most worthie
the admiration. So that hereupon the Astrologers all the world over agreeing
together for the destruction of the world, with a great feare terrifyed the minds of many weake men; in that they so constantly
all with one consent affirmed, the world to be
now againe ouerwhelmed with an vniuersall deluge and inundation of waters; in
somuch that many miscreants caused shippes to be made for them to saue
themselves in from such the rage of the waters, and especially Auriolus President of Tholose a most cunning lawier, but
a man either ignorant, or a contemne of the lawes of
God, howbeit that he heard the promises of God still preached unto him, and the
oath by him made unto Genes. 7.Noah that he would no more destroy the world by water.
And true it is that in that yeare were flouds and inundations of waters in
diuers countries, but yet no such generall deluge as was foretold and feared,
neither any cities or countries at all knowne to be drowned. Wherefore to
affirme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of Commonweales, it sufficeth not
to behold onely those great coniunctions of
the three superiour Planets, but also diligently to obserue and note the meane
coniunctions, which are every two hundred and fortie, and every twentie yeare:
as also the eclipse of the Sunne, and of the Moone, with the oppositions and
coniunctions of the inferiour Planets amongst themselves, and with superiour
planets, and in briefe their mutuall traiections, as also the force and power
of the fixe starres, and their respect towards others. True it is that many of
the auntient writers have noted either dearth, or popular diseases, great
mortalitie of liuing creatures, or the remouing of people, inundations of
waters, or the destruction of cities, or chaunges of kingdomes to have followed
such coniunction of the superiour planets; yet not in every place generally,
but in certaine countries and places onely,
whereby they have by a certain coniecture iudged this or that signe to be by
God deputed unto this or that countrie. And hereof according to the power of
the foure elements they have divided the twelue celestiall signes into foure
parts, and have thereof left certaine instructions to posteritie: whereof for
all that because they were not by long experience approued they could make no
certaine art: as the Chaldies haueThe vanitie of the
Chaldean Astrologers. fained, who vaunted themselves to have spent
470 thousand yeares in the practise of natiuities, the better to perswade men
of the certaintie of their knowledge, and to make it thereby the more saleable.
Which the Chaldean bables spred abroad farre and wide unto all people, but vnto
none more foolishly then to the Indian Chinois, who say 783 thousand and seauen
hundred sixtie two yeares, to be the last yeare past since the creation of the world. Others there be which in
that matter lie not so loudly and yet impudently enough. For Linus the most auntient writer of the Greekes, Orpheus and Heraclitus, shut up the period of
the greatest yeare within the reuolution of 360 thousand yeares, whereof they
supposed an hundred fourescore foure thousand to be past. But a certaine
Aegiptian priest vaunted before Solon, the Aegiptians
his countrie men to have an historie of twentie thousand yeares written in
Hieroglyphicall letters. And a little while after Herodotus (called the father of historie) vnderstood from the same
Aegiptians, recordes of thirteene thousand yeares to be extant in their sacred
letters. Diodorus yonger then the rest going into Aegipt
to find out the trueth, heard certaine Priests to say antiquities of three and
thirtie thousand yeares old to be found
amongst the Aegiptians: but when he came to wey the trueth of the matter in
equall ballance, he found all their antiquitie to consist but of three thousand
seauen hundred yeares: the computation of which time from the beginning of the
world, agreeth altogether with Philo, or within little
lesse then two hundred yeres. And truely Callisthenes
perswaded by the speech of Aristotle his master, when as
others at the sacking of Babylon greedely sought after the Persian wealth, he
diligently searched out and gathered together the bookes and antiquities of the
Chaldies, and there noted all the historie of the Chaldies to have bene
comprehended in 1903 yeares: which time well agreeth
with the sacred historie, if we account the time from Nimrod, who first obtained the
soueraigntie of the Chaldies: which historie is to be thought so much the
truer, for that it is so reported by Simplicius a
mortall enemie of the Christians, as wee have elswhere declared. And therefore
Ptolomey, who farthest repeating from vttermost
remembrance the antiquities of the Chaldies (of them I say, which had noted the
stedie courses of the celestiall Spheres) bringeth the beginnings of the
celestiall motions no farther than from Nabonassar, and
from those eclipses of the moone which happened in the time of his raigne, that
is, the yeare of the world 3750: But Ptolomey flourished
in the time of Adrian the emperour, about foure hundred
yeares after Nabonassar. Wherefore it ought not to seeme
straunge to any man, if he neuersomuch as once suspected the motion of
trepidation, neither vnderstood the reuolution
of the eight Sphere: yea he well obserued not the Equinoctials: For hee saith,
The Equinoctium to have bene the the twentie sixt of September, after the sunne
rising: which Hisparchus had taught to have happened 285
yeares the same day of the moneth, about midnight, whose errours could scarcely
be perceiued in the time of our ancestors: as not long ago Io. Regiomontanus shewed the motion of trepidation, before vnto
Astronomers vnknowne. Wherefore by what meanes could they by any art conclude
mens fortunes, or the chaunges and ruines of cities and Commonweales, who
vnderstood not so much as the celestiall motions, and much lesse the histories
of all nations, when as yet they scarcely knew the tenth part of the
world?
Wherefore they do foolishly which attribute the Quadripartite booke to Ptolomey,The triplicities of the caelestiall signes not to be
determinatly assigned unto certaine regions and countries, as the
Astrologers appoynt. wherein the fiery Triplicitie is giuen to
Europe, and those countries which lye betwixt the West and the North; the ayrie
triplicitie unto Asia, and those places which are seated betwixt the North and
the East; the watrie triplicitie unto Affrike, and the earthly triplicitie vnto
the other places. Neither have those things followed the coniunctions of the
superiour planets, which should have followed had their rules beene true. Now
if any man thinke (as many there be which think right foolishly) the places of
the signes being chaunged, the force and nature of the celestiall Spheres to be
chaunged also; he must surely vtterly subuert all the knowledge of the force
and power of the stars by them before set downe and delivered: seeing that the
fix starres are found since the beginning of
the world to have passed through the fourth part of the eight Sphere: but since
the time wherein the course of the celestiall Spheres began first to bee of the
Chaldeis noted under king Nabonassar unto this our time,
to have ouergone almost a whole signe, , or which is all one, the Equinoctials in
the same space, to have preuented the staies of the wandering starres, , and yet neuerthelesse
the force and power of the celestiall houses approued in mens natiuities, is
still the selfe same that it is reported to have before bene: which thing to be
so, Cardan himselfe confesseth: whom yet for all that it
ashamed him not to write the Britons, Spaniards, & Normans, in auntient
time gentle and modest nations, to be now (the regions of the starres being
changed) become slie, craftie, and deceitfull theeves; for that they were in antient time gouerned by Sagitary, but now by Scorpio▪ unto whom the same may be
aunswered which Cassius did unto a certain Chaldean
Astrologer, who forbad him to fight with the Parthians before the moone was out
of Scorpio: unto whomThe ieast of Cassius unto a Caldean
Astrologer.Cassius pleasantly aunswered, Non
Scorpiones metuo, sed Sagittarios, I feare not (said he) Scorpions, but
Sagittaries; meaning the Parthian archers, by whom the Roman legions wherwith
Crassus in Chaldea discomfited and ouerthrowne. And
truely if Cardans opinion were true, the nature of all
things must needs so be subuerted, which yet is still the same which euer it
was: For the people toward the North are now taller and stronger, and more
warlike than the rest of the people of the world; and such Vitruuius,Plinie, Caesar, Strabo, and Plutarch, have writ them to have beene sixteene hundred yeare agoe: and therefore them to be pleasant,
drunkards, grosse witted, hoarce, gray eyed, yellow haired: but Southerne
people to bee sad, small of stature, leane, weake, smooth, blacke eyed, curled
haire, and cleere of voice. And yet it is manifest, the coniunctionsThe coniunctions of the superior Planets to have oftentimes
wrought great effects for the alteration and changing of
Commonweales. of the superiour planets in the same celestiall house,
viz. in Scorpio to have showed their force (if it
were any) in Asia, and Europe, and not in Affrike, which they say to be
gouerned by the signe of Scorpio. For before the chaunge of the Roman empire
was made, and that Popular estates transferred unto the soueraigntie of Caesar alone, the superiour planets with a great
coniunction met together in Scorpio: which coniunction chaunged againe about
seauen hundred yeares after: at which time innumerable legions of the Arabians
hauing receiued the new doctrine of Muhamed, rebelled against the Greeke emperours, subdued
a great part of the East Asia, abolished the orders, customes, rites,
ceremonies, and lawes of the Christians, when as yet Asia is in situation
contrarie unto Europe. The same coniunction happened in the yeare of our Lord
164, after which ensued diuers motions of the
people, almost in all parts of the world. For Ladamachus
king of the Tartars was by his subiects thrust out of his kingdome: Henrie the sixt, king of England was by his subiects also
taken and in prison slain, Edward the iiij of a subiect
made king: Frederike the third driuen out of Hungary by
Matthias Coruinus, who of a prisoner was chosen a
king: Lewes the eleuenth the French king, by his
nobilitie and vassals besieged in his principall citie, and brought in daunger
to have lost his estate. At which time also Alexander
(commonly called Scanderbeg) the king of Albania his soone, brought up in
the Turkes court, reuolted from the Turke, and tooke up armes against him. Yet
is it worth the noting, that the great coniunctions of superiour planets, show
their effects more in Scorpio, a martial signe, than in any other the rest of
the signes, and so much the more if Mars be there
als, or else some one of the other planets be also
in coniunction or opposition with them. With like coniunction the same planets
met together also in Sagittarie, in the yeare of our Lord Christ 74: at which
time all the land of Palestine was sacked, the citie of Hierusalem burnt and
rased, and eleuen hundred thousand dead in the warres: at which selfe same time
were seene in Europe great civill warres, and foure emperours slaine the same
yeare. Two hundred and fortie yeres after, another coniunction of the
same planets chaunced in Capricorne, after
which ensued wonderfull chaunges not onely of Commonweales, but euen of empires
and kingdomes also: Constantine the Great being therein
chiefe doer: who hauing put to flight and slaine foure emperors, and translated
the seat of the empire from the West into the East, by a perpetuall law tooke
away the vaine and superstitious worshipping of the Paynim gods. We see also,
that after the coniunction of the same planers in Aquarius, in the yeare 430,
the Gothes, the Ostrogothes, the Francons, the Gepiges, the Heruli, the Hunnes,
& other Northerne people going out like swarmes of bees, ouerranne and
ransacked the prouinces of the Roman empire, and most cruelly sacked the verie
citie it selfe, sometime the seat of the empire. And againe in the yeare 1524,
when as the coniunction of the same superiour
planets, (yea twentie other coniunctions) had happened in Pisces, most great
motions of the people ensued thereafter in many places in Europe: the people in
armes against the nobilitie set all Germany on a broyle: in which warre an
hundred thousand men are reported to have bene slaine: the Rhodes by the Turkes
was taken from the Christians: Frederike, his brother
Christierne being driuen out of his kingdome,
possessed the kingdome of Denmarke: Gostauus of a priuat
man became king of Sweden: Francis the French king
ouerthrowne at Pauia was taken prisoner by the Spaniards. Besides that, it is
to be seene, that after the great coniunction of the same superiour planets in Leo, in the yeare 796 king Charlemaigne ouerthrew the estates of the Lombards, tooke their king, and conquered Italie. At
which very selfe same time the Polonians made choyce of their first king: with
diuers other notable and remarkable chaunges. So also fortie yeares after, the
same coniunction happened in the signe of Sagittarie, when as the Moores sacked
diuers countries, inuaded a part of Greece, and ouerran Italie: and the Danes
were then up in great civill warres: when as at the same time Charlemaigne made himselfe Lord of Germanie, tooke away the Paynim
superstition in Saxonie, and chaunged all the Commonweales and principalities
in Germanie, and Hungarie, which he brought under his obeysance. With this
great coniunction happened also foure eclipses: which hath not happened since:
but six hundred thirtie six yeares after, viz. in the
yeare 1544, in which time haply there had bene
moe notable changes seene, if the great coniunction which hapned the yeare
following in Scorpio, had happened the same yeare. And yet neuerthelesse as it
was, all Germanie was up in armes; which warres continued seuen yeares after.
In briefe, if any foreknowledge be to be had from celestiall things, for the
chaunges of Commonweales, we must consider the coniunctions of superior
planets, since 570 yeres, with the coniunctions, eclipses, and aspects of
inferiour planets, and of the fix starres at the time of the great
coniunctions, and to compare them with the truth of histories, and of times
with coniunctions before past; and not wholly to rest upon opinion of them,
which have determinatly assigned the Triplicities unto regions, which I have by
euident examples before shewed not to be of any good assurance, but rather to
stay upon the nature of the signes and of the
planets. And yet for all that to referre the causes and effects of them vnto
the great God of nature, and not to tie them unto his creatures. As didThe errour of Leouicius.Ciprianus Leouitius, who of a coniunction of almost all
the planets, than to come together with an eclips of the sunne in the yeare
1584 by his writings (as from an oracle) denounced the end of the world euen
then to come, saying, Procul dubio alterum aduentum filij Dei
& hominis in maiestate gloriae suae praenuntiat, Without all doubt
(saith he) it foreshoweth another comming of the sonne of God and man in the
maiestie of his glorie. But seeing he had so strongly assured men then of the
consummation of the world, why did he yet write his Ephemerides for thirtie
yeares after, when as the celestiall signes and all Commonweales should
according to his predictions have before
perished? But therein he found himselfe as wel deceiued, as was before him Albumar, who with like rashnesse had written, That the
Christian religion should take end in the yeare 1460. And Abraham the Iew (surnamed The Prince of
Astrologers) who prophesied, That in the yeare 1464 should be borne a
great captaine (whom they call Messias) who should
deliver the Iewes his countrey men from the seruitude of the Christians. And
Arnold the Spaniard, who with like follie prophesied
of the comming of Antichrist, in the yeare of our Lord 136. But Leouicius might have knowne, that since the creation of
the world unto this time, there have beene two hundred and threescore
coniunctions of the superious planets, wherein were twentie foure great ones;
that is to say, such as still come againe
after the reuolution of two hundred and fortie yeares, Iupiter and Saturne meeting together in the
same triplicitie (as they call it) and the lesser euerie twentie yeares: and
the meanest planets, as of Saturne and Mars, euerie thertie yeares in the signe Cancer: and the greatest of
all, viz. of Iupiter and Saturne in Aries, which commeth againe about euerie eight
hundred yeares. Howbeit that Messahala calleth it the
greatest coniunction of all, when as the three superior planets meet together
in Aries: which yet I see not shall chaunce in the yeare 1584, as Leouicius supposeth, when as Iupiter shall be distant twelue degrees from the full coniunction of
Saturne and Mars: which cannot
rightly be called a coniunction so much as by their
Spheres. But whereas the same coniunction, yea and a greater too, together with
the most darke eclipses of the sunne, and of
the moone, happened in the raigne of Charles the Great,
yet wee see not the world therefore to have taken end. True it is, that the
Hebrew learned men write, the destruction of all this elementarie world, and so
of allThe opinion of the learned Hebrues concerning the
consumation of the world. mankind, & of all Commonweales, to
ensue after euerie seuen thousand yeares, by the inundation of waters, or els
by fire, and so to rest a thousand yeares: after which God shal againe restore
that which is perished: and that this shal be done seuen times, which maketh
nine and fortie thousand yeres compleat, and that then this elementarie world
and the celestiall also, with all the bodies thereof shall take end, the
maiestie of the great eternall God, with all the blessed spirits yet still
remaining. Which they say to bee by the word of God, howbeit verie obscurely
declared: when as the tilling of the ground is
commaunded every seuenth yeare to be left off: and after seuen times seuen, not
only the tilling of the ground is commaunded to be left off, but euen slaues
and debtors to be set free, and euerie man to returne againe unto his owne
lands and dwelling. Truly it is by long obseruation at length knowne and found
out, the motion of trepidation of the eight Sphere to accomplish the course
thereof, in the reuolution of seuen thousand yeares, and the ninth Sphere in
the space of fortie nine thousand yeares. Whereof Io.
Regiomontanus hath since within this foure and twentie yeares made
plaine demonstration: of the truth of which motion neither the auntient
Chaldies nor Aegyptians had any knowledge, but were thereof altogether
ignorant. And albeit that the auntient learned Hebrewes, have by the gift and
goodnesse of God, had not onely the knowledge
of diuine and celestiall things, but euen the hidden and secret causes of
nature also reuealed and made knowne unto them, and that from them the
knowledge of most goodly things is unto other men come: as Porphyrie the greatest of all the Philosophers of his time confesseth:
and that this doctrine of the Hebrewes curteth off the impietie of them which
hold the eternitie of the world, or els that God was for an innumerable world
of yeares altogether idle: yet doe these so learned Hebrewes attribute nothing
unto fatall necessitie, either feare any the decrees of the celestiall starres,
but affirme all things to be gouerned and changed by the will and pleasure of
almightie God: as by him which as oft as he will is of power to shake the
nature of all things, yea euen the verie foundations of the world it selfe, as
was well seene in the generall deluge, which
ouerwhelmed the whole world 1656 yeares after the creation thereof.
Yet doubt I not but that some more certaine precepts might be giuen of the
chaunges,By what order and meane some more certain and
probable coniecture might be made of the chaunges and ruines of
commonweales. and ruines of Commonweales, if a man would enter into a
certaine account of the time past euen from the beginning of the world: and so
comparing one thing with another, and knitting one thing unto another, shall
proceed farther, and set in order the varietie of Historiographers at varience
among themselves: and also going backwards, shall of all the eclipses of the
Sunne and of the Moone, euen to the beginning of the world, by most certaine
demonstrations comprehend the reason of the whole time past: and compare the
histories of the most true writers amongst themselves, and with the oppositions
and coniunctions of the celestial starres and bodies, knit and conioyne
the same with numbers, whose force in all
the course of nature is greatest: which things foulded up in infinit
obscurities, and hidden and shut up in the most secret places of nature, are to
be showed not by vaine coniectures, but by most euident and manifest arguments.
Which is not to be hoped for from them which are more desirous of words than of
matter or knowledge: who upon an obstinat opinion confound the beginning of the
world, and beginning the yere at the spring, which they ought to begin at
Autumne, and the day at noone, which they ought to begin at euen, not
remembring darknesse to have bene before light, confusion before order, and a
rude confused Chaos before the world it selfe: beside
that it is in the sacred bookes of Genesis so often repeated, Vespere & mane dies
vnus, The euening and morning were made one day. Truely I commend many
things in Gerardus Mercator a most pure writer for the
obseruation of time: but in that I cannot commend him, that he beginneth the
yeare elswhere than of Libra; whereas we have by most certaine reasons not
onely out of the most auntient customes of almost all nations; but also out of
the most pure fountainsThe greatest and most notable
chaunges of estates and Commonweales to have commonly hapned in the moneth
of September. of sacred scriptures, declared the yeare to have taken
beginning in Autumne. Which we will againe show by the great and notable
changes of estates and Commonweals: whereby things to come may be the better
and more certainly perceiued, and the greatest chaunces, alterations, and
changes, seene to have happened about Autumne, that is to say, a little before,
or a little after the Autumnall equinoctiall in September, the Sun then entring into Libra: where the law of God
appointeth the beginning of the yeare. And first it is manifest, the generall
deluge to have begun and also ended in Autumne. We read also, the great
earthquakes, wherewith oft times great cities, and whole countries have bene
destroyed, to have happened in Autumne, such as was that trembling of the earth
at Constantinople, wherein thirteene thousand men were lost in the yeare 1509,
in the moneth of September: in which moneth, and in the same citie, the earth
againe grieuously shooke in the yeare 1479. So also in the yeare of Christ 545
such an earthquake happened in September, that almost all Europe shooke
therewith. The same moneth of September, wherein the battell was fought at
Actium, ten thousand men perished in the land
of Palestine with an earthquake. And not long agoe, viz.
in the yeare 1526, and 27, in the moneth of September a great earthquake
happened at Puteoli. The third day of the same moneth, in the yeare of our Lord
1556, such a tempest of raine and thunder happened at Lucerne, as that a
greater (as is reported) was neuer seene: which selfe same month & day the
towne hall at Maidenburg in Germanie, with the citisens dauncing therein, were
all together with lightning consumed. The victorie of Augustus also against Antonius in the battaile
at Actium, was by him obtained the second of September, where question was of
the greatest empire that euer was, and the matter tried with the greatest
forces that euer were assembled in any wars whatsoeuer: by which victorie the
empire both of the East and of the West, fell into the power of Augustus himselfe alone.
The third day of the same moneth the Macedonian empire, which had so long, aud
with so great glorie flourished, was by Paulus Aemilius
chaunged from a great kingdome into diuers Popular estates, the king Perseus being by him ouercome and taken prisoner. Sultan Soliman on the like day tooke Buda the chiefe
citie of Hungarie, with the greatest part of that kingdome. The same day and
moneth Rhoderike king of Spaine was by the Moores
ouercome and chased out of his kingdome, which wrought a wonderfull chaunge in
the state of all that Monarchie. On the same day and moneth reuoluing, Lewes the twelth the French king tooke the citie of
Milan, with Lewes Sfortia duke thereof, whome he
depriued of his estate. The like day the emperour Charles the sift passed over into Affrike, and inuaded the kingdome of Algiers. The day following, that is to
say, the fourth of September Sultan Soliman died before
Sigeth, which being one of the strongest holds of Christendome, was by the
Turkes taken the seuenth day after. The ninth of September, in the yeare of our
Lord 1544, Iames king of Scots was by the English men
slaine, and his armie ouerthrowne. The same day in the reuolution of the yeare,
the councell of Possi was gathered in Fraunce, Charles
the ninth then raigning in the yeare 1561, and a decree made for the receiuing
of the new religion, which raised most great troubles in France. The same day
and moneth Alexander the Great at Arbela ouerthrew Darius king of Persia, with his armie of foure hundred
thousand men; and so ioyned the kingdome of Persia
unto his owne. The tenth of September Iohn duke of
Burgundie, was by the commandement of Charles the seuenth slaine, wherof great wars arose
throughout all Fraunce. The like day and moneth was Peter
Louys the tyrant of Placence slaine by the conspiratours. We read also,
that the eleuenth of September the Palaeologues, the Greeke emperours tooke the
imperiall citie of Constantinople, and draue out thence the earles of
Flaunders, who had there possessed the empire 560 yeres. The fourteenth day of
September the Swiffers were with a great slaughter ouerthrowne by the French,
in the expedition of Mirignan: which selfe same day also the Turkes great armie
laid siege to Vienna, the Metropoliticall citie of Austria. The seuenteenth day
the French armie was by the English ouerthrowne at Poitiers, and king Iohn of France by them taken prisoner. Which day also,
(or rather the like in the reuolution of the
yeare) a peace was concluded at Soissons, betwixt Francis the first, the French king, & the emperour Charles the fift, being both readie with their great
armies to have fought for the kingdome, to the great hazard of both their
estates, in the yeare 1544: a thing the more to be noted, for that the same
yeare, moneth, and day, was also a great coniunction of the superior planets.
The same day of the same moneth, in the yeare 1575 the Christian fleet with a
great slaughter ouerthrew the Turkes great fleet in the battell of Lepanto. The
eighteenth day of the same moneth Boulleine was delivered unto the Englishmen.
And the foure and twentieth of September Constantine the
Great, in a bloudie battell ouercame Maxentius the
emperour, in the yeare of our Lord 333, and so of a simple straunge captaine
made himselfe a great Monarch (which wrought a
most notable and maruellous chaunge almost throughout the whole world) and so
from thenceforth commaunded the account of the yeare to bee begun in September▪
and in the Greeke feasts unto that day is added, . Wee find also, that in the yeare 1136,
in the moneth of September there was a great coniunction both of the superiour
and inferiour planets, in so much that the Astrologers of the East, by their
letters written from all parts (as saith the Cronicle of Saint Denis) threatned the world with great calamities, and the
people with the chaunge of their estates, which afterwards indeed chaunced:
howbeit that in that the author of the historie erred, that he saith, How that
the same yeare there was an eclips of the Sun the eleuenth of Aprill, and
another of the Moone the fift of the same
moneth, a thing by nature impossible. It is also right memorable, that the
seuenteenth day of September, in the yeare 1567 Charles
the ninth the French king, was by his subiects assailed neere unto Meaux, where
by speedie flight, and the helpe of the Swissers he hardly with life escaped
the hands of the conspiratours: the which selfe same day, moneth, and yeare,
Henry king of Sweden was by his rebellious subiects
dispoiled of his estate, and east in prison, where he yet remaineth, without
any great hope to be euer with life from thence againe delivered. The battell
Montcontour was fought also in September. And the eighteenth day of September
Baiazet at Nicopolis with a notable ouerthrow
defeated a great armie of the Christians, of three hundred thousand men. And
the same day Saladin tooke the citie of Hierusalem, on
which Pompey had
before taken it. Pope Boniface the eight also was in
September 1303 by the French taken prisoner, and depriued of his papall
dignitie. We read also many the greatest princes and monarches of the world, to
have as this moneth died: as namely the great emperour Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Aurelianus, Theodosius
the Great, Valentinianus, Gratianus, Basilius,
Constantine the fift, Leo the fourth, Rodolphe, Frederike the fourth, Charles the fift, all Roman or Greeke emperors. And of the French
kings, Pipin, Lewes the younger, Philip the third, Charles the fift surnamed the
Wise, and Lewes his kinsman king of Hungaria and
Polonia, with other most noble and famous Monarkes in
number infinite. But that is worth the marking
that Lothaire and Charles the
bauld, the one the king of Fraunce, and the other the German Emperour (and both
of them the sonnes of Lewes the deuout emperour) both
dyed the xxix of September, the first of them in the yeare 855, and the other
877. So Charles the fift, and Sultan
Solyman, two of the greatest Emperours that were these many ages, were
both borne in one yeare, and so both also in one moneth dyed, viz. in September. Antonius Pius also and Francis the first the French king, both of them great
& famous Monarques, were both borne in September, and died both in March
the moneth opposite to September. Octauius Augustus was
also borne in September,What times of the yeare the notable
chaunces and chaunges of the world most commonly happen in. and so
likewise in the same moneth of September dyed. Whereby it is to be vnderstood,
Autumne and especially that moneth wherein the world was created, viz. September, in a sort to carie as a marke
therof the notable chaunces of many the most noble and renowmed Princes, as
also the straunge chaunges which have happened aswell unto the whole world, as
unto particular Estates and Commonweales. The next conuersions and chaunges of
cities and Commonweales we see to happen into the signe of Aries, which is an
other period of the Sunne, and the third and fourth sort of chaunges to fall
out about the Winter or Sommer Solstitium, or farthest stayes of the Sunne: not
for that the creation of the world is to be deriued from Aries, but for the
notable periods of the Sunne in those times. Wherefore Leouicius following the dreames of vnskilful men, ought not to refer
the creation and destruction of the world unto the moneth of March; and much
lesse to threaten unto the world euen a present consummation and end. But he the same man had before by his writings
promised unto Maximilian the Emperour the soueraigntie
of all Europe, with power to correct and chastice the crueltie and tirannie of
other Princes (for so he writeth) of whom forLeouicius
taxed. all that it beseemeth him to have more modestly writ: But Maximilian was so farre from the soueraigntie which he
had in his vaine hope conceiued, as that he yet liuing, and with the German
hoast also looking on: Sultan Solyman without any
empeachment hauing farre and wide wasted the borders of the Empire, besieged
and forced Sigeth the strongest place of the Empire, yea
of all Europe: showing well that he should not have too far assured himselfe
upon the prophecie of Luther, who hath left in writing
that the power of the Turkes should from thenceforth diminish, which yet
more encreaseth than euer it did. But it is
straunge that Leouicius saw nothing of the straunge
chaunge of the three kingdomes his next neighbours: which sith he saw not, how
could he have such certein knowledge of the end of the world, neuer as yet vnto
the Angels themselves reuealed? For all which he bringeth no other reason, but
that the Christian religion must together with the world take end in the
waterie triplicitie, for that Christ Iesus himselfe was borne under the waterie
triplicitie; willing as should seeme to bring in an other deluge: Wherein he
showeth no lesse impietie then ignorance, whether we respect the maximes of the
Astrologers, who affirme and say that neuer planet ruinateth his owne house,
which should yet happen unto Iupiter being in
Pisces. (For certein it is in the signe Pisces in the great coniunction in the
yeare 1583 and 84, and that the coniunction of these two planets in that Signe
is alwaies friendly:) or that we follow the opinion of Plato, and of the Hebrewes, and of all other Philosophers, who
generally say, That the world is to be successiuely destroied first by water,
and then againe by fire: or else that we rest our selues (as indeed we ought)
upon the promises of God, who cannot lye, which he in mercie made to Noah neuer to drowne the world againe. But as we ought
not rashly certeinly to affirme any thing of the chaunges and ruines of
Monarchies and Commonweales: So can we not denie but that the effects are right
great and wonderfull in the coniunction of the higher
planets, when they chaunge the triplicitie, and especially when the three
Great and maruelous effects wrought by the coniunction of
the superior Planets. superiour planets are in coniunction together:
or that such their coniunction have concurrence with the the eclipses of the
Sunne or of the Moone: as it happened the day before the taking of Perseus king of Macedon, and the battell of Arbella in Chaldea, which drew after them the ruine of
two great Monarches, and the chaunge of diuers Commonweals, there appeared two
most great and darke eclipses of the Moone. As there did also in the beginning
of the Peloponesian warre, wherewith all Grecia was on a fire, the Sunne upon a
faire day was wonderfully darkened, euen at such time as Pericles the Athenian Generall began to set saile.
But as for them which contemne the force of the heauenly starres, or els are
altogether ignorant thereof; they stand as men amased, to see in the same
instant such conuersions and chaunges of
Commonweales, and such great and turbulent motions of the people together and
at once raised. As namely Polybius (himselfe an Atheist)
in his historie exceedingly maruelleth, That in the hundred and thirtieth
Olympiade in one selfe same time there was seene upon the sudden a new chaunge
of princes almost throughout the whole world. As namely Philip the younger to become king of Macedon, Achaeus to be king of Asia, which he vsurped upon Antiochus, Ptolomeus Philopater to become king of Aegypt, Lycurgus the younger, king of Lacedemonia, Antiochus king of Syria, Hanniball
generall of the Carthaginensians: and all these people as it were at the same
instant up in armes one of them against another; the Carthaginensians against
the Romans, Ptolomey against Antiochus, the Achaeans and Macedonians, against the Aetolians and Lacedemonians. And afterward also three of the
most famous generals of the world, namely Scipio Affricanus,
Hannibal, and Philopoemenes, to have all died
(as Liuie writeth) in one yeare. These great chaunges
are more euident to be seene after the coniunction of the two superiour
planets, with the Sunne, or Mars: as it happened in the
yeare 1564, that the superiour planets were in coniunction in the signe Leo,
together with the Sunne & Mercurie: So have we
afterwards seene strange motions and sturres almost all Europe ouer. We haue
seene in the same time, in the same yeare, in the same moneth, in the same day,
viz. the twentie seuenth of September, in the yeare
1567, the French king guarded with the Swissers, assailed and in daunger to
have bene taken by his subiects: and Henrie king of
Sweden dispoyled of his estate, and by his
owne subiects cast in prison: and euen as it were at the same time Mary the most noble queene of the Scots spoiled of her
kingdome by her subiects, and by them imprisoned, by whome it beseemed her to
have bene delivered: and the king of Thunes driuen out of his kingdome by the
king of Algiers: the Arabians up in armes against the Turkes, the Moores of
Granado and the Flemings against the king Catholike, the Englishmen against
their queene, and all Fraunce in combustion. The same coniunction of the three
superiour planets happened also an hundred yeares before, viz. in the yeare 1464, but not so precisely, neither in the signe of
Leo, but onely in the signe of Pisces, and yet by and by after all the people
were seene up in armes, and not onely the princes among themselves, but the
subiects also against their princes, as we
have before said.
Now as for that which Copernicus (the great Astrologer
of his time) saith, The changesThe opinion of Copernicus
concerning the motion & influence: of the earth, refuted. and
ruines of kingdomes and Commonweales, to depend of the Eccentrique motion of
the earth, it is such, as that it deserueth no aunswere or account to bee
thereof made. For that he for the ground thereof supposeth two things most
absurd: the one That the influences which all Philosophers attribute unto the
starres, proceed from the earth, and not from the heauens: the other, That the
earth it selfe moueth with the same motions, which all the Astrologers of
former times (except Eudoxus) have alwais giuen unto the heauens. And yet more straunge it is to make the
Sunne immouable and the center of the world;
and the earth fiftie thousand leagues distant from the center, and to make part
of the heauens, & of the planets, to be mouable, and part of them
immouable. Which old opinion of Eudoxus, Ptolomey hath
by probable arguments and reasons refuted. Whereunto Copernicus hath well aunswered: unto whome Melancthon hath onely with this verse right well replied, God in the heauens hath a tabernacle for the Sunne, which
commeth out as a bridegroome out of his chamber, and reioyceth as a Giant to
runne his course. It goeth out from the vttermost part of the heauen, and
runneth about to the end of it againe: and there is nothing hid from the
heat thereof. So also might he say, That Iosua
commaunded the Sunne and Moone to stay their course. But unto all this might be
aunswered, That the Scripture oftentimes accommodateth and sitteth it selfe unto our weake sences: as when it
calleth the Moone the greatest light next unto the Sunne, which yet
neuerthelesse is the least of all the starres except Mercurie. But this
doctrine of Copernicus might by a manifest
demonstration, which no man hath yet vsed, easily be refelled, viz. that one simple bodie hath but one simple motion
proper unto the same: as is manifestly to be proued by the principles of
naturall Philosophie: then seeing that the earth is one of the simple bodies,
as the other elements be, we must necessarily conclude, that it cannot have but
one onely motion proper unto it selfe: and yet for all that Copernicus hath assigned unto it three diuers motions: whereof it can
have but one proper unto it selfe, so that the other must needs be violent, a thing altogether impossible: and so by
the same consequence impossible also, that the alterations and chaunges of
Commonweales, should proceed from the Eccentrique motion of the earth.
But let vs now come unto the opinion of Plato, who
thought the chaunges andThe most darke and obscur opinion of Plato concerning
the chaunges and ruines of Commonweales. ruines of Commonweales to
ensue, when as the consent of the sweetnesse which proceedeth from the harmonie
thereof is interrupted and broken. Which chaunceth when in the nuptiall number
(as he tearmeth it) you depart farthest from those concords which the Musitions
call and . As for the nuptiall
number he defineth it to be, that number which beginning of an unitie, as of a
mayden inuiolate is divided in a double or triple sort of consent, in such sort
as that the male, that is to say the odd
numbers shall in continuate order be placed on the right hand, and the female,
that is to say, the euen numbers on the left hand in this sort and order. As
for the middle places they are to be filled with numbers
perfect, imperfect, quadrate, spherique, and cubique, so that no sort of
numbers be wanting. But this order of numbers may be infinite, for that the
force and power of tune and consent, is in diuision as infinite, as any other
dimension whatsoeuer. So that the forme of a well ordered Commonweale shall so
long be firme and sure, as it shall keepe right consent and tune, well agreeing
unto the sweet delite of the eare. The Dupla or Diapason, which is of one to two; the Sesquialtera, which is the
proportion of two to three, which maketh or a fift; the Sesquitertia or proportion
of three to foure, which maketh or a fourth. The Tripla porportion which
maketh , which for that
it comprehendeth al concords and consents is called , or a gathering of all together. Now if
you go farther as unto that proportion which is of foure to nine, the
proportion of these numbers being not harmonicall, their followeth thereof an
vnpleasant discord, which marreth the whole harmonie of a Commonwealte. And
this in mine opinion is that which Plato would say, for
no man as yet hath explaned this point; so that antiquitie it selfe hath not
without cause long since complained, nothing to be
more obscure than the Platonicall numbers.Nothing more obscure than the Platonical numbers. For
Forrester the Germaine is farre from the mind of Plato, when as he seeketh after triple and quadruple
proportions, for that in so doing he ouerthroweth the foundations of the
nuptiall number & the sides of the Triangle, which consist of the double
and triple proportion. But in him is also absurd, that he thinketh the same
proportion to be betwixt 27. and 64▪ which is of three to foure, a thing by
nature impossible, and contrarie to the grounds of the Mathematiques. But Plato willeth vs also to fill the vacant place of the
propounded triangle of the nuptiall number with such
other numbers as proportionally arise of the mutuall coniunction of the male
and female numbers, yet still continuing the harmonie, for that the same
concords are amongst them to be found, which
we have alreadie set downe amongst the other foure first numbers: as of the
mariage of two to three: viz. of two times three is
begot the number of six, which placed in the middest filleth up the emptie
place betwixt 4. and 9, which two numbers by no meanes make any consent or
harmonie, but the proportion of either of them unto sixe, is the same which is
is of three to foure, that is to say, Sesquialtera or , or a fift. And so also if the number of
two be as it were maried or in proportion ioyned unto six, or the number of
three, so combyned unto six; as viz. two times six, or
three times six, thereof shall arise two numbers, viz.
12. and 18, which shall fill the emptie space of the triangle betwixt 8. and
27. So if the number of two be proportionally
ioyned unto twelue, and the number of three to eighteene (as viz. two times twelue, or three times eighteene) thereof shall arise
the numbers of 24. and of 54. And againe, if three be ioyned unto twelue, or
that which is all one, two to eighteene, thereof ariseth the number of 36.
which three proportionate numbers of 24. 36. and 54. shall fill up the vacant
place of the triangle betwixt 16. and 81, the mutuall proportion of which
numbers so put into the void places of the triangle, and so filled with the
numbers next, still keepe a perpetuall sweet course, although the sides of the
triangle were infinitely extended, of which triange let this be the forme. If
therefore choice be had of such proportions as make a sweet consent in the
perpetuall course of numbers, the Commonwealth shall so be euerlasting: if so
be that the The true discord which indeedmaryeth the sweet harmonie of a
Commonweale. state of Commonweales depend of harmonie. But that
harmonie (as saith Plato) is sometime broken, so that
the sweet consent thereof must needs perish, and so Commonweales at length come
to ruine and decay. But to say the truth, is it not much more to be feared,
lest the subiects or citisens erring or declyning from the sweet and naturall
harmonie of well tuned lawes, and customes, shall in steed of them embrace most
wicked and pernitious lawes and fashions? And yet for all that will I not denie
but that harmonie and musike have great force & power for the chaunging of
a Commonweale, in which point both Plato and Aristotle well agree. Howbeit that Cicero is of opinion it to be a thing impossible, that for the musique
of a CommonwealMusike to be of great force, for the
chaunging or maintaining of a Commonweale. chaunged, the Commonweale
should it selfe therefore take chaunge. Whereof for all that we have a most memorable example, of the
Commonweale of the Cynethenses in Arcadia, who hauing giuen over the pleasure
of musique, shortly after fell into such sedition and civill warres, as wherein
no kind of crueltie was forgotten, or not put in execution: whereat every man
marueling why this people was become so wilde and barbarors, seeing that all
the rest of the people of Arcadia were wonderfull civill, courteous, and
tractable: Polybius was the first which noted it so to
have happened, for that they had left to take pleasure and delight in musique;
which from all antiquitie had beene alwaies more honored and esteemed in
Arcadia than in any place of the world else, in such
sort as that by the lawes and customes of that countrie every one was uppon great paines bound to exercise him selfe
therein, vntill he was thirtie yeares old, which was the meane (as sayth Polybius) the first lawgiuers of that people wisely
deuised, to quiet and tame them, being by nature rough and barbarous, as
commonlyMusique most honored in Athadia. all the inhabitants of the mountaines
and cold countries be. The like we may almost also say of the French nation,
whom Iulian the Apostata in his time calleth a barbarous
and fierce people and of all others most desirous of libertie, who yet now at
this day are in ciuilitie inferiour to no people of all Europe, none being more
tractable unto their magistrates or obedient unto their Princes than they, as
men by nature well, but by instruction better taught, and in the iudgement of
all their neighbours most skilfull in Musike. Wherein that is also worth the
noting, that almost all the French songes
& tunes (wherewith the countrie people are euen yet much delighted) are
still Ionique or Lidian, that is to say, of the fift or seuenth tune. Which
tunes Plato and Aristotle forbid
the youth and women to vse: for that they be of great force and power to
mollifie and effeminate the minds of men; and therefore would have them to vse
the Dorian tune, which our men call the first tune, to the intent that so they
might be the better instructed with a certaine pleasant modestie, mixt with
grauitie, a thing proper unto this Dorian Musike. Which prohibition might haue
serued better in the lesser Asia, where they have no other songes but of the
fift or seauenth tune; and namely in the countries of Lydia and Ionia: But the
people of the cold and mountaine Northern countries, which are ordinarily more
sauage or at least wise lesse courteous than
the people of the South and the inhabitants of the plaine countries, can no way
better tame and mollifie themselves than by vsing the Lydian and Ionique
harmonie. Which kind of Musike was also forbidden in the primitiue Church;
wherein it was not permitted to sing Psalmes or prayses unto God but in the
Dorian or first tune, which at this present is yet in the Church most in vse.
But as men which would tame wilde and sauage beasts, disarme them first of
their teeth and clawes; so the Lydian and Ionique harmonie disarmeth the more
outragious andLight musike forbidden in the primatiue
church barbarous people of their sauage and cruell nature, and maketh
them quiet and tractable: As it is happened unto the Frenchmen, who happely had
not beene so pliant and obedient unto the
lawes and statutes of this kingdome, if the nature which Iulian the Emperour saieth to have beene in them so hautie and
impatient of seruitude, had not by Musique beene attempered and mollified.
But of all those things which we have yet brought to iudge of the future
chaungesNumbers to be of greatforce, whatby to deeme the
chaunge and ruine of a Commonweale. and ruines of Commonweales, we
see no rule (whether it be of Astrologie or musike) certain and sure: howbeit
that we have by them some probable coniectures, whereof yet none seemeth vnto
mee more certain or easie, than that which may be drawen from numbers. For why
I thinke almightie God who with wonderfull wisdome hath so couched together the
nature of all things, and with certain their numbers, meanes, measures, and
consent, bound together all things to come: to have also within their certaine numbers so shut up and enclosed
Commonweales, as that after a certaine period of yeares once past, yet must
they needes then perish and take end, although they vse neuer so good lawes and
customes: as Plato with Aristotle
therein agree. But when that period shall be, neither of them declareth: except
some there be which suppose Plato to signifie it by
certaine obscure numbers in his eight booke De
Republica: at which rocke not onely all the Academikes, but euen almost all the sects of other Philosophers also,
have suffered shipwracke. And first of all Aristotle
skippeth over this place as over a dich, neither doth here carpe his maister
(as his manner is) when as for the obscuritie thereof he had not wherefore he
might reproue him. Proclus also hauing curiously enough enterpreted seauen
of Plato his bookes de Republica:The eight booke of Plato de Repub.
most difficult and obscure. would not so much as touch the eight,
stayed (as I suppose) with the difficultie of the matter. Theon also of Smyrna (for there is an other Theon also of Alexandria; who writt a commentarie upon Ptolomee in Greeke) a man most skilfull not in Plato his philosophie onely: but in the Mathematiques
also: at such time as he expounded Plato his Commonweale
there stucke fast, neither tooke upon him to expound this place. Cicero in one word excuseth the difficultie of Plato his numbers. Marsilius
Ficinus (in mine opinion) the sharpest of all the Academikes plainely confesseth himselfe not to know what Plato in that place ment: fearing lest it should so fall
out with him as it did with Iamblichus, who seemeth to
have bene willing in three words not to have manifested a thing of it selfe
most obscure, but rather to have made it
darker. Philo the Iewe euerie where imitating of Plato, thought that obscure and hidden number to be
fiftie, and that he saieth to be signified by the right cornered Scalenus, such
an one as Pithagoras comprehended in the three numbers
3, 4, 5. and therunto he supposeth those wordes of Plato
to be referred, sesqui tertia radix quinario coniuncta:
sesqui tertia the radix or root ioyned unto the
number of five for the proportion of 3, 2, 4. is the proportion sesqui tertia. But in that he is deceiued for that he
hath brought in a plaine number, whenas it appeareth Plato his meaning to have bene to have a solid number sought out,
which should in it selfe containe all kind of numbers, excepting the numbers
perfect. Yet Philo of these radicall numbers, 3, 4,
5,
Sesquitertia i that which containeth all that
an other thing doth, and a third part more. brought euerie one of
them apart into themselves maketh three quadrats: whereof are made 50 numbers, all plaine: but the wordes of Plato make mention of the hundred cube. Beside that there
be Dimetients incommensurable unto the sides, as in the number of Plato: whose wordes it pleaseth mee heare to set downe,
and to interpret the same: as well for that the interpretors doe in the
interpretation thereof verie much differ amongst themselves: as also for that
hee sayth the ignorance of that number to bee unto the Gouernours of Cities and
Common-weales almost capitall. . which is
as I interprer it, Truly the compasse of such things which
take their beginning from God, is by the perfect number comprehended: but
the compas of worldly things is contained by that number wherein are found
numbers exceeding, and numbers exceeded by encrease and decrease, three
spaces in foure tearmes comprehended; whereof are made numbers among
themselves both like, and vnlike, numbers encreased, and diminished, which
may be called by their owne names, and compared among themselves: whose
sesquitertiall radix ioyned unto the number of fiue, maketh two consents
thrice encreased, one equall equally: an hundred times an hundred: an other
equall, on one part of it selfe longer, of an hundred dimetients, which
might among themselves be compared, the numbers of five detracted lesse by
the unitie: but two of ineffable proportion: but an hundredCubes of the ternarie it selfe. And this number made by
Geometricall proportion, is in worldly things most mightie, to them which
have either the better or the worse beginning. Here Plato is sylie led away, not vnlike the fish
Polypus, hauing on every sideObscuritie by Plato and many
the auntient writers of purpose in their writings affected. cast out
his blacking like ynke, lest otherwise he should have beene entangled and
caught. Wherein truely he seemed to have imitated Heraclitus, to vnderstand whose writings he said a man had need of a
most skilfull interpretour. Which obscure kind of writing and speaking by Heraclitus deuised (when as he most often would beat into
his Schollers eares that his , that is to say speake obscurelie) is oft
times used not of Plato onely,
but euen of Aristotle him selfe also, to the intent that
so hauing cast a mist before his eyes aswell
of the learned as of the vnlearned, concerning the knowledge of most difficult
things, and shut up in the hidden secrets of nature, they might themselves
become therefore the more admirable. Which thing we especially note in the
bookes of nature; which bookes Aristotle boasteth
himselfe of purpose to have so writ, as that he would not have them to be
vnderstood, imitating therein Plato his most obscure
Timaeus: Which thing Lucilius writ also of him selfe,
that he had rather not to be at all vnderstood, then to be reprehended or found
fault with all. But let vs discover Plato his deceit by
those things which he himselfe writethPlato discouered and
in some sort refuted. more plainly, that we may more certeinly iudge
of those things which he fouldeth up in such obscuritie of words: for he would
that those things which take their beginning
from God, should be contained within the perfect number. But what thing is
there at length which oweth not the first beginning of the being thereof vnto
almightie God, either immediatly without any other meane cause, or else some
other the meane or middle causes comming betweene. And that God himselfe
without any other meane cause created the Angels, and other the celestiall
bodies not onely Plato, but euen the Manichies also themselves confesse; who yet most wickedly thought all
earthly things to have had their beginning from the prince of euils. True it is
that the earth brought forth plants & other liuing creatures, the waters
also fishes, and foules; yet both of them by the commaundement of almightie
God: But unto the creation of Man he would
also have the Faciamus hominem: Or let vs make man. Angels
present. Howbeit that Aristotle was of opinion the
formes of all things to be in a sort diuinely infused into them, when as he
writ in all things to be , or some diuine thing. As for the mind of man he calleth it not obscurely or
doubtfully but euen plainely : which is (as I interpret it) , from aboue, from God,
or from heauen, not out of the power of the seed, as he saith of other liuing
creatures: of whom for all that Virgil in generall
saith: Igneus est ollis vigor & caelestis origo, A
fierie force they haue, and a celestiall beginning. Wherefore we must confesse
all things to be included in perfect numbers if we will beleeue Plato. But let vs graunt unto the Academikes (which yet
is an impietie to do) these earthly things which we speake of, to have had
their beginning else where then from almightie
God, shall therefore the perfect numbers as better, be attributed unto heauenly
things? yea the perfect numbers should rather agree unto earthly things, for
that the perfect numbers how many soeuer they be are euen, and of the female
kind, for otherwise they were not perfect: neither are more than * foureThe foure perfect numbers within an hundred thousand, are 6.
496. 68▪ and 8128. within an hundred
thousand: there beeing also other perfect numbers * aboue that number of an
hundred thousand, but such as cannot be applied either unto diuine, or humaine
or worldlie things. Wherefore seeing that the number of six is the first
ofPerfect numbers aboue an hundred thousand: 130811,
2096128, 33550336. 536814528. the perfect numbers, it ought by the
opinion of Plato to agree unto things immediately by God
himselfe created; and yet we see the same number neuerthelesse to agree vnto
most vile and abiect liuing creatures. For Aristotle
writeth the Hare (by the law of God an
vncleane creature, & forbidden his holie people to eate of) to live at the
most but six yeares. The like number of yeares the same man attributeth also
unto Mice. And unto certaine kinds of flyes, as unto waspes and Bees six yeares
are by Virgill allotted, and their hiues are still made
six cornered; all which base creatures except the Hare are engendered of
putrifcation. But as saith the Poet: Numero Deus impare
gaudet, God delighteth in an odd number. And odd numbers are attributed
unto men: For that which Seneca writeth: Septimus quisque annus aetati notam imprimit, every
seauenth yeare imprinteth some marke into age, is to be vnderstood onely of the
male sexe: for experience showeth vs euen unto the view of the eye, that the
number of six maketh a chaunge, and leaueth a marke
unto the female kind: So that as men begin to
feele the heat of youth at fourteene yeares; women wax ripe at twelue, and so
holding on from six to six, still so find in themselves some notable chaunge in
the disposition either of their bodies, or of their mindes. All diuine
HolydaiesPlato vainely to attribute the perfect or euen
numbers unto heauenly things. also are concluded in septenaries, or
such other odd numbers. In many places also Diamonds grow by nature it selfe
pollished six square, as Plinie in his 33. booke
reporteth, which in the mountaines of the Pyrenes is a common matter. Wherefore
it is an absurd thing that Plato attributeth the
beginning and ending of diuine things unto perfect numbers onely. But Porphyree the most famous philosopher of his time, when
he enterpreted that of Plato out of his Timaeus , writeth the estate of
all Commonweales, and the life of spirits to be determined, at the farthest in the reuolution of a thousand yeares. Plutarch in his booke entituled supposeth the life of Spirits to extend
longer, but yet neither of them sought after the perfect numbers. But if so be
that Plato in so great fewnesse of perfect numbers,
could not tell which of them should agree to things sprung from a diuine
beginning; by what numbers then should he discide so great varietie of worldly
things? or if he knew that number, why did he pray and make vowes unto the
Muses that they would show him it.
Wherefore it behoueth a man of deeper consideration to seeke out such
numbersThe numbers of seauen and nine to be of great
force in the chaunge of worldly things. as may signifie the
conuersions & chaunges of worldly things, and which are by long experience,
and not by light and vaine coniectures approued: such as I deeme the numbers of seauen and nine and their quadrate and
cubike numbers: viz. 49, 81, 343, 729, to be. For as the
number of six (which is of all perfect numbers the first) chaungeth the
manners, habit, or nature of the Female kind, so most Hippocrat. de partis septimestri. auncient antiquitie hath by
experience proued the number of seauen in some sort to chaunge the Male kind
also: and that as the numbers of seauen or nine vse commonly to giue vnto
menThe number of sixe to be of great power in the femaile
sexe, and the number of seauen in the maile kind. the beginning and
time of their birth, that so the number growing of the multiplying of either of
them, hath beene wont to bring unto them their end and destruction. Which same
thing I transfer and applie unto Commonweales also, so that the numbers of
seauen and nine, and such as arise of their quadrate and cubike numbers, do
often times bring ruine and destruction unto Commonweales. For that which we
have alleaged out of Seneca and Censorius every seauenth yeare to
imprint some marke into the age of man, and so the daungers of mens lives &
substance to happen still upon their seauenth yeares: vnderstand that to belong
especially unto men. Of which mine opinion I have vse aud experience the
authour: For it is every sixt yeare which leaueth a most certaine note of it
selfe unto women. And first to begin withall the strength of bodie and of mind
is increased in them the sixt yeare, or else therein they die: the twelft yeare
they begin to wax warme, and the eighteenth yeare are readie for husbands: and
if diseases fall upon them in their sixt yeares, they are so often times in
daunger: The like whereof happeneth unto men the seauenth, the fourteenth, and
one and twentieth yeare: So that Plato not without cause
attributeth the euen numbers unto the female
sexe, and the odd numbers unto the male. And for this cause Plutarch saith, The auntient Romans to have used to giue name vnto
their male children the ninth day, for that the seauenth was more daungerous,
and unto their female children or daughters the eight day: for that (as saith
he) the euen number is proper unto the female sexe: And therefore I suppose
them of old time to have used every eight day to do sacrifice unto Neptune, for
that the element of water agreeth unto women, as doth the firie element vnto
men: As also that they thought the number of seauen to be feared. Howbeit that
the law of God commaundeth the male children to be
circumcised the eight day: which the sacred interpretors of the Hebrewes thinke
The seuenth day of all others most blessed. to haue
beene done, that so there might be one Sabaoth betwixt the birth of the child
and the circumcision thereof, and so more strength might thereby be giuen vnto
the child. For why, Moyses doth in sacred writ teach vs,
God most plentifully to blesse the Seauenth day (which was the birth day of the
world) with his grace and all other good things: which aboundance and stoare of
his good blessings is no where seene to be giuen unto the rest of the other
dayes, by a certaine wonderfull cause of nature from all Philosophers
hidden.
Yet nothing seemeth in mans nature more wonderfull than that the yeare
threescoreThe clymactericall yeare of 63, most commonly
fatall unto old men. three hath bene still noted to be unto almost
all old men fatall, Obseruandum est (saieth Au. Gellius) in multa hominum memoria,
expertumque in senioribus plerisqueomnibus sexagesimum tertium vitae annum cum periculo &
clade aliqua venire, aut corporis morbis grauioris, aut vitae interitus, aut
animi aegritudinis, It is a thing obserued (sayeth hee) in the great
remembrance of men, and also by experience proued in many old men, The
threescore and third yeare of their age to come unto them all with some danger
and hurt, either of the body, or of some great disease, or of losse of life, or
of some tormenting griefe of mind. Yea there is an epistle of Augustus the emperour unto his nephew Caius,
bearing date the ninth of the Calends of October, written to the same purpose,
in this sort, Aue mi Cai, meus ocellus iucūdissimus, quem
semper medius fidius desidero quùm a me abes: sed praecipuè diebus talibus
qualis est hodiernus: oculi mei requir unt meum Caium: quem vbicum{que}
& hoc die fuisti, spero laetum &bene valentem celebrasse quartum & sexagesimum natalem
meum: nam vt videscommunem seniorum omnium tertium & sexagesimum euasimus,
&c. All haile my Caius (sayth he) my most
sweet delight, whom of my faith I alwaies long for when thou art from me, but
especially on such daies as this is mine eyes doe now seeke after my Caius, whome wheresoeuer thou hast this day bene, I hope
that thou merrie and in good health, hast celebrated my threescore & fourth
birth day: for as you see we have escaped the threescore and third yeare, the
common Climacteriall yeare of all old men, &c. Howbeit that Augustus lived vntill he was seuentie seuen yeares old;
as did also Pomponius Atticus, who died at that age. We
might reckon up an infinit number not only of the poore and baser sort, but
euen of the nobler sort also, who ended their Great learned men which dyed at the 93. yeare of their
age. daies in the threescore and third yeare of their age: but we
will onely reckon up some such as were for their learning famous, who as at
that age died, viz. Aristotle, Cicero, Crysippus, S. Bernard, Boccace, Erasmus, Luthar, Melancthon, Siluius,
Alexander Imolensis, the most famous lawier of his time, Cardinall Cusan, Linacre, and Sturmius: And
therfore the old Greeke diuines seeme to have consecrated the number of seauen
unto Apollo, and of nine unto the Muses, as Plutarque writeth.
Now if any man will more curiously search out these things, whether it be in
theThe seauenth and ninth yeares still daungerous or
fatall unto old men; and the sixt yeare unto women. sacred or profane
histories, he shal find the lives of men for the most part to have expired and
taken end still in the seauenth or ninth yeares of their age: and women in the
sixt. Plato is said
to have died at the age of fourscore and one, which is nine times nine yeares:
Theophrastus at 84, which are twelue times seauen
yeares, which period few men passe; or els they passe to xiii times seauen, as
did S. Hierom and Isocrates, who
lived 91 yeares. Plinie, Bartholus, and Caesar lived fiftie sixe yeares, which is eight times
seauen yeares: Lamech lived 777 yeares, and Methusala (who of all others lived the longest) 970
yeares: Abraham lived an hundred seauentie and fiue
yeares, which are five and twentie times seauen yeares: Iacob 147 yeares, which are xxi septinaries, or spaces of seauen
yeres: Isaac lived 190 yeares, which make xx times nine
yeares: Dauid lived seauentie yeares, which make ten
times seauen yeares. An infinit thing it were to
recken up all which are in histories found to have ended their daies at these
aforesaid periods of seauens and nines. He
also who of our auncestors and of histories is called Ioannes
de temporibus lived 361 yeares, that is to say three and fiftie times
seauen yeares. It is manifest also men to be alwaies borne in the ninth or
seauenth monethe whom the Graeks therfore call and that they which are borne either
sooner or later live not. For which cause Hippocrates
writeth a child to be fully made and perfected in all the parts and limbs
thereof the seauenth day: and afterward to take encrease: and being borne the
seauenth moneth to live: but none to have lived being borne in the eight
moneth: a child also in the seuenth yeare to have all the teeth, and that men
(as Plinie writeth it to have bene euen from the
farthest memorie of men obserued) hauing bene kept from meat seuen dayes,
albeit they may live longer, shall yet The Saboath or Seauenth day of all other daies the most
blessed. neuerthelesse at length die thereof. The law of God hath
most religiously also both consecrated and commaunded, the seuenth day to be
kept holy, as the birth day of the world, and of all that therein is: which one
day of all others God almightie blessed, and which day all antiquitie hath by
long experience reported to be so vnlike the other daies of the weeke, as that
it is taken up as an old prouerbe, No seuenth day passe
wherein the sunne is not at one time or other therein to be seene. upon which
day the auntient Hebrewes constantly affirme, The rage of diuels to be
restrained, wisedome to be into the minds of men infused, their bodies to be
strengthened, and their fields with encrease of fruit to be blessed. The
seuenth yeare also is by the law of God holy, as is also the seuenth time seuen
yeare, which is the yeare of Iubilie: neither is if to
be doubted, but that a certaine secret force
is in them, both for the chaunge and ruine of Commonweales. So that it ought
not to seeme straunge, if that this number of seuen be of the Hebrews called
sacred or holy: which Caluin (following Galen, as I suppose) calleth Perfect (where he entreateth
of the rest of the Sabboth day) which hee euen to astonishment woundereth to be
so often and so religiously propounded, to bee of all men obserued and kept, in
so much that euen the paine of death is propounded unto the breakers thereof:
so that the whole summe of all God his lawes may seeme to bee therein
contained: yet is not therefore the number of seauen a number perfect, for that
it is odd and masculine: whereas all perfect numbers are euen and feminine. For
why,What a perfect number is? the Mathematitians
define that to be perfect, which may bee divided into the same whole parts, whereof it is made, so that in such diuision
nothing be wanting or superfluous. As 1, 2, 3, make sixe: which three numbers
do also equally diuide sixe into equall parts, as it was of them made, as it is
in other perfect numbers also. Lactantius* In lib. de oppiicto Dei. in the same errour offended, who calleth the number of three and ten,
perfect and full numbers: and also Cicero, who deceiued
many, in calling the numbers of seuen andIn somnio
scipionis. eightfull numbers; which Macrobius
vnderstandeth to bee solide, and others to bee perfect numbers: neither of
which can truely bee said of the number of seuen: as for the number of eight it
is indeed a solid, but not therefore a perfect number. With like errour is Plutarch himselfe deceiued, who writeth, Three to be a
number perfect: howbeit that Aristotle deemeth the force
of that number to be of great force in the
whole course of nature. Philo was herein also deceiued,
in taking ten to bee the most perfect number.But four
perfect numbers from one to an hundred thousand.
Now indeed there are but foure perfect numbers from one unto an hundred
thousand, viz. 6, 28, 496, and 8128, amongst which the
last cannot serue for the changing of Commonweales, for that it exceedeth the
age of the world: neither the two first, for that they are too little: so that
but one of them can be well applied unto the chaunges of cities and
Commonweals, viz. the number of The number 469▪ the onely perfect number which can well bee applied vnto
the changes of cities and Commonweales. 496, which is made of
seuentie septenaries of yeares, and a perfect number: it being also a thing by
most auntient antiquitie obserued, All cities in the
reuolution of five hundred yeares, to suffer either some great chaunge, or else some vtter ruine. But these numbers
touching the chaunge or ruine of cities and Commonweales, may be two wayes
applyed, viz. unto the princes themselves, or els vnto
the continuance of their kingdomes and empires. As if a man should say, This
kingdome of Fraunce to fall and take end, after that threescore and three kings
had therein raigned, this number consisting of the numbers of seuen andThe numbers of seauen and nine fatall unto Commonweales.
nine, conuerted in themselves. As Esaias, who liuing in
the time of Romulus, prophesied, That nine kings should
more yet raigne in Iudea, and that the tenth should together with the people be
led away into captiuitie, and so that kingdome to take end: As also that there
should be nine kings of the Persians, or as that the seuenth king of the Romans
should be thrust out of his kingdom: which number of princes well agreeth
with the number of the yeares which they
raigned in Iurie, viz. 182, a number consisting of six
& twenty septenaries: & at Rome 244, for in the 75 septenarie, that is
to say, in the 245 yere Tarquin the proud, last king of
Rome, was thrust out of his kingdome. Hieremie the
Prophet then lived, when as the prophesie of Esay was
fulfilled, and himselfe prophesied, That the people should be againe delivered
in the seuentie yeare of their captiuitie, as indeed they were, and the temple
againe restored. The same Prophet Chap 24.Esayas prophesied also, The most famous citie of Tyre to
be in 70 yeres after vnpeopled and left desolat, and afterwards within seuentie
yeares moe after the ruine therof, to be againe restored. The same number
agreeth unto the Athenian Commonweale, wherein
seauen princes, whome they call , raigned also 70 yeres▪ the taking of
which citie, and the victorie of the Athenians at Salamine, is reported to haue
happened upon the verie like day. As for the number which of the Academikes is
called fatalis nmerus, or a
Fatall number, viz. 1728 (being indeed a quadrat number)
seemeth to have bene expired from the raigne of Ninus
unto the victorie of Alexander the Great, at Arbela, and
the ouerthrow of the Persian empire. For Herodotus, Diodorus,
Trogus Pompeius, Iustin, and Ctesias, begin that
empire from Ninus. And at such time as Hierusalem
ouerwhelmed with most bitter calamities, was won and rased, the temple
ouerthrowne, king Sedechias slaine, and the people
carried away into captiuitie: at the selfe same time the Aegyptians rebelled
against the kings of Assyria, the Athenians
shooke off the tyrannicall yoke of the Pisistratides,
and the Romans expulsed the proud Tarquins. Now the
temple had before stood 427 yeares, a time cousisting of whole septenaries. But
for that in the computation of times, there is great difference amongst the
Historiographers, we will vse the Roman Fasts or Calenders, which cannot lie.
Wherein we see, that from the foundation of the citie, and of the Roman
Commonweale unto the battaile of Actium, wherein Marcus
Antonius was by Augustus vanquished, and the
whole empire brought under the power of one onely Monarch, and a generall peace
established throughout the world, there are accounted 729 yeares, the solide
number of nine. The same number of yeres passed from the conquest of the
kingdome of the Lombards by Charlemaigne, unto the
conquest of the same countrey by Lewes the twelfth the French king, upon the Venetians and
the Sforces. The like number of yeares is accounted also from the ouerthrow of
the kingdom of the Picts, and the great victorie of the Scots unto the
captiuitie of Marie Steward their queene. As also from
Egbert king of the West Saxons (who hauing vanquished
the East Saxons, made himselfe the sole Monarch of England, and called the
people Englishmen) unto queene Marie, who was the first
woman that tooke upon her the soueraigntie of that people in fourteene hundred
and fortie yeares space. So from the raigne of Augustus,
after the victorie by him obtained at Actium, and the temple of Inus the fourth time shut up,
unto Augustus the last of all the Roman emperors, slaine
by Odouacer king of the
Herules, and the empire possessed by the Gothes, there are accounted 496 yeares, which we said to be a perfect number, as
consisting of seuentie septinaries; with the perfect number of six: For by the
Fasts the yeare following Odouacer began to raigne.
Wherein it is also worth the noting, that as the first emperour Augustus with wonderfull felicitie and wisedome, both
established and encreased that so great a Monarchy, which he held more than
fortie yeres: so Augustulus the last of the Roman
emperours diminished both in name and soueraigntie, held that his empire scarce
a whole yeare, which happened the tenth of the calends of September. As it
happened to Constantine the Great, who established the
seat of the empire at Constantinople: and to Constantine
the last Christian emperour, there dispoyled of his estate, and slaine by Mahomet king of the Turkes, surnamed the Great. Now from
the building of the citie unto this Augustulus, are accounted 1225 yeares: which number
consisteth of whole septinaries: which thing Vectius the
great sooth-saier foretold, asThe number perfect of 496 a
number proper unto the chaunes of
Commōnweales.Censorinus out of Marcus Varro
writeth. The same number of yeares wee find from Ninus
king of Assyria, unto the death of Sardanapalus, whome
Arbaces gouernour of Media dispoyled of his
government, and translated the kingdome unto the Medes. Now from Saul the first king of the elect people of God unto that
Sedechias was slain, and his kingdome ouerthrowne,
returneth that perfect number of 496 yeres. But whereas Iosephus reporteth the burning of both the Temples, and the taking of
the citie, to have chaunced the selfesame day, viz. the
ninth day of the first moneth; he in that agreeth not with the booke of the
Kings, neither with the Prophet Hieremy, who both otherwise report the same. So many
yeares, viz. 496. are accounted from Caranus first king of the Macedons, unto Alexander the Great last king of that countrey, discended of the line
and issue of Hercules, and of Aeacus. Some there bee which adde certaine yeares moe, and some others
which detract some also. Wherefore my meaning is not to alleage any other than
the records set downe by the most certaine Historiographers, and such as every
man may draw euen out of the verie fasts and calenders of the Romans
themselves. Of which sort is that, that from the foundation of the citie of
Rome, unto the sacking therof by the French men, are accounted 364 yeres, which
number consisteth of whole septinaries: As also from the building of the citie,
unto the slaughter at Cannas, Terentius Varro being then
Consull (at which time the Commonweale was
fallen into extreame danger) are numbred 536 yeres, that is to say 77
septinaries of yeres: And from thence unto the slaughter by the Romans,
receiued from the Germans, under the conduct of Quinctilius
Varro, are passed 224 yeares, a number consisting of whole septenaries:
both which ouerthrowes happened the second day of August, as is by the auntient
Romans reported. Neither is that lesse memorable which Tarapha a most certaine Historiographer amongst the Spaniards
reporteth, The Moores and Arabians to have inuaded Spaine in the yere of Christ
707, and that also the seuenth yeare of the raigne of king Roderike, and to have holden the same kingdome 770 yeares, neither
could vtterly be from thence againe expulsed, before the time of Ferdinand king of Arragon and Castile. It is also worth
the noting, that from the execution of Aman, and the deliverie of the Iewes at the intercession
of Hester, unto the victorie of Iudas
Machabeus against Antiochus the noble king of
Syria and his lieutenant, there passed 343 yeares, which is the solid number of
seuen, that is to say seuen times seuen septenaries: both which victories
happened the thirteenth day of the moneth Adar, as the Hebrewes have well
noted. The same number of yeares passed from the time that Octauianus (hauing vanquished Marcus Antonius,
and vnited the whole Roman empire under his owne obeysance) was by the Senat
called Augustus, unto Constantine
the Great; a time notable for the straunge chaunces which then happened in the whole empire, as well in the lawes
politique, as in matters of religion.Tacitus hath also noted in another singularitie, That
the citie of Rome was by Nero burnt, on the like day
that it had long before beene burnt by the Gaules, which was the fourteenth of
the calends of August: wherēin some have gone so farre, as to number how many
yeares, moneths and dayes, passed betwixt both those fiers.
But that the numbers of six are almost unto women fatall, I thought it not
needfullThe number of sixe to be unto women
fatall. by examples to proue, least I might be thought to stand upon
triflles, only that I note, that in the yeare 1582, at such time as the prince
of Orenge had receiued a mortall wound, the one and twentieth of March, being
the fortie ninth yeare of his age, and that all men dispaired of his life, he
yet recouered his health at his entrance into his fiftieth yeare: But Carola Charlet of Burbon his wife within two monethes
after died, when as shee entred into the six
and thirtieth yeare of her age, which is the quadrat of the number of six: euen
as the prince her husband was wounded in the nine and fortieth yeare of his
age, the quadrat of the septenarie or number of seuen: which I thought not to
have written, but that I was told the same by the prince of Orenge himselfe, as
a thing by him noted, when as I was of councell with Francis duke of Alanson at Anwerpe.
But now for that we are by way of discourse come so farre, the last that
remayneth is for me to aunswere some thing to them which take pleasure rather
to carpe than to commend my writings: for that In his
booke: De Methode historiarum. I said I vnderstood not the prophecies of Daniel
concerning the rising and ruine of Empires and kingdomes. For I doubt not but
that if he (amongst others a most wise man)
would in their due times have plainly set downe such things as he by diuine
inspiration had conceiued and declared, all things then whereof we now doubt,
should without all doubt be unto vs most plaine and cleere. Truely he defineth
the state of his owne citie, king Cyrus then beginning
his raigne, what time the captiuitie was ended, according to Hier. 2. & Daniel 9. the prophecie of Ieremie, (which he beginneth from the destruction of the Citie and of
the Temple, and not from the raigne of Ioachim as some
suppose) and the holie people returned. He definethA good
discou of Daniel his seauentie weeks. it
(I say) by seauentie weekes of yeares, that is by 490. yeares, and that right
plainly; when as the prophecie was made in the last yeare of the captiuitie,
which was the seauentieth from the destruction of the Citie and of the Temple:
that so the prophecies might in good order
with the prophecies, and times with times be continued: whereas they which
longer protract the times leaue an hundred and twentie yeares at one gaping.
But the Prophet expresly taught, that the beginning of the time ought to be
accounted from the time of the prophecie giuen, wherein the people againe
returned as if it had beene before dead, and appointed unto it selfe a Prince
and other magistrates, from whence the restoring of the Citie is to be
accounted, and not from the repairing of the walles and buildings. In which
case Pompee said well: Vrbe deserta,
in parietibus Rempublicam non consistere, That the citie being
forsaken, the Commonweale consisted not in the walles thereof. But many Iosephus. Funccius. Mercator. Philo.
Historiographers from the time of Cyrus unto the raigne of Herode
the great (who hauing taken Hierusalem and slaine all the Senators together
with the king himselfe, and spoiled the Iewes of their kingdome) do account
490. yeares. Others there be which recken otherwise, and so great varietie and
difference there is amongst them, as that all the opinions of all of them, may
well be refelled, not onely by every one of them a part, but euen by all of
them together. As for those things which Daniel writ
concerning the Empires, he openly and plainly hath called the Medes, the
Persians, and Grecians unto the Empire of Babylon; but besides them none. The
fourth Empire (by him spoken of) we have showed not to belong unto the Romans,
seeing that question is there concerning Babylon,
which the Romans neuer subdued; which when they passing over the riuer
Euphrates had vnfortunately attempted, they
receiued many and great ouerthrowes of the most inuincible Parthians. But yet
more foolishy do they who attribute that fourth Empire unto the Germans, who
neuer so much as dreamed of any the least part of the Babylonians Empire. Which
things for that they be by vs else where disputed we will here let passe. Which
things for all that Frankbergerus the Saxon and Bishop
of Lipsic, by the authoritie of Luther, and one Dresserus a meere schoolman with rayling without any
reason at all refelleth, whom I shall yet count an eloquent man, if he shall
but learne aswell to speake, as he hath learned to speake euill: But for that
the angrie man (a common fault of the wise) is angrie with me, for that I dare
not rashly iudge of the diuine oracles, least in so doing I might offend in
such his matters, and so farre from all mens
senses: he should have taught me why he thinketh the Prophet Daniel to have there omitted fiftie empires, which I have In methdo . noted to have bin ten times greater than the German empire, and
such as have in them also contained a great part of the Babylonian empire? Why
also Daniel in his first chapter hath writ of himselfe,
That he lived in the first yeare of the raigne of Cyrus
king of Persia? And yet more, why he should write himself to have receiued that
diuine oracle or prophesie in the Chap. . third yeare of the raigne of king Cyrus? And why in the chapter following doth he make
mention of Darius king of Persia▪ who was inuested in
that kingdome seuen and thirtie yeares after that Cyrus
began to raigne? For neither Berosus a most true
interpretor of the Chaldean antiquities, whome Ctesias
and most of the auntient writers, haue
followed: neither Megusthenes the Cronicler of the
Persian affaires, neither Herodotus, called the Father
of Historie, neither any of the Greeke or Hebrew historiographers, report any
to have bene before Darius Hystaspes: I except onely Iosephus, who in that place dissenteth from Berosus. But least we should seeme to deale to sharply,
and to presse them too farre, What is the reason why Daniel in the eleuenth chapter of his prophesie writeth, That Darius should have three Persians his successors and that
the fourth should come out of Grecia, who by mightie force and strong hand
should obtaine the empire? But that this was Alexander
the Great no man doubteth, who thrust Darius Codomaenus
out of the Persian empire, whose father was Darius
Achos, his grandfather Darius Mnemon, and his
great grandfather Darius Nothus, unto whome Daniel turneth his speech.
Which if it be so, Daniel must needes have lived two
hundred and twentie yeares, if he were a youth growne when as hee was carried
captiue into Chaldea, which he must needes be, for that hee then spoke both
most eloquently and wisely. And thus much euerie man may most plainely gather
both out of the sacred scriptures, and also out of the auntient histories of
Herodotus and Iosephus. For
Cyrus died in the 30 yeare of his raigne, Cambyses in the 6, Darius
Hystaspes in the 37, Xerxes in the 21, Artaxerxes in the 44, Darius
Nothus in the 19, Darius Mnemon in the 36, Darius Achos in the 6, Darius Cadomanus in the 10, all making the summe of 228
yeares. For Daniel was taken prisoner together with king
Ioachim. But let the interpretors of these diuine
oracles suppose all things to bee manifest unto them, and let euerie one of them with great confidence at their pleasure
determine of these Daniels weekes. Yet how can these which euen most subtilly
hane discussed all these matters, defend that of the Prophets ZachariasChap.. and Aggaeus, who
writ their prophecies in the end of the seauentieth yeare of the captiuitie,
Darius Nothus* Chap. 23. as they will haue
it then raigning. This is now (say those Prophets) the seauentieth yeare▪ And
if it be so that they will have the seauentie yeares to be accounted not from
the destruction of the Temple, but from the Edict of Xerxes, then truly Zerubabel and Nehemiah the chiefetaines of the people must needs haue
lived full two hundred and fiftie yeares, being so old
when Cyrus began his raigne, as that they were able to
conduct the people out of Chaldea into the
land of Palestine: whom yet the doubt not to proue euen by the testimonie of
Nehemiah himselfe, him to have lived euen to the last
Darius. Wherefore all Historiographers are here much
troubled and at great variance among themselves: one saying that there were but
five of these Persian kings: an other six: and others seauen: many eight: some
nine: yea and some there be which have deuised a tenth also. Truely Genebrardus in his Chronologie affirmeth there to haue
bene of them onely fiue: but Functius saith ten.
Wherefore in so great rietie of opinions one of the two may be: as viz. that none of them all be true, the other can in no
wise be, that moe of them then one should at all be true; and which of them it
is I can not affirme: neither if I could would I. And in mine opinion
I have hereof more modestly than they
written, that it was not a thing to me well knowne, unto whom for all that I
will yeeld, if they can by any meanes maintaine the certaintie of their owne
positions. Howbeit that S. Hierome hath reiected many
things which are found in the writings of Daniel: And
that the Hebrewes allow not of the rest which are not writ in the Chaldee, but
in the Greeke tongue by Theodotion.
Wherefore these examples thus propounded, it is lawfull by a certaine
coniecturallHow it is lawfull for a man to gesse at the
rising and falling of a Common wealth. gessing to ayme at the rising
and falling of Commonweales: as also for a man looking into the precedent
causes of things, with the diuers coniunctions and oppositions of the Planets,
to go so farre as the knowledge of such things will beare: not rashly affirming, or lightly beleeuing any thing concerning
such things as are by the Almightie and euer liuing God farre set from the
sense and reach of man.
CHAP. III. That it is a most daungerous thing at one and
the selfe same time▪ to chaunge the forme, lawes, and customes of a
Commonweale.
HOw Cities and Commonweales arise; by what meanes
they are also encreased; what diuers alterations and chaunges befall every one
of them; and by what coniectures the fall and ruine of them is to be by vs gathered, I suppose we have sufficiently before
declared. But for asmuch as the presumptions by vs alreadie noted, are not
sufficient to make any certaine demonstration of, but rest upon such grounds as
are farthest off from the senses and capacitie of the common sort of men:
Neither that if they were delivered by way of demonstration, or other more
certaine rules, should they therefore inferre any necessitie at all? It
remaineth that wee according to that wisedome and discretion wherewith
almightie God hath of his goodnes endued men, endeuour our selues to rule
Estates and Commonweales, and by all meanes to foresee and decline the chaunges
and ruines of them. For why, it is one generall opinion and doctrine of all
Philosophers, yea euen of them which idly dispute what is done in heauen: a wise man not to be bound or
subiect unto the power or influenceWise men not to be
subiect unto the power or influence of the starres, as sensual men
be. of the starres: but onely they which giue the raines unto their
disordered appetites, and beastly desires, not suffering themselves to be
gouerned by the rule of reason, or of other the best lawes: unto whome Salomon the maister of wisedome hath sharply threatned
the torment of the wheele, saying, That God should cause the wheele to passe
over them: that is to say, the force and effect of the celestiall Spheres,
which over the good should have no power at all. Seeing therefore that the
power & influence of the starres may by the power of God, that is, by
wisdome (by the gift and goodnesse of almightie God giuen unto men) be auoided:
and that wise physitians have found the meanes to
chaunge the diseases, and to alter feuers contrarie unto their naturall
courses, to the intent the more easily to
cure them, or at leastwise to asswage them; why shouldThe
mine of a Commonweale to be by the wisdome of the gouernour preuented, or
ls warning thereof to be by him in de time giuen unto his subiects. not the wise
polititian, or gouernour of a Commonweale, foreseeing the conuersions and
chaunges which naturally happen unto Commonweales, by good lawes and other
convenient remedies preuent the ruine therof: or if the force of the mischiefe
be so great, and the destruction so certaine, as that it can by no wisdome of
man bee preuented or staied, yet shall he performe that which cunning
physitians doe, who by the Symptomes appearing upon the criticall dayes, and by
the causes of the disease, doe more certainlie and better guesse of the sicke
mans death in what manner it shall bee: and so yet in good rime giueth thereof
warning unto his ignorant subiects, lest that they should upon the suddein be
vtterly oppressed with the ruine of the falling Estate and Commonweale. And as the most skilfull Phisitions euen in
the state of the disease,Wisdome neuer discouraged with the
daungers of the Commonweale: so long as they see the state wisely and
dis gouerned. and the greatest griefe
therof, do yet put their patients in greater comfort, if the Symptomes, be good
then if the griefe or fit without them were but easie and gentle; and as to the
contrarie when they see a man in the highest degree of health that may be, they
are then in the greatest feare, lest he should suddenly fall unto some extreame
sicknesse, as the great phisition Hippocrates saith: So
also a wise gouernour of a Commonweale, seeing the state on all sides beset,
and almost ouerwhelmed with enemyes, yet if in so great daunger he otherwise
see wise men sitting at the helme of the Commonweale, the subiects obedient
unto the Magistrats, and the Magistrats unto the Lawes; he taketh courage
thereat, and promiseth both unto himselfe and others good successe; the ignorant people & cowards hauing in
the meane time lost their patience, and lying as men plunged euen into the
bothom of dispaire. In which state the Romaine commonweal stood after the third
slaughter of their armie at Cannas, when as now many of the friendly and
confederate cites, which before had continued in their fidelitie and
allegeance, reuolted from the Romaines, following the fortune andWhat opinion wise men had of the distressed estate of the
Romaine Commonwealea, fet the great ouerthrowe at
Cannas. victories of Hanniball: For why almost
all men now despaired of the estate of the Romaine Empire: at which time of
distresse, of all others no man more hurt the Commonweale than did Terentius Varro the Consul, who with some few hauing
escaped from so great a slaughter (as wherein threescore thousand of the
citisens of Rome were slaine) writ letters unto the Senat and people of Capua,
That the Roman Commonweale was vndoone, as
hauing in that battell lost all the force and flower thereof. Which thing so
terrified them of Capua, (although in wealth and power they fare exceeded all the rest of the Roman confederates)
that they not onely themselves forsooke the Romans, but drew with them many of
their allies and confederates also unto Hanniball: when
as in deed the Consul should have extenuated the ouerthrow and losse receiued.
Whereas Scipio, who was afterwards called Africanus, to the contrarie with comfortable speeches
then cheered up diuers of the citisens dispairing of the state of the
Commonweale, and by oath constrained such as were about to have abandoned the
citie, to stay there still, and not to stirre, but resolutely to aduenture
their lives for the defence of their countrie and Commonweale. Neither was
the Senate terrified with the feare of so
many daungers, as wherewith they were on every side beset and inclosed, but
rather seemed with greater wisdome to mannage the Estate than euer it did
before. And albeit that the common people (according to their wonted lightnesse
and foolish ignorance) almost in every towne and city sung the praises of Hanniball, after his so many and so great victories ouer
the Romans: Yet for all that, the Senat of every citie favoured the Romans: For
so saith Liuie, Vnus veluti morbus omnes Italiae populos
inuaserat, vt plebs ab optimatibus dissentiret: Senatus Romanis faueret,
plebs ad Poenos rem traheret, One disease as it were (saith he) had
infected all the people of Italie, viz. That the people still dissented from the nobilitie; the Senat
still favoured the Romanes; and the people
still enclined unto the Carthaginensians. Yea Hiero king
of Siracusa, accounted the wisest prince of his age, did then much more
carefully than before honour and reuerence the amitie and alliance of the
Romaines, not doubting in what he could to helpe and releeue them; yea and in
that their desperat estate amongst other things sent them a statue of Victorie
(of gold) for a present▪ as he which had oftentimes proued the incredible
wisdome of that Senat in the mannaging of their affaires. Wherein a man may
see, that the wiser sort seeing the Romans so aduised and so constant in their
extreme necessitie, and that their lawes were neuer more straightly kept, or
martiall discipline more seuerely obserued, (as Polybius
an eyewitnesse of those things, himselfe writeth) were alwaies of opinion that
the issue of their affaires would be good: not
vnlike the wise physition, who seeing favourable Symptomes in the strongest fit
of his patients disease, is yet still in good hope. Whereas Carthage to the
contrarie proud of so many and so great victories, mistres of so many countries
and nations, and placed in the height of all worldly felicitie, was neuer than
then neerer unto ruine and destruction: wherof were most certain tokens, for
that in that Commonweale was no place left either for law or vertue, all things
being done by the popular rage, or vnruly lust of the common people: so that it
must needs shortly after be cast downe headlong from the highest degree of
honour, and become subiect unto the Romans, as not long after it did, Scipio beeing then their generall.
Wherefore the first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales inThe first rule for the keeping and preseruing of Commonweales
in their estates. their estates, is well to know the nature of every
Commonweale, together with the diseases incident unto them: whereof we haue
more at large discoursed in the former Booke. For it is not enough to know
which kind of Commonweale is better than other, but it behoueth vs also to know
the meanes how to maintaine euerie one of them in their estate, if it be not in
our power to chaunge the same, or that in chaunging thereof we shall put all to
the hasard of vtter ruine and decay. For whie, it is better to have an euill
Commonweale than none at all: as with convenient diet in someViolent remedies neuer to be used but in desperat
diseases. sort to preserue the sicke man, than by applying of
medicines to an incurable disease so to take away his life quite. For as
physitians say, we must neuer apply violent remedies but unto desperat diseases; and that whenas there is now no
other hope left. And this maxime taketh place in euerie sort of Commonweale,
not onely for the changing of the estate, but euen for the changing of lawes,
maners, and customes also: whereunto many hauing no regard have ruinated and
ouerthrowne right faire and great Commonweales, allured with the baite of some
one or other good law, which they have borrowed from some one Commonweale quite
contrarie unto their owne. For as we have before shewed, many good lawes there
be good for the maintenance of a Monarchie, and yet fit for to ruinat a Popular
estate: as other also there bee good for the preseruation of the Popular
liberty, & yet most fitly seruing for the ouerthrow of a Monarchy: for that
those Estates by nature contrary, are by quite contrary laws both maintained and ruinated.
And albeit ihat some lawes there be good and indifferent to all sorts of
Commonweales, yet so it is, that the antient question of right wise Polititians
is not yet well resolued, viz. Whether a new law being
better, be to be preferred before an old antient lawA notable question.that is worse? For the law be it neuer so good, is
nothing worth if it cary with it a contempt of it selfe, or of the rest of the
lawes: Now so it is, that newnesse in matter ofAuntient
lawes though worse still of greater esteeme and reuerence than the new
though better. lawes is alwayes contemptible, whereas to the
contrary, the reuerence of antiquity is so great, as that it giueth strength
enough unto a law to cause it to be of it selfe obeyed, without the authority of any Magistrat at all ioyned unto it: whereas new
edicts and lawes with all the threats and
penalties annexed unto them, and all that the Magistrats can do, cannot but
with great difficulty find intertainment: in such sort, as that the fruit we
are to receiue of a new edict or law, is not oft times so great, as the harme
which the contempt of the rest of the lawes draweth after it for the nouelty of
some one. And to make the matter short, there is nothing more difficult to
handle, nor more doubtful in euent, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to
bring in new decrees or lawes. And this reason seemeth unto me very
considerable, but yet I will set downe another of no lesse weight, which is,
That all the change of laws concerning the estate is dangerous: For to chaunge
the customes and lawes concerning inheritance, contracts, or seruitude from
euill to good, is in some sort tollerable; but to chaunge the laws which
concerne Auntient lawes concerning the estate of a Commonweale not to
be without great daunger altered. the estare, is as daungerous, as to
remoue the foundation or corner stones which uphold the whole weight or burthen
of the buildings; in which doing▪ the whole fabrike is to be sore shaken, and
beside the daunger of falling, receiueth more hurt by the shaking thereof, than
it doth good by the new repairation, especially if it bee now become old and
ruinous. For euen so it is in a Commonweale now alreadie growne old, wherein if
a man neuer so little remoue the foundations that upholdeth the same, he is in
great danger of the ruine therof. For the antient maxime of the most wise
polititians ought wel to be waied, That we must not change
any thing in the laws of a Commonweale which hath long maintained it selfe
in good estate, whatsoeuer apparent profit may bee thereby pretended.
And for these causes the old law of the Athcnians, which was afterward
also receiued in Rome, and passed in force
of a law, published at the request of Publius Philo, was
the most necessarie law that could be in a Commonweale, viz. That it should not be lawfull for any person upon paine of death
to present any request unto the people, without the priuitie of the Senat.
Which law is yet better kept in Venice than in any place of the world els,
whereas it is not permitted so much as to present any request euen unto the
Senat, without the aduise of the councell of the Sages. And yetThe extreame daunger he was in, which moued any new law amongst
the Locrensians. in the Commonweale of the Locrensians, this law was
much straiter, Where he which would present any request, to have it passe in
force of a law, was constrained to moue it before the people with a rope about
his neck, wherewith hee was there upon the place to be strangled, if he
preuailed not to proue the law by him moued to be good and profitable
for the Commonweale. Which was the cause
that this estate for a most long time stood and flourished, without any thing
added or diminished to or from the most antient laws and customes thereof, no
man daring to propound any new law to passe, vntill that one of the citisens
which had but one ie, made a request unto the people,
That he which wittingly should put out his eye which had but one, should
therefore himselfe have both his owne put out: For the making of which motion
his aduersarie had giuen him cause, hauing oftentimes threatned him to thrust
out his eye, and so to depriue him quite of his sight, although he were
therefore to endure the penaltie of the law, which was to loose one of his
owne. With the equitie, or rather necessitie of whose so reasonable a request
the people moued (though with much a do) enacted the law. Whereby yet nothing was derogated from the law called Lex talioni (or the law of like punishment) which was then common to almost all
nations: For why, it was reason that hee which had maliciously depriued another
man of his sight, should himselfe be depriued of his owne sight also.
Now if any man should say, That many lawes must oft times of necessitie bee
changed,Lawes concerning ordinarie pollicie may oftntimes be changed but not lawes concerning the
estate. as the lawes concerning victuals, or the bringing in, or
carrying out of marchandise, or concerning the augmenting or diminishing of the
punishment to bee inflicted upon offendors, which are euen in a short time to
be chaunged; I therein agree with him, for that
necessitie hath no law: first, if new lawes giue good hope of fruit and profit
of them to arise, as of good corne yet in
the blade, then are they not to be reiected: but here question is not of lawes
concerning ordinarie policie, but of such as concerne the very estate it selfe.
Which I both would and wish, if possibly it might be, that they should still be
most firme and immutable: not for that the Commonweale ought to serue the laws,
seeing that they are al made for the maintenance of the Commonweale, and of the
societie of men: neither that any man wisheth the safetie and preseruation of
the lawes, but for the Commonweales sake. For why, the first and chiefe law of
allThe chiefe lawe of all Commonweales.
Commonweales, is this, SALVS POPVLI SupREMA LEX ESTO, The welfare of the
people, let that be the last law. For what reason moued Themistocles to fortifie the citie of Athens with walles and
bulwarkes, euen the verie same reason induced Theramenes to persuade the Athenians to rase their
walles, viz. the welfare of the people: whereas
otherwise the Lacedemonians had vndone the citisens together with the citie.
Wherefore no law is so sacred, but that upon vrgent necessitie it is to be
changed. And therefore Solon after he had published his
lawes, caused the Athenians to sweare toNo lawe so sacred
but that upon vrgent necessitie it is to be chaunged▪ obserue and
keepe them for the space of one hundred yeare: giuing them thereby to
vnderstand, that lawes could neuer be made immutable, neither were to be all at
once together chaunged. Lycurgus also in like maner
tooke an oath of the Lacedemonians his subiects, to keepe his lawes vntill his
returne from the Oracle of Apollo, from whence he
afterwards neuer returned, but went himselfe into voluntarie exile, out of his
natiue countrey; so to bind his citisens so much as possible was to the
perpetuall Better to suffer euill lawes by little and little to growe
out of vse; then upon the soden with daunger to abrogate them all at
once▪ keeping of his lawes. And albeit that the iniquitie of some
auntient law bee by right euident, yet is it better to endure it, vntill that
it in time by little and little of it selfe loose the force, than upon the
sudden by violence to repeale it. For so did the Romans by many the lawes of
the twelue tables, which they would not abrogat, but onely by not obseruing
them, in that they were vnprofitable or vniust, suffered them so to grow out of
vse: which they so did, least in abrogating of them, they might seeme to
impaire the credit and authoritie of the rest of the same lawes. Yet after that
they had by tract of time bene of long buried as it were in obliuion (which was
seuen hundred yeares after that they were first published) it was at the motion
of Aebutius the Tribune, decreed, That such of those
lawes as were as it were of themselves growne out of vse, should be reputed as repealed and abrogated, to the end that no
man should with them yet standing in force be entangled.
But for that the nature of man as of all other worldly things also, is most
slipperiNeither are old lawes to be altogether sodenly without
daunger abrogated: or newe lawes rashly stablished. and vnconstant, running still headlong from good to
euill, and from euill to worse; vices by little and little still encreasing,
not vnlike unto euill humors, which without sencible feeling encrease mans
bodie, vntill it be full of them, breedeth in it many most daungerous diseases,
and so at length bringeth it unto vtter destruction. For remedie where of new
lawes must of necessitie be deuised: which must yet for all that by little and
little be done, and not violently all at once. As Agis
king of Lacedemonia vnwisely attempted to have done: who desiring to
reestablish in the Commonweale the auntient
discipline of Lycurgus, now by the negligence of the
magistrats almost grown quite out of vse, caused all the obligations and
scedules of priuat men to be uppon a sudden brought out & burnt: which
done, he was about to have proceeded to the making of a new diuision of lands,
to the end to have so made an equalitie of wealth and goods amongst the
citisens, as Lycurgus had before done: which although it
were a thing desired of many in the Lacedemonian Commonweale (which had indeed
so bene founded) yet so it was, that in making too much hast in the doing
thereof, he not onely fell from his hope, but thereby kindled such a fire of
sedition also, as burnt up his whole house, and so
afterward dispoiled of his estate, and by his rebellious subiects together
with his mother and other his friends and
partakers strangled; made away for a sort of mad and euill minded fellowes to
inuade the state, hauing so depriued his countrey of himselfe a good and
vertuous prince. Whereas he should before have made himselfe maister of the
forces, or if that had not bene possible, yet to have sounded the minds of them
of the geater sort, and by meanes to have gained them unto him one after
another, as had Lycurgus done before him; and then to
have forbidden them the vse of gold and siluer, that so it might have growne
into as little estimation as iron: and in some time after that, to haue
forbidden all sumptuousnesse in apparell, and rich furniture, and not at once
to have encroached upon the libertie of the people, to have proued their
patience, and chaunged their discipline: For that to vse such a violent letting
of blood, before the corrupt humors purged,
or so strong a medicine, before any preparatiue giuen, is not the way to cure
the diseases, but to kill the diseased. Wherefore in the governments of
Commonweales, and healing the diseases thereof, we must imitat not the
Physitians onely, but euen nature it selfe, or rather the great God of nature
whom we see to do all things by little and little, and almost insensibly. The
Venetians right wisely during the life of Augustin
Barbarin their duke, attempted not in any thing to abridge his power,
though by them much misliked and feared; least in so doing they should
eithe have offered some disgrace unto him their
prince, now growne old, or els have raised some new sturres, and so haue
troubled the quiet of their Commonweale. But he once dead, before they
proceeded unto the new election of Loredan, the seignorie caused such new lawes and
decrees to be published, as whereby the power of the dukes was right greatly
impeired and diminished. The same wee have shewed also to have bene done in the
elections of the German emperours, the kings of Polonia, and of Denmarke, who
of soueraigne Monarches are now brought unto the small estates of Generals in
chiefe, some of them more, and some lesse: which the more closely to hide, they
have left unto them the imperiall and roiall markes and cognisances in their
habits, in their titles and ceremonies, but in few things els in effect and
deed.
But as it is a daungerous thing for the subiects all at once to abridge or cut
shortDangerous for a prince upon the soden to displace or
caste offe the anntient seruitor of his predecessours, or great magistrats
of the estate. the power of a soueraigne prince or magistrat, who yet
hath the power in his hand: so is it also no lesse daungerous for a prince upon
the sudden to displace or cast off the antient
seruitors of his predecessours, or els at once to thrust out some part of the
great magistrats and officers of the estate, and to retaine the rest, they
which are new chosen or retained, resting over charged with enuie, and the
other with euill doing or ignorance, and withall depriued of the honour and
good, which they have bought full deere. And it may be that one of the fairest
foundations of this monarchy is, that the king dying, the officers of the
crowne continue still in their charge, who by that means still maintaine the
Commonweale in the estate thereof. And albeit that the officers of the kings
house be at the pleasure of the successour to be chaunged, so ought hee yet
therein to vse such discretion, as that they which are remoued have not
occasion to innouat or moue any thing as men disgraced, or at leastwise have no
power left them so to doe, albeit that they
were thereunto willing. In which point the emperour Galba being deceiued, and hauing thrust Otho
out of the hope hee had conceiued of the empire, to adopt Piso to succeed him in the government, and yet for all that without
disarming of Otho, he was shortly after by the same Otho (a man in great fauor with the Pretorian souldiours)
slaine together with Piso, whome he had before adopted
to succeed him in the empire and government of the state. All which perils and
daungers are lesse to be feared in an Aristocratike or Popular estate, for that
in them they which have the soueraigntie neuer die; howbeit that there is in
them no lesse danger in chaunging of their soueraigne
magistrats, or generals (as we have before declared) or in making of lawes which may tend to the impairtng of the power of
the people▪ or which may any way seeme profitable unto the nobilitie, and
preiudiciall or hurtfull unto the people: or in case that victuals and
prouisions faile, or that some great extreame dearth arise; in which cases
there is alwaies daunger of popular commotions and rebellions. So thatAll alterations of lawes or other great matters in a
Commonweale are best to be made by little and little. in briefe, when
question is for the displacing of great magistrats, or for the suppressing of
corporations or colledges, or for the cutting short of priuileges, or the
augmenting of punishments, or for the reforming of disorders amongst the
people, or for the calling of great men to account, or for the reducing of
religion to▪ the former course and beginning thereof; which by succession of
time, following the naturall corruption of man, hath bin altered & changed
from the first puritie therof: there is no better means than to come thereunto by little and little, without forcing of
any thing, if it were possible, as by way of suppression. Whereof we have a
notable example of king Charles the fift (euen he that
was surnamed the Wise) who at such time as he was Regent in France (his father
being as then prisoner in England) by the euill councell of some, ignorant in
matters of estate, at one chop suspended all the officers in Fraunce, of whome
also hee suppressed the greatest part, appointing fiftie commissioners for the
hearing of such accusations as should be laid against them for the extortion
and briberie by them committed and vsed: whereupon all Fraunce was in such
tumult and upore (for the infinit number that then
were of male contents) as that shortly after for remedie thereof, hee
by a decree in the high court of parliament
at Paris, whereunto all the nobilitie were assembled, abrogated the former law.
Which decree is yet extant in the act of that his court, to this effect and
purpose, Cùm regiae potestati & procurationi, quam
gerimus, non modò quae ab alijs, sed etiam quae a nobis ipsis & in
Rempublicam, & in singulos peccantur emendare consentaneum sit, rebus
planè perspectis & cognitis, quae de imperio magistratibus adempto noua
lege iussimus, placet abrogari; vt quidem abrogamus, & apertè
declaramus, legis illius, quae importunis quorumdam rogationibus erepta est,
nullam vim fore, & quae acta gesta sunt, cum magno nostro dolore acta
gesta fuisse; nec illam magistratuum ac honorum abrogationem, quam non iure
factam esse censitemur cuiquam fraudi esse: aut cuiusquam ius ac dignitatem
violare nos vlla ex parte voluisse: ac proinde legem illam iure a nobisrescindi & abrogaritestamur, vt omnibus magistratibus
salua omnia & integra restituantur, Whereas by the regall power and
authoritie which we beare, it is fitting for vs to correct and amend, not onely
such things as by others, but euen by our selues also are trespassed against
the Commonweale, or other men in particular: all things throughly looked into,
and tried, our pleasure is, That what we have by a new law commaunded
concerning power and authoritie taken from the magistrats, to be againe
abrogated, as indeed we abrogat, and plainely declare the force of that law
(which was by the importunat suit of some wrested from vs) to be nothing: and
that such things as were then done, to have bene done to our great griefe:
neither that that depriuation of offices or honours, which we confesse to haue
bene not lawfully done, to bee impued to any man: neither that our will was in any part to
violat any mans right or honour: And therefore we freely protest, that new law
to be of vs rightly repealed and abrogated: and that so all things safe and
whole, may so againe bee unto the magistrats restored. And thus much he. But
Charles the ninth comming unto the crowne, and seeing
the number of officers through the libertie of the times growne almost infinit,
toThe wise course taken of Charles the IX for the abating
of the infinite number of officers in the Commonweale. the great hurt
of the Commonweale, in such sort, as that it seemed a thing almost necessarie
to have depriued them of their honours and fees, yet did he not so, for that it
could not without great iniurie be done, when as the money they had before paid
for them, could not by reason of the want of coine in the common treasurie, bee
againe repaid unto them: neither if it could haue
bene, could he yet be without imputation &
disgrace, that was so without cause displaced. Besides that, unto many their
credit & reputation was in more esteeme & deerer than was their profit,
and much the more was it to be feared, that if they should both of their money
and preferment be together spoiled, least their present credit and profit being
impaired, and the hope also of the recouerie of the money they had paid lost▪
should minister unto many of them occasions for them to raise rebellions and
new sturres in the estate of the Commonweale. Wherefore the want of money in
the common treasurie profited vs then mindfull of other things, and fortune so
favoured our vnskilfulnesse and ignorance, as in auntient time it did a
painter, who painting of an horse, when as he not knowing how cunningly to
expresse the foame of the horses mouth, and wearie of his worke not well
sorting to his mind, in an anger cast his wet
spunge at it, and so by fortune expressed that which he by cunning could not
do: euen so it pleased that king to lessen the multitude of his officers stil
as they died, by chusing no new in their steads, when as he could not againe
restore unto them the money they had paid for their offices; neither yet if the
princes wealth &Not good for a prince to vse the
greatnesse of his power in displacing of the great officers of his realme
and state. power had bene so great, as with his becke or a wink of
his eye, to cause all his subiects to tremble, and so to be able to doe what
thing soeuer he list, should he yet seeme to do wisely by force to take away
the offices and places before sold unto his magistrats and officers: For that
not onely they which have receiued the iniurie, but euen other his subiects
also, are oft times much moued and incensed with iniuries and wrongs done vnto
other men: Besides that, the mightier that a man is, the more iustly and
temperately he ought to behave himselfe
towards all men, but especiall towards his subiects.Religeous houses with great wisdome quietly suppressed at Basill and
Coire. Wherefore the Senat and people of Basil did wisely, who hauing
renounced the Bishop of Romes Religion (which they now detested) would not upon
the sodaine thrust the Monkes and Nunnes with other the Religious persons out
of their Abbies and Monasteries: but onely tooke order, that as they dyed, they
should die both for themselves and their successors, expresly forbidding any
new to be chosen in their places; that so by that meanes their colledges might
by little and little by the death of the fellowes be extinguished. Whereby it
came to passe, that all the rest of the Carthusians of their owne accord
forsaking their cloister, yet one of them all alone for along time remained
therein, and so quietly and without any disturbance held the right of his
couent, being neuer enforced to chaunge
either his place, his habit, or old ceremonies, or religion before by him
receiued. The like order was taken at Coire in the diet of the Grisons: wherin
it was decreed, That the ministers of the reformed religion should be
maintained of the profits and reuenewes of the church, the religious men yet
neuerthelesse still remaining in their cloisters and couents, to bee by their
death suppressed, they being now prohibited to chuse any new in stead of them
which were dead: as I have learned by the letters of the ambassadour of
Fraunce, who was then at Coire. By which meanes both they which professed the
new religion, and they which professed the old, were both prouided for: whereas
otherwise it had beene an vnreasonable thing to have thrust them, who had
learned not onely to live idly, but euen to doe nothing at all (as Lucilius merrily saith)
hauing neither trade nor occupation to live uppon, out of the old possession of
their lands, were it neuer so vniust. Whereof beside the iniurie unto them
done, daunger might have also ensued, least they not hauing whereof to live,
and so brought into dispaire, might have attempted some thing against the
state; and so haply drawne after them all their friends and allies alo, to the
great trouble of the whole Commonweale. For the same cause the king hauing
giuen leaue for the free exercise of the new religion in this realme of
Fraunce, and seeing that they which under the colour thereof were gone out of
ther cloisters, demanded a portion in the lands and
inheritance of their parents or neere kinsmen: it was decreed, and that upon
great paine, That they should againe
returne unto their cloisters: which seemed to be a thing directly contrarie
unto the law, whereby free libertie was giuen for euerie man that wold, to
professe the new reformed religion. Howbeit that this was indirectly to stop
the mouthes of them which departing out of their monasteries, sought to trouble
the estate, and under the vaile and colour of religion, to trouble the most
great and noble houses of this realme: besides that it had beene also
necessarie in all the customes of this realme, to rase the article concerning
the religions, who both by the cannon and civill laws, as also by all our lawes
and customes, are excluded and shut out from all hope of inheritance.
But now that which we have said, That the multitude of officers, or of
colleges, and companies, of priuileges, or of
wicked men, which through the sufferance of princes, or the negligence of the
magistrat, are by little and little growne to the hurt of the Commonweale, are
by the same meane to be againe suppressed; hath place in all things which
concerne the publike state, and hath a reference unto the nature of the
lawes,The best and surest way for the suppressing of a
tyrant. which have no force nor effect but for the time to come. And
albeit that tyrannie bee a thing most cruell and detestable, yet so it is, that
the surest way and meane to suppresse the same, if the tyrant have neither
children nor brethren to succeed him, is together with the death of the tyrant
to abolish also the tyrannicall government; & not by force whilest he yet
liveth to striue to take from him the government, with the hazard of the
ruine of the whole estate, as oftentimes it
chaunceth. But if the tyrant have children, and doth what he may to destroy the
good, and to put the great men one after another to death (as Tarquin the proud, and other tyrants following his steps used commonly
to doe) or to suppresse the magistrats or other great officers which might stay
the course of his tyrannie, to the end that hee may without let or controlement
doe whatsoeuer him pleaseth: then in this ease violent remedies are to bee
vsed, but with such limitation and restriction as we have before set downe, and
not otherwise, least so wee might seeme rashly to arme the subiects against
their princes.
We ought then in the government of a well ordered estate and Commonweale,The wise polititian in the government of the estate is to
imitate the works of God in nature who by litle and litle bringeth great
things to perfection. to imitat and follow the great God of nature,
who in all things proceedeth easily and by
little and little, who of a little seed causeth to grow a tree for height and
greatnesse right admirable, and yet for all that insensibly; and still by
meanes conioyning the extremities of nature, as by putting the Spring betwixt
Winter and Sommer, and Autumne betwixt Sommer and Winter, moderating the
extremities of the times and seasons, which the selfe same wisedome which he
vseth in all other things also, and that in such sort, as that no violent force
or course therein appeareth. But if it be oftentimes daungerous to chaunge the
lawes of an estate or Commonweale, as wee have before declared: Let vs now see
also, if it be not in like sort daungerous oftentimes to chaungethe
magistrates, or that it is much better to have them perpetuall and without chaunge.
CHAP. IIII. ¶ Whether it be better in a Commonweale to
have the Magistrats still chaungeable, or else perpetuall.
FOrasmuch as both cities, citisens, and
Commonweales, vse commonly to be for nothing more turmoiled and troubled than
by men for the obtaining of offices and honours, mee thinke this question to
bee one of the most profitable and most necessarie of any that can be made in
matter of estate, Whether it be better to have annuall or
perpetuall Magistratsin a Commonweale? Than which question I know not whether
there be any amongst them which concerne a Commonweal more harder to decide, or
more pleasant to vnderstand, and therefore not in any wise by vs in this place
to be omitted. Which I say not as meaning to take upon me the deciding of this
question, but onely to touch the reasons which might well be giuen both on the
one side and the other, leauing the resolution therof unto them which
heretofore have better sounded the proceeding and consequence thereof. Neither
is it mine intent or purpose, either to propound and moue this question, to
giue foot unto them which would chaunge the laws alreadie receiued, which the
subiects ought to hold for good and wholesome in euerie Commonweale▪ nor for any desire I have to chaunge the estate of
Commonweals alreadie established, which have continued by long succession and
course of yeares.
Now the first and strongest reason that is to be had to make the magistrats and
officersReasons to show that magistrats ought not to be
perpetuall. annuall, is, for that the first and principall end of
euerie Commonweale ought to consist in vertue: and that the scope of euerie
good and true law▪ giuer, is to make his subiects vertuous. Which to attaine
vnto, it behoueth him to propound unto the viewRewards for
vertue ought to be unto all men common. and sight of the whole world,
the rewards of vertue, as the marke whereat euerie man ought to aime in best
sort he can.
Now most certaine it is, that honour is no other thing than the reward and
prize of vertue, which neither ought nor can by the counterpoise of profit be
esteemed: wheras rather to the contrarie
vertue hath no more capital an enemie, than profit deuised to arise by honour.
If then the honourable preferments, offices and commissions bee taken out of
publique place, to be alwayes enclosed & shut up within the particular
houses of most vnworthy men, who for favour or money carrie away the same; it
is not then to be thought vertue in that estate to be the prize, the corrupt
nature of man being such as is right hardly to be drawne unto vertue, what
reward or prise soeuer bee deuised for the alluring of men thereto. And thus
much for the first point, which ought to moue princes and wise law giuers, to
set preferments, offices, and all such other the rewards of vertue, in the eye
of all the world, and so to diuide them amongst their subiects, to every man
according to his deserts, which they cannot do, if they grant them unto men in perpetuities.
Another point which the wise law giuer ought still to have before his eyes, is,
ToThe root of sedition is by all meanes to be cut up in a
Commonweale which can hardly be where magistrats and officers be
perpetuall. cut up the roots, and to take away the seedes of civill
sedition, so to maintaine his subiects in good peace and amitie amongst
themselves, and one of them with another. Which is a matter of such weight, as
that many have thought it to bee the onely end which the good law maker ought
to hope after. For albeit that vertue may oftentimes be banished out of
Commonweales, for men to live in a disordered licentiousnesse of all kind of
voluptuous pleasures: yet in that all men agree, that there is no more
daungerous a plague unto Commonweales, than civill
sedition and discord. Forasmuch as it draweth
after it the common ruine aswell of the good as of the bad. Now so it is, that
the first and principall cause of sedition, is inequalitie; as to the contrarie
the mother nurse of peace and amitie, is equalitie; which is no other thing
than naturall equitie, distributing rewards, preferments, honours, and all
other things common unto the subiects indifferently, and in the best sort that
may be. From which equalitie the very theeves and robbers themselves may in no
wise depart, if they meane to live together. Hee therefore that shall diuide
the honours and offices of estate unto a small number of men, as needs it must
be, when they are giuen for tearme of life, hee I say hath lighted the greatest
flames of ielousie of one of them against another, and the greatest fire of
sedition that can possibly be raised in a Commonweale.
Now if there were no more but the two reasons before alleaged, viz. The enioyingPerpetuitie of
offices the caus of impunitie of the great
officers. of vertue, with the rewards thereunto due, and the auoyding
of sedition, the greatest plague of a Commonweale; yet were they euen
sufficient to let, that offices should not be perpetuall, but rather annuall,
to the end that euerie man so hauing therein part and interest, might so also
have occasion to live in peace. But yet there are farther reasons also, which
is, that by such perpetuitie of offices and promotions, not onely the unitie
and concord of subiects, and the true rewards of vertue are so taken away, but
that the due punishment by the lawes appointed for offendors are thereby also
impeached, or rather quite abolished: Whereof the wise law giuer ought to haue
a greater regard than of the rewards to vertue due▪ For that the wise and
accomplished man looketh for no other reward
of his vertuous actions, more than vertue it selfe: which a man cannot say of
vice, neither of the vitious. And for this cause the lawes both of God and man,
euen from the first unto the last, have commaunded nothing more, than the
punishment of the wicked. And what punishment should a man do uppon them, who
are alwaies so high mounted, as that it is impossible to come nigh them? Who
shall accuse them? who shall imprison them? who shall condemne them? Shall
their companions or fellowes in power? will they cut their owne armes, or rip
their owne entrals? beleeue it they will neuer be so euill aduised. What if the
great ones bee also partakers of their foule robberies, villanies, and
extortion? how shall they then punish the
others? they will rather blush for shame, and be touched with compassion of
them which are like unto themselves, than with the hainousnesse of the offences
be enduced to take of them punishment. But if any there be so hardie as to
accuse, yea or but so much as to complaine of one of these demie gods, he is in
daunger of his life, as a false enformer, if hee by proofe cleerer than the
sunne it selfe, proue not villanies done in most obscure darkenesse: and admit
that all be by them well proued, and that the guiltie magistrat be conuinced
and attainted, yet so it is, that this ordinarie clause Frater noster est, He is our brother, shall suffice to cover and burie
all the villanies, deceits, and extortion, of the most vniust magistrat that a
man could imagine. So that hardly one of a thousand which had deserued
punishment, should in five hundred yeres be brought to execution.
But if the magistrats were annuall, it is most certaine, that the feare to be
called to account,Great magistrat
and officers in doubt to be called to account where they are but
annuall. would alwaies keepe them in awe, and that they would tremble
and quake as often as they heard that thundering threatning which the Tribunes
of the people made to Manlius, Priuatum rationem rerum ab se
gestarum redditurum, quoniam Consulnoluisset, That he being a priuat
man, should giue account of such things as hee had done, for that he would not
so do being Consull. And indeed what could a man see more faire, than them
which had but a little before administred iustice, and taken charge of the
common treasure, with other such publike offices, after that they had put off
their robes of dignitie, to come in their common
attire as priuat men, to giue an account of
their actions done in the time of their magistracie. And this is it for which
Plutarch hath so highly commended the custome of the
auntient Romans, who animated the young men to commence their publike
accusations against such as had euill acquited themselves in their publike
charges, setting them on as grayhounds upon wolues, or other wild beasts. In
which doing not onely the offendors were punished, but euerie man else also
upon an emulation and strife, as it were endeuoured him to doe well; but
especially they, who had themselves accused others, as well assured that there
neuer wanted some, who still right narrowly looked into all their doings, so
that it much concerned them to beare themselves most uprightly in the whole
course of their lives. Which benefits those estates and Commonweales must
neeedes want, which have their magistrats
perpetuall, or for tearme of life. For which cause the emperour Claudius wisely renewed an old edict or law, then growne
out of vse: which was, That hee to whome the government of any prouince was by
lot fallen (as the maner was) should forthwith, all excuses set apart, go vnto
his charge; and that the time of his authoritie and charge once expired, he
should not forthwith take uppon him any other new publike charge or government,
to the intent that the euill behauiour or extortion of the magistrats should
not by such continuation of their power and authoritie remaine vnpunished. For
whatsoeuer decrees or lawes bee made, the euill magistrats would stillEuill magistrats most commonly hold together. keepe the
power in their hands, and doe what they can one for another; in such sort
strengthening themselves, as that is a thing almost impossible to have of them
any reason. Which was the cause that moued Hannibal that great captaine to present a request vnto
the people of Carthage, To make their judges annuall, which before held their
places for tearme of life, and that none of them should keepe his place two
yeares together, as Liuie reporteth, whose words we
thought good thus here to set downe, Iudicum or do ea
tempestate dominabatur Carthagine, eo maximè quòd ijdem perpetui iudices:
res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat; qui vnum eius ordinis,
& omnes aduersos habebat. horum in tam impotenti regno Praetor
factus Annibal, vocare ad se Quaestorem; idem pro
nihilo habuit; nam aduersae factionis erat: & quia ex qustura in iudices potentissimum ordinem referuntur,
iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebant: id indignum ratus Annibal,
viatorem ad prehendendum Quaestorem misit, subductumque
inconcionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum (prae quorum
superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent, nec magistratus) accusauit,
& vt secundis auribus accipi orationem animaduertit, legem extemplo
promulgauit pertulitque, The order or companie of the judges (saith he)
did at that time beare all the sway at Carthage; and well the more, for that
the selfe same men were still perpetuall judges: euerie mans wealth, fame, and
life, was in their power; he that had one of them of that order against him,
had them al his enemies. In this their so insolent a raigne Hannibal being made Pretor, conuented one of the Questors, or publike
receiuers before him, which made thereof no reckoning, for why, he was of the
contrarie faction unto him: and forasmuch as out of the Questors choyce was
still made into the most mightie order of the judges, they still bare their hautie minds aunswerable unto the wealth
and power they were afterwards to enioy. Which Hannibal
taking for a great indignitie, sent a sergeant to lay hands upon the Questor,
and hauing brought him into the generall assemblie of the people, accused not
him more than he did the whole order of the judges (through whose pride and
wealth, neither the lawes nor the magistrats were (as he said) any thing at all
regarded) and perceiuing his speech to be with the good liking of the people
receiued, forthwith enacted, and proclaimed a law, That the judges should be
every yeare chosen, and that none of them should be judges two yeares together.
And thus farre he. For why, it was otherwise a thing
impossible to chastise them, a man still hauing them all his enemies, that should touch but one of them. For that they
beeing perpetuall magistrats, and commonly allied one of them unto another, it
was impossible to hope to have any of them punished, and much lesse to haue
against them iustice, if a man had any thing to do with them: and in case a man
refused one of them, hee must in so doing refuse the whole bench of them also.
As not many yeares ago in the court of Paris (which at this time consisteth of
an hundred and fiftie judges) in a suit betwixt Chr.
Thuan, chiefe justice in that court, and Iohn
Tili, register of the court (who tooke upon him the defence of his
daughter being absent) were, for alliance onely, threescore judges on the one
side, and two and fortie on the other, chalenged and reiected▪ and all upon the
same bench. And for this cause it was ordained in the assembly of the estates
of the countrey of Languedoc, holden at
Montpelier in the yeare 1556, where then I was, and charge there giuen to Iohn Durande, atturney for that country, That amongst
other his instructions, he should especially moue the king, that it might
please him to ordaine, that the nie kinsmen or other of alliance unto the
judges, should not from thenceforth be admitted unto the same bench, neither
into the same court. Which same request foure yeares after, was by the estates
of Fraunce presented unto the king in the parliament at Orleance, howbeit that
nothing could therein bee obtained, neither can be, so long as honours and
preferments are in perpetuitie giuen in the Commonweale. For it is now two
hundred and fiftie yeares since that king Charles the
fift, and before him Philip the Faire had ordained, That no man should bee judge in
theThat o man should be a iudg
in his owne countrie. same countrey wherein he was borne: as in like
case Marcus Aurelius made an edict, That no man should
be gouernour in his owne countrey. Of which law the profit was thought so
great, as that he would have the same afterwards extended euen unto them which
were but councellours or assistants unto the gouernours of countries: which was
a thing then wel put in execution, as it is at this present in Spaine, & in
mostThe ordinarie iudges in Italie straungers. of
the cities in Italie, where the ordinarie judge is most commonly a stranger.
Which was also by the ambassadours of Moscouie requested of the estates of
Polonia. Howbeit that the decrees of our kings concerning those matters, were
quickly buried, after that the publike offices and charges began to be with vs
giuen for tearme of life. And not to search
further into the edicts of the Roman emperours, we find also in Caesar hisLib. 7. Commentaries, that the auntient
Gaules, and namely they of Autun, had amongst them an inuiolable law, which
expresly forbad the magistrats to be continued in their places aboue one yeare,
and that two of one familie could not be magistrats together, nor yet one of
them, so long as the other who had alreadie bene magistrat should live. And
that more is, it was alwaies expresly forbidden, That two of one familie might
be councellors together, neither yet one of them, so long as the other who had
alreadie so bene a councellour was alive.
Moreover the thing which ought of all others to be most recommended vnto
allThe great office and
preferments of the Commonweale giuen in perpetuitie breedeth a carelesnes of
the Common good both in the magistrats themselves and others subiects
in generall, & euerie one of them in particular, is the preseruation of the
Commonweale. And what regard or care of the
publike good should they haue, which therein have no part? Such as are
themselves excluded, and which see the common preferments and offices giuen in
prey to some few in perpetuitie? How should they have any care of that which
concerneth them not, neither neere, nor a farre off? And admit that any good
and honest man would say, would doe, or vndertake, any thing that were for the
common good or profit, being himselfe but a priuat man, who should hearken vnto
him? who should support him? who should favour him? So that every man leauing
to thinke of the publike, entendeth unto his owne businesse, and hee in that
case should be but laughed at, and derided as a foole, which should take more
care of the common welfare than of his owne. As for
them who alreadie enioy the publike
preferments and offices, they for the most part have no great care of the
common good, being now for euer assured of that which they most desired. O but
how much more happie should both the subiects and Commonweale be, if euerie man
in his degree and according to his qualitie, hauing enioyed conuenable
preferments, and so hauing learned true wisedome by the mannaging of worldly
affaires, should retire themselves from these vaine and worldly businesses, to
occupie themselves in the contemplation of things naturall and diuine? For most
certaine it is, that contemplation is the true mother and mistresse of al true
wisedome and happinesse, which men altogether wrapped up in worldly affaires,
neuer so much as once dreamed or tasted of; and yet for all that this is the
end, this is the scope, this the chiefe point of all mans felicitie.
And yet besides these three, there is another great inconuenience also, in that
officesOne man to have many offices and especially in
perpetuitie, not good for the Commonweale. and preferments are in
Commonweales graunted unto men for tearme of life: that is to wit, that some
few would have all, and some one would possesse himselfe of many publike
charges and offices at once; as it was in auntient time permitted them in
Carthage: which for all that seemed both unto Plato and
Aristotle a thing right daungerous, For that it is an
hard matter for one man well to discharge one office, but well to discharge
many no one man can; and is therefore in euerie well ordered Commonweale a
thing forbidden. Howbeit that the ambitious desires of men alwayes passeth
beyond the prohibitions of the lawes, the most vnworthy most commonly burning
with the hoatest flames of ambition; not vnlike the weake stomacke, which is
alwaies more desirous of meat which it cannot
disgest, than is the stomacke which can better disgest it: thinking it not to
stand with their honor and reputation to stay in the meane, or to abate any of
their titles and dignities, but contrariwise to mount still higher and higher.
In so much that the seigneurie of Venice in some sort to satisfie the ambition
of the citisens, gaue leaue unto him which had borne a greater office, to
refuse the lesse being laid upon him: which is a daungerous course, to measure
the publike charges and offices, by the foot of the subiects ambition, and not
by the common profit.
Then how much more daungerous is it, to make the magistrats and publike charges
perpetuall, onely to serue the ambitious desires of some, and so to make the
Commonweale subiect unto the desire and pleasure of some few? For why, it is to
be feared least that they who can neuer
satisfie their immoderat desires with the multitude of offices and publike
charges, but had rather to burst at the table of ambition, than in time to
withdraw themselves: It is (I say) to be feared least some hungrie fellowes
shall at length say unto them, Depart you hence; or if they will not so doe,
plucke them away by force, not without their owne daungers, and troubling of
the quiet estate of the Commonweale. At the assemblies of the estates of Rome
into the place called CampusOld mn in danger to be thrust off
the bridges.Martius, for the chusing of their cheife magistrats, and
other their great officers, certaine narrow bridges were in diuers places laid
for the citisens to passe over by, that so the little tables wherein their
voices were contained, might the better be of them receiued: at which time such
as were threescore yeares old, were still warned to giue place, and not to come to giue their voices, least haply
they might by the multitude of the younger sort be oppressed: and not for that
such old men were cast headlong from off the bridges into the riuer, as some
have thought. But how much more seemely were it for them which have quietly of
long enioyed the great offices and preferments in the Commonweale, and which
are now growne old therein, sweetly to retire themselves out of those high
places, than violently to be thrust out by others? especially considering that
there is no place more slipperie or daungerous, than are the places of honour
and commaund. Besides that (which worse is) such ambitious men in their falling
draw after them the fall of many others also,
together with the ruine of the whole Ambitious men neuer satisfied with honors, oftentimes the
cause of great trobles in a Commonweale. Commonweale▪ as did Marius, who hauing passed through all the degrees of
honour, and bene six times Consull (which neuer Roman had bene before him) yet
not so content, would needs take upon him the charge of the wars against king
Mithridates (which by lot was fallen unto Sylla) howbeit that hee was now growne extreame old, to
the intent to obtaine the seuenth Consulship, and to continue a perpetuall
commaunding power unto himselfe. But Sylla understanding
of the commission giuen to Marius, and of the authority
by a tumultuous assembly of the people taken from him now absent (and hauing
also an army with him) contrarie unto the law and the custom of their
auncestors, straight way returned to Rome with his partakers, seyzed upon the
citie, where he made a most horrible massacre; which afterwards in such sort
continued, as that all Italie and Spaine was
embrued with blood, not onely the captaines and chiefe commaunders of Marius his faction being by Sylla
slaine, but euen his companions, friends, and kinsmen also, being most
shamefully proscribed, or els banished, and so the Popular estate brought vnto
an extreame tyrannie. So euen for the same occasion three hundred yeares
before, the Popular estate was there chaunged into a faction of an Oligarchie;
not for hauing of offices in perpetuitie for tearme of life, but onely for
hauing continued the charge unto the Decemuiri, or ten Commissioners, for two
yeares together; men appointed for the reforming and amending of the lawes, who
would have so continued the third yeare also, and by force of armes still
maintained their commission, encroaching upon the libertie of the people, had
they not by force of armes (though not without
great daunger of the state) bene againe remoued.
So by the same meanes many Popular and Aristocratique estates were chaunged
intoContinuation of great offices oftentimes the cause of
the change of the estate. Monarchies, or at leastwise into
tyrannicall governments; for hauing giuen the publike charges and commissions
unto their magistrats or commissioners, for longer time than was needfull, or
for proroguing of them longer than by the law they should; as to Pisistratus in Athens, to Philon
in the citie of Argos, to Cypselus in Corinth, to Dionysius at Syracusa, to Panaetius at Leontium, and to Caesar at Rome.
Which Aemylius Mamercus the Dictator foreseeing,
presented a request unto the people, which passed into the force of a law,
whereby it was ordained, That the Censors power from that time forward should continue but for eighteene monethes,
which before was established for five yeares: and the next day after that he
was created Dictator, deposed himselfe of his Dictatorship, being not willing
to hold it more than one day; giuing this reason unto the people of his so
doing, Vt scitas quàm mihi diuturna imperia non
placeant, That you may know (said he) how little long lasting
authoritie and power please me. And for the same occasion the law Cornelia,
published at the instance of one of the Tribunes of the people, prouided, That
it should not be lawful for any man to seeke to have one and the same office
more than once in ten yeares. Neither missed it much but that Gabinius the Tribune had by the Senators themselves beene slaine in
the full Senat, for hauing by his request made unto the people, procured
commission for five yeares together to be
graunted unto Pompey, for the ending of the Piraticall
warre: Whereof Dion giueth a notable reason, For that
(saith he) the nature of man is such, as that a man hauing for long time borne
some honourable charge, commonly hath al other men in contempt and disdaine,
neither can well endure to live in subiection after he hath for a long time
commaunded. Which thing Cassiodorus almost in the same
sence writeth, Antiquitas, prouinciarum dignitatem voluit
annua successione reparari, vt nec diutina potestate vnus in solesceret,
& multorum prouectus gaudia reperiret, Antiquitie (saith he) would
the honour of the prouinces to be repaired with annuall succession, in such
sort as that one man should neither grow insolent with long power, and preferment be a comfort to many. And haply it was not
one of the least causes that the Assyrian and
Persian empires stood so long, for that they euerie yeare chaunged their
lieutenants and generals.
But how then commeth it to passe, that euen children by way of complaint sue
toGreat inconueniences ensuing by making of offices and
dignities hereditarie. be maintained and kept in the possession of
the honours and estates that their fathers and grandfathers had? As in fact
hath bene seene in the constables of Campagne, of Normandie, and of Britaigne:
in the marshals De la Foy, as they tearme them, in the great chamberlaines, and
other infinit, euen unto the sergeants sees of Normandie, as I have before
noted. And namely in Aniou, Touraine, and Maine, the house of Roches had made
the offices of bailifes and stewards hereditarie, had not Lewes the ninth reuoked them, and made them mutable and iusticiable,
by his decree in the yeare 1256. The like is
done in Principalities, Dukedomes, Marquisats, and Earledomes, which now are
had in perpetuitie, which before were holden but by way of commission, and that
during the princes pleasure, which at the first were but annuall, but
afterwards perpetuall: and at last by the favour of our kings are become
hereditarie. Howbeit that other people also as well as we, have in the same
errour offended. So that there is almost no place in all Europe (except in
England) where offices and dignities are not now hereditarie, in such sort as
that commaunding power and authoritie, with the administration of iustice, is
by right of succession fallen euen unto women and children, and so of a thing
publike made particular, and to be sold to him that wil giue most, as it must
needs be, being once brought into the forme of a patrimonie, which hath giuen
occasion more boldly to trucke all estates
and offices, when as men see by the lawes and customes euen sacred iustice it
selfe prophaned, and set to sale to him that will giue most: Of which
inconueniences is proceeded the euill custome of making of all estates and
offices perpetuall. For one should doe iniurie to take an office from a
marchant, and not restore unto him againe the money that he paid for it. Thus
we see the dangers and absurdities one of them as it were linked in another, by
the making of the estates and offices of the Commonweale perpetuall. Besides
which reasons by me alleaged, we have also the authoritie of the greatest Law
makers, Philosophers, and Lawyers, as also the examples of almost all the
auntienr Commonweales; as namely, of the Athenians, the Romans, the Celtes, and
others infinit, who have flourished, and do
yet flourish in diuers places of Italie, Swisserland, and Germanie, as also the
authoritie of Sir Thomas Moore, chauncellour of England,
who in the Commonweale by him deuised, maketh all the magistrats and officers
therein annuall, some from six monethis to six monethes, and othersome from two
monethes to two monethes, and all to auoid the inconueniences which I haue
before spoke of. And these reasons they for most part vse, which say, That
magistrats and officers should not be in a Commonweale perpetuall.
But now on the other side, they which maintaine it to bee more for the
publikeThe great inconueniences ensuing of hauing the
offices in a Commonweale still annuall or changable. good, to make
the estates and offices in a Commonweale perpetuall, alleage, That nothing can
be well done in a yeares space, when as the magistrat must depart out of his
charge before he well know his dutie; and
hauing begun to vnderstand what belongeth unto his place, must yet forthwith
leaue the same unto a new man; and so hee likewise unto another, all still new
men; so that the Commonweale is still to fall into the hands of vnsufficient
men, and such as want experience. But suppose that the prince or the people, or
they which have the choice of the magistrats, commit not the publike charge but
unto men knowne to be of good experience, yet seeing so many holy daies, dayes
not iudiciall, vacations, daies of election, and of triumph, as take up a great
part of the yeares, as well the publike as mens priuat actions must therewith
needs be trobled, warres begun be delaid, iudgements
interrupted, actions of the wicked abolished, punishments deferred, & in briefe the Commonweal in the greatest
dangers therof to be abandoned. Whereof wee have a million of examples in all
histories, both of the Greekes, and of the Latines, which had their offices
annuall. And it hath oftentimes happened, that the magistrats and captaines
hauing charge to make & performe some warre, were upon a sudden called home
againe, and so all was at a stay: as it happened when question was for the
sending of one to succeed Scipio Africanus, the people,
the Senat, and the magistrats, found themselves therewith greatly entangled;
Mutis (saith Liuie) contentionibus & in Senatu, & ad populum acta res est:
postremò eò deducta vt Senatui permitterent: patres igitur iurati (sic enim
conuenerat) censuerunt vt Consules prouincias inter se compararent, The
matter (saith he) was with great contention debated, both in the Senat, and before the people; at length it was
brought to that point, as that the people committed it unto the Senat:
wherefore the Senators beeing sworne (for so it was agreed) determined, That
the Consuls should diuide the prouinces betwixt them. Which was a great
noueltie to sweare the Senat thereunto. But Scipio
understanding of the decree of the Senat, whereby one of the Consuls was
forthwith to succeed him, without farther delay concluded a peace, more to the
aduantage of the enemie than hee would otherwise have done, if hee had not
feared least his successour should have carried away from him the glorie and
honour of his victorie, as it is reported himselfe to have oftentimes said. So
the warre against king Mithridates was protracted
aboue twentie yeares, by reason of the
continuall chaunging of the Roman Generals, the enemie in the meane while (many
faire opportunities by him offered, and by the Romans neglected) farre and wide
extending his dominion and empire. Yea sometimes the Generall was to giue up
his charge, when hee was euen uppon the point to ioyne battell with the enemie,
although he had none appointed to succeed him: as it happened unto the great
captaines Epaminondas and Pelopidas, whose charge expired euen at such time as they were to giue
the enemie battell: who yet neuerthelesse seeing themselves to have an
aduantage of the enemie, and that they could not without the most manifest
danger of the state leaue their charge, gaue battel, and so obtained a most
glorious victorie, whereby the Thebans with their allies were preserued, and the Lacedemonians with a great slaughter
ouerthrowne. But returning home, in stead of thanks and triumph, they were both
accused of high treason, for that they had holden their charge longer than the
time by the law appointed, & so brought unto their triall and conuicted,
were by the commissioners condemned to die: howbeit that they were afterwards
by the people pardoned. Now who knoweth not how many strong places have bene
taken by the enemie, for chaunging of their captaines? how many cities and
townes have bene forced, for hauing put into them new gouernours? and
especially at such time as the enemie was nie, & readie to besiege the
same: as oftentimes it commeth to passe, that the favourites carrying away the
honor, the old expert captaines are excluded, who right often in revenge
thereof either go over unto the enemie, or els
otherwise disfurnish the place of victuals, and other things necessarie.
And yet there is another reason which might well stay the preferments and
offices of the commonweale from being mutable, which reason Tiberius the emperour hadThe reason why Tiberius
the Emperor would not have the great officers often chaunged. still
in his mouth, at such time as men complained him to be the first that had for
many yeares together continued the estates and offices still in the same mens
hands: I do it (said he) to the end that they which are already full of the
blood of the people, may as Horseleeches, full and ready to burst, giue the
subiects some release, fearing lest such as should come new & all an
hungred, should without remorse or respect at all, draw out the rest of their
blood, gnaw their bones, and sucke out the very marrow that was yet left in the subiects. And this unto me seemeth to be a reason
of right great importance: for it is an olde
and true saing, Non parcit populis regnum breue, a short
raigne spareth not the people. And yet in the raigne of Tiberius, offices and other places of commaund, were vsually giuen and
not sold; obtained, but not craued, upon men of desert bestowed, and not
shamefully set to sale to them that would giue most: which opinion of Tiberius ought to bee of much more force in such places
as where port sale is made of all preferments and offices of the commonweale:
for it is to bee presumed (as sayth Alexander Seuerus
the emperor, & after him Lewes the 12) that the
marchants of offices must sel by retaile, & as deere as they can, that
which they had before bought in grosse.
And beside that which we have already said, how is it possible that he should
commaund with such authority as beseemeth a magistrat, which seeth that by and
by after he shall but stand for a cipher (as
they say) without any authority or power at all? who shall obey him? who shal
feare him? who shall do his commaunds? wheras to the contrary, if the
magistrats power be perpetuall, he shall commaund with dignity, hee shall
boldly oppose himselfe against the wicked, and giue ayde and succour unto the
good: he shall revenge the wrong done unto the oppressed, and resist the
violence of tyrants, and that without feare or misdoubt of being thrust out, or
dispoyled of his dignity and office, as hath bene seene by some euen of the
greatest princes, astonished with the constancy & immutable assurance of
the magistrats, not hauing what to reproue him for: neither yet daring to
displace them, fearing also the discontentment of their subiects, unto whom the
brightnes of Iustice and vertue is alwayes redoubtable, and the integrity
of valiant and couragious men right
commendable.
In briefe, if we would have (as all men ought to wish to haue) magistrats wise,
stout, and well experimented in the charge committed unto them, we must wish
them to bee perpetual: for why it is impossible that new magistrats should be
expert in their charge the first yeare, considering that the life of man is
right short, and the nature of authority and power most difficult, whether it
be for the training up of the subiects in warres, or for the maintaining of
them in peace; for the administration of Iustice, or for the mannaging of the
publike reuenues: all which cannot in short time of new magistrats be either
throughly learned, or duly practised. For as the ruine of families commonly
commeth of new seruitors, euen so the fals of Commonweales also proceedeth from
New lords new lawes. new magistrats, who still bring
in new deuises, councels, laws, factions, customs, edicts, stiles, iudgements,
ceremonies, actions, and in briefe a new chaunge of all things in the
Commonweale; whereof ensueth a contempt of the old laws & customs, as also
of the magistrats themselves. All which may well be seene in the antient
Commonweals of of the Greeks & Romans, wherein the new magistrats were no
sooner placed, but they forthwith forged new edicts & laws, so to cause
themselves to be the more spoken of; without regard whether they were
profitable for the Commonweal or not: propounding only this unto themselves,
how to leaue a remembrance of their names unto posteritie: wheras men so sicke
of ambition, are still more desirous of a great than of a good name. Howbeit
that it is not needfull to vse many arguments to proue & show as it were unto the sight of the eye, that the
magistrats and officers ought to be perpetuall, seeing that we have the law of
God, which cannot bee so bound unto places or persons, but that a man therefrom
may well draw an example to imitate and follow. Now it is not found, that the
magistrats and officers established in the law of God were annuall: neither is
it found, that they which were once prouided of honorable places and
preferments in the Commonweale, were euer after againe remoued to giue place
unto new magistrats, and so to yeeld unto ambition that which is to vertue due.
So wee find also, that Plato would that the offices in
his Commonweale should still for the most part be
perpetuall. So that in briefe we see the reasons by vs alleaged, to be by the sacred scriptures, as also by long
experience and tract of time confirmed, not by the example of small
Commonweales, but euen of the greatest and most flourishing monarchies and
kingdomes that now are, or euer were in the whole world, as were those of the
Assyrians, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the Parthians, the Aethiopians, the
Turkes, the Tartars, the Moscouites, the Polonians, the Germans, the French
men, the Danes, the Swedens, the Englishmen, the Scots, the Spaniards, the
Italians; excepting some few Commonweals, which are still turmoiled with the
continual changing of their Magistrats, and perpetuall flouds of sedition and
discord for the shortnesse of their offices.
Now it is not like so many people and nations to have failed of the light of
nature, of iudgement, of reason, &
experience, seeing their estate so wisely managed, and to have so long
flourished both in time of peace and war: which could in no wise so long haue
stood, had their mutable magistrats bene every moment to have bene anew chosen.
And thus we see the reasons both of the one side and of the other, which might
moue some to make their magistrats perpetuall, as some others also to make them
annuall. unto which reasons sometime are ioyned such flourishes of eloquence,
as might at the first well dasse the eyes not onely of the ignorant, but euen
of the sharpest witted also, to heare the reasons of the one side, without
giuing of eare unto the reasons of the other, which are hereby vs indifferently
set downe, that every man might suspend his iudgement, vntill that euerie thing
were in equall ballance well weighed▪
But as men oftentimes erre in the maintaining of the societies of men▪ and
governmentTwo great errors oftentimes committed in the
government of Commonweales. of cities and Commonweales; so doe they
in two notable things also especially: whereof the one is, That they too
narrowly looke into the inconueniences of a law, without weighing of the good
that ensueth thereof: the other, That they runne from one extreame into
another; and so as it were shunning the water, run all headlong into the fire,
when as they should have staied in the middest. Plato
would, that the magistrats in his Commonweale should bee all perpetuall: which
extremitie seemed unto Aristotle blame-worthy, who
therefore running himselfe into the other extremitie, and reiecting the opinion
of his master Plato, opened a way unto all the citisens,
to all the honours and preferments of his
Commonweal, saying, That otherwise to do, were to kindle the fire of sedition
in the whole estate: whereas yet neither the one nor the other of them hath
made any distinction at all of Commonweales, whereof the resolution of this
question especially dependeth. And we have seene euen in this our time one* of
the greatest persons of this realme, and the chiefe man of his cote, who
hauingMichael hospitalis chauncelour of France.
embraced the opinion of Aristotle, hath endeuoured
himselfe by all means to change all the offices into commissions, to be holden
but by sufferance: who neuer had other thing in his mouth, and yet without any
distinction in what forme of Commonweale this chaunge were, without harme to be
receiued.
Now most certaine it is, that Commonweales in nature contrarie, are by
contrarie Commonweales in nature contrarie, by contrarie meanes to be
also maintained. lawes and meanes to bee also gouerned and maintained
(as wee have oftentimes before said, and yet must oft times say) so that the
rules and orders proper to maintaine and preserue Popular estates, serue to the
readie ruine and ouerthrow of Monarchies and sole governments. The Popular
estates are maintained byAnnuall magistrats best in a
popular Commonweale. continuall chaunge of officers, to the end that
euerie man according to his qualitie might have part in the offices, according
as they have part in the soueraigntie, which can in no wise bee where offices
be giuen in perpetuitie. Besides that equalitie the nurse of Popular estates is
by the annuall succession of magistrates the better maintained, and the long
custome of continuall commaund giue not an appetite or
desire to some one or other ambitions citisen to aspire unto the soueraigntie
alone. Whereas to the contrarie in
Monarchies it is not necessarie, no nor yet wholesome, that subiects hauing no
interest in the soueraigntie, should be nourished in ambition, it being
sufficient for them to learne to bee dutifull and obedient unto their
soueraigne prince, and especially if the Monarchy be Lordlike or Tyrannicall:
For that the subiects in the one be the princes naturall slaues, and in the
other the tyrants slaues by force, it should be a thing impossible for such a
Lordlike Monarch, or tyrant to hold their estates, and to giue such yearely or
successiue commanding power unto their subiects.The pollicie
and craft of tyrants. And therefore tyrants, who are no lesse hated
and feared of their subiects, than they themselves feare and hate them, hauing
little or no trust or confidence in them, for most part guard themselves with
straungers onely, and some few of their owne subiects, such as they know to be unto themselves most loyall and
faithfull, unto whome they commit the custodie and guard of their owne persons,
of their estates, of their forces, and of their wealth, without any desire at
all to chaunge them, not onely for that they distrust others, but also for that
they would not acquaint them with the sweetnesse of power and command, least so
some one or other of them therewith enflamed, should be desirous to dispatch
the tyrant of his life, so to obtaine his place: or els otherwise in so doing
to gratifie the subiects. Whereas the Lordlike Monarch whome his subiects more
willingly obey as his naturall slaues, is not so much hindred or letted from
the choice of his magistrats and officers, as is the tyrant, who is not but by
force and constraint obeyed of his subiects; and therefore giueth not the
preferments or offices of his estates in
perpetuitie, neither yet maketh them annuall; but onely bestoweth them as he
seeth good, and that for so long as pleaseth him, diuiding them amongst many at
his good pleasure, without any law or decree therefore, all depending of his
will and pleasure.
But the Royall Monarch, who is in such sort to intreat his subiects, as is the
good fatherThe magistrats in a royall monarchie some
perpetuall and some annuall. his louing children, albeit that he be
no more bound unto mans lawes, than are the other Monarches, yet will he
neuerthelesse of himselfe establish decrees and lawes, for the placing and
displacing of magistrats and officers, to the end they might so bee holden;
diuiding the honours and rewards of vertue not to all indifferently, without
discretion, but unto such as deserue the same; hauing still more respect vnto
the experience and vertue, than unto the grace
and favour of them who are unto him most of all commended. And yet for all
that, shall in all things obserue and keepe the commendable mediocritie, in
such sort, as that he shall make many offices perpetuall, and some changeable
also from three yeares to three yeares; and othersome to bee euerie yeare also
chaunged; as namely the presidents of the parliaments, of the finances or
common receit, or gouernours of prouinces, who could neuer otherwise bee
punished for their oppression and misdemeanor, if they had their such great
authoritie and power in the estate and Commonweale still in perpetuitie. He
shall also diuide the honors and peferments of the
state, unto the richer and nobler sort, albeit that they be not men of so great
experience as are some of the poorer and baser sort, so to preuent sturres and
seditions: yet for all that prouided
alwayes, that unto them which of themselves are not of sufficient capacitie be
still associat men of good experience in their charge, so to cover and supplie
the defect of the others: And yet is not so bound, unto his own laws, but in
case of necessitie hee may againe displace them whome hee hath before ordained
to be perpetuall magistrats, finding them of whome he hath so euill made
choice, for the weakenesse of their minds or bodies, to be altogether
insufficient for the publike charge to be by them sustained, or for to couer
the shame of them which are so insufficient, shall giue them some honest meanes
to discharge themselves of such their charge: as did
the most wise emperor Augustus unto a great number of
the Senators, who vnworthy of their so
honourable places, by that meane cleanely displaced themselves, without any
force or sturre; or at leastwise shall appoint them deputies for the executing
of their charge: yet in the meane time suffering the magistrates and officers
themselves, to enioy still their titles of their offices, and woonted
priuileges. And to the intent that iustice, the principall and chiefe ground of
an estateThat the colleges and companies of iudges ought to
be petuall. or Commonweale may bee the more
religiously distributed, hee shall for the administration thereof appoint
perpetuall colledges and companies of Iudges, and especially of such as are
without appeale to iudge of the lives, fame, and goods of the subiects: not
onely that these judges should so be the better experimented (as well for
hearing the opinion of diuers, as for their long exercise in iudgement:) but
also that so their seuerall power might be in
some sort weakened (for feare they should abuse the same) and that so being
many of like authoritie and power, they should not so easily be corrupted: not
unlike to a great deale of water which is more hardly corrupted than is a
little. For as Plinie sayth: Nemo
omnes, neminem omnes vnquam fefellerunt: meliùs omnibus quàm singulis
creditur. No man euer deceiued all men, neither did all mn euer deceiue any man: better it is to beleeue all
than one. Howbeit, yet that by the wisedome and vertue of some one good judge,
a whole companie, or bench of judges of the same court is oftentimes releeued:
and their factions and secret practises broken; or being otherwise good men,
yet misse-enformed by false accusers and pettie foggers, cannot know or vnderstand the truth: but are by the wisedome of
some one of their companie the better enformed. As I have knowne one judge
alone to have caused the whole companie of judges to change their opinion,
being before resolued and set downe to have put a poore innocent woman to
death: whom yet for all that he by most pregnant and lively reasons clearely
and fully acquited of that shee was in danger to have beene condemned for. Who
therefore well deserueth to be named: and was Potier a
learned judge of great integritie and vertue: who hath left unto his countrey
his two sonnes inheritours of their fathers vertues: one of them Master of the
Requests: and the other, Secretarie of the Finances; in vertue not inferior
unto their father. Besides that, the experience of many worlds of yeares hath
giuen vs sufficiently to understand many
judges, by conferring their opinions together, to giue therby a better and
sounder iudgement, than where they iudge every one of them apart. Howbeit that
Aristotle thinketh it better to have every judges
opinion considered of apart by it selfe: and that he saith to have beene the
vsuall manner of iudgement in many the cities of the Greeks. Now the Romans to
have holden both these fashions and manners of iudgements Asconius Paedianus is the Authour, where he saith: Aliam esse rationem cum vniuersi Iudices constituunt, aliam cum singuli
sententiam ferunt, It to be one manner of proceeding when all the
judges together determine of a matter, and another when every one of them
deliver their opinions apart. Wherefore causes are more indifferently and
uprightly discided in Europe by a competent number of judges together: then by seuerall judges in Asia and
Africke, whereas one particularBetter many iudges then one
alone. judge of a Prouince according to his will and pleasure
determineth of all appeales made unto him from the other particular and
inferiout judges in that prouince. And albeit that in Grand Caire (one of the
greatest cities of the world) there be foure judges which have their diuers and
seperate iurisdictions, and every one of them have also their diuers Deputies,
who iudge also of causes apart and by themselves, yet are the appeales still
brought unto the first judge chiefe of the foure; who alone without any
companion or assistant by him selfe at his pleasure discideth all appeales:
whom it is no great matter for him to winne, that standeth in his good grace,
or that hath the greatest presents to giue him.
Howbeit that the two Cadeleschers are the chiefe of all the judges, and may at their pleasure place or displace any
of the rest of the judges, yea and all of them together also so long as it
shall please the Grand Seignor▪ For why amongst the Turkes all power and
commaund is but by sufferance and during pleasure both giuen and receiued.
Now we have before said that in the royall Monarchie all the Magistrates and
OfficersGood that inferiour Magistrats & officers
should be perpetuall. should neither be perpetuall, neither all still
mutable: For that it is not needfull to chaunge the meane officers, as Clarks,
Sergeants, Vshers, Notaries, and such other like, who for that they have no
power or authoritie to commaund, cannot hurt the Estate: and yet neuerthelesse
the experience of their charge which cannot but in long time and by great
practise be got, requireth that they should bee perpetuall. And so might a man say of other inferiour officers also,
being still subiect unto the power and authoritie of the greater, but cannot
yet oft times be chaunged without the great hurt of the Commonweale, and many
priuate mens hinderance. The Senators and Councelours of estate also, whose
dexteritie for the mannaging of the great affaires of the Commonweale is not
but by long experience to be gotten; we see them to have That Senators and Counsellors of estate ought to be stìll perpetual.
beene in Rome, in Lacedemonia, and amongst the Areopagi in Athens, perpetuall:
and so I thinke they ought to be every where else, so that in the perpetuall
chaunge of mutable magistrates, the Senate should still be constant, firme, and
immutable, and that upon it the other mutable offices and magistrates should as
upon a most sure slay rest: which was not so well prouided for by * Plato, who would have his Senate to be Lib. de Legibus Cap. 174. every yeare by lot
chosen. But now as for such great magistrates and officers as acknowledge no
commaund more than the soueraigne Princes alone, whither it be in martiall
affaires, the administration of iustice, or the charge of the publique receit
if the royall Monarch shall keepe them but one, two, or three yeares in their
charge at the most, he shall so leaue open a way unto his iustice, for the
examining of their actions, and by the same meanes shall cause the wicked and
corrupt magistrates to quake, standing alwayes in dread to be called to giue an
account of their doings. And for that Magistrats and Officers are not to be
chaunged all at once (for that all sudden chaunges in a Commonweale are
daungerous) and that the publique actions be not interrupted, the chaunge of
such great Magistrates as are in corporations and colleges together is to be made by the succeeding of them one of them
unto an other: as they doe in the Commonweale of Rhaguse, where the Senate is
perpetuall, and the Senators who are also soueraigne judges, are not but every
one of them one yere in charge: who yet chaunge not all at once, but
successiuely, and as it were insensiblie; and in their turne after that they
have for a certaine time lived as priuate men, returne more fresh unto the same
charge againe.
But yet generally in every Commonweale this rule hath alwayes place without
exception,A generall and necessarie rule to be kept in
every Commonweale.viz. That the perpetuall Magistrats & Officers
should have either no power at all, or else verie little power to commaund, or
else some companion ioyned with them: and that they to whom great power is
giuen, have the same but for a short time, and
by the law limitted to some few monethes or yeares. By which tempering and
moderation of power and commaund, the difficulties and daungers shall cease,
which might otherwise ensue by the sudden chaunge of all the Magistrates at
once, for the interruption of publique actions. Neither need we so to feare
lest the Commonweale should be without Magistrates, as a ship without a master
to gouerne the same: as it often times chaunced in Rome, for the sute of the
magistrates, who one of them hindered an other, or els the same day entered all
into their charge, as they all at one and at the selfe same instant departed
out of the same together. Neither need we to feare
also lest the wicked by briberie mounted unto the more hie degrees of honour,
should escape vncorrected: or that the
ignorant or vnskilfull should carie away the preferments of the estate and
Commonweale: they which before had charge, hauing for certaine yeares rested
themselves, still returning againe with much greater experience then before.
Now they which wish for annuall Magistrats, annuall Senators, annuall powers
and commaunds, forsee not that (beside the difficulties and daungers by vs
before alleaged to ensure thereof) by this meanes either rude artificers or
such like ignorant and vnskilfull men, must be called unto such publike charges
as they are neuer able to discharge, or else that the Commonweale must needs be
full of most wise men, and such as are of greatest experience and knowledge.
Howbeit that cannot by nature be, that all men can do all things: wheras we see
particular men scarcely well to discharge
their particular charges; and in other some to rest great wisedome, who yet
have no skill in government at all. But in doing that which wee have said there
shall not easilie any default fall out, neither shall the subiects have any
iust cause whereof to complaine; the rewards of honour being so exposed to
every mans sight, as the marke whereat every one should ayme, though few there
bee which hit the same, and the fewer officers and rewards there should be, and
the dearer that they were prized, the more they should be of all desired: when
as every man should for his vertue be called upon, and that there should be no
cause of sedition, no man being excluded from the merite and reward of his
vertue and sufficiencie, so that the causes of sedition so taken away, the subiects may still live in all peace and
tranquillitie. And if need be we may vse Commissioners or Syndiques, as they
did in the time of Lewes the ix, and Philip the faire, for the chastising of the officers, and the calling
of them to account.
Now some difficulties concerning the chaunging of Magistrats and Lawes are by
vs before set downe, and more I suppose will be imagined: yet were it
vnreasonable to looke into the discommodities of a law (and so for the same to
reiect it) without considerationNo lawe so good but that it
draweth after it some discommoditie. also of the profits thereof,
seeing that there is no law so good (as saith Co the Censor) which draweth not after it some
incommodities. And in mine opinion that law may alwayes be accounted good and
profitable, if the good which may ensueThat a good law is
not to be changed for some one discommoditie ensuing thereof. thereof
be manifest, and greater then the harme that is to be feared thereof: wherein
many often times offend, which thinke it
impossible to have all discommodities quite taken out of the lawes, the
Commonweale yet neuerthelesse still standing in safetie,Dangerous to change all the cheife magistrats of a Commonweale at
once. but so falling into such daungers as they before thought not
of, straight waies blame the lawes, and often times chaunge the same, when as
in truth they should have accused & chaunged them selues. So some good
Princes euill aduised often times to their harme cancell a good Law for some
one incommoditie they have seene therein▪ Whereof we will vse no other example
then that of Lewes the xj, who comming to the Crowne at
once displaced all his fathers auntient seruitours, and remoued also the
princes his nie kinsmen from the government of the state: who therefore with a
wonderfull consent conspired with the enemy against him, and brought him to
such a strait, as that they had almost strucke
the crowne from his head, and by force wrested the roiall scepter out of his
hands. But these sturres againe quieted, and all things well pacified and set
in order, fearing lest his sonne should fall into the like daunger, charged him
neuer to chaunge them whom he had aduanced; and yet not so contented, made a
law, whereby he decreed all offices to be perpetuall; and that such as were
once preferred thereunto, should not be againe displaced, otherwise then by
resignation, death, or forfaiture: And by an other Edict declaring the former,
published the xx. of September in the yeare 1482 decreed, That no officers
hauing forfeited their offices, for what cause soeuer, should be enforced to
yeeld up their offices, except it were so before
adiudged, and the parties condemned. Which edict hee commaunded to stand in
force, not onely whilest he himselfe yet
lived, but also during the raigne of his sonne Charles.
And albeit that he could not so bind the hands of his successour, yet so it is
neuerthelesse, that this his decree & law hath euer since bene inuiolably
kept, although the auntient clause, So long as it shall
please vs, remaine still in all letters of office. Which words declare
no perpetuall power to be giuen unto the magistrats or officers, but by
sufferance onely, except by law or custome it be otherwise prouided. Yet still
remaineth that idle clause, that thereby it may be vnderstood, all power and
authoritie to have in auntient times bene giuen by our kings during their
pleasure, and so to have of the magistrats bene holden but by sufferance onely.
And albeit that in the raigne of Philip the Faire this
string was againe touched, for the giuing of offices in perpetuitie, yet for all that the matter still rested vndecided.
But Philip Valois reuoked the commissions, and ordained,
That from that time forward the royall offices should bee perpetuall; which
well declareth them before to have beene mutable at the pleasure of the kings,
albeit that the officers had not forfeited them. And amongst those praises
which they giue unto king Robert, one of the greatest
is, That he neuer displaced officer, if he had not for some foule and infamous
fact before forfeited his office. Whereby it is to be gathered, king Robert his auncestours to have used other lawes and
customes.
But yet haply it may seeme unto some, that if offices should still be giuen
with that clause, During the Princes pleasure, the
magistrats would better discharge their charges for the hope they should haue
by this meane to continue still in their places, proceeding still from better to better, and bearing themselves
uprightly, for feare otherwise to be displaced. Whereunto I agree, in a well
ordered Lordly Monarchy: but the daunger should be greater to open such a gap
under a prince on every side beset with flatterers, and compassed in with
clawbackes: For why, euerie man seeth, that princes so beset, must either make
a most filthy gaine and traffique of their offices, or else take such places
and power to commaund, from good men, who almost alwaies have the courtiers
life (polluted with all manner of vices) in hatred and detestation. Besides
thatThat offices in a royal Monarchie are rather to be
bestowed by order of law, than by the Princes will & pleasure
onely. this bestowing of offices during pleasure, sauoureth somewhat
of tyranny, or of a Lordlike government, rather than of a Royall Monarchy;
which (so much as possible is) should by lawes, and not by the princes will and
pleasure onely bee gouerned: So as many a
Lordly Monarchie, where the subiects being naturall slaues adore and feare
their soueraigne prince, as a god come downe from heauen, accounting his
commaunds as the lawes of nature it selfe. Whereas in a Royall Monarchy, where
the subiects are as children, it is needfull to rule and gouerne all things by
law, as much as possible may be: for otherwise if the king shall without cause
exclude some one more than some other from some office or preferment, he that
should bee so excluded should hold himselfe iniured, and so rest discontented
with his prince; who ought rather to be beloued than feared of his subiects:
which to bee, he ought to take away all occasion of discontentment that men
might have against him; and better meanes is there none, than to leaue all that
may be to the disposition of the lawes and customes, no man so hauing iust cause to complaine of the prince.
The learned Budeus who was of opinion that it were best
to have the magistrats and offices still changeable, without hauing regard vnto
the law made by Lewes the xi. hath holden, That in
auntient time the Presidents and counsellors of the parliament of Paris were
but annuall: and that the solemne oath which they still take the 12. day of
nouember, and the letters patents which they still are to have from the king
for the opening of the Parliament, show sufficiently that their estates were
not perpetuall, but still at the pleasure of the prince to bee reuoked, and so
to bee by them holden but by sufferance: and so by
these reasons drew many to be of the same opiniō with him, who The erection of the parliament of Paris. had they but
turned over the records of the court, and of the chamber of accounts, they
should have found that that Parliament which before was ambulatorie &
moueable, and which had no power but by commission, was by Philip the long ordayned to be an ordinarie Court, with ordinarie
power, circuite, and iurisdiction; in the erection whereof was expressed that
it should still have therein one or two Presidents, of whom the first was the
Earle of Burgundie the kings nie kinsman, as in like sort the President in the
Imperiall chamber, is alway one of the princes of the Empire. And so for a long
time also the President of the court of Paris was still a martiall man and not
a gowne man as he now is: and euen yet at this present the Great Praetor of the
court of Paris, whom we call the chiefe President, is still honored with the
qualitie and title of a martiall man, as of a
knight, or as the Latins call it Miles, or a souldiour,
although he neuer drew sword: which title the other judges of that court haue
not, who then were but three score, but now are an hundred and fiftie. Whereby
it is plaine the court of Paris so founded to have an ordinarie and perpetuall
power, neither to have need of the Princes annuall rescripts, or letters
patents for the disciding and determining of controuersies. Howbeit that king
Henry the second comming into the Parliament for the
publishing of certaine Edicts and lawes, which in that court could hardly find
passage (hauing it put into his mouth by certaine flatterers) said openly, That
the Parliament had at all no power, if it pleased not him by sending of his
letters Patents every yeare to giue opening unto the same; which his speech
astonished many. But certaine it is that
the letters patents which are sent to this end, and the annuall oath which the
Presidents and Councelours take, is but a matter of formalitie and custome,
necessarie at such time as the parliaments were not holden but by commission:
But afterwards that they were erected into the forme of ordinarie courts, such
auntient solemnities are no more necessarie: for why the annuall Magistrats are
to take an annuall oath; whereas they which are perpetuall Magistrats are to
take it but once for all, without any needlesse reiteration of the same. So the
continuall Roman Magistrats every yeare tooke their oath, for that their power
was but annuall: wheras the Senators tooke it but once for all, for that their
dignitie was perpetuall and during the whole
time of their lives. The same might be said of the forme of the commissions and
decrees of that court, conceiued under the name and seale of the king, and
namely of the letters missiue of the court: which although they bee conceiued
in the name of the court, are yet neuerthelesse sealed with the little royall
seale with the flowredeluce: howbeit that all the other magistrats, seneschals,
bailiefes, prouosts, and gouernours of countries, hauing power of ordinarie
commaund or by commission, direct the same under their owne names, and their
owne seales; which is yet retained of the auntient forme, euer since that the
parliament was but the kings priuie councell, which councell for that it had no
ordinarie power, did nothing of it selfe, and the commissions are alwaies
graunted in the name of the king, as hauing the onely power to commaund in his councell, as we have before shewed. Which
forme hath bene euer since followed in the erection of other parliaments, euen
unto the court of Aides, who giue out all their commissions, under the kings
name which hath moued some to say, That the
parliaments have nothing but an extraordinarie power by way of commission
onely. Howbeit that it sufficiently appeareth by that which is by vs before
said, them to have an ordinarie and perpetuall power, which they still hold the
king beeing dead: Which if it were but a power holden upon sufferance, (as some
would have it) it should then together with the death of the king take end, as
all other powers and commissions else doe. But these courts and the ordinarie
magistrats thereof, the king being dead neither
chaunge their attire, nor vse any mourning garments, or other signes of sorrow: yea that more is, the first confirmations
of the new king are alwaies graunted unto the Courts of Parliament; as hath
beene alwaies used since the time of Lewes the eleuenth,
in such sort as that their power is not onely ordinarie, but perpetuall also,
not onely in the whole bodies of themselves, but euen in every one of the
members, officers, and ministers of the said Courts of Parliament.The giuing of offices during the princes pleasure not to be
discommended.
And yet for all that is not the manner of those Princes to be discommended, who
unto their Officers and Magistrates giue their power but by sufferance, which
they (if cause be) at their pleasure againe take from them, as the kings of
England have used to doe. For albeit that the auntient and moderne
Commonweales, especially the Popular and Aristocratique (more straitly bound
unto the lawes than are Monarchies) have their
Magistrates and officers for the most part annuall, and that none of them was
againe displaced, without iust cause why; yet so it was for all that, that the
people sometimes reuoked their former choice made, and placed some others whom
they knew to be more fit for the charge they were to vndergoe: as it did in
establishing the Dictators and others their Captaines and Gouernors, reuoking
sometimes (as I say) euen their ordinarie magistrates; as it did Octacilius the Consul, who at the request of Fabius Maximus was remoued from his charge, as a man not
sufficient for the mannaging of so great and daungerous a warre as the State
had then in hand. Neither had they for the remouing of their magistrat, regard
onely if he had in any thing trespassed, and so deserued to be remoued; but
euen unto the insufficiencie of him also, whither it were knowne or vnknowne when they receiued him into the
Estate, or that it were befallen him afterwards; deeming also weaknesse, or
age, madnesse, or other like diseases, such as let and hinder mens reasonable
actions, to be sufficient also to displace them from their offices. And namely
Lucius Torquatus chosen the third time Consul excused
himselfe before the people for the infirmitie of his eyes; saying, That it was
not reason to put the government of the Commonweale into his hands, who could
not see but by other mens eyes. But O how many are there of the blind, deafe,
and dumbe, not hauing in themselves any light of nature, neither wisedome, nor
experience so much as to gouerne themselves, who are not yet content to guide
the sayles and tackles, but desire also to lay hands euen upon the verie helme
also of the Commonweale?
Now that which we have said concerning the meane that ought to be kept in the
chaunge and continuation of Magistrats and Officers, hath not onely place in
royall Monarchies, but euen in Popular and Aristocratique estates also, where
the officesThat in every commonweale there ought to be some
estates and magistrats perpepetuall. almost all, or for the most
part, ought to be every yeare, or from two yeares to two yeares still mutable:
as they do among the Swissers, and diuers other Commonweals. Yet neuerthelesse
for the preseruation of the same, there must still be some estates in the
Commonweale perpetuall: as namely those whose experience and wisdome is alwayes
necessarie for the stay of the rest, such as be the Councellors of estate: And
this is it, for which the Senat in Rome, in Athens, and in Lacedemonia, was
still perpetuall. And why, the Senators still
during their lives held their charge and places: for as the hookes and hinges
whereupon great burdens rest, must of themselves be strong and vnmoueable; euen
so the Senat of the Areopagi, and of other Commonweales also, were as most
strong and sure hinges, whereupon as well all the mutable officers as the whole
waight of the Estate and Commonweale rested & reposed themselves. The
contrarie whereof is to be done in Monarchies, wherein the greater part, and
almost all the estates ought to be perpetuall, except some few of the chiefe
and principall: as they doe in the kindome of Spayne, where they well know how
to keepe this mediocritie or meane proper unto the
royall estate. And so for the same cause the
Venetians which have an Aristocratique estate, make their officers every yeare
chaungeable, and some of them from two moneths to two moneths; and yet
neuerthelesse have their Duke, the Procurators of S. Marke, the Chauncelour,
and foure Secretaries for the Estate, perpetuall; which the Florentines
ordayned in their Estate also (after that they were by Lewes the xij, delivered from the most cruell tyrannie of Countie Valentinus Borgia) taking order that their Duke should
from that time forward be perpetuall, to the entent that the Commonweal before
in perpetuall motion and chaunge of all their estates and offices, might yet
have some thing firme and stable whereupon to rest and stay it selfe: which
good order being in short time after by the most turbulent Florentines
abolished, they fell againe into greater tumuls and civill warres then euer they were in before: whereas if they had had but
a perpetuall Senate at the least, and the Senators continued in their charge,
(who from six moneths to six moneths were stil chaunged and rechaunged) and had
but kept a certaine meane betwixt these two extremities, of generall chaunge,
and still continuing of all their offices, their estate had beene much the more
assured, neither had their Commonweale beene still so tossed and turmoyled with
so many and so great surges of sedition, and tempests of civill warres. But
these things thus by vs declared, let vs now see also whether in a wise and
well ordered Commonweale it be good that the Magistrates should be all at
unitie, and of one accord among themselves or not?
CHAP. V. ¶ Whether the unitie and concord of Magistrats
amongst themselves bee good and wholesome for the Commonweale, or not?
THis question, viz. Whether
it be good that the magistrats and officers of a Commonweale should be of
accord, or els at discord and variance among themselves? may perhaps seeme
altogether needlesse and vaine. For who euer doubted but that it was alwaies
expedient, yea and necessarie too, that the Magistrats in euerie Commonweale
Reasons to show that magistrats ought to be at vn tie and
concord among themselves. should be of one and the same mind? to the
end that they all together might with one consent and heart embrace and seeke
after the publike good: And if so it be (as wise men have alwaies thought) that
a well ordered Commonweale ought to resemble a mans bodie, wherein all the
members are vnited and conioyned with a maruellous bond, euerie one of them
doing their office and dutie; and yet neuerthelesse when need is, one of them
still aideth another, one of them releeueth another; and so all together
strengthen themselves, to maintaine the health, beautie, and welfare of the
whole bodie: but if it should happen them to enter into hatred one of them
against another; and that the one hand should cut the other, or the right foot
supplant the left, and that the fingers should
scrape out the eyes, and so euerie member should draw unto it selfe the
nourishment of the other next unto it; it must needs fall out, that the bodie
in the end must become maimed, lame, and impotent, in all the actions therof:
euen so in like manner may a man deeme of the estate of a Commonweale, the
honour and welfare whereof dependeth of the mutuall loue and good will of the
subiects among themselves, as also toward their soueraigne prince. Which sweet
unitie and agreement how is it to be hoped for, if the magistrats which are the
principall subiects▪ and such as ought by their example to bind together the
rest, be at variance and discord among themselves? But euen to the contrarie
the subiects shall become partakers of the factions of the magistrats, they
first nourishing secret grudges, and afterward open
enmitie, vntill that at length all breake out into open civill warre, all for
the maintenance and upholding euerie one of
them of the chiefe of their factions, to the destruction of the Commonweale: or
in case stay be made thereof, and that things fall not out altogether so euill,
yet must still publike actions by such ambitious discord of the magistrats be
hindred, and the Commonweale sore troubled: whereunto it shall happen as it
doth unto a maid, for whome (as Plutarch saith) her
suters enter into such a ielousie and passion, as that desiring euerie one of
them to have her to himselfe, they so in stead of louing and embracing of her,
most cruelly rent her in peeces amongst them. And what good successe may a man
expect of an armie, or what victorie is to bee hoped for over the enemie, where
the captaines and commaunders are at discord among themselves? or what iustice
is to be looked for, where the judges are divided into factions? Yea it hath bene oftentimes seene some of them to haue
beene of contrarie opinions and aduise unto others, and that upon a verie
iealousie and hatred they had among themselves, and so play as it were at
hazard with the life, the goods, and honour of the subiects: as Agesilaus king of the Lacedemonians (albeit that hee was
one of the most famous of them that euer was) to impaire the credit and
authoritie of Lysander whome he hated, reuersed all his
iudgements, and gaue sentence quite contrarie, not so much for the iniquitie of
the cause (as he himselfe said) as in despight of him his enemie onely. And to
make the matter short, most certaine it is, that dissentions and civill warres
(the capitall plagues of Commonweales) take foot, root, encrease, and
nourishment, of nothing more than of the hatred and enmitie of the magistrats
among themselves. Whereof it followeth the
unitie and concord of them among thmselues to be unto the subiects not onely
profitable, but euen necessarie also. Which may all seeme right profitable
arguments and reasons for the one side.
But now they which more subtilly reason of these matters, deeme to the
contrarie,Contrary reasons to show that it is good for
the Commonweale, that magistrats should be at discord and variance among
themselves. the health, and welfare of the Commonweale to be best
preserued and kept by the discord of the magistrats. For why (say they) the
force and nature of vertue is such, as that it cannot be contrarie unto vertue;
neither that good men, although they bee at neuer so great oddes, can yet be
enemies among themselves: but being prouoked by the iniuries of the wicked
their aduersaries, do still wel the more and more encrease and flourish:
neither is the valour of worthy men any where more euident and manifest, than
when they without bitternesse contend among
themselves; and so prickt forward with an honest ambition, and enflamed with
the heat of men like unto themselves, as with a fire, are by the emulation of
their competitors incited to take in hand great matters, and so still to
ouercome their enemies in well doing. So when Taxilas
king of the Indians had by his ambassadours freely and without resistance
offered his kingdome unto Alexander the Great, (then
bearing downe all the kingdomes of the East before him) if so be he wanted
wealth; and withall refused not to receiue wealth also at his hands, if hee had
of it too much: Alexander glad of such a match, said
unto him, If we must thus contend and combat together, it shall neuer be said,
that you shall take this point of honour from me, as to be accounted more
magnificall, more courteous, or more royall,
than my selfe: and so gaue unto him another great kingdome, with an infinit
masse of treasure. In like manner Tullus Hostilius king
of the Romans, said unto Metius Suffetius Dictator of
the Albanians, The civill discords which thou obiectest vnto
vs, wee deem them as profitable to our citie; for we striue together,
whether of vs shall better or more earnestly fight for the good of the
Commonweale.
Now if contention and emulation be thus good and profitable amongst valiant
& good citisens, and wholesome for Commonweales, how much more then ought
it to be thought necessarie for most base and abiect men, for the stirring of
them up to vertue,The fruit of oes. and deterring of them from vice. For of all the great
profits which men vse to reap from their
enemies, none is greater than so to live as that we seeme not to exceed them in
vices, or be ouercome of them in vertues. But if such discord and contention be
both honourable and profitable in a citie or Commonweale, wherein the princes
and magistrats are all good men, and striue but for vertue onely; how much more
then shall the contention be profitable, where the good striue against the
euill? But in case that all the magistrats be euill, then is discord and
contention amongst them not onely profitable, but euen necessarie also, least
otherwise they beeing at unitie and concord among themselves, and in possession
of the government, might freely and without feare make hauocke and spoile both
of the publike and priuat affaires. In which case it cannot fall out better
either for the subiects, or for the whole Commonweale, than if they by their
mutuall hatred and accusations shall openly
detect and lay open unto the world, their owne filthinesse, their foule
extortions and robberies, as the sheepe are neuer more assured, than when the
wolues deuoure one another; as it happened saith Philip
Commines in England, that whilest the great lords slew or condemned one
another, the poore people in the meane while remained safe from their inuasion.
Which was the wise councell of Cincinnatus, seeing the
Consull Appius openly to withstand the people to hinder
them for the doubling the number of their Tribunes: Let be (said Cincinnatus) for the moe they shall be, the worse they
will agree. And right needfull oftentimes it was the power of the Tribunes to
bee broken and weakned by their owne diuision,
when as by the opposition of any one of them, all the proceedings of the rest
were so hindered and stayed. And truely Cincinnatus
therein said wisely, for so the Commonweale stood and flourished, the Tribunes
oftentimes being at discord and varience among themselves, which (they being at
unitie and concord) would have in a moment fallen: and so long it well stood
vntil that Pub. Clodius a most wicked man, about foure
hundred yeares after presented a request unto the people, which passed into the
force of a law, whereby it was ordained, That from thenceforth the opposition
of one of the Tribunes should not hinder the proceeding of the rest of his
fellow Tribunes. And therfore Cato the Censor, the
beautie of the Romane wisedome (and one to whome was giuen the chiefe prayse
for wisedome and vertue amongst the Romans) could neither endure the agreement of his seruants in his familie, nor of
the Magistrats in the Commonweale, but slily and secretly still sowed hatred
and sedition amongst them; that so the wicked and offendors might with their
accusations as with mutuall wounds fall, and the good so gaine praise. For why,
he thought it a thing almost impossible in so great an accord of slaues and of
magistrats, but that the one of them should make spoile of the Commonweale, and
the other of his priuat substance, especially being in hope to escape
vnpunished, and our of feare for being accused. And therefore doubted not
fiftie times to accuse offendors, hee himselfe being also fortie times by
others accused: howbeit that he still bearing himselfe upon the integritie of
his forepassed life, and the commendable things by him done, easily auoided all
the slanders by his aduersaries against him
fasly surmised. Neither was that Commonweale euer after fuller of good and
valiant citisens, than it was in his time. Yea the Senat of Rome allotted a
great summe of money to Mar. Bibulus to buy his
Consulship, and the voyces of the people, to the intent to oppose him against
Caesar his knowne enemie, who had cunningly set up
Luceius his friend (whome the Senat would have had
excluded) that so hee might doe all things as he thought good, his friend and
fellow in office agreeing thereunto. And not to go farther, we have herefore
the witnesse of Iulius Caesar, who in his
CommentariesLib.. saith, The Gaules to have had a most
auntient custome amongst them, to stirre up their great lords one of them
against another, to the intent that the common people
(which were as he reporteth but slaues) might so bee safe and free from their
outrages and robberies. For so one of them
opposing himselfe against another, and euill controlled by the good, and the
wicked by themselves; there should be no doubt but that the Commonweale should
so be in much more safetie and assurance, than if they were of one accord among
themselves. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the discord of princes and
magistrats to have alwaies bene unto Commonweals wholesom: as the meane whereby
the wicked (as we said) may by the vertue of the good, or their owne mutuall
accusations be weakned. Which seemed a thing profitable not onely unto the
Romans, and our auncestours, but euen vnro Lycurgus the
wise law giuer also, who therefore himselfe set dissention betwixt the two
kings of Lacedemonia, and appointed also, That there should alwaies two enemies
be sent ambassadours for the state; to the
intent they should not by their mutuall consent and good agreement betray the
Commonweale: but that being at variance, they might still one of them bee
controlled by the other. As for that which is said, the parts of mans bodie
which represent a well ordered Commonweale, to bee neuer at discord among
themselves, is quite contrarie; for were not the humors of mans bodie much
contrarie, a man should quickly perish: the preseruation thereof dependeth of
the contrarietie of hoat & cold, of moisture and drought, of bitter choller
to sweet flegme, of beastly desires to diuine reason; as also the preseruation
of the whole world next unto God dependeth of the contrarietie, which is in the
whole and every part thereof. Euen so the magistrates in a Commonweale ought in some sort to be at difference among
themselves, albeit that they otherwise be right good men, for that trueth, the
publike good, and that which is honest, best discouereth it selfe by that which
is thereunto contrarie: and is still to bee found in the middest betwixt two
extreames. And it seemeth that the Romans had this principall end before their
eyes, ordinarily making choyce of their magistrats that were to bee placed in
the same charge, still enemies one of them unto another; or at leastwise of
quite contrarie humors and dispositions, as is in all their histories to be
seene. As when the Senat foresaw that Claudius Nero
should carrie away the Consulship, an hoat and sturting man, and withall a most
valiant and couragious captaine to oppose against Hannibal: the Senat (I say) procured to have ioyned unto him for his
companion or fellow in office Liuius Salinator an old
captaine, and a man of great experience, but
yet as cold and staid, as was the other hoat and terrible, and yet fit to heat
the old age of Liuius, now a little too cold for the
warres: who so ioyned and vnited together, gained a most notable victorie
against Hannibal, which was the ruine of the
Carthaginians, and the preseruation of the Roman estate. These two men also
afterwards were by the people made Censors together; who still at discord,
noted one of them another of infamie, a thing neuer before seene: and yet they
thus still at variance, were in all mens iudgements two of the most famous and
vertuous men that then were in Rome. With like wisedome the Romans ioyned
together Pabius Maximus, and Marcus
Marcellus, in their warres against Hannibal,
both of them right great and most expert captaines, but the one of them being a
cold, and the other an exceeding hoat man; the
one alway still desirous of battell, and the other still seeking for delay; the
one called the Roman Sword, and the other the Bucklet; the one a fierce
warrier, and the other a long lingerer: by which contrarie humors of these two
so great personages the estate was not onely preserued from ruine and
destruction, which must needs otherwise vndoubtedly have ensued, but farre and
wide enlarged also. If then the emulation and discord of the most vertuous
magistrats be so profitable unto a Commonweale, what then is to bee hoped for,
when the good magistrats shall oppose themselves against the wicked?
And these reasons may on both sides seeme probable, but
what in trueth is to bee The resolution of the former question. resolued upon,
is not so easie to iudge which to do, not onely the qualitie of the magistrats
themselves, but the diuers formes of Commonweales, is to bee also considered.
And yet I suppose, that in euerie kind of Commonweale it is good that the
inferiour magistrats and officers, being under the power and authoritie of the
greater, should stil be at variance and discord among themselves, and that more
in a Popular estate than in any other: For that the people hauing none but the
magistrats to gouerne them, is most easie to be pilled and polled, if the
magistrats bee not one of them by another controlled. And in a Monarchie it is
expedient also, that euen the greatest magistrats should sometime be at oddes,
considering that there is a soueraine prince to chastise and correct them; so
that hee bee not mad, furious, or a child, or one otherwise subiect unto another mans power. But in an Aristocratike or
Popular Commonweale it is most daungerous, that the great magistrats should bee
at discord among themselves, and that especially if they bee not good men, who
neuer have any such contention or debate amongst them, as may hurt the estate
or Commonweale: but such as was the honourable difference betwixt Scipio Affricanus, the elder, and Fabius Maximus: betwixt Scipio the younger, and
Cato; betwixt Liuius and his
companion Nero; or the contention of Lepidus with Fuluius, of Marcus Scaurus with Catulus; or of Themistocles with Aristides: whose
notable contention for vertues sake was alwayes unto the Commonweale wholesome.
But if the greatest magistrats in a Popular estate bee euill and wicked men, or
that their ambition be founded uppon an euill
ground, it is then daungerous least that their differences bee cause of civill
warres; as it happened betwixt Marius and Scylla, betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Augustus and Marke Anthonie,
Thucidides and Pericles. And yet much more
dangerous such contentions are in an Aristocratie, than in a Popular
Commonweale: For that the gouernours, which are alwaies the fewer in number in
an Aristocratique estate, and yet commaund the rest, have still to doe with the
people: who upon the first occasion take up armes against their lords, if they
once enter into quarrels. For a few lords in an Aristocratie are easily drawne
into two parts, by the great magistrats, who if they fall into sedition among
themselves, as also with the people, it cannot
otherwise bee, but that the chaunge of the estate must thereof needes ensue;
the leaders of the factions oppressing their enemies: or else the government of
the estate falling wholly into one mans hands, which is not so much to bee
feared in a Monarchie, whereas the soueraigne prince under his power keepeth
all the magistrats in awe.
But in euerie Commonweale it is expedient and necessarie, that the numbet of
theThat the number of the soueraigne magistrats in a
Commonweale should still be odd. soueraigne magistrats, or of them
which come neere unto the soueraigntie, should still be odd, to the end that
the dissention amongst them might still be composed by the greater part or
number of them; and that the publike actions be not by the equalitie of them
hindred or letted. And that is it for which the Cantons of Vrie,
Vnderuald, Zug, and Glaris (which of all
others are most Popular) have beene glad to make in euerie one of them three
soueraigne magistrats, whom they call Amans, & not two, for that the third
may easily reconcile two being at variance betwixt thēselues: in stead whereof
they of Schwits have foure, as they of Geneua have also their foure Sindicques,
and they of Berne, Lucerne, Friburg, and Solure their two Auoyers: and Zuric,
Basil, Schaffouse, their two Bourgomasters: as some there were which thought it
better to have of such great magistrats moe than foure, and yet in odd number
also; as in auntient time the Athenians had their nine Pretors, whome they
called Archontas; that so the fewer might still yeeld unto the rest, or be in
number ouercome, which cannot be where onely two beare
the sway, except they had alternatiue power to
commaund each of them his day by turnes, so as had the Carthaginensians
Suffetes, and the Roman Consuls, so as we have before said. And therefore by
our laws also are three appointed for the common receit, that so the third
might still reconcile the other two his companions at difference betwixt
themselves, or els by ioyning himselfe to one of them, make that part the
greater. Which odd number of great magistrats is more necessarie in a Popular
or Aristocratike estate, than in a Monarchy; and the discord and dissention of
them lesse in this state to be feared than in the other. For that as almightie
God the Father of the whole Fabrike of the world, and of nature, doth with an
admirable concord and agreement gouerne this world, composed of the contrarie
conuersions and motions of the celestiall orbes among themselves, as also of
the different natures of the starres and
elements, and of the contrarie force and power of planets and of other liuing
creatures: euen so also a king (the liuing image of God himselfe the prince of
all things) should of the dissimilitude of magistrats, in some sort, at
variance among themselves, keepe and maintaine the welfare of his subiects and
people. And as in instruments, and song it selfe, which altogether out of tune,
or all in the selfe same tune, the skilfull and learned eare cannot in any sort
endure, is yet made a certaine well tuned discord, and agreeing harmonie, of
most vnlike voices and tunes, viz. of Bases, Trebles,
and Meanes, cunningly confused and mixt betwixt both: euen so also of the
mightie, and of the weake, of the hie, and of the low, and others of the middle
degree and sort betwixt both; yea euen of the verie discord of the magistrats
among themselves ariseth an agreeing welfare
of all, the straitest bond of safetie in euerie well ordered Commonweale. So
Caesar making sharpe warre upon them of Beauuis,
hauing in his armie two captaines deadly enemies one of them unto the other,
commaunded them to turne all that their hatred upon their enemies, who so in
his verie sight with great emulation gained a notable victory over their
enemies, which their dissention had giuen unto their enemies, had they not had
a generall aboue them, who kept them both in awe. Which as it oftentimes
happeneth, so did it also chaunce to Lewes the twelfth
the French king, who gained the estates of Bolonia, and ouerthrew the Popes
armie, by reason of the discord betwixt the cardinall of Pauie, and the duke of
Vrbin, who through iealousie of one of them against the other, so hindred &
entangled themselves, as that they gaue
victorie unto the French: into which daunger the Roman estate was like to haue
fallen, by the contention risen betwixt Fabius Maximus,
and Minutius the Roman generals, which had vndoubtedly
giuen Hannibal the victorie, and the Romans the
ouerthrow, had not Fabius for the good of the
Commonweale forgot his displeasure, and by his valour delivered his rash
companion together with the Roman armie, from a most certaine and present
destruction.
Wherefore the contentions of the greater Magistrates are most daungerous in
aThe contention of the great magistrats most dangerous in
a popular Commonweale: and their too great friendship to be no lesse
perilous also. Popular estate or Commonweale, (where there is no
other head to commaund them but the multitude) and especially if he seeke how
to serue their owne proud and ambitious desires, rather then the common good.
And therefore the Roman Senat seeing Marcus Lepidus, and Q. Fuluius
mortall enemies chosen Censors together, went unto them in great number to
perswade them now at length for the Commonwealth sake to become friends, or at
least wise to suspend their enmitie, so the better to attend unto their office,
being the fairest and of greatest importance in the whole Commonweale. The like
whereof we read to have beene often done by the Senat, in setting the busie
Tribunes, and proud Consuls agreed, at such time as their dissentions seemed to
tend unto the daunger of the State. But as it is not good that the greatest
magistrates in a Popular estate should be too great enemies; so also is it not
convenient that they should be too great friends,
especially if they be not good men, and that for the reasons by vs before alleaged. Which was the cause that the
yonger Cato seeing Pompee,
Caesar, and Crassus so straitly allied together,
and that they so conioyned, were too strong for all the rest of the people;
cried out aloud the Commonweale by such combyning of the great ones to be
bought and sold; foreseeing as it were out of a watch tower the stormes and
tempests thereof then at hand. Yet true it is that of two extremities it is
better that the great Lords and magistrats in a Popular or Aristocratique
estate should be of one accord then at discord: for that being of accord, they
will alwaies like better to commaund others, and so in some sort or other to
preserue the Estate such as it is, than together with the Commonweale, quite to
ouerthrow their owne power, whereunto their discord would bring them, when they
had once giuen sayles unto the tempest. In
such sort as Liuie said of Caluinus the Campanian: Improbum hominem, sed non ad
extremum perditum, qui mallet incolumi quàm euersa patria dominari, A
wicked man (saith he) but not altogether desperate, who had rather to rule ouer
his countrie yet standing upright, then over the same ouerthrowne. So albeit
that Mar. Tullius said, The three-headed alliance of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompee to be
a thing greatly to be feared: Yet when he saw Crassus
the moderator with the Roman legions slaine in Chaldea, and Iulia Caesars daughter Pompee his wife by
vntimelyPhilip. 2. death taken away, he cried out: Vtinam Cn. Pompei, amicitiam cum Caesare nunquàm coisses, aut
nunquàm diremisses, I would to god, O Pompee, (said he) thou haddest either neuer made friendship with Caesar, or
hauing once made it, haddest neuer broken it. For why their friendship much
diminished the Popular power, but their enmitie altogether ruinated the same;
one of them being in no wise able to endure his equall, nor the other his
superiour, vntill that so by civill warre the state was quite at length
ouerthrowne, and Caesar become master of all. And as for
that which Caesar writeth, our auncestours the auntient
Gaules to have thought the dissention of their princes and great gouernours to
have beene profitable unto their estates, I can hardly be perswaded therein:
when as by the report euen of Caesar himselfe, the
dissention of the princes and of the estates of Fraunce, (then for the most
part gouerned by Aristocraties) wrought their owne destruction; some of them
praying aide of the Germans, and some of them
of the Romans, being long a prey both to the one and to the other, and in the
end unto the Romans alone as the onely conquerors. Neither is it true the
mutuall slaughters of the Nobilitie of England to have beene commodious and
profitable unto the comminaltie and inferiour sort, as Philip
Comines writeth; yea at such time as I was Embassadour in England, I
vnderstood by some of the inhabitants there, them to feare nothing more then
the factions of the Nobilitie and their civill discord: for the better
appeasing and repressing whereof they have often times used to assemble the
high court of Parliament, whereunto all the States are assembled. And thus we
have declared in what sort the Magistrates ought to behave them selues towards
their Prince, as also how they ought to beare them selues one of them
towards an other, as also towards other
priuate men; and whether they ought to be at unitie among them selues or not.
Now it remaineth for vs briefly to show also, how the Prince ought to behaue
him selfe towards his subiects; and whither it be expedient that he should him
selfe iudge them, or be him selfe conuersant among them.
CHAP. VI. ¶ Whether it be convenient or expedient for
the Maiestie of a soueraigne Prince to iudge his subiects him selfe, or to be
much conuersant with them.
IT may seeme unto some that this question not
before reasoned of, hath not in it any doubt, and that it is not needfull for
vs farther to enter there into, considering that all the auntient and wise
polytitians are of accord, that kings were neuer for other thing established
than for the administration of justice, as saith Herodotus speaking of the Medes; and Cicero
likewise of the Romans;Kings first established to iudge his
subiects. as also we read that the first kings of Greece, Aeacus, Minos, and Radamanthus had
no title more honorable then the title of Iudges; who for they with great equity administred iustice, are by the Poets
reported to have obtayned of Iupiter an euerlasting
power & office for iudging of the ghosts in hel. And albeit that Homer calleth princes the pastors, or feeders of the
people. Yet so it is that the title of Iudges hath long time after him
continued in the person of the princes of Athens, who had the soueraigne
government for ten yeares. And not onely the princes of the Medes, the Greeks,
and Latins, but euen the Generals also, who were as soueraignes amongst the
Hebrewes, had no other title then the title of Iudges: And at such time as they
demaunded of Samuel (now wearied with age) a king, they
ioyned thereunto, that he might iudge them, as other kings did their people:
Which showeth sufficiently that the principall charge which they had, was to
doe iustice themselves in person. And the
principall reason that might moue the princes themselves to iudge theReasons to show that princes themselves in person ought to
administer iustice unto their subiects. subiects, is the mutuall
obligation which is betwixt the Prince and his subiects: For as the subiect
oweth unto his lord all duety, aide, & obedience; so the Prince also oweth
unto his subiects iustice, guard, & protection: so that the subiects are no
more bound to obey the prince, than is the prince to administer unto them
iustice. Neither is it sufficient to have it done by an other man, as by the
Magistrate at the Princes command, seeing that the subiects being commaunded to
yeeld their faith and obedience unto the prince, cannot do it by their
Deputies, but onely by themselves in person; and that this obligation betwixt
the Prince and the subiect is reciprocall. Howbeit that it is lesse
inconvenient that the vassall should giue his faith and homage unto his Lord
by his deputie, than the Lord to do him
iustice by his officer, for that the obeisance of the subiect in this case
cannot be called in doubt: whereas the subiect hath no warrant that the
magistrat or officer shall not suffer himselfe to be by bribes corrupted, which
the Prince will not do, who is therefore still aunswerable before God, vnto
whom he cannot say that he hath therewith charged the conscience of his Iudges,
his owne thereby being not discharged. Besides that it much and notably
concerneth Commonweales, that they which hold the soueraignty should themselves
doe iustice: that is to wit, the vnion and amitie of the Princes with the
subiects, which cannot better be nourished and maintained than by the communion
of one of them with the other, which is lost, and brought to nought, when the
Princes do nothing but by their magistrats and
officers: For so it seemeth unto the subiects that their princes disdaine and
contemne them, a thing unto them more grieuous than if the prince should him
selfe doe them wrong; and so much the more heauy, as a contumelie or disgrace
isThe great good that ensueth whē princes in person
themselves do iustice unto their subiects. more hardly to be borne,
than is a simple wrong or iniurie. Whereas to the contrarie when the subiects
see their Prince to present him selfe in person unto them to do them iustice,
they go away halfe contented, albeit that they have not that which they
desired, or at least wise they will say, The king hath seene our request, he
hath heard our difference, he hath taken the paines to iudge our cause. And if
so be that the subiects be by their king seene, heard,
or vnderstood, it is almost incredible, how much they are rauished with contentment and pleasure, if the Prince be neuer so
little vertuous, or have any other commendable qualitie in him. Besides that
there is no greater meane to giue authoritie unto his Magistrats and officers,
and to cause iustice it selfe to be both feared and reuerenced, than to see the
king him selfe sitting in his regall throne to do his subiects iustice.
Moreover the Magistrats often times doe wrong and iniurie unto the subiects by
standing upon the nice clauses, words, and sillables of the law, which they
dare not passe, as being bound and subiect thereunto. And in case that they
make any conscience to iudge according to the strictnesse of the law, they must
yet first send their reasons unto the Prince, and attend his aunswere, and
exposition of his Edicts and lawes made according unto the opinion and aduise
of his other officers, who will often times see
the suters purses bothom; in such sort as that many sutes live longer than the
parties and suters them selues, yea and some times are for euer suspended.
Whereas if the Prince him selfe in person shall vouchsafe to iudge the matter,
he which is the liuing law, and aboue all civill lawes, being accompanied with
his Counsell shall doe both good and speedie iustice, as hauing respect vnto
the verie ground and equitie of the matter, without farther standing upon
titles and formalities. By this meanes also so many oppositions, appeales,
civill requests, remouing of causes, infinite decrees, one of them upon an
other, which make sutes immortall, should cease, and iustice without stay or
let take course, no appeal being to be made from the Prince. Ioyning hereunto
also that the Commonweale should so be relieued of the great charges and wages which it alloweth unto Iudges, and of their
particular fees which are aboue measure heauie; besides the bribes and presents
which must be giuen, which often times passe the ordinarie fees, in such sort
as that the subiects in steed of hauing good and speedie iustice (which the
Prince oweth them) are constrained to paie for it as for the most precious
thing in the world: howbeit that oftentimes it happeneth, that the marchant is
well paid, and yet the marchandise by him delivered is right little or nothing
worth. And yet there is another verie considerable point also: which is, That
the parties contending are sometimes great and honourable, as that they would
neuer answere before many judges, in discredit for their vnworthinesse,
iniquitie, or other like qualitie, whereby
it oftentimes commeth to passe, that they end their suits and differences by
combats and dynt of sword: whereas the Prince in presence might euen with the
twinkling of his eye set them agreed. And were it that no other greater profit
were thereby to come unto the Commonweale, then that the prince by vse and
exercise of iudgement should have the force of right and iustice throughly
engrafted in his mind; what greater or better thing could there bee wished of
almightie God either for the prince or for the subiects, than that hee might
most curiously and seriously learne daily to administer iustice? The knowledge
of other artes and sciences, which is it selfe a thing most royall, and so most
proper unto kings. For as for the knowledge of armes, and of martiall affaires,
it is well fitting a Prince against his enemies, whereas iustice is most
necessarie for him at all times, and in all places, whether it be in peace or warre.
But not to rest altogether upon reason and arguments, we will also vse the
examplesExamples of great Princes, who themselves in
person administred iustice unto their subiects. herein of the most
wise and noble princes. VVhat man was there amongst men to be in wisedome
compared with Salomon? And yet we read, That the onely
prayer that he made unto God, was to obtaine wisedome wherewith rightly to
iudge his people, which his prayer was so acceptable unto God, as that he
seemed therefore most plentifully, and to the great worlds wonder, to haue
powred out upon him all the treasures both of wisedome and of knowledge; that
so all men might vnderstand God not onely to haue
inspired him with wisdome, but also that the office of right iudgement was
euen by God himselfe giuen unto kings; who
was also for experience in great affaires and politike wisedome like unto the
Great Augustus? And yet neuerthelesse wee read that he
without ceasing was still busied in the administration of iustice, insomuch
that euen when he was sicke, he caused himselfe to bee carried in his
horselitter to doe iustice. Howbeit that that was the ordinarie vacant time of
the Roman emperours, who for the administration of iustice were commended aboue
all the princes of the world,A notable example of the great
emperour Adrian for the doing of a poore old woman iustice. euen so
farre, as that a poore old woman to whom the Great emperour Adrian refused to aunswere her preferring unto him a request, excusing
himself, That he was not then at leasure, Raigne no longer
then (said she) but discharge thee of thy charge thou
bearest. Whereunto the emperor hauing not what to answere, presently
staid & did her iustice. Now then if so
great a prince (whose empire was bounded with the same bounds that the course
of the sunne was, and troubled with so great affaires) acknowledged the bond,
To doe his subiect iustice: what ought they then to doe which hold but the
scantlings of that great empire? Ought not euerie one of them to enforce
himselfe in his owne person, and to studie with all his power, how to imploy
himselfe for the doing of iustice? considering that (as Plinie the yonger saith) there is no more noble Philosophie, than to
entreat of the publike affaires, and to doe iustice, putting in practise that
which the Philosophers have taught.
Now if the knowledge of that which is right, and the administration of iustice,
bring so many & so great profits unto princes; how much greater shal the
same then be, if they To be necessarie for a prince to vnderstand of the affaires
of estate. shall by themselves handle but those things onely which
are proper unto their soueraigntie? For as for the rest of the civill affaires,
a prince may well commit them unto the magistrats: but the rights of
soueraigntie, and the deciding of them, hee can in no wise put off, but
together with the soueraigntie it self. Surely they are verie blind, deafe, and
dumbe, which neuer but by other mens eies see, and by other mens eares heare,
and by another mans tongue, and that oftentimes a straunge tongue also, speake
and talke of such things as are theirs, and most proper unto themselves. Now
wee have before shewed also, not by the examples of straunge nations onely, but
euen by the examples of our auncestours also, the idle slothfulnesse of kings,
who committed the mannaging of all their affairs unto their domesticall
seruants, to have thereby brought both themselves and their posteritie unto destruction.
These arguments and reasons thus by vs before alleaged, make a faire show vnto
them who sufficiently vnderstand not, nor by experience know not, the secrets
of soueraigntie,Reasons to show that it is not meet for
princes themselves in person to administer iustice unto their
subiects. and hidden knowledge for the maintaining of maiestie: But
unto me looking neerer into the matter, they are not sufficient to resolue this
question, nor to maintaine, That a prince ought in person himselfe to
administer iustice: Yea unto mee it seemeth not onely not necessarie, but not
profitable unto the subiects, the prince himselfe to bee unto them the minister
of iustice. True it is, that for them so to do, it should bee not onely
profitable, but euen necessarie also, if the princes were themselves such as
Scylax faigned unto himselfe the kings of the Indians
to be; that is to say, so much better than
their subiects, as the gods are aboue men. For what can bee more glorious or
more royall, than to see a prince by himselfe in the open sight of the people
with great integritie and uprightnesse iudge and decide causes, to giue rewards
unto such as have well deserued of the Commonweale, and to inflict punishment
upon the wicked and offendors. For he must needs be a good and wise man
himselfe, which is not delighted but in the companie of good and wise men: and
he must needs excell in integritie and iustice, who himselfe with great equitie
administreth iustice. But shall we therfore say, that vitious princes ought to
thrust themselves into the sight, and so to communicat
their vices unto their subiects? the least vice in a prince being like unto a
canker in a faire face: and so to doe, what
were it els, than in the sight of the people to set up an example of vice, to
lead men, to draw them, yea & euen to enforce them to be naught? For there
is nothing more naturall, than for the subiects to conforme themselves
vntoSuch a prince, such a people. the manners,
unto the doings and sayings of their prince; there being neither gesture,
action, nor countenance in him, be it good or bad, which is not marked, or
counterfaited by them which see him, hauing their eyes, their sences, and all
their spirits, wholy bent to the imitation of him. So that Plinie well called the princes life a Perpetual Censorship, whereunto
we still direct and conforme our selues. And this is a doctrine from most
auntient antiquitie delivered unto all posteritie, first by the maister of
wisedome himselfe, and after by Plato, Cicero, Liuie,
and Cassiodore, repeated as an infallible
rule,That such as the prince of a Commonweale is, such will the
people also be. Yea Theodoric king of the
Gothes, writing unto the Senat of Rome, passeth further, vsing these words, Facilius est errare raturam, quam dissimilem sui princeps
possit Rempublicam formare, An easier thing it is (said he) for nature
to chaunge her course, than for a prince to frame a Commonweale vnlike vnto
himselfe. And though examples need not in so plaine a matter, yet we have seene
king Francis the first, in this realme, and Mansor, surnamed the Great, emperour of Affrike and
Spaine, who both two in diuers times, and in diuers places, began to haue
learning and learned men in estimation; when suddenly the princes, the
nobilitie, the cleargie, yea euen the souldiors and artificers, with all the
people in general, gaue themselves so to learning, as that there was neuer
found so great a number of learned men in all
languages, and in all sciences, as in their time. Seeing thereforeThat an euill prince ought not much to come abroad for the
people to imitat his vices. that the princes example is of so great
force and power for the conforming and chaunging of his subiects manners,
either to good or bad; great heed is to bee taken, that the prince, except he
be by nature wel, and by education better framed and instructed, come not much
abroad for the people to behold and imitat: but if he be euill & wicked,
then by all meanes to be as a popular and common plague kept out of the sight
of his subiects. Yet haply some man may say, That an euill prince should not
therefore abstaine or withdraw himselfe from publike affaires, or from the
iudgement place or Senat; for that no man was so bad, but that he hath in him
some vertues or commendable qualitie; or which cannnot at leastwise dissemble
some of his vices: of which his vertues &
vices, his subiects may make choyce, in such sort as that they may easily
decline the one, and embrace the other. But in mine opinion and iudgement, they
will rather imitateThe subiects still eadier to imitate the vices than the vertues of the
prince. his vices, than his vertues: and so much the rather, by how
much the corrupt nature of man is more prone and enclined unto vice than vnto
vertue; as also for that there is but one most strait way which leadeth vnto
vertue, wheras on both sides there are innumerable crooked by-wayes and
turnings unto vice, whereinto they may more easily fall, than into the straight
and right way of vertue. In Alexander the Great were
many most rare and heroicall vertues, yet so it was, that he greatly blemished
the beautie of them, as also of his other noble acts, by an euill custome that
hee had to bee drunke; wherein he tooke such delight, as that hee propounded a
talent as a prize unto 600 Crownes. him which could drinke most: in which
beastly contention and strife fortie together with him which had gained the
prize burst and perished; hee himselfe almost looking on. Mithridates also king of Amasia, imitating of Alexander the Great herein, surpassed him, that hauing set up a prize
for him that could eat and drinke most, hee (as Plutarch
saith) gained the foule victorie in both (if to bee ouercome of intemperance
and excesse be to be accounted at all a victorie.) But to counterfeit vertues,
or to dissemble vices, as it hath alwayes seemed a most hard thing unto all
men, so hath it especially unto princes, for that they of all others have least
learned to commaund their desires, to restraine their
lusts, to bridle their affection, which he that knoweth not how Princes of all others most hardly to counterfeit vertues, or
to dissemble their vices to do, shall neuer be a good or cunning
dissembler. Dionysius the younger moued with the fame
and vertue of Plato, caused him to be sent for vnto
Syracusa, who had no sooner begun to tast of the wisedome, vertue, and learning
of the man, but that in a moment all minstrels, players, drunkards, bauds,
harlots, and such like, were quite vanished out of the princes sight, and the
court so suddenly chaunged, as if it had bene from heauen inspired. But for
that Dionysius had but chaunged his countenance, &
not his mind, and cast out the allurements of pleasures, but not pleasures
themselves; hee could not long dissemble his vices, eithes yet edure Plato, who was no sooner
gone out of the court, and disembarqued out of Sicilie, but that the prince
forthwith returned unto his woonted vices, by him before for a while forborne,
but not quite forsaken: at which verie instant
minstrels, dauncers, harlots, bauds, and such other vermine of the court, which
had before bene driuen out were againe recalled. So much power the prince hath
at his pleasure to chaunge and turne the harts of his subiects, but alwayes
rather unto vices and vanities, than unto vertues. But I doe more willingly
remember our own domesticall examples than others; king Francis the elder, for the healing of a wound he had receiued in his
head, caused his head to be polled, when suddenly after all his houshold
seruants, all the princes, all the nobilitie, the magistrats, the artificers,
and people of all sorts in generall, caused their heads to be from that time
forward polled also, insomuch that if any did from thenceforth vse the old
fashion, and account it an vndecent thing to be polled, he was therefore of all
men derided: whereas before from the beginning
of this kingdome, it had alwayes bene the marke of the kings, neither was it
lawfull for any but for the nobilitie and Senators, to weare long haire: all
the rest of the meaner sort being befor compelled to poll themselves as slaues,
vntil that Peter Lombard bishop of Paris (for the power
and authoritie which bishops then had aboue kings) obtained, That it might be
lawful for the common people to weare long haire also. True it is, that the
flatterers of princes helpe much to conforme the maners and fashions of the
people unto those of the princes, they still rather counterfeiting than
imitating euen the vices and defects of the prince, whome if they see laugh,
they laugh also, although they know no cause why; if he be lame, they halt
downe right also. Alexander the Great, and Alphonsus king of Aragon, beeing both wrie
necked, the one by nature, and the other by
custome, the courtly curres to counterfeit that their deformitie, held their
neckes also awry; as the Courtier, and Plutarch in the
life of Pyrrhus writeth. Seeing therefore the nature of
man is enclined to follow the vice of the prince, were it not euen to vndoe a
people, and to ruinat an estate, to thrust still into the sight of the people a
prince euill brought up; and a pottraitor of vices for them to imitat? And yet
it is more daungerous for that for one vice which the prince hath, oftentimes
those of his traine have an hundred, who euerie where as they passe, may alter
& marre the good disposition of the people; or like swarmes of flies &
caterpillers, who hauing deuoured the leaues, and fruit, do also leaue their
spaune behind them, able to insect the fields and trees be they neuer so cleane
and fruitfull.
But suppose we the prince not to be vitious (a rare gift, and by the goodnes of
God giuen unto men, when as in euerie age a tollerable prince is scarcely to
bee found) but to be of great vertue and perfection, yea euen a man without
fault (howbeit that there is a great space betwixt them which are endued with
vertues, and them which are without vices) yet is it almost a thing impossible,
but that some thing shall at one time or other fall from him, which wel noted
may seeme unto the people foolish or rediculous: wherein much is derogated from
the reputation and dignitie which the subiects ought to have of him. But let vs
suppose that also, him to be neither a man euill giuen, nor foolish; neither yet so to seeme, but to be a man endued with
great vertues, and of good Too much familiarity of a prince with his subiects; not
good: and alwayes to be seene of them in his maiestie, a thing unto them
dreadfull. education; yet so it is that too ordinarie conuersation,
and too great familiaritie of the subiects with the prince▪ much diminisheth
his maiestie, and withall engendreth a certaine contempt of him: of which
contempt proceedeth the disobedience of the subiects unto him and his
commaunds, to the ruine of the whole estate. And now againe to the contrarie,
if the prince to maintaine his maiestie shall ordinarily show himselfe unto his
subiects, in his greatnesse, with a terrible port, it may be that so hee may
bee the more of them redoubted: but it is daungerous least he should be
therefore the lesse loued. Whereas the loue of subiects towards their
soueraigne is much more necessarie for the preseruation of an estate, than is
feare; and so much the more, for that loue cannot be without feare to offend
him whome wee loue; whereas feare may well be, and most often is without any loue at all, men commonly hating
him whome they feare, and as occasion serueth still seeking to take him out of
the way.
And truely unto me more deepely considering of the matter, almightie God
(theHow princes are to behave themselves, to be of their
subiects both beloued and feaed. soueraigne
prince of the whole world) seemeth to have shewed a short way unto worldly
princes (the true images of himselfe) how they are to communicat themselves
unto their subiects, to be of them both beloued and feared: For the
communicateth himselfe unto men but by visions and dreames, and that but to a
few of the elect & most perfect of them also, men of great integritie of
life. But when hee with his owne voyce published the Ten Commaundements, he
caused his fire to bee seene heauens high, and the mountaines to tremble with
thunder and lightning, with such a dreadfull
sound of trumpets, that the people strucken with feare, and falling flat upon
their faces, besought him, That hee would no more from thenceforth speake vnto
them himselfe (for that otherwise they should all die) but onely to commaund
such things as he pleased by his seruant Moyses. So that
that people of all others most chosen, had but once almightie God (who sheweth
himselfe but in spirit to be seene) himselfe sounding forth his lawes; when as
yet for all that to allure men the more feruently to loue him, hee at all
times, and in all places and countries, doth with great loue, and eternall
bountie, foster and cherish all mankind, yea indeed all sort of liuing
creatures, powring continually upon them his great and infinit favours, larges,
and bountie. If therefore the wise prince
ought in mannaging of his subiects, to imitate the wisedom of God in the
government of the world, he must but seldome times come into the sight of his
subiects, and that with such a state and maiestie, as best agreeth with his
wisedome, power, and greatnesse, and yet make choice of some few most wise and
worthy men, with whome to communicat his secret councels, and by them to
declare his will and pleasure unto the rest, and yet incessantly to heape upon
his subiects his graces and favours; & with great wisedome and power to
protect and defend them against their enemies. In the booke De Mundo (or of the world) dedicated to Alexander the Great (and without cause ascribed to Aristotle, as sauouring nothing of his stile) a comparison is made of
a soueraigne prince unto God; as that the great king of Persia was stil resiant
in a proud and stately pallace or castle, compassed in with three high walles,
full of all pleasures and delights, neuer
sturring abroad, or shewing & acquainting himselfe but with some few of his
friends; who yet neuerthelesse by fiers and watches set upon high places, stil
in one day vnderstood and knew all the enemies of his empire, euen from the
farthest parts of the East Indies, unto the straits of Hellespontus. And yet
neuer was there any princes under heauen more honoured and reuerenced, or
better beloued of their subiects than they: or whose commaunds were more iust
unto their subiects, or more of their subiects regarded, or that longer
preserued their empire, power, and state. So those princes also which giue
themselves ouer, and became slaues unto their vaine pleasures and delights, most commonly used to withdraw themselves from
the sight of the multitude into some secret
places, that so they might at more libertie glut themselves with all kind of
pleasures. For so Tiberius Caesar of all others the most
cunning dissembler, made choyce of a most desert island, wherein he for many
yeres lived in all kind of voluptuous and beastly pleasures. Which was of him
right filthily done, but yet more wisely than they who with the most odious
smell of their loathsome pleasures pollute and defile as well publike as priuat
places: who besides that they offend more by giuing of euill example than by
the wickednesse it selfe by them committed, doe also in the minds and conceits
of men engender a neglect and contempt of themselves.
Wherefore a prince that wise is, so oft as he should show himselfe unto the
peopleHow a prince is to frame his countenance and speech
when he showeth himselfe unto the people. (which he should most
seldome do) should so prepare himselfe, as that he may unto all men seeme euen in his face and countenance to carry
with him a certaine state and maiestie, yet still mixt with modestie, but
especially in his speech, which should alwaies be maiesticall and sententious,
and in the manner of phrase, something different from the vulgar. Which if it
shall seeme something hard for the prince to performe, or that he have not the
grace of speaking, it is best for him to speake little, or els altogether to be
silent: For that we know men in so great matters, as to contemne, or feare; to
hate, or loue; to be stil no lesse with opinion, than with any certaine reason,
led & moued thereunto. For if the prouerbe of the wise Hebrew be true, That the foole himselfe in holding his peace is accounted
wise, how circumspect and aduised ought a prince to be, when hee
openeth his mouth to speake in publike place? considering that his words, his
countenance, and lookes, are oftentimes
accounted and esteemed of as lawes, oracles, and decrees. Wherein Tiberius the emperour, least he should in any thing
offend, brought in a new fashion, as to be spoke vnto, and also to giue
aunswere by writing, for what matter soeuer it was, Moris
erat (saith Tranquillus) eo tempore principem etiam
presentem scripto adire, The manner (saith he) at that time was, with
writing to goe unto the prince euen then present; to the end that nothing might
escape which had not before bene well thought upon. For it is not possible but
that they which speake much in open assemblies, as in the Senat, or before the
people, must many times erre: which done by a prince, shall breed contempt, or
at leastwise cause him to bee the lesse esteemed: so that a Grecian (I wot not
who) not vnfitly said, That a prince if hee bee wiseshould unto the people, or in open audience no otherwise
speake, than hee would doe in a Tragedie.
But I know that some of contrary opinion unto mine, wil say, Is it not the true
estate and office of a prince, to doe iustice unto his people? to heare the
complaints of his subiects? to see the requests of his own? and by the mouth of
every one to vnderstand of their iust grieuances, which are commonly
suppressed, or at leastwise disguised by another man? And why then should the
prince hide himselfe from his people? talke but with few, and those of his most
inward friends also? or aunswere nothing unto many, of right asking him of many
things? yea not to be willing so much as to heare his subiects speake? Things
altogether absurd, and not beseeming the maiestie of a soueraigne prince. Whereunto I say, that mine opinion is not,
that he should so hide himselfe, as not at all to show himselfe; as the kings
yet doe euen at this present in the East Indies, and namely the king of Borney,
who speaketh not unto any but unto his wifeThe maner of the
kings of Borney. and children; neither is seene of any, but still
speaketh unto others by one of his gentlemen through an hole by a reed or cane
which he holdeth in his mouth, as he did unto the king Catholike (as we read in
the histories of the Indies:) but my meaning is,How a prince
ought but seldome times to conuerse with his subiects. that he should
not be much in the assemblies of the people, neither easie to bee spoke withall
of all men, not to vse much discourse with his subiects, except with such as
are neere unto him, or of his familiar acquaintance;
not to take pleasure in iests and taunts, in
play, or other publike exercise: For that by such things the princes maiestie
and reputation, which ought by all meanes to be whole and vntouched, is greatly
impaired and lightned: and so much the more, by how▪ much the prince is of
greater estate and maiestie: whereunto good and especiall regard is alwayes to
be had. For it were not seemely for a pettie prince in his estate to
counterfeit the great kings of Aethiopia, of Tartarie, of Persia, or of Turkie,
who suffer not their subiects so much as to looke directly upon them, neither
are so much of them redoubted and feared for their power, as for the maiesty
that they hold when they show themselves unto their subiects. Howbeit that the
kings of Affrike hold yet this maiestie more, as in the historie of Francis D' Aluarez is to be seene, where hee speaketh of
the maiestie of the Great Negus, whome we call
Prester Iohn: and in the historie of Leo of Affrike, where hee speaketh of the king of Tombut,
before whome his subiects appeare not, but upon their knees, with dust upon
their heads.
Now if any man shall say, That the kings of the East, and of the South are thus
to be honoured, for that their subiects are of an abiect and a seruile nature;
but that they of the North, or of the West, whose subiects be of greater
courage, are not able to endure such a seruitude and slauerie: this shall be in
due place decided, as also what the nature of euerie region is: and yet for all
that I see the kings of England, Sweden, Denmarke, and Polonia, who are situat
toward the North, much better to maintaine the maiestie of their estates with
their subiects, than doe the kings of Fraunce, or the princes of Italie; and the kings of Moscouia yet better than
all the rest, and yet are not therefore the lesse, but well the more of their
subiects obeyed.
Now the greatest daunger that can come unto a prince, to doe all by others, is,
leastHow the danger least a prince should be dispossessed
of his estate by him whom he putteth in trust for the mannaging of his
affaires, is to be preuented. that they upon whome he should so
discharge himselfe, should take from him his estate and soueraigntie, and so
possesse themselves thereof: which for al that hath neuer chanced in this
realme, but onely under king Childeric, surnamed the
Loutish▪ since the time that the kings of Fraunce showed themselves unto their
subiects in their maiestie but once a yeare, viz. the
first of May; as we read in our owne histories, and also in Cedrinus a Greeke author, who saith, That the auntient kings of
Fraunce tooke no other pleasure but to eat and drinke, leauing the mannaging of
all their affaires unto the great Master of
the Pallace. But we must not draw into consequence the example of one king
bereft of sence, to ground a maxime of state upon. Yet is there well one meane
to meet with that inconuenience, which is, That the prince for one lieutenant,
or for one great Maister of the Pallace, should have two or three in power and
favour equall: For in so doing he shall neuer be circumuented, their power
being so diminished, one of them still bewraying or controlling the other, the
kings maiestie being so still the more stately and sure. For Tiberius hauing made Seianus too great; and so
Commodus, Perennius; Theodosius the second, Eutropius; Iustinian, Bellisarius; Xerxes, Artaebanus;
and Childeric, Pepin: committing unto them alone the
mannaging of all their affaires, with the guard of their persons, they fell
into the daungers which wee spake of, being in
hazard of their estates.
As for the administration of iustice, and the hearing of the complaints and
griefes ofIustice better to be administred by good and
sufficient magistrats, than by the prince himselfe. the subiects, it
shall be alwayes better prouided by good and sufficient magistrats, than by the
prince in person himselfe. For who knoweth not so many good parts to bee
requisit in a good judge, as are not all well to be found in the most
sufficient prince in the world? Yea who knoweth not so many things to bee
within the compasse of the duetie of a good judge, as may ouerslip and escape
euen the most skilfull and carefull men? whereof many must needs escape the
prince before he can perceiue them, and so many times
the verie substance of the matter consisteth in that which is
ouerslipped. And if one shall say, that the
prince may have about him both wise and learned councellors, according to whose
aduise and councell he may determine of matters, and so giue iudgement; such as
Augustus, Traian, Adrian, Marcus Aurelius, Alexander
Seuerus, and the other Roman emperours are reported to have had: who
were alwaies accompanied with most worthy and excellent personages: truly that
seemed not so hard a matter unto the Roman princes, so brought up and so enured
thereunto, but now we live after another manner and fashion. And who is there
that seeth not, not onely the prince not to be able to endure so many dilatory
pleas, so many slights of the lawyers, so many shifts of the plaintifes; such
petitions and outcries of such as run from court to to court? but not euen the
magistrats themselves without incredible tediousnesse to be able to endure the same? all which yet they must deuoure.
Yea the prince is not able himselfe to conceiue all such things as are the
greatest and of most importance in the Commonweale, and how then shall he alone
suffice to decide and determine so many suits and causes? But if hee shall take
that charge in hand, and not well and orderly discharge the same, in stead of
doing of the subiects right, hee shall doe them great iniurie and wrong.
Wherein Demetrius (he which was called the Besieger)
hath for iust cause beene blamed: who hauing receiued a great number of his
subiects requests, put them into the lap of his mantle, and at the first bridge
he came vnto, whereby hee was to passe over a riuer, shooke them all into the
water: Wherof the subiects seeing themselves by him contemned, conceiued a
mutuall hatred against him, so that shortly after he was forsaken of his armie, which yeelded it selfe to Pyrrhus together with the kingdome, which he so gained
without battell. Besides that in this course taken, we should be alwaies driuen
to have recourse unto the commissioners for instructions: and afterwards vnto
the prince for iudgement of the cause: howbeit that it is sometimes hard, and
oftentimes pernitious also, to seperat the instructions of the matter from the
iudgement.
But suppose that the prince were at leisure, and that hee both could and would
see,An hard chargesble, and daungerous matter, for
subiects to prosecute their suits before the prince. heare, and iudge
all the causes of his people, yet were it a thing not beseeming the maiestie of
a king to make such an ordinarie confusion of his court, where beside the
subtilties, the countenances and favours, (not there subiect to enquirie) and
the contraritie of letters, commissions,
decrees, and prouisions, which are there dispatched under the name (but without
the knowledge) of the prince, whereof colour is oftentimes made for the doing
of wrong: it is yet moreover insupportable for the subiects, unto whome iustice
is due in the places where they are, to search for the same at the court, and
to follow the prince still remouing from place to place; where it were better
for them sometimes to loose their right, than with so great charge to follow
the suit. Besides that the most honorable and worthy causes for a prince that
wil himselfe intermedde in iudgements, are the causes
concerning life and honor: who shall be the accusers? who would fall into so
great charges to sue the matter in the court? and into the daunger to bee
slaine by the accused, if the prince should pardon the fault. For when princes
vse scarcely at any time to condemne the
guiltie parties, but doe oftentimes pardon and restore such as be alreadie
condemned: by this meanes should ensue not onely no punishment of offences, but
euen the greatest impunitie of the offendors: than which there is no more
certaine token of a Commonweale in short time about to perish. Wherewith to
meet, secret accusations have bene brought in and admitted by an auntient edict
of Conan king of Scots, which is at this day in vse in
Scotland, and called the Indict: and yet is better prouided for by the
ordinance of Milan (which well deserueth to bee religiously kept in euerie
Commonweale) where in euerie towne there is a chest with an hole in it, in every principall church, whereof the gouernours
have the key, whereinto it is lawfull for
every one secretly to put his bill of accusation against any man; wherin the
crime committed, the time, the place, the partie guiltie, and the witnesses,
are all of them comprised, with the reward of the moitie of the confiscation
allowed unto the accuser. Which is an easie way for the punishing of offences
before ordinarie judges; a thing impossible to prosecute before the prince. For
these reasons and the difficulties by vs noted, Tiberius
the emperour hauing obtained the empire, protested in the full Senat, and
afterwards by his letters made it knowne unto the officers, That hee would take
uppon him nothing which belonged unto the iurisdiction of the magistrats;Why the office to iudge and decide matters, a thing proper vnto
the autiene kings, now belongeth unto magistrats
and judges. for that it was more that was required of a prince, than
of a magistrat. Neither ought it to seeme unto any man straunge, why the office
to iudge and decide matters, proper unto the
auntient kings, should now belong unto the magistrats? for that when people as
yet had no lawes, but that the kings power and will was accounted for law, it
was then needfull for subiects causes to bee iudged by the princes: but after
that lawes were once established, according unto which the magistrat was bound
to iudge, and due punishment by them appointed for offences, and rewards vnto
such as had well deserued; that necessitie was taken away, and translated from
the princes unto the judges.
But here some man may say, That a prince may be so wise, so iust, and so full
of understanding,Not good for a louegne prince how sufficient soeuer, to sit in iudgement himselfe, for feare
of too much lenitie, or else seu: ritie▪ to the peruerting of
iustice. as that he will giue no iudgement but such as is agreeable
unto equitie and reason; and the compasse of
his territorie so strait, as that hee may himselfe suffice to iudge and
determine all the suits of his subiects, as there bee diuers such princes in
the Low countries, in Germanie, & especially in Italie: In this case should
it not be a goodly and a profitable thing for the Commonweale, the prince
himselfe there to administer iustice? If thou aske me what mine opinion is
therein, I thinke it not profitable either for that so blessed a prince, either
for those his so happie citisens or subiects, or him in person himself to sit
in iudgement; not for that the subiects do so much loue and honour the maiestie
of their prince, as not to dare freely enough to speake their minds, and to
cause him to vnderstand their right; neither for that they could hardly haue
accesse unto him, for the multitude of causes which he should still have before
him, hauing opened this gap: but euen for that
nothing is so proper unto a prince, as clemencie; nothing unto a king, as
mercie; nothing unto maiestie, as lenitie. And therefore the emperor Titus (a man of so great courtesie, as that he was called
Humani generis delitias, or the myrror of mankind)
gladly took upon him the office of the great bishop, because he would pronounce
sentence of death upon no man, either pollute his hands with mans blood, when
as yet some other emperours who were also bishops (though not so religious as
he) least of all others abstained from such capitall iudgements of life and
death. Now nothing is more contrarie unto true iustice, than pitie; neither
anyNothing more contrary unto true iustice, than lenitie
and piti. thing more repugnant unto the
office and dutie of an upright judge, than mercie: hee not onely by the civill
law, but euen by the law of God also being forbidden to have pitie (euen of the poore) in iudgement: which we said to be
so proper unto maiestie, as that it cannot be therefrom divided or seperated.
So that a prince sitting in iudgement must take upon him two contrarie persons,
that is to say, of a mercifull father, and of an upright magistrat; of a most
gentle prince, and of an inflexible judge. And if the prince be by nature mild
and pitifull, there shall bee none so euill or wicked, who by force of teares
and prayers shall not escape the punishment by the law appointed, euen the most
cruell men being oftentimes by them ouercome. So we read, that Augustus the great emperour, for wisedome inferiour vnto
none, examining a murderer, began in this sort to question with him, I am sure thou hast not killed thy father: in which words
he not onely instructed the guiltie man what he was to
aunswere to him both his prince and judge, but
also most courteously gaue him his pardon. Nero also at
such time as the condemnation of a man was presented to him to signe, is
reported to have said, Vtinam liter as nescirem, I would
to God I knew not letters. And therefore Cicero pleading
before Caesar, before resolued in any wise to have put
Ligarius to death, said, That he pleaded not before
him as a judge, but as before the father of the people: and hauing somewhat
appeased his anger, began thus to presse him farther, Causas,
Caesar, egi multas, & quidem tecum, cum te tenuit ratio honorum tuorum,
certe nunquam hoc modo; ignoscite iudices: errauit, lapsus est, non putauit,
si vnquam posthac: ad parentem sic agi solet, ad iudices, non fecit, non
cogitauit, falsi testes, fictum crimen, Dic te Caesar de facto Ligarij
iudicem esse &c. Caesar (saith he) I have pleaded many causes, and
that with thee, when thou stoodst upon thine
honour, but yet neuer pleaded I in this manner: pardon him my lords, he hath
erred, he was deceiued, he thought it not, if euer hee shall doe so againe: so
men vse to plead before a (soueraigne prince, or a) father: but unto the
judges, we say flatly, He did it not, hee neuer thought it, the crime is
forged, the witnesses are false. But say Caesar, thy
selfe to be judge of the deed done by Ligarius, &c.
And in this sort secretly infinuating unto Caesar, that
he ought not to bee a judge, holding the place of a soueraigne: and afterwards
highly commending Caesar his noble acts, his valour and
his clemencie, moued him so much, as that he chaunged both his colour and
countenance, and was in such a sort rauished, as that he could not heare the
one halfe of the oration (the shortest of all them that Cicero left in writing) but that he graunted more unto the guiltie man than euer he hoped for. If then Caesar himselfe, one of the greatest orators that euer
was (euen in the iudgement of his capitall enemie Cicero) and one of the most valiant and wisest men of his time, was so
ouercome by the force of eloquence, pardoning him whome he deadly hated, and
had before resolued to put to death: what shall the lesse circumspect prince
do, be he neuer so little enclined unto pitie? how shall he be able to endure
the filed speech of an eloquent aduocat? the pititious complaints of poore old
men? the cries and sighes of distressed women? the weeping and wayling of
little children? King Agesilaus a most famous prince of
his time, ouercome by the importunat requests of a friend, writ unto the
judges, requesting them, That if the partie accused, in whose behalfe he writ,
were not guiltie, hee should bee acquited by the equitie of his cause: but if he were lawfully conuict, hee should yet
neuerthelesse bee for Agesilaus his sake discharged, and
so in any case acquited. But O how many should escape the penaltie of the
lawes, if judges in such cases should hearken not onely unto the princes secret
letters, but euen unto their letters pattents also: and then what may wee deeme
that a prince himselfe would doo? Wherefore himselfe in person to sit in
iudgement, beseemeth not the maiestie of a soueraigne prince.
But now if it bee so hard for a prince in this case not to erre and bee
deceiued, thenThe people in a Popular estate easily moued
unto pitie. how much more hard is it in a Popular estate, where the
people suffer themselves to bee deceiued and led away with faire words, as a
man may see almost in all the accusations made both in Athens and Rome, when
the people giue sentence; where the innocent
were condemned, and the guiltie acquited: of examples whereof all the histories
are full. As Seruius Galba a great oratour, accused,
attainted, and condemned of treason befor the people of Rome; not hauing any
more to say for himselfe, but turning his speech and action, wholly framed to
the mouing of pitie; and so embracing his children, and with teares commending
them unto the people, so moued the beholders, as that he easily obtained
pardon, and so escaped. Whereupon Cato the elder, who
had accused him, said That had not Galba abused his
children and his teares, hee had beene well whipt. Whereas other noble and
valiant men, who could neither abuse their prayers nor
teares, but bearing themselves upon their integritie, if but some lying oratour, or false enformer, had accused them,
they were most vniustly condemned. And so oftentimes in like manner not
oratours, but flatterers: and that not openly, but secretly, doe with diuers
deceits circumuent the prince. And therefore the nobilitie of Polonia, by force
wrested a priuilege from Lewes king of Polonia and
Hungarie: That if question were of any of their lives and honours, they should
not bee iudged but by the king himselfe: foreseeing, that so they might easily
escape the iudgement of the king, but not the judges, who are bound unto the
stricktnesse of the lawes. And hereupon it is come to passe, that none of the
nobilitie are euer there condemned to death, what offence soeuer they doe, but
alwayes escape either by fine, or at worst, by
beeing kept in prison for the space of a yeare and sixe weekes, which is now
there passed into the force and strength of a law, and yet is there obserued
and kept; as I have learned of Zamosche the Polonian
ambassadour.
But suppose the prince to bee such an one as is not easily to bee moued vnto
pitie orA most hard thing for a soueraigne prince sitting
himselfe in iudgement, to keepe a meane betwixt too much lenitie and
seueritie. compassion, yet then is it to bee feared, least hee in
iudgement fall into crueltie. For whereas to keepe the meane is to euerie man a
right hard thing, so unto princes it is of all others most difficult, who
easily suffer themselves to be carried into the one extremitie or other. If hee
bee a good prince and an embracer of vertue, hee will have wicked men in
extreme horror & detestation, wherwith euen the wisest men are moued
with a iust anger, and so oftentimes
carried away with a cholerike passion. There need no better example than that
of Augustus the emperour, who was accounted to bee one
of the most wise and vertuous princes that euer was, and at his first sitting
in iudgement endured as it were the paine of the condemned: and suffered not
lesse (as saith Seneca) than did they themselves which
were executed. And yet neuerthelesse this vertuous prince by continuall custome
of iudging and condemning such as were conuict before him (as most necessarie
it was) became too much rigorous and cruell, suffering himselfe to bee
transported with passion and indignation against the wicked: in such sort, that
one day sitting in iudgement, and condemning many the accused to diuers
punishments: his friend Mecenas beeing not able for the
preasse to come neere him, cast a little
billet of paper into his bosome, wherein hee called him an Executioner or
Hangman: whereat Augustus suddenly staied, and finding
himselfe transported with choler, and so to bee too hastie in iudgement, to
stay his anger forthwith brake up the court. And for this cause our fathers
have right wisely ordayned, That the Criminall Chamber of Parliaments should
from three monethes to three monethes still bee chaunged (which for this cause
is called Tournelle: for that all the judges of the
other Chambers iudged euerie one of them by turnes, to the intent that the
common custome to condemne and put men to death, should not chaunge the
naturall mildnesse of the judges, and make them cruell and hard harted. Besides
that it is a verie hard, and almost impossible
thing (as saith Theophrastus) that a good and honest
man, should not enter into choller, seeing the most detestable enormities of
the wicked, and so sometimes to become as a man euen furious, and as it were
out of his wits. So Claudius the emperour hearing one
day the plaintife rehearse the great and manifold villanies of one accused,
fell into such an outrage, that taking up a knife which lay before him, hee
threw it into the accused mans face, euen in full iudgement. But if the prince
which intermedleth himselfe with iudgement bee by nature cruell, he shall then
make a butcherie of his court; as did the emperour Caligula, who by oneThe most strange & extreame
crueltie of Caligula the emperour. onely sentence, for diuers crimes
condemned fiftie persons, euen unto the same kind of death, and often tooke
pleasure to cut off the heads of many goood men, sometime to proue his owne strength, and sometime to proue but the edge
of his Cimitar, If therefore it bee so hard
euen for the most wise, to keepe the meane betwixt mildnesse and rigour, which
is necessarie for judges, it is not so easily to bee found in princes, who are
most commonly extreame in their actions: for the waywardnesse of a priuat man,
is indignation in a prince; and the anger of a subiect, is called furie in a
king.
But let vs proceed farther, and suppose, that the prince have the grauitie, the
knowledge,The best and surest meanes for the maintenance
of a prince in his estate, is by all good meanes to procure the loue of his
subiects: and how the same is to be obtained. the wisedome, the
discretion, the experience, the patience, and all other the vertues requisit in
a good judge: yet so it is, that he cannot be without daunger, if he shall in
person iudge his subiects. For the best and fairest rule for the maintenance of
the state of a Monarchy, is, that the prince, if it may be, cause himself to be
beloued of al, without the disdaine or hatred
of any. Wherunto to attaine, he hath two means, the one by appointing due
punishment to be inflicted upon the euill, & the other by giuing deserued
rewards unto the good. And for that the one of them is fauorable, & the
other odious, it behoueth the prince that would be loued, to reserue vnto
himselfe the bestowing of rewards; which are, estates, honors, offices,
benifices, pentions, priuileges, prerogatives, immunities, exemptions,
restitutions, and other graces and favours, which every well aduised prince
ought himselfe to graunt: but as for condemnations, fines, confiscations, and
other punishments, he is not himselfe to meddle with them, but to commit them
unto his most upright and wise magistrats, for them to doe good and speedie
instice therein. In which doing, they which receiue the benefits, shall haue
good cause to loue, respect, and reuerence the
prince their benefactor: and those which are condemned, shall yet have no
occasion at all to hate him, but shall still discharge their choller upon the
magistrats and judges. For why, the prince doing good to every one, and euill
to none, shall be beloued of all, and hated of none: which euen nature hath
figured out unto vs in the king of Bees, who neuer hath sting, least he should
hurt any. And albeit that the sacred Scriptures teach vs, all plagues,
diseases, calamities, and other worldly chaunces to depend of the wrath of God;
yet in this all diuines (which more exactly entreat of diuine matters) wholly
agree, none of all these things to bee done by almightie God, as by an
efficient cause; but by permission onely, and to bee from him divided, but as
from a not letting cause: which cause the manner of the Hebrew phrase
euerie where signifieth by the word Hiphil, ordinarily vsed, when it speaketh of the
vengeance of God. We read also in the Poets (though somewhat otherwise) that
Iupiter had three kinds of lightning, which they
called Manubias Albas, Rubras, Atras, The first is
white, which serueth for aduertisement, but hurteth no man, as proceeding onely
from Iupiter, and his friendly aspect unto the Sunne:
For which cause Seneca saith, Id solum
fulmen placabile est quod mittit Iupiter, That onely lightning (saith
hee) is peaceable which Iupiter sendeth. The other is
red, and proceedeth from the aspect of Iupiter unto the
inferiour planets, whome they call the inferiour gods, which hurteth and
blasteth fruits and beasts, but killeth no man. The third is blacke, and made
by the aspect of Iupiter unto the high planets and the
sixe starres (which they call the high gods)
which killeth, ouerthroweth and destroieth whatsoeuer it lighteth upon. For the
Theologie of the auntients belonged unto the Bishops, the Philosophers, and the
Poets, as Marcus Varro witnesseth in the one and
twentieth booke of worldly things: wherein they all agreed, That the great God,
which they thought to be Iupiter (to speake properly and
according to the truth) could not be himselfe augrie, neither hurt nor condemne
any man, but all things to be done by meane causes, and the ministerie and
power of angels. And therefore the auntient Aegyptians deriued a law euen from
Promethius their law giuer, whereby their kings were not
onely forbidden to kill any man, but euen so
much as to behold any execution done; least by such looking on, some print of
crueltie should remaine in them the beholders. And this unto mee seemeth a
great secret of this our kingdome, and a thing of great force for the gaining
of the subiects loue and good will towards the prince; all rewards, gifts,
honours, offices, charges, and commaunds, comming still from the king: but
penalties, and punishments alwaies adiudged and inflicted by the magistrats.
For at such time as William Poyet (my countrey man)
Chauncellor of Fraunce was accused of treason, and by the enuy of his most
gratious enemies circumuented, the king who had receiued the wrong would not
himselfe be iudge in the cause, neither so much as be present at the triall;
yea when the partie accused had refused all the judges of Paris, it was the
kings pleasure, that two judges, men of great
integritie, and free from all corruption, should be called and chosen out of
every court of parliament in Fraunce to try him: Whereby may be vnderstood with
what an obseruation of law and iustice this kingdome standeth, when as almost
at the same time Thomas Moore Chauncellor of England,
and Hierome Moron Chancellor of Milan, both of them
accused of treason, had for their judges, one of them euen the verie
conspirators themselves, guiltie of the same treason against the prince, and
the other his great enemies.
But here haply some man may say, the honour of noble personages to require,
that when question is of their lives, their honour, or whole estate, the king
himselfe should take upon him the hearing of the matter. For when the duke of
Alencon (Charles the
seuenth his nie kinsman) was accused of treason, the court of parliament
answered the king, That hee could not be tryed but in the presence of the king,
and of the peeres of Fraunce, without being lawfull for them to appoint their
substitutes. In like case uppon councell asked by Lewes
the eleuenth, when question was for the triall of Renate
of Aniou king of Sicilie, the court gaue the same aunswere, viz. That it could not soNot lawfull for the French
king to be in person assistant in the triall of a prince or peere accused of
treason. much as giue an interlocutorie decree against a peere of
Fraunce, when question was of his honour, except the king himselfe were there
present. I say for all that, that this was not for the king to iudge. For why,
it is to be proued, that the king in auntient time was not in person himselfe
assistant in the iudgement of treason, although it were in the triall of the
princes, or of the peeres; as is to be found in the records of the court, a
protestation the third of March 1386, made by
the duke of Burgundie, as chiefe peere of Fraunce, against king Charles the sixt, wherein is contained, That the king
ought not to be assistant at the iudgement of the king of Nauarre, arraigned of
treason; and that so to be, appertained not but onely to the peeres of Fraunce,
saying, The like protestation to have beene made against king Charles the fift, to the intent hee should not bee present at the
triall of the duke of Brittaine: and in case hee would needs passe on farther,
and breake the custome of their auncestors, the peeres of Fraunce demaunded in
full parliament, That an act of that their protestation might be unto them
decreed, and so afterwards it was enioyned unto the clarke by a decree of the
court, to deliver unto the peeres, and to the kings Attourney generall an act
of such their protestation. So also when
question was for the triall of the marquesse of Salusse, under the raigne of
Francis the first, it was by lively reasons, and by
the authoritie of the lawes both of God and man maintained, That the French
king could not in that iudgement be assistant, seeing it concerned the
confiscation of the marquisat: and albeit that the kings Attourney generall
vrging the matter, the king was at the iudgement present, yet gaue hee not
sentence, whereby the marquesse was himselfe condemned, and his goods most
iustly confiscat, yet that iudgement for al that seemeth unto many but
extorted, and the other princes rested therewith much discontented. So also Alexander the Great would neuer
take upon him the person of a judge, neither thought it meet to bee assistant
in the iudgement giuen against Philotas, Calisthenes, and others which conspired against
his person, least he should so seeme to have terrified the judges, or to haue
taken fromThe king ought nt to be
judge, where he is himselfe a partie, as in matters concerning his owne
interest. them the free power of iudging: as we read in Quintus Curtius. For if it bee contrarie unto the law of
nature, that the partie should be judge also; & That the king is a partie
in all causes which concerne either the publike or his owne proper patrimonie
in particular, in which case he cannot be a judge; by a much stronger reason
ought the same to take place in the offence of treason, and especially in the
chiefe point, where question is, the partie accused to have attempted the
honour or life of his prince. And for this cause Lewes
the ninth would not pronounce sentence at the iudgement of Peter Mauclere duke of Britaine, albeit that hee was there present
when the iudgement was giuen; neither likewise
at the iudgement of Thomas earle of Flaunders. Neither
yet Philip the Long the French king, in the cause of Robert earle of Flaunders attainted of treason. Yea that
more is, the decrees or sentences are giuen in the name of the peers, and not
in the name of the king, albeit that he were himselfe there present: as is to
bee seene in the sentence giuen against Robert earle of
Flaunders, which beginneth thus, Nos pares Franciae ad
requestam & mandatum regis venimus in suam curiam Parisijs &
tenuimus curiàm cum xij alijs personis, &c. Wee the peeres of
Fraunce at the request and commaundement of the king came into his court at
Paris, and with twelue other persons held court. The sentence also against Peter Mauclere, whereby the fee of the countie of
Britaine was taken from him, is giuen by one archbishop, two bishops, eight
earles, Mathew
Montmorancie the vicount of Beaumont, and Iohn
of Soissons, conceiued in these words, Notum facimus quod nos
coram clarissimo domino nostro Ludouico rege Franciae iudicauimus,
&c. We make it knowne, that we before our most noble lord Lewes king of Fraunce have iudged, &c. By which words
it appeareth that the king, albeit that he was present, yet gaue not sentence,
no not euen in trials concerning soueraigntie. So also we may see in the case
of the succession of Alphonsus countie of Poitiers,
although there were but question of the demaine, the king yet neuerthelesse
gaue not therein his opinion or iudgement. Neither in like sort did king Francis, howbeit that he was present at the iudgement of
Charles of Burbon the constable attainted of treason▪
And that more is, when question was of the fealtie and homage which the
counties of Champagne ought to doe unto the
king, it was iudged by the peeres of Fraunce, and many earles, the king the
present, not to iudge, but to assist them: the forme of which sentence is yet
found in these words conceiued, Iudicatum est a paribus
regni, videlicet a Rhemensi Archiepiscopo, & Lingonensi, Guillielmo
Catalaunensi, Ph. Beluacensi, Stephano Nouiomensi episcopis, & Odone
duce Burgundiae, & alijs episcopis, & baronibus, &c. Nobis
audientibus & iudicium approbantibus &c. Now if the prince
ought to doubt to iudge the causes of his subiects, where it concerneth but
their particular, and wherein he himselfe can have no interest, to the end not
to giue occasion of discontentment to them whome he should condemne, whether it
were right or wrong, but ought still to maintaine himselfe in the loue and
unitie of his owne people, as in a most
stately and strong tower: then how much more ought he so to doe, when hee is
himselfe a partie, or the causes capitall, as for rebellion or treason? I
remember, that in the triall of Charles duke of Burbon,
one Valier examined in the tower of Loches, by the
president de Selua, and the bishop of Puy, and other the
conspiratours examined at Tarrare by Iohn Brinon
president of Roan, deposed, That the occasion which caused the duke to rebell,
was the aunswere that king Francis made unto the
articles which the duke had sent unto the court of parliament, concerning the
suit he had against the king and the regent, concerning certaine lands and
demaines which the duke claimed as belonging vnto
himselfe. Wherein had not the king in any sort medled, but left it all
together unto his judges and attourneies,
he had not giuen occasion to so great a subiect to have brought both the king
himselfe, and the whole realme, into such a daungerous an estate as it was in
short time after. For what good iustice soeuer the prince do, alwaies he that
shall bee condemned will thinke that hee hath wrong done him.
Now to say as some men do obiect and say, That if the prince in person
himselfeA vaine obiection for the shortning of suits, if
the prince himselfe in person take upon him the administration of
iustice. should take upon him the administration of iustice, men
should have a good and quicke dispatch of their suits; and that such numbers of
appeales, such exceptions and petitions, with other long delaies of iustice,
should be so quite cut off; deserueth not so much as aunswere. For who is he
which knoweth not at what great charge he must bee, how many circumstances and
delayes, how many windings and turnings, how many repulses and griefes he must endure that hath any suit in court?
Neither is it to be thought, Iudgements to be so much the better, by how much
they are the shorter. For albeit that Thucidides (the
most famous of them that were of his time, of the councel of the Areopagi in
Athens) seemeth to have beene in the same opinion that some others were, viz. That offences once committed, were forthwith to be
punished; yet I verily suppose the opinion of Plutarch,
yea of the Hebrewes themselves to bee the truer: for these thinke it necessarie
for him that will iudge aright, to vse delaies in publike iudgements. But he in
that little booke which he wrot of the slow vengeance of God, plainlyThe quicker iustice not alwayes the better. teacheth men
to be warned by almightie God, if they will be the true imitators of his
iustice, to proceed but slowly and by
little and little in the triall of capitall causes, whether it be that the
truth of the matter may the better appeare, or for the drawing of some profit
from the offendors before their death, or to draw them to repentance, or for
their more griuous punishment (for that the punishment is the greater the
longer that it hangeth over ones head) or the better or more iustly to iudge of
another mans life, being withall in question. For right hard it is for a judge
pressed with choller and desire of revenge, hasted by some, and thrust forward
by others, to doe good iustice, what knowledge or feare soeuer hee have to
iudge amisse: and what shall then the prince doe, who hath neither the one nor
the other? The iudgements of the inferiour magistrats are corrected by the
superiour, by way of appeale: but if the prince himselfe shall take upon him to iudge, who shall reforme his decrees?
For he that in the former iudgement hath not sufficiently declared his matter
unto the judge, or by ouersight let some thing passe; if yet he may appeale,
all may wel be amended: but if the prince himselfe shall once giue iudgement,
the gate is then after sentence shut up, and no place left for appeale, or how
to amend the errour. Which we say to restraine a prince from intermedling with
iudgements, except he be a man of great wisedome, or vse therein theCauses worthy & well beseeming the princes hearing &
deciding. assistance of his wise and learned councellors; and the
causes such as may seeme worthy the princes hearing and iudgement: following
therein the councell of Iethro, who seeing Moyses troubled from morning to night in doing iustice to
all men, and in all causes, You kill your selfe (said he) with taking so much
paine; chuse mee out of the wisest and most
discreet men of the people to ease your selfe upon; and if there be any thing
high or difficult to iudge, it sufficeth that you take upon you the hearing
thereof, leauing the rest unto the other magistrats and judges to heare and
determine. Which counsell of his father in law Moyses
followed. So likewise wee read, that Romulus hauing
committed unto the Senat and the magistrats, the ordinarie administration of
iustice, reserued unto himselfe onely the hearing of matters of greatest
importance. And albeit that the Roman emperours afterwards would have their
iudgements to extend something farther, yet was the emperours iurisdiction for
the hearing of matters still shut up and included within certaine bounds: which
for all that the princes flatterers, or else the
princes themselves oft times went beyond, sitting in iudgement sometimes
euen of light and ordinarie matters: so as
did Claudius the emperour, (the most sottish lout that
euer was) who yet would alwayes be iudging and deciding of causes and
controuersies: of whome Tranquillus thus writeth, Alium negantem rem cognitionis sed ordinarij iuris esse,
subito causam apud se agere coegit, He compelled (saith he) another man
denying the matter to belong unto the emperours hearing, but to be onely an
ordinarie matter, and so to belong to the ordinarie iurisdiction, hee compelled
him (I say) euen forthwith and without more adoo, to plead the cause before
him, but that so foolishly, as that the lawyers openly mocked him, therefore
insomuch that one of them was so bold with him as to say unto him in Greeke,
which yet most of the standers byClaudius the emperour
derided for taking uppon him the deciding of common causes and
matters. vnderstood, , An old man, and a
foole too. And another tript him going
out of the iudgement seat, and so gaue him a fall: yea his folly at last
proceeded so farre, as that the verie pages and lackies would play with his
nose as hee slept, and spot his face with inke. And into this case the prince
must needs fall, who void of wisedome, thinketh it a goodly matter in the
presence of the people to determine great matters, and so to make himselfe to
bee of all men contemned and laughed at: than which nothing can be more
daungerous in a Monarchy. Wherefore the prince which will often sit in
iudgement, be present in the Senat, or much show himselfe unto the people, him
I would have equall in understanding unto Salomon, in
wisedomeThe great care that a prince should have of
himselfe, which would oftentimes it in iudgement,
or much show himselfe, and especially unto strangers. to Angustus, and in modestie to Anreltus; or els but seldome to come abroad, and more seldome himselfe
to administer iustice, and that so much the lesse in the presence of straungers, who still iudge such things as seeme
not commendable in a prince, not onely in his mind, but euen in the euill
feature of his bodie, or vncomelinesse of his attire: and such other small
imperfections (which the subiects for the loue and reuerence which they beare
unto their naturall prince easily beare with all) to be euen right great vices
or deformities. Which the straungers neuer excuse, but reporting the same to
the worst, still augment them in straunge places, euen to the least of his
lookes, countenance, behauiours and gestures. The same of king Agesilaus had with the bruit therof filled all the lesser
Asia, Greece, and Affrike, whome yet when the king of Aegypt had seene lying
upon the ground in a medow, with a course Greeke cloke on his back, and
himselfe but leane, little, and lame withall, he made of him no great account,
but rather had him in contempt and derision.
The like is reported in the memorie of our fathers, to have happened unto king
Lewes the eleuenth, who being chosen arbitrator in a
controuersie betwixt the kings of Nauarre and Castile, and going unto the
frontiers of his kingdome, the Spaniards at their arriuall mocked the French
men and their king, Who seemed unto them as a pilgrim come from Saint Iames of Compostella, with his great cap upon his head,
set all about with brouches, and his iacket of course cloath, without any
maiestie at all, either in his countenance, or in his behauiour; and they of
his traine all in like sort apparrelled: (For why, he could not abide to see
any man in braue attire) whereas the king of Castile and his troupe beeing
come, showed themselves in most sumptuous attire, with their horses in their
rich caparisons: which shewed a certaine
greatnesse in the Spaniard, insomuch as that it seemed the Frenchmen to haue
bene but the Spaniards seruants, but that there was a great and strong armie of
them not farre off in the field, in readinesse at all assaies: which the
Spaniards discouering, yeeld unto the French king such conditions as himselfe
pleased. And yet the same king Lewes the eleuenth
considering princes by the opinion of men to bee either prayse or disprayse
worthy (who commonly are led away but with the exterior show) hearing that the
ambassadours of Venice were come brauely apparrelled, and well accompanied, he
caused himselfe to be also most magnificently in royall robes attired, and so sitting in an high chaire of Estate, admitted
the embassadours unto his presence.
Wherefore with greater reason ought a prince, when as he commeth to an
enterThat princes ought seldome to come to an enteruiew
of their persons. view with another strange prince (which he ought
but most seldome to doe) to shew himselfe in such sort, as that there be
nothing in his attire, and much lesse in his countenance or behauiour and
speech to be discommended. And that is it for which Philip
Comines speaking of the enterview of princes, sayth, That they ought to
shun it so much as they may: for that their presence alwaies diminisheth their
fame, and the opinion conceiued of their persons, causeth them to bee the lesse
esteemed: a thing yet more to be feared towards the strangers than towards the
subiects.
Now that which I have said, It not to be fit for soueraigntie, or for
soueraigne princes to entermeddle with
iudgements; ought yet more to be obserued in a popular estate,The people vfie to iudge of
matters. for the great difficulties in assembling of the people, and
to cause them to vnderstand reason; and then after that they have vnderstood
it, to induce them well to iudge thereof, their iudgements being oft times
peruerted by seditious declamations or factions: which was the greatest
occasion of the civill warres amongst the Romans, vntill that Sylla the Dictator had remitted the hearing of all causes unto the
magistrats, excepting the offence of treason, and that in the highest
degree.
But yet besides the inconueniences by vs before noted, nothing hath euer bene
moreThat the Senat or Magistrats are not to be depriued
of their authoritie & power to have the sam
giuen to the prince. daungerous, or more ruinated Commonweales, than
to translate the authoritie of the Senat or
commaund of the magistrats, unto the prince or the people. For that the lesse
the power of the soueraigntie is (the true markes of maiestie thereunto still
reserued) the more it is assured; as well said Theopompus king of Lacedemonia, who hauing encreased the power of the
Senat, and appointed five Ephori in title of office, as Tribunes of the people:
and being therefore by his wife reproued, for that in so doing hee had much
diminished his owne power: So have I also (said he) much more assured the same
for the time to come. For hard it is for high and stately buildings long to
stand, except they be upholden and staid by most strong shores, and rest upon
most sure foundations; all which consisteth in the Senat or councell, & in
the good duties of the magistrats. In which thing the Venetians, as they haue
done many things wisely, so have they done in
nothing more than in that, that they which have the soueraigntie, intermedle
not with iudgements onely, but not so much as with any other thing els, which
may wel by the magistrats or the Senat be dispatched: Which haply hath bene one
of the chiefe meanes wherby that state hath bene so long preserued, considering
that there neither is, nor euer was any Cōmonweal, where they which have the
soueraigntie troble themselves lesse with that which belongeth unto the councel
or the magistrats. The Great Councel of the nobilitie, or gentlemen, wherin the
whole maiestie of that Commonweal resteth, is neuer assembled but for the
creating of new magistrats, or enacting of lawes, all the rest of the affaires
of the estate being to be dispatched by the Senat, and the councell of the Ten,
and of the Seuen men; and matters of iurisdiction by the other magistrats. Which if it be a thing commendable, and well
appointed in Aristocratike estates, with better reason ought it to take place
in Popular estates, Where the moe heads there be, the lesse
wit there is, and so the worse resolution also. Neither like I of Xenophon that most famous mans opinion, who speaking of
the Athenian Commonweale, saith, That the more popular that the lawes are, the
better they maintaine a Democratie, or Popular estate, When as (saith hee) the
people hath the hearing of all matters, and that all passeth by lot and voyce:
which thing indeed doth vtterly ouerthrow all Popular Commonweales. As in
Athens, when as by the persuasion of Pericles, the
hearing and deciding of matters, and the mannaging of the state, was taken from the Senat or councell of the Areopagi, to be
brought backe unto the people; the The Popular Commonweale not to be the best maintained by the
most Popular lawes. citie destitute of wit, and without councell,
fell first forthwith into great broyles, and not long after into vtter ruine
& decay. But amongst the Swissers, where their Popular estates have now
flourished 260 yeares, and so yet continue and grow from good to better, still
flourishing both in peace and warre: those their estates are preserued and
upholden by lawes of all other least popular, nothing being almost left vnto
the people more than the chusing of their officers, the other rights of
soueraigntie being but sparingly and within a certaine convenient measure
communicated unto them. Neither was the Roman Commonweale euer fairer or
farther from civill warres, than when (the maiestie of the people saued whole)
all things were done by the Senat and the magistrats: which was from the first
Carthaginensian warre, unto the conquest of
the kingdome of Macedon. But after that both the Gracchies by their most popular lawes had taken from the authoritie of
the Senat and the power of the magistrats, as much as they possibly could, all
to encrease the wealth and libertie of the people; there ensued thereof a most
miserable change of that Commonweale: neither did the citie of Rome euer after
cease from civill warres and sedition, vntill that immoderat libertie of the
insolent people, was by the power of one oppressed and brought vnder, and they
so brought into extreame miserie and seruitude. The same inconuenience or
mischiefe befell the Megarensians, who from a Popular estate fell into a most
miserable Tyrannicall government (as saith Plato) for
the vnbridled libertie and insolencie of the people, taking upon them the
hearing of all things, aboue the authoritie, iurisdiction, and power of the Senat, or of the other magistrats.
But the best kind of Commonweale is that, wherein the soueraigne holdeth
whatThe best ordered Commonwealth concerneth his
maiestie, the Senat maintaineth the authoritie thereof, the magistrats execute
their power, and iustice hath her ordinarie course. Whereas otherwise if the
prince or the people shall take upon themselves the authoritie of the Senat, or
the commaunds, offices, or iurisdictions of the magistrats; it is much to be
feared, least that they destitute of all helpe, shall at the length be spoyled
of their owne soueraigne maiestie also. And in mine opinion they shamefully
erre, which thinke themselves to encrease the princes wealth and power, when
they show unto him his Clawes, giuing him to vnderstand, that his will his
countenance, and his looke, ought to be as an edict, a decree, and a law; to the end that there should be none of his
subiects which should presume to take upon them the hearing or deciding of any
matter, which might not bee againe by him reuersed and chaunged: so as did the
tyrant Caligula, who would not that theThe foolish saying of Caligula. lawyers should so much
as giue their councell and opinions, when as he said, Paciam
vt nihil respondeant nisi Eccum, that is to say, That is he to whome it
alone belongeth to giue his opinion; meaning by himselfe: but by the word Eccum, which is, Behold the man; alluding to the word Aequum, which is, That which is right and iust. But this
opinion by little and little crept into princes minds, breeding in them an
incredible desire of oppression and tyrannie.
CHAP. VII. ¶ Whether a Prince in civill factions ought to
ioyne himselfe to one of the parties, and whether a good subiect ought to be
constrained to take part with the one or the other faction: with the meanes to
remedie seditions.
NOw wee have alreadie declared▪ What a Soueraigne
Prince ought to be in the administration of iustice towards his subiects; and
if he should take upon him the person of a judge, when, and how, and in what
sort of Commonweale he ought to doe it: let vs now also see out of the tearmes
of iustice, when the subiects; are divided
into factions and part-takings, and that the judges and magistrats are
themselves parties also, Whether the Soueraigne Prince ought to ioyne himselfe
to one of the parties; & whether the good subiect ought to be constrained
to follow the one or the other partie, or not. And first let vs set downe this
as a maxime, All factions and part-takings to be daungerous and pernitious in
euerie sort of Commonweales, and that they ought, ifAll
factions and part-takings dan gerous unto Commonweales▪ it be
possible, by all meanes to be preuented; or if that cannot be before they bee
plotted, yet to search the meanes to heale them▪ or at leastwise to imploy all
convenient remedies to mittigat the disease. And albeit that of ciuil seditions
and part-takings there sometime commeth great good, as some one or other good
law, or some other good reformation, which had
not beue if the sedition had not happened; yet it is not therefore to be said,
that sedition is not daungerous, although that it by chaunce and casually draw
after it some good: as in mans bodie a disease chauncing, is the cause that men
vse letting of blood, and purgations, and so draw away the euill and corrupt
humors: so seditions oftentimes are cause that the euill or wicked men are
slaine, or driuen away and banished, to the end that the rest may live in
quiet; or that euill lawes and decrees be cancelled and repealed, to giue place
unto good, which had otherwise neuer beene receiued. For which if one shall
say, That seditions, and civill warres, are good, hee might also say, that
murders, parricides, adulteries, theft; and the subuersion of estates &
Commonweales are also good. For why, there
is no impietie so great, no villanie so detestable, whereof no profit may
redound, either to all, or to some men in particular; yea the verie villanies
of wicked men almightie God vseth to draw either to the punishment of the
reprobat, or to the glorie of his name. Which yet to prayse, were as if we
should commend diseases; as Fauorinus the Philosopher
highly commended the feuer quartaine: which were but to confound the difference
betwixt good and euill, the difference betwixt profit and disprofit, betwixt
honour and dishonour, betwixt vice and vertue; and in briefe to confound fire
and water, heauen and earth together. Wherefore as vices and diseases are
daungerous both unto the bodie and the soule; so seditions and civill warres
are hurtfull and pernitious unto all estates and Commonweales.
But it may be some man will say, That seditions and civill warres are good and
profitable Seditions and factions dangerous euen for Tyrannicall
governments for Tyrannicall Monarchies, and for the maintaining of
Tyrants in their Tyrannicall estates, they being alwayes enemies unto their
subiects, and such as cannot long continue, if the subiect be once at accord
amongst themselves. But we have before declared, the Tyrannicall Monarchy to be
of all others the weakest, as that which is not but by cruelties and villanies
nourished and maintained; and yet commonly wee see it to fall and take end by
seditions and civill warres: so that if we looke into all tyrannies which haue
bene destoyed and ouerthrowne, we shal find it most commonly to have happened
of factions and civill tumults. Yea euen the most craftie and subtill tyrants,
who by little and little put to death, now some,
and then others, to fat themselves with the
blood of their subiects, and to saue their owne vnluckie life, which they lead
in continuall paine and languor, neuer escape the murdering hands of
conspirators; who so much the more encrease, by how much moe the tyrant putteth
of his subiects to death; others which are unto them allied, being alwaies
prest and readie to revenge the death of their so nie kinsmen: and albeit that
the tirant put to death all their kinsmen, friends, and allies, yet
neuerthelesse they shall so stirre up all the good subiects against themselves.
And of the goods of the subiects for tyrants to enrich themselves, is to
procure their owne ruine and decay: for it is impossible that spleene should
fill it selfe, or that the ouergrowing of corrupt proud flesh should fatten it
selfe, but that the other members must drie, and so the whole bodie shortly
after perish and consume also. And therfore
the Florentines in my iudgement had no reasonable cause, why secretly to
maintaine the factions of the Pistoians, whome they had before subdued: for
that they foresaw not, them whome they thought might so by their mutuall
broiles and contentions be weakned, & so the more easily endure the
Florentines their lords, by liberty and the vse of armes to grow more fierce
and couragious, than if they had lived in peace and quiet, and with aboundance
of delights lost their force and strength: besides that, they therewith lost so
much of their owne force, by the losse of so many good subiects, one of them by
another ruinated and ouerthrowne.
Now if seditios and factions be dangerous vnto
monarchies, then are they muchAn especiall benefit a Monarch
hath aboue other Commonweales. more daungerous unto Aristocraties and
Popular estates: for that Monarches may
maintayne their maiesty, and as neuters decide the quarrels of their subiects;
or by ioyning themselves to one of the parties, to bring the other unto reason,
or els altogether to oppresse them: whereas the people divided in a popular
estate, hath no soueraigne over them; no more than the lords divided in
Aristocratie have no man to cōmaund them: if it be not that the greater part
of the people, or of the lords, be not of the faction, which so may commaund
the rest. Now when I say faction, my meaning is notPriuat
factions how they are to be suppressed. of an handfull of people, or
some small number of subiects, but euen of a good part of them banded against
an other, able to trouble the whole estate: but if they be but few in number,
hee that hath the soueraignty in hand, ought at the first to represse them;
which he may doe either by commaunding them to lay downe armes, or by referring
the cause of their dissention and variance
unto indifferent judges: or if the matter bee such as may require his own
declaration and pleasure, then to doe the same with good aduice, and the mature
deliberation of his most wise magistrats and councellours, not in any wise
suspected to favour the one part more than the other: and this to the intent
that the prince, or they which have the soueraignty, should not themselves
beare the enuy or discontentment of them which should so bee condemned. But if
the faction be grown so farre, as that it cannot by way of justice, or by
orderly inducements be appeased, it then be hooueth the soueraigne prince, or
them that hold the soueraignety in an Aristocratie or popular estate, to vse
their forces for the vtter extinguishing thereof, by the punishing of some few
of the ring-leaders and chiefe men in the faction; that so the punishment may touch but some few▪ and yet the feare
come unto all of them. Neither ought the soueraigne prince to deferre the
matter so long, vntill they bee growne so strong as that they be not any more
to be resisted, or that the leaders of them being for feare of punishment
become desperat, shall seeke to ouerthrow the whole estate of the commonweale.
For there still are, and alwaies have bene good and valiant men, which for the
welfare of their countrey doubt not to aduenture their lives; although there be
many, who to the contrary had rather their countrey should perish for them.
Which kind of men (the very plagues of commonweales) are upon the sudden to bee
oppressed▪ lest happely the whole estate of the
commonweale were oft times by some one or
other of them to bee indaungered; yea, although such civill discord rise but
for some priuate displeasure of theirs.
But all this which we have yet said, is to be vnderstood but of factions which
concerneFactions and conspiracies against the prince or
estate, how they are to be repressed and the conspirators punished.
not the estate; for if the faction be directly against the state, or the life
of the soueraigne prince, there is then no question whether the prince should
take a part, or show himselfe an open enemy unto such seditious, which so
professe themselves of all others the greatest enemy of their prince &
commonweale: for otherwise, if when the state and welfare of the commonweale,
or the prince his owne life is attempted, he shall sit still but as an idle
beholder, he shall so inuite and annimate not the more desperate sort of men
onely, but euen very cowards to seeke after his life also. But yet a great
difference there is to bee made in the manner
of punishment of the offendors: for if the number of the conspirators against
the state or his person be but few, he shall suffer the Magistrats to proceed
against them by order of law, and as he seeth cause himselfe to moderate the
heauinesse of the punishment; which the fewer the conspirators are, is so much
the sooner to be inflicted▪ and before that moe bee discouered, to the end that
by the punishment of some few, the good subiects may stil be kept within the
compasse of their allegiance and dutie, and those which were euill enclined, so
terrified from their euill intended purpose. Neither yet is too strait or
strict enquirie to bee made to findThat in a conspiracie it
is not good to make too strait enquiry to find out all the
conspirators. out all the conspirators, least by force of torture and
torment, such things bee haply wrung out, as
were indeed better vnknowne than knowne. And yet it is not to bee dissembled or
winked at, if the partie guiltie bee once discouered to have conspired against
the life of his soueraigne, or yet to have but bene willing so to have done. As
it happened unto a gentleman of Normandie, who confessing unto a frier (his
ghostly father) of a purpose that he had had to have slaine Francis the first the French king, but yet not daring so to do, to
have repented him now of his so wicked and detestable a purpose, was therefore
of the frier so much as in him lay pardoned; who yet neuerthelesse forthwith
reuealed the same unto the king, who causing the gentleman to bee apprehended,
sent him unto the parliament of Paris to be tryed, where he was as a traitor
condemned to death. Howbeit, that (in mine opinion) the king in his greater
wisedome might have done better to haue
pardoned him, for that it had repented him of that his wicked purpose (which
the law for the hainousnesse of the fact doe so seuerely punish) & so was
become the betraier & accuser of himself before he was by any other
accused. And it may be that it had bin better to have executed him without
making of the king acquainted therewith, so to have disburdened him of the enuy
of such a iudgment. So as did the emperour Augustus with
Q. Gallus, who hauing not onely purposed, but euen
desperatly also attempted to have slaine him; and being therefore by the Senate
condemned of treason, was yet by the same emperour Augustus (dissembling the matter as if he had thereof knowne nothing)
pardoned, and so sent away unto his brother then gouernour in one of the
prouinces: but was yet neuerthelesse upon the
way slaine, not without the secret commaundement of Augustus himselfe, as many men supposed, vsing therein the like
subtilty: a craft that had his vncle Caesar before vsed,
in giuing pardon to M. Marcellus at the request of the
Senate; who yet was immediatly after slaine, as one of Caesar his most mortall enemies. Yet more likely it is, neyther Caesar (who in a certayne naturall clemency exceeded
almost all other princes) neyther Augustus (placed in so
high a seat of honour and maiestie) to have beene willing to have defiled or
stained their so great honour & dignity with the secret murder of them whom
they might most iustly have executed. Howbeit that some of the finer sort to
the contrary excuse the matter, as by them done for the safty of their owne lives; and yet so by his meanes still to maintaine the
great opinion which they had before Torture for the finding out of conspirators ought to be most
warily vsed. caused men to conceiue of their clemency and mercy. But
if the conspirators be in number many, and that they be not all discouered, the
wise prince ought to beware how he putteth to torture those that be condemned,
albeit that he might euen with a becke without danger kill them all: for that
for one that he should put to death, there would arise up an hundred of their
allies & friends, who it may be, have power enough, or at least wise neuer
fayle of will enough to revenge the death of them which were of their bloud;
and in case all this were not so, yet ought the prince alwayes to shunne the
note and blame of cruelty, as well of his subiects as of strangers: wherein Nero was greatly deceiued, who hauing discouered the
conspiracy against his person and estate, would needs by torture & torment
know all them that were partakers therein: wherin he found so great a number of them that were, what by right,
and what by wrong accused, as that the cōspirators indeed seeing themselves
condemned, discharged their choller upon the tyrants most faithfull and loyall
friends: all whom hee caused most cruelly to be slayne; which was afterwards
the cause of the open and generall rebellion of the captaynes and gouernours of
the prouinces against him. And for this cause Alexander
the great hauing put to death Parmenio, Philotas, and
the rest which had conspired his death, by a new decree or law abrogated the
auncient law of the Macedonians, whereby five of them that were the nearest of
kinne unto the conspirators were still to be put to death. But the best and
surest way to auoyd the farther daunger of a conspiracy already preuented, is
for a prince to dissemble the matter, as if he knew not the conspirators, as Tacitus well
sayed, Optimum remedium insidiarum, est si nonConspirators preuented to have oftentimes bene right wisely
dissembled, and not farther enquired after.intelligatur, The best remedie of a conspiracie is, not
to seeme to vnderstand thereof. So when Hanno generall
of the Carthaginensians, had purposed to have slaine all the Senators, and
chiefe men of the citie, under the colour of the marriage of his daughter; the
Senat understanding of the matter, but dissembling the same, forthwith caused
an edict or law to be published, concerning the charges to be made at feasts:
wherein the number of the guests, & the charges of the feast (which was not
great) was most straitly appointed. By which decree of the Senat, the
conspiracie intended, was without any tumult or bloodshed at all quietly
suppressed. So in like manner Eteocles captaine of the
Lacedemonians, with a strong garrison of souldiors holding the island of Chio
against the Atheniensians, and
understanding that the garrison souldiours secretly conspiring together, had
determined to kill the inhabitants their friends and allies, in whose aid they
were come, and so to take unto themselves the possession of the iland; and that
the signall of the conspiratours was, for every one of them to carrie in their
hands a cane, or reed: hee (I say) understanding of the matter, and accompanied
with certaine of his most assured friends, & so walking about the citie,
slew the first that he met withall carrying of a reed, and so suddenly gaue it
out, That hee would kill all the rest that so carried reeds in their hands, and
yet withall tooke order with the inhabitants of the island, that the souldiers
were paid their pay: and so by the death of one onely souldiour the conspiracie
was quenched before the fire could bee well kindled: and the occasion of the conspiracie so taken away, and all againe
well quieted. Wherefore euerie gouernour and magistrat ought to take care, not
so much to take away seditions alreadie growne, as to preuent them: For that a
sedition once set on fire, is like a sparke suddenly blowne, which with the
rage of the people, which setteth all the citie on a light fire before it can
be againe quenched. Wherein the princes commaunds are not to be expected, who
commonly know least of such things as touch them neerest. Yea oftentimes it
happeneth princes wel to vnderstand the secrets, writings, doings, and sayings
of other forren princes, and yet perceiue not the fire kindled at home in their
own realmes, in their own pallaces, yea euen in their
owne bed chambers. The conspiracy of Princes oftentimes better to vnderstand of the conspiracies
against princes, than of such as are against
themselves at Rome contriued.Pelopidas, for the surprising of the castle Cadmea, and
the expulsing of the Lacedemonians out of Thebes, was knowne in Athens, before
that any thing thereof was disconered in Thebes, as the euent shewed. For why,
but euen a little before that Archias the captaine of
the castle was together with the garrison souldiors therein slaine, he was by
letters from the bishop of Athens warned to looke to himselfe: which letters
because he would not at supper read, he used the common prouerb; In crastinum negotia, To morrow will serue for our
businesse. Who knoweth not the emperour Charles the fift
to have bene either partaker, or priuie almost to all things that were any
where done by other princes, yet did he not so much as once suspect the
conspiracie which 1552. duke Maurice and Albertus marquesse of Brandeburg
his familiar and domesticall friends, had euen
fast by him contriued against him: yea and had also effected the same before he
could feele or perceiue the smoke thereof. But what need forren examples? the
conspiracie of Amboise, which set all Fraunce on fire,
was diuulged in Germanie, England, and Italy, before it was once suspected by
them against whome it was contriued in Fraunce: unto whom the cardinall Granuellan is reported by his letters to have first
discouered the same, and yet there were aboue ten thousand persons which had
therein a part. Whereby it is plaine, such conspiracies as wherein the force
and powerConspiracies hard to be concesld, being oft times euen
by women reuealed. of many is to be required, to have alwayes had
most difficult and daungerous euents: for that they can neither by a few be
effected, neither yet by many be concealed. Yea oft times it chaunceth the
conspirators most secret designes to bee euen by women first reuealed. As it happened to Philotas,
who discouering the conspiracie against Alexander the
Great unto a courtisan whom he loued, was together with his complices to his
destruction by her bewrayed. So Fuluia understanding of
Cateline his conspiracie by one of his souldiors,
reuealed the same unto the Consull Cicero. And in our
time the secret designes of the Prior of Campania (generall of the French
gallies) for the sudden surprising and rifling of the citie of Venice by a
souldiour reuealed unto a courtisan,The most dangerous
conspiracie that can be against the person of a prince, and the hardest to
be auoyded. was forthwith by her
discouered and made knowne unto the Senat. Yet for all that an hard matter it
is for a prince, be he neuer so wise or subtill, to preserue himselfe from the
daunger of a resolute man that hath sworne his death: for that as the secret,
& the exeuction thereof is but against one
man onely, so is it but in one man alone enclosed, willing and resolued to
sacrifice his life (how deere unto him soeuer) to have another mans, howbeit
that he were beset round with an armie. Such an one as Scuola is reported to have bene; who of the euent
gaue first name unto his house and familie, for that he of his owne accord had
thrust his right hand into a burning fire, so to bee burnt of, for that he
mistaking the man, had slaine the kings lieutenant in stead of the king
himselfe. With no lesse boldnesse (or valour should I say) did a seruant of Lazarus the Despot of Seruia kill Amurath the king of the Turkes, in the middest of his legions of men,
so to revenge the death of his lord, and the dishonour done unto the queene his
wife. So Pausaenias also in the sight of the whole armie
slew Philip king of Macedon, Alexander the Great his father. And Peter
Aloisius also duke of Placence, was in
his owne castle by two murderers stabbed and slaine euen in the sight of his
guard. And he that slew the emperour Domitian went to
seeke him out euen into his cabinet with his arme in a scarfe: in such sort as
did Aod kill Eglon king of the
Moabites. And if Cosmus Medices duke of Florence (hauing
ceized upon the estate) had not alwaies gone armed, neither could his great
guards, nether yet his strong castles have kept him from the hands of most
desperat men, who oftentimes found meanes to enter euen into his most close and
secret places, to have slain him an hundred times, what death soeuer they
should therefore have died. Yea amongst the rest of many most desperat murtherers, there was one, who euen in the councell chamber
strucke him with his dagger, thinking so to
have stabbed him (his guard standing round about him) not knowing him as then
to have had a priuie coat upon him. And yet well hee knew that his life lay
thereon, and so indeed was presently cast headlong out at a window downe to the
ground.
But forasmuch as we have before touched certaine meanes which may preserue a
prince from falling into these daungers, and whereby to hinder the conspiracies
which might be made against his person: Let vs now see how he ought to beare
and behave himselfe in conspiracies and factions, which are not directly
against himselfe nor his estate, but amongst his great lords among themselves,
or among the estates, townes, or prouinces subiect unto him; all which he ought
by all meanes to preuent, and not to neglect
any thing how little soeuer it be for the meeting therewith. For as the great
stormes and tempests are caused of most light and insensible exhalations and
vapours:Of small sparkes oft times do arise the great
flames and fiers of sedition. euen so seditions and civill warres the
destructions of cities and Commonweales, are most times begun for most smal
matters, and such as a man would not thinke that euen they should worke such
effect. In the raigne of Iustiman the emperour all the
cities of the Greeke empire were divided into factions, for the maintaining of
the colours of Greene & Blew, which they according to their fancies tooke
unto them in their sports and iusts, one of them brauing and contending with
another: which in the end tooke such force and went so farre, as that the
judges and magistrats of Constantinople, going about to punish the seditious,
were letted so to doe by others of the same faction who tooke part with them, and so tooke out of the hands of the
officers and executioners such as were by them led to the place of execution,
and not so contented brake open the prisons also, and let loose all the
prisoners, and in the same rage burnt the temple of Saint Sophia: and to auoid the punishment which they (hauing laid downe
armes) were not to hope for, made choyce of one Hippatius the captaine and ring-leader of their faction, for emperour;
Iustinian with his familie in the meane time lurking
in a corner. Which tumult proceeded so farre, as that thirtie thousand men were
in one day in that quarrel slaine: and had not he the leader of the faction
(and he euen the new chosen emperour) there beene killed, the emperour Iustinian had vndoubtedly had much to do to have saued
his life; who yet at the beginning together with his other courtiers tooke great sport and pleasure therein. The like
whereof happened at Syracusa also, where two of the magistrats become riuals,
and so falling out for their loue, at the first gaue occasion for other men to
laugh at them, but at length so divided the whole Commonweale into two such
factions, which so banded the one the other, as that the most couragious of the
nobilitie being slaine, the people taking up armes and driuing out them that
were left of the nobilitie or better sort, tooke upon it the soueraigntie, and
so changed the Aristocratie into a Democratie or Popular estate. Wherfore it
behoueth a prince, before the fire of sedition and civill warres by such
sparkes beThat the quarrels of great men ought euen in the
beginning to be wisely appeased, or by force of the prince
suppressed. enflamed, to cast on cold water, or else quite to quench
the same: that is to say, to proceed to the preuenting thereof, either by sweet
speeches and persuasions, or elsby open force.
So as did Alexander the Great, who seeing Ephestion and Craterus his
greatest friends, upon a mutuall emulation to be at discord and varience
amongst themselves, and so to draw the rest of his valiant captaines into
parts-taking with them: hee at the first with faire words, and gentle
persuasions sought to make them friends together, but afterwards taking them
apart, sharply rebuked them both, threatning withall to band himselfe against
him which soeuer of them should first by word or deed offend the other: by
which sharp reprehension putting them both in feare, made them friends
together. And so our king Lewes, he who for his deuotion
towards God, for his loue towards his neighbours, for
his charitie towards particular men, and upright dealing towards al, is numbred amongst the Saints; unto his great
praise used the matter, as that all the time of his raigne there was neuer
difference or contentions betwixt any the princes, which he for his integritie
and wisedome himselfe in most friendly and peaceable manner quieted not. Yet of
all things this is in a prince most to bee taken heed of, That in ending the
differences and quarrels of the nobilitie or princes, he seeme not to be led or
moued with the loue or hatred of any of them, one more than another. Wherin Archidamus king of the Lacedemonians, wisely prouided for
himselfe, whoA wise part of Archidamus in making of two
great enemies friends. seeing two great men his most deere friends at
oddes betwixt themselves, brought them both into the temple, and there
demaunded of them whome they would make choyce of to be arbitrator of the
difference betwixt them? who both answering, That they would make choyce of none other but of Archidamus himselfe: Sweare then unto me (said he) that
you shall both abide mine award, and doe as I shall enioyne you: which they
both doing, he straitly enioyned them both, Neuer to depart out of that same
church, vntill they had reconciled themselves one of them unto another, and so
became sworne friends. Whereby he wisely without any offence or displeasure
unto himselfe (by giuing of iudgement betwixt them) made them friends, and so
with thanks enioyed the fruit of their friendship and good agreement, than
which nothing ought to be more deerer or more pretious unto a prince: for that
no fortresses are unto princes more assured, no castles stronger, than is the
loue and fidelitie of their subiects towards them. But here I speake of a good
prince, and not of a tyrant which taketh
pleasure to see the great men still ruinated one of them by another; neither
aimeth at any other marke, but how to flesh the great ones one of them upon
another. HowbeitThe craft of tyrants in setting other mn together by the eares, sometime daungerous vnto
themselves. that it oftentimes falleth out, that the dogges falling
unto agreement among themselves, fall all upon the wolfe: so as did the
factions of the Colonnois and the Vrsins, who hauing discouered that pope Alexander the sixt set them still at discord and variance
among themselves, so by their calamities and falles to encrease the strength
and power of his bastard sonne Borgia; they fell to
agreement among themselves, and so made head against him their common
enemie.
Sometime also a tyrant seeing the nobilitie in the State to flourish with the
strength and alliance of friends, and the
favour of the people, and not to seeke one of them anothers ruine, neither to
have any equall aduersaries to oppose themselves against them; doth yet
secretly affoord favour unto some of the meaner or weaker sort, and so armeth
them against the richer and stronger, and by some notable and irremissable
villanie by them committed against the other, bindeth them unto him, in such
sort, as that they can neuer be reconciled againe unto the parties by them so
offended. So as Iohn Bentiuole the tyrant of Bononia is
reported to have done: who fearing the good agreement of them of the greater
sort, easily suffered the chiefest of the house and familie of the Marischots (then the richest and a man of greatest credit
in all that countrey) to bee of his enemies slaine, to the end that hee might
so bee dispatched of him, and supported of them of the contrarie faction: all
reconciliation being by that so great an outrage broken off, and all hope of mutuall friendship vtterly cut a
sunder: all which his tyrannicall slights and deceits, together with the favour
of the French king, yet helped him not, but that at length he was thrust out of
his estate, and so by violence pluckt headlongThe obligation
of wicked and desperat men grounded uppon some norable villanie, in all
Commonweales most daungerous, and how to be suppressed. euen out of
the chiefest strength of his tyranny. But as the bond and obligation of a
notable villanie is of all others the strongest, so is it also in every
Commonweale most of all to be feared, for that thereby all the hope of amitie
and concord is cut off towards them which have receiued the iniurie. As it
happened to the armie of Carthage, which for want of pay reuolting against the
seigneurie or state, under the conduct of two or three
of their mutinous captaines, ceized upon diuers strong townes & places which they rifled and ransackt: which captaines
and ringleaders fearing to bee by the souldiours at one time or other betrayed
and delivered, persuaded the rest of the chiefe principall men amongst them, to
kill the ambassadours of the seigneurie, and to hang up Hasdrubal the Generall with the rest of the Carthaginensians which
were fallen into their hands, to the end that hauing bound them by such
cruelties, they should now have no hope at al to saue their lives by
composition. In which case there was no other meane for the Seigneurie to vse,
but euen plaine force, so vtterly to root them out which could not otherwise be
healed: as was afterwards that armie of the Carthaginensians, being by a long
and cruell war at length defeated. For why, they had directly banded themselves
against the seigneurie: in which case we have said the prince must of
necessitie become a partie, and show himselfe
a most sharpe enemie unto the rebellious.
But if discord and contention be amongst the princes and great men themselves,
&How a soueraign prince is to end the quarrels and
controuersies that are betwixt the nobilitie. that under the same
soueraigne prince, which yet he cannot either by his princely authoritie,
neither by faire persuasion, nor hope of rewards, appease; he ought then to
giue them arbitrators, men of great integritie and wisdome, and such as they
themselves can like of. In which doing the soueraigne prince shall discharge
himselfe of the heauinesse of the iudgement to be giuen, and of the hatred and
displeasure of him or them that should be condemned. For if this manner of
proceeding is and alwayes hath beene commendable for the ending of
controuersies euen betwixt kings themselves, by committing their differences
unto the arbitrement of princes; and that all nations vse this manner and fashion: with how much more reason ought a wise
prince (as of right hee may) cause his owne subiects to condescend thereunto,
and especially them which are neere unto him in alliance or blood, to the end
that their quarrels and contentions should neuer (if it were possible) so farre
passe the bounds of reason, as to come to bee tried by the sword or force of
armes.
But in ending such controuersies, the prince aboue all things must beware that
heeDangerous for a prince not to shew himselfe
indifferent in the quarrels and controuersies of his great subiects.
show not himselfe more affected unto the one part than to the other: which hath
bene the cause of the ruine and ouerthrow of many princes and estates. So Philip the first king of Macedon was not slaine, but for
that he openly favoured Antipater against Pausanias a meane gentleman, in denying of him iustice;
which was the cause that Pausianas discharged his choler euen upon the person of
the king himselfe. Neither for any other cause did Henrie the sixt, king of England, stirre up that long and deadly
civill warre, wherewith all England was in combustion eight and twentie yeares,
and wherein were lost about fourescore princes of the royall blood (as Philip Comines reporteth) but for that the king tooke
upon him to be captaine of them of the faction of the house of Lancaster,
against them of the faction and house of Yorke: who at length hauing vanquished
and ouercome their enemies, put to death the king himselfe in prison, with all
the rest of his neerest kinsmen. The conspiracie also of the marquesse of
Pescara, against Charles the emperour, was grounded upon
the favour that the emperour bare unto the viceroy of Naples, against the
marquesse. It were but lost time to set downe
in writing the cruell & bloodie warres which have bene raised in this
realme by Robert of Arthois, Lewes of Eureux king of Nauarre, Iohn Montford,
Iohn of Burgundie, and diuers others of our time, which it is not
needfull to rehearse, and all for the favours of the kings, who forgetting the
high degree of maiestie whereunto they were mounted, would basely take upon
them the offices of aduocats, of judges, and arbitrators; so descending from
the highest unto the lowest places, so to follow the passions of their
subiects, making themselves companions unto some of them, and unto other some
of them enemies.
But some will haply say, That by this meanes the king
shall know newes, and keepe the parties also
in awe: whereunto I also well agree, that a young king might so doe amongst his
ladies and gentlewomen, to take pleasure & knowledge of news enough, but
not amongst his princes and other his great lords. Now if any man shall further
obiect and say, Princes to be oftentimes, yea and that against their will
enforced so to doe, and to take a part, when as he which thinketh himselfe
wronged, upon an obstinatWhen, and how a soueraigne prince
is to vse his force for the appealing of the controuersies and quarrels
betwixt his great subiects mind will not by any reason, persuasion,
iudgement, or arbitrement, suffer himselfe to be ouerruled or persuaded. In
which case I say, that necessitie hath no law: and yet that the prince before
hee may come to that point of extremitie, as to vse his force, ought to proue
all the meanes that he possibly may, for the composing of the matter in
controuersie, and making of those his great subiects friends: which if it may
not be, then by force and strong hand to
ouerrule that which he could not otherwise doe: For that it cannot be, that he
which shall be so froward or presumptuous as not to hearken unto reason, nor
his friends persuasion, can have many to take his part, or to stand fast by him
in that his so great and obstinat wilfulnesse.
Yet might some man say, That the occasion of the quarrell may be so secret, as
that no proofe can thereof be made, neither any iudgement giuen, and yet that
hee which hath so receiued the iniurie, demaundeth thereof an amends: in which
case the princes find themselves oftentimes much troubled, as when an iniurie
or offence is unto any man secretly offered or done, which he which did it
denieth, and that the trueth cannot therein be
tried but onely by bare surmises & coniectures; in this case what is
amongst the common and vulgar sort to bee done? it is an easie thing to say, as
that no man ought without most manifest witnesses to be condemned: but
souldiours, and such asThe beginning of combats.
stand upon their nobilitie, deeme their honour to be stained, and their
reputation greatly impaired, except he have satisfaction, who upon his oath
affirmeth himselfe to have so bene by any man secretly wronged. For why, such
men say, the subiects lives and goods to be all in the princes hand and power
to be disposed of▪ but not their honour and reputation. In which case the
people of the North have for the tryall of the matter appointed combats; as is
to be seene in the auntient lawes of the Lombards, of the Saliens, the
Ripuaries, the English, the Burgundions, the Danes, the Almaines, and the
Normans; who in their customes call the
Combat, The law of appearance: which many for all that
have as a most beastly thing reiected, as neuer receiued or practised by the
Assyrians, the Aegyptians, the Persians, the Greekes, or Latines, except in
lawfull warre, one man against his enemie, and that by the good leaue of the
Generall of the armie; or else sometime one Generall encountering hand to hand
with another, for the sparing of their subiects blood: so Cossus and Marcellus in battell hand to hand
ouercame their enemies kings? Or els one king against another king, as did Romulus with the king of the Latines, and Hundig king of the Saxons, with Roe king of Denmarke. So also Charles king of
Naples chalenged Peter king of Arragon unto the combat,
for the triall of their right unto that kingdome, which they yet performed
not. Neither is this any meane matter, when
as Corbis and Orsua contending
for the principalitie before Scipio Affricanus the
Romane Generall, said, That they would have none other judge, either of God or
man, to decide their quarrell, but Mars onely. And
yetCombats when to be admitted. for all that it is
better to appoint combats amongst subiects, according to the auntient and
lawfull manner of our auncestors, when the persons are of like qualitie which
so stand upon their honour, and that there is some apparant coniecture of the
wrong receiued (for why, the auntient lawes neuer admitted combat in a plaine
and euident matter, or wherein good proofe was to be had) for that to deny
combat vnro noble personages standing upon their honour, and at so great oddes
as that they can by no other means be appeased, were
but to nourish the fire of civill war euen in the entrails of the Commonweale, which after it is once kindled, enflameth
the whole body thereof. For that two inconueniences propounded, wise men haue
well taught vs, the greater ought stil to be of vs declined. Ioine hereunto
also, that to change a custom which hath for many worlds of yeares bene found
necessarie, is not onely an hard matter, but withallCombats
by diuers great princes forbidden, & for the auoiding of greater
inconueniences by them again allowed.
daungerous also. Rotaris king of the Lombards, had taken
the law of Combats from amongst his subiects, but yet at their instant requests
was enforced to restore the same againe into the former force; protesting
withall, That it was but inhumane and naught, (as is in the lawes of the
Lombards to be seene) but yet for all that necessarie to auoid greater
inconueniences: For that the law of Combat being so taken away, moe good and
innocent men were most cruelly and secretly slain and made away, than haply
had bene, the daunger and eternall infamie
of such hidden treacherie beeing still propounded to the offendors, to be tried
by combat. So king Lewes the ninth, hauing the honour of
God, and the welfare of his subiects before his eyes, was the first that forbad
combats in this realme; which edect was thus, NOVS DEFENDONS BATAILLES PAR TOVT
EN NOSTRE DOMAINE EN TOVTES QVERELLES, We forbid Combats in
all quarrels throughout our dominions. And for that this edict was
euill kept, Philip the Faire, king Lewes his nephew, caused the like also to bee published, whereby he
vtterly forbad combats: who yet within two yeres after was at the instant
request of his subiects constrayned to restore them againe, by reason of the
secret murders and stabbings, yea euen of the most valiant men, who then were
in every place so slaine. Philip of France, surnamed the Hardie, duke of Burgundie, did not
altogether forbid combats in Holland, but yet commanded them not to bee at all
suffered, without the lawfull appointment of the magistrats: whereas before
they were there open and common without iust cause euen to all sorts of men.
But it was a thing most barbarous, that Fronto king of
Denmarke in auntient time appointed all causes and quarrels to bee decided by
combat, as the Saxon historiographer saith. Howbeit that the Russians and
Hungarians otherwise vse it not, but when there is no euident proofe of the
matter brought in question. But in our remembrance the prince of Melphe, the
king his lieutenant in Piemont, found no remedie or meanes better, for the
restrayning of the secret murders and mutinies which were ordinarie amongst his
souldiors, than combat to be for them
appointed, by the leaue and authoritie of the Generall; with condition, That
the vanquished should not be spared, but still bee slaine by the victor, and
his bodie throwne into the riuer: For which such combats hee appointed a
publike place betwixt two bridges, compassed round about with the riuer: so
that the hope of flight or of aid taken away, and that they must either
ouercome their enemie, or there shamefully die; the souldiors afterwards began
to behave themselves more modestly, and so live the more quietly together.Of the lie giuen, what is to be thought.
But now, when as to have the lie giuen one, was neither by the Romans thought
to be a thing iniurious, neither that our auncestors had allowed the combat for
the lie giuen to another man; it began in our age to be a thing not only
contumelious, but euen capitall also; and that
especially in the time of Francis the first the French
king, who in a great assembly of his greatest peers one day said, that he was
not an honest man which could endure the lie giuen him. Which he said, hauing
by his heraults at armes giuen the lie to Charles the
fift, for some dishonorable speeches he had giuen of him. Which yet since with
vs is growne as it were into a law, so that none of the nobilitie or martiall
men, which will put up the lie, is accounted of, as of a man of any worth or
valour, but as of a base or vile fellow. Whereof have risen great quarrels,
brawles, and murders, amongst all sorts of subiects. Which to meet withall, Henry the second, who not without much griefe with a great number of his nobilitie, had seene a matter ended
by combat, by a perpetuall law forbad
controuersies or quarrels to be afterwards so tried. And to the intent that no
man, who had rashly receiued the lie, should incurre the note of infamie: Charles the ninth reuiuing the edict made by his father,
for the forbidding of combats, ioyned thereunto moreouer, That he would take
unto himselfe the honour and reputation of such as found themselves grieued,
for that they might not have the combat for the lie offered them: and yet there
was neuer in Fraunce so many murders seene, as when combats were so forbidden.
For who should not bee well laughed at, which for the lie giuen him should
appeale unto the judges? And yet in the opinion of the nobilitie and martiall
men, he shall seeme to incurre the most heauie note of infamie, which shall not
by force of armes repell such a reproach or disgrace offered him. Neither can the frowardnesse (should I say) or vanitie
of so foolish an opinion easily be out of mens minds remoued.
But whereas we before said, that the combat is for the auoiding of greater
inconueniencesHow, and for what cause combats are to be
granted. to be borne withall, my meaning is not, that it should be by
law allowed, but onely in case of necessitie graunted, and that by the princes
expresse letters, after the hearing of the parties, and for the auoyding of
murders and seditions, which might otherwise ensue. Whereby that inconuenience
shall be auoyded, which otherwise without combat could not be prouided for,
that kinsmen, neighbours, and friends, should for one mans wrong in a sort be
enforced to take up armes, and so to entertaine another mans quarrell: as oftentimes it chaunceth the force and furie of
wicked men, to fall upon the heads of good and worthy subiects. But that is in
the hearing of the matter especially to be respected, that combat be not
graunted for the triall of any but of capitall causes, and those also whereof
no manifest proofe is to be had or found out: following therein also the
auntient lawes, which will, That the vanquished should bee declared infamous,
and so disgraded of all his estates and honours, condemned to some shamefull
death, if he will not better die of the hand of the victor. Which seueritie of
punishment, and feare of infamie, might stay many as well from entring into
combats, as also from leading of a quarrellous and wicked life. For Philip the Faire hauing forbidden combats, thought it not
good otherwise to restore them againe unto the nobilitie, but upon the cause before knowne unto the magistrats, as it
was by the old decree of the Senat prouided. As by another decree of the same
Senat giuen in the controuersie betwixt the counties of Foix and Armagnac, it
was said, That combats might not take place, when question was of civill right
and law, which is yet the custome of them of Berne. And by the lawes of Naples
also, it was ordained, That combats should not take place but in cases of
treason, and of casuall murder: whereas before it was lawfull in any offence
whatsoeuer to chalenge the combat of the aduersarie, theft onely except: which
yet I see by the custome of them of latter time, not to have beene without good
cause lawfull. Howbeit that by the lawes of Spaine no iust cause of combat is
allowed. And thus much concerning priuat and particular quarrels▪ with the
meanes to appease the same.
But if quarrels and contentions arise betwixt whole families, or betwixt whole
corporationsCombats nor to be admitted for the quarrels
and contentions betwixt families. and colledges of the same citie or
Commonweale, and upon such like causes as doe betwixt priuat men: combats in
that case are not to have place▪ but the parties so at oddes are by way of
iustice to be kept in good peace; or otherwise by force & sharpe punishment
to be inflicted upon the offendors to be kept in awe; yet for all that in such
sort, as that iustice should still have place euen in armes in the execution
doing: as it was in Rome, at such time as by a decree of the Senat it was
appointed and set downe, That foure hundred innocent slaues should be all put
to death; with which vnusuall manner of execution the
common people all inraged was about to have taken Seditions arising for the execution of iustice, how they are
to be preuented. up armes, if the emperor Nero
had not for the keeping of them in, dispersed the souldiours of his guard into
every quarter of the citie, so to keepe all quiet, vntill that the execution
was done. Whereof Iustinian the emperour hauing euen in
like case failed, fell into the great and daungerous sedition (whereof we
before spake) which upon the sudden set all Constantinople almost upon a light
fire. As not long ago the two most famous cities of Paris and Antwerpe, were in
great tumults and uproares, at such time as the people saued from execution
certaine persons for their religion condemned to die: whereof the reuolt of the
Low countries against the king begun. Neither is this any new matter, but
knowne to have happened in the glory of the Roman Commonweale: when as at such
time as the Consull had commanded one Volero a factious
fellow to have the bastenado giuen him, (as
the manner of punishing of such offendors was) the people by force tooke him
out of the hands of iustice, euen as hee was to have bene stripped, and made
him Tribune to defend the popular libertie against the Senat and the Nobilitie,
with whome the people were still at warre, if they had no enemies abroad. For
which cause the Senat and Magistrats chiefe care, was to find out forren
enemies to oppose against the people: or if they wanted such, by all meanes to
forge new enemies and warres, as knowing them otherwise neuer to cease from
seditions & civill broyles. For so soone as that the Carthaginensians had
made peace with the Romans, after the first Punique warres, they forthwith
entred into a great daungerous civill warre at home among themselves: which
still happened unto them at Rome, if they were
neuer so little a while without warres. We see also, that they neuer shut up
the temple of Ianus, which was the signe of an
vniuersall peace, but twice in seuen hundred yeares space. And if we marke the
histories well, wee shall find nothing to haueNothing more
hurtfull unto a warlike people than peace. bene more daungerons and
hurtfull unto a valiant and warlike people, than peace: For that men accustomed
to warres, and still trayned up in armes, seeke for nothing els but dissentions
and broyles, neither hate any thing more than to be at rest and quiet. And that
is it for which the histories report Ca. Marius to haue
bene the best generall of his time in the warres abroad, but the worst and most
troublesome man alive at home and in time of peace: for that he well knew not
what peace & quietnesse meant. Yet whether it be better in a Commonweale to
traine the people up in peace or warre wee will hereafter declare.
Now we have in some sort touched certaine meanes for the preuenting of
seditions and part-takings: but as it is much more easie to stay the enemie
from entring, than to driue him out after he is once entred; so is it more
easie also to preuent seditions and tumults, than to appease the same: and yet
that more hardly also in a Popular estate orSeditions in a
Popular Commonweale of all others most dangerous, and how to be
appeased. Commonweale, than in any other. For why, the prince in a
Monarchy, and the lords in an Aristocratie still are, and ought to be, as
soueraigne judges and arbitrators of the subiects: and so oft times of their
absolute power and authoritie appease and quiet all their differences: wheras
in the Popular government the soueraigntie lieth in the people themselves,
which are so divided into factions, who in no other acknowledge the magistrats, but as men subiect unto their commaund and
power. Wherefore in such Commonweales such seditions and factions are with the
greatest care and diligence that possible is, to be at the first preuented: but
if they bee once risen before they were well foreseene, then it behoueth the
most wise and vertuous men in the estate to take the matter in hand: who by
their great wisedome and kind speeches may againe appease the turbulent motions
of headstrong and giddie common people. For as they which are sicke of a
phrensie, which causeth them to skip and daunce without ceasing, cannot be
cured, except the cunning musitian tune his instrument unto their mad manner
and fashion, to draw them unto his owne, and so to
fall by little and little▪ vntill that they be
so againe made more quiet and tractable: euen so ought also the wise magistrate
seeing the people in a rage, at the first to accommodate and frame himselfe
unto their disordered appetite, that so he may afterwards by little and little
induce them to hearken unto reason: and so by yeelding at first unto the
tempest, at length put into the desired hauen. For to seeke by force to stay
the rage of an angry and incensed multitude, is no other thing than as if a man
should by maine strength seeke to stay the force and course of an headie
streame, most violently falling from the high and steepe rockes.
And as for them which goe about by force of armes and strong hand to stay
theThat the people up in tumult or sedition, is not by
strong hand or open force to be staid or
appeased angrie peoples rage and furie, if they bee not verie strong
and well assured of the victorie, they put the
estate into great perill and danger: for if the subiect become victor, no doubt
but that hee will at his pleasure prescribe lawes unto the vanquished. And
admit that the prince himselfe be not vanquished, yet so it is, that if he
attaine not unto the full of his designes, he shall in so doing make himselfe
contemptible, giue occasion unto his other subiects to rebell, for strangers to
inuade him, and for all men to contemne him. Which is yet more to bee feared in
popular estates, and was most manifestly knowne in the seditions which happened
in Rome, wherein they which would needs proceed by force, and openly resist the
desires of the people (up in furie) matred all: whereas to the contrarie, they
which sought by faire meanes to win them, still
brought them to reason, and so upheld the state of the citie, otherwise readie
to have fallen. Appius Claudius seeing the people of
Rome to demaund to have had the obligations and bands for money lent, canceled,
(wherein the richer sort and vsurers had a notable interest) was of opinion,
not to have any thing of the due debt remitted. And at another time the people
being reuolted from the nobilitie, hee the same man would have had them most
rigorously entreated, without any regard to have been had of them at all; for
that the people otherwise would swell with pride, and become insupportable:
howbeit, Seruilius at the first time, and Menenius Agrippa at the second, withstood him, and so
carried away the matter from him. Which Agrippa shewed
in deed, and by a most excellent fable of mans bodie and the parts thereof
(which hee so lively set before every mans
eyes) that he caused the armes to fall out of the hands of both parties, and so
sweetly againe reconciled the people unto the nobilitie: wherby he together
with the welfare of the Commonweale, and all mens loue, gained also vnto
himselfe immortall fame and glorie. And if so be that wild beasts will neuer by
strokes be tamed, but by the kind handling of him that ameth them: euen so the people once moued or enraged, as a beast with many
heads, and of all others the wildest and fiercest, is neuer by force, but by
good and kind vsage and entreatie to be gained. Wherefore in such time of
common uprore and tumult, something is to be graunted unto the people: and if
the sedition be raised for famine or for dearth of victuals, some present
distribution is to be made, and reliefe giuen unto the poorer sort, who are not
with words to bee appeased. For that as Cato the Censor, speaking of the people of Rome, sayd,
The hungrie bellie hath no eares. Neither in that case must the magistratsThe hungry belly hath no eares. spare faire words or
promises, yea more than is euer to be performed. For that the matter so
standing, both Plato and Xenophon
giue leaue unto the magistrates to lie, as physitions to children and their
sicke patients. So the wise Pericles, to draw the
peopleThe wisedome of Pericles to draw the common peo ple
of Athens to vnderstand reason. of Athens unto reason, fed them with
feasts, with plaies, with comedies, with songs and daunces; and in time of
dearth caused some distribution of corne or money to be made amongst them: and
hauing by these meanes tamed this beast with many heads, one while by the eyes,
another while by the eares, and sometimes by the bellie, hee then caused wholesome edicts and lawes to bee published,
declaring unto them the graue and wise reasons
thereof: which the people in mutinie, or an hungred, would neuer have hearkened
vnto.
Yet whereas we have said, that the people is to be flattered, and to haue
somethingHow, and when the people is to be
flattered. graunted unto it: yea sometimes euen things vnreasonable;
especially in popular and Aristocraticke estates, that is to be vnderstood in
time of extremitie, when as it is alreadie up in sedition: and not for that one
ought still to follow the appetite and passion of the insatiable people, and
without reason: But euen to the contrarie, it is so to bee gouerned, as that it
be not too hard curbed, neither yet left with the reines at too much libertie.
For as it is a right slipperie high standing place to serue the appetite and
pleasure of the vnsteady people, so is it yet much more daungerous also, openly
to oppose a mans selfe against it: so as did
Appius, Coriolanus, Metellus, Cto the younger, Phocion, and Hermiodorus, who whilest they would have all things of the people by
strong hand, and rather breake than bow, they did either vtterly vndoo
themselves together with the Commonweale, or at leastwise brought it into most
great perill and danger. True it is, that for the prince or magistrats thus to
temper maiestie with clemency towards an vnruly and headstrong people, without
iudgement and reason, is a most hard and difficult matter: yet is there nothing
more necessarie, especially in Popular governments, than not too much to
flatter, neither yet to deale too roughly with the people. But as the Sunne
goeth, rising and setting with the other starres and planets, dayly carried
about with the most swift motion of the superiour celestiall spheres, and
yet for all that faileth not to performe
his owne naturall course by retiring backe by little and little; and that by
how much the higher he is mounted up from the Horison, the lesser hee seemeth
for to be: Euen so ought the wise gouernour to doe, following in part the
affections and desires of the troubled people, so much the more easily
afterwardsForce neuer to be used against the people,
where faire meanes may preuaile. to attaine unto the full of his
designes. And albeit that a prince had the power by force to represse and
reforme a mutinous and rebellious people, yet ought he not so to doe, if
otherwise he may appease them. For what Physitian is there so inconsiderat, as
to vse sections, and cauterisings, or burnings, if the disease might otherwise
be cured? And so what prince is there so euill aduised, as by way of force and
fact to proceed against his people, if with a kind word speaking hee may
appease all? But especially in a Popular
estate, wherein it beseemeth the wise magistrat, by all faire means to appease
and quiet the passions of a troubled people, in laying plaine before their eyes
the euill successe which may ensue of their so euill and disordered
proceedings. We read therof many examples, but yet none more famous than that
of Pacuuius Caluinus of Capua, who being accounted a
great favourer of the comminaltie, and an vtter enemie unto the nobilitie of
that citie, yet understanding of a purpose that the people had uppon the sudden
to kill all the Senators of the citie, which so cruell a murder hee greatly
detested, but yet seeing the common people so resolutely set downe upon the
matter, as that they were not to be remoued, he himselfe made show also, as if
he had as well as any of the rest liked of that the peoples will and purpose,
yet withall gaue the Senators to vnderstand of
the great daunger they were in, and of the purpose he had for the safegard of
their lives, willing them to bee of good cheere, and to feare nothing. AndThe commendable deceit of Pauius, to
deceiue the angry people. so afterwards the Tribune or chiefe leader
of the mutinous people, hauing shut up all the Senators into a strong place, as
men appointed for the slaughter: but indeed so to preserue them from the
present furie, hee then with a merrie and chearefull countenance comming forth
unto the angrie people, spake unto them thus, That which you
men of Capua have oftentimes wished for, That it might once be in your power
to be revengedof the most wicked and abhominable Senat; you now have the
same put into yourhands, not by uprore and tumult, by assaulting and breaking
open their houses one by one, which they keepe and defend with strong
companies and guards of their seruants and friends, but euen at your
pleasure, and without daunger. Receiue them all shut up in the court, where
I will giue you power to pronounce sentence of every one of their lives. But
before all things it behoueth you so to satisfie your anger, as yet to deeme
your owne health and welfare better than the satisfying of your rage and
wrath. For a Senat you will not altogether bee without: for that you must
needs either have a king, which is a thing to be abhorred; or els a Senat,
the onely Councell of a free citie. Wherefore two things rest for you to
doe, the one that you take out of the way the old Senat: and the other, that
you chuse a new. And this said, hee sat downe; and so the Senatours
names beeing all put into a pot, hee
commaunded the first name that was drawne out to bee read, and him so named, to
bee brought out of the court. Is it your pleasure then (said hee) that this man
shall first die? Whereunto all the people cried alowd, That it was well said of
him, and well done. Well, I see then (said Pacuuius) what his doome is: let him
bee cast out; and now for him an euill and wicked man, make you choyce of a
good and upright Senator to bee put into his place. Whereupon they all
at the first were silent▪ for lacke of a better to make choyce of: but as soone
as one more impudent than the rest had named one, presently a greater crie was
heard than before; some crying out, That they knew him not; othersome
exclaiming as fast against him as a naughtie base fellow, of some beggerly
trade or other, and so vnworthy of the place:
The like sturre there was▪ when choyce was to bee made of the second, and third
Senator, the base artificers and trades-men still nominating some one, and some
another: in such sort, as that they now began to fall out among themselves,
about the choyce, none of them beeing willing to yeeld or giue place to other,
which whilest they did in euerie Senator which was named, there was no lesse
trouble and sturre among themselves, than was before betwixt them and the
Senatours. Whereuppon they were better contented that the old Senatours should
now still hold their places, than to suffer one of them to bee preferred before
another. Wherein the councell of the Tribune was right wise, and cunningly by
him put in execution: who after hee had by his wise dissimulation somewhat
appeased the mad peoples rage, hee as it were
with his finger poynted out, and layed open euen unto euerie mans eye, the
great hurt and inconuenience that was to ensue, by putting the Senators to
death: as that not onely such a shamefull murder should for euer bee accounted
most cruell and inhumane; but that also by the dooing thereof the Commonweale
should bee without councell, as a bodie without a soule; and the fire of
sedition raised also amongst the people, about the preferment, and them that
were to bee preferred.
But if the people once enraged be alreadie up in armes, it is a most hard and
daungerousThe mutinous people best appeased by the good
persuasion of some good old vertuous personage. matter to appease
them: in so much as that not long agoe there was one that set fire on his owne
house (least the Commonweale should with the flames of sedition euen then have perished) so to turne the citisens then
together by the eares to leaue the fray, and to come to helpe to quench the
fire, for feare least all should have beene burnt. Then if any man there bee in
vertue and valour exceeding the rest, who will with good speech take uppon him
to persuade the people unto peace and concord, hee onely, or else none, is the
man that may appease the peoples frantike furie and rage. Which thing Virgil most excellently expressed in these few verses
following▪
Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta Seditio est, saeuit{que} anmis ignobile
vulgus;Iam{que} faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:Tum pietate grauem ac meritis si fortè virum quemConspexere, silent, arrectis{que} auribus astant:Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.And as a sudden tumult rais'd amidst a people great,When as the base and rascall sort are in the greatest heat,And firebrands now and stones do flie, such weapons as there lye,Then if some good graue worthy sire they fortune to espie,They silent with attentiue eare stand listning to his lore:He with good words their minds doth rule, and calmes the whole uprore.
Such we said Pericles to have bene in Athens, Menenius Agrippa in Rome, and not long agoe Peter Loredan in Venice, who at such time as the
marriners and sea-faring men banded themselves against the rest of the
citisens, and in such sort massacred one another, as that neither duke, neither
the Senat, nor other magistrat could come nie, but that they were by force and
violence of the furious people reiected; this plaine gentleman Peter Loredan (I say) a priuat citisen, and bearing no
office at all, showingPeter Lored an a most notable
citisen. but himselfe in the middest of these combats, and holding
but up his hand on hie, caused the weapons to
fall out of every mans hand, for the reuerence they all bare unto the vertue of
so graue a personage; and so as it were in a moment appeased all that civill
discord. Whereby it was to be seene, vertue to be of greater power and maiestie
than armes, than lawes, yea than all the magistrats together.
There is also in the reuerend feare of religion a great power for the staying
of theThe reuerend feare of religion a good meane for the
appeasing of the seditious people. tumultuous people. For at such
time as the Florentines were fallen out into such a furie among themselves, as
that the citie swome with the blood and slaughter of the citisens: and that
they could by no meanes be parted, Francis Soderin the
bishop attired in his bishoplike attire, and attended upon with a company of
priests, and a crosse carried before him, came into the middest of the furious
citisens, so bandying it one against another;
at the sight and presence of whome, they all for the reuerend feare of religion
upon the sudden laid downe their weapons, and so without more adoo, got
themselves home every man unto his owne house. So also Iadus the Iewes high Priest, in his Pontificilibus met Alexander the
Great comming towards Hierusalem with his victorious armie, with whose port and
maiestie Alexander terrified, worshipped the High
Priest, and was so farre from ransacking either of the countrey or holy citie,
as that he gaue it great priuileges, with whatsoeuer the High priest els
requested. With like wisedome pope Vrban is reported to
have turned Attila king of the Hungarians from the siege
of Aquilia.
But sometime such is the deadly hatred of citisens amongst themselves, as that
they Seditions sometimes appeased by the interposition and
mediation of friends. need of the helpe of their friends and allies,
yea and sometimes euen of meere strangers to set them agreed. In which case an
other good old man of Florence seeing the citisens without pity to kill and
massacre one another, and on all sides to burne one anothers houses, went to
request the Luquois their neighbours and friends, to interpose themselves for
the appeasing of these so deadly broyles, as had well neere ruinated the whole
estate: Wherewith the Luquois mooued, came in great numbers, by whose good
trauell and mediation all those slaughters and broyles were well stayed and
quited: a thing both commendable and profitable, not to them onely which are so
set agreed, but euen to them also which were the
workers therein, as reaping therby great
honour, together with the loue of them whom they so made friends. Yea
oftentimes it happeneth, that the citisens deuided into factions, weary at
length of their murders and tumults, seeke but to find an occasion for them to
fall to agreement; yet being of opinion it to touch them in honour, that should
first seeke for peace, therefore continue their bloody quarrels vntill that
they have vtterly ruinated one another, if some third man interpose not himself
betwixt them for the making of them friends: which thing oftner happeneth in
popular or Aristocratike commonweales, than in a monarchie: wherein the
subiects are by the power and authority of one onely prince still to bee set at
one, & reconciled amongst themselves, together with the commonweale.
HowbeNothing more daungerous unto a prince, than in
seditions to make himselfe a partie. it, that sometime it happeneth
the soueraigne prince to make himselfe a party, in stead of holding the place of a soueraigne Iudge: in which
doing for all that he shall be no more but the head of one party, and so
vndoubtedly put himselfe in daunger of his life, and that especially when such
daungerous seditions and factions be not grounded upon matters directly
touching his estate, but otherwise, as it hath happened almost in all Europe
within this fifty yeares, in the warres made for matters of religion: for we
have seene the kingdome of Sweden, of Scotland, of Denmarke, of England, the
Cantons of the Swissers, yea and the Germaine empire also, to have changed
their religion, the estate of every of these monarchies and commonweales yet
standing entire and whole: howbeit that the truth is, that it was not done, but
with great violence, and much bloudshed in many places.
But religion by common consent once receiued and setled, is not againe to be
calledIt is daungerous to call that into question which
ought to be holden as resolued upon. into question and dispute, that
so all the wayes and entrances unto sedition and faction may be stopped, and
the assurances of vnity and peace strengthened; for that all things called into
disputation, are so also but as things probable called in doubt: and what can
come neerer to impiety then by probable arguments to call in doubt the lawes of
God, which are by their nature immutable and eternall; and such as of the truth
whereof every man ought to be most certainly resolued and assured Besides that,
nothing is so firme and stable, nothing so manifest and cleare (except it rest
upon mostReligion once receiued and setled, to be no more
called into question or doubt. playne and vndoubtfull demonstrations)
which may not by disputation and force of arguments be obscured or made
doubtfull; and especially where that which is called into question, or dispute, resteth not so much upon
demonstration or reason, as uppon the assurance of fayth and beleefe onely:
which they which seeke by demonstrations and publishing of bookes to performe,
they are not onely mad with reason, but weaken also the foundations and grounds
of all sorts of religions.
There is a most antient law of Licurgus extant, which
the Florentines (of all others the sharpest disputors) established in their
popular estate, viz. Ne de legibus semel reepctis ac probatis
disserere liceret, That it might not be lawfull to dispute or make
question lawes once receiued and allowed. For why he of others the wisest▪ well
vnderstood, lawes disputed and reasoned upon to bee still doubted of; which
doubting brought with it an opinion of the iniquity thereof; whereof must needs
follow the contempt both of the lawes and
magistrats, and so consequently the ruine and destruction of the whole
commonweale. But if Philosophers and Mathematicians cannot abide to have the
principles of their sciences reasoned of, what great folly, or rather madnesse
is it to dispute not onely priuatly, but euen openly also of religion alreadie
approued. Howbeit that Anaxagoras maintained the snow to
be blacke, and Fauorinus the Quartaine feuer to bee a
very good and wholesome thing; and Carneades hauing one
day highly commended iustice, the very next day preferred iniustice before it,
and that it was (without all comparison) better to be a verie knaue than a
vertuous honest man: which they all so perfuasiuely
did, as that they drew a great number of men to bee indeed of their opinions. Although Aristotle
said them which made question, whether snow were white or not, to want sence:
but them which doubted whether there were a God or not▪ not to be with
arguments refuted, but by the lawes punished: howbeit that he himselfe by
necessarie demonstration proued there to be one euerlasting God, and that there
could be no moe gods but he. Wherfore, all the kings and princes both of
Affricke and of the East, doe most straitly forbid all men to dispute of their
religion. Which like strict prohibition is also set downe by the lawes and
decrees of Spaine. So also the king of Moscouie seeing his people, who had
receiued the rites and ceremonies of the Greekes, divided into diuers sects and
factions, by reason of the diuers preachings and disputations of the ministers:
hee thereupon forbad them uppon paine of death
any more to preach or dispute of religion; and withall gaue a booke unto the
bishop and parish priests, wherein was contained what hee would have every man
persuaded of, and to beleeue, concerning matters of faith and religion, which
he commaunded them upon all feastiuall dayes to reade and publish unto the
people: with a capitall paine thereunto annexed, if by any mans exposition any
thing were at all thereunto either added or diminished. And Moyses, when hee had most curiously written all those things which he
had learned and receiued from Almightie God, and declared the same unto the
people: yet in one chapter of the law (the people yet wandering up and downe in
the desart) he commaunded the priests and Leuits aloud and distinctly to reade
the law, yea, and that dayly also, that so it might bee vnderstood and knowne unto the people of every age and sexe: and
so in another chapter forbad any thing to be unto the lawes of God either added
or detracted. Yet sayth hee not, that they should dispute thereof: but euen to
the contrarie, the Hebrewes instructed by the prophets from the father to the
sonne: they teaching the law of God in seuen Colledges, which then were in
mount Syon, neuer yet suffered men to enter into disputation thereof, as we
read in Optatus Mileuitnus.
For why, disputation was* Lib.
3. inuented▪ but for things probable and doubtfull; and not for
things religious and necessarie, and such as every man is bound to beleeue:
which by disputation are alwaies made doubtfull. Wherefore seeing that
disputations of religion bring not only the doubt and ouerthrow of religions,
but euen the ruine and destruction of Commonweales Disputations of religion dangerous. also; it
behooueth them to be by most strait lawes forbidden: which after long civill
war was by the estates and princes of the Germane empire prouided for, and a
decree made, that the princes should with mutuall consent defend both the
Romane and Saxon religion: whereunto that was also ioyned, That no man should
upon paine of death dispute of the religions. Which seuere punishments, after
that the Germane magistrates had inflicted upon diuers, all Germany was
afterwards at good quiet & rest: no man daring more to dispute of matters
of religion. Moreouer, seeing that not onely all wise law-giuers and
Philosophers, but euen the very Atheists themselves also (as namely Lib. 6. De militari ac domestica
Romanorum disiplina.Polybius himselfe an Atheist) are of accord, That there
is nothing which doth more uphold and maintaine the estates and Commonweals
than religion: and that it is the principall
foundation of the power and strength of monarchies and Seignories: as also for
the execution of justice, for the obedience of the subiects, the reuerence of
theThe power of religion. magistrats, for the
feare of doing euill, and for the mutuall loue and amitie of every one towards
other, it is by most strait and seuere lawes to be prouided; that so sacred a
thing as is religion be not by childish and sophisticall disputations, (and
especially by such as are publickely had) made contemptible, or by probable
arguments made doubtful, and so at length quite taken out of the minds, both of
the hearers & of the disputors together. Neither are they to be heard which
thinke themselves to be able with more subtill reasons
to persuade all things: for that as Papinian most wisely
said, Summa ratio estquae pro religione facit, It is of all the greatest
reason, which tendeth to the maintainance of Religion.
I will not here in so great varietie of people so much differing among
themselves inReligion not to be enforced. religion,
take upon me to determine which of them is the best (howbeit that there can be
but one such, one truth, and one diuine law, by the mouth of God published) but
ifHow a prince wel assured of the truth of his religion
is to draw his subiects therunto, being therfoe
divided into sects and factions the prince well assured of the truth
of his religion, would draw his subiects thereunto, divided into sects and
factions, hee must not therein (in mine opinion) vse force: (For that the minds
of men the more they are forced, the more froward and stubborne they are; and
the greater punishment that shall be inflicted uppon them, the lesse good is to
be done; the nature of man being commonly such as may of it selfe bee led to
like of anything, but neuer enforced so to
doe) but rather it he houeth the prince so persuaded of the truth of his
religion, without fainting or dissembling to professe and follow the same,
still deuoutly seruing the almightie God: by which meanes he shall both turne
the will and minds of his subiects unto the admiration and imitation of
himselfe, and at length also plucke up euen the verie rootes of all sects and
opinions: In which doing he shall not onely auoid commotions, troubles, and
civill warres, but lead also his straying subiects unto the port of health.
Whereof as there are many examples, so is there none more fit for this our
purpose, than that of Theodosius the elder, who at the
beginning of his raigne found all the prouinces of the empire full of
Arrians, whose strength and power was so
growne and encreased under three or foure Arrian emperous their favourors, as
that their doctrine was not onely by eight councels confirmed, which were at
diuers times assembled at Tyre, at Sardis, at Sirme, at Milan, Seleucia, Nice,
Tarsis, and especially at Ariminum (where six hundred bishops were of their
opinion: and but three of name which held the contrarie) but that they also
punished other their aduersaries of opinion contrarie unto themselves, with
confiscations, proscriptions, and other most grieuous punishments. Yet would
not this good emperour now come unto the empire, either force or punish the
Arrians, although that hee deadly hated them, but graunted unto them both the
Arrians (I say) and the Catholikes, their churches, and suffered them in euerie
towne to have two bishops, of either religion
one: and albeit that hee at the importunat suit and instance of the Catholike
bishops, commaunded certaine edicts to bee published against the Arrians, yet
was hee well contented to have the same holden in suspence, and not put into
execution; as his letters unto Ambrose in these words
declare, Trade Arrianis Basilicam, mei namque sunt omnia
iuris, Giue (saith hee) unto the Arrians a church: for that all are in
my power. Which thing Rotaris also king of the Lombards
by his law permitted. And yet neuerthelesse this emperor liuing according to
his religion, and instructing his children & kinsmen in the same,
wonderfully diminished the Arian sect in Europe: howbeit that they have euer
since continued, and so yet do, both in Asia and Affrike, under the law of Mahomet, grounded upon the same foundation. The great
emperour of the Turkes doth with as great
deuotion as any prince in the world honour and obserue the religion by him
receiued from his auncestours, and yet detesteth hee not the straunge religions
of others; but to the contrarie permitteth every man to live according to his
conscience: yea and that more is, neere unto his pallace at Pera, suffereth
foure diuers religions, viz. That of the Iewes, that of
the Christians, that of the Grecians, and that of the Mahometanes: and besides
that, sendeth almes unto the Calogers or religious Monkes, dwelling uppon the
mountaine Athos (being Christians) to pray for him: as did Augustus to the Iews, to whom he ordinarily
sent his almes and perpetuall sacrifices to Hierusalem, which hee commaunded to
bee there dayly made for the health of
himselfe, and of the Commonweale. For why the people of auntient time were
persuaded, as were the Turks, All sorts of religions which proceed from a pure
mind, to be acceptable unto the gods. And albeit that the Romans easily
admitted not straunge religions into their Commonwealeas (as in the warres
against them of Veios the Aediles had in charge, Ne qui nisi
Romani dij, neu quo alio more quam patrio Colerentur, That no gods
should be worshipped but the Roman gods, neither after any other manner than
after the manner of the countrey) yet for all that did they easily suffer every
man priuatly within the citie to vse his owne manner and fashion, and his owne
religion: yea the Romans themselves receiued into the citie the sacrifices of
Isis and of Esculapius, and
suffered the Pantheon to be dedicated to all the gods. Only the Iewes of all people detested straunge ceremonies: whereby
they prouoked the hatred of all people against them. For at such time as Antiochus the Noble besieged Hierusalem, the Iewes tooke
truce with him for eight dayes, wherein they might keepe holy the Feast of
their deliverance out of Aegypt, dedicated unto the honour of the immortall
God: Whereunto Antiochus (as Plutarch writeth) willingly condescended; and yet not so contented,
with great reioicing brought also bulles and rammes for the furnishing of the
sacrifice euen unto the gates of the citie. Howbeit that afterwards the time of
the truce expired, he tooke the citie and sacked it. But as he was about
therein to have sacrificed after the manner of the Greekes, the Priests &
Leuites cursing and banning, forsooke the Temple. For which cause Antiochus enforced them,
as contemners of the gods, to receiue the Greeke ceremonies and sacrifices, yea
and caused hogges also to be killed in the temple, and the Iewes to bee
enforced to eat of them, tormenting such as refused so to do with all kind of
torments and tortures, which in that citie wrought the change both of the
religion and state. But Ptolomeus Lagus (as Agatharchides writeth) and after him Pompeius, after long siege hauing taken Hierusalem (the same day that
the Iewes had before taken truce with Antiochus) yet
both of them kept their hands from sacrilege: which Crassus did not, neither Flaccus: whome yet Cicero denieth to have taken any gold belonging unto the
temple; in which oration, as serued for his purpose, hee said, The gods of the
Iewes to have delivered their seruants from the bondage of the Romans. So that
the Iewes detesting the gods of other nations,
caused all other people and nations most grieuously to hate and contemne them:
For at such time as Quadratus being President of Iudea,
a common souldiour had in contempt showed his tayle unto the Iewes, as they
were sacrifising in the temple, such an uproe and
tumult ensued thereof, as that twentie thousand of the Iewes were there slaine.
At which time the Iewes by a decree of the Senat, were driuen also out of Rome:
where Tiberius caused such as would not remoue thence,
either to chaunge their religion, or to become slaues; but this was done in
Rome onely. For the same Tiberius forbad Pilat, who had determined to have placed certain shields
and escutchions in the temple of the Iewes, to place the same, or to alter any
thing of their religion. But Alexander Seuerus the
emperor in his priuat sacrifices worshipped Abraham, Orpheus, Hercules, and Christ. But when the Christians as well as the Iewes, had begun to
detest those thirtie thousand gods which Pindarus now in
his time worshipped, and so began to breed a contempt of the gods in the minds
of men, the princes and magistrats began likewise with most grieuous
punishments to persecute them, except they would forsweare Christ and the
Christian religion, the Iewes (bearing themselves upon the antiquitie of their
religion) being become their accusers and enformers against them, least they
should seeme partakers of the same impietie with them. And thus as the
multitude of religion and sects was innumerable, some detesting the rites and ceremonies of others: so thereof proceeded also
the diuers and manifold chaunges of
Commonweales. And albeit that tyrants had before exercised incredible cruelties
upon their subiects, yet neuer thought they it lawfull for them to rule ouer
mens minds before the time of this Antiochus, whome wee
but euen now spoke of. Which was the cause that Theodoricus king of the Gothes (though favouring the Arrians) would
not yet enforce the conscience of his subiects, nor have them tormented for
their religion; least under the pretence of impietie hee should have seemed to
have taken the spoyle of their goods, or bind their minds, which could by no
threats or commaunds be constrained or bound. For so he wriing unto the SenatNo man to b compelled against his will to beleeue. at
Rome, vseth these words, Religionem imperare non possumus,
quia nemo cogitur vt credat inuitus, Religion (saith he) we cannot
commaund, for that no man is compelled against
his will to beleeue: as we read in Cassiodore: Which
reason of all others seemeth unto me most effectuall, for the taking away of
such punishments, as are under the colour of religion to be inflicted upon the
subiects. Wicked and straunge rites & ceremonies, and such other as the
greater part of the subiects of greatest power detest, I thinke it good and
profitable to have them kept out of the Commonweale. For the preseruation of
the subiects loue amongst themselves, which is especially nouished &
maintained by their consent and agreement in matters of religion: yet if the
same religion be liked of by the opinion of neighbour nations, and of many of
the subiects, then ought it not onely with punishments not to be restrained,
but also so much as may be prouided, that if it may not without sedition bee
publikely profesed, yet that no man be forbidden the priuat exercise of such his religion.
For otherwise it shall comeTo forbid men the priuat exercise
of their religion, is to make them oftentime to
become Atheists. to passe, that they which are destitute of the
exercise of their religion, and withall distasted of the religion of the
others, shall become altogether Atheists (as wee daily see) and so after that
they have once lost the feare of God, tread also under foot both the lawes and
magistrats, and so inure themselves to all kinds of impieties and villanies,
such as is impossible by mans lawes to be redressed. Howbeit what lettteth vs
to follow the councell of the most holy prophets, of whom Baruc. the one persuaded his
countrimen ld away into captiuitie into Chaldea, That
at such time as they should bee enforced to fall downe before the idols, yet
that they should with a pure mind alwayes worship the euer liuing God: &
the . other admitted the request or excuse of Naaman the king of Syria
his seruant, but newly instructed in the true religion and seruice of God, if
he were present with the king his maister sacrificing unto a straunge god, so
that hee kept his mind pure and cleane from idolatrie. For they are much
deceiued, which think Commonweales to be better kept in order by mens commands
and lawes, than by the feare of God his iudgements. For as the greatest tyranny
is nothing so miserable as anAtheisme worse than the
greatest Superstition. Anatchie, when as there is neither prince nor
magistrat, none that obeieth, neither yet any that commaundeth, but that all
men live as they list at libertie in all loosenesse of life, without feare of
punishment. So the greatest superstition that is, is not by much any thing so
detestable as Atheisme. And truely they (in mine opinion) offend much, which
thinke that the same punishment is to bee appointed for them that make many
gods, and them that would have none at all:
or that the infinitie of gods admitted, the almightie and euerliuing God is
thereby taken away. For that superstition how great soeuer it be, doth yet hold
men in feare and awe, both of the laws and of the magistrats, as also in
mutuall duties and offices one of them towards another: whereas meere Atheisme
doth vtterly root out of mens minds all the feare of doing euill. Wherfore two
inconueniences propounded▪ Superstition (I say) and Atheisme, we must still
decline the greater: yet when we may not publikely vse the true religion, which
still consisteth in the worshipping of one almightie and euerlasting God: least
by contemning of the religion which is publikely
receiued, we should seeme to allure or stirre the subiects unto impietie or sedition, it is better to come unto the
publike seruice, so that the mind still rest in the honour and reuerence of one
almightie and euer liuing God.
But now, whereas some men maruell how it came to passe, that in the time of Theodosius,Why many sects better agree in a Commonweale than two
onely. considering the diuersitie of sects and of religions that then
were, they could so stand without civill warres, being then at the least an
hundred diuers sorts of them according to the account of Tertullian and Epiphanius: whereof the cause
was, the multitude and varietie of such different opinions, which so still held
one of them in counterpoise with another. Now in matters of sedition and
tumult, nothing is more dangerous, than to have the subiects divided into two
opinions or factions onely, whether it be before matters of estate, or of
religion, or for the lawes and customes, or other matters whatsoeuer that the subiects are so divided. For that but
one thing can by nature be contrary unto another thing: and moe things than one
to be contrarie unto one, is a thing not to be imagined. So that where there be
moe than two sects or sorts, there must needs be some in the meane betwixt the
two contrarie extreames, which may set them agreed, which otherwise of
themselves would neuer fall to agreement. And therfore Solon by law prouided, That in civill seditions and troubles, every
man should ofWhether Solons law for part-taking▪ as that
every man should be of necessitie bound to take either the one o the other part in time of sedition, be good and
profitable unto Commonweals or not necessitie take either the one or
other part, and that it should not bee lawfull for any man to stand as neuer: which unto many seemed a thing vnreasonable,
considering that the greatest prayse and commendation of a good subiect is; to
bee a quiet civill man, desirous and doing the best that he can to live in
peace. Besides that, by this means the
conscience of an honest man is forced, to take either the one or other part,
when as haply he thinketh both naught, and that they are both in the wrong. And
that more is, it may so happen, that if in such seditions he will follow that
part which hee iudgeth the better, he must beare armes euen against his father,
against his brethren, and friends, which are in armes in the other side: which
were the way so to compell men to commit vnnaturall murders, and to kil euen
them whom we ought to defend, & to depriue them of life, by whom we our
selues live. In briefe the law of God forbiddeth him that knoweth the truth, to
follow the common opinion of them which are out of the way: whereunto Solons law seemeth to repugne, in forcing a man to take
either the one part or the other, although that they be both naught. Howbeit
that a man might say unto the contrarie, this
Solons law to be most profitable and necessarie also
unto Popular and Aristocratike estates, wherein is no soueraigne, which
standing as neuer, may determine and decide the
differences of them which shall so bee at discord and variance. For men well
know, that the most craftie men in time of civill warres, withdraw themselves
so much as possibly they can out of the preasse, if they be not well assured of
the victorie of the part that they themselves take (if it bee not so, that they
see the daunger such, as that the publike fire is like to take hold and burne
euen their own priuat houses) yea oftentimes the more subtill and deceitfull
sort set the rest at dissention and debate, that so they may themselves the
better fish in troubled water, and make a bridge for themselves to passe ouer,
to ceize upon other mens goods and honors: imitating therin the priests of Mars, whome the
auntients called , or
Fire-bearers, who hauing orderly performed their
solemne execrations, cast fire brands betwixt both armies standing readie
ranged, and so stirred them up to battell: but yet retired themselves in
safetie out of the medley and daunger. Now if the law of Solon might take place, these fire makers durst not sow debate and
discord among the citisens, seeing that they must themselves then run into the
same danger with others. And as for other honest men which loue peace, and like
neither of the one nor other faction, if they must needs be constrained to take
a part, they will then enforce themselves by all means to preuent seditions, and in what they may to withstand them: or if they
cannot be foreseene, yet to do what they may
to appease them. For why, the great vertue and authoritie of good subiects is
of great force to keepe the rash and mad vulgar people in some order: and to
persuade them being disquieted againe unto reason, who would euer be at ods and
variance, if they were not by the good councell of the wiser sort better
persuaded. By which reasons Solons law seemeth to be
unto cities and Commonweales profitable. Besides that, if in the leagues and
societies of princes among themselves, it be good and profitable for them all,
some one of them to be of greater power than the rest, or at leastwise to ioyne
himselfe with them that bee of greatest power: how much more true and
profitable is it in civill warres still to take the one or the other part:
where hee which standeth as neuter, as he is of no man protected, so lieth he
open to the common The daungerous estate of them that stand as neuters in time
of sedition. spoyle of all men. For so Theramenes, who all the time of the Peloponesian war, and the troubles
of the Athenians, had kept himselfe quiet, and stood still looking on, but as
an idle beholder, without taking part either with the one or with the other,
was himselfe at the last forsaken of all, and so left unto the mercie of the
tyrants, who made him a miserable spectacle unto all men, and in the end most
cruelly put him to death. Hee therefore which will stand as neuter, whether it
be in civill warre, or in warres amongst straungers, ought at the least to doe
his endeuour to set the rest agreed: or if hee shall see the quarrels, warres,
and ruines of others, to tend to the profit of the better sort, or the
assurance of his estate, his wealth or person (as it sometimes happeneth that
tyrants and wicked subiects or citisens agree
not but for to uinat the good) yet ought he which so
standeth as neuter, to show himselfe in appearance desirous and forward to set
them agreed: which many men have done euen then when they most nourished and
maintained such quarrels in the most secret manner they could: A thing which God (as SalomonProuerb. 4. saith) abhorreth: if it be not in case (as I have said) that the concord and
agreement of the euill, tend to the ineuitable ruine and decay of the good. For
as for one good vertue, there are many vices one of them quite contrarie vnto
another; and that for one good man, there be ten which are nothing worth: so
God hath also appointed, That the euill and wicked men should euen one of them
by another be brought to ruine and destruction: I will
revenge me (saith God, speaking by the mouth of the prophet Ieremie) of mine enemies, by mine
enemies. I have said, that good princes and good subiects ought to
dissemble the good and pleasure they take in the discord and contention of
other the wicked princes or citisens; for that there is nothing which grieueth
a man more, than to see others in all securitie, to take pleasure and reioyce
in his ruine and decay.
Thus have we seene certaine meanes for the appeasing of tumults and
seditionsThe vse of belles, why in many countries
forbidden. amongst many. For which there might yet some more
particulars bee also rehearsed; as to take away the vse of belles from
rebellious or seditious citisens: so as wee read to have bene done in the
rebellions at Montpelier, and at Bourdeaux, which were yet afterward unto them
againe not without a great fine restored: howbeit that the greater part of the inhabitants of Bourdeaux most instantly
requested, That they might not be so restored, hauing felt the commoditie that
came thereby. But whether well or euill, I leaue it to the resolution of every
man of sound iudgement. The great emperour of the Turkes, with the other
princes of the East, have taken strait order, That this inuention of belles,
first deuised in Italie, should not into any of their dominions or territories
be receiued: whereby they have well auoided one of the greatest occasions of
civill tumults and broyles. The noyse and backward ringing of the belles (as
when houses be on fire) being not onely proper unto straunge accidents, and to
put the mutinous people into armes, but also to trouble euen the quiet spirits
of peaceable men, and to thrust fooles headlong into
fury: as did he, who the more to sturre up the people rung the Tocsaine, together with the great bell at
Bourdeaux, and was therefore himselfe hanged in the belrope, as he had well
deserued.
Another and the most vsuall way to preuent sedition, is to take away the
subiectsThe best and surest way to preuent
sedition. armes: howbeit that the princes of Italy, & of the East
cannot endure that they should at all have armes; as doe the people of the
North and of the West: no more then they did in auncient time in Greece and in
Asia. For so Aristotle speaking of the Barbarians,
accounteth it for a strange thing, that a man should in a quiet and peaceable
citieThe common wearing of weapons in a peaceable
Commonweale, the occasion of many euils. weare a sword or a dagger in
time of peace: which by our lawes, as also by the manners and customes of the
Germaines and Englishmen is not onely lawfull; but by the lawes and decrees of
the Swissers euen necessarily commaunded: the cause of an infinit number of murders, hee which weareth a sword, a
dagger, or a pistoll, being more fierce and insolent to offer unto others
iniury, as also to commit murder if any iniurie be offered him: whereas if he
were disarmed, he should doe neither the one nor the other; neither should yet
incurre the infamy and disgrace which followeth them, who when they are
wronged, dare not to draw their weapons. The Turkes herein go yet farther, not
onely in punishing with all seuerity the seditious and
people, but also by forbidding them to beare armes, yea euen in time of warre,
except it bee when they are to giue battell: wheras otherwise if the enemie be
not nie, they lay their armes up in their tents, or in their carriages: and yet
they are accounted the best soldiours of the world: which if they doe in the
field, and in time of warre, what is it to be
thought them to doe in their townes, and in time of peace?
Amongst many the lawdable manners and customes of the policy of Paris, there is
one a very good one, and well put in execution, which is, That no car-man or
porter shall weare sword, dagger, knife, or any other offensiue weapon, and
that for the murders by them committed in their ordinaie quarrels which they still had one of them against another▪ which if it
might take place upon all persons: also a thousand murders and stabbings are
committed, which should neuer have happened, neither the seditions and broyles
raysed, which have upon this occasion bene in many places kindled. For it is
not the part of a wise polititian, neither of a good gouernour, to expect
vntill the murder be committed, or that the sedition be raysed, before he
forbid the bearing of armes, but as a good
phisition preuenteth diseases: and if chaunce be that the partie be sodainly
attainted with any violent griefe, he first asswageth the present paine, and
that done applyeth convenient remedies unto the causes of the disease: euen so
the wise prince ought (so much as in him lyeth) to preuent sedition, as also
when they are happened to appease them at what charge soeuer: and then
afterward to looke into the cause of the diseases farthest off from the
effects, and so thereunto to apply remedies convenient.
Now we have before spoken of the causes which worke the chaunge of estates
andImpunitie of offendors to draw after it ruine of
estates. commonweales, of which selfe same causes proceed also
seditions and civill warres, as of the denyall of iustice, of the oppression of
the common people, of the inequall distribution of punishments, and of rewards; of the excessiue riches of some few in
number, and extreame pouertie of the greater sort; of the too great idlenesse
of the subiects, or of the impunitie of offendors: and it may be that this last
point is therein of greatest consequence or importance, and yet the least of
all regarded. Which as I have before touched, so must I also oftentimes repeat
the same, for that the princes and magistrats which desire to be accounted
mercifull, do oftentimes turne upon their owne heads the same punishment that
the offendors deserued. And that is it for which the wise Hebrew hath so
oftentimes aduised vs, Not to become suretie for another man: not for that he
forbiddeth a charitable dealing one of vs towards
another (as many have thought) but rather to
giue all men to vnderstand, That they which become sureties for wicked men, and
so find meanes to deliver them from deserued punishment, shall beare the pain
of the offendors guilt therefore. As was said to king Achab, who had saued the life of Benadab the
king of Syria, whom hee should have put to death, God caused it to bee told
unto him by his prophet, That he was become suretie for another man, and that
it should surely cost him his life therefore. Which being but spoken in
particular unto this one king, extendeth yet in general unto all princes and
Commonweals, who have no more certaine cause of their ruine and decay, than the
want of the due execution of iustice. To punish the rebellious, is also one of
the meanes to preuent and meet with rebellions yet to come, which how it is to
be done we have before said, when as wee reasoned of punishments to be upon corporations and colledges
inflicted; which is to take place when some one corporation, or the least part
of the subiects have erred or offended; but not if all the people in generall,
or the greatest part of them be in fault: For albeit that the physitian or
surgeon sometimes for the preseruation of the whole bodie, cuts off a mans leg
or arme, yet must he not therfore cut off the head, or any other of the
principall members, if they shall chance to be infected: but therin follow the
wise councell of the great Physitian Hippocratts, who
unto desperat diseases forbiddeth vs to apply any remedy at all. But beside the
causes of seditions & rebellions, which wee haueThe
immoderat libertie of speech giuen unto Orators a great cause of seditions
and rebellions. before spoke of, there is yet another, which
dependeth of the immoderat libertie of speech
giuen to orators, who direct & guide the peoples hearts & minds
according to their owne pleasure. For there is nothing that hath more force
over the minds of men, than hath eloquence: So that our ancestors have not
without cause putraied Hercules
Celtique not as a yong & strong man with a great club in his hand,
but as a reuerend bauld old man, drawing after him a great number of people
enchained, & hanging by the eares with chaines, which all issued out of his
mouth; to shew, that the armies and power of kings and monarchs are not so
strong as the vehemencie and force of an eloquent man, who encourageth &
enflameth the most cowardly & faint hearted to vanquish euen the most
valiant, who striketh armes out of the hands of the most couragious, who
turneth rage into mildnesse, & barbarisme into ciuility, who changeth whole
Commonweals, and sporteth with the people
at his pleasure. Which I say not for the prayse of eloquence, but to shew the
force & power therof, which is oftner emploied toThe
force and power of eloquence. euill, than to good. For seeing that
this is nothing els but a disguising of the truth, and an art to make that
seeme good, which is indeed naught, & that right which is wrong, and to
make a great matter of nothing, as of an Emot an Elephant (that is to say, an
art to lie cunnungly) wee need not doubt, but that for one which vseth this art
well, fiftie vse the same euill, & that amongst 50 Orators it is hard to
find an honest man. For that to seeke after the plaine & bare truth, were a
thing altogether contrarie unto their profession, seeing that the best rule
that Cicero giueth under the person of Marcus Antonius the Orator, is to say nothing against himself: or
rather as Aristotle saith, So well to disguise
matters, as that the deceit thereof cannot
not be discouered: or to speake more plainly, to cover all things with lies and
dissimulation. So that if we will but wel looke into al them which had the name
to have beene the most noble and famous Orators, we shall find them to haue
beene still the stirrers up of the people to sedition, to have oftentimes
changed the laws, the customs, the religions, and Commonweals, yea & some
others of them to have vtterly ruinated the same; in which doing they have also
almost all of them ended their dayes by violent death. Which it is not needfull
here to proue by the Orators of Athens, or of Rome, but euen by those of our
age, who have so well besturred themselves, as that under the colour of
religion they have troubled all the empires both of
Affrike & of the West: yea and many of them so wrested the scepters euen out of the kings hands. As it happened
unto the king of Marocco, descended (as is supposed) from the house of Ioseph, from whom a preacher under the vaile of religion
tooke both the crowne and scepter: & albeit that he was commonly called the
Asse Knight, yet preached he so well, as that he
assembled an armie of sixscore thousand men to take his part. In like sort he
which was first called the Sophi, inuaded the kingdome of Persia, and in short
time draue out the children of Vsun Cassan the lawfull
king, under the same coulour of religion. As also not long agoe Iohn of Leiden (who of a botcher became a preacher)
ceised upon Munster the Metropoliticall citie of Westphalia, and there taking
upon him the state of a king, was hardly after three yeares siege by the
imperiall armie thence remoued. And by the selfe same meanes Hierome Sauanarola a preacher,
incited by Anthonie Soderin, uppon the contention which
happened among the inhabitants at Florence, about the estate, so much preuailed
with his persuasions unto the people, as that hee translated the soueraigntie
from the nobilitie unto the people, and chaunged the Aristocratie into a
Democratie or Popular estate. No otherwise than had before Ephialtes, by the setting on of Pericles by his
seditious orations, drawne unto the people the soueraigntie of that state,
taken from the Senat of the Areopagi; and so made the Athenian estate of all
others the most Popular. And to be briefe, we have seene all Germany in armes,
and an hundred thousand men slaine in lesse than in a yeare space, after that
the mutinous preachers had stirred up the people against the nobilitie. How
often hath the speeches of preachers bene
heard, tending by all meanes to have incited the princes and people to kill,
massacre, & burne their subiects: as did in auntient time Nestorius, preaching before the emperor at Constantinople in this
sort, Giue me emperour, the earth void of heretikes, and I
will giue thee heauen: destroy with me the heretikes, and I with thee wil
ruinat the power of the Persians: for which he was called the Fire maker: For had the emperour giuen credence unto him,
he had so put to death the greatest part, and almost all his subiects, and Nestorius himselfe first of all. Wherefore a knife is not
more daungerous in the hand of aEloquence in an euill man as
dangerous, as a sword in a mad mans hand. mad man, than eloquence in
the mouth of a mutinous Orator. And yet neuerthelesse it is a meane for them
which will well vse it, to reduce the people from barbarisme to humanitie, to
reforme disordered maners, to correct the lawes, to chastice tyrants, to cast
out vices, to maintaine vertue. And as men
charme the Aspis, Vipers, and Serpents, by certaine words; euen so the Orators
(as Plato saith) by the sweetnesse of their eloquent
persuations, charme euen the most sauage and cruell people. Neither is there
any otherA wise, vertuous, and eloquent preacher, of all
others the fittest man to appease rebellions, and to keepe the people in
obedience to their prince. greater or better means for the appeasing
of seditions & tumults, and to keepe the subiects in the obedience of their
princes, than to have a wise and vertuous preacher, by whom they may bend and
bow the hearts of the most stubborne rebels, especially in a Popular estate,
wherein the ignorant people beareth the sway, and cannot possibly bee kept in
order but by the eloquent Orators: which for this cause have alwayes holden the
chiefe degree of honour & power in such Popular estates, causing the
honourable charges & commissions, gifts and rewards, to be still giuen to
whom they saw good: so that in briefe both
peace & war, arms and laws, wholy depended on the pleasure of the Orators.
And so to the contrarie, there is nothing more to be dreaded in a tyrant, than
the Orator which hath the bent of the peoples bow, and is in credit &
estimation with them, especially if he hate the tyrant, or his Tyrannicall
government. But forasmuch as the rules by vs alreadie set downe, ought to bee
applied unto the nature of Commonweals, and that the Commonweals, laws &
customs, are likewise to bee fitted unto the nature & disposition of every
nation. Let vs now also speake of the nature of al people, as of a thing most
necessary for the good government of Estates and Commonweales.
THE FIFT BOOKE OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONWEALE.
CHAP. I. ¶ What order and course is to be taken, to
apply the forme of a Commonweale to the diuersitie of mens humors, and the
meanes how to discover the nature and disposition of the people.
HItherto we have treated of that which concernes
the generall Estate of Commonweales; Let vs now shew what may be particular to
some, through the diuersitie of peoples humors, to the end that wee may
accommodat the publike weale to the nature of the place; and the ordinances of
man to the laws of nature, wherof many have had small regard: but striuing to
make nature obedient to their edicts, haueThe nature of the
people is much to be regarded in the framing of a Commonweale.
oftentimes troubled, yea ruined great estates. And yet those which have written
of a Commonweale, have not treated of this
question. For euen as we see a great varietie in all sorts of beasts, and in
every kind some notable alteration for the diuersitie of regions: in like sort
we may say, that there is in a manner as great difference in the nature and
disposition of men, as there is of countries: yea in the same climats the
people of the East are found to differ much from them of the West: And in the
same latitude and difference from the Equator, the people of the North differ
from them of the South: And which is more, in the same climat, latitude, and
longitude, and under the same degree, we find a difference betwixt a hilly
countrey and the plaines: so at in the same citie, the diuersitie of hills and
vallies forceth a diuersitie of humors and dispositions: And townes seated
uppon vneuenTownes vneuenly built uppon mountaines and
vallies, are subiect to seditions. places, are more subiect to
seditions and chaunges, than those that are built uppon an equall and plaine ground. The citie of Rome, which hath
seuen hils, was neuer long without sedition. And Plutarch (hauing not duely examined the cause) doth wonder why there
were three factions in Athens of diuers humors: those of the high citie, which
they called Astu, demaunded a Popular State; those of
the base towne required Oligarchia, or the government of
few; and the inhabitants of the Port Pjree, desired an Aristocraticall State,
that is, a mixt government of the nobilitie and the people: whereof wee will
soone shew you a naturall cause. And if Theophrastus
find it strange that the people of Greece be so different in manners and
dispositions, who would not admire to see such contrarie humors in one and the
same citie? we cannot impute it to the mixture of
people which have come thither from all parts, seeing that Plutarch speaketh of Solons
time, when as the Athenians were so little mingled with any other nations, as
they held for certaine, that they were issued out of the land of Attica, wherin
the Orator Aristides doth glorie. In lik sort we say the
Swissers (hauing their originall out of Sweden) to be verie different in
manners, nature, and government: for although they be more strictly allied than
euer any nations were, yet the five small cantons of the mountaines, and the
Grisons, are held more fierce and more warlike, and do gouerne wholy popularly:
the rest are more tractable, and are gouerded by an Aristocratie, being more
enclined thereunto, than to a Popular estate. It is needfull to have a speciall
care to the nature and inclination of the people, if wee will chaunge an
estateTo frame an estate, we must apply it to the nature
of the subiects. as it happened in Florence, about an hundred years
since, when as the Commonweale by succession
of time was almost chaunged into Aristocratia, the
citisens beeing so encreased, as they were forced thrise to enlarge the
compasse of their walles. For the preuention whereof the Senat was assembled,
and the matter propunded: whereas the Senatour Vespucius
did show by lively reasons, That an Aristocraticall estate was without all
comparison the most sure, and farre better than a Popular government; giuing
for an example the state of Venice, flourishing under the commaund of few
gentle men: but Antonie Soderine maintained a Popular
estate, and preuailed; saying, ThatGuichardin. the
nature of the Venetians was proportionable to an Aristocratie, & the
Florentines to a Popular estate. We will soone shew if his grounds were true.
We read also, that the Ephesians, Milesians, and the Siracusians were almost of
the Florentines humor: for they could not
endure any but a Popular estate, nor allow any one to exceed his companions,
banishing euen those that surmounted in vertue: and yet the Athenians,
Ephesians, and Milesians, were much more mild and tractable; so were they much
neerer the East: and contrariwise the Siracusians, Florentines, and
Carthagineans, wereThe humours of sundrie people.
much more fierce and rebellious, beeing more Westward. The people of the East
have much more ostentation and many words, in the iudgement of all auntient
writer, and euen of the ambassadour of the Rhodiots, excusing the fault of his
maisters, upon their naturall inclination, making mention also of the naturall
vices of other people, Gentes aliae (inquit) iracundae, aliae
audaces, quaedam timidae, in vinum ac venerem proniores aliae sunt,
Atheniensium populum fama est celerem & supra vires audacem ad
conandum,Lacedemoniorum cunctatorem: non negauerim & totam Asiae
regionem inanioraLiuius lib. 4.parere ingenia, & nostrorum tumidiorem sermonem
esse, Some nations (said he) are cholerike, others bold; some fearfull,
others prone to wine and women; the people of Athens are said to be sudden, and
exceeding bold to attempt any thing; the Lacedemonians are slow and deliberat:
I will not denie, but that all the region of Asia bringsNotable differences betweene the Atheniens, Romans, and
Carthaginians. forth vaine wits, and ours great talkers. The people
of Athens (said Plutarch) were cholerike and pitifull,
taking pleasure in flatteries, and enduring easily a scoffe: but those of
Carthage were cruell and revengefull, humble to their superiours, and imperious
to their subiects, faint hearted in aduersitie, and insolent in prosperitie.
The people of Rome contrarie unto them were patient in their losses, constant
in their victories, moderat in their passions,
hating flatterers, and taking delight in graue and seuere men: so as the elder
Cato demaunding the Censorship of the people, said,
That they had need of a seuere Censor, threatning to punish vice with
seueritie: yet the people desired rather to chuse him that threatned them,
being but of a meane calling, than the greatestPlut. in
Calon Censorio. noble men▪ that
flattered them. The like they did to L. Torquatus, whome
the people did chuse Consull without his priuitie: understanding of his
election, he told the people, That his disposition was such, as he could not
tollerat their vices, neither could the people endure his commaundements; and
therefore if they were wise, they should make another
choyce: yet was he chosen againe by the people. That which I say may be easily discerned by the difference of the Athenian
and Roman Orators: for these did more respect the maiestie of the people, than
those of Athens, who abused the people with such insolencie, as one of them
hauing assembled the people for matters of state, after that he had made them
to attend him long, in the end he came into the pleading place, with a garland
of roses, saying unto them, That hee had resolued that day to feast his
friends, and so departed: whereat the people laughed. Another time Alcibiades speaking to the people, let flie a quaile out
of his bosome, and the people run after it, and brought it to him againe. If he
had done this in Carthage (saith Plutarch) before the
people, they would have stoned him: the Romans would not have suffered it
vnpunished; for that a citisen of Rome was depriued of his Bourgeship, for that
hee had yawned too lowd before a Censor, as
Valerius Maximus doth testifie.
Therefore a wise gouernour of any Commonweale must know their humours, before
he attempt any thing in the alteration of the state and lawes. For one of the
greatest, and it may be the chiefest foundation of a Commonweale, is to
accommodat the estate to the humor of the citisens; and the lawes and
ordinanees to the nature of the place, persons, and time. For although Baldus saith, That reason and naturall equitie is not
restrained nor limited to a certaine place: that is to bee vnderstood, when as
the reason is vniuersall, and not whereas a particular reason of places and
persons receiuesA good Architect fits his building according
to the stuffe he finds upon the place. a priuate consideration. For
which cause wee must varie the estate of the Commonweale to the diuersitie of
places; like unto a good Architect, which doth fit his building according to the stuffe hee finds upon the
place: So should a wise Polititian doe, who may not chuse what people he will.
As Isocrates said in the prayses of Busiris king of Aegypt, whome he esteemeth very much, for that hee
could chuse a countrey and a people the fittest in all the world to gouerne.
Let vs first speake of the nature of the people of the North and South, and
then of the East, and West, and the difference betwixt the mountainers &
those that live in vallies, or in moorish places, or that are subiect to
violent winds: then will we shew how much discipline may change the nature and
disposition of men, reiecting the opinions of Polybius,
and Galen, who held, That the countrey and nature of the
place did rule necessarily in the manners of men. And the better to vnderstand
the infinit varietie which may be betwixt the people A diuision of people. of the North and South, we will
diuide all the nations that inhabit the earth, or this side the Equator, into
three parts: the first shal be of thirtie degrees on this side the Equator,
which we will attribute to the burning Regions, and people of the South: &
the thirtie degrees next, to those that inbabit the temperat regions, unto the
sixtieth degree towards the Pole, and from thence unto the Pole shall bee the
thirtie degrees of the nations of the North, and the regions that be exceeding
cold. The like diuision may be made of regions beyond the Equator, towards the
Antartike Pole: then wee will diuide the thirtie degrees of the burning regions
into the moitie, the fifteene firstThe heat is greater vnder
the Tro pick, than under the Equator. being more moderat, betwixt the
Equator and the Tropickes; the other fifteene more burning, under the Tropicks:
and by the same meanes we will take the fifteene degrees following of the temperat region, which stretcheth unto the
45 degree, which hold more of the South, and the other fifteene unto the
sixtieth degree, the which are more distempered in cold, and incline more to
the North: and in the fifteene following, unto the 75 degree, although that men
bee much afflicted with cold, yet are there many nations and Commonweales. But
as for the other fifteene adioyning to the Pole, wee must make no account of
them; for that there are few men, which live in caues like unto brute beasts
(as marchants do report, and histories have certified.) I and Saxo Grammaticus. have giuen the reason of
these diuisions in a particular booke of the Method of Histories, and therefore need lesse now to enter any further into it.
These points being concluded, it shall be more
easie to iudge of the nature and disposition of the people. For it is not
sufficient to say, that the people of the North have force, with bignesse &
beautie of the bodie, and little wit: and contrariwise, that the Southerne
nations are weake, little, blacke, and have great wits: for that experience
doth teach vs, that those people which live in the extremities of the North,
are little, leane, and tamed with cold; the which Hipocrates doth confesse, the which we must reconcile with the rest,
in settingAristotle & Hipocrates agree herein.
the limits as I have said. And the saying of Hipocrates
shall bee vnderstood of those nations that inhabit beyond the 70 degree towards
the Poles. We will also allow of the opinion of Hippocrates, and after him of Aristotle, who
have written, That the people of the North have a flaxen and fine haire. And
yet Galen saith, That they have the haire red: the which we must vnderstand of those
that are about the 60 degree, whereof there are many in England, whome the
inhabitants say are issued from the Danes and Swedens, who inuaded England;
noting them by their red haire. But from the Baltique sea unto the 45 degree,
and on this side, the people have commonly flaxen haires. And in old times,
when as nations were not so mingled as since they have bene, they did know a
Northerne man by his flaxen haire and his greene eyes; as Plutarch, Tacitus, Iuuenal, and in our times the Baron of Herbestein
have obserued: andThe difference of the people in the
Northerne regions. as I have discoursed in my booke of the Method of
Histories, and shewed that Amiot in his translation of
Plutarch, upon the towne of Marius, tearmes them red
and chesnut eyes: wheras he should have called them greene eyes: the which is
verie apparant. But those which are about the
60 degree, have in a manner all eyes like unto Owles, and the colour of the
water lookes white in their eyes: they have a weake sight by day, and see
better in the darke, like unto night Owles, which they call Nictalopes. Of this I was assured of the ambassadour Pruinski, a Lituanian, and of Holster
Commissarie of the warres, borne at Ostolcome in Sweden, who is haired like a
Kow, and eyed like an Owle: which colour, force, and bignesse, comes (as Aristotle saith) of the interiour heat: as the
inhabitants of Affrike have blacke eyes, for the little heat they have in their
interiour parts, being exhaled by the heat and drought of the sunne: whereas
the cold doth keepe in the heat in the Northerne regions, if it be not so
vehement as it doth in a maner quench it: for which cause those that inhabit
beyond the 75 degree, are weake, little, and
tamed with extreme cold, the which is so vehement, as many die; as the
marchants report. And euen the baron of Heberstein writes, That the spittle
freezethIn the history of Moscouie. sometimes
before it falles to the ground, the which may seeme incredible. But it is most
certaine that the Baltique sea freezeth in such sort, as whole armies passe
from the maine land to the ilands; although the heat in sommer is sometimes so
violent, as it burnes not onely the fruits of the earth, but also the houses
and villages, as the same author writes that it hath happened in Moscouie, in
the yeare 1524. The which also chanced in Polonia, in the yeare 1552, as Thomas Cromer writes. And the like chaunced in England,
in the yeare 1556, as I have seene by letters from M. de
Nouailles ambassador in England fot the French king: in the which he
doth assure, That the heat had bene so
vehement, as the flame kindled by the sunne, burnt the fruits and villages
throughout a whole countrey. The which Aristotle doth
affirme in his Problemes, That the heatThe heat more
vehement in sommer in cold countries than in hoat. is more violent in
cold countries than in hoat: but that is to bee vnderstood in watry places. And
whereas there is some mountaine which doubleth the heat by reuerberation; as it
happened in the towne of Naim in Gascoine, the which was wholy burnt with the
heat of the sunne at noone day, in the yeare 1540: and the towne of Montcornet
neere unto Laon, the which was burnt in the moneth of May, in the yere 1574,
after a straunge manner, the fire flying through the streets, and through
places farre distant from the houses where it first
began: for the situation thereof is waterish, as I have said; and the grossenesse of the vapour retaines the
heat, the which the maisters of boat houses know full well; who to spare wood,
cast water into their stoues. The Northerne parts then being full of waters,
lakes, and fountaines, the vapors which are drawne up into the ayre, receiue
and retaine the heat more violently: as in the Southerne parts it is more
vehement upon the earth. For euen as the heat is more violent in mettall than
in wood, and in great wood than in small brush: so the sun hath moreWhy the sunne is hoater on the earth than in the ayre.
effect upon the earth than in the ayre; and in a vaporous ayre in moyst
regions, than in a dry countrey, whereus the ayre is subtill, and without any
sencible bodies: which may be the cause that God hath made the Southerne
countries more rainie, and lesse waterish: and those places which are moist in
the Southerne parts, lie commonly towards the
North, and are couered with mountaines towards the South, as AquitaineWhat places in the South are most subiect to waters.
(which is so called for the aboundance of waters) hath the Pyrenean hilles.
Barberie hath mount Atlas, which is wonderfully high, out of the which the
springs and riuers rise all towards the North (as we read in Leo of Affrike) also the sun casting his beams perpendicularly upon
the countrey, would make that inhabitable, the which is one of the most
fruitfull and best peopled countries in the world. And euen as in winter the
places under ground, and the inward parts of creatures, retaine the heat which
doth euaporat in summer: euen so it fares with people that inhabit the
Northerne parts, which have the inward heat more vehement than those of the
Southerne regions: which heat causeth the forces and naturall powers to be
greater in the one than in the other: and which
also doth cause the one to eat more, and to disgest better than the other, for
the coolenesse of the region which keeps in the naturall heat. So as those
armies which come from the Southerne parts into the North, are more vigorous
and lustie; as it was seene in the armie of Hannibal
passing into Italy, and the armie of Moores and Arabians, which have come into
Europe: and of seuen thousand Spaniards which passed into Germanie, under the
emperour Charles the fift: and of fortie thousand
Gascoines, which went to succour the king of Sweden, who obtained goodly
victories. And contrariwise the armies that come out of the North, grow weake
and languish, the moreWhy the armies of the North languish
when they go towards the South. they goe towards the South, yea euen
in sommer; as it appeared in the Cimbrians, of whome Plutarch witnesseth, That they were all molten with sweat, and
languished with heat which they felt in
Prouence, the which would soone have consumed them all, although they had not
bene vanquished by the Romans: as it happened to the French before Naples,
& to the Lansquenets which passed into Italie, under the commaund of Charles of Bourbon and of George
Fronsperg, of the which after they had sackt Rome, there died ten
thousand without any blow, before the yeare was expired, as Guichardine writes. This doth also plainely appeare in the troupes of
cattell which goe out of the North into the South, they loose their fatnesse,
and their milke, and fall away: the which Plinie hath
noted, and the marchants find it true by daily experience. And euen as the
Spaniard doubles his appetite and forces, comming out of Spaine into Fraunce;
euen so the French loose their appetites and languish, going into
Spaine: and if he will eat and drinke as he
doth in Fraunce, he is in daunger not to continue it long. And euen the nations
of the Northerne regions fall a languishing and fainting of the heart, when as
the Southerne winds blow: the same reason doth teach vs, why that men and
beasts, yea and birds which most suddenly feele this alteration, grow far in
winter, and leane in sommer. If Leo of Affrike, and Francis of Aluares, (who haueWhy the
people of the South be abstinent. written the histories of Affrike
and Ethiopia) had well obserued this reason, which is naturall, they had not so
highly commended the abstinence of those people: for they cannot have any
appetite, the interiour heat wanting in them. Neither must we blame the people of the North, for that they are more hungry, and
deuoure more than they Why the people of the North are more hungry. of the
South, considering the inward heat and greatnesse of the men. The same effects
are found in the Antartike regions: for read in the
Histories of the Indies, That Magellan found neere vnto
the strait which he called by his own name Giants Patagenes, so great and mightie, that eight Spaniards armed were
troubled to hold one; but otherwise verie simple. The people of the North get
it by force, and they of the South by policie: so they of the middest
participat of the one and the other, and are more fit for warre, by the
iudgement of Vegetius and Vitruuius: and therefore they have erected great empires, the which
have flourished in armes and lawes. And the wisedome of God hath so well
distributed his graces, as he hath neuer ioined foce
with excellencie of wit, neither in men nor beasts: for there is nothing more
cruell than iiustice armed with power. The people therfore of the middle regions haue
more force than they ofThe people of the middle regions are
better tempered in wit and bodie. the South, & lesse pollicie:
and more wit than they of the North, & lesse force; and are more fit to
commaund and gouerne Commonweales, and more iust in their actions. And if we
looke well into the histories of all nations, we shall find, That euen as great
armies and mightie powers have come out of the North; euen so the hidden
knowledge of Philosophie, the Mathematikes, and other contemplatiue sciences,
are come out of the South: and the politike sciences, lawes, and the studie
thereof, the grace of well speaking and discoursing, have had their beginning
in the middle regions, and allThe greatest empires were in
the middle regions. great empires have bene there established; as the
empire of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Perthians, Grecians, Romans, Celtes.
And although that the Arabians & Moors had
for a time ceised upon the empire of Persia, Syria, Aegypt, and Barbarie, &
brought a good part of Spaine under subiection, yet could they not subdue
Greece nor Italie. And whereas they would have subiected Fraunce, they were
vanquished, and their armie of 300 thousand men (which they had brought)
defeated. In like sort the Romans have stretched forth their power over all the
nations of the South and East, but they preuailed little against them of the
North and West: & although they were conquerors over all other people, yet
they imploied all their forces, & had somewhat to do to make resistance
against the Northerne nations, who neither had walled townes, fortresses, nor
castles; as Tacitus saith, speaking of the Germans. And
although that Traian had made an admirable bridge upon
the riuer of Danow, and vanquished Decebalus king of Daciens; yet the emperour Adrian his successour, caused it to bee broken downe,
fearing least the people of the North (hauing such a passage open) should enter
into the heart of the Roman empire: as they did after that the emperour Constantine had discharged the Roman legions, which
guarded the riuer of Rhine and Danow: For soone after the Almans, then the
Gothes, Ostrogothes, Vandales, Francs,The people of the
North dispersed throughout all the Roman empire. Bourguignons,
Herules, Huns, Hongres, Lombards; and in succession of time, Normans, Tartars,
Turkes, and other nations of Scithia, inuaded the Prouinces which the Romans
had held. And although the English have had great victories over the French and
conquered the country which lieth South to them, yet for these nine hundred
yeres they could neuer expell the Scottish men out of the island; and yet it is
well knowne how much more populous France is
than England, and England than Scotland. We may obserue the like in the Turkes,
a Northerne nation, who hath extended the greatnesse of their empire to the
goodliest regions of Asia, Affrica, and Europe, hauing in a manner subdued all
the ilands of the Mediterrannean sea; yet have they bene defeated by the
Tartarians, & are much trouled to make head against the Moscouits. We read,
that God did threaten his people by the oracles of his prophets with the
nations ofEsai. 14. 41. Ezec. 16. 51.
Dan. 8. 48. Zah. 11. the North, foretelling that
warre murder, and the ruine of Commonweales should come from thence. For
although that men be much diminished in numbers, force, proportion, vigour, and age, in respect of the auntients (a complaint of
most writers by the historie of Plinie) so hardly upon the face of the earth shall you
now find a citie comparable to Capua (containing thirteene miles in circuit)
much lesse matchable to the famous Babylon, which though it were situated foure
square in a leuell soile, yet could a good foot man hardly trauell round about
it in three dayes: but this notwithstanding in multitudes of people, in
strength of bodies, and large proportion of members, the Northerne prouinces do
at this day farre excell the Southerne. In regard whereof that militarie
discipline of the Romans, which priuileged souldiours at fiftie yeares from
future seruice, was not allowable amongst the Lacedemonians; who being nothing
inferiour to the Romans, either for strength of bodie, or warlike experience,
yet freed their people from the seruice thereof, at fortie: the reason being,
for that they Lacedemon more Southerly than Rome. were so much the
more vnable to hold out so long as the Romans, by how much the one nation
approached more neere to the South than the other. So bring a Scithian from his
natiue habitation to the South, and you shall find him presently to droop, and
fall away with sweat and faintnesse. And therefore the pirats of the
Mediterrannean finding by experience, that the English and Dutch captaines are
vnfit for paines taking in those hoat countries, in their markets prize them at
a verie low rate. For the people of the North are inwardly hoat, enioying a
most dry aire, and therefore more thriftie than the Southerne, who inwardly are
cold, according to the propertie of the South, a climat moist by nature.
Wherein the Grecians deriuing, , i. ab humore,
from moisture, are to be beleeued; experience teaching vs, That when the
winds blow from the South, we expect
showers; but when from the North, faire weather and cleere skies. For which
reason the people of the North are and have alwaies bene great drinkers,
witnesse the Greeke prouerbe, To drinke like a Scythian, the which Tacitus hath not forgotten, speaking of the manners of
the Germans, Diem noctemque (inquit) continuare potando nulli
probrū, ita vt craebrae inter vinolentos rixae fiebant, They held it
no disgrace (saith he) to sit all day and night drinking: so as oftentimes
there fell out iarres among these drunkards. The which is not the fault of the
men, but of the region: For such as trauell from the South to the North, will
eat and drinke no lesse than they that are home bred. But Tacitus was deceiued, in saying, That the Germans did drinke more and
eat lesse, by reason of the coldnesse and barrennesse of the
countrey. But contrariwise seeing that
thirst is nothing else but an appetite of cold and moisture, and that hunger is
an appetite of drought and heat; and that the people of the North have the
interiour heat much more in comparison than those of the South, theyThe reason why they of the North drinke more than in the
South. must of necessitie drinke more. In like sort the people of the
Northerne regions have their skins softer, more hairie, and subiect to sweat
than the people of the South; which have the skin hard, little haire and
curled, and the skin withered with drinesse, enduring heat easile without
sweating: but they cannot well beare with cold, not wet; as appeared in the
Spaniards, which died of cold in great numbers uppon the high mountaines of
Peruana. And no wonder, for men bred and brought up in hoat regions, in colder
places inwardly waxe chill, whose bodies if any extraordinarie or sudden
alteration of wether attache (an accident
often happening in those Sotherly quarters, especially upon the tops of those
high hils) it must needes follow, that their naturall heat, both inward and
outward, do vtterly forsake them: the contrarie whereof betideth the Scythian,
who by nature being inwardly hoat, by cold becommeth so much the more able and
couragious, by how much the cold forceth the outward heat unto the heart, the
true seat and center of lively heat. Yea the report, how subiect the Southerne
people through want of inward heat are to loosenesse and the bloody flixe,
almost passeth credit, albeit most true: Whereas on the contrarie the countries
situated Northwards, abounding with riuers and lakes,
do enure mens bodies to fogges & cold
moistures, and that in such able manner, that Scythians do oftentimes defeat
their enemies by their ambuscadoes hidden in deepe marishes; testified by Herodianus, who writeth, That the Germans infested the
Romans with their missiue weapons, themselves standing safe in the middest of
the waters. Which secret of nature Galen not well
understanding, seemeth to wonder at, especially for bathing their new borne
infants in cold unning riuers; a custome used in like
manner by the Ausonij,
Natos ad flumina primùm,Deferimus, saeuoque gelu durmus & vndis:Our new-borne babes at first to springs we bring,T'endure cold stormes their bodies so enuring.
The ground of which German custome Iulianus surnamed the
Apostata writeth to be, that this people held an
opinion, That the true borne children would flote upon the waters, but the base
and bastards would sinke to the bottome. And euen as the peopleProofe to know the bastards from them that were lawfull.
of the North doe languish soone with heat, so are they soone wearied and tyred
with labour in the Southerne parts, or in a hoat season. The which was first
knowne at the battell of Plombin, whereas the Celtes being inuironed with two
armies of the Romans, fought valiantly: but after they had spent their first
furie, they were soone vanquished. Polybius saith, That
to vanquish the Celtes, you must but ward their blows for a time, and yet they were held inuincible, Caesar holds the same opinion of the Gaules, That in the
beginning of a battell they were more than men, but in the end lesse than
women. The which is more naturall to the Germans, and other people of the North
(as Tacitus saith) who had knowne them by long
experience: For the Gaules, especially those of Languedouich, hold the middle
region betwixt the cold and extreame heat, although the qualitie of the
Westerne region makes the country more cold. And those which are in the middest
are impatient of cold or heat: the which Caesar doth
witnesse of the Gaules, who suffet cold more easily than the Spaniards, and
heat than the Germans. And euen as the people of the middle regions hold of the
two extreames in humor, so doe they agree with the one and the other in manners
and The middle region participats of both the extreames.
complexions: and as God by his admirable wisedome doth vnite all things by
convenient meanes to their extremities. In like sort we see that hee hath
obserued the same order betwixt the nations of the North and South, which can
neuer concurre together for the contrarietie of manners and humors that is
betwixt them. The which is a thing verie considerable, when there is any
question to treat a peace, or to make a league betwixt two nations so
contrarie, or to lead them both forth to the warre together; you must place
that nation betwixt them that doth participat of both their natures, and that
have their affections more moderat. As Galen saith, That
the Germans and Arabians have not that commendable ciuilitie which is in them
that are borne in Asia the lesse, the which is not onely betwixt the Pole and
the Equator; but also betwixt the East Indies
and Fraunce Westward: A countrey for this vertue so highly and humanitie comes from Asia. commended by
Tully, that he doubteth not to affirme, That therein
not onely rested the mirror of ciuilitie, but that from thence it hath bin
deriued to all forreine nations. But I am not of their opinions, who draw their
arguments of ciuilitie and babarisme from the effects
of heate and cold, finding every day by common experience, that the Southerne
people go beyond al other nations in quicknes of wit, whereas barbarisme and
rude behauiour proceede from ignorance and want of education, a lesson long ago
verified by Herodotus, who for good wits and civill
behauiour commendeth the Aegyptians before all other
people of what nation soeuer. And after him Caesar (in
his Commentaries of the civill warres) gaue
them the like priuilege, saying, That the Alexandrians did so artificially
counterfeit the Roman engines of warre, as it seemed the Romans were but their
apes, he vseth these words, Ipsi homines ingeniosissimi ac
subtilissimi, The men themselves were verie wittie and politike: And
yet Aegypt is partly under the Tropique, whereas the heat is more violent than
under the Equator, by the iudgement of Possidonius and
the Spaniards. The Romans held the like opinion of the people of Affrike, whom
they called Paenos, who had often deceiued the Romans,
and ouerthrowne their forces by policie. So Columella
tearmes them Gentem acutissimam, A most subtill nation:
But yet they had not such excellent wits as the Aegyptians, neither are they so
neer the South. And without any further search we have the proofe therof in this realm, where the difference is apparent
in regard of the English, who complained to Philip of
Comines with admiration, for that the French lost
most commonly in their warres against them, and won still in their treaties.
Wee may write the like of the Spaniards, who neuer made treatie for these
hundred yeares with the French,The nature of the
French. but they had the aduantage: the which were long to repeate in
particular. I will onely produce the treatie of Cambresis, made in the yeare
1559. It cannot bee denied but the forces of Fraunce were great and sufficient
to withstand a mightie enemie, yet the Spaniard got more by this treatie,
without striking stroke, than they had done beforeThe
Spaniard alwayes circumuents the French by treacheries. in fortie
yeares, neuer hoping (as they confessed afterwards) to draw Sauoy no Piedmont out of the hands of the French: For
although the duke of Sauoie, a vertuous and a generous prince, deserued much,
as well for the equitie of his cause, as for the alliance of the house of
Fraunce, yet he expected not so happie an issue of his affaires: the which was
cunningly handled by the Spaniard, which reaped both thankes, and the greatest
fruits of this treatie, hauing so much diminished the state of Fraunce (which
stretched euen unto the gates of Milan) and set the duke of Sauoy as it were a
barre betwixt Italie and Fraunce, to shut up the passage that the French might
pretend no more in Italie. It cannot be denied, that such as had the charge to
capitulat for the French, did not shew so great discretion, faith, and
loyaltie, as they might: but I vnderstand from one of good credit, that it was
resolued in the councell of Spaine, That they should prolong the treatie all they could; for that the nature of the
French was so sudden andThe reason why the Spaniards
circumuent the French. actiue, as they would easily yeeld to that
which was demanded, being tired with many iourneies, and the ordinarie
tediousnesse of the Spaniard, the which was not forgotten in this treatie. It
was also obserued, That in all the sittings and assemblies made by the
deputies, alwaies the French were first come, and although they had set all
their people to watch, that they might sometimes enter the last; yet were they
still deceiued by the subtiltie of the Spaniards, and impatience of the French,
who seemed by this meanes to sue for peace. This fault is not to bee imputed to
them that had the charge to treat a peace, but unto nature, which is hardly
vanquished. For we read the like of the ambassadours of Fraunce, conferring
with the ambassadours of the emperour, of Venice, Spaine, and Ferrare, before Francis Sforce duke of
Milan. Our manner (saith Philip de Comines) is not to
speake treatably, as they doe: for wee speake sometimes two or three together,
so as the Duke said, Ho, one to one. Whereby we may iudge as in any other
obseruations, That the nature of the Spaniard (being much more miridionallThe nature of the Spaniard. than we) is colder, more
melancholike, more staied, more contemplatiue, and by consequence more
ingenious than the French; who by nature cannot stay to contemplat, being
cholerike and full of spleene, the which makes him more actiue and prompt, yea
so sudden, as he seemes unto the Spaniard to run, when hee goes but his
ordinarie pace: for which cause both the Spaniard and the Italian desire to
have French men to serue them, for their diligence and
quicknesse in all their actions: so as yerely there go infinit numbers into Spaine; as I have seene being at
Narbone, especially out of AuergneThe Spaniard heauy & slothful and Limosin, to build, plant, till
their lands, and doe all manuall workes, which the Spaniard cannot doe, but
would rather die for hunger, he is so slothfull and heauie in al his actions.
When as N. Strossie Prior of Capoua, attempted to
surprise Valencia in Spaine, by meanes of the French gallies, whereof he was
then Admirall: the practise being discouered, the Viceroy sought to expell all
the French out of Valencia, which were found to be ten thousand: for whose
loyaltie the Spaniards stood bound, rather than they should depart: which
shewes how greatly that countrey is peopled with French. And without doubt
those which are bred of the mixture of those two nations, are more accomplished
than either of them: For in the Spaniard wee desire more viuacitie and cheerefulnesse, and to have the actions and
passions of the French more moderat: and it seemes the Italian doth participat
of the one and the other, Italie beeing in the most temperat situation that can
be, betwixt the Pole and the Equator, and in the middest of Asia, Affrike, and
Europe, bending a little towards the East & South. And euen as they which
live at the extremities of the Poles, are Flegmatike, and at the South
melancholie; euen so they which are thirtie degrees on this side the Pole, are
more sanguin; and they which approach neerer unto the middest, more sanguin and
cholerike; and then drawing towards the South, more sanguin and melancholike:
soWhence the varietie of complexions doth grow
their complexion is more blacke and yellow, blacke being the colour of
melancholy, and yellow of choler. Galen confesseth, That
flegme makes men heauie and dull; blood
cheerefull and strong; choler, actiue and nimble; and melancholy, constant and
graue:The disposition of the foure complexions.
and according to the mixture of these foure humors, more or lesse, so many
varieties there be, which Theodore Duca of the house of
Lascare emperour of Constantinople hath laboured to
comprehend in 92 kinds, not onely for the foure humors, but also for the three
parts of the soule, Reason, Anger, & Appetite (or Desire:) but for that his
opinions are not grounded upon the proofe of any example, nor upon necessarie
reason; and for that he makes no distinction of the parts of the world, neither
of moist places, hilly nor windie, from those that are drie, plaine, and
temperat: neither for that he hath not denied those people which have bene
brought up in civill discipline, from the rude and barbarous, in this varietie
of soules and humors which he hath supposed, wee will follow that discipline which seemeth most agreeing to reason
and nature, & hath beene confirmed by many examples. Auntient histories do
agree, That the people of the North are not malitious nor craftie, as the
nations of the South be. And Tacitus speakingThe people of the North not subtill. of the Germans,
saith, It is a nation that is neither subtill nor craftie, discouering their
secrets as it were in jest, and then they goe easily from their promises. The
like iudgement we find of the Scythians in Herodotus, Iustin,
Strabo, Plinie, and Vegetius, & therefore
auntient princes as well as at this day, had no other guards for their persons
than Scythians, Thracians, Germans, Swissers, and Circassians. And euen the
Seignerie of Rhaguse or of Genes, have no other
guards but Germans and Swissers. And which is more, the kings of Affrike beyond
mount Atlas, have none other guard but
souldiours of Europe; who although they be Mahometans, yet had they rather
trust in Christians that have abiured their faith, than in those of the
countrey; the which was first put in practise by the great Mansor emperour of Affrike and of Spaine: and heretofore the king of
Tunis had 1500 light horsemen of Christians renigadoes, and his guard of
Turkish and Christian slaues, as Leo of Affrike saith;
knowing well that the people of the North have more force than subtiltie, and
hauing receiued entertainment of any prince, they alwayes remaine faithfull for
the guard of his person, and to revenge his iniuries (although he be a tyrant)
neuer aspiring to his estate. And therfore Chereas captaine of the guard to the emperour Caligula, hauing slaine the emperor, was The people of the North faithful to the prince that
entertaineth them presently murdered by the guard, which were
Germans, who could not (as Iosephus writeth) forbeare
revenge. In like sort the antients have obserued a barbarous crueltie in the
people of the North: for euen Thucidides son to Olorus king of Thrace, tearmes the Thracians a most
cruell nation: and Taritus speaking of the Germans, They
doe not (saith he) put the guiltie to death after order of law, but by
crueltie, as enemies. I will let passe the auntient, and content my selfe with
late examples. Wee have none more notable than that of George captaine of the rebels in Hungarie, beeing taken by them of
Transiluania, they caused his souldiours and companions to fast three dayes,
and then gaue them to eat their captaine halfe roasted, and his bowels boyled.
I omitStrange cruelties of the people of the North.
the straunge cruelties of Dracula duke of Transiluania,
and of Otton Trucces, who caused the murtherer of his lieutenant to be roasted with a slow
fire, during the commons : and of late Grombache a German, was condemned to have his heart pulled out being
alive, and to have his face beaten therewithall, by Augustus duke of Saxonie in the castle of Goth. We find also, that the
breaking upon the wheele was inuented in Germany, and the impaling or setting
men upon stakes alive, in Tartaria. Neither is it lesse cruell in Tartaria, to
force them that are condemned, to breake their owne neckes, or els to whip and
torment them: Which makes men to thinke, that the cruelties of the king of
Moscouie published and printed, are verie likely. For the lesse reason and
iudgement men haue, the more they approach to the nature of brute beasts, who
canno more yeeld to reason and gouerne their passions than brute beasts. And
contrariwise,Melancholike men cruell and revengefull. the people
of the South are cruell and revengefull, by reason of melancholie, which doth
inflame the passions of the soule with an exceeding violence, the which is not
easily suppressed. Polybius speaking of the wartes of
the Speudians, and Carthagineans, people of Affrike, he saith, That there was
neuer seene nor heard of any , where there was more
treacherie and crueltie: and yet they are but toyes in respect ofTerrible cruelties of the people of the South. the
horrible treacheries mentioned by Leo of Affrike (and in
our age) betwixt Muleasses and his owne children. And
euen the king of Tenesme beeing solicited by Ioseph king
of Marocco to submit himselfe under his obedience, which his grandfather had
reiected, he slew his ambassadours; wherewith the king of Marocco beeing
insenced, put a million of people to the sword in the realme of Tenesme,
leauing him neither towne, castle, house,
beast, nor tree. And speaking of Homar Essuein a
minister to Mahomet, seeking to make himselfe king,
after that he had forced the fort of Vngiasen, hee was not content to put all
to the sword, but he cut & tare the children out of their mothers wombes.
And the same author writes, That Isaak king of Tombut in
Affrike, hauing taken the king of Gagao, he caused him presently to bee put to
death, and his children to be guelt to serue him as slaues, doing the like vnto
al the kings he takes. We read of the like cruelties or greater at the
West▪Indies, newly discouered: for the Brasilians are not contented to eat the
flesh of their enemies, but will bathe their children in their blood. But the
crueltie is more remarkable, when as they doe execute any one that is condemned
by law; the which should be done without passion, and free from revenge. Yet we read of punishments that were used in
old time among the Persians, which exceed all crueltie: and in Aegypt at this
day they flea them alive which rob by the high way, then they stuffe the skin
full of hai and set it upon an Asse, by his sideThe people betwixt both extreames, not subiect to
crueltie. that is so fleaed: Which cruelties the people that live
betwixt both these extreames can neither see nor heate without horrour: and
therefore it seemes, that for this cause the Romans suffred them that were
condemned, to die of hunger, and the Greeks gaue them hemlocke (which is a
sweet poison) to drinke: and those of Chio did temper it with water, and the
Athenians with wine, to take away the bitternesse thereof, as Theophrastus saith. We may therefore note the difference of
crueltie betwixt the people of the North and
South: for that the first are transported with a brutish violence, like beasts
without reason: and the other (like unto foxes) imploy all their wits to glut
themselves with revenge: and euen as the bodie cannot bee purged of melancholy
but with great difficultie, so the passions and perturbations of the mind,
which grow by a setled melancholy, are not easily pacified. So as they which
are possessed with this humor, are more subiect unto frensie than any others,
if they find not wherewithall to satisfieWhy the people of
the South are more revengefull then others, and more subiect to
madnes. their affections. And therefore there are more mad men in the
Southerne regions, than towards the North. Leo of
Affrike doth write, That in the kingdoms of Fez and Marocco there are great
numbers: And euen in Grenado (which is more Southernly) there are many
hospitals for mad men onely. The varietie of mad men shews the naturall humour of the people: for although there bee
store of fooles and mad men in all places and of all sorts, yet those of the
Southerne parts have many terrible visions, they preach and speake many
languages without learning them, and are sometimes possest with euill spirits,
hauing leane bodies, more like unto ghosts then those corpulent and sanguin men
towards the North, which do nothing but dance,Why musicke
cures mad men, and expels diuels. laugh and leape in their fooleries:
and in Germanie it is called the disease of S. Victus,
the which is cured by musick: whether that the sweet harmonie thereof doth
recall the reason which was distempered, or whether that musick doth cure the
infirmities of the bodie by the mind, as the phisick doth cure the mind by the
bodie, or that euill spirits which do sometimes torment mad men are expelled
with this diuine harmonie, delighting in
nothing but in discords: or as we reade that the euill spirit hearing the sound
of a harp fled, and left Saul in rest, which seemes to
have been the cause why Elizeus when he would prophecie
before the kings of Iuda and Samaria, he caused one to play of an Instrument.
And when as Saul was encountred by the holie troupe of
the Prophets playing upon instruments of musick, presently the spirit of God
fell upon him. Oftentimes euill spirits doe applie themselves to the humor of
mad men: for chollerike men strike in their furie, which happens not in those
that are of a sanguin complexion, and much lesse in them that be flegmatike,
which have a Lethargie, the which is a dull and sleeping furie. And for that
the melancholike man is the wiser, if he chance to fall mad, his furie is the
more incurable, for that a melancholike humor suffers not it selfe to be gouerned as the rest: those that be
sanguin, although they be not so often furious, yet are they often mad, the
which is neuer incident to wise men, for Tully sayth,
Furor in sapientem cadere potest, insania non potest,
& furioso curator datur,The difference betwixt a furious and a mad man.non insano; quia insanus dicitur, qui suis cupiditatibus
imperare nescit: Furie may well fall into a wise man, but not madnes: a
gouernor is giuen to a furious man, but not to a mad man, for he is called mad
that cannot rule his owne desires. As touching that which we have said, that
the people of the South are commonly more graue, more discreet, and more
moderate in all their actions: it is plainely seene not only in diuers other
nations, but also in this realme, which seemes to be the cause that those which
have made the customes, have limited them to be of full age that live towards
the North at 25. yeares, and the others at 19
or 20 yeares, except it bee in those countries which border upon the sea,
whereas the people (by reason of their trafficke) are more politike. I cannot
without the note of ingratitude to mine owne countrie forget the iudgement
which the auncients have giuen of the citie of Angiers, as it is to be seene in
the letters pattents of king Charles the 5 called the
wise, the which he granted for the priuiledges of the Vniuersitie of the said
citie in these words, Quod{que} inter regiones alias Regni
nostri, ciuitas Andegauensis veluti fons scientiarum irriguus, viros alti
consilij solet ab antiquo propagatione quasi naturali prouidere: For
that among other prouinces of this our realme, the
citie of Angers like unto a flowing spring of all sciences, is wont to
send forth men of great knowledge and
iudgement, as it were by a naturall propagation. These letters are dated the
first of August in the yeare 1373.
We have yet another notable difference betwixt the people of the South and of
the North, for that these are more chast and abstinent, and those of the South
much giuen to lust, the which growes by reason of the spongious melancholie, so
as all Monsters do commonly come from Affrike, which Ptolomie saith to be under Scorpio andThe people of the South much giuen to women.Venus, adding moreouer, that all Affrike did worship Venus: and Titus Liuius speaking
of the Numidians (who were the most Southerly of all the Romans subiects or
allies) The Numidians (sayth he) were giuen to venerie more than all the other
Barbarians. Wee read also that the kings of Affrike and Persia had alwaies
great troupes of wiues and concubines, the
which is not to be imputed to their depraued customes, for that at the West
Indies king Alcazares had 400 wiues: and the father of
Attabalipa the last king of Peru, (who was defeated
by Pizarre) had 200 wiues, and fiftie children: and the
king of Giolo had 600 children: so many had Hierotimus
king of the Parthians, who had also a great number of wiues: and Surenus Generall of that armie of the Parthians which
defeated Crassus, had ten thousand. The Scythians and
Germaines have enough of one wife: and Caesar in his
Commentaries sayth, that the Englishmen in his time had but one woman to ten or
twelue men: and many men inA strange manee of gelding of
men, which they used in Scythia & low Germanie. the North parts
knowing their owne insufficiencies, geld themselves in despight, cutting
the vaines Parotides under the eares, as
Hippocrates sayth: who seeking out the cause of this
disabilitie, concludes, that is for the coldnes of the bellie, and for that,
they are commonly on horseback: wherein he is deceiued, for Aristotle holdeth, that agitation doth prouoke; and as for want of
heate, it is most certaine that those which dwell in cold countries abound with
heate inwardly, as it appeares by the corpulencie and strength of those Northen
nations: and contrarywise those of the South are very cold. It is the nature of
melancholie which abounds most in them of the South, the which being frothie,
prouokes to lust, as Aristotle writes in his Problemes,
where heMelancholik men most giuen
to lust. demaunds why melancholike men are most lecherous: the which
is notorious in the Hare, the which is the most melancholike of all other
creatures, and which only conceiues being big
with yong, as well the male as the female, as M. Varro,
and other writers do witnesse, and experience hath taught vs; so as we may say
they are much deceiued which have so much extolled the pudicitie and chastitie
of the Scythians, Germaines, and other Northen nations, as Caesar writes in his Commentaries. Among the Germaines (sayth he) it
is a dishonest and villanous thing for a man to know a woman before the age of
25 yeares, which thing they conceale not: and Tacitus
sayth,The people of the North enemies to women.
there are none but the Germaines among the barbarous nations that content
themselves with one wife: yea sometimes they live in perpetuall chastetie, as
the Emperour Henry 2. did, and Casimir 1. king of Poland, and Ladislaus king
of Bohemia would neuer marrie; the which was not for that they were chaste, but
rather through a naturall weakenes: and Ihon 2. great Duke of Muscouia, did so abhorre women, as
he did euen sound at the very sight of them, as the Baron of Herbestein doth
write, speaking of the Muscouites, They neuer see their wiues (saith he) vntill
the day of their marriage. The people of the North are so little subiect to
iealousie, as Alcomer a Germaine, and Irenicus do write in commendation of their countrie, that men and
women throughout all Germanie doth bathe together pel mel, yea and with
strangers, without any touch of iealousie, the which as Munster sayth, is not knowne in Germanie: whereas contrariwise those
of the South are so passionate, as oftentimes they dye of that disease.
BeingThe people of the South much giuen to
iealousie. sent into England with an Ambassage, I heard Mendoza the spanish Ambassadour
say, That it was a shamefull thing to see men & women sit together at holie
sermons: to whome Doctor Dale Master of Requests answered pleasantly, That it was a more
shamefull thing for Spaniards to thinke of satisfying of their lusts euen in
holie places, the which was far from Englishmens minds. We reade in the
historie of the Indies that the king of Puna was so iealous, as he did cut off
the priuie parts, with the noses and armes of those Eunukes that attended of
his women. The people that inhabit the middle regions hold a mediocritie in all
this, but the most part of them allow but one lawfull wife: and although that
Iulius Caesar did persuade Heludius Cinna to publish the law of Poligamie (or
manie wiues) to the end that Cesarion (whom he had by
the Queene Cleopatr) might be legitimate, yet this lawe was reiected: and the same lawe being
reuiued by Ihon Leiden a cobler, hauing made himselfe
king of Munster in Westphalia, did more
trouble their estate than all the other lawes and alterations which he made.
But the Romaine Emperours made a generall lawe to all nations without any
distinction, noting him with infamie that had more than one wife: and since,
that punishment of infamie hath been made capitall within this realme. But the
Romane lawe hath been of no force in Affrike, for the inconueniences that
happened; as it is incident to all those that seeke to applie the lawes of the
people of the South toAll lawes agree not with all
nations. them of the North, making no difference of their
dispositions, wherein many have beene much deceiued, and euen Cardan, who sayth, That man is wiser than all other creatures, for
that he is more hote and moyst; the which is quite contrarie to the truth,
being most apparant that the wisest beasts are colder than any other, in the
opinion of Aristotle. In like sort among militarie punishments, one
was, to let the souldier bloud that had offended, for that those which abound
in bloud had the passions of the mind more violent and lesse obedient vnto
reason. Of all beasts the Elephant is held to be the wisest, of the Antients,
for that their bloud is coldest; and the most melancholike of all others, the
which makes them leapers: and to this leprosie the people of theMelancholy the cause of wisedom South are much subiect,
the which was called by the Antients Elephantiasis, a
disease vnknowne in Greece before Plutarch, or in Italie
before Pompey, as Plinie writes.
But he deceiues himselfe to say, that it was proper to the Egyptians, for all
the coast of Affrike abounds with them; and in Ethiopia it is so common, as the
leapers are not separated from the sound. But Leprosie differs from Elephantiasis, the which is a great swelling in the thighes and legs, and leprosie is a canker or
infection over the whole bodie. It may be this melancholie is the cause of long
life, for all the Ancients consent, that the Elephant lives three and foure
hundred yeares, and Rauens more, who have littleMelancholy
the cause of long life. bloud, and that very melancholie. Francis Aluarez reporteth, that he had seene Abuna Mare Bishop of Ethiopia who was 150 yeares old, and
yet verie lustie, which was the greatest age that euer was found in the Censors
registers at Rome. And we must not wonder if Homer
sayth, that Memnon king of Ethiopia lived five hundred
yeares, for Xenophon long after writes, that in the same
countrie there were men that lived sixe hundred yeares: but those of the South
have verie drie bodies, and are subiect to the falling sicknes, quartaine
agues, and the Kings euill. Hereby we may iudge, that the people of the South are infected with great diseases of
the bodie, and notorious vices of the minde: and contrarywise there are no
people that have their bodies better disposed to live long, and their minds
apter for great vertues. So TitusThe people of the South subiect to extreames.Liuius hauing much commended Hannibal for his heroicall vertues, These great vertues (saied hee)
were accompanied with as great vices, inhumane cruelty, treacherie, impietie,
and contempt of all religion: for greatest spirits are subiect to greatest
vertues and vices. Wherein the auntient writers have bene deceiued, commending
so highly the vertue, integritie, and bountie of the Scythians, and other
people of the North, and condemning the vices of the
South: For he deserues no prayse for his
bountie, that hath no wit, and that cannot be wicked, for that hee knoweth no
euill;Posse & noll
nobile. but he that knoweth euill, and how to put it in practise, and
yet is an honest man. In like sort Machiauel was
ouerseene, saying, That the Spaniards, Italians, and Frenchmen, were the
wickedest people in the world; shewing thereby, that he had neuer read any good
booke, nor knowne the disposition and differences of nations. But if wee shall
looke more narrowly into the disposition of the people of the North, of the
South, and of them that are betwixt both; we shall find that their natures are
like unto young men, old men, and them of middle age, and to the qualities
which are attributed unto them. In like sort euerie one of those three in the
government of the Commonweale vseth that which he hath most at commaund: The
nations of the North, by force; those in the
middest, by equitie and iustice; and the Southerne parts, by religion. TheThe manner of government in the three temperatures.
magistrat (saith Tacitus) commaunds nothing in Germanie,
but with the sword in his hand. And Caesar writes in his
Commentaries, That the Germans have no care of religion, and make no account of
any thing but of warre and of hunting. And the Schythians (saith Solinus) did sticke a sword into the ground, the which
they did worship, placing the end of all their actions, lawes, religions, and
iudgements, in their force and armes. We find that combats came first from the
people of the North, as wee have said elswhere: all the lawes of the Saliens,
Francons, English, Ripuaries, and other Northerne nations are full of them: And
the law of Fronton king of Denmarke would have all
controuersies decided by single combat: Which lawes could neuer be
abrogated, although that both popes and
other princes have laboured much, not considering that the naturall disposition
of them of the North, is quite contrarie to them of the South. And at this
present in Germany they make great account of the Reisters law, the which is
neither diuine, humane, nor canonicall; but the stronger commands the weaker:
as Brennus captaine of the Gaules said unto the
treasuror Sulpitius. The middle nations are more
reasonable and lesse strong, they have recourse unto reason, unto judges, and
unto suits. It is most certaine, that lawes and the manner of pleading are come
from the people of the middle nations; as from Asia the lesse (whereas great
Orators and Pleaders were in credit) from Greece, Italie, and Fraunce: whereof
a certaine Poet speaketh, Gallia causidicos docuit facunda
Britannos, Eloquent Fraunce hath
taught the pleading Brittons. It is not at this day alone, that Fraunce hath
beene fullThe Frenchmen giuen by nature to pleading.
of suits and contentions, the which cannot be altered and taken away, vnlesse
they change the nature and disposition of the people: and it is much better to
decide all controuersies by law, than by the sword; the one is fit for
reasonable creatures, the other for brute beasts: and to conclude, all great
Orators, Law-makers, Lawyers, Historiographers, Poets, Comedians, and others
which draw unto them the hearts of men with goodly discourses and sweet words,
are in a manner all of the middle nations. We see in the histories both of the
Greeks and Latins, before they attempted the least warre, the matter was
debated with many solemne orations, denominations, and protestations: the which
the people of the North do not vse, who presently fall to The seuerall disposition of people according to the
climas. armes, and euen as the one vse
force only like unto Lions, so they of the middest arme themselves with lawes
and reasons. In like sort the people of the South have recourse unto craft and
subtiltie, like unto Foxes; or unto religion: for eloquent discourses agree not
with the grosse wits of the Northerne people, and they are too base for them of
the South, who allow not of any legall reasons or rhetoricall suppositions,
which hold truth and falshood in suspence, but they require certaine
demonstrations or diuine oracles, which exceed any humaine discourse. So we see
that the people of the South, the Aegyptians, Caldeans, and Arabians, haue
brought to light the hidden sciences both naturall and
mathematicall, which torment the greatest wits, and force them to confesse
the truth: and all religions have in a
manner taken their beginning from the people of the South, and from thence haue
been dispersed over the whole earth: not that God hath any acception of places
and persons, or that he doth not suffer his diuine light to shine upon all men;
but euen as the Sunne is seene more easily in a cleere and still water than in
that which is troubled and filthie, so in my opinion the heauenly light doth
shine far more brighter in pure and cleane spirits, than in those which are
poluted with base and earthly affections. And if it be so that the true
purifying of the soule is by his heauenly light, and by the force of
contemplation in the most perfect subiect; without doubt they shall soonest
attaine unto it which have their soules rauished up into heauen; the which we
see happen unto melancholike men, which have Melancholike men most giuen to contemplation their
spirits setled and giuen to contemplation, the which is called by the Hebrewes
and Accademiks a pretious death, for that it drawes the soule out of this
earthlie bodieMeans to gouerne the people of the
South. unto spirituall things. It is no meruaile then if the people
of the South be better gouerned by religion, than by force or reason, the which
is a point verie considerable to draw the people, when as neither force nor
reason can preuaile: as we reade in the historie of the Indies, that Christopher Colombus when he could not draw the people
ofA fine policie of Colombus the Geneuois. the
West Indies unto humanitie by any flatterie or faire meanes, he shewed them the
Moone the which they did worship, giuing them to vnderstand that she should
soone lose her light: three dayes after seeing the Moone ecclipsed, they were
so amazed, as they did what he commanded them. So the more we draw towards the
South, the more deuout we finde men, and the
more firme and constant in their religion, as in Spaine, and more in Affrike:
whereas Francis Aluarez, and Leo
of Affrike do say, that religion is much more reuerenced and honoured there
than in Europe, where among other obseruatiōs Leo
notes, That in one citie of Fez there are seauen hundred temples,Religion most respected in the South. and the greatest
is 1500 paces in compasse, 31 gates, and within it 900 lamps, the yearely
reuenue of which temple is 73000 ducates. But Aluarez
reports far stranger things of the greatnes of temples, of the incredible fasts
and deuotion of the people of Ethiopia, and that the greatest part of the
nobilitie and the people make verie strict vowes of religion. The greatest
reason that hath so long maintained Ethiopia in that goodlie and florishing
estate, and that doth still hold the subiects in the obedience of their prince and gouernour, is the assured persuasion
which they have (as Aluarez saith) That good and euill
comes not unto them by their friends or enemies, but by the will of God. As for
suites, there are fewer than in any part of the world: and which is more
strange, they keepe no records in writing of any decrees, iudgements,
testaments, or contracts, except the accounts of the receit and expences. Who
so should seeke to gouerne those nations by the lawes and ordinances used in
Turkie, Greece, Italie, France, and other midle regions, he should ruine their
estate. In like sort he that should accustome the people of the North to the
pleading of France and Italie, should finde himselfe much troubled, as it
hapned to Mathias king of Hongarie, who sent for Iudges
out of Italie to reforme the iurisdiction of Hongarie, but in a short time the
people were so troubled with this canonicall
pleading, as the king was constrained (at the request of his Estates) to send
back his Italian Iudges into their countrie. So Ferdinand king of Spaine sending Pedrarias
Viceroy to the West Indies, the which then were newly discouered, he did
expresly forbid him to carrie any lawyer or aduocate withThe
disposition of the people is greatly to be obserued in the
government. him, to the end he should not sow any seeds of sutes and
pleading where as there was not yet any. But who so should seeke to roote out
all sutes and processes in France and Italie, he should thrust the people into
perpetuall seditions: for euen the Iudges themselves being vnable to determine
and end sutes, for the difficultie and contrarietie of
reasons that are of either side, they oftentimes depute arbitrators, or else
they prolong the sute of purpose to giue the
parties occasion to agree friendly, and to discharge their choller upon the
Iudges and aduocates, else they would fall to armes, whereby it appeares that
the people of the middle region are more capable to gouerne a commonweale, as
hauing more naturall reason, the which is proper to humaine actions, and as it
were the touchstone to destinguish the difference betwixt good and euill,
betwixt right and wrong, and betwixt honest and dishonest things. Wisedome is
fit to commaund, and force to execute, the which is proper to the people of the
North, butThree vertues proper to three nations of the
North, South, & middle region. they of the South being lesse
capable of gouerment, giue themselves wholly to the contemplation of naturall
and diuine sciences, and to discerne truth from falshood. And euen as the
wisedome to know good and euill is greatest in the people of the
middest, and the knowledge of truth and
falshood in the people of the South, euen so thosePrudenti. Scienti.
Ars. arts which consist in handie works, are greater in the people of
the North then in any other, and therefore the Spaniards and the Italians
admire so many and so diuers kinds of works made with the hand, as are brought
out of Germanie, Flanders, and England. And as there are three principall parts
in the soule of man, that is to say, the imaginatiue or common sence, reason,
and the intellectuall part, euen so in every well ordered Commonweale the
Priests and Philosophers are imployed in the search of diuine and hidden
sciences, being as it were the hart of the citie, the magistrates and officers
to commaund, iudge, and prouide for the government of the State, being as it
were the reason of the citie: and the common people applie themselves to labour
and mechanicall arts, the which is conformable
to common sence.
We may conclude the like of the vniuersall Commonweale of this world, the which
God hath so ordained by his admirable wisedome: As the people of the South
areThe disposition of the three nations in the gouerment
of the world. made and appointed for the search of hidden sciences,
that they may instruct other nations: Those of the North for labour and manuall
artes: and those of the middle betwixt the two extreames, to negotiat,
traffique, iudge, plead, command, establish Commonweales; and to make lawes and
ordinances for other nations: whereunto those of the North are not so apt for
want of wisedome: neither are the people of the South, be it that they be too
much giuen to diuine and naturall contemplations; or for wantWhy those of the South are not fit to gouerne a state. of that
alacritie and promptnesse, which is required in humane actions; be it that hee
cannot yeeld in his opinions, dissemble,
nor endure the toyle which is necessarie for a man of state; or that he is
soone wearie of publike affaires, or that hee is oftentimes expelied by
ambitious courtiers: as it happened to the wise men of Persia, who were
suddenly put from the government of the state, after the death of Cambises: and to the Pithagorians in Italie. And it
seemes this was figured by the fable of Iupiter, who
expelled his father Saturne out of his kingdome: that is
to say, an ambitious and politike courtier dispossessed a Philosopher giuen to
contemplation: For who so shall wel obserue the nature of Planets, he shall
find in my opinion, that the diuision of them doth agree with the three regions
aboue mentioned, according unto their naturall order, giuing the highest
Planet, which is Saturne, to the Southerne region, Iupiter to the middle,The proportion of the Planets to the people. and Mars to the Septentrionall parts, the Sunne remaining in
the middest, as the spring of light equally common to them all. Then followes
Venus, proper to the people of the South, then Mercurie to them of the middle regions: and last of all
is the Moone for the North parts, which sheweth the naturall inclination of the
people of the North to warre and hunting, fit for Mars
and Diana: and the people of the South to contemplation,
besides their disposition to venerie. And the nations betwixt both the qualitie
of Iupiter and Mercurie, fit for
politike governments: the which hath a straunge sympathie in mans bodie, which
is the image of the vniuersall world, and of a well
ordered Commonweale: for setting the right hand of man towards the
North, going from the East into the West,
according unto the naturall motion of the world,In Method. hist. cap. 5. and the true
constitution thereof; as I have shewed in another place: the right part which
is the more strong and masculine, hauing the lyuer and the gall, which the
Hebrewes attribute to the Moone and Mars, sheweth
plainely the nature of the people of the North to be sanguin and warlike. The
left side, which is the feminine part (so called by the Philosophers) and the
weaker, hauing the spleene and the melancholike humor, discouers the qualitie
of the people of the South. Euen so we find more women in the Southerne parts,
and more men in the North: for else it were impossible that euerie man in the
South countries should have so many wiues.More women in the
South than men.
And thus much as touching the generall qualities of all people: for as for the
particular, there are in all places and in
all countries men of all humors, and subiect to that which I have said more or
lesse. Moreover the particular situation of places, doth much alter the nature
of the countrey. For although there is not any certaine place, whereas we may
distinguish the East from the West, as we may the South from the North: yet all
auntients have held, That the people of the East are more mild, more courteous,
more tractable, and more ingenious, than those of the West, and lesse warlike,
Behold (saith Iulian the emperour) how the Persians and
Syrians are mild and tractable. Who sees not the furie of the Celtes &
Germans, & how iealous they are of libertie? the Romans are courteous and
warlike, the Aegyptians wittie and subtill, and withall effeminat. The
Spaniards have obserued, That the people of Sina (the whicThe people of the East more courteous, and more ingenious
than those of the VVest. are farthest Eastward) are the most
ingenious and courteous people in the world: and those of Brezill, which are
farre Westward, the most cruell and barbarous. To conclude, if we looke well
into histories, we shall find, that the people of the West do participat much
of the nature of the North; and the people of the East with them of the South
in the same latitude. The naturall bountie of the ayre, and of the Easterly
winds, is the cause that men are more faire, and of a bigger proportion: and it
is straunge, if the plague or any other infectious disease comes from the West
into the East, or from the North into the South, it continues not: whereas if
they begin in the East, or in any part of the South, they are long and verie
infectious: as it hath bene proued by experience in old times, and at this day
the coniecture is infallible in the countrey of Languedoc, whereas the plague is ordinarie. I have noted many examples
in another place, the which I omit now for breuitie sake: yet the difference of
manners and dispositions of people, is much more notorious betwixt the North
and the South, than betwixt the East and the West. But the greatest chaunge in
particular, is the difference of hilly places from vallies: and of vallies
turned towards the North or towards the South,Remarkable
particularities of places. in the same climat or like latitude, yea
in the same degree, which causeth a wonderfull difference betwixt the one and
the other: as it is plainly seene in mountaines which stretch from the West to
the East: as the Appenin, which diuideth in a manner all Italie in two, mount
Saint Adrian in Spaine, the mountaines of Anuergne in Fraunce, and the Pyenees betwixt Fraunce and Spaine, mount Taurus in Asia,
and Atlas in Affrike, which runs from the
Atlantike sea unto the confines of Aegypt aboue six hundred leagues; mount
Imaus, which diuides Tartarie from South Asia, the Alpes which begin in France,
and continue unto Thrace: and mount Calphat, which diuides Polonia from
Hungarie; the which causeth them of Tuscane to be of a contrarie humor to them
of Lombardie, and farre more ingenious: as also wee see them of Arragon and
Valence, and other people beyond the Pyrenean hilles, to bee of a different
disposition to them of Gasconie and Languedoc, who hold much of the nature of
the North; and the people on this side mount Atlas are farre lesse ingenious
than the Numidians, and other nations which are on the
other side mount Atlas: for the one are very
white, and the other exceeding blacke; the one subiect to many infirmities, the
other sound, cheerefull, and of long life. We must not then maruell if the
Florentine (who is towards the East and South, hauing the mountaines at his
backe upon the North & West) be of more subtill spirit than the Venetians,
and more aduised in his priuat affaires:The cause or the
diuersitie of humors in Italie. and yet the Florentines in their
assemblies spoile all through the subtiltie of their wits: whereas the
Venetians in their councels resolue grauely, as wee have obserued for these two
hundred yeres: for those that have least wit, yeeld to reason, change their
opinions, and referre themselves to men of best iudgement: but so many great
spirits being subtill and ambitious, are obstinat, and will hardly yeeld from
their opinions: & for that euerie man holds himselfe able to commaund, they
will have a Popular estate, the which they
cannot maintaine without quarrels and civill dissentions, by reason of a
naturall obstinacie, proper to the people of the South, which are melancholike,
and to those which for the particular situation of the place, doe participat of
the nature of the South. And euen as they which goe from Bouloigne to Florence,
or from CarassonneA mountain causeth a great difference of people that live in
opposit vallies. to Valence, find a great alteration from cold to
hoat, in the same degree of latitude, by reason of the diuersitie of the one
vallie turning to the South, and the other to the North: in like sort shall
they find a diuersitie of spirits. And therefore Plato
gaue God thankes, That he was a Grecian, and not a Barbarian; an Athenian,
& not a Theban; although there be not twentie leagues betwixt Thebes and
Athens: but the situation of Athens was
towards the south, inclining towards Pyrene, hauing a little mountaine behind
it, and the riuer Asopus betwixth the two cities: so the one was giuen to
learning and knowledge, and the other to armes. And although they had one kind
of Popular government, yet was there no sedition in Thebes, whereas the
Athenians had many quarrels and dissentions for the state. In like sort the
Cantons of the Swissers have maintained their Popular estate verie wisely these
foure hundred yeres: the which the Florentines and the Geneuois could neuer
(with the excellencie of their wits) doe ten yeares together, without some
mutines. For the people of the North, and those that live upon mountaines,
being fierce and warlike, trusting in their force and strength, desire Popular
estates, or at the least electiue Monarchies: neither can they easily endure
Why the people of the North have electiue kingdomes.
to be commaunded imperiously. So all their kings are electiue, whome they
expell if they insult or tyrannize: as I have obserued of the kings of Sweden,
Denmarke, Norway, Poland, Bohemia, and Tartarie, which are electiue.
That which I have spoken of the nature of the Northerne countries, agrees with
the mountaines, the which are oftentimes more cold than the regions that are
farre Northward: for in many places they have snow and yce perpetually: and
euen under the Equator the mountaines of Peru are so high and cold, as many
Spaniards died for cold, and lay long dead before they corrupted; as we read in
the histories of the West Indies. Leo of Affrike hath no
cause to wonder, why the inhabitants of the high mountaine of Megeza in Affrike
are white, tall, and strong; and those of the vallie are little, weake, and blacke: for generally both the men, beasts,
and the trees of the mountaine, are of a stronger constitution than the others.
And old men upon mount Atlas of 100 yeres old, are vigorus, as Leo doth testifie. This force and vigour doth cause the
mountainersVVhy those that live upon mountaines loue
Popular states. to loue popular libertie, who cannot endure to be
braued; as wee have said of the Swissers and Grisons. And in like sort the
inhabitants of the mountaines of Bugia, Fez, Marocco, and Arabia, live in all
libertie, without any commaunder: not through the assurance of any places that
are fortified by nature, but for that they are sauage and cannot be reclaimed.
The which should serue for an aunswere unto Plutarchs
demand, Why the inhabitants of the high towne of Athens required a Popular
estate, & those of the low towne the government of
few: considering the reason that I have giuen.
He should therefore wrong himselfe verie much, that should seeke to chaunge the
Popular estate of the Swissers, Grisons, and other mountainers, into a
Monarchie: For although a Monarchie be farre better of it selfe, yet is it not
so fit for that subiect.
We must therefore carefully obserue what euerie nation desires, and what they
abhore; and first you must draw them to a milder
kind of life, before you propound a royaltie unto them, the which is effected
by quietnesse and ease, inuring them to the studies of sciences and musicke.
And for this cause Polybius saith, That the auntient
lawgiuers of Arcadia, had strictly bound the inhabitants of the mountaines of
Arcadia, to learne musicke, upon great penalties: thereby to temper the
naturall sauagnesse of that people. Titus Liuius also
speaking of the Aetolians dwelling on mountaines, the most warlike and rebellious people of all Greece, he sayth, Ferociores Aetoli quam pro ingenijs Grecorum, The
Aetolians were more fierce than was agreeable to the humor of the Greekes: They
troubled the Romans more (although they had but three townes) than all the rest
of the Greekes. In like sort, the inhabitants of the mountaine of Genes
defeated the Roman armies, and continued warre against them one hundred yeares,
neither could they euer bring them in subiection vntill they had transported
them from the mountaines into the vallies, after which time they became good
& quiet subiects; as we read in Titus Liuius. We
must not then maruell, if by the SwissersIn Swisserland
every one is boūd to we are a sword. lawes euerie man is bound to
weare a sword, and to have his house furnished with offensiue and defensiue
armes: which other people forbad for the most part. And contrariwise the inhabitants of vallies are commonly effeminat and
delicat: and euen the naturall fertilitie of the vallies, giue the inhabitants
thereof occasion to glut themselves with pleasure.
As for the inhabitants upon the Sea coast, and of great townes of traffique,
all writersInhabitants of vallies are effeinate. have obserued, That they are more
subtill, politike, and cunning, than those that lie farre from the sea and
traffique. Therefore Caesar speaking of the inhabitants
of Tournay, These men (saith he) for that they are farre from the ports of the
sea, are not & effeminat with the marchandise and
delights of straungers And to that end Tully said, That
the inhabitants of the riuer of Genes, were called deceiuers and conseners;
& those of the mountaines, rude and vncivill: for that these were not
accustomed to traffique, to ell and to deceiue. Wherfore Ioseph speaking of the inhabitants of Ierusalem & Sparta, saith,
That they were remote from the sea, & lesse corrupted than others. For
which cause Plato forbids them to build his Commonweale
neere unto the sea, saying, That such men are deceitfull and treacherous. And
it seemeth that the prouerbe which saith, That Ilanders are commonly
deceitfull; should be applied to this that we have spoken, for that they are
more giuen to traffique, and by consequence to know the diuersitie of men and
their humors, wherein the policie of trading doth consist, to dissemble his
words and countenance, to deceiue, lie, and to cousen the simple for gaine, the
which isMerchants giuen to lie & deceiue. the end
of many marchants. And to this end the Hebrewes applie that text of Scripture,
where it is said, Non eris mercator in populo tuo, There
shall be no marchant among the people: which
some do interpret a deceiuer or cousener; but the Hebrew word signifies
Marchant.
There is also a great varietie for the difference of places subiect to violent
winds, which makes people to differ much in manners, although they be in the
same latitude and climat: For we see plainely, that those people are more graue
and staied, when theThe violence of the wind breeds a great
varietie in men. ayre is calme and temperat, than those which live in
regions beaten with violent winds: as Fraunce, and especially Languedoc, high
Germanie, Hungarie, Thrace, Circassia, the countrey of Genes, Portugall, and
Persia, whereas men have more turbulent spirits, than
those of Italie, Natolia, Assiria, and Aegypt, whereas the calmnesse of the
ayre make men farre more mild. We doe also see
in moorish places another difference of men, contrarie in humour to them of the
mountaines. The barrennesse and fruitfulnesse of places doth in some sort
chaunge the naturall inclination of the heauens: AndA
fertill countrey breeds people. therefore Titus Liuius said, That men of a fat and fertill soile,
are most commonly effeminat and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren countrey
makes men temperat by necessitie, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and
industrious: as the Athenians were, whereas idlenesse was punished capitally:
Neither by Solons law were the children bound to relive
the parents, if they had not taught them some meanes whereby to get their
liuing. So as the barrennesse of the soyle doth not onely make men more
temperat, apt to labour, and of a more subtill spirit; but also it makes townes
more populous: for an enemie affects not a
barren countrey, and the inhabitants liuing in safetie doe multiplie, and are
forced to traffique or to labour. Such a one was the citie of Athens, the most
populous of all Greece: and Nuremberg, which is seated in the most barren soyle
that can be, yet is it one of the greatest cities of the empire, and full of
theA barren soyl makes the
people . best artisans in the world: and so are
the cities of Limoges, Genes, and Gand. But those that dwell in vallies become
soft and slothfull through the richnesse of the soyle. And as they that lie
upon the sea for their traffique, and those of barren countries for their
sobrietie, are industrious: in like sort those which make the frontiers of two
estates beeing enemies, are more fierce and warlike than the rest, for that
they are continually in warre, which makes men
barbarous,, mutinous, and cruell; as peace makes men quiet, courteous, and
tractable▪ And for this cause the English heretofore were held so mutinous and
vnruly, as euen their princes could not keepe them in awe: yet since that
theyPeople giuen to firce and sauag. haue
treated of peace and alliance with France & Scotland, & that they haue
bene gouerned by a mild and peacefull princesse, they are growne verie civill
and full of courtesie. Whereas contrariwise the French, which did not yeeld to
any nation in courtesie and humanitie, are much chaunged in their dispositious,
and are become fierce & barbarous since the civill warres: as it chaunced
(as Plutarch saith) to the inhabitants of Sicilie, who
by reason of their continuall wars, wete growne like vuro brute beasts.
But he that would see what force education, lawes, and customes, have to
chaunge nature, let him looke into the people
of Germanie, who in the time of Tacitus the
Proconsull,Education alter
natur. had neither lawes, religion,
knowledge, nor any forme of a Commonweale; whereas now they seeme to exceed
other nations in goodly cities, and well peopled, in armes, varietie of artes,
and civill discipline: And the inhabitants of Bugia (which in old time was
Carthage, the which in former times had contended with the Romans for the
empire of the world, being the most warlike people of all Affrike) by the
continuance of peace, and the practise of musike (wherewith they are much
delighted) they are become so effeminat and timerous, that Peter of Nauarre comming thither with fourteene ships onely, the king
with all the inhabitants fled, and without striking stroke abandoned the citie,
whereas the Spaniards built goodly forts without any opposition. Therefore Plato maintained,
That there were two arts necessarie in al cities, Wrestling,Wrestling and Musike necessary in all Commonweales. and Musicke; the
one being the nurce of the mind, the other of the bodie. If they neglect
wrestling, the force of the bodie must languish: if the studie of Musicke, they
will become rude and barbarous: if both, then must both bodie and mind grow
dull with idlenesse and sloth: For commonly we see those whose minds are
delighted with the sweet sound of Musicke, to be verie mild and courteous. What
should I speake of the Romans, & of that famous citie, which had so often
triumphed over Europe, Asia, and Affrike, whilest that it flourished in armes
and learning; which hath now lost the beautie and vertues of their fathers,
through sloth, to the eternall infamie of their idle
prelats. Whereby it appeares how much education preuailes: whereof Licurgus made triall, hauing bred up two grayhounds of
one litter, the one in hunting, the other to the pottage pot, and then made
triall of them before all the people of Lacedemon, bringing forth a quick hare,
and pots of meat; so as the one followed the hare, and the other ran to the
meat. It is most certaine that if lawes and customes be not well maintained and
kept, the people will soone returne to their naturall dispositions: and if they
be transplanted into another countrey, they shall not be chaunged so soone, as
plants which draw their nourishment from the earth: yet in the end they shall
be altered, as we may see of the Gothes, which did inuade. Spaine, and high
Languedoc; and the auntient Gaules which did people Germanie, about the blacke
forrest and Francford, with their Collonies. Caesar
saith, That in his time (which was some five hundred yeres after their passage) they had chaunged their manners and
naturall disposition with that of Germany.
But it is needfull to purge an errour into the which many have fallen, hauing
taxed the French of lightnesse, imitating therein Caesar,
Tacitus, Trebellius, and Pollio. If they tearme
a certaine alacritie and promptnesse in all their actions, Lightnesse; the
iniurie pleaseth me, the which is common to all the people of the middle
regions betwixt the Pole and the Equator: for euen in like sort Titus Liuus doth call them of
Asia, Greece, and Syria, Leuissima hominum genera, Light
kind of men: the which the ambassadaur of the Rhodians did freely confesse in
the open Senat at Rome. And Caesar himselfe doth
interpret that which he would say, acknowledging that the Gaules have good
wits, and prompt, and tractable. And Scaliger borne at Veona,
writes, That there is not any nation of a quicker & more lively spirit than
the French; be it in armes or learning, be it in the trade of marchandise, or
in well speaking: but aboue all, their hearts are generous and loyall, keeping
their faith more constantly than any nation. And Baptista
Mantuanus, the most excellent Poet of his age, writes thus of the
French,
Hoat fierie spirits have the Gaules, their bodies passing white,And of that white have they their names; a crimson colour brightTheir womans faces garnisheth, wherewith a comely graceBeing mixt, Nature out of two sundrie colours one doth raise:Frolike they are, of cheerefull hew, delight in rounds and rime,Prone unto Venus sports, to banqueting, and when they
see their timeAs prone unto Church seruice. They list not beare the yoke,Hypocrisie they flie amaine, and what is falsly spoke:Hating the sullen Saturnist, they giue themselves to game,To hunting, hawking, hils and dales theile thorow them amaine.I, they in warres delight them too, the barbed horse to ride;Their brigantines, their bow, and speare, to vse it is their pride:Whole nights abroad to sleepe on ground it is their chiefest ioy,And to be slurd with sunne, and rust, th' account it nothing coy,With dust to be orespred, to sweat under the weight of armes,For countrey, kin, and eke for king, to under goe all harmes;Yea death it selfe to them is sweet. Thus farre
Mantuan.
The constancie of the French appeares plainely by the religion which hath bene
receiuedThe French held to be constant. and
allowed by our predecessors, for the which we have contended these threescore
yeres with such obstinacie, as no nation in the world hath endured such
burnings, spoylings, tortures, and civill wars, as we have caused unto our
selues. Wherby Caesars testimony appeares to be very true, writing, That all
the nations of the Gauls was much giuen to
religion, which is far from lighntesse and inconstancie. But that fierie
vigour, as Veronensis sayth, which we see in the french,
and the wonderfull alacritie in doing of things proceedes from choller: from
thence grow the violent motions of the mind, from thence come murthers, when as
from words they fall to blowes, and choller enclining unto rashnes breakes
forth sodenly, the which if it be restrained within the bound of reason it doth
greatly increase wisedome the gouernesse of mans life, as Galen sayth, writing of a chollerike humor, but if it be distempered,
it turnes into rashnes,Inconstancie incident to them of the
North. which properly we call lightnes, but this inconstancie is much
more proper and incident to the people of the North. We have said (speaking in
generall) that the people of the South are of a contrarie humour and
disposition to them of the North: these are
great and strong, they are little and weake: they of the north hot and moyst,
the others cold and dry; the one hath a big voyce and greene eyes, the other
hath a weake voyce and black eyes; the one hath a flaxen haire and a faire
skin, the other hath bothThe difference of humors betwixt
them of the North and South. haire and skin black; the one feareth
cold, and the other heate; the one is ioyfull and pleasant, the other sad; the
one is fearefull and peaceable, the other is hardie and mutinous; the one is
sociable, the other solitarie; the one is giuen to drinke, the other sober; the
one rude and grosse witted, the other aduised and ceremonious; the one is
prodigall and greedie, the other is couetous and holds fast; the one is a
souldier, the other a philosopher; the one fit for armes and labour, the other
for knowledge and rest. If then the inhabitants of the South be wilfull and
obstinate, as Plutarch sayth, speaking of the Affricans, maintaining his resolutions very
wilfully, it is most certaine that the other is changeable, and hauing no
cōstancie, those of the middle regions hold the vertue of the meane, betwixt
wilfulnes and lightnes, not being changeable in their resolutions without
reason, like unto the people of the North, nor yet so setled in their opinions,
as they will not be altered without the ruine of an estate. Tacitus writing of the Germains, saith, that they hold it no dishonor
to denie their word. The Eastgoths and Weastgoths being expelled by Attila, they required some land to inhabit from the
Emperour Valens, swearing to imbrate the Christian
religion, which hauing granted them, they treacherously seazed on Valens, and burnt him alive, and the people of Gronland
which are neerest unto the Pole, being of an inconstant humor, as MunsterThe people of the North carelesse of their faith.
saith, did easily imbrace the Christian religion, and then afterwards fell
againe to their Idolatrie. And as for the Muscouites, the Baron of Heberstein
saith in their historie, that he hath not knowne any nation more disoyall, which will have all men to keepe their faith
with them, and they with no man. This falshood or treacherie comes from
distrust, or from feare, and both the one and the other from want of spirit and
wit: for a wise and considerate man as those of the middle region be, is not
distrustfull, for that he foreseeth what may happen, and with courage and
constancie doth execute what he hath resolued, the which the people of the
South do not so well, being fearefull, nor they of the North which want wit.
And to make it manifest how distrustfull and suspitious the people of the North
be, looke into the realme of Denmarke and Sweden, whereas the magistrates do hide men in the Innes to heare what is spoken.
The gouermentThe government of a state alters the peoples
dispositions. of every Citie is of great force in the alteration of
the peoples natures and dispositions: if they be oppressed with tyrannie and
seruitude, they grow faintharted and deiected: they which live in popular
estates and enioy their liberties, must of necessitie be more bold and warlike,
wherein not only the nature of the heauens and regions in generall are to be
considered, but also the particularities of the regions. What may grow in the
minds of men from the ayre, water, winds, hills and vallies, what from
religion, lawes, customes, discipline, and from the state of every commonweale,
and not to obserue the climate alone, for we see in
climates that be alike and of the same eleuation foure notable differences of people in colour, without speaking of other
qualities,Great differences of people in colour in the
same climats. for that the West Indians are generallie of a duskish
colour like unto a roasted quinze, vnlesse it be a handfull of men that are
black, whom the tempest carried from the coast of Affrike: and in Siuill of
Spaine the men are white, at Cape Bonne Esperance black, at the riuer of Plate
of a chestnut colour, all being in like latitude, and like climates, as we
reade in the histories of the Indies which the Spaniards have left in writing:
the cause may be the change from one countrie to another, and that the Sunne in
Capricorne is neerer unto the earth by all the eccentricall latitude, the which
are aboue foure hundred thousand leagues. The transportation of Collonies works
a great difference in men, but the nature of the heauens, winds, waters and
earth, are of more force. The Colonie of the
Saxons which Charlemaine brought into Flanders, differed
much from all the French, but by little and little they were so changed as they
retaine nothing of the Saxon but the language, the which is much altered,
pronouncing their aspirations more lightly, and interlacing the vowels with the
consonants: as the Saxon when he calles a horse Pferd, the Flemings say Perd,
and so of many others. For alwaies the people of the North, or that dwell upon
mountaines, hauing a more inward heate, deliver their words with greater
vehemencie and more aspiration than the people of the East or South, who
interlace their vowels sweetly, and auoid aspirations all they can (and for the
same reason women who are of a colder complexion than men, speake more sweetly)
the which was verified in one tribe of the people of Israell, for those of the tribe of Ephraim
which remained in the mountaine and towards the North, which they called
Gallaad, were not only more rough and audacious and bold than those that dwelt
in the valies, of the same tribe, but did also pronounce the consonants and
aspirations which the others could not pronounce; so as being vanquished, and
flying from the battaile, not able to distinguish the one from the other being
of one nation, they watched them at the passage of Iordain, demaunding of them
how they called the passage or foord, which was named Schibolet, the which they pronounced Sibolet,
which doth properly signifie an eare of corne, although that they be both
oftentimes confounded, by which meanes there were 42000 men slaine. It is most
certaine that at that time the Hebrewes held the purenes of bloud inuiolable,
and that it was but one tribe. That which I
have said, That the nature of the place doth greatly change the nature and
pronunciation of men; may be generally obserued, and especially in Gasconie in
the countrie which is called Labdac, for that the people put L. in stead of
other consonants. We do also see the Polonias, which
are more Eastward than Germanie, to pronounce much more sweetly: and the
Geneuois being more Southerly than the Venetian these men pronounce Cabre, and
the Geneuois say Crabe, whereby the Venetians distinguished them that fled,
hauing gotten a great victorieThe nature of the place doth
commonly change the language. against the Geneuois, making them to
pronounce Cabre, and killing all them that could not do it. The like did the
inhabitants of Montpellier in a sedition which hapned in the time of king Charles the fift, seeking to kill the strangers, they
shewed them beanes, which the strangers called
Febues, and the inhabitants of the countrie called
them Haues; like unto the Sabins, which did pronounce
Fircus Faedus, for Hircus
Haedus, as Marcus Varro sayth. And thus much
touching the naturall inclination of people, the which notwithstanding carrie
no necessitie as I have sayd, but are of great consequence for the setling of a
Commonweale, lawes and customes, and to know in what manner to treat with the
one and the other. Let vs now speake of other meanes to preuent the changes of
Commonweales, which groweth through aboundance of riches.
CHAP. II. The meanes to preuent the changes of
Commonweales, which happen through the great riches of some, and exceeding
pouertie of others.
AMong all the causes of seditions and changes of
CommonwealesThe chiefest cause of the change and
subuersion of a state there is none greater than the excessiue wealth
of some fewe subiects, and the extreme pouertie of the greatest part. All
antient histories are full, whereas it appeares that all they which haue
pretended any discontentment against the state, have alwayes imbraced the first occasion to spoile the rich: yet these
changes and mutenies were more ordinarie in old time than at this day, for the
infinite number of slaues which were thirtie or fortie for one free man; and
the greatest reward of their seruice, was to see themselves freed, although
they reaped no other benefit but only libertie, which many bought with that
which they had spared all their life time, or else with what they borrowed,
binding themselves to restore it, besides the duties they did owe to them that
did infranchise them: besides, they had many children, which happens most
commonly to them that labour most,The cause of in an estate. and live most continently, so as
seeing themselves in libertie and opprest with pouertie, they were forced to borrow upon interest, to sell their
children, or to satisfie their creditors with their fruites and labours; and
the longer they lived, the more they were indebted, and the lesse able to pay:
for the Hebrewes called vsurie a biting, which doth not only wast the debtor
unto the bones, but doth also suck both bloud and marrow, so as in the end the
number of the poore being increased, and not able to indure this want, they did
rise against the rich, and expelled them from their houses and townes, or else
they lived on them at discretion. And therefore Plato
called riches and pouertieThe two plagues of all Common. the two antient plagues of a Commonweale,
not only for the necessitie that doth oppresse the hongrie, but also for the
shame, the which is more insupportable to many than pouertie it selfe: for the
preuenting whereof, some have sought an equalitie, the which many have commended, tearming it the nurse of peace,
and loue betwixt subiects; and contrariwise inequalitie the spring of all
diuisions, factions, hatred and partialities: for he that hath more than an
other, and sees himselfe to have greater wealth, he will also be higher in
honor, in delights, in pleasures, in diet and in apparell, hauing no great
regard of vertue: the poore on their part conceiue an extreme hatred and
iealousie, seeing themselves thus troden under foote, they thinke themselves
more worthie than the rich, and yet are opprest with pouertie, honger, miserie
and reproch. And therefore many antient law giuers did equally diuide the goods
and lands among theEqualitie the surest maintenanc of a Commonweale. subiects, as in our time
Thomas Moore Chancellor of England in his Commonweale
sayth, That the only way of safetie for an estate, is when as men live in
common: the which cannot be whereas is any
proprietie. And Plato hauing charge to frame the
Commonweale and new Colonie of the Thebans and Phociens, by the consent of the
subiects which sent Ambassadors to him to that end, he departed, leauing it
vnfinished, for that the rich would not impart any of their wealth unto the
poore: the which Licurgus did with the hazard of his
life, for after that he had banished the vse of gold and siluer, he made an
equall distribution of the lands. And although that Solon could not do the like, yet his will was good, for that he made
frustrate all bonds, and granted a generall abolition of debts. And after that
the vse of gold and siluer was allowed in Lacedemon after the victorie of Lisander, and that the testamentarie law was brought in, the which was partly the cause of inequalitie of
goods: King Agis seeking to bring in the antient equalitie, he caused all bonds and
obligations to be brought into a publike place and there burnt them, saying,
That he had neuer seene a goodlier fier: then he began to deuide his owne goods
equally, but when he sought to distribute the lands, he was cast into prison by
the Ephores and there slaine. In like sort Nabis the
tyrant hauing taken the citie of Argos, published two Edicts, the one to free
them of all debts, the other to deuide the lands equally: Duas faces (sayth Titus Liuius) noantibus res ad plebem in optimates
accendendam: Two firebrands for them that sought for innouations to
kindle and incense the people against the better sort. And although the Romains
have in that point seemed more iust than other nations, yet have they often
granted a generall recision of debts sometimes for a fourth part, sometimes for a third, and sometimes for all; hauing
no better meanes to pacifie the mutinies and seditions of the multitude, least
it should happen unto them as it did unto the chiefe men among the Thuriens,
who hauing gotten all the lands into their hands, the people seeing themselves
opprest with debt and vsurie, and without any meanes to satisfie, they fell
upon the rich and expelled them from their goods and houses. These reasons may
be held goodly in shew, when as in truth there is nothingEqualitie of goods dangerous to a Commonweale. more pernitious and
dangerous to Commonweales, than equalitie of goods, the which have no firmer
support and foundation than faith, without the which neither iustice, nor
publike societie can stand, neither can there be any faith, if there be not a
due obseruation of conuentions and lawfull promises. If then bonds be broken,
contracts disanulled, and debts abolished,
what can there be expected but the vtter subuersion of an estate? for there can
be no trust one in an other. Moreover such generall abolitions do most commonly
hurt the poore, and ruine many, for the poore widowes, orphelins, and meaner
sort hauing nothing but some little rent, are vndone when this abolitionAbolition of debts ruins the poorer sort. of debts
comes; whereas the vsurers preuent it, and oftentimes gaine by it: as it
happened when as Solon and Agis
did publish an abolition of debts, for the vsurers (hauing some intelligence
thereof) borrowed money of all men, to defraud their creditors. Besides, the
hope of these abolitions do incourage the prodigall to borrow at what rate
soeuer, and when their credit is crackt to ioyne with the poore which are
discontented and desperate, and to stir up seditions: whereas if the hope of
these abolitions were not, every one would
seeke to gouerne his estate wisely, and to live in peace. If it be vniust for
the creditor to lose his goods, and the debter to gaine that which is not his,
how much more vniust is it to take land from the lawfull owners to enrichThe equall diuision of lands most iniust. other men with
their spoyles: for they that seeke to be freed from their debts, pretend the
oppression of vsurie, and the barren nature of siluer, the which cannot be in
lawfullEqualitie of goods the ruine of humane
societie. successions, so as we may rightly say, that such a diuision
of another mans goods, is a meere robberie under a shew of equalitie, and the
ruine not onely of a Commonweale, but of all humane societie. To say, That
equalitie is the nurce of friendship; is but to abuse the ignorant: for it is
most certaine, that there is neuer greater hatred, nor more capitall quarrels,
than betwixt equals: and the iealousie betwixt equals, is the spring and
fountaine of troubles, seditions, and
civill warres. Whereas contrariwise the poore and the weake yeeld and obey
willingly the great, rich, and mightie, for the helpe and profit which they
expect: which was one of the reasons which moued Hippodamus the law giuer of the Milesians, to ordaine, That the poore
should marrie with the rich, not onely to auoid inequalitie, but also to make
their friendship the more firme. And whatsoeuer they say of Solon, it appeares sufficiently by the institution of his Commonweale,
that he made foure degrees of citisens according to their reuenewes, and as
many degreesSolons deuision of citisens. of state and
honours: the rich had five hundred measures of corne, wine, or oyle, in rent; the next three hundred, others two hundred,
and those which had lesse might beare no
office of honour. And euen Plato hath made three estates
in his second Commonweale, one richer than another, ordaining, That every one
of the five thousand & fortie citisens, should leaue one of his children
sole heire. And as for that which Licurgus did, who
would have equalitie perpetually obserued in succession, diuiding the lands by
the powle; it was impossible, for that he might see before his eyes, or soone
after,Equalitie impossible to be kept in a state.
this equalitie quite altered, some hauing twelue or fifteene children, others
one or two, or none at all: the which would be more ridiculous in those
countries whereas pluralitie of wiues is tollerated, as in Asia, and in a
manner throughout all Affrike, and at the new found lands, whereas it falles
out oftentimes, that one man hath fiftie children. Some have sought to preuent
this inconuenience, as Hippodamus law-maker to
the Milesians, who would not allow aboue
ten thousand citisens, the which Aristotle did like well
of, but by that meanes they must banish the ouerplus, or else execute the
cruell law of Plato approued by Aristotle, who hauing limited the number of his citisensA cruell law made by Plato. to five thousand and fortie,
ordained that they should cause the rest to miscarrie as soone as they were
conceiued, and those that were borne lame or crooked should be cast off: the
which cannot be spoken without great impietie, that the goodliest creature
which God hath made, should not only be made away after it is borne, but also
be destroyed in the mothers womb. Whereunto Thomas Moore
Chancellor of England seemes to agree, who would not have lesse than ten, nor
more than 16 children in one familie: as if he might commaund nature. And
although that Phidon law-giuer to the Corinthians did seeme to foresee it more wisely, forbidding
expresly to build any more in Corinth (as they made a defence not to build in
the suburbs of Paris, by the kings Edict in the yeare 1558,) yet the subiects
multiplying they must either erect a newIt is iniurious to
tye a citie to a certaine number. Colonie, or banish them
iniuriously. But in my opinion they erre much which doubt ofscarcitie by the
multitude of children and citisens, when as no cities are more rich nor more
famous in arts and disciplines than those which abound most with citisens. It
is indeed lesse to feare that by reason of so great a multitude of citisens
there will be deuisions, for that there is nothing that doth keepe a citie more
free from mutinies andGreat cities are lesse subiect to
seditions than others. factions than the multitude of citisens, for
that there are many which be as a meane betwixt the rich and the poore, the
good and the wicked, the wise and the simple, and artificers and noblemen, which may recoucile these extremes
when they disagree: and there is nothing more dangerous than to have the
subiects divided into two factions without a meane, the which doth vsually fall
out in cities where there are but few citisens. Laying aside therefore this
opinion of equalitie in a Commonweale alreadie framed, rauishing and taking
away another mans goods, whereas they should preserue to every man his owne,
according unto the law of nature; and reiecting also them that would limit the
number of the citisens, we will maintaine that this deuision of portions ought
not to be allowed but in the framing of a new Commonweale in a conqueredThe manner how to diuide a conquered citie. countrie:
the which diuision should be made by families, and not by the powle, reseruing
alwaies some prerogative for one of the familie, and some right for the elder
in euerie house, according to the law of God;
who doth shew vs with his finger what course to take, for hauing chosen the
tribe of Leui to giue him the right of the elder aboue
the other twelue, he gaue them no lands but only houses in cities, appointing
them the tenth of every tribe (which was twelue tenths) without any labour, the
which was twise as much at the least as any tribe had, all things deducted. And
among the Leuites the right of the elder was reserued to the house of Aaron, which had the tenth of the Leuites, and all the
oblations and first fruites: and to every priuat house he assignedDeuision of land by the law of God. twise as much of the
goods and lands unto the elder as to any other of the
heires, excluding the daughters wholie from the succession, but for want of
males in the same degree, whereby we may iudge
that the law of God hath directly reiected all equalitie, giuing to one more
than to another: and yet he hath kept among the twelue tribes, except that of
Leui, an equall deuision of inheritances; and among
the yongers an equall deuision of the succession, except the right of the
elder, the which was not of two third parts, nor of foure five parts, nor of
all; but of the halfe, to the end that such inequalitie should not be the cause
of the great wealth of some few subiects, and the extreame pouertie of an
infinit number: which is the occasion of murthers among brethren, of diuisions
in families, and of mutinies and civill wars among subiects. And to the end the
diuisions thus made may remaine indifferent, there must not be any prohibition
of alienation, either in a mans life, or by testament; as it is used in some
places, if we will obserue the law of God,
which ordaines, That all successions sold, shall returne the fiftieth yeare to
the house, familie, or tribe, from the which it was sold: whereby the poore
that are afflicted, and forced to sell to supply their necessities, shall haue
means to sell the fruits and reuenewes of their lands to the fiftieth yeare,
the which shall returne afterwards to them or to their heires: ill husbands
shall be forced to live in penurie, and the couetousnesse of the rich shall be
preuented.
As for abolition of debts, it was a thing of a daungerous consequence, as it is
said, notAbolition of debts pernitious. so much for
the losse of the creditor (the which is of no great moment, when the question
is of the publike state) as for that it opens a way for the breach of faith in
lawfull conuentions, and giues occasions to mutines to trouble the state,
hoping still to have abolition of debts, or at
the least an abatement of interests which have bene long due, reducing them to
the five and twentieth penie: the which hath bene obserued in Venice. We see by
the law of God, that debts are not cut off, but it giues the debtor respight
the seuenth yeare, and suspends the debt. But the true meanes to preuent
vsurers to ease the poore for euer, and to maintaine lawfull contracts, is to
obserue the law of God, which hath defended all kinds of vsuries among the
subiects: For the law wereVsurie must bee cut off.
vniust in regard of straungers, if it were lawfull for them to deliver out
money upon interest unto the subiect, from whome he should draw his whole
estate, if the subiect might not vse the like prerogative unto straungers. This
law hath bene alwaies much esteemed of all lawgiuers, and of the greatest
Polititians, that is to say, of Solon, Licurgus,Plato, Aristotle, and euen the ten commissionars deputed
to reforme the customes of Rome, and to make choyce of the most profitable
lawes, would not allow aboue one in the hundred for interest; the which they
called Vnciarium, for that the vsurie ofTacit. lib. 5. Pest. lib.
19. euerie moneth came but to an ounce, which was the twelfth part of
the hundreth crowne which had bene borrowed, and the vsurer which exacted any
more, was condemned to restore foure fold: esteeming the vsurer (as Cato said) worse than a theefe, which was condemned but
in the double. The same law was afterwards publishedAn
vsurer esteemed worse than a theefe. anew at the request of the
Tribune Duilius in the yeare of the foundation of Rome
396: and ten yeres after Torquatus and Plautius being Consuls, it was reduced to halfe an ounce in the
moneth, and a halfe penie in the hundred: so as it did not equall the
principall but in two hundred yeares. But
the yeare following vsurie was quite forbiddenVsurie
forbidden in Rome. by the law Genutia, for the dayly seditions which
happened by the contempt of those lawes of vsurie: for what moderation soeuer
you make of vsurie, if it bee any thing tollerated it will soone encrease. And
those which maintaine under a color of religion, That moderat vsurie or rents,
after foure or five in the hundred, are honest and iust, for that the debtor
reapes more profit than the creditor, abuse the word of God, which doth
expresly forbid it. For although some would take light interest for the good of
the debtor, yet many would abuse it. For euen as a
hatchet at the first makes but a little rift, but in the end breakes all in
sunder: so the sufferance of vnlawfull things,
how small soeuer, growes in the end to all impunitie: as they which haue
forbidden vsurie among Christians, and yet have allowed it for the church and
hospitals; and some also have found it convenient for the Commonweale and the
treasure; but there is nothing that giues the subiect more occasion to breake a
law, than to defend a thing, and tollerat it with some exceptions. The which is
an ordinarie fault among princes and prelats, seeking to exempt and free
themselves from those things which are forbidden to the subiect: & who
would find that bad in particular, which is publikely allowed? And for that all
defences in matter of lawes are vnprofitableLaws are
vnprofitable without penalties. without some punishment, the which
are not regarded if they be not duly executed, therefore the law Genutia being
ill executed, was by little and little neglected. And therefore in England they have prouided, that when as any edict was
made, they presently appointed a Magistrat or Commissarie, to see the law
obserued, who continued in that charge vntill the law were disanulled. But the
couetousnesse of vsurers did so exceed, as they lent after twentie foure in the
hundred, vntill that the law Gabinia did moderat the greatest interest, at
twelue in the hundred, vnlesse it were in venturing at sea, whereas the
creditor tooke upon him the hazard: But this law was ill executed in the
prouinces, whereas they did take fortie eight in the hundred for a yeare, For
the extreame necessitie of him that borrowes, and the insatiable couetousnesse
of him that lends, will alwayes find a thousand deuises to defraud the law. The
punishment of vsurie was verie seuere in the Commonweale of the Candiots: and
therefore hee that would borrow seemes as if
he would take it violently from the creditor: so as if the debtor did not pay
the intrest, which they could not recover by law, he was accused as a theefe
and robber: the which was but a grosse shift, in regard of their sales they
make at this day, the Notarie putting in this cause, And the
rest in money. It is true, that at the first councell of Nice, the
bishops procured the emperour to forbid vsurie in money and fruits: the which
in regard of fruits, were so much and halfe so much more: that is to say,
fiftie for a hundred. But it was not obserued, especially for fruits, whereas
he that borrowes in a time of dearth is glad to pay it againe and halfe as much
more after haruest. Wherein it seemes there is great reason, for hee that lends
might have gained Vsurie in fruits seemes tollerable more if he had
sold it in a time of scarcitie, as they do commonly. Besides there is nothing
deerer than that which nourisheth, nor any thing more necessarie. And
thereforeNothing deerer or more necessarie than that
which nourisheth. the emperour Iustinian
hauing rated vsurie for the countrey man at foure in the hundred in money, he
decreed, They should pay but twelue in the hundred in fruits, and not fiftie in
the hundred as had bene formerly vsed. Charles of Molins
had no cause to seeke to correct the Greeke and Latine text of the law, against
the truth of all copies, that hee might defend the edict of Lewes the twelfth, and the decrees of the court of parliament, which
made equall the interest in fruits and money: but the difference is great
betwixt the one and the other: for by Iustinians law,
the poore labourer reaped great profit, being freed for thirteen bushels of
corne after haruest, for twelue which he had
borrowed in a time of death: and yet by this correction which Molins giues, he
should be freed for a third part of a bushell, the which is verie absurd;
seeing that before Iustinians decree, it was lawfull to
take fiftie in the hundred for fruits. It is farre better to relie upon the law
of God, which doth absolutely forbid vsurie, and the creditors good deeds shall
be more meritorious and more honourable to lend withoutA
meritorious deed to lend without vsurie. profit, than to receiue of
the poore laborer, in the qualitie of vsurie, a handfull of corne, for so great
and necessarie a good turne. Therefore Nehemias (after
the peoples returne from captiuitie) did forbid them to take any more vsurie,
as they had done before taking twelue in the hundred, as well in money as in
fruits: and according to this example the decree of
Nice was made: but after that Calixtus the 3, & Martin the 5, popes, had
giuen way to rents & annuities, the which were little before that time in
vse, the interest hath growne so high, as the vsurie limited by Iustinian, & partly practised by the Cantons of the
Swissers, is farre more easie and more supportable, although the laws of
Fraunce and Venice do not allow any man to demaund aboue five yeares arrerages
past: For this sufferance of interest, without interest hath growne to be a
law, wherby the vsurers doe sucke the blood of the poore with all impunitie,
especially in sea towns, where there is a common bourse or banke; as at Genes,
where there are some worth foure or five hundred thousand duckets, others aboue
a million, as Adam Centenier, & they say that Thomas Marin hath twise as much. So as the marchant for
the sweetnesAnnuities worse than interest. of gaine
giues over his traffique, the artificer scornes his shop, the labourer leaues
his labour, the shepheard his flocke, and the
noble man sels his land of inheritance, to make fortie or fiftie pounds a yeare
rent in annuities, in stead often pounds a yeare in fee simple land. Then
afterwards when as the rents faile, and the money is spent, as they know which
know not any other good meanes to live, giue themselves to theeuing, or to stir
up seditions ad civill warres, that they might robbe
secretly: the which is the more to be feared, when as one of the estates of the
Commonweale, and the least in force and number, hath in a manner as much wealth
as all the rest; as it hath beene seene heretofore in the state of the Church:
whereas the hundred part of the subiects in the Westerne Commonweales, making
the third estate, had the tythes of what nature soeuer, and against the lawes
of the ptimitiue Church (as the Popes themselves confesse) and have seized upon testamentarie legacies, as well mouables as
immouables, DutchiesThe Clergy enriched, and others made
poor. Counties, Baronies, Lordships, Castles, houses both within and
without Townes, rents of all sorts, and bonds made freely; and yet they tooke
successions of all sides: they sold, exchaunged, purchased, and imploied the
reuenewes of their benifices for other acquisitions; and all without taxe,
subsidie, or any charge, euen in those places whereas the taxes are personall.
So as it was necessarie to enioyne the Cleargie to put away such land as had
bene left unto the church within a certaine time, uppon paine of confiscation:
as by a law made in England by king Edward the first,
which did forbid all church men to purchase any land; as it appeareth in Magna Carta: the which hath beene sinceClergy men forbidden to purchase lands. renewed by the emperour Charles the fift in Flanders, upon paine of confiscation:
the which seemes to have bene forbidden in old
time. For we find that earles of Flanders have bene heirs unto priests: which
custome was abolished by pope Vrbin the fift. For the
same reason the parliament at Paris did prohibit the Chartrens and Celestines
of Paris, to purchase any more, against the opinion of the abbat of Palerme.
Yet these defences were grounded upon the chapter, Nuper de
decimis. And at Venice it hath bene enacted, and church men were
commanded to dispossesse themselves of all lands, prohibiting to leaue any
legacie to a Cleargie man, nor to make a will by the mouth or writing of a
cleargie man. And by a law made at the request of the states of Otleans, the
twentie seuenth article, all cleargie men are forbidden to receiue a testament
or last wil, in the which any thing is giuen him (the which is verie ill
executed) for the abuses In old time every man was forced to leaue something unto the
church. that were committed. Not a hundred yeares since within this
realme, they would not have laid any dead bodie in holy buriall, if hee had not
bequeathed some legacie unto the church; so as they tooke out a commission from
the officiall directed to the first priest of the place: who taking a view of
his goods that had died intestat, bequethed what he pleased unto the church in
his name that was dead▪ the which was reproued by two decrees of the parliament
of Paris, one in the yeare 1388, and the other in the yeare 1401. I have also a
declaration drawne out of the Treasure of France, by the which the twentie
barrons of Normandy named in the act, dated in the yere 1202, declare unto Philip Augustus, That the
goods of him that dies without making a will,
belonged unto him, hauing laine three dayes sicke before his death: and by the
confirmation of the priuileges of Rochell, graunted by Richard king of England and earle of Poitou, it is said, That the
goods of the Rochelois should not bee confiscat, althoughThe
anntient rights o the duke of Norandie and earles of Poitou. they died
intestat: the which was also common in Spaine, vntill the ordinance made by Ferdinand in the yere 1392, bearing these words, Que no sellauen quintos da los que mueren sin fazer testamento
dexando hijos o parientes dentro del quarto grado que pueden hauer &
heredar sus bienes, vz. The fift shal not be leuied of those which die
intestat, so as they have any children, or kinsfolke within the fourth degree
fit to succeed. It is no wonder then if the clergy were rich, seeing that
euerie man was forced to make a wil & to leaue the church a legacie, vnder
rigorous paines; being also straitly defended for many yeares, not to alienat nor rent out the goods of the church,
upon paine of nullitie. By the commaundement of Charles
the ninth a suruay was made of all the reuenewes of the church within this
realme, the which was found to amount to twelue hundredThe
reuenewes of he Clergy in France. and thirtie thousand pounds
starling a yere rent, not comprehending the ordinarie and extraordinarie alms.
But Allemont president of the accounts at Paris, made an
estimat, That of twelue parts of all the reuenewes of Fraunce, the Cleargie
enioyed seuen. And by the registers of the chamber of accompts it appeeres,
that within this realme there are twelue Archbishopricks, 104 Bishopriks, 540
Abbaies, and 27400 parishes or cures (taking every towne for a cure, and the
least village for one where there is a parish)
besides Priories and begging friers. Their reuenues had been far greater if
PopeThe propertie of land is in vaine whereas the
vsufruit is perpetualIohn the 22 had not disanulled the decree of Pope Nicholas, who had allowed all begging friers to enioy the
frutes of lands, and the Pope should have the proprietie, the which was a
grosse cunning to frustrate the vowes of pouertie▪ for that the propertie is
fruitlesse and in vaine, as the law saith, if the vsufruct were perpetuall, as
bodies and colledges be. I do not speake of the well imploying of their goods,
but I say that this great inequalitie (it may be) hath ministred occasion of
troubles and seditions against theAn occasion found out to
ruine the Cleargy. Clergie, throughout all Europe, when as in shew
they made a cullour of religion: for if this occasion had not been, they had
found out some other, as they did in time of our predecessors against the
Templers and the Iewes; or else they would have required a new deuision of lands, as Philip the
Roman Tribune did for the people, pretending that there were but two thousand
men in Rome which possessed all, although they were numbred in all to be aboue
three hundred thousand; and those few did so increase in wealth, as Marcus Crassus by a declaration of the Censors, was
esteemed to be worth sixe millions of crownes: and fiftie yeares after Lentulus the high Priest was found to be worth ten
millions of crownes. The Romains laboured to preuent these inconueniences,
publishing many lawes touching the deuision of lands: among the which the law
Quintia and Apuleia, would have the conquered lands deuided among the
people,The cause of seditions in Rome. the which
if they had bin well executed, those seditions had bin preuented which so
troubled the Commonweale: but the mischiefe was, that the conquered lands were
farmed out by favour to priuat men, with a
pretence of benefit to the Commonweale, upon condition to pay the tenth of
graine, and the fift of frtes, and some rent for the
pastures: yet this rent and other duties were not paied, for that great men
held them in other mens names: for which cause Sextus
Titius the Tribune presented a request unto the people, to the end that
the receiuers of the reuenues might the arrerages that
were due, the which was granted, but being not well executed, it was a meanes
to present other requests unto the people, that the lands and reuenues of the
Commonweale which priuate men held without paying any thing, might be deuided
among the people: the which did greatly amaze the rich, and caused them to
suborne Thorius the Tribune
under hand, That by his intercession unto the people the lands should remain
still in their possessions, and the
arrerages should be paied unto the receiuers of the reuenues: which law they
caused afterwards to be abrogated, when as the magistrates themselves held the
lands, of the which they could not be dispossest, nor forced to pay without
great disturbance to the state. In the end the law Sempronia was published by
force, at the request of Tiberius Gracchus, the which
differed from the law Licinia, by the which all men were forbidden (of what
estate or qualitie soeuer) to hold aboue five hundred acres of the Commonweales
land, a hundred kine, and five hundred sheepe and goates, and to forfeit the
ouerplus: but the law Sempronia spake of nothing but of the publike lands,
ordaining that every yeare there should be three Commissioners appointed by the
people to distribute unto the poore the surplusage of five hundred Law made for the distribution of
lands. acres that should be found in any one familie: but the Tribune
was slaine the last day of the publication, in a sedition moued by the Nobles:
yet Caius Gracchus his brother being Tribune of the
people ten yeres after, caused it to be put in execution, but he was slaine
also in the pursuite thereof, after whose death the Senate to pacifie the
people caused it to be executed against many. And to the end those lands should
not remaine waste, the poore wanting cattell and meanes to till it, it was
ordained that according unto the law Sempronia of Tiberius
Gracchus, the treasure of king Attalus (who had
made the people of Rome his heire) should be distributed among the poore, to
whom they had giuen part of the lands: by which meanes many of the poore were
prouided for. And to take away occasion of future seditions, they sent away
part of the poorer sort into Colonies, to
whome they did distribute countries conqueted from the enemie. But there was
one article in the law of C. Gracchus which was most
necessarie, and yet it was abrogated, Prohibiting the poore to sell or make
away those lands that were assigned unto them: for the rich seeing that the
poore had no meanes to entertaine those lands, redeemed them.
There was also another cause of this inequalitie of goods, which was by the
libertieThe testamentarie law the cause of
inequalitie. that euerie one had to dispose freely of his goods, and
to whom he pleased, by the law of the twelue Tables. All other people, except
the Athenians (where Solon first published this law) had
not free libertie to dispose of their lands. And Licurgus hauing deuided the lands of the inhabitants of the citie into
seuen thousand parts (some say more, others
say lesse) and the lands of the countrie into twelue thousand equall parts, he
did not suffer any one to dispose thereof; but contrariwise, to the end that in
processe of time the seuen thousand parts of inheritance might not be sold, or
diminished into many members, it was decreed, That the elder of the house, or
the next of kin should succeed to the whole inheritance; and, that he could not
have but one part of the seuen thousand; and he must be also a Spartaine borne.
Others were excluded from the succession, as Plutarch
saith, speaking of king Agesilaus, who in the beginning
was bred up straightly as a younger brother, for that hee was issued of a
younger house. This for a time did entertaine the 7000 families in equalitie,
vntill that one of the Ephores being incensed against his eldest sonne,
presented a request unto the Seigneurie, the
which passed for a law, by the which every man had libertie to dispose of his
goods by will. These testamentarie lawes being receiued in Greece, and
afterwards published in Rome, and incerted in the twelue tables, were the cause
of great alterations. But the people of the East and West might not dispose of
lands by testament: a custome which is yet obserued in some parts of France,
Germanie, and other nationsIn Poland and many other parts of
the North, they may not dispose of lands by testament. of the North.
And therefore Tacitus writes, that the Germaines had no
vse of Testaments, the which many have vnaduisedly attributed to ignorance and
barbarisme. And euen in Polonia it is expresly forbidden by the lawes of the
two Sigismonds, according vnto
the antient customes, to dispose of lands by testament. The Oxiles and
the Phytales had a stricter custome,
forbidding them to pawne any lands. And by the custome of Amiens and other
customes of the Lowcountries of Flanders, no Nobleman might sell away their
seigneuries vntill they had solemnely sworne pouertie: theIn
some places noble men may not sell away their seigneuries. which is
also strictly obserued in Spaine. We have also said before, that the law of God
did expresly defend all alienation of lands, either in a mans life or by
testament, reseruing the right of the elder in every familie, without any
difference of noble or villain, according to Licurgus
law in his deuision of 7000 parts in Lacedemon: and those of Caux in Normandie,
as well the Gentlemen as others, do much better preserue the dignitie and
beautie of their antient houses and families, the which by this meanes are not
dismembred, and all the estate of the Commonweale in generall: the which is the
more firme and stable being grounded upon
good houses and families, and as great and immoueable pillers, the which could
not support the burthen of a great building, if they were weake, although they
were many. And it seemes that the greatnes of France, Spaine, and England is
supported by great and noble families, and by corporationsGreat kingdoms supported by noble families, especially in an Aristocratical
estate, but they are contrarie to a Popular estate, or to a Tyranny.
and Colleges, the which being dismembred into peeces, will be the ruine of the
State. But this opinion is more probable than necessarie, vnlesse it be in an
Aristocraticall estate: for it is most certaine that in a Monarchie there is
nothing more to be feared than great men, and corporations, especially if it be
tyranicall. As for a popular estate which requires equalitie in all things, how
can it endure so great inequalitie in families,
whereas some should have all, and others die of hunger: seeing that all the
seditions which have happened in Rome and in Greece have been grounded upon
thisInequalitie main tained the estat of Sparta. point. There remaines an
Aristocratie where as the noble and great men are vnequall with the common
people, and in this case the right of the elder may mainetaine the estate, as
in the seigneurie of Sparta, whereas the seuen thousand parts equally divided
unto the elder of every familie, maintained the State: and as for the yonger
brethren, vertue aduanced them to offices and honors according to their merits:
and commonly they proued the most famous, hauing (as Plutarch said) nothing to aduance them but their vertues. It was the
antient custome of the Gaules: and without doubt our Nobilitie would be much
more esteemed, if the prohibition of selling of their seigneuries were dulie executed, according to the lawes and
ordinances of this realme, and of the Empire, where it is better obserued. The
like defences were made in Polonia, by the laws of Albert, & Sigismond Augustus kings in the
yere 1495 & 1538, & by an edictLaws prohibiting
noble men to ell their seigneuries. made by
Peter duke of Brittaine, forbidding the common people
to purchase the seigneuries of noble men, upon paine of confiscation. And
although that Lewis the 12 disanulled those defences in
the yeare 1505, yet king Francis the first renewed the
Edict in the yeare 1535 under the same paine of confiscation. The meanes to
vnite the nobilitieA meanes to vnite the gentry & the
plebeians. and the common people more strictly together, is to marrie
the yonger children of noble houses being poore (in an Aristocraticall estate)
with the Plebeians that are rich, as they did in Rome after the law Canuleia;
the which is practised at this day by the
Venetians, and almost in every Commonweale, whereas the nobilitie hath any
prerogative over the common people: the which is the surest way to maintaine
the nobilitie in wealth, honour, and dignitie. And yet it is necessarie to
moderat the dowries of women in what estate soeuer, least that meane houses be
not beggered to enrich the nobles: wherein the antient lawgiuers have been much
troubled to obserue this equalitie, and to prouide that ancient houses and
families might not be dismembred and ruined by the daughters. The law of God
would not allow the daughters to succeed if there were any brethren: and
although there were not any, yet the daughters that were heires were commanded
to marrie the next kinsman of that familie: to the end
saith the law, that the inheritance may not be drawne from the house by the
daughters. This law was obserued in Greece,
where as the next kinsman married the heire, neither might the daughter marrie
with any other. In Persia and Armenia the daughter had nothing of the house but
the moueables: a custome which is yet obserued in allI the East parts the daughters inherit o lands. the East, and almost throughout all
Affrike, although that Iustinian the Emperour, or rather
Theodora his wife, hauing alwayes fauored her owne
sexe, reformed that custome of Armenia, terming it barbarous, not regarding the
intention of the antient lawgiuers. Hippodamus lawgiuer
to the Milesians, would not frustrate the daughters of all succession, but he
ordained that the rich should marrie with the poore, wherein he did obserue the
equalitie of goods, and entertained loue betwixt the couples, and betwixt the
poore and the rich. It is most certaine that if the daughters be made equall
with the sonnes in the right of succession,
families shall be soone dismembred: for commonly there are more women than men,
be it in Commonweales in generall, or inThe inequalitie of
goods grows, for that the daughters being heires are married to the
rich. priuate families: the which was first verified at Athens, where
as the pluralitie of women gaue name unto the citie: and within these twentie
yeares at Venice, (whether comes a world of strangers) there was found upon a
suruaie two thousand women more than men: whether it be that they are not
subiect to the dangers of warre and trauell, or that nature is apter to produce
those things that are lesse perfect. And therefore Aristotle said in his Politikes, That of five parts of inheritance the
women of Sparta held three, the which came by the permission of the
testamentarie law; and for this cause (saith he) they cōmanded absolutely ouer
their husbands, whom they called Ladies. But
to preuent this inconuenience at Rome, Voconius Saxa the
Tribune, by the persuasion of Cato the Censor, presented
a request unto the people, the which passedThe law of
succession at Rome, dfrauded. for a law,
whereby it was enacted, That the females should not succeed so long as there
were any male carrying the name, in what degree of consanguinitie soeuer he
were; and, that they might not have giuen them by testament aboue the fourth
part of the goods; nor more than the least of the Testators heires. This law
retained the antient families in their dignities, and the goods in some
equalitie, keeping women in some sort in awe: yet they found a meanes to
defraud it, by legacies and feofments made in trust to friends, with request to
restore the successions or legacies unto the women which could not recover them
by order of law not by petition, before Augustus time;
who following the pernitious counsell of Trebatius, tooke an occasion to abrogate the law,
demanding a dispensation of the law Voconia of the Senat, for his wife Liuia: so as this law being troden under foot, the Roman
citisens began to be slaues unto their wiues, who were their mistresses both in
name and effect. Then might you have seene women wearing two rich successions
at their eares, as Seneca saith; and the daughter of a
Proconsull who did weare at one time in apparell and iewels the value of three
millions of crownes, the inequalitie of goods being then at the highest, after
which time the Roman empire declined still vntill it was wholie ruined. By the
antient custome of Marseilles it was not lawfull to giue aboue a hundred
crownes in marriage with a daughter, and five crownes in apparell. And by the
Statutes at Venice it is forbidden A commendable law at Venic.
to giue aboue 1600 ducats to a noble mans daughter: and if a Gentleman of
Venice marrie a citisens daughter, he may not take aboue two thousand ducats;
nor the females succeed so long as there is any male of the familie: but in
truth this law is as ill obserued as that of king Charles the 9, which forbids to giue unto a daughter in marriageThe law of Fraunce for the marriage of daughters. aboue
a thousand pounds starling, and yet the ordinance of king Charles the 5 doth giue no more unto the daughters of the house of
France. And although that Elizabeth of France, daughter
to Philip the faire were married unto the king of
England, yet had she but twelue hundred pounds starling to her dowrie. Some one
will say unto me, that it was very much, considering
the scarcetie of gold and siluer in those daies: but the difference also is very great betwixt a thousand pounds, and foure
hundred thousand crownes. It is true that she was the goodliest Princesse of
her age, and of the greatest house that was at that day. And if we will seeke
higher, we shall find in the lawThe law of God for
dowries. of God that the marriage of a daughter at the most was taxed
but at fiftie sicles, which make fower pounds starling of our money, in which
penaltie he was condemned that had seduced a virgin, whom also he was forced by
the law to bring home, if the father of the maiden so pleased: which makes me
beleeue that the antient custome of the Persians is likely, for that the
Commissioners deputed yearely to marrie the maidsThe law of
Persia. gaue the honestest and fairest to them that offred most, and
with that money they married them that were lesse esteemed (that none might be
vnprouided for) with this caution to them that
married the deformed, Neuer to put away their wiues, but in restoring of their
dowries▪ by the which they prouided for the marriage of maids, the modestie of
wiues, the dignitie of husbands, and the publike honestie whereon wise
lawgiuers should have a speciall care, as Plato had. For
to take from the daughters all meanes to prefer themselves according to their
qualities, were to giue occasion of a greater inconuenience. And it seemes that
the customes of Aniou and of Maine haueCustome of
Aniou. giuen them a third part in successions, of gentlemen in fee
simple, the which is left to the yonger males but for terme of life, to the end
the daughters should not be vnprouided for, hauing not meanes to aduance
themselves like unto the males: for the reformation of which custome they have heretofore made great complaints:
the which might as well be done, as in the custome of Mondidier, and in that of Vendosme, (an antient
dependance of the countrie of Aniou, before that it was erected to a Countie or
a Duchie) where as a yonger brother of the house of Aniou, hauing taken his
elder brother prisoner, made him to change the custome of Aniou in regard of
the Chasteleine of Vendosme, the which he had but for
terme of life. And although that in Brittaine by the decree of Cont Geoffrie in the yeare 1181 the eldest in gentlemens
houses caried away all the succession, and maintained the yonger at his owne
pleasure: yet to preuent infinit inconueniences, Arthur
the first duke of Brittanie enacted, That the yonger children should have a
third part of the succession for terme of life, as it is obserued in the countrie of Caux, by a decree of the Parlament
at Rouen, the daughters portions being deducted. I have hitherto treated of
subiects only, but we must also take heed least that strangers set footing
within the realme, and purchase the goods of the naturall subiect: and
preuenting all idle vagabonds which desguise themselves like Egiptians, when as
in truth they are very theeves, whom all Magistrates and Gouernors are
commanded to expell out of the real me by a law made at the estates of
Orleance, as it was in like manner decreed in Spaine by Ferdinand in the yeare 1492 in these words, Que los
Egiptianos consennores salgan del Reyno dentro sessenta dias: That all
the Egiptians with their women shall depart out of the realme within threescore
daies. This swarme of caterpillers do
multiplie in the Pyrenees, the Alps, the mountaines of Arabia, and other hillie
and barren places, and then come downe like wasps to cate the honie from the
bees. Thus in my opinion I have set downe briefly the fittest meanes to preuent
the extreme pouertie of the greatest part of the subiects, and the excessiue
wealth of a small number, leauing to discourse hereafter, If the lands
appointed for the seruice of the warre may be dismembred or sold. Let vs now
see if the goods of men condemned should be left unto their heires.
CHAP. III. Whether the goods of men condemned should be
applied unto the common treasure, or to the Church; or els left unto the
heires.
THis Chapter depends upon the former, for one of
the causes which brings the subiects to extreame pouertie, is to take the goods
of the condemned from their lawfull heires, and especially from children, if
they have no other support nor hope, but in the succession of their parents:
and the more children they haue, the greater their pouertie shall be, to whome
the succession of their fathers belongs by the
law of nature, and who by the law of God should not suffer for their fathers
offences. By which confiscations not onely the lawes of God and nature seeme to
be violated, but the children (who haply have benebred up in delights) are
oftentimesIt seemes against the law of nature to take the
succession of the father condemned from the child. reduced to such
pouertie and miserie, as they are thrust into despaire, and attempt any
villanie, either to be revenged, or to flie from want which doth oppresse them.
For we may not hope, that they which have bene bred up as maisters, will serue
as slaues: and if they have not in former times learned any thing, they will
not now begin, when as they have no meanes. Besides the shame they have either
to beg, or to suffer the reproach of infamie, doth force them to banish
themselves, and to ioyne with theeves & robbers: so as for one sometimes
there goe forth two or three worse than hee that had lost both life and goods: so as the punishment which serueth
not onely for a revenge of the offence, but also to diminish the number of the
wicked, and for the saftie of the good, produceth quite contrarie effects.
These reasons briefly run ouer, and amplified by some examples, seeme
necessarie to shew that the law of Iustinian the
emperour, receiued and practised in many countries, is most iust and
profitable: whereby it was enacted, That the goods of them that were condemned
should be left unto their heirs,Iustinian left the goods of
the condemned unto the heire. vnlesse it were in case of high
treason. Contrariwise some may say, that this is a new law, and contrarie to
all the auntient lawes and ordinances of the wisest princes & lawgiuers,
who would have the goods of any one condemned, adiudged unto the publike,
without some especiall cause to moue them to the contrarie: bee it for
reparation of faults, which oft times is
pecuniarie, and is to be paid to the Commonweale interessed, for els there
should bee no meanes to punish by fines, the which is an ordinarie kind of
punishment: be it for the qualitie of the crimes, and of those that have robbed
the Commonweale, which must be satisfied out of his goods that hath offended:
or to terrifie the wicked, which commit all the villanies in the world to
enrich their children,Wicked men wil attempt any thing to
enrich their children. and many times they care not to loose their
lives, yea to damne themselves, so as their children may be heires of their
robberies and thefts. It is needlesse to proue this by examples, the which are
infinit: I will onely produce one of Cassius Licinius,
who being accused and condemned of many thefts and extortions, and seeing Cicero (who was then president) putting on his purple
robe, to pronounce the sentence of confiscation and banishment, he sent one to tell Cicero that he
was dead during the processe, & before the condemnation, choaking himselfe
in view of the judges with a table napkin, to the end he might saue his goods
for his children: Then Cicero (saith Valerius) would not pronounce the sentence. It was in the power of the
accused to saue his life in abandoning of his goods, according unto the
conclusions of his accusers: as Verres and many others
in like case did▪ for by the law Sempronia they might not condemne a bourgesse
of Rome to death, nor whip them by the law Portia. And although that Plutarch, and Cicero himselfe
writes to his friend Atticus, That hee had condemned Licinius, it is to be vnderstood by the aduice and opinion of
all the judges, not that he had pronounced the
sentence, for those lawes were not yet made against them which killed
themselves before sentence. And a hundred and fiftie yeares after, if any one
being accused and guiltie of any crime, had killed himselfe through dispaire or
griefe, he was buried and his testament was of force, in the time of cruell Tiberius, Pretium festinand,A law in favour of murtherers. (saith Tacitus) that is to say, Murtherers in their persons had
that aduantage over others. But whether that he were condemned after his death,
or that he died of griefe, it appeares plainely that many make no difficultie
to damne themselves to enrich their children. And it may be there is nothing
that doth more restraine the wicked from offending, than the feare of
confiscation, whereby their children should be left beggers.The law of confiscation the wicked. Therefore
the law saith, That the Commonweale hath a great interest, that the children
of them that are condemned, should be poore
and needie. Neither can wee say, that the law of God or nature is therein
broken, nor is the sonne punished for the father, for that the fathers goods
are not the childrens: and there is no succession of him whose goods are iustly
taken away before he is dead.
And if any one feares that want wil driue the children to dispaire, and to all
kinds of wickednesse: much more reason hath he to feare, that wicked children
will abuse their fathers goods, to the ruine of good men and of the
Commonweale. And therefore the law excludes the sonnes of him that is condemned
for high treason, from all successions direct and collaterall, and leaues vnto
the daughters (who have lesse power to revenge) a fourth part of their mothers
goods. But there is a greater inconuenience if Rewards are necessary for accusers. the goods of the
condemned be left unto their heirs, then shall the accusers and informers haue
no rewards, and wickednesse shall remaine vnpunished.
These be the inconueniences on either part, but to resolue of that which is
most fit, is most necessarie that the true debts being either publike or
priuat, and the charges of informations, should be deducted out of the goods of
the condemned, if they have wherewithall: else there should be no punishment of
the wicked. Yet this clause ought not to be annexed unto the sentence, and hath
bene reproued by many decrees of the court of parliament, to the end that the
judges may know, that they ought to do iustice although the condemned hath not
any thing. In like sort it is necessarie that fines & amercements should be
leied out of their goods that are condemned in any
summe of money, prouided alwayes, that it be
taken out of their mouable goods▪ or out of thatWhat order
is to be obserued in their goods that are condemned. which they haue
purchased, and not out of those lands which come by succession, the which must
be left unto the heire. And in capitall crimes, that the mouables & lands
purchased, should be forfeited and sold to them that would giue most, for the
charges of the processe, and the reward of informers; and the rest to be
imployed to publike & charitable vses, the succession remaining to the
lawful heires: in so doing you shal preuent the extreame pouertie of the
children, the couetousnesse of slaunderers, the tyranny of bad princes, the
euasion of the wicked, and the impunitie of offences. For to forfeit those
lands which are tyed unto the house, were no reason, seeing it is not lawfull
toLands which come by succession cannot be
forfeited. alienat them by testament, nor in many places to dispose
therof in their life time: by the which should
follow a great inequalitie of goods. And for this reason the goods and lands
purchased must be sold, and not applied unto the church or publike treasure,
least that in the end all priuat mens estates should come to the publike, or to
the church: for that it is not lawfull to alienat those goods which are vnited
to the reuenewes of the Commonweale, or to the church. Moreover informers and
accusers must bee rewarded, not with the possessions of the condemned (which
might animat them to accuse good men wrongfully) but with some peece of mony:
For the desire to have the house or inheritance of another man, the which they
could not obtaine for money, would be a great occasion
of false accusers to ruine the innocent. Yet must informers have some reward, else the wicked shall continue their
villanies with all impunitie. And as a good huntsman will neuer faile to reward
his dogges with the intrails of the beast, to make them the more lively: so a
wise law-giuer must reward them which seize uppon the wolues and lions of the
Commonweales. And for that there is nothing (after the honour due unto God) of
greater consequence than the punishment of offences, wee must seeke all meanes
possible to attaine unto it. But the difficultie is not small, to take the
confiscations from the publike, to imploy them as I have said, and especially
in a Moarchy. Yet there are many reasons, the which a wise and vertuous prince
will more esteeme for his reputation, than all the goods in the world gotten by
confiscations.The inconueniences which grow in adiudging
of confiscations unto the publike. For if the publike reuenewes be
great, or the charges and impositions laid uppon the subiect sufficient, the confiscations ought not to be adiudged unto the
treasure, if the Commonweale be poore, much lesse may you inrich it with
confiscations. Inso doing you shall open a gate for false accusers to make
marchandise of the blood of the poore subiects, and for princes to become
tyrants. So we see that the height of all tyranny hath bene in proscriptions
and coufiscation of the subiects goods. By this means Tiberius the emperour made the way to a most cruell butcherie, leauing
to the value ofConfiscations the caue of tyranny. sixtie seuen millions of crownes gotten the most part
by confiscations. And after him his nephewes Caligula
and Nero, polluted their hands with the blood of the
best and most vertuous men in all the empire, and all for their goods. It is
well knowne that Nero had no colour to put to death his
maister Seneca, but for his wealth. Neither shall there be at any time false accusers wanting,
knowing they shall neuer bee called in question for their slaunders, being
supported by the prince, who reaps part of the profit. Plinie the younger speaking of those times, Wee have (saith hee) seene
the iudgements of informers, like unto theeves and robbers: for there was no
testament, nor any mans estate assured. And therefore by the lawes, the kings
procurator is enioyned to name the informer, least the accusation in the end
should proue slaunderous: the which is necessarily obserued in Spaine, before
that the kings procurator is admitted to accuse any man, by an edict of Ferdinand, made in the yere 1492, in these tearmes, Que ningun fiscal pueda accusar a conseo persone particular sin dar primerimente
delator, That no fiscall or publike officer may accuse any priuat
person before the Councell, but hee shall
first giue in the accusers name. If confiscations have beene alwayes odious in
euerie Commonweale, much more daungerous be they in a Monarchy than in a
Popular or Aristocraticall estate, where false accusers are not so easily
receiued.
If any one will obiect, That we need not to feare these inconueniences in a
Royall estate, hauing to doe with good princes: I annswere, that this right of
confiscation isConfiscations most daungerous in a
Monarchy. one of the greatest means that euer was inuented, to make a
good prince a tyrant, especially if the prince be poore. For he that hath no
pretext to put his subiect to death; ifTyrants are enriched
by false accusations, by meanes of confiscations. he hopes to haue
his goods thereby, he will neuer want crime, accusers, nor flatterets. And
oftentimes the wiues of princes kindle this fire, & inflame their husbands
to al crueltie, to enioy the goods of them that are condemned. Achab king of Samaria could not get Naboths vinyard, neither for
price nor praier, but queene Iesabel subborned two false
witnesses, to condemne the innocent as guiltie of treason both against God and
man. And Faustine did still importune the emperour Marcus Aurelius her husband, to put to death the poore
innocent children of Auidius Cassius, beeing condemned
for treason, whose goods the emperour left unto his children; as the kings of
Persia were woont to doe, euen in cases of high treason, and hath bene often
practised in this realm. And by the lawes of Polonia, confiscation hath no
place but in the highest degree of treason: and oftentimes it is giuen unto the
kinsfolkes. But it is a hard matter to recover the
goods which are once forfeited, be it by right or wrong; for they hold it for a
rule, That amercements once adiudged to the
crowne and receiued, are neuer restored, although the iudgement were false. The
which is the more to bee feared, for that the goods of them that are condemned
for treason, are forfeited to the prince, and not to the lords of the soyle,
who cannot pretend any thing if another mans subiect bee condemned for treason,
as they may doe in all other crimes. And although we may number as many good
and vertuous kings in this realme, as euer were in any Monarchie upon this
earth, yet wee shall see that the reuenewes have beene more augmented by
confiscations and forced gifts, than by any thing else. Was there euer prince
in the world in vertue, pietie, and integritie, like unto our king Saint Lewes? and yet by the meanes aforesaid, hauing caused Peter of Dreux to be condemned, he did confiscat, and
then vnite unto his crowne the earldome of
Dreux: as he did also unto Thibaut king of Nauarre and
earle of Champagne, who was in the like daunger, if he had not resigned Bray,
Fortione, and Monstrueil: and Raymond earle of Tholouse,
the countrey of Languedoc.1234. The countries of
Guienne, Aniou, Maine, Touraine, and Auuergne, are come unto the crowne by
confiscations in the time of Philip Augustus. The
dutchie of Alencon,1202. and the earledome of Perch,
are also come by confiscations. In like case 1458. Perigort, 1369. Ponthieu,
1370. la Marche, 1302. Angoulesme, 1302. l'Isle in
Iourdaine, the marquisat of Salusses, and 1535.
all the goods of Charles of Bourbon, with many other
priuat Seigneuries, have bene forfeited for high treason, according to the
custome of other Commonweales, and the antient laws. But the custome of
Scotland in cases of treasons is more cruell,
whereas all the goods of him that is condemned accrue unto the exchequer,
without any regard of wife, children, nor creditors.
If any man will say, That the king freeing himself of those lands which hold
not immediatly of him, according to the edict of Philip
the Faire, and giuing the most part of them which hold directly of him, vnto
such as shall deserue well, the which he may do before they be incorporat vnto
the crowne: hee shall not appropriat unto the publike all the goods of priuat
men, as else he might do in time. And to preuent this inconuenience, the king
cannot recover those lands which hold directly of him, offring the price to
them that bought them: for so he might by purchase get all his subiects lands.
I doe therefore thinke this more convenient, than to adiudge the confiscations
unto the people; as they did in Rome by the
law Cornelia, which Sylla the Dictator did publish,
after that he had enriched his friends and partisans with the spoyles of his
enemies. But there is as small reason to giue them to the flatterers of
princes, and to the horse leaches of the court, as it is vsuall in all gouerned
Monarchies, which opens a gap unto false accusers, giuing unto the vnworthy the
rewards of the well deseruing. Who doth not remember (although I grieue to
remember) the blood of innocent citisens shed for gaine under a colour of
religion, to glut these horseleaches of the court? Therefore to auoide these
inconueniences of either part as much as may be, I see no better meanes than
that which I have said, That deducting the charges of the suit, his iust debts
being publick or priuate, and the rewards of the accusers; the surplusage of
his inheritance should be left unto the
heires, and that which was purchased to charitable vses▪ prouided alwaies that
that which is giuen to the informers, or to the colleges in charitie, shall be
only in money and not in lands, for the reasons that I have formerlyInformers must be rewarded with money, and not with
lands. giuen. As for charitable works, there neuer wants meanes to
imploy it, either in diuine things, or in publike works, or else about the
sicke or the poore. In old time at Rome amercements were adiudged to the
treasurie of Churches, to be imployed in sacrifices, and therefore they called
amercements Sacramenta, as Sextus
Pompeius saith: for which cause Titius Romilius
refused the peoples bountie, which had decreed that
they should restore unto him the fine in the which he had bene condemned,
saying, That things consecrated unto God
should not be taken from him. The like was also obserued in Greece for the
tenth of the goods that were confiscate, the which were adiudged unto the
Church, as we may see in the sentence giuen against Archiptolome, Antiphon, and his consorts in Athence in the forme that
followeth. The 16 day of Prytanee, Demonicus Dalopeie
being Register, and Philostratus Captaine, at the
pursuite of Andron touching Archiptolemus, Onomaches, and Antiphon, whome
the Captaine hath accused that they went to Lacedemon to the preiudice of the
Commonweale, and that they departed from the Camp in one of the enemies ships;
the Senat hath decreed, That they should be apprehended, and that the Captaine
with ten Senators named by the Senat, should determine of them, to the end they
might be punished, that the Thesmothetes
should call them the next day, and bring them before the Iudges, and that the
Captaine or any other might accuse them, to the end that iudgement beingThe law of Athens in cases of treason. giuen, execution
might follow, according to the lawes made against traitors. And under the
decree the sentence is set downe in this sort, Archiptolemus and Antiphon were condemned and
delivered into the hands of eleuen executioners of iustice, their goods
forfaited, and the tenth reserued unto the goddesse Minerua, and their houses razed: afterwards they did adiudge all vnto
the publike treasor, and yet the law did allow the Iudges to dispose in their
sentence as they should thinke the cause deserued for publike or charitable
vses, as we have a commendable custome in this realme. That which I have said
of successions should principallie take place, when as there is any question of lands holden in fee, for the prerogative
and qualitie of the fee, affected to the antient families for the seruice of
the Commonweal. Wherin the Germans have well prouided, for in all confiscations
the next of kin are preferred before the publikeThe law of
Germanie for confications. treasurie when
there is any question of land in fee; wherby flatterers have no means to accuse
wrongfully, nor Princes to put good men to death for their fees▪ which seemes
to have been the reason that by the lawes of God the amercement was consecrated
unto God, and giuen to the high Priests, if he that had offended were not in
presence, or had no heires. And for that this Chapter concernes rewards and
punishments, order requires that we discourse of the one and the
other.
CHAP. IIII. Of reward and punishment.
IT is needfull to treate here briefly of rewards
and punishments, for he that would discourse thereof at large should make a
great volume, for that these two points concerne all Commonweales, so as if
punishments and rewards be well and wisely distributed, the Commonweale shall
be alwaies happie and florish, and contrariwiseThe two
principall foundations of every Commonweale. if the good be not
rewarded and the bad punished according to their deserts, there is no hope that
a Commonweale can long continue. There is not
any thing that hath bred greater troubles, seditions, civill warres, and ruines
of Commonweales than the contempt of good men, and the libertie which is giuen
to the wicked to offend with all impunitie. It is not so necessarie to
discourse of punishments, as of rewards, for that all lawes and bookes of
lawyers are full of them, but I find not any one that hath written of rewards:
either for that good men are so rare, and wicked men abound; or for that it
seemes more profitable for a Commonweale to restraine the wicked with the feare
of punishment, than to incourage the good to vertue with rewards. But for that
punishmēts are odious of themselves, and rewards
favourable, therefore wise Princes have accustomed to referre punishments
unto the Magistrate, and to reserue rewards
unto themselves, to get the loue of the subiects, and to flie their hatred: for
which cause Lawyers and Magistrates have treated amplie of punishments, and but
few have made any mention of rewards. And although the word merit is taken in
the best sence, as Seneca saith, Altius iniuriae quam merita descendunt, Iniuries make a deeper
impression than merits, yet we will vse it indifferently and according unto the
vulgar phrase. every reward is either honorable, orDifference of rewards. profitable, or both together, else it is no
reward, speaking popularly and politikely, seeing we are in the middest of a
Commonweale, and not in the schooles of the Academikes and Stoikes, which hold
nothing to be profitable that is not honest; nor honorable which is not
profitable: the which is a goodly paradoxe, and yet contrarie to the rules of policie, which doe neuer ballance profit
with the counterpoise of honour: for the more profit rewards have in them, the
lesse honourable are they, and alwayes the profit doth diminish the beautie and
dignitie of the honour. And euen those are most esteemed and honoured, wherein
they imploy their goods to maintaine the honour. So as when we speake of
rewards, we vnderstand triumphes, statues, honourable charges, estates, and
offices, which are therefore called honors: for that many times the priuat
estates of famous men are wasted thereby: the rest have more profit than honour
in them, as benefices, militarie gifts, immunities of all or some charges; as
of taxes, imposts, wardship, exemptions from the warre; and from ordinarie
judges, letters of estate, of freedome, of
legitimation, of faires, of gentrie, of knighthood, and such like. But if the
office be hurtfull, and without honour, it is no longer a reward, but a charge
or burthen. Neither may wee confound a reward and a benefit; for a reward is
giuenDifferent of reward and
benefit upon good desert, and a benefit upon speciall favour. And as
Commonweals be diuers, so the distribution of honours and rewards is verie
different in a Monarchy, and in the other two estates. In a Popular estate
rewards are more honourable than profitable: for the common people hunt only
after profit, caring little for honour, the which theyThe
difference of giuing rewards in a Popular estate and a Monarchy. doe
willingly giue to them that are ambitious. But in a Monarchie the prince is
more iealous of honour than of profit, especially if he be a tyrant, who takes
nothing more disdainefully, than to see his subiect honoured and respected;
fearing least the sweet intising bait of
honour, should make him aspire and attempt against his estate: or els for that
a tirant cannot endure the light of vertue: as we read of the emperor Caligula, whoA tyrant cannot endure to
have the subiect honoured. was iealous and enuious of the honor that
was done to God himself: and the emperor Domitian, who
was the most base and cowardly tyrant that euer was, yet could hee neuer endure
that any honour should be done unto them that had best deserued, but hee put
them to death. Sometimes princes in stead of recompencing of worthy men, they
put them to death, banish them, or condemne them to perpetuall prison, for the
safetie of their estates. So did Alexander the Great to
Parmenio his constable, Iustinian to Bellisarius, Edward the fourth to
the earle of Warwike; and infinit others, who for the reward of their prowesse
have bene slaine, poisoned, or ill intreated by their princes. And for this cause, as Tacitus
writes, the Germans did attribut all the honour of their goodly exploits vnto
their princes, to free themselves from enuie which followes vertue. And
therefore we neuer see Monarches, & much lesse tyrants, to graunt triumphes
and honourable entries unto his subiects, what victorie soeuer they have gotten
of the enemie.The honour of the souldiors victory is due
unto the captaine. But contrariwise a discreet captaine, in stead of
a triumph at his returne from victorie, humbling himselfe before his prince, he
saith, Sir, your victorie is my glorie, although the prince were not present:
for hee that commaunds deserues the honour of the victorie, euen in a Popular
estate: as it was adiudged betwixt the Consull Luctatius
and Valerius his lieutenant, upon a controuersie they
had for the triumph, the which Valerius pretended to be due unto him, for that the
Consull was absent the day of the battell. So
we may say, that the honour of the victorie is alwayes due unto the prince,
although he be absent the day of the battell: as Charles
the fift, king of France was, who gaue his armes unto one of his gentlemen, and
retired himselfe out of the fight, fearing to fall into his enemies hands: And
for this cause he was called wise, remembring how preiudiciall his fathers
captiuitie was unto Fraunce. The like we may say of PopularWhy Popular estates have more famous men than Monarchies. estates,
that the generals victories belong unto the people under whose ensigns they
have fought, but the honor of the triumph is giuen unto the Generall: the which
is not obserued in a Monarchy. Which is the chiefe, and it may be the onely
occasion, why in Popular estates well gouerned, there are more vertuous men
than in a Monarchy: For that honor which is the onely reward of vertue is taken
away, or at the least much restrained from
them that deserue it in a Monarchy, and is graunted in a lawfull PopularPreferments to honour breeds men of desert. estate, euen
in matters of armes. For as a generous and noble minded man doth more esteeme
honour than all the treasure of the world; so without doubt he will willingly
sacrifice his life and goods for the glorie he expects: and the greater the
honours be, the more men there will be of merit and fame. And therefore the
Commonweale of Rome hath had more great Captaines, wise Senators, eloquent
Orators, and learned Lawyers, than any other Commonweale, either Barbarians,
Greeks, or Latines: For he that had put to rout a legion of the enemies, it was
at his thoice to demand the triumph, or at the least some honourable charge;
one of the which could not bee denied him. As for the triumph, which was the
highest point of honour a Roman citisen could
aspire vnto, there were no people under heauen where it was solemnised with
more state and pompe than at Rome: For he that triumphed, made his entrie
moreThe description of a triumph at Rome.
honourable than a king could doe in his realme, dragging the captiue kings
& commaunders in chaines after his chariot, hee sitting on high attired
with a purple robe wrought with gold, and a crowne of baies accompanied with
his victorious armie, being braue with the spoyles of their enemies, with a
sound of trumpets and clarons, rauishing the hearts of all men, partly with
incredible ioy, and partly with amazement & admiration: and in this manner
the Generall went upto the Capitoll to doe sacrifice. Aboue all (saith Polybius) that which did most inflame the youth to aspire
to honour, were the triumphall statues or images lively drawne of his parents
and predecessors, to accompnie him to the
Capitoll. And after he had done the solemne sacrifice, hee was conducted home
to his house by the greatest noble men and captaines. And those which died were
publikely praysed before the people, according unto the merits of their
forepassed lines. And not onely the men, but also the women, as we read in Titus Liuius, Matronis honor additus, vt eorum sicut virorum
solemnis laudatio esset, There was honour giuen unto matrons, that
there might bee a solemne commendation of them as of men. I know there are
preachers which will say, That this desire of honour is vaine, which euerie
good man should flie: but I hold that there is nothing more necessarie for
youth (as Theophrastus said) the which doth enflame them
with an honest ambition; who when as they see themselves commended, then do
vertues spring and take deeper root in them.
And Thomas Aquinus saith, That a prince must bee
nourished with the desire of true glorie, to giue him the taste of vertue. We
have no reason then to maruell, if neuer any Commonweale did bring forth such
famous men, and so many, as Rome did: For the honours which were graunted in
other Commonweals, came nor neere unto them which were giuen in Rome. It was a
great reward of honourThe honours giuen at Athens. at
Athens, and in the Olympike games, to be crowned with a crowne of gold in the
open theatre before all the people, and commended by an Orator; or to obtaine a
statue of brasse, or to be enterrained of the publike charge, or to be the
first, or of the first rank in places of honors, for
himselfe & his house; the which Demochares required
of the people for Demosthenes, after that he had made a repetition of his prayses,
wherin there was no lesse profit than honour. But the Romans (to giue them to
vnderstand that they must not esteeme honour by profit) had no crowne in
greater estimation,The Romans esteemed honour more than
profit. than that of grasse or greene corne, the which they held more
pretious than all the crownes of gold of other nations. Neither was it euer
giuen to any, but to Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator, with this title, Patrie
seruatori, To the preseruer of his countrey. Wherein the wisedome of
the auntient Romans is greatly to be commended, hauing thereby banished
couetousnesse and the desire of gainefull rewards; and planted the loue of
vertue in the subiects hearts, with the price of honour. And whereas other
princes are greatly troubled to find money, to emptie their coffers, to sell
their reuenewes, to oppresse their subiects,
to forfeit some, and to spoile others, to recompence their slaues and
flatterers (although that vertue cannot bee valued by any price) the Romans
gaue nothing but honours, for that the captaines respected nothing lesse than
profit: and euen a priuat Roman souldiour refused a chaine of gold of Labienus lieutenant to Caesar, for
that he had hazarded his life couragiously against the enemie, saying, That he
would not the reward of the couetous, but of the vertuous; the whichA worthy saying of a souldir.
is honour, that we must have alwayes before our eyes. But vertue must not
follow, but goe before honour: as it was decreed by the auntient high Priests
at Rome, when as Consull Marcus Marcellus had built a
temple to Honour and Vertue; to the end the vows and sacrifices of the one
should not be confounded with the other, they resolued to make a wall to diuide the temple in two, but yet so, as
they must passe thorow the temple of Vertue, to enter into that of Honour. And
to speake truely, the auntient Romans onely did vnderstand the merits of
vertue, and the true points of honour. For although the Senator Agrippa left not wherewithall to defray his funerall, nor
the Consull Fabricius nor the Dictator Cincinnatus wherewithall to feed their families, yet the one was
drawne from the plogh to the Dictatorship, and the
other refused halfe the kingdomes of Pyrrhus, to
maintaine his reputation and honour. The Commonweale was neuer so furnished
with worthy men, as in those dayes, neither were honours and dignities better
distributed than in that age. But when as this pretious reward The refuse honours when they are
giuen to the vnwothy. of vertue was
imparted to the vicious and vnworthy, it grew contemtible, so as every one
scorned it, and held it dishonourable: as it happened of the gold rings which
all the gentlemen of Rome neglected, seeing Flauius a
libertine to Appius and a popular man, created Aedile,
or chiefe ouerseer of the victuals; the which they were not accustomed to giue
to any but gentlemen, although he had deserued well of the people. And the
which is most to be feared, good men will abandon the place wholly to the
wicked, for that they will have no communication nor fellowship with them: as
Cato the younger did, who being chosen by lot with
diuers other judges to iudge Gabinius, and seeing that
they pretended to absolue him, beeing corrupted with gifts, hee retired
himselfe before the people, and brake the tables that were offered unto him. So
did the chast women in this realme, who cast away their girdles of gold, the
which none might weare that had stained their
honours, who notwithstanding did weare girdles, & then they said, Que bonne renommee valoit meux que ceinture doree, That a
good name was better than a golden girdle. For alwaies vertuous men haue
impatiently endured to bee equalled with the wicked in the reward of honour.
have wee not seene that the onely meanes that king Charles the seuenth found to make a number of vnworthy men, who had
gotten the order of knights of the Starre, by women or favour, to leaue it, he
decreed, That the archers of the watch at Paris, should weare a star upon naturall der of honour and
vertue. their cassockes, which was the marke of Saint Owen: whereuppon all the knights of this disorder left the starre. As in like case the people of
Athens disanulled the law of Ostracisme, by
the which the best men were banished their countrey for three yeares, when as
Hyperbolus one of the worst and wickedest men of
Athens had bene condemned by that law.
It is a daungerous and very pernitious thing in every Commonweale, to grant
honours and rewards without any difference, or to sell them for money; although
that they which thinke to win honour in buying their offices, abuse themselves
as much as those which thought to flie with the golden wings of Euripides, making that which should be the lightest of
all others, of the heauiest mettall: for then the precious treasure of honour
turnes to dishonour; and honour being once lost, then do they exceedThe reward of honour turnes to infamie, if it be giuen to the
vnworthy. in all vice and wickednesse: the which shall neuer happen
if the distribution of rewards and punishments
be ordered by a harmoniacall iustice, as wee will shew in the end of this
worke. If a Consull be allowed a triumph, it is reason that captains and
lieutenants should have the estates and offices, the horsmen the crowns and
horses, and the priuat soldiors also should have part of the arms & spoils.
And in the bestowing of offices theyHarmonicall proportion
in the distribution of rewards. must also have a respect unto the
qualitie of persons: to Gentlemen the offices of Consull, and governments; to
the Plebeians the Tribunes places, and other meane offices fit for their
qualities and merits: and if the vertue of a meane man or of a priuate souldier
be so great that hee exceeds all others, it is reason that he have his part in
the greatest dignities, as it was decreed by the law Canuleia, to appease the
seditions betwixt the nobilitie of Rome and the people: but he that would make
a Consull, a knight of the Order, or a master
of the horse, of a base fellow that had neuer caried arms, without doubt he
should blemish the dignitie of rewards, and put the whole estate in danger of
ruine. In old time there was more difficultie to create a simple Knight, than
is now to make a Generall: they must have deserued well, and prepare themselves
for it with great solemnitie. And euen Kings children and Princes of the bloud
were not admittedThe estimation of honours in old
times. to be Knights but with great ceremonies: as we may reade of
Saint Lewis, when he made his sonne Philip the 3. Knight, who afterwards created Philip the faire Knight in the yeare 1284 and he his three children in
the presence of all his Princes: and which is more, king Francis the first after the battaile of Marignan caused himselfe to be
dubbed knight by Captaine Bayard, taking his sword from
him. But since that cowards and housedoues
caried away this price of honor, true knights neuer esteemed it: so as Charles the sixt at the siege of Bourges made aboue fiue
hundred knights banerets, & many other knights, which had not power to
raise a banner, as Monstrelet said. In like sort that
militarie girdle which the Roman Emperours did vse to giue as a reward of honor
to them that had deserued well of the Commonweale; as the coller of the order,
the which they tooke away in reproch, as Iulian the
Emperour did from Iouinian and other christian
Captaines; and the honor of a Patrician, the which the Emperours of the East
did esteeme as the highest point of honor and favour: in the beginning it was
not giuen but unto the greatest Princes and noble men. As we read that the
Emperour Anastasius sent the order of a Patrician to
king Clouis in the citie of Tours, but after that it was imparted to men of base condition and
vnworthie of that honor, it grew contemptible, so as Princes have bin of
necessitie glad to forge new honors, new prizes, and new rewards. As Edward the third king of England made the order of Saint
George, or of the Garter: and soone after the 6 of
Ianuary 1351 king Ihon did institute the order of the
Starre in the Castell of Saint Owen: and long after that Philip the secondThe orders of England, Franc, and Bourgongne duke of Burgogne erected the
order of the golden Fleece: and 40 yeres after him Lewis
the II king of France made the order of Saint Michaell;
as also after him the dukes of Sauoy have instituted the order of the Anonciado, and other Princes have done the like, to honor with the title of Knighthood those that deserued
well, whose seruices they cannot otherwise
reward. By the first article of the golden Fleece, theThe
law of the Golden Fleec. which was
instituted the tenth of Ianuary 1429 no man might be Knight of that order,
vnlesse he were a Gentleman of name and armes, and without reproch: by the
second, he might not carrie any other order of what Prince soeuer, but with the
priuitie & consent of the chiefe of the order: the seuenth article wils,
That all personall quarrels and dissentions of Knights among themselves shall
be decided by Iudges of the order, the which is a bodie and Colledge, with a
Chancellor, Treasorer, King at armes, Register, a priuat Seale of the order,
and soueraigne iurisdiction, without appeale or civill request. Lewis the II imitating the example of Philip Duke of Bourgogne, who had entertained him in the time of his
disgrace with his father, instituting the order of Saint Michell into a Colledge, the first day of August in the
yeare 1469 he set downe those articles whereof I have made mention, and all
other articles specified in the institutionThe law of the
order of Saint Michael. of the Fleece: and besides in the 37 article
it is said, That when any assemblie shall be made the life and conuersation of
every Knight shall be examined one after an other, during which examination
they shall depart out of the Chapter, and be called againe to heare the
admonitions and censures of the Chancellor of the order: and in the 38 article
it is said, That an examination and censure shall be made of the soueraigne and
head of the order, which is the King, as of the rest to be punished and
corrected, according to the aduice of the brethren of the order, if he hath
committed any thing against the honor, estate,
and dutie of Knighthood, or against the statutes of the order: and in the 42
article it is decreed, That any Knights place being voyd, the Chapter shall
proceed to a new election, and the Soueraignes voice shall stand but for two:
and both he and all the Knights of the order shall be bound to take a solemne
oth at their entrie into the Chapter, to chuse the worthiest that they know,
without respect to hatred, friendship, favour, bloud, or any other occasion,
which might▪ diuert them from the right: which oth shall be made in the
Soueraignes hands from the first unto the last: and in the last article there
is an expresse clause, That neither the King nor his successors, nor the
chapter of the order may not derogate from the articles of the institution.
Behold briefly the institution of the order and Colledge of honor, the
goodliest and the most royall that euer was in
any Commonweale, to draw, yea to force mens minds unto vertue. It may be some
one will say, that the first institution of 31 Knights in the order of the
golden Fleece, of 36 in the order of France, and of 24 in the order of the
Garter instituted at Windsor, cuts off the way to vertue, for that it is
expresly defended in the last article of the ordinances of Lewis the II, not to increase that number, although the Soueraigne
Prince and the whole Chapter were so resolued; but in my opinion it is one of
the chiefest articles that ought to have bene dulie obserued: to auoid the
inconueniences which we have seene by the infinite number of the order of Saint
Michell,The excessiu number of Knights of
the order, have ruined the order. for the number is sufficient to
receiue them that shall deserue that honor: and the fewer there are, the more
it will be desired of all men: as at a prize, the which is the more greedily desired, for that every man hopes for it, and
few carrie it. And in this number soueraigne Princes are not comprehended, to
whom they present the order only for honor, for that they cannot be tyed to the
lawes of the order, and retaine the rights and prerogatives of soueraigntie.
And although the number were small, yet were there but foureteene Knightes at
the first institution of the order, the which are named in the ordinance: and
in the time of King Francis the first the number was
neuer full. So it is most certaine, that there is nothing that doth more
blemish the greatnes of the honor, than to impart it to so many And for this
cause many seeing the smal account was held of the order, procured to haue
their Seigneuries erected into Earledomes, Marquisats,
and Duchies, which number hath so increased in a short time, as the multitude
hath bred contempt, so as Charls the ninth enacted by an edict, That after that time all
Duchies, Marquisats and Counties should be vnited unto the Crowne, if the
Dukes, Marquises and Earles dyed without heires males issued of their bodies,
although the said Seigneuries had not in former times belonged unto the Crowne:
the which is a verie necessarie Edict to restraine the insatiable ambition of
such as had not deserued these titles of honor, whereof the Prince should be
iealous. And generally in all gifts, rewards, and titles of honor it is
expedient (for the greater grace of the benefi) tthat he only which holds the
Soueraigntie should bestow it on him that hath deserued; who will thinke
himselfe much more honored, when his Prince hath giuen him his reward, seene
him, heard him, and graced him. Also the Prince aboue all things must be
iealous that the thanks of his bountie may
remaine, banishing from his court those sellers of smoke, or punishing them as
Alexander Seuerus did, who caused one to be tyedSellers of smoke dangerous to an estate. unto a post, as
Spartian saith, and smothered him with smoke, causing
it to be proclaimed by the trompet, So perish all such as sell smoke. He was
fauored by the Emperour, who as soone as he knew the name of any one whom the
Emperour meant to grace either with honor or office, he went unto him,
promising him his favour, the which he sold at a high rate, and like a
horseleech of the Court he suckt the bloud of the subiects to the dishonor of
his Prince, who should hold nothing more deere than the thanks of his gifts and
bountie; else if he indure that his houshold seruants steale away the favours
of his subiects, it is to be feared that in the end they will make themselves
masters, as Absolon
did, who shewing himselfe affable and courteous to all the subiects, abusing
the charges of honor, offices, and benefices, giuing them under the favour of
the King his father to whom he pleased; he stole from him (saith the scripture)
his subiects hearts, and expelled him from his royall throne. We read also of
Otho, who hauing receiued 2500 crownes for a
dispensation which the Emperour Galba gaue at his
request, he gaue them among the Captaines of the guards, the which was a chiefe
meanes for him to vsurp the State, after that he had caused Galba to be slaine. This gift was like unto the Eagle which the
Emperour Iulian caried in his Standard, the which pulled
off her owne feathers, whereof they made arrowes to shoot at her. ForIt is the ruine of princes to giue too great authoritie to his
subiects. the same occasion the last kings issued from Meroue and Charlemaigne were
expelled from their estates by the Maiors of
the pallace, who gaue all offices and benefices to whom they pleased without
the kings priuitie or consent: and therefore Loup Abbot
of Ferrieres did write unto Charles the 3 king of
France, aduising him to have a speciall care that his flatterers and courtiers
did not steale from him the thanks of his liberalitie. Some will say, that it
is impossible for a Prince to refuse his mother, brethren, children, and
friends: I must confesse it is a hard matter to auoid it, yet I have seene a
King whoCharles the ninth to Henry. being importuned
by his brother for another, said unto him in the presence of the sutor,
Brother, at this time I will do nothing for your sake, but for the loue of this
man who hath deserued well, to whom he graciously granted what his brother had
demanded. But if the Prince will wholie yeeld himselfe to the appetite of his
followers, we may well say that he is but a
cipher, which giues all power unto others, & reserues nothing to himselfe:
he must therefore know which be good and vertuous men, and that have well
deserued. And least the Prince should be forced to denie many importunate
beggers, he must make choise of wise and faithfull masters of requests, to
receiue every mans petition, who may dissuade such as demaund any thing that is
vniust or against the good of the State, or at the least they must acquaint the
Prince therewith that he may not be surprised in his answer: By this meanes
importunat beggers shall be kept backe by goodmen, neither shall they have any
cause to bee discontented with the Prince, who they
will thinke vnderstands not thereof, or else he will satisfie them with
Tranqud. in Tit. pertinent
reasons, wherein the Emperour Titus is greatly
commended, for that he neuer sent away any man discontented, whether he granted
or refused what he demanded, and therefore they called him, The delight of
mankind. Moreover an impudent begger knowing that his petition shall be viewed,
red and examined by a wise Chancellor, or an understanding master of requests
will not presume to pursue a thing that is vniust; for Princes neuer want
flatterers and impudent beggers, the which have no other end but to drinke the
bloud, eate the boanes, & suck the marrow both of Prince and subiect: and
those which have best deserued of the Commonweale, are commonlyWhy good and vertuous men want rewards. most kept back,
not only for that their honor forbids them to flatter, and to beg the reward of
vertue, which should be offred unto them: but also for the charges and expences
of the pursuite, and many times without all
hope. And if their petitions be once reiected, they will not make a second
attempt, no more then Callicratidas a Lacedemonian
Captaine (one of the most vertuous of his age) who was mockt of the Courtiers
of yong Cyrus, for that he had not the patience to court
it long: and contrariwise Lisander a flattering
courtier, if euer any were, obtained whatsoeuer he demaunded.Plut. in Lisand. A modest and bashfull man is amazed in this case,
where as the impudent preuaile, knowing well the humor of Princes, who alwaies
loue them to whom they have done most good, and the most part hate them to whom
they are most bound: and to say the truth, the nature of a benefit is such, as
it doth no lesse bind him that giues, than him
that receiues it: and contrariwise thanks and the acknowledging of a benefit is
troublesome to an ingratefull person, and revenge is sweet, wherof Tacitus giues the reason,Why we are
more prone to revenge than to requite. saying, Proniores ad vindictam sumus quàm ad gratiam, quia gratia oneri, vltio in
questu betur: We are more prone to revenge
then to giue thanks, for thanks is held a burthen, and revenge a gaine. And
although that many Princes neither pay, nor giue any thing but words, yet the
least promise that is made unto them they hold as a firme bond. There is yet an
other point which hinders and cuts off the rewards of good men, which is, that
if a wise Prince bestowes any office, priuiledge, or gift to whom soeuer,
before he can enioy it, he must giue the one halfe in rewards: and oftentimes
their promises are sold so deere, as they carrie away little or nothing at all,
the which is an incurable disease but by
seuere and rigorous punishments, for the which they must of necessitiePunishments & rewards, the two supports of a
Commonweale. prouide, seeing that punishments and rewards are the two
firmest supports of a Commonweale. The best meanes to preuent it is for the
Prince to cause the gift to be brought and delivered, and if it were possible
to be present thereat himselfe, specially if it be to a man of worth: for the
gift comming in this sort from the Princes own hand, hath more efficacie and
grace, then a hundred times as much giuen him by an other repiningly, or
curtalled for the most part. The like censure is to be made of praise or
commendations, which the Prince delivers with his owne mouth to him that hath
deserued it, the which hath more effect then all the wealth that he can giue
him: and a reproch or blame is as a stabbe unto generous minds to force them to
do well. But it is impossible euer to see a
iust distribution of punishments and rewards, so long as Princes shall set to
sale dignities, honors, offices, and benefices, the which is the most dangerous
and pernitious plague in a Commonweale. All nations have prouided for it
byThe sale of offices and benefices most dangerous in a
Commonweale. good and wholesome lawes; and euen in this realme the
ordinance of S. Lewis notes them with infamie that haue
used the favour of any man to procure them offices of iustice, the which was
reasonablie well executed vntill the raigne of king Francis the first, and in England it is yet rigorously obserued, as I
have vnderstood by M. Randall the english Ambassador;
the which was also strictly decreed by an edict of Ferdinand, great Grandfather by the mothers side to Philip, made in the yeare 1492 where as the
forme of choosing of offices of iustice is set downe: Que no
se puedan vender, ny trocarofficios de Alcaldia, ny AlquaZiladgo, ny regimiento, ny
veyntes quatria, ny fiel executoria, ny iuraderia. It is not needfull
to set down the inconueniences & miseries that a Commonweale is subiect
unto by the sale of offices, the labour were infinite being so well knowne to
all men. But it is more difficult in a popular State to perswade them that this
trafficke is good, then where as the richest men hold the Soueraignetie. it is
the onely meanes to exclude the poorer sort from offices, who in a popular
estate willSale of offices least used in a Popular
estate. have their parts without paying any money, and yet hardly
shall they obserue these prohibitions, when as the common people shall reape
some benefit by choosing of ambitious men. As for a Monarke, pouertie sometimes
forceth him to breake good lawes to supplie his wants, but after they have once
made a breach, it is impossible to repaire it.
It was forbidden by the law Petilia to go to fayers and assemblies, to sue for
the peoples favour & voyces. By the law Papiria no man might weare a white
gowne. The law Calphurnia declared him incapable for euer to beare any office
that had been condemned of ambition, vnlesse he had accused and conuicted an
other, and he that had caused his competitor to be condemned of ambition, he
obtained his office; afterwards punishment was made greater by the law Tullia,
published at the request of Cicero, whereby it was
decreed that a Senator condemned of ambition should be banished for ten yeares,
but it was not obserued by the rich, who sent their broakers into the assemblie
of the States with great sommes of money to corrupt the people, so as Caesar fearing to have one ioyned with him in the
Consulship that might crosse his designes, he
offred his friend Luceius as much money as was needfull
to purchase the peoples voyces: whereof the Senat being aduertised, they
appointed a great somme of money for his competitor Marcus
Bibulus to buy the peoples suffrages, as Suetonius doth testifie. This was upon the declining of the popular
estate, the which was ouerthrowneThe inconueniences which
grow by the sale of offices. by this meanes; for vndoubtedly they
which make sale of estates, offices, and benefices, they sell the most sacred
thing in the world which is Iustice, they sell the Commonweale, they sell the
bloud of the subiects, they sell the lawes, and taking away all the rewards of
honor, vertue, learning, pietie, and religion, they open the gates to thefts,
corruption, couetousnes, iniustice, arrogancie, impietie, and to be short, to
all vice and villanie. Neither must the Prince excuse himselfe by his pouertie,
for there is no auailable excuse, or that hath
any colour to seeke the ruine of an estate, under aPouertie
no lawfull excuse in a prince for the sale of offices. pretence of
pouertie. And it is a ridiculous thing for a Prince to pretend pouertie, seeing
he hath so many meanes to preuent it if he please. We reade that the Empire of
Rome was neuer more poore and indebted then under the Emperour Heliogabalus that monster of nature, and yet Alexander Seuerus his successor, one of the wisest and
most vertuous Princesse that euer was would neuer indure the sale of offices,
saying in the open Senat, Non patiar mercatores
potestatum, I will not indure these marchants, orA
worthy saying of an emperour. buyers of dignities: and yet this good
Emperour did so abate the taxes and imposts, as he that paied one and thirtie
crownes under Heliogabalus, paied but one crowne vnder
Alexander, resoluing, if he had lived, to take but
the third part of it, but he raigned but
foureteene yeares after that he had freed his predecessors debts, and defeated
the Parthians and the people of the north, leauing to his successor an Empire
florishing in armes and lawes. But his court was wisely ordred, excessiue
prodigalities were cut off, rewards were equallie destributed, & the
theeves of the publike treasure were seuerely punished. He was called Seuerus, by reason of his seueritie. He hated flatterers
as aThe disposition of the emperour Seuerus. plague
to all Princes, neither durst the horseleeches of the court come neere him. He
was very wise in all things, but especially in the discouering of mens humors,
and of a great iudgement in decerning of every mans merits; being reuerent with
a seuere kind of maiestie. We have shewed before, that
the softnes or simplicitie of a Prince is dangerous to an estate. After that the great king Francis the first became (through his old age) austere and not so
accessible, the flatterers and horseleeches of the court came notThe good husbandry of king Francis the first. neere him,
so as the treasure was so well husbanded, as after his death they found
seuenteene hundred thousand crownes in readie money, besides the quarter of
March which was readie to be receiued: and his realme full of learned men,
great Captaines, good Architects, and all sorts of handicrafts, and the
frontires of his estate extending euen unto the gates of Milan, being assured
by a firme firme peace with all Princes. And although that he had been
encountred with great and mightie enemies, and had been taken prisoner and
paied his ransome, yet did he build Cities, Townes, Castles, and stately
Pallaces: but the facilitie and too great bountie of his successor Henry the second brought The prodigality of king Henrie the second. the estate
indebted within little more than twelue yeares after, foure millions three
hundred fortie eight thousand three hundred nintie three pounds eighteene
shillings starling (as I learned out of the accounts) and the countries of
Sauoy and Piedmont, with all that which they had conquered in thirtie yeares
before, lost, and the rest much ingaged. I omit to speake how much France was
falne from her antient dignitie and beautie, how worthie men were kept from
their degrees, vertuous men troden under foote, and the learned contemned: and
all these miseries came upon the realme, for thatThe cause
of the calamities of Fraunce. he did prodigallie giue dignities,
offices, benefices, and the treasure to the vnworthie, and suffered the wicked
with all impunitie. That Prince then that will enioy a happie estate let him
refer the punishment of offences to the Magistrate, as it is expedient, and
reserue rewards unto himselfe, giuing by
little and little according to every ones merit, that the thanks may be the
more durable; and commaund punishments to be done at an instant, to the end
they may be the lesse grieuous to them that suffer them, and the feare deeper
grauen in the harts of others, terrifying them from their wicked and disordred
lives. These lawes of punishments and rewards being dulie obserued in a
Commonweale, vertue shall be alwaies honorablie rewarded, the wicked shall be
banished, publick debts shall be paied, and the State shall flourish with all
aboundance. But for that the frauds of courtiers are so many, and such infinit
deuises to rob the treasurie, so as the wisest Princes may be circumuented, a
law was made by Philip of Valois, and In the yeare 1333. 11. May. verified in the court of
Parliament, and chamber of accompts, whereby it was enacted, That all gifts
giuen by the king should be void, if his letters pattents did not containe
whatsoeuer had been giuen to him or to any of his predecessors in former times
by the Princes bountie: which law although it were most profitable, yet was it
abrogated two yeares after by their meanes that were interessed, finding how
much it did preiudice them, so as it was enacted that it should bee sufficient
to have the derogatorie annexed to their pattents, as I have seene in the
auntient registers of the court: but that also was taken away, least any
remembrance of benefits should hinder the Princes bountie.
There was another law made by Charles the 8. whereby all
gifts aboue ten pounds starling should be enrolled: but since they have used so
much fraud, as one in this realm was not
ashamed to bragge in a great assembly, That he had gotten (besides his offices)
five thousand pounds starling a yeare of good rent, and yet there was not any
one gift made unto him to be found in all the registers of the chamber,
although it were apparant that he had nothing but from the king. We must not
therefore wonder at great debts, seeing the treasure is exhausted after so
strange a manner, as hee that hath mostIn what sort the
prince should giue. receiued, makes a shew to have had nothing. For
to giue so much to one man, although he deserue well, doth not onely waste the
treasure of the Commonweale, but also stirre up the discontented to seditions
and rebellions. And one of the best meanes to preserue
an estate in her greatnesse, is to bestow gifts and rewards on many, to
continue euerie one in his dutie, and that
they may ballance one another. Also an aduised prince must giue sparingly to
the importunat, and offer to them that beg not, so as they bee of good desert,
for some can neuer aske, nor yet take it when it is offered them. As Antigonus king of Asia said, That he had two friends,
whereof the one could neuer be satisfied, & the other could neuer be forced
to take any thing. To such men Dionisius the elder, lord
of Siracusa, behaued himselfe wisely, For to vs (said Aristippus) which demaundA safe kind of
giuing. much he giues little, and to Plato who
craues nothing, he giues too much. This was a safe kind of giuing, retaining
both the money and the thankes. Yet princes have many other means to grace and
reward a seruant, than with mony, the which is lesse esteemed by men of honour,
than a good looke, an alliance, a marriage, or a gracious
remembrance. And sometimes the gift is such,
as it brings more profit to him that giues it, than to him that receiues it.
Charles the fift, emperour, being come into Spaine,
toAn excellent policie of the emperor Charles the
fift. requite the well deseruing of the duke of Calabria (who had
refused the crowne and kingdome of Spaine, which was offered unto him by the
estates) being then a prisoner, he freed him out of prison, and married him to
one of the richest princesses that was then liuing, widow to king Ferdinand: with the which deed the people receiued great
content, the duke great honour, wealth, and libertie, and the emperour the loue
of the duke, the loue of the people, and the assurance of his estate, without
any charge: And moreover by this meanes hee kept the widow from marrying with
any forren prince: giuing to the duke a wife that was aged and barren, to the
end that the dukes line (which made a pretence
to the realme of Naples) should be extinct with him.
It is a principal point which a prince ought to respect, That his bountie and
rewards be giuen with a cheerfull heart: for some are so vnpleasing, as they
neuer giue any thing without reproach, the which taketh away the grace of the
gift, especially if the gift be in stead of a reward or recompence. But they do
much worse, which giue one & the same office, or one confiscatton to many,
without aduertising either the one or the other: the which is no benefit, but
an iniurie. This is to cast the golden apple among subiectsIt is pernitios to giue one thing to many.
to ruine them. And oftentimes we see them consumed with suits, and murder one
another with the sword: whereby the prince shall not onely loose the fruits of
his bountie, but the loue of his subiects, and reape for thankes eternall
hatred. The which is a grosse errour in
matters of state, and yet vsuall among princes; not so much through
forgerfulnesse of that which is past, but of set purpose, being falsly
instructed from their youth, That they must be liberall and refuse no man,
thereby to win the hearts of all men: and yet the end is quite contrarie to
that which they have propounded, giuing one thing to many. And to refuse no
man, is not to be liberall nor wise, but prodigall and indiscreet. I would not
onely have the prince liberall, but bountifull, so as he proue not prodigall:
for from a prodigall he will grow to be an exactor, and of an exactor a tyrant:
and after that he hath giuen his owne, he must of force pull from others to
giue. The laws ofliberalitieThe law of libertie.
commaund, That he should obserue well to whome he giues, what hee giues, at
what time, in what place, and to what end, and his owne abilitie that giues.
But a soueraigne prince must withall remember,
that rewards must goe before gifts, and that he must first recompence them that
have well deserued, before he giue to such as have nothing deserued; and aboue
all, let him measure his bountie according to his abilitie. The Romans to
releeue the pouertie of Horatius Cocles (who alone had
withstood the enemies armie, and saued the citie from sacking, and the citisens
from ruine) they gaue him an acre of land, or little more; the which was much
at that time, hauing but two leagues compasse about the citie. But Alexander the Great gaue kingdomes and empires, and
thousands of talents: if he had done otherwise it had beene against his
maiestie and greatnesse. Alphonsus the fift, king of Castile, gaue the kingdome of Portugall
The beginning of the kings of Portugall. to Henrie of Boulogne of the house of Loraine, from whome
are issued the kings of Portugall for these five hundred and fiftie yeares: it
was for a reward of his vertue, marrying him to his bastard daughter. But yet
was he blamed, to have giuen away so goodly an estate, his owne not being at
that time much greater. In like sort wee may say, that the custome of the
auntient Romans was commendable, to nourish upon the publike charge three
children borne at one birth, for a reward of the memoriall victorie obtained by
the three Horatij against the Curiatij. But Solons law, which would haue
their children which had beene slaine in the warres for their countrey,
maintained by the publike, could not continue, although it were practised
throughout all Greece, as we read in Aristotle, for it
did quite waste and consume their treasure.
If any one suppose, that the bountie and greatnesse of a prince shall not
appeare, if he giue to none but to such as shall deserue; I will yeeld vnto
him. I know that bountie &Bountie will besits a great
prince magnificence is well befitting a great prince: neither must
wee thinke it strange if the prince aduance one of a poore and base condition
to honour and wealth, so as there be vertue and merit in him: else if the
prince shall raise an vnworthie person aboue good men, or equall him in ranke
with great personages, in doing good to the one hee shall wrong all the rest.
That worthy saying of Chilo is extant, one demanding of
him what God did, He casts downe the proud (aunswered he) from aboue, and
raiseth the poore and deiected to the highest degree of honour. A good prince
should imitat God, aduancing the poore and vertuous to honours and riches. But
when as the colledge of Cardinals did admonish
Pope Iulio the third, hauing created P. M. du Mont Cardinall, being a young boy whome he loued, saying,
That it was a great dishonour to blemish so honourable an order with so base a
man, hauing neither vertue in him, nor learning, neither nobilitie nor goods,
nor any marke which might merit (as they said) to approach to such a degree:
But the pope (who was verie pleasant) turning unto the cardinals, What vertue,
(saith he) what nobilitie, what learning, what honor,A
pleasant aunswere of pope Iulius the third. did you finde in me, to
make me pope? It is most certaine, that a vicious and vnworthy prince, will
alwayes have his friends and followers of his owne humor: as it appeares by the
emperour. Heliogabalus, who gaue the greatest offices,
and inriched the most detestable villaines in
all the empire: wherewith his subiects and guard being incensed, they slew that
monster of mankind, with his mother, and threw them into the common priuies.
But without any further search, we have seene the proofe before ourAduancements bestowed on the vnworthy incense the
subiects eyes, how disdainefully it hath bene taken to see the due
rewards of good subiects, and vertuous men, giuen to the vicious, to
straungers, and to the vnworthy, the which hath put the goodliest realme of
Europe in combustion. For wee find, that the gifts in the yeare 1572 amounted
to 270000 pounds starling: and the yeare following to 204400 pounds: and in the
yeare 1574 there was giuen 54700 pounds: and in the six moneths following they
gaue 95500 pounds starling, besides pensions which were not lesse than twentie
thousand pounds starling: and the greatest part of all this treasure grew by
the sale of offices, & by confiscations, which was the cause of all our
miseries: and yet by the law of Fraunce,
England, and Spaine, such buyers should be held infamous: which lawes should be
reuiued, and that commendable custome which was practised vnderA commendable custome of Alexander Seuerus.Seuerus maintained, who caused his name to be set up in
all publike places, whome hee meant to preferre to any government, giuing leaue
to all men to accuse him, yet with the paine of death to him that did it
falsely, saying, That it was great shame to bee lesse carefull of the life and
conuersation of a gouernour, than the Christians were of the qualities of their
bishops and ministers, whome they examined with all rigour before they were
admitted. The which is much more expedient than the manner of examination which the Venetians, Genouois, Luquois, and
Florentines, do vse, after that the officer
hath left his charge. For a bad and corrupt magistrat growne rich with thefts,
will not sticke to corrupt a judge, to saue both his life and his goods
corruptly gotten. It is better therefore to preuent a disease, than to labour
to cure it, and better late than neuer, that the feare of this search might
keepe officers within the bounds of their dutie. But yet Solons law was farre better, by the which the life of the officer was
examined both before his admittance to the office, and after he had left it: as
we read in the. in or at. de fals legat.
& contr Timrchum. pleadings of Demosthenes. Hauing then
examined the life and manners of such as aspire to dignities, offices,
benefices, knighthoods, exemptions, immunities, gifts and rewards. If their
lives be polluted and wicked, they are not onely to be reiected, but also to
bee punished. And rewards are to be distributed to good men, according to
euerie mans merit: and by an harmoniacall
proportion you must giue the purse to the most loyall, armes to the most
valiant, iustice to the most iust, the cenfure to the most upright, labourA true distribution of offices and charges. to the
strongest, the government to the wisest, the priesthood to the deuoutest: yet
hauing respect to the nobilitie, riches, age, and power of euerie one, and to
the qualitie of the charges and offices. For it were a ridiculous thing to
seeke a judge that were a warrior, a prelat couragious, and a souldiour with a
conscience. We have treated of Rewards, Triumphes, and Honours, which are for
the most part giuen unto men of warre: Let vs now see if it be fit to exercise
the subiect in armes.
CHAP. V. Whether it bee more convenient to trayne up
the subiects in armes, and to fortifie their townes or not.
IT is one of the highest questions of State, and it
may be of the greatest difficultie to resolue, for the inconueniences that may
rise on either part, the which I will treat of as briefly as I may, setting
down what I hold most convenient, leauing notwithstanding the resolution to the
wise polititians. To follow the opinion of Aristotle
simply, and to maintaine that a citie ought to be well fortified, well situated
for the sending forth of an armie, and of hard
accesse for the enemie; were not to decide the difficulties which might be
obiected, whether it should have place in a Monarchie, as well as in a Popular
estate, or in a tyranie as in a monarchie; seeing that we have shewed before
that Commonweals contrarie one unto an other, or at the least very different,
must be gouerned by contrarie or very different maximes. Besides, for the well
training the subiect up in armes, there is nothing more contrarie than to
fortifie their townes, for that the fortification of them make the inhabitants
effeminate and cowards: as Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia
doth witnes, who seeing the strong fortifications of a towne, he cryed out, O
goodly retreat for women. And for this cause Licurgus
the lawgiuer would neuer allowReasons against the fortifying
of townes. the city of Sparta to be fortified, fearing least the
subiects relying on the strength of their
walls should grow faintharted, knowing well that there was no such fortresse as
of men, who will alwaies fight for their goods, lives, and honors, for their
wiues, children, and countrie, so long as they have no hope in flight, or of
any retreat to saue themselves. These two things then are contrarie, to haue
warlike citisens, and fortified cities: for valiant and warlike men have no
need of castles, and those which dwell in strong places desire no warre. So we
see the Tartarians in Scythia, and the Aethiopians and Arabians in Affrike,
which are held to bee most warlike: and yet they have no forts but tents, and
some villages without wall or ditch. And euen the great Negus or Preste-Ian, which is the greatest lord in all Affrike,
hauing (as they say) fiftie kings under Francis Aluere in the historie of
Aethiopia. him that doe him homage, hath no forts nor castles, but
his tents, but that fort only which is built upon the top of the mountaine
Anga, whereas all the princes of the blood are kept with a sure guard, least
they should draw the subiects from the obedience of their prince by seditious
factions. Yet there is no prince under heauen more reuerenced and respected of
his subiects, nor more redoubted of his enemies, than in Tartaria, and
Aethiopia. Forts are held fruitlesse and of small consequence in the
opinionHe that is master of the field, is master of the
townes. of the greatest captaines, who hold him that is maister of
the field, to bee maister of all the townes. It is well knowne, that after the
battell of Arbella in Chaldea, wheras Darius the last
king of Persia was defeated, that there was neither citie nor fort in all the
whole Persian empire, that held out one day against Alexander the Great, although there
were an infinit number, and the conqueror had but thirtie thousand men. After
that Paulus Aemilius had vanquished Perseus king of Macedon in battaile, there was not any one towne that
made resistance, but all the whole kingdome yeelded in a moment. After the
battell of Pharsalia, who forsooke not Pompey? all the
townes and strong places of the East, which before were shut against Caesar, did now open their gates unto him without any
difficultie. And without any further search, it is well knowne, that after the
victorie which king Lewes the twelft obtained against
the Venetians, he was presently maister of the townes. As in like case after
the battaile of Marignan, all Lombardie, and euen the castell of Milan, yeelded
unto king Francis; and
upon his taking prisoner at Pauia, he lost all on the other side of the
Alpes.
But there is a more necessarie reason against the fortifying of places, it is
to bee feared, that an enemie entring the stronger, and taking those strong
places, hee will hold them, and by that meanes the whole countrey: whereas
otherwise hauing once spoyled it, he shall be forced to leaue it. For this
reason Iohn Maria de la Rouere duke of Vrbin, rased all
the forts of his countrey, and retired himselfe to Venice, finding his forces
too weake to encounter the enemie; assuring him that the duke of Valentinois
comming with all the power of the church could not hold it, being hated to the
death, and the duke of Vrbin beloued and respected of his subiects; as it
proued true. for popeThe strongest fort is the loue of the
subiects.Alexander being dead, the duke of Vrbin was receiued
with great ioy of his subiects, and all other
princes that were feudatories to the church, were either taken or slaine in
their places of strength. And for the same cause the Geneuois, after the
battaile of Pauia being reuolted from the king of Fraunce, besieged their fort
called the Lanterne, and then rased it. As also the Milanois did the castle I
of, the which was built before the Sforces were lords of
Milan, to the end that forreine princes should bring them no more in subiection
by meanes of their fort. So the auntient Siracusians did Acradina, and the
Romans the cities of Corinth, Carthage, and Numance, the which they had neuer
rased, if the fort of Acrocorinth and other places, strong by nature and easie
to be fortified, had not forced them unto it, least the inhabitants should make
vse of them, as Philip the younger, king of Macedonie
had done, who called the cities of Corinth,
Chalcide, and Demetrias, the shackles and fetters of Greece. Which forts Titus Flaminius rased to the ground, to free them from
the seruitude of the Macedonians, and to take away all feare of tyrants. The
which is another strong reason to take all occasion from princes to tyrannize
over their subiects, as those doe which assure themselves by Cittadels, which
the people called Tyrants nests; and tyrants tearmed them a scourge for
villaines, in contempt and scorne of the poore subiects: as Grislerus lieurenant to the emperour in Swisserland did, who built a
fort in the vallie of Vri, and calling it Zwing Vri,
that is to say, the yoake of Vri, which was the first occasion that moued
theThe first cause of the Swissers reuolt. Cantons
of the Swissers to reuolt, as we read in their histories. And Salomon was the first that made a Citadell in
Ierusalem, beginning euen then to intreat his subiects ill, exacting new tributes of them, giuing occasion to his
successour to continue them, and for the ten tribes to reuolt, and to chuse
themselves a king: for commonly Citadels breed a ealousie and distrust betwixt the prince and his subiects, the which is the
nurce of all hatred, feare, and rebellion. And euen as castles and Citadels
giue bad princes occasion to afflict their subiects, so townes well walled and
fortified, do oftentimes cause subiects to rebell against their princes and
lords; as I have shewed elsewhere. And therfore the kings of England neuer
suffer their subiects to fortifie their houses, the which is more strictly
obserued in Moscouie, to auoid the rebellion of subiects, who are easily moued
thereunto, trusting in their walles. And the inhabitants of Telesse in the
realme of Thunis, relied so much in the strength of their citie wals, as
commonly they slew their gouernours, not able
to endure any commaund: so as the king of Thunis going thither with a mightie
armic, he demaunded of them, Who lived? they answered him, The red wall: but
hauing forced the towne, he rased it, and put all the inhabitants to the sword:
as Hannibal did at Saguntum, Sylla at Athens, the emperor Seuerus at
Bizantium, Dagobert at , Nabuchodonosor and Vespasian to
the citie of Ierusalem, all which were reuolted for the trust they had in their
orts, eating euen their children through the
tediousnesse of sieges, and in the end have bene rased, and the inhabitants
rooted out: the which would have easily compounded, if the confidenceWeake townes compound soone to saue themselves. of their
strong places had not abused them. For commonly wee see, that weake townes and
ill fortified, doe soone compound and send away the enemie, for some peece of money, without any infamie or dishonour: as
it hath bene seene by the citie of Paris, the which was neuer taken since that
Caesar forced it, the which had beene long since
rased if it had bene fortified, hauing bene so often threatned by the enemie:
but still they have preserued themselves by treaties and compositions, the
which they had not done being well fortified, either for feare of reproach and
dishonour which follow them, which treat with an enemie when they may resist:
or for the obstinacie of the inhabitants, or the heads of a faction, who had
rather die, than yeeld unto an enemie, hauingPlaces of
strēgth make the inhabitants obstina. no
hope to escape, & seeing their houses on fire, they striue in ruining it,
to quench it with the blood of their fellow citisens. But there be no cities so
strong, that can long resist the canon, and much lesse famine: For if the
besieged be few in number, they shal be soone
wearie and tired: if there be many, they shall be the sooer stared.
If then forts and citadels make a bad prince to tyrannize, an enemie to ceize
upponThe inconueniences of forts and citadels. the
countrey, subiects to be cowards towards an enemie, rebels to their prince, and
seditious among themselves? we cannot say they be profitable, or necessarie;
but contrariwise hurtfull and pernitious to a Commonweale.
As for the other question, Whether we should traine the subiects up in armes,
and seeke warre rather than peace: It seemes we should not call that in doubt:
for we must esteeme that Commonweale most happie, whereas the king is obedient
to the lawes of God and nature, the magistrats unto the king, priuat men to the
Magistrats, the children to the parents, the seruants to the maisters, &
the subiects vnited together in loue, and all
ioyntly with their prince to enioy the sweetnesse of peace and true
tranquilitie of mind. But warre is contrarie to this which I have said, and
souldiours are sworne enemies to this kind of life. It is impossible for a
Commonweale to flourish in religion, iustice, charitie, integritie of life, and
in all the liberall sciences and mechanike artes, if the citisens enioy not a
firme and an assured peace. And who is more enemie to a peaceable man, than a
furious souldiour? to a mild countrey man, than a bloodie warrior? to a
philosopher, than a captaine? to the wise, than fooles? For the greatest
delight that souldiours take, is to forrage and spoyle the country, rob the
peasant, burne villages, besiege, batter, force and
sacke townes; massacre good and bad, young and
old, all ages, and all sexes; force virgines, wash themselves in the blood of
the murthered, prophane holy things, rase temples, blaspheme the name of God,
and tread vnderoot all dluine and humane lawes. These
are the fruits of warre, pleasing and delightfull to all souldiors, but
abominable to all good men, & detestable before God. WhatWarre hatefull to God and need examples in so manifest a matter? who can thinke of them without
horror? or heare them spoken of without sighing? Who knowes not the wounds of
the husbandman? who sees not their miseries? who heares not their complaints?
every mans field, catell, and corne, wherewith we
live and draw our breath, are in the power of soldiours, that is (as many do
interpet it) of robbers. If it be so, I see no
reason why wee should instruct citisens in this cruell and execrable kind of
life, or to arme them, but to The subiect is not to be trained up in armes. repulfe
violence in time of extreame necessitie. For those which take small occasions
to make warre, are like unto flies, which cannot hold themselves uppon a smooth
polished glasse, but up on rough places. And those which seeke warre to inrich
themselves with their neighbours spoyles, shall be in continuall torment,
leading a miserable life: for desire hath no bounds, although in show they
seeme to be contented with the desire of a kingdome: euen like unto a slaue,
who desires onely to be freed of his bands; being vnbound, he affecteth his
libertie; and being free, he demaunds to bee made a citisen; after that he
desires to be a magistrat; and being come to highest place of magistracie, he
affects to be a king; and being a king, hee will bee an absolute and sole
monarch; and in the end he will be worshipped as a God. How much more happy
then is a prince, or a small Commonweale
(although there be nothing little where there is content) enioying an assured
rest, and a peace without enemies, without warre, and without enuie. For the
bounds of a well ordered Commonweale are not limited by the sword, as Agesilaus boasted, but by iustice, as Pompey said to the king of the Parthians, when as he would have the
riuer of Euphrates to distinguish the bounds of the Roman and Parthian
empires.
This have I briefly obiected against the fortifying of cities, & militarie
discipline: but many things may be said on the contrarie part, That townes
without wals lie openThe inconueniences not to haue
fortresses. to the spoyle of theeves and robbers, and the lives and
liberties of the citisens, to the mercie of
their enemies. Moreover a towne without walles seemes to be a bait to intice
any one that would inuade it, who else would have no desire, and lesse power,
if itA towne vnfortified, is a bait for an enemie.
were well fortified: like unto men that trauell vnarmed, they encourage theeves
to kill them, to have their spoiles. For it is manifest, that the sacke of
cities is a bait for souldidiours, and he will willingly be an enemie to them
that are weake, that durst not look of them being armed. Besides, the first,
and in a manner the onely occasion to gather men together into one societie and
communaltie, was for the tuition of every one inA communalty
cannot be in safetie without some defence. particular, and of all in
generall, and of their wiues, children, goods, and possessions, the which
cannot be in safetie without wals. For, to say, that men will make a wall
against the enemie, that may well be when as they must fight: but those which
must make defence, are not commonly the fourth part of the inhabitants, for
that there are alwayes more women than men,
besides children, old men, sicke men and impotent, who can have no recourse but
unto walles.
It is a ridiculous thing to say, That men without walls will be more valiant:
if that were true, what need we any offensiue armes to affront the enemie, nay
rather it should be necessarie to command every man to fight naked, as Isadas did, being one of the goodliest and most valiant
gentlemen of Sparta, who seeing Epaminondas with an
armie of Thebans fighting with the Lacedemonians, and labouring to enter into
their citie, he stript himselfe naked, and with a pertuisan in one hand, and a
sword in the other, he chargeth the enemie desperatly,
whereas he did valiant exploits: for the which Isadas punished for his rashnesse, and rewarded for his
valour. the seigneurie gaue him a crowne, but he was condemned in a
fine, hauing so rashly abandoned his life unto the enemie, being vnarmed. In
like sort should the Senat of Sparta have been condemned in a great fine, for
that they had abandoned the people and so great a citie to the mercie of their
enemies; hauing no walls, the which without doubt had then fallen into the
Thebans power if they had not been fortified with ditches and rampars. If a
rampar did then auaile for the safetie of the citisens, who doubts but walls
will be more profitable? and if walls make the citisens cowards, mutinous, and
rebels, why did they not fill up the ditches of Lacedemon? But the euent doth
shew which of the two is most profitable, for Cleomines
king of Sparta hauing lost the battaile of Selaria, hauing no place of retreat
was forced to flie into Aegypt, abandoning his
estate and countrie to the enemie, who presently entred into the citie of
Sparta without any resistance. And if walls make men cowards, Lisander hauing taken Athens, would not have razed the walls, the
which Themistocles and Pericles
had caused to be built for the defence of that citie, the which was afterwards
the most flourishing of all the East. To say that the enemie shall not be able
to hold a countrie if there be no walled townes, I yeeld unto it: but who shall
keepe him from the spoile of cities, from burning of houses, from murthering of
men, rauishing of women, and leading children into captiuitie, according to the
antient warres, that is, of the stronger? all histories are full of these
calamities. There is also as small reason to thinke that weakeWeake townes must eeld to the victors
will townes and without walls will compound with the enemie, and not
stand out; where as contrariwise an enemie
that shall see the entrie easie, will neuer allow of any reasonable
composition, which otherwise he would do, finding a difficultie to besiege and
to force a town well fortified. Moreover who sees not but a small fort doth
oftentimesA strong fort is oftentimes the ruine of the
enemies armie. stay a great and mightie armie, whereof we have too
many examples: and many times those which do besiege are besieged with cold,
hunger, and diseases, and for one they kill within, there are a hundred slaine
without. Constantinople did indure the Turks siege eight yeares, vntill they
were relieued by Tamberlan emperour of the Tartars, who
defeated Baiazet king of the Turks with all his armie.
Euen so the king of Fez indued a siege seuen yeares
in the towne of Fauzara against the king of Marocco, whose armie in the end was
consumed with the plague in the yeare 1412. And the Leo of Affrike. towne of Mecna in Affrike held out
also seuen yeares, whereas the enemies died for the most part, and were forced
to depart with shame and losse. And in our age the citie of Metz (although it
were nothing so well fortified as it is at this day) did long resist the armie
of the emperour Charles the fift, and was a buckler vnto
all France, which had been in great danger if the emperour had not found this
towne well fortified, from whence he was forced to depart, being both himselfe
and his armie besieged with hunger, cold, & many diseases. The citie of
Tyre held out-great Alexander seuen moneths, during
which time the king of Persia had good meanes to leauie forces, and to prouide
for his estate. And if walls made men faintharted and cowards, why did the
Romans fortifie their citie, being the most valiant people that euer were? And
it was auaileable for them to have good walls,
when as Marcius Coriolanus, the Tarquins, Hanniall, and others did besiege
them, and burnt euen unto their gates. And euen when as the Gaules had forced
and wholie burnt the citie, their estate had been vtterly ruined if they had
not retired into the Capitoll. The like had happened unto the Pope and
Cardinals after that the armie of Charles of Bourbon had
sackt Rome, if they had not fled into the castell S. Ange, where they were
besieged as long as the antient Romans were in the Capitoll. And every man
knowes that countries without forts are presently conquered upon the first
battaile that is woon within the countrie, as we reade of England, which the Saxons conquered from the antient Brittains, who were
expelled, and their The realme of England thrice conquered. enemies tooke
possession. After the Saxons the Danes entred, who were lords of it for the
most part: then William the Conqueror by the meanes of
one only victorie became absolute lord, and tooke possession thereof. And
during the quarels betwixt the houses of Lancaster and Yorke, the realme was
lost and recouered thrise in sixe moneths: as if Henry
the sixt, Edward the fourth, and the earle of Warwike
had plaied at base: and although that Edward in the end
inioyed the realme, yet soone after his death his brother Richard duke of Glocester (hauing made himselfe king by the murther of
his nephues) was defeated and slaine by the earle of Richmond, who had bin
banished into France, from whence he brought some small ayde which king Lewis the 11 had giuenThe Romans did
alwayes fortifie their camps. him. The which happens not in fortified
countries where there is any retreat: for which cause the Romans did neuer camp but they cast up a trench about the armie of
25 foot broad, and most commonlie with palissadoes; neither did they euer giue
battaile but they left a garrison within their camp, to make good the retreat
if their enemies were the stronger, the which hath relieued them in great
losses, as Paulus Aemilius did wisely discourse unto the
armie before that he gaue battaile unto the king of Macedon, saying, Maiores nostri castra munita portum ad omnes casus exercitus
ducebant esse, vnde ad pugnam exirent, quo iactati pugnae receptum haberent
& qui castris exutus erat, etiamsi pugnando acie vicisset, pro victo
habebatur: Our elders held a camp well fortified, a safe retreat for
all euents, from the which they went forth to fight, and retired if they
were beaten, and he that had lost his camp,
although he had ouercome in fighting, yet was he held as vanquished. The
experience of many ages, and of the antient Commonweales of the Persians,
Egiptians, Greeks, Latins, Gaules, and other nations, which have alwaies
fortified and vittailed their townes, ports and places that were fit to be
fortified, to assure and defend their friends, and to incounter and resist
their enemies, giues vs to vnderstand, that it is necessarie to vse it; and
euen the Tartars within these hundred yeares build and fortifie their places:
for how valiant soeuer a nation be, yetA countrey
vnfortified cannot long resist a strong . can
they not long resist nor vanquish him which is much more stronger. These
reasons shall serue to prooue that it is necessarie to fortifie towns. We will
in like maner hold, that the citisens must be instructed in martiall
discipline, for that seeing by the lawes of
God and nature we may defend our lives from violence, and our goods from
spoyle, we must then conclude, That it is needful to accustome the subiects to
armes, not only defensiue, but also offensiue, to protect the good, and offend
the wicked. I call all those theeves and wicked which make warre vniustly, and
take away an other mans goods wrongfully, and euen as wee ought to punish and
take revenge on subiects that bee theeves and robbers, so must we of strangers
what royall title soeuer they carrie, this is grounded upon the law of God and
nature. Neither is it true that Tully writ, That noThe cause makes the warre iust. warre was iust but for
the recouerie of ones owne; or, that was denounced before unto the enemie: for
the proclaiming of warre makes it not iust, but the cause must be necessarie:
there can be none then more iust than to defend the lives of innocents. There
are other priuate considerations besides
these: for the best meanes to maintaine an estate,War
against an enemie, entertaines the subiects in loue. and to preserue
it from rebellions, seditions, and civill warres, and to entertaine them in
loue, is to have an enemie against whom they may oppose themselves. This
appeares by the example of all Commonweales, and namely of the Romans, who
neuer could find a more safe and surer remedie against civill warres, than to
affront the subiects with an enemie: for being on a time at warre among
themselves, the enemie entred theDion. Halicar. lib. 7. Liuis lib. 3. towne, and seazed upon the
Capitoll, but suddenly they were reconciled, and expelled him: a while after
the Veientes seeing them returne to civill warres, they began to wast and
spoyle the Roman territories, but the Romans were soone agreed, discharging their choller upon them, so as they neuer ceased vntill
they had razed their citie, and made the
inhabitants subiect. And about the same time the princes and people of Tuscane
hauing conspired against the Roman state, sought to nourish seditions and
diuisions among them, saying, That their power was inuincible, and would
alwayes grow, if it were not made weake by civill warres, the which is the only
poyson to makecivill warres the ruine of states.
Empires and States mortall, which else would be immortall. In like case the
people of Spaine being reuolted from the emperour Charles the fift, forcing in a manner the duke of Calabria to accept
of the Crowne, being thus in armes one against an other, king Francis the first sent an armie which recouered Fontarabie and the
kingdome of Nauarre, but sodenly this civill warre was pacified among the
Spanyards, who with one common consent fell upon the french, and recouered that
from them which they had conquered, else the
state of Spaine had been in great danger, as many have supposed, if the french
had temporized a while. And without any further search, we have a president of
this realme, the which was in great hazard in the yeare 1562, if the english
had not set footing into France, hauing seazed upon Newhauen, but presently the
civillNew hauen taken by the English caused the civill
wars of Fraunce to cease. warres ceassed, and the subiects agreed to
fall upon their common enemie, which the english perceiuing, they have since
resolued to let the french fight and ruine one another, and afterwards to
inuade the realme without any difficultie or resistance. But I will returne to
forraine examples, (and I would to God we had no domesticall presidents) to
shew that it is a hard thing and almost impossible, to maintaine subiects in
peace and loue, if they be not in war against some enemie. It is apparant in
all the histories of the Romans, who after
they had vanquished their enemies, presently fell to mutinie, for which cause
the Senat entertained warre, and deuised enemies when they had none, to keepe
them from civill warres, the which they continued vntill they had extended
their frontiers unto the ilands of Orcades, to the Atlantike sea, to the riuers
ofRest the cause of civill ware in a warlike
citie. Danubius and Euphrates, and to the deserts of Arabia: and
hauing no more enemies to make head against them, they murthered one an other
most cruelly, and so much the more, for that they were growne mightie, and had
few enemies, as in the civill warre betwixt Caesar and
Pompey for rule, whereof Cicero speaking said, Bellum pium ac necessarium
visum est, ciuibus tamen exitiabile, nisi Pompeius vicerit, calamitosum
etiam si vicerit: It seemes, said he, to be a godly and necessarie
warre, yet fatall unto the citisens vnlesse
that Pompey win, and lamentable if he do win: But it was
more cruell betwixt Augustus and Marc
Anthonie: for which cause the emperour Augustus
hauing changed the popular estate into a Monarkie, was not so ill aduised as to
discharge the fortie legions, but he sent them into prouinces, & upon the
frontiers of barbarous nations, to entertaine them in martiall discipline, and
to preuent all occasions of civill warres at Rome. But the emperour Constantine the great (following the counsell of some
BishopsThe first occasion to ruine the Roman
empire. and ministers vnacquainted with matters of State) discharged
the legions, which made them forget the antient militarie discipline, and
opened a gate to barbarous nations, who inuaded the Roman empire of all sides,
whereby it appeeres that lawes, iustice, religion, subiects, and the whole
estate next under God, is in the protection of Armes the defence of states. armes, as under a strong
shield. There is yet an other reason of great moment, to shew that it is
necessarie to entertaine martiall discipline, and to make warre, for that there
is no citie so holy, nor so well gouerned that hath not in it many theeves,
murtherers, idle persons, vagabonds, mutins, adulterers, and diceplayers, which
leade a wicked life, and corrupt the simplicitie of good subiects; neither can
lawes, magistrates, nor any punishment keepe them in awe. And euen it is
commonlie said that gibets are set upA meane to purge the
Commonweale of vagabonds and idle persons. but for beggers, for that
statutes and ordinances in many places are like unto spiders webs, as Anacharsis said unto Solon, for
that none but weake flies are taken in them, and great
beasts breake easily through them. There is no better meanes then to purge the
Commonweale of this infectious filth, then
to send them to the warre, the which is as it were a purging medicine to expell
corrupted humors out of the vniuersall bodie of the state. This was the
principall occasion which moued Charles the wise king of
France to send succors so willinglie unto the bastard of Castille under the
conduct of Bertrand of Guesclin Constable, the which
purged France of an infinite number of theeves: Euen so did Lewis the II to the Earle of Richmond; and both the one and the other
not only purged France of idle persons, but also returned with honor to haue
setled two kings in their estates, from the which they were expelled. Moreouer,
the militarie discipline of the Romans which should be common to all nations,
made a cowardThe martiall discipline of the Romans, was a
schoole of vertue. valiant, an intemperat man modest, a slothfull man
actiue, a prodigall man frugall, and a
licentious man continent: neither is it sufficient for a captaine or souldier
to know how to fight, but there are many other excellent arts which be
companions to this vertue, that is to say labor in busines, resolution in
dangers, temperance in desires, industrie in action, speed in execution, and
counsell in prouiding, these are necessarie for the arte of warre. The subiect
then being instructed in militarie discipline, is not infected with lust,
licentiousnes, impietie and sloth, but being wicked and impious, they inure
themselves to all kinds of vertue if they learne the precepts of the Roman
militarieThe praise of militarie discipline.
discipline and arte of commanding. Besides, there is nothing that containes the
people within the dutie of honor and vertue more then the feare of a warlike
enemie. The people of Rome (saith Polibius) were neuer
more vertuous, nor the subiects more obedient
unto the magistrates, nor the magistrates unto the lawes, then when as PyrrhusThe feare of enemies keeps subiects in awe. at one
time, and Hanniball at an other were at the gates of
Rome; but after that Perseus and Antiochus were vanquished, hauing no enemie left whom they might
feare, then vices began to take roote, and the people fell into superfluities
and delights, wich corrupted all good manners, and blemished the beautie of
their antient vertue. O how wisely did Scipio oppose
himselfe in open Senat, that the citie of Carthage should notThe prouidence of Scipio the younger. be razed, foretelling they
either should have civill warres, or that the vertue of the Romans would soone
decay, hauing no enemy to contend withall, for euen as moderate libertie puffes
men up, and makes them proane to all vices, so feare retaines them in their
duties: and we must not doubt but the great politian and gouernour of all the
world as he hath giuen to every thing his
contrarie, so hath he suffred warres and hatred among nations to punish one by
an other, and to keepe them all in feare, which is the only comptroller of
vertue, as Samuell in an oration which he made unto the
people said, That God had stirred them up enemies, to keepe them in awe, try
them, and punish them. And that I may conclude briefly, if there be no respect
had of so manyWars allowed of God. commodities, yet
let vs have a care of the health and necessitie of the Commonweale, least it
grow wast and desolate through the spoiles and insolencie of the enemie, for
when as the enemies forces are neere, although there be no inuasion, yet the
flocks are forsaken, the tillage is abandoned, and all trafficke ceasseth; and
oftentimes the whole yeares fruits are lost at the tumor of any danger, or the
terror of warre. Who will then doubt but the
subiects should be trained up in armes, in the which there is not only much
glorie and profit, but also the health of the citisens, the help of their
neighbors, the fortunes of the subiects, and the securitie of them all. By
these reasons it appeares, that they are much abused which thinke that the only
end of warre is peace. And if it were so, what better meanes were there to haue
peace in despight of the enemie,The way to have a peace, is
to prepare for force then to let him know that you have meanes to
make warre? Neuer wise Prince nor good Captaine made a peace vnarmed, and as
Manlius Capitolinus said, Ostendite
modo bellum, pacem habebitis, videant vos paratos ad vim, ius
ipsiremittent: Shew them warre said he, and
you shall have peace, let them see you readie for force, and they will
do you right. These reasons are partly true
and partly probable, and may of either side dazle the eyes of the cleerest
sighted if they looke not neerely unto them. To the end we may resolue
something, let vs distinguish of Commonweales. I hold then that in aA resolution of the question. popular estate it is
necessarie to traine the subiects up in armes, to auoid the abouenamed
inconueniences, unto the which a popular estate is by nature subiect; and if
the people be warlike and mutinous by nature, as the nations of the North be,
being trained up to armes and martiall discipline, it shall be expedient to
affront them often with their enemies, and not to admit any peace but upon good
termes, as a dangerous thingIn a Popular estate the subiects
must be trayned up in armes. to a warlike nation. And a peace being
concluded, you must notwithstanding entertain your souldiers upon the
frontiers, as the emperor Augustus did, although he had
changed the popular estate into a Monarchie:
or else send them to Princes that are in league, to be entertained in the art
of warre; as the Swissers have wisely done, being a people bred in the
mountaines apt to warre, and hardly maintained in peace, inioying a popular
libertie; and by this meanes they have alwayes had souldiers nourished and
entertained at another mans cost, besides their publike and priuat pensions
(which have been great, as I have formerly shewed) and the assurance of their
estate, by means of alliances contracted with so mightie a king. And as for
forts, it is not needfull in a popular estate to have their townes too well
fortified (except it be the chiefe citie,In a Popular estate
onely the capitall citie must be fortified which is the seate of the
popular estate) and much lesse any Castels or Citadels, least some one thrust
on with an ambitious desire of rule surprise them, and change the popular
estate into a Monarchie: as Denis the tyrant did, hauing surprised Acradina theCitadels not to be built in a Popular estate. fort of
Siracusa by fraud. Or else the enemie may take them & fortifie them, as the
Lacedemonians did, hauing razed the walls of Athens, they left a garrison in
the Castell: and doing the like unto the popular estate of Thebes, they tooke
their fort called Cadmee, leauing a garrison in it. For there is no meanes to
subiect a people, or to change a Democratia into a Monarchie but by Cittadels,
so did the tyrants in old time: and in our age Cosme de
Medicis duke of Florence had made two Cittadels in Florence, with a
garrison of strangers, hauing found by experience that it was impossibleCitadels the cause of tyrants. to change the popular
estate into a Monarchie, and to assure his life among the people: and therefore
the Cantons of Vri, Vnderuald, Glaris, and Appenzell, which are all popular, have no walles, like unto the rest which
are gouerned Aristocratically. We will giue the same censure of Aristocratia in regard of fortresses, as of a popular
estate, the which is so much more to be feared, for that it is more easie for
one of theCitadels more dangerous wheras few do
gouern commanders to win the common people to his will, and to
incense them against the chiefe men. But as for royall Monarchies, if their
bounds and limits be large, it is not expedient for the Prince to build
Cittadels, not places of strength, but upon the frontiers, to the end the
people may be without feare of tyranizing; and yet hauing fortified the
frontiers of his estate with places impregnable, the subiects will stil thinke
it is against the enemie, and the Prince at neede may vse them against all
enemies, both strangers and subiects in case they rebell: the which nature hath
taught vs, which hath armed the head and the
extremities of all beasts, leauing the middest, the bowels, andTo fortifie the frontiers, is according to the law of
nature. the other parts vnarmed. But the Monarke is ill aduised that
doth inuiron a towne with mightie walls, if he doth not withall build a good
Cittadell, for that nothing doth more animate the subiects to reuolt, the which
they would not so easily attempt, seeing before their eyes Cittadels well
fortified. It is also necessarie as well in a Monarchie as in an Aristocritie,
that the gouernor of the towne depend not of the captaine of the Cittadell, nor
the captaine of the gouernor, neither that the captaine of the Cittadell be a
Prince, or a great man: the which is well obserued in Turkie, according to the
rule of the antient Sultans of Egipt, as also our
kings do, but the Venetians more strictlie
then all others, for that they are forced to fortifie their townes, to defend
the subiects against their enemies, and fearing the rebellion of their
subiects, who have no share in the gouerment, they have strong Cittadels in
their townes, whither they doCitadels in townes of strength,
keepe the subiects from rebelling. every yeare send new Captaines
besides the Potestates or Gouernors, least that he should hold the Cittadell as
his inheritance. And those of Rhagouse (which have but one citie and a small
territorie) are forced to change their Captaine every day, who isDistrust of noble men in an Aristo craticall estate.
brought into the fort with his face couered. In like sort the Athenians changed
the Captaine of their fortresse every day, the which was one of the nine
Archontes, for the distrust they had that one of the subiects should make
himselfe lord. For the preuenting whereof, it shall be needfull to remoue
Cittadels from the capitall townes in a
popular estate, or an Aristocraticall estate, as the Venetians have done wisely
at Venice,Citadels not to be built in the chiefe citie of a
Popular estate, nor in a Seigneurie. to take all occasion from the
duke, and to free the gentlemen from suspition of any alteration in the state.
It was wisely prouided in England, Turkie, Muscouie, and in a manner by all the
kings of the East and of Affrike, that no subiect should fortifie his house in
the countrie, for if the maister of a priuate castell be a great man, he will
soone take an occasion to reuolt, if he be poore, to rob; and for this cause
the imperiall townes of Germany have oftentimes razed gentlemens castels, that
rebels and theeves might have no retreat, the which the Swissers have done
throughout all their countrey, hauing expelled the antient lords. But this were
a dangerous thing in an antient Monarchie to
ruine priuate mens castels which are of strength, but well they may prohibit
their subiects not to build any more without licence from the Soueraigne, who
may not easily grant it, for that it is sufficient to have a house able to
defend him from theeves, and thus much for fortifications. But the question is
not small, if in Aristocratia, the better sort only, which command, are to be
trained up in armes, or all the people, or else wholie to banish the arte of
warre. If the common people do once become souldiers, it is to be feared they
will attempt to change the state, to have a part in the gouerment, if they be
not alwayes imployed against the enemies, as I have shewed before by many
examples; and if none but the better sort be armed, they shall be soone
defeated, and will cause a necessarie change of their estate: but if they will
quite banish the arte of warre out of their
Commonweale, they shall remaine a skorne and pray to all their neighbors, if
they be not strictly allied unto the strongest, or else if they have not townes
that be inaccessible and forts impregnable, as the Venetians, who fearingThe Venetians do not practise arm in
their Commonweale. the aboue named inconueniences, have banished the
arte of warre out of their Commonweale, as Cardinall Contarenus saith: the which is rather to be attributed to sloth, then
to any set or positiue law, for that within these two hundred yeares they were
verie warlike, and obtained great victories of the Geneuois, but pleasing
themselves with the continuall fruits of peace and ease, they have neglected
the practise of armes, imployingWhy the Venetians neglected
armes. strangers in their warres: neither can they indure any
gentleman of the seigneurie to be a commander, but if they know any Venetian
gentleman that aspires to the warres, and that
followes the courts of other Princes, by and by they call him home, desiring
rather to have an Almain a Bargamasco, or a stranger for their generall, if
they make warre by land, than one of their owne lords, and an armie of
strangers rather than of subiects: but withall they send a Prouidador or
Commissarie, by whose councell the Generall is gouerned. And although there be
many inconueniences, to have a Commissarie commaund a Generall, a citisen
strangers: one that vnderstands nothing in matters of warre, them that are bred
up in armes: yet by this meanes they auoid many other daungers which are not
lesse: the which we have seene fall out in their Commonweale, whereas they vsed
none but their own subiects and forces. Their
histories are full of conspiracies, seditions & ciuil wars, which they had
in the middest of Why the Venetians imploy strangers in their warres.
their city. The Carthagineans, being not yet wel instructed in the art of war,
were wont to send for Lacedemonian captaines, which should lead a Carthaginean
armie under a Generall of Carthage; yet would they neuer have both Generall and
armie strangers, least their Commonweale should fall into the power of
straungers. If warre be not to be vndertaken, but for the repelling of
iniuries, and to enioy peace, and that it sufficeth to make a Commonweale
happie to keepe their owne, to have their places neere unto their enemies well
manned and fortified, and to enioy the fruits of a desired peace;The seigneury of Venice most happy. without doubt the
Seigneurie of Venice may iustly tearme it selfe happie, which hath not onely
the seat of their empire by nature and art inexpugnable, but also have their
townes and fortresses upon the continent so well fortified, as they neither
need to feare the inuasions of their enemies,
nor the rebellions of their subiects: caring little for any new conquests, or
to extend their bounds. We see the Venetians do flie from all occasionsThe Venetians desire peace with their losse. of warre,
as from the plague, and they neuer enter into it but by constraint, and seeke
for peace at what price soeuer, euen with the losse of their reuenewes; as we
may see in the treatie which they made with pope Iulio
the second, the emperor Maximilian, and the king of
Naples, in the yere 1508, their ambassadours being humbled at their feet,
yeelding to all which they demanded. As they did in like maner to Sultan Selim in the yeare 1570, abandoning the holy
league to purchase his peace, after they had lost a goodly kingdome. And euen
as beasts which have no offensiue armes, as hates that have no gall, as Stagges
and Does seeke to saue themselves from the hounds and hawke, by flight; so they are not to be blamed, nor that
Commonweale to bee lesse esteemed, which sues for peace, hauing no meanes to
resist: the which would be dishonourable to a warlike nation, or for a
conquering prince, who cannot demaund a peace of his enemie without blushing.
There was nothing that did so long protract the conclusionA
generous prince demands neither peace nor warre. of a peace betwixt
king Henrie the second, and the emperour Charles the fift, as a certaine rumor spred abroad, That
the emperour demaunded a peace: which was to get the highest point of honour,
which a generous prince may desire, yea if he were entred into anothers
countrey. As the same emperour did in the yeare 1544, hauing thrust all the
forces of the empire, and his owne, into this realme, with those of the king of
England on another side, who had alreadie divided the realme betwixt them (as
Sleidan saith) if the pope had not forced the emperour
to make a peace: which the king would neither demaund, nor accept, but with
reasonable conditions. Although thatLewes the eleuenth
reproched by his subiects for demaunding of a
peace.Lewis the eleuenth demaunded it of Edward the fourth, king of England, as soone as he was entred into
Picardie, and bought it deerely, caring little that the earle of Lude and other
his favourites called him cowardly king. But his father Charles the seuenth did a stranger thing for to obtaine a peace of the
duke of Bourgongne, his vassall and naturall subiect; he sent the constable of
France, the chauncellor, a marshall of France, and many other great personages,
to treat a peace with him, who in open assembly, and in the name of the king
their maister, craued pardon of the duke, for the death of IohnCharles the seuenth demaunds a peace basely of the duke of
Bourgongne. duke of Bourgongne, confessing openly, That the king had
done ill, being young, indiscreet, and ill
councelled; intreating the duke, that he would forget his discontent: the duke
said, That he did pardon the king for the honour of God, and compassion of the
people of Fraunce, and to obey the councell of the pope and other christian
princes that had intreated him. A slaue could not behave himselfe more humbly
and abiectly unto his maister, than the king did unto his subiect, to restore
the realme to his first beautie, and to exepll the English, as he did soone
after. The Romans would rather have lost their estate, than once to have dreamt
of it: For wee cannot find that at any time during seuen hundred yeares, that
they had warres with all nations, that they euer
demaunded peace but of the Gaules, who held them besieged in the
Capitol, after they had burnt their citie:
and of Coriolanus: But contrariwise being
vanquishedThe Romans neuer demanded a peace of any but
twice. by the power of king Perseus, they
would neuer accept of any peace of the victor, vnlesse he would submit himselfe
and his kingdome unto their mercie, although he offred to pay them tribute. And
when as king Pyrrhus (after that hee had obtained two
notable victories, and was maister almost of all Italie) sent his ambassadour
to Rome, to treat a peace upon reasonable conditions: they were aunswered, That
the Romans would not treat of any peace, except that Pyrrhus did first depart out of Italie; and that they did contend with
him for their honours and dignities, not for their lives and fortunes. The king
receiuing this aunswere, said, That the Romans could not live in quiet,The Romans of an vndaunted resolution. neither
conquerors, nor conquered. This was the aunswere of a valiant people, who
knew their owne forces to be able to make
head against an enemie: the which would be very much vnbefitting a weake
prince, who must (like unto a wise pilot) strike sails, & yeeld unto the
tempest, that he may recover a safe port, & not to make necessitie subiect
to ambition: as the Vauoide of Transiluania did, who said openly, That he had
rather bee slaue unto the Turke, than allied unto Ferdinand, and so afterwards it fell out. Wee have an example of the
great Knez of Moscouie, who seeing the Procope of Tartaria entred into his
countrey with eighteene legions, knowing well thatItis no
dishonor to submit in time of necessitie. he was vnable to make
resistance, he went to meet him vnarmed, and humbling himselfe before him, he
saued his people and his estate from an ineuitable ruine, yet holding his
countey by yeelding homage to the Procope. But
being at this day equall or greater in forces,
& freed from the seruitude of the Tartar, all princes would scorne him, if
he should demaund a peace, especially hauing receiued an iniurie. For that
prince that beares an iniurie, will soone endure to have a law prescribed him;
and if he once suffer his enemie to giue him a law, he shall soone be reduced
into slauerie. But howsoever, a mightie prince (if he be wise and valiant) will
neuer seeke for war nor peace, if necessitie (which is not subiect to the lawes
of honour nor force) doth not constraine him, neitherWhen a
prince should giue battaile. will he euer giue battaile, if there be
not more apparant profit in the victorie, than of losse if the enemies should
vanquish: as the emperour Augustus said, who for this
reason neuer gaue battaile but upon necessitie. But it is not vnfitting a poore
pince, or a small
seigneurie, or for him that makes no profession of armes, to demaund peace in
his losse. As pope Iulio the third, who demaunded peace
of king Henrie the second, calling him before God, to
iudge of the wrong which hee had done him: The king graunted him a peace, and
said, That he would appeare before God; but hee doubted the pope would not shew
himselfe. Wherewith the pope, who was of a pleasant disposition (seeing the
letters which were signed by the king in the campe lying at Metz, in the yeare
1552) was very glad, although in shew he seemed to bee grieued, saying, That it
was not the king that had indited those letters, but the capitall enemie of the
church. And as the greatnesse of courage and magnanimitie is the light of all
other vertues, and which doth aduance princes to the highest point of honour;
so is it the onely vertue which doth most
daunt an enemie, although he be mightie and warlike,A shew
of courage doth many times daunt an enemie. and oftentimes giues the
victorie without blowes: as Furius Camillus hauing sent
home the children of the Falisques, whome their Schoolemaister had brought into
his campe, he conquered their citie without striking stroke. And Fabricius hauing sent unto king Pyrrhus the Physitian which offred to poison him, refusing halfe his
kingdomes and his treasure, (although he were one of the poorest gentlemen in
Rome) and causing their ransomes to be paid, whome Pyrrhus had freely set at libertie, beeing loath the Romans should be
bound in any respect unto so great a king. Or as Scipio
who hauing conquered a good part of Spaine with little paine, sent backe a
ladie of singular beautie unto her husband, prince of
the Celtiberians, imitating the example of Cyrus. These vertuous acts tooke from their enemies all
courage, to make any more warre against so valiant and magnanimious a people,
who could neither bee vanquishedThe Romans could neuer be
vanquished by honour, not by . by honour, nor
vanquished by treacherie: the which was more apparant after the battaile of
Cannes, Hannibal hauing appointed eight thousand Roman
prisoners to be ransomed for an hundred crowns a peece one with another, hoping
that the Romans who had lost so many men, would willingly pay their ransoms:
but the Senat decreed, That no one should be redeemed at any rate, giuing all
to vnderstand, That either they must vanquish, or be slaues to the enemie:
Wherewith Hannibal was so amased, and daunted, as he
dispaired euer to vanquish the Romans. And contrariwise the Romans did assure
their estate, which was much shaken and abandoned of all friends and
allies. For the Senat did well imagin, that
Hannibal hauing sucked so much blood of the Romans,
he would also exhaust their treasure, in drawing from them eight hundred
thousand crownes, and restoring unto them the veriest cowards of all the Roman
armie; making every one to resolue either to vanquish or die, hauing lost all
hope of libertie, whereby they became fearefull and inuincible. And euen as
they neuer fainted in their losses; so were they neuer proud nor arrogant in
their victories. For when as Antiochus the Great hauing
lost a goodly armie, sent his ambassadours to both the Scipioes, offring to accept of what conditions the Romans pleased:
Whereunto Scipio the Affrican made an answere worthy of
a great and vertuous prince, That the Romans lostA worthy
answere of Scipio. no part of their courage when they were
vanquished, nor of their modestie, when they
did vanquish, demaunding no harder conditions after their victorie than before.
But the aduantag which the Romans had, was, that they
made warre in their enemies countrey, magazins of
souldiors in Italy, to supply their armies if they were defeated: or if they
conquered those countries where they made warre, they might add them to their
empire, & plant them with their owne colonies. A wise prince will neuer
attend an enemie in his own country, if he may stop his entrie, vnlesse he hath
another army ready, or a sure retrait into some places of strength, els he
hazards his whole estateA prince may not hazard his estate
upon one victorie. upon a victorie; as Antiochus,
Perseus, Iuba, and Ptolome the last king of
Aegypt did against the Romans: Darius against Alexander, and oftentimes the French against the English.
And for this cause Lewis the grosse understanding that
the emperour Henry came with a mightie power to make warre in
Fraunce (the king hauing receiued Pope Gelasius into his
protection, and suffered him to excommunicat the emperor) he gathered together
an armie of two hundred thousand men, as Suggerius abbat
of Saint Dens i Fraunce hath left in writing, and went as farre as the
Rhin upon the territories of the empire, which was the onely cause that made
the emperour to lay aside armes, and to accept of what peace it pleased the
king. In like sort Philip Augustus aduertised that the
emperour Otho the second, the king of England, with the
potentats of the Low countries, came into his realme with a mightie armie, he
fortified his places, marched out of his frontiers, and defeated them in
battaile. And if king Francis the first, when as he lost
his armie before Pauia, and himselfe taken prisoner, had receiued such an
ouerthrow in the hart of Fraunce, this
realme had bene in great daunger; but chauncing in Italie, the conquerors
contented themselves with the victorie; and the subiects in the meane time had
leasure to rally their forces, and to fortifie their frontiers.
Many hold opinion, That a soueraigne prince should not hazard his person on a
day of battaile, especially if the enemie be entred into the hart of his
realme: It is true, if he be a coward and base minded: but hauing the
reputation of a valiant and generousThe presence of the
prince is of great consequence to van an
enemie. prince, he doubles the courage and force of his armie, and so
much the more if he be beloued of his armie, and his presence works a
wonderfull effect, when he is seene of them all, and
euerie one seene of him, for oftentimes shame retaines a flying armie, seeing
the presence of their king, and fearing
least he should fall into some daunger, Vrget enim (vt ait
Maro) presentia Turni, The presence of Turnus
(as Maro saith) doth vrge them to fight. As it happened
to Caesar before Therouenne; and in Spaine, fighting for
his life against Pompeis children, where the battaile
had bene lost if he had not bene present. And many beleeue that the victories
which Edward the fourth got in nine battails, was, for
that he did alwaies fight on foot. How many princes and great men do willingly
follow the kings person, which else would not march under any others commaund.
For when as Eumenes was very sicke his armie refused to
fight, vnlesse heHow a prince or Generall should carry
himselfe in a battaile. were brought into the campe in a litter; such
confidence they had in his presence. Yet would I not that a soueraigne prince
or a Generall, should do the office of a priuat soldiour, putting his life rashly in daunger; as it is said of Pelopidas, Marcellus, Gaston de Foix duke of Nemours, and
many others, whose death hath drawne after it the hazard of the state.
I will not here treat of the art of warre, which many have handled, but onely
that which concernes the state. I conclude then, that a prince hauing well
manned and fortified his frontiers, if he doubts that the enemie will enter
into his countrey, let him preuent him, and put the warre as farre from him as
he may: and if he be entred, not to hazard his estate and person rashly upon
the euent of a battaile, especially if hee have to deale with a warlike people,
who commonly get the victory being brought to dispaire, knowing well, that
there is no meanes for them to escape death in anothers countrey, if they be vanquished, hauing neither fort, retreat,
nor any succour. Amongst many we have a lamentable example of our king Iohn, who chose rather to hazard his life, his nobilitie,
and his whole estate, in a doubtfull battaile at Poitiers, than to graunt a
peace unto the prince of Wales, and the English armie, who demaunded only to
depart with their lives: there did ten thousand desparat men defeat an armie of
fortie five thousandIt is daungerous to fight with a
desprat army. French, and led away the
king captiue. Gaston of Foix committed the like errour,
hauing defeated the enemie at Rauenne, seeking to pursue a squadron of
Spaniards that fled, he lost his life, and left all that hee had conquered in
Italie in prey to the enemie. What should I speake of auntient examples, the
histories are full of them: but there is none
more famous than that of Caesar, whose armie was in
despaire through famine &Necessitie of an inuincible
force. want, being enuironed both by sea and land with the enemies
townes and legions, and had soone perished for hunger, if they had not
vanquished, yet would Pompey needs giue that battell of
Pharsalia, hauing twice as many men as Caesar. In so
great a despaire of things, the Generall of the Volsques did incourage his
armie with a briefe speech, after this maner, Armati armatis
obstant virtute pares, sed necessitate superiores estis, Armed men
stand against armed men, equall in vertue, but in necessitie you exceed them.
And another captaine of the Samnites said, Iustum est bellum
quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur
spes, That war is iust to whome it is necessarie, and those armes
religious to them that have no hope but in armes. And therefore FabiusMaximus (the last of that familie) endured all the
scornes and disgraces of his enemies,No prince should fight
a battaile, but constrained. rather than he would commit the fortune
of the Commonweale to a doubtfull battell: and in the end he reaped the honor,
To have preserued his countrey. Whereas Hannibal hauing
hazarded a battaile against Scipio, who went to besiege
Carhage, to draw the enemie out of Italie, lost
both his armie and the estate. It is no good consequence to say, that the
Romans fought three battails with Pyrrhus, and as many
with Hannibal, in the heart of Italie, for that they had
magazins of men of warre, as well out of their owne countries, as from their
allies: the which they could not want, for that by the laws euerie one was
forced to carrie armes at seuenteene yeares of age, and were not freed from them vntill fiftie fiue: neither was it lawful for
any man to demaund an office or Plut. in Gracchis. benefice, that had not carried
armes ten yeares. And at one time there were two thousand citisens excluded
from the Bourgeship, for that they had bene foure yeares together absent from
the warres, except they which had bene dispensed withall upon some iust cause
(as Titus Liuius saith) to the which discipline they
were at the first constrained by the incursions of their bordering neighbours,
being iealous of their greatnesse: But hauing afterwards brought all the people
of Italie under their subiection, or treated alliances with them, and finding
that a people giuen to armes, could not live idly in peace without civill
warres, they found it expedient for the good of the Commonweale, to seeke out
new enemies, making warre sometimes to revenge the wrongsThe
Romans sought occasion of warre. done unto their confederats: and
sometimes defending them against their enemies,
graunting triumphes, honourahle estates, and great rewards to valiant
captaines. The which was wisely ordained by the Senat, as an healthfull remedie
against civill warres; the which Bebius the Tribune of
the people did obiect unto the Fathers, That warre was sowne upon warre, that
the people might neuer be at quiet: and therefore there was no distinction
betwixt militarie charges and offices of iustice: So as one and the selfe same
citisen, might be a valiant Captaine, a wise Senator, a good Iudge, and a great
Orator: as it is said of Cato the Censor, who was well
skilled in tillage, as it appeareth by his bookes, yet was he not ashamed to
leaue his armes to goe to the plough; or to leaue the plough to plead,
sometimes to be a Iudge, to sacrifice, or to play the Oratour before the people
or Senat. And Caesar was high Priest, and in Tullies opinion a most
excellent Orator, and the best captaine of his age. There were many not onely
in Italie, but also in Greece, that excelled in the art of warre and policie.
We read in Iulius Pollux, That the Athenians were bound
to go to warre at foureteene yeares, and continued vntill threescore. Therefore
Aristides, Pericles, Phocion, Leosthenes, Demetrius
the Phalerian, Alcibiades, Themistocles, and infinit
other Grecians, were like unto thePlut. in Phocione
auntient Romans, and did excell in the art of warre and policie. But the wisest
polititians did seperat the art of warre from other vocations. In the
Commonweale of Creet euerie man was not allowed to carrie armes, but certaine
speciall persons: nor inPlut. in Licurg. old times in
Fraunce, whereas the horsemen had this charge, and the Druides were exempt. In
Aegypt none but the Calasires were men of warre: the which LicurgusHerodot. did allow. And therefore Plato divided the citisens into three orders, Keepers, Men at armes,
and Labourers: imitating the Aegyptians, who made three seuerall kindes of
estates. By little and little the Athenians made a distinction of Armes,
Policie, and Iustice;In Phocione. and so did the
Romans. And truely in this short course of our life, there are few that doe
excell in politike arts, but in both not any. It seemes that Augustus did first take from Senators, Proconsuls, and Gouernours of
Prouinces, the power to weare armes: so as in succession of time they called
offices without armes dignities; as weeDion. lib. 53 read in Cassiodorus, Quamuis inquit, omnia dignitatum officia manu secludantur
armata,In forma Comitiue, Written to the Gouernour of a
Prouince.& ciuilibus vestibus induti videantur, qui districtionem
publicam docentur operari: tua tamen dignitas à terroribus eruatur, quae
gladio bellico rebus etiam pacatis accingitur: armaista iuris sunt, non furoris, Although (saith hee) that
all offices of dignitie bee excluded from armed hands, and that they seeme to
bee attired with civill garments, that are taught to labour in the difficulties
of the Commonweale: yet the dignitie seemes to be pluckt from terrours, the
which is guirt with a warlike sword, euen in the quietest times: these be the
armes of Iustice, not of Furie. And consequently all nations by degrees, haue
separated souldiours from schollers and men of justice, beeing a difficult
thing to excell in one art, but impossible in all; nor worthily to exercise
many victories. Moreover it was a thing almost impossible, to traine all the
subiects of a Commonweale up to armes, and to
maintaine them in the obedience of the laws and magistrats. This was haply the cause which made king Francis the first, to cast the seuen legions of foot, which he had
erected within this realme, in the yeare 1534, every legion containing six
thousand foot. And although that his sonne Henry did
renew them twentie yeares after, yet was he forced to alter his opinion, seeing
the Commonweale troubled, and mutinies growne in many places, by meanes of
those legions. And yet in the opinion of straungers, and of those that haue
iudicially examined the goodly ordinances that were made to that end, there was
neuer any thing better instituted for the art ofThe
entertainment of legions, very necessarie in a state. warre, the
which is as necessarie in this realme, as in any part of the world, being
enuironed with warlike and mightie nations, which make a common practise to
spoyle: like to a countrey of conquest. Yea if they had entertained but foure
legions of foot, besides the troopes of horse,
for the defence of the realme, and placed them as it were in garrison upon the
frontiers, they had prouided wisely for the safetie of the Commonweale. Fraunce
is not the twentieth part of the Roman empire, for the guard whereof Augustus Caesar said, That fortie legions did suffice,
being but five thousand men in a legion. The foure legions of foot and troopes
of horse, paied in time of peace, according to the ordinance of king Francis the first, would not have cost three hundred and
fiftie thousand pounds starling, and yet is it halfe as much more as the
legions had in Augustus his time: and the whole pay of
the men at armes of Fraunce, in the yeare 1560, came but to 235300 pounds
starling, as well the old bands, as the men at armes. And Augustus entertained fortie
legions of horse aud foot, besides his and the citieAugustus
kept fortie legions continually in pay. guards, and two nauies for
the defence of both seas, keeping the empire safe from forren and civill
warres, and all for twelue hundred thousand pounds starling a yeare, with an
excellent description of all orders: the which other princes should propound
unto themselves, to imitat such as Orosius, Dion,
Tranquillus, & other writers have described it in their monuments:
and yet was it not lawfull for the Roman souldiours (notwithstanding their
small entertainment) to rob and spoyle: as we see at this day. This was the
meanes to maintaine martiall discipline, to defend the rights of citisens, and
allies, and to repell the enemie: Else if you be prest with warre, you shall be
forced not only to abandon your neighbours, but also your countrey: or else in
this extremitie you must vse vntrained
souldiours, who become captaines before they were euer souldiours:The inconueniences, not to have trained bands. or else
forced with necessitie you must beg and buy forren succours at a deere rate. I
doe not thinke that forren succours are to bee reiected, as many suppose: for
there is no great empire can be angmented▪ without the succours of confederats,
neither can they long resist the violence of an enemie: but I allow of those
succours which come from allies, that are vnited together in an offensiue and
defensiue league, as the Cantons of the Swissers be: or at the least in a
defensiue league, as they bee with the house of Fraunce. For by this meanes
they are not onely the more strengthned, butIt is good to
have mightie friends and allies in an equall league. they also take
from the enemie those succours which he might draw from them, and the occasion
from all men to make warre against either of them, vnlesse hee meane to
be a professed enemie unto them both. But I
desire that the confederats should be tied by a mutuall bond, and altogether
equall, to auoid the reproaches, quarrels, and inconueniences that grow of
inequalitie. Those leagues and treaties be vnequall, when as one is bound to
pay the diets or assemblies of their allies, although they did raise but one
companie of souldiours, and notwithstanding bee tied to pay them a continuall
pension, besides their entertainment in the time of warre, and succours of
horse and foot at need without pension or pay. These treaties did our kings of
Fraunce make with the Cantons of the Swissers, least other princes should draw
them to their succours. It is also necessarie in an offensiue and defensiue
league which is equall, That the conquests should be
common (as it hath alwaies been among the Cantons, when as they have made warre in common) and that whatsoeuer is
conquered by the one, should be priuate, wherein the antient Italians were
circumuented by the Romans in their treaties, for the Romans hauing made an
offensiue and defensiue league with their neighbors the Italians, they had
alwayes for one Romaine legion two from their allies readie paied, and the
Generall of the armie was alwaies a Romaine; and yet theirPolibius and Liuie. The Romans circumuented their allies in Italy in their
treaties. allies had no pension nor entertainement from the Romans,
nor any part of their conquests which were made in common, nor in dignities and
offices, except some townes of the Latins; which was the cause of the sociall
or confederats warre in Italie against the Romans, who were reduced to that
extremitie, as they were forced to giue the right of a citisen, with part of
their offices, and their voyces at elections, almost to all their allies in Italie. The Athenians with the like fraude
did circumuent their neighbors and confederats, from whom they did exact
tributes contrarie to their treaties, neither did they euer vndertake any warre
but one without the forces of their allies, whereupon most of them fell off
unto the Lacedemonians when occasion was offred.
It may also be doubted whether it be fit to have many allies, or mercinarie
souldiers of diuers languages, for the difficultie there is to speake vnto
them, and to incourage them by orations, a thing very necessarie in warre. But
experience hath taught vs, that diuers nations and diuers tongues are easie to
gouerne and leade, as Anniball did shew, hauing an armie
consisting of Carthaginians, Mauritanians, Numidians, Spaniards, Italians,
Gaules, and Greeks, and yet in fifteene yeares space he neuer had mutinie in his camp, & obtained great victories;
but if such an armie be once mutined, there is no meanes to pacifie it: this is
the opinion of Polibius, a captaine of great experience,
and Schoolemaster to Scipio Affricanus. That which we
have spoken touching the succors of allies, is not to be vnderstood that an
estate should wholie relie upon them, but a well gouerned Commonweale must be
supported by her owne forces, and alwayes be stronger than the succours she
hath from her allies: for he alwayes commands the state that is master of the
force, and will make himselfe an absolute lord upon the least occasion, if he
have any desire, the which neuer wants in ambitious minds. And if allies and
confederates be to be feared in an others countrie when they are the stronger,
what assurance can we have of strange forces, which have no offensiue
Forren force being the stronger,
make themselves maister over them that call them
to their succours. nor defensiue league with vs? there is no doubt,
but in danger they will be more carefull of their owne lives than of an other
mans, and will attribute unto themselves the profit and honor of the victorie,
exhausting their treasures, and growing souldiers at their cost whom they
serue. How often have we seene the stranger being the stronger, make himselfe
absolute lord over them that called him? We have in our age the example of Cairadin that famous pirat, called in by the inhabitants
of Alger, to expell the Spaniards out of their fort; hauing vanquished them, he
slew Selim their king with all his familie, and made
himselfe king thereof, leauing the state to Ariadin
Barbarousse his brother. And Saladin a Tartar
being called by the Caliph and the inhabitants of Caire to expell the
Christians out of Soria, after the victorie he sew
the Caliph; and made himselfe absolute lord▪
and least that they of the countrie should attempt any thing against him, he
alwayes imployed Tartarians and Circassians (that were slaues) in the warre,
and for his guard, forbidding all others to beare any armes: and by this meanes
he and his successors inioyed that kingdome, vntill that Sultan Selim Emperout of the Turks made himselfe lord thereof. By the
same means the Herules, Gothes, and Lombards became lords of Italy, the French
of Gaule, the English Saxons of Brittaine, the Scottishmen of Scotland, hauing
expelled the Brittons and the Picts, who had called them to their succours; and
the Turke of the empire of the East and the realme of
Hongary, being intreated by the Emperours of Constantinople and the states of Hongary. And the Emperour Charles the fift had reduced Germanie into the forme of a Prouince,
and made it hereditarie by the same fraude that the rest, when as a part of
Germanie under colour of religion called in the Spaniards and Italians, for
hauing subdued the princes of Saxony, he labored to subiect the rest under the
spanish empire, intending to make Philip his sonne king
of Germanie, if Henry the second had not freed them with
the forces of France, who for this cause was called by the Germaines in their
printed bookes the protector of the Empire, and the deliverer of the Princes.
The which the princes of Germanie hauing foreseene, did bind the Emperour Charles the fift in the twelft article of his oth, that
he should neuer bring an armie of strangers into Germanie; but since the
Emperours death the Electors did sweare neuer
to choose a fortaine prince Emperour; yet if the States of the countrie cannot
agree upon a soueraigne prince, it is better to have a prince from a farre
countrie than a neighbour. And for this cause the Aetolians made Antiochus king of Asia their Generall for a yeare, the
Tarentines king Pyrrhus, the Polonians Henry Duke of Aniou; Leo king of Armenia one of
the children of Andrew king of Hongarie, to giue him his
daughter and his estate: else it is to be feared that a neighbour prince chosen
Generall but for a yeare, will make himselfe perpetuall, or if he be
perpetuall, will grow hereditarie, taking from the subiects their right of
election: or if the estate be giuen to one that is a king and to his heires, it
is to be doubted he will make it a tributarie
prouince to free his owne countrie from taxes and impositions, which happilie
was the cause why they did not choose the Emperours eldest sonne king of Polonia, for it is not to be expected that he will euer
beare that affection to strangers that he doth unto his owne, but will easily▪
abandon an others estate at need, to defend his owne. ToThe
conclusion of the proposition. conclude, in my opinion a Commonweale
well ordained, of what nature soeuer, should be fortified upon the approches
and frontires, in the which forts there should be good garrisons trained up
dayly to armes, hauing certaine lands appointed for souldiers the which they
should enioy only for their lives, as in old time the fees and feudataries
were, and at this day the Timars and Timariots in Turkie, the which are giuen
unto souldiers like unto benefices, upon condition they should be readie with
horse and armes whensoeuer occasion of warre
required: which lands neuer go unto their heires, but are bestowed by the
princes free gift upon the most valiant souldiers, with a clause not to
alienate them, that souldiers might not rob and steale as now they do with all
impunitie. And vntill that these lands in fee may be disposed according to
their first institution, it shall be fit to erect some legions of foote and
horse according to the estate and greatnes of every Commonweale, that they may
be bred up in martiall discipline from their youth in garrisons upon the
frontires in time of peace, as the antient Romans did, who knew not what it was
to live at discretion, and much lesse to rob, spoile, and murther, as they do
at this day, but their camp was a schoole of honor, sobrietie, chastitie,
iustice, and all other vertues, in the which no man might revenge his owne
iniuries, nor vse any violence. And to the
end this discipline may be obserued, as they do at this day in the Turks armie,
it is necessarie that good Captaines and souldiers be recompenced, especially
when they grow aged, with some exemptions, priuiledges, impunities, and
rewards, after the manner of the Romans. And although the third part of the
reuenues be imployed about the entertainement of souldiers, it were not too
much: for thereby you should be assured of men at need to defend the state,
especially if it be enuied and enuironed about with warlike nations, as those
people be that are scituate in the temperate and fertile regions of France,
Italie, Hongarie, Greece, Asia the lesse, Soria, Egipt, Persia, and the ilands
lying in the Mediterranean sea: for the nations lying
upon the extremities of hot and cold, as the Ethiopians, Numidians,
Negros,Those which inhabit in fertill countries, being enuironed by
greedy enemies, have need to bee warlike. Tartars, Gothes,
Muscouites, Scottishmen, and Swedens, have no neede of great forts, nor to
entertaine any legions in time of peace, hauing no enemies but such as they
make themselves; the people of the North being by nature too warlike, all
horsemen, or for the most part, and giuen to armes, without any need to traine
them up in it, vnlesse it be to discharge the countrie, or as I have said, for
that they cannot be kept in peace. And to the end the state may not be brought
in danger by any treacherous and faithlesse allies, or that strangers suck not
the bloud of the subiects growing warlike at an others charge, being readie to
inuade the estate, let all offensiue and defensiue leagues and alliances be
equall, receiuing as great succours at neede as they shall be bound to giue;
and yet the succours of the confederate must not be such as they may force or
prescribe a law. Moreouer, it must not be
allowed for all other subiects to carrie armes, least the laborer and
handicrafts man should take a delight in theeuing and robbing, leauing the
plough and shop, hauing no experience of armes, and when as they are to march
against an enemie, they forsake their coulors and flie at the first charge,
putting a whole armie in disorder, especiallie the handicrafts man, and they
that sit alwaies, beingHandicraftsmen vnfit for
warre. bred up in the shadow, whom all antient and wise Captaines
have held vnfit for warre, whatsoeuer Sir Thomas Moore
saith in his Commonweale. Seeing that wee have discoursed of men of warre, of
forts and of succors that are drawne from them that are in league, let vs now
speake of the suretie of treaties and leagues betwixt Princes and
Commonweales.
CHAP. VI. Of the suertie of alliances and treaties
betwixt Princes and Commonweales, and of the lawes of armes.
THis treatie depends of the former, the which ought
not to be omitted, seeing that neither lawyer nor polititian hath euer handled
it: and yet there is nothing in all affaires of state that doth more trouble
Princes and Commonweales, then to assure the treaties which they make one with an other, be it betwixt friends or
enemies, with those that be newters, or with subiects. Some assure themselves
upon their simple faith mutuallie giuen, others demaund hostages, and many
require some places of strength: some there are which rest not satisfied if
they disarme not the vanquished for their better assurance, but that which hath
been held the strongest assurance, is, when it is confirmed by alliance and
neerenes of bloud. And euen as there is a difference betwixt friends and
enemies, the conquerours and the conquered, those that are equall in power and
the weake, the prince and the subiect, so in like sort their treaties must be
diuers, and their assurances diuers. But this maxime holds generall and
vndoubted, that in all kinds of treaties there is no greater assurance then
that the clauses and conditions inserted in
the treaties be fit and sortable for the parties, and agreeing with the subiect
that is treated of. There was neuer any thing more true then the aduicePlantius Consul, pud li. 8 of
that Consull which said in open Senat, Neminem populum
diutiùs ea conditione esse posse, cuius eum poeniteat, No people can
continue long in that estate whereof they are wearie. The question was touching
the Priuernates whom the Romans had vanquished, for that they had broken the
league, they demanded of their Ambassador what punishment they had deserued?
The paines, answered he, of such as should live in libertie. Then the Consull
replied, If we pardon you, shall we be assured of a peace? the Ambassador answered, Si bonam dederitis,
& fidam & perpetuam, sin malam hauddiuturnam: If you giue vs a good peace, you shall haue
it kept faithfullie and perpetually; if a bad one, it shall be soone broken.
The yonger Senators found these answers too proud and haughtie, but the wiser
sort said▪ That this people which contended only for their libertie deserued to
be made citisens of Rome, else they would neuer be good subiects, nor trustie
friends: and according to this aduice the decree of the Senat did passe in
force of a priuiledge, and was confirmed by the people; and yet had they
yeelded themselves to the mercie of the Romans, as all the other cities of the
Latins their allies had done, who had conspired against the Romains. The
assurance which the antient Romans tooke of those whom they would make ubiect
after they had vanquished them, was to seaze upon all their places of strength,
to put in garrisons, to receiue hostages, and
to disarme the vanquished. Mos autem, inquit Liuius, Romanis
vetustus erat, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur , non prius Imperio in eum tanquam pacatum vti, quam
omnia diuina humanaque dedidsset, obsides accepti
arma adempta, praesidia vrbibus imposita forent: It was an antient
custome among the Romans towards those with whom they had not ioyned in league,
nor contracted friendship upon equall earmes; neuer
to gouerne them peaceably, vntill they had yeelded up all, delivered hostages,
disarmed them, and put garrisons into their townes. For we may not thinke euer
to keepe that people in subiection which hath alwayes livedA
free people i neuer kept in subiction, vnlesse they e
disarmed. in libertie, if they be not disarmed. To take away part of
their libertie, is to incense them more, than if they were wholie subiected: as
Lewis the 12 did unto the Geneuois, who had put themselves under his protection when they were
in danger, which being past, they reuolted, and allied themselves unto his
enemies; against whom he went in person, besieged them, and forced them to
yeeld; then he condemned them in two hundred thousand crownes, putting a strong
garrison into their fort called the Lanterne; yet he suffered them to live
after their owne lawes and with their old magistrates, takingA Popular estat must either be wholly subiected,
or set at free libertie. only from them the stamp of their coine. It
had been farre better either to have made them good subiects, or to haue
restored them to their perfect libertie: for king Lewis
the 11 to whom they had giuen themselves, made answere, That he gaue them vnto
the diuell▪ refusing to receiue a yearely pension for the protection of such
disoyall allies,
who had reuolted from king Charles the 6, hauing them into his protection to defend them against the
Venetians. And the Earles of Sauoy receiued those of Berne into their
protection, beeing opprest by the lords of Bourdorg; but the feare being past,
they desired nothing more than to be freed from their protection, the which the
Earle willinglie granted, chusing rather to have faithfull fellowes, than
faithlesse allies. But king Francis the first in my
opinion committed a greater error, who refused two hundred thousand crownes in
his necessitie, the which the Geneuois offred him to be freed from his
protection, giuing him to vnderstand that upon the first occasion they would
reuolt, as they did after the battaile of Pauia, and afterwards expelled the
garrison which remained in their fort, and razed it to the ground: he should
either have ade them faithfull and free confederats,
being tied together by an equall league; or
els have made them subiects, and so have taken from them the government of
their estate.
But some one will say, that it is a breach of faith to infringe the treaties,
and to change the protection into a soueraignetie. I answere, that it is and
alwayes shall be lawfull for the Patron to make himselfe absolute lord, if the
client be disloyall. We read that Augustus made those
people subiect which had abused their libertie. And therefore king Charles the 9 (hauing discouered the secret practises of
the Spaniards with the inhabitants of Thoul, Metz, and Verdun) was inforced
somewhat to restraine their liberties, for in all
treaties of protection there is an expresse clause, That those which are in protection shall retaine their estate and
soueraigntie: but there is no great assurance if the Protector holds his
clients forts, for that he may make them subiect when he pleaseth. Who knowes
not that the cities of Constance, Vtrech,Imperiall made▪ subiect under colour of protection.
Cambray, Vienna in Austria, and many others which have put themselves in the
protection of the house of Austria, have now lost their liberties. The kingdome
of Hongarie hath runne the same fortune: for after the death of king Ihon, the estates of the countrie sent Ambassadours to
the Turke to receiue their yong king and the realme into his protection,
fearing least Ferdinand should make himselfe lord
thereof, pretending the realme to belong unto him by vertue of certaine
treaties made betwixt the house of Austria, and the kings of Hongarie; but
those treaties had no sure ground, for the
realme being electiue, the king could not take this prerogative from the people
without their consent: and if the house of Austria lying so neere and being so
famous for their glorious deeds, had made offer of any one of their princes to
have bin chosen, they had caried it without any difficultie; but the estates
had rather make choise of Mathew Coruin for their king,
than to lose the right of election: and although that the new king and the
estates of the countrie did ratifie the former treaties with the house of
Austria, yet were they not kept, for that they seemed to be made by force
against all law and reason, wherefore they did chuse rather to put themselves
under the TurksHungary mad subiect
under shadow of protection. protection; who soone after made himselfe
absolute lord, knowing well that Ferdinand would carrie
it, who notwithstanding had some part, but he was forced to agree with
the Turke, paying yeerely a good summe of
money, which the Emperour tearmes a Pension, & the Turke a Tribute, vanting
that the Emperor is his Tributarie. But there is a great difference betwixt a
pensionar and a tributarie, for tribute is paied by the subiect, or by him who
to inioy his libertie paies that which is promised unto him which hath forced
him thereunto. A pension is voluntarily giuen by him that is in
protection,The difference betwixt tribute and
pension. or by him that is equall in a treatie of alliance to haue
peace, and to withhold the pensionar from ioyning with his enemies, or to haue
succours when he shall require them; as in the treaties of equall league
betwixt the kings of France, and the Cantons of the Swissers, upon that
condition that our kings might at their pleasures leauie an armieWhy the king of France gaue pension unto the Swissers.
of Swissers for the defence of this realme, and should likewise help them
against the incursions of their enemies: and
for that it was needfull to make many leuies of Swissers for the guard of this
crowne: fearing also least the enemies thereof should draw them from the
societie of the French, our kings have willingly graunted a thousand crownes
yearely pension to every Canton, notwithstanding that king Francis the first, three yeares before the treatie, had gotten of the
Swissers at Marignan one of the goodlyest victories that euer Prince obtayned.
And although we have sayd, That protection rightlie was that, when as one takes
the defence of an other freely without any reward, for that the mightie are
bound to defend the weake against the iniuries of their enemies: yet for the
assurance of treaties and protections, they vseThe mighty
are bound to defend the weake. to receiue a pension from him that
puts himselfe into protection, to the end that
the Protector beeing bound not onely by his oath, but also in receiuing a
pension, should bee more readie to succour his adherent a need. This was held
by the Antients, against the honor and maiestie of the Empire: but since that,
they have confounded honestie with profit, they have begun to make marchandise
of protection; whereof Saluian of Marseilles doth
greatlie complayne, saying, That the weake putting themselves in the protection
of the mightie, giue all they have to be protected. It is well knowne that they
of Luques, Parma, Sienna, and manie others, pay great pensions to be protected:
And oftentimes a pension is payed to the protector,
not so much to warrant him from his enemies, as from the protector himselfe: as it happened after the battaile of Pauia,
all the potentates of Italie turned their vowes to the Spanyard, and to free
themselves from inuasion, they put themselves into their protection. Amongst
others the Luquois payed unto the Emperour Charles the
fift, tenne thousand ducates▪ the Siennois fifteene thousand, and the duke of
Ferrare fifteene thousand, the which he paied to the Viceroy of Naples, vnder
colour of lending, without hope of restitution, being in the protectionIt is dishonourable to abandon him you have taken into
protection. of the French. But it is shamefull and dishonourable, to
take into protection, to receiue a pension, and to abandon the client in his
great need. Not long since Sigismund Augustus king of
Poland had taken the protection of the inhabitants of Lifland, against the king
of Moscouia: but hauing made a league with the Moscouite, he is not onely said to have abandoned his clients, but to haue
betrayed them unto their enemie. But if he that is in protection as a
soueraigne, and in subiection as a vassall and subiect, demaunds aid of his
protector, he hath double reason to defend him, especially if they attempt any
thing against his honour and person: as it happened in the yeare 1563, in the
Moneth of March, when as the Inquisition at Rome sent out a CitationBy the commandement of pope Pius the fift. against the
queene of Nauarre, to appeare personally at Rome within six moneths, and not by
any procurator, upon paine of confiscation of all her goods, estates, and
seigneuries. King Charles the ninth tooke her into his
protection, saying, That she was neerely allied unto him in blood, that she was
a widow, and tied to the house of Fraunce, a
vassall and subiect unto the king; and that by treaties of popes, and generall
councels she might not be drawne out of the realm for what cause soeuer: seeing
that pope Clement the seuenth sent two cardinals into
England, to heare king Henrie the eight, touching the
betwixt him and Katherine of
Spaine. And for that the Citation and threat made unto such a princesse, toucht
his honour and the estates, the king of France did aduertise all his neighbour
princes and allies, by his ambassadors, giuing the popes legat to vnderstand,
That his maister should not take it ill, if hee did punish those that were the
cause of this enterprise: as Lewis the young did in the
like case to Thibaud earle of Champagne, who had caused
the earle of Vermandois to be censured by the pope: intreating the pope
moreouer, to reuoke his sentences giuen as well by himselfe, as by his deputies: else he should not hold it strange if
hee used the meanes which had bene accustomed in like cases.
But it falls out oft, that those which are receiued into protection, after the
daunger is past, make warre against their protectour: We have many examples,
and without further search, in our memorie we have seene many princes of
Germany cast themselvesThe Duke of Saxonie. into the
protection of king Henrie the second, to be freed from
the captiuitie and slaueryThe Lantgraue of Hesse.
which did threaten them: the king receiued them into protection, and in stead
ofThe Marquesse of Brandebourg. taking any
pension, he gaue them two hundred thousand crownes towards their wars, and
leuied an armie of threescore thousand men at his owne charge for the libertie
of the empire. And although by the 34 article of the treatie of Protection, it
was concluded, That the confederat princes
should suffer the king to seize upon the imperiall townes, speaking French, yet
the emperour was no sooner chased away, & the empire restored to her former
beautie, by meanes of the French, but the chiefe of the confederats and
adherents, forsooke the kings protection: and which is more, tooke armes
against their protectour. And at an imperiall diet, held in the yere 1565, it
was decreed, To send an ambassage into Fraunce, to demaund those three
imperiall townes which are in the protection of France, Thoul, Verdun, and
Metz, although that Verdun hath for these hundred and sixtie yeares bene in the
protection of Fraunce, paying thirtie pound starling onely for a yearely
pension. But this imperiall decree tooke no effect,
and the king was aduertised by letters of the first of December 1559, from a
pensioner of his, That the estates of the
empire would be wel pleased, to have the king hold those townes of the empire,
doing homage for them: which shewed, that he held not theseThose which are in protection have need of greater securiti than the protector. townes but upon good and
iust considerations. And for that the protectour cannot be inuaded by him that
is in protection, being alwayes the weaker: those which put themselves into
protection, have need of greater securitie than the protectors, least under a
colour of patronage they loose their liberties.
Some one may obiect, That it is an absurd thing to demaund securitie of the
protector, seeing that the client puts himselfe in his protection: and by an
auntient decree of the court of parliament, the vassal demaunding securitie
against his lord, was reiected. But the deceit and treacherie of man hath so
farre extended, as the wisest have held it
necessarie to succor the vassall against the violence of his patron, whom the
soueraigne prince shall take into his safegard, if there be iust cause: with
greater reason the client is to seeke all the securitie that may be from the
protector. The first assurance dependsThe assurance of the
league of protection. upon reasonable conditions annexed unto the
treatie: the second of the letters of protection, which the protector must
deliver unto the clients, to testifie, That all the rights of soueraigntie and
maiestie remaine absolute unto the client: and this is to be done in
Monarchies, at the comming of a new prince: for the protection is dissolued by
the death of the client, as well as of the patron: neither is the succession
tied unto the protection. And therefore the inhabitants of Mets, after the
death of Henry the second, demaunded to have new letters
of protection from Charles his sonne: not for that they
should be more safe from their enemies, but
to shew that they were not in subiection, the which is generall in all treaties
made betwixt princes, and it hath beene alwayes obserued, to renew leagues and
alliances, which else should be dissolued y death. So
Perseus king of Macedon, after the death of his
father, sent an ambassage to the Senat of Rome, to renew the league they had
with his father, and to the end he might be called king by the Senat. But when
as the Senat offered to renew the same conditions of the league which they had
with Philip his father, Perseus
refused them, saying, That the treatie made with his father, did nothing
concerne him: and if they would contract a new league, they must first agree
upon the conditions. So Henrie the seuenth, king of
England hauing receiued the duke of Suffolke from the Archduke Philip, father unto A league made with the father binds not the sonne.
the emperour Charles the fift, upon condition, That he
should not put him to death, he kept his faith; but he being dead, his sonne
Henry the eight caused his head to bee cut off,
saying, That he was not tied unto the treatie which his father had made.
But for that protections are more daungerous for the adherents or clients, than
all other treaties, it is needfull to have greater securitie: for oft times wee
see, that for want of securitie the protection is chaunged into a seigneurie.
And sometimes hee thinkes himselfe well assured, that makes the wolfe the
keeper of his flocke. And therefore protections must be limited to a certaine
time, especially in Popular and Aristocraticall estates, which neuer die. And
therefore the inhabitants of Geneua hauing put themselves in the protection of
them of Berne, would not have the protection continue aboue thirtie yeares, the which did expire in the yeare
1558, and then the Geneuois made an equall league with the Bernois, the which
was not without great difficultie, being almost brought into subiection, by the
practises of some citisens that were executed. Since the first impression of
these books, a Printer of Geneua put them suddenly to the presse, making an
aduertisement in the beginning, wherein hee doth controll some places: but he
deserues to be punished by the Seigneurie: First, for that hee hath attempted
against another mans workes, who hath spoken as honourably of Geneua, as of any
Commonweale whatsoeuer. Secondly, for that he hath infringed the ordinances of the Seigneurie of Geneua, published the fift of
Iune, 1559: whereby it is expresly defended,
To make any inuectiue against such authors as are set forth. For if the author
deserued any reproachfull words from the Printer, he should not have printed
them, and much lesse set them to sale. But as for his reprehensions all men of
iudgement have esteemed them as they deserue. And heretofore this good Printer
hath bene aunswered, who maintaines, That it is lawfull for the subiect to kil
his prince, kindling by this meanes the fire of sedition and rebellion in all
places. And whereas hee saith, That Geneua hath not bene in the protection of
Berne, the author refers himselfe unto the treatie that was made in the yeare
1536. But the fault growes, for that they knew not what protection was, which
our auntient treaties call Auouoison, and in Latine Aduocatio. The like may be said of Rotuille, and of
Mulhouse, which are allied with the Cantons of
the Swissers, but it is an alliance of protection. As in like case the abbat
and towne of Saint Gall, which are also allied, but yet in the protection of
Zurich, Lucerne, Swits, and Glaris, as I have seene by the treaties which the
abbat of Orbez, (hauing remained long ambassedour in Swisserland) imparted vnto
me from the first unto the last: those of Valdaost, were in like daunger to
them of Geneua, for the Valoisians would have made them subiect, under a colour
of protection, in the yeare 1559, if the king of Fraunce bad not defended them.
And euen as the vassall is freed from the fealtie and homage which he oweth
unto his lord, if hee bee ill intreated by him, as it was adiudged by the court
of parliament, for the lady of Raiz against the duke of Brittaine: in like sort
the client is exempt from the power of the The client is freed from the protection, if the protector
make any brach. protector, if he doth
infringe and breake the lawes of protection. But the chiefest caution and
assurance, is, when as the protector is not ceised of the places of strength,
nor hath not any garrisons in his clients townes. There is nothing more true,
than what was spoken by Brutus the Tribune of the
people, unto the nobilitie of Rome, That there was one onely assurance for the
weake against the mightie, which was, That if the mightie would, they could not
hurt them: for that ambitious men that have power over another, neuer want
will. And therefore it was wisely prouided by the Scots, when as they came into
the protection of the English, made in the yeare 1559, That the queene of
England, who tooke their protection, should giue hostages, the which should be
chaunged every six moneths: and that she should not build any forts in
Scotland, but with the consent of the
Scottish men. Wherein the Athenians did erre, who hauing put themselves first
into the protection of Antipater, then of Cassander, of Ptolomey, and in the
end of Demetrius the Besieger, they suffered their
protectors to seize upon their forts, and to put in garrisons, who presently
made themselves soueraigne lords. The which Demosthenes
had well and wisely foreseene, when as one commended unto him the mildnesse and
courtesie of Antipater: hee aunswered, Wee desire no
lord and maister, how mild and gratious soeuer: and him did Antipater pursue euen into Italie, and slue him. But the Athenians
were circumuented by the same fraud as they had done their associats: For the
Persians being expelled out of Greece, all the cities of Greece made an equall
league, for the defence of their estates and liberties, concluding, That they should have one common treasurie in Apolloes temple, whither all the associats should yearely
bring their money, that an account might bee giuen of the receits and expences
by a common consent. Euerie citie sent ambassadours for the swearing of their
league: Aristides surnamed the Iust, came for the
Athenians, who after solemne sacrifice, did cast peeces of burning yron into
the sea, calling heauen and earth, and all their gods, to witnesse, and saying,
As this fire is quencht in the water, so let them suddenly perish, that shall
breake their faith. But the Athenians seeing theThe league
broken by the raud of the Athenians common
treasure great, fortified their citie ports, & passages therewith, and made
prouision of nauie, ships, & gallies well armed.
And then finding themselves the stronger, they
changed the equal league into protection, & protection into subiection. So
as theThe cities of Greece subiected under colour of
alliance. appellations of all the confederat cities came unto Athens;
as we read in Xenophon, & all charges and
impositions were taxed by the Athenians, who had freed themselves from all
imposts: the which chanced for that the Athenians trained their subiects up in
arms, at their confederats costs. And so did the Lacedemonians to all their
confederats, whom under colour of an equall league, they imperiously forced to
obey: for that for the most part they were all mechanike people. And
contrariwise in Lacedemon there was not any Spartan that was an Artisan, being
against Licurgus his lawes: so as the citie of Sparta
was farre more mightie, and held in a manner all their other allies in
subiection; as we read in Plutarch. We see that the
Latines fell almost into the like difficultie,
after that they had made an equall league with the Romans, against whom they
tooke armes: for that the Romans commaunded them imperiously as their subiects:
whereof Setin captaine of the Latines complained,
saying, Sub vmbra foederis aequi seruitutem patimur, We
are (saith he) slaues unto the Romans, under colour of an equall league. And a
little after, Consilia populorum Latinorum habita,
responsumque non ambiguum imperantibus milites Romanis datum, absisterent
imperare ijs, quorum auxilio egerent: Latinos pro sua libertate potius quam
pro alieno imperio arma laturos, The Latines hauing held a councell,
and giuen a plaine aunswere to the Romans which commaunded the souldiours, they
wished them to forbeare to commaund them whose aid they needed: the Latines
would rather take arms for their owne liberties, than for anothers rule and empire. We read, that Licortas captaine generall of the Acheans, used the like complaints to
Appius the Consull, after that the Acheans had
treated an equall league with the Romans, Foedus Romanorum
cum Acheis specie quidem aequum esse: re precariam libertatem, pud Romanos etiam imperium esse, The league
which the Romans have with the Acheans, in shew it is equall, but in effect it
is an intreated libertie, and with the Romans it is emperie or absolute
command. For the same cause the Samnites made warre against the Romans,
renouncing their league: for that under a colour of societie, they would
commaund absolutely over them. And for the same reason the cities of Italie
allied unto the Romans by an equall league, reuolted from their alliance for
that the Romans drew from them an infinit succour of men and money, so that in
The cause of the sociall warre. all their warres they
had two of their allies for one Roman, and by that meanes conquered the
greatest empire that euer was, and yet their associats had no part of the
conquest, but some pillage, after that the Romans had taken what they pleased:
which. 56. was the cause of the confederats
warre in Italie, the which had no end, vntill that the allies were made
citisens of Rome, to have part of honours and offices. And yet what equall
league soeuer the Romans made, they were still the stronger, & held their
allies as it were in subiection. How imperiously the Romans behaued themselves
towards their confederats, the speech of the Consull Appius unto the Generall of the Acheans, contending for the libertie
of the Lacedemonians, is a sufficient testimonie, saying, Dum
liceret voluntate sua facere gratiam inirent, ne mox inuiti & coacti
facerent, Whilest they might do it of
their owne free will, they should deserue thankes; else they should be soone
forced thereunto against their wills. And in the treatie made with the
Aetolians (to whome they would not graunt any peace, vnlesse they submitted
themselves wholly unto their mercie) there are these words, Imperium maiestatemque populi Romanorm gens
Aetolorum conseruato sine dolo malo; hostes eosdem habeto quos populus
Romanus, armaque in eos ferto: & bellum pariter gerito, obsides arbitrio
Consulis 40, & talenta
dato, You Aetolians shall maintaine the empire and maiestie of the
people o Rome, without any fraud or guile, their
enemies shall be yours, you shall carry arms, and make
warre against them with the people of Rome: you shall giue fortie hostages
at the Consuls discretion, and fiftie
talents. They left them the free government of the state, but with such
conditions, as they were little better than subiects; hauing vnfurnished them
of men and money, and taken the best amongst them for hostages. These words of
the league, Maiestatem Romanorum conseruato, Maintaine
the maiestie of the Romans; shewes, that the league betwixt the Romans and the
Aetolians was vnequall, and that the one did respect the maiestie of the other
with all honour. And although the Romans gaue lawes unto the Aetolians, yet
they did enioy their estate and soueraigntie: as they did in all Greece, which
they freed from the power of the kings of Macedon. And after that they had
vanquished and taken Perseus king of Macedon, they freed
all the people, and discharged them of the moitie of their imposts, suffering
them to gouerne their owne estates: and for
their better assurance, they commaunded upon paine of death, That all
Gouernours, Captaines, Lieutenants, Presidents, Councellours of state,
Gentlemen in ordinarie, and euen the kings Pages and Footmen (qui seruire regibus humiliter alijs superbe imperare consueuerunt,
Which had beene accustomed to serue their kings humbly, and to commaund others
imperiously) to depart out of Macedon, and to passe into Italy. And not content
therewith, they divided Macedon into foure prouinces, forbidding upon paine of
death, That the one should have no accesse, communication, traffique, commerce,
nor alliance of marriage, with another: and moreouer, that the moitie of those
charges which were paid to the king, should be carried yearely into the
treasurie of Rome. And so the people of Macedonie Macedonie made tributarie to the Romans. receiued a
law from the victor, and remained tributaries, yet they enioyed the government
of their estates. The Consull Mummius used the like
policie, hauing subiected the estate of Achaia, he rased Corinth, and abolished
the societies & communalties of Greece; yet he suffered the free people to
enioy their laws and magistrats, easing them of part of their tributes: the
which was a subtill meanes to draw unto the amitie of the Romans all the people
which had bene held in slauish subiection, and to make tyrants to tremble, or
at the least to force soueraigne kings and princes to gouerne their subiects
iustly, seeing that the prize and reward of the Romans victorie, was the
libertyThe of the Romans
victories of people, and ruine of tyrants. Whereby they reaped the
greatest honour that men might in this world, To be iust and wise.
It is also a double wrong which the lord receiues from his subiect, hauing put
himselfe in the protection of another, and from him that hath receiued him, if
hee hold not of him by fealtie and homage, or hath some liuing in the
protectors countrey. And for that Charles of Lorraine
bishop of Metz, put himselfe into the protection of the empire, and obtained a
safegard for him and his, of all that which he held in the country of Messin,
in the yeare 1565, the king of Fraunce his lieutenant opposed himselfe to the
publication of this safegard: whereby he (hauing recourse unto the empire)
brought in question his obedience due unto his prince, the protection of Metz,
& his kings right. And yet many princes receiue all that seeke it, without
discretion, the which is the cause of many inconueniences, if the protection be
not iust. It is a dangerous thing to vndertake
the protection of another prince, but it is more dangerous to vndergoe it
without a iust cause, being the chiefe subiect of all wars, & the ruine of
cities and kingdoms, when as subiects fall from the obedience of their naturall
prince, to obey another. And generally all treaties of alliance made with a
prince or warlike people, draw after them a subiection and necessitie to take
armes alwayes for his succour, and to run the same fortune: as the Romans
confederats, who by their treaties were bound to furnish men and money for
their succours, and all the profit and honour of the conquests came unto the
Romans. They make no such treaties at this day, yet the victor prescribes a law
unto the vanquished. And therefore many have bene
of opinion, That it was expedient Neutralitie is sometimes profitable. for a prince to
be a Neuter, and not to meddle with any other princes warres: the chief reason
is, That the losse is common, but the fruit of the victorie is his only whose
quarrell they maintaine; besides, he must declare himselfe an enemie to those
princes which have not wronged him: but he that shall stand indifferent, is
oftentimes a means to reconcile enemies: and maintaining himselfe in the loue
of them all, hee shall reape thanks and honour of euerie side. And if all
princes be in league one against another, who shal mediat a peace? Moreover it
seems there is no better meanes to maintaine the greatnes of an estate, than to
see the neighbor princes ruine one another. For the greatnes of a prince (to
speake properly) is nothing els but the ruine & fall of his neighbors:How a prince maintaines his greatnesse. & his
strength is no other thing, but the weaknesse of another. And therfore Flaminius said unto the Consull Attilius, intending to ruine the citie of the Aetolians, That it was
not so expedient to weaken the Aetolians, as to oppose against the greatnesse
of young Philip king of Macedon. These reasons may helpe
them that defend neutralitie: but it seemes they are subiect to greater
inconueniences. First in matter of state it is a maxime, That he must either be
the stronger, or of the stronger faction (and this rule doth not admit many
exceptions, be it in the selfe same Commonweale, or amongNeutralitie is many times dangerous. sundrie princes) els hee must
alwayes remaine a prey at the victors discretion: as the Roman ambassadour said
unto the Acheans, whome Antiochus king of Persia
persuaded, That they would remaine neuters betwixt him and the Romans. And it
seemes, that whosoeuer will maintaine himselfe, must of necessitie bee a friend
or an enemie. Whereof we have an example in Lewes the eleuenth, king of Fraunce, against whom they
made warre of all sides, so long as he continued a newter: but after that he
had allied the Swissers more strictly among thēselues, & the citie of
Strausbourg with them, and that he had entred into that league, neuer any
enemies durst assault him, (as Philip de Commines
saith:) for neutralitie, Neque amicos parat, neque inimicos
tollit, It neitherLiuius lib. 5. purchaseth friends, nor takes
away enemies: as an auntient captaine of the Samnites said. And the like
conclusion was made among the estates of the Aetolians, by Aristemus their Generall, saying, Romanos aut socios
habere oportet, aut hostes, media via nulla est, We must have the
Romans either confederats or enemies, there is no meane. WeNeutralitie is oftentimes the ruine of princes. have infinit
examples in al histories: Ferdinand king of Aragon found
no better means to pull the kingdome of
Nauarre from Peter of Albret, than in persuading him to
bee a neuter betwixt him and the king of Fraunce, that hee might bee abandoned
at need. And the inhabitants of Iabes remaining neuters, and not ingaging
themselves in the warre which the people of Israel made against the tribe of
Beniamin, they were all slaine, and their townes
rased. As also the Thebans fell into great daunger, being neuters, when as king
Xerxes came into Greece. As in the like case the
towne of Lays in Soria, was surprised, spoiled, sacked, and burnt, by a small
troupe of the tribe of Dan: for that (as the historie
saith) they were not in league with any soueraigne princeIud. c. 18. or state. And without any further
search, the Florentines after they had left the alliance of the house of
Fraunce, refusing to enter into league with the pope, the emperor, the king of England, and the king of Spaine, against
the king of Fraunce, they soone felt the fruits of their neutralitie.
But it were an vniust thing, will some one say, to ioyne in league against
France, with whom they had been so strictly conioyned: I confesse it, so should
they not have left it at need as they did; for the league is not only broken if
thou beest an enemie to my associates, or if thou ioynest with my enemies, but
also if for feare thou doest abandon thy associates, being bound by the league
to succour them; as a Roman Ambassador said, Sisocios meos
pro hostibus habeas, aut cum hostibus te coniungas, If thou takest my associates for thine enemies, or ioynest with mine
enemies. Yet some may say, that neutralitie
may well be granted with the consent of other princes, which seemeth to be the
best support without any feare of the victors. The estates of Lorraine,
Bourgongue and Sauoy have maintained themselves in a free peace, so long as
they had an alliance of tranquilitie, but after that the Duke of Sauoy had once
vnited himselfe to the Spanish faction, he was expelled his countrie by the
french. But there is a great difference to be a neuter without the friendship
either of the one or the other, and a neuter alliedThe
difference of neutralities. to both parties, and these are farre more
assured, than if they were enemies to both factions: for they are free from the
victors inuasion, and if there be any treatie of peace betwixt both parties,
they are comprehended of either side. And if neutralitie be commendable in that
manner, as I have said, it is farre more commendable in a Prince that
doth exceede all others in power and
dignitie, that he may have the honor to be the vmper and moderator; as it
happens alwaies, that quarrels betwixt Princes are decided by friends that
stand indifferent, and especially by those which exceede the rest in power and
greatnes, as heretofore many Popes which knew well how to mainetaine their
ranke, and reconcile Christian Princes, have reaped honor, thanks, and
assuranceIn what case one should be neuter for
their persons and estates, and those which have followed either the one or the
other partie, have drawne after them the ruine of other Princes. It was thought
very strange in Spaine that Pope Alexander the 6 a
naturall Spanyard, should enter into league with Lewis
the 12, king of France against the Spanyards; and when as the Spanyards
had the better in Italie, he told the
french Ambassador that he would remaine a neuter, and be a common father to
both parties, but it was too late now to make a shew to quench that fier which
he himselfe had kindled. As in the like case the Duke of Alua Viceroy of Naples
being aduertised of a request made by the Procurator of the chamber of Rome
against the Emperour, touching the confiscation and reunion of the realme of
Naples to the reuenues of S. Peter, he did write vnto
Pope Theatin, who had entred into league with the house
of France, that he should remaine as neuter for the dignitie which he had aboue
all other Christian Princes, but the truce being broken, the armies in field,
and their ensignes displayed, the end was miserable, for the Pope renounced the
league, leauing the french in their greatest neede, and it was concluded by
a treatie which he made with the Spanyard
that he should continue newter. Neuer was the hatred of any Prince so
pernitious unto his enemie, as the favour of Theatin was
then unto the french, without the which they had not bin reduced to such
extremitie, as in one day to lose all they had conquered in thirtie yeares. It
is more strange, for that the memory is more fresh of the like errors committed
by pope Clement the 7, fauoring one of these princes
against the aduice of Lewis Canosa his Ambassador, who
aduertised him by letters written out of France, that the greatnes and suertie
of his estate was to shew himselfe a neuter: so soone after he see himselfe
prisoner to the imperials and the citie of Rome sackt after a strange manner,
and both himselfe and his Cardinals ransomed at the victors discretion. I enter
not into the worthines of the fact, neither is
it in question to know who deserued most favour, but only, that hee which alone
may be iudge and moderator of honor, should neuer make himselfe a partie,
although he were assured that he should incurre no danger, much more when his
estate is in question, and that he can have no securitie but hazard by the
victorie. There are others who to win favour of all sides forbids their
subiects by publike proclamations to giue ayde or succour to the enemies of
their associates, and yet vnderhand they suffer them to passe, yea sometimes
they send them, so did the Aetolians, saith Titus Liuius, Qui
iuuentutem aduersus suos socios, publica tantum auctoritate dempta, militare
sinunt, & contrariae saepè acies in vtra{que} parte Aetolica auxilia
habent, Which suffer there your yong men
vnderhand to goe to warre against their owne confederates,Allies are someimes dangerous. and oftentimes troupes
of Aetolians are seene in either armie. Such allies are more dangerous than
enemies. But it may be some one will say that it is dangerous to suffer a
Prince so to increase in power as he may giue law unto the rest, and inuade
their estates when he pleaseth. It is true, and there is no greater occasion
then that, to induce a neuter to seeke by all meanes to hinder him; for the
suretie of Princes and Commonweales consists in the equall counterpeeze of
power. So when as the Romans made warre against king Perseus, some fauored the king, others supported the Romans, Tertia pars (said Titus Liuius)
optima eadem & prudentissima, si vtique optio domini
potioris daretur, sub Romanis quàm sub Rege esse mallebat: si liberum inde
arbitrium neutram partem vole bat altera oppressa fieri potentiorem: it a
inter vtrosque conditionemciuitatum optimam fore, protegente semper altero inopem ab
alterius iniuria, & illihatis vtriusque partis viribus parem esse:
A third part, saith Titus Liuius being the best and the
wisest, if they were to make choise of their lord, had rather subiect
themselves unto the Romans than under the king, but if they might have their
free will, they would have neither of them superior, with the ruine of the
other, so as betwixt both the cities should be secure, the one alwayes
protecting the weake from the iniuries of the other, and they both should
remaine equall, their forces being not impaired: So as the wisest have held
opinion, that there was nothing better for the suretie of estates, then to haue
the power of great Princes as equall as might be; yet those which were of this
opinion, when as the Romans and Macedonians were in warre, remained
neuters, although they were tyed to the
power of the Romans, and to the king of Macedon, and it succeeded well for
them: for there is a difference in wishing the parties to be equall, and in
making himselfe a partisan. It is therefore commendable for the greatestIt is honourable for great princes to be neuters. and
mightiest Princes to remaine neuters, although it be not so concluded betwixt
other Princes, as I have said before. And this is necessarie for the common
good of all Princes and States, which cannot be reconciled but by their common
allies, or by them that are neuters. But those that be neuters do many times
kindle the fier in stead of quenching it; the which may be excusable, if the
preseruation of their estate depends upon the warre which they entertaine
betwixt others; but it can hardly be concealed, and the matter once discouered,
the parties most commonly agree to fall upon their common enemie, as it happened to the Venetians, who were
alwayes wont to sow diuision among their neighbours, and to fish in a troubled
water. Lewis the twelfth discouering it, he allied
himselfe with all the other Princes, and then they all iointly made aA generall league against the Venetians. league against
the Venetians, who were reduced to that extremitie, as they yeelded Creme,
Bresse, Bergame, Cremona, and Guiradadde, being members of the Duchie of Milan,
unto the french king, and to the Pope Fauence, Rimini, Rauenne, and Ceruie,
being of the patrimonie of S. Peter: to the Empire
Padoua, Vincentia, and Verona: to the Emperour the places of Friuli and
Treuisan, being the inheritance of the house of Austria: to Ferdinand the ports and places ingaged by the kings of Naples to the
seigneurie of Venice, and to call home their magistrates from the imperiall
townes, and out of all the countrie which
they held upon the firme land. Whereas before the warre the Pope would haue
been contented with some one place, but this tooke not effect, for Dominike Treuiran Procurator of S. Marke
stayed the Senat, saying, That the Venetians were alwayes accustomed to take
townes and castels, but hauing once taken them, it were absurd to restore them.
It is therefore more sase for him that remaines a neuter to meditate a peace,
than to nourish warre, and in so doing to purchaseIt is most
safe for a neuter to mediat peace. honor and the loue of others with
the assurance of his owne estate, as the Athenians procured a peace betwixt the
Rhodians and Demetrius the besieger, to the great
content of both parties, who were tyred with warre,
and yet were loth to demaund a peace one of
another: by which meanes the Athenians did reape great honor and profit to
their estate. The which is so much the more necessarie, if he which is a neuter
be allied to them that are in warre, and hath occasion to draw succors from his
allies: as our kings have alwayes done betwixt the Catholike and Protestant
Swissers, and betwixt the Grisons and the Swissers, as well for the lawes of
friendship, as fearing that in the meane time he should want the ayd of his
confederats. And sometimes those which are wearied with the warre, stirre up a
third partie being a neuter, for the desire they have of peace, and the shame
they have to seeke it: as the Florentines not able to subdue the Pisans, by
reason of the Venetian succors, who desired nothing more than to retire
themselves, they did procure the duke of Ferrare vnderhand to mediate an
agreement. It is the greatest point of
honor that a Prince can attaine vnto, to be chosen judge and vmpier of other
princes quarrels, as in old time the Romans were, forIt is
honourable for a prince to be an vmpire in other princes quarrels.
the great opinion which was held of their vertue & integritie: & since,
this prerogative hath been giuen unto the Popes among other Christian Princes,
who oftentimes have been chosen iudges and arbitrators of all their
controuersies: as in the treaties betwixt king Charles
the 5, and Charles king of Nauarre, made in the yeare
1365; and betwixt Philip Augustus and Richard king of England: If the Pope were not a partie, as Innocent the 4 was against the Emperour Frederick the 2, then the Emperour made choise of the Parliament of
Paris for arbitrator, which was the Senat of Peeres and Princes, and the Councell of France. And Pope Clement the 7 making a league with the kings of France and England
against the Emperour in the yeare 1528, he caused it to be inserted in the
treatie, That if it were needfull to conclude a peace with the Emperor, he
should have the honor to be arbitrator. Paule the 3 did
the like betwixt the king of France and the Emperour in the treaties of
Marseilles and Soissons. One of the most necessarie things for the assurance of
treaties of peace and alliance, is to name some great and mightier Prince to be
iudge and vmpier in case of contrauention, that they may have recourse unto him
to meditate an agreement betwixt them; who being equall, cannot with their
honors refuse warre, nor demaund peace. But to the end that other Princes be
not driuen to that exigent, it shall be necessarie for them all to ioyne
together in league, to keepe downe the
power of any one that might bring the weaker into subiection: or else if they
be in league, to send Ambassadors to meditate a peace before the victorie, as
the Athenians, the Rhodians, the king of Egipt, and the seigneurie of Chio did,
betwixt Philip the yong, king of Macedon, and the
Aetolians, fearing the greatnes of the king of Macedon, as we reade in Titus Liuius. And for this cause after the taking of king
Francis the first before Pauia, the Pope, the
Venetians, the Florentines, the Duke of Ferrare, and other Potentates of
Italie, made a league with theWhy many princes made a league
against the emperour after the battaile of Pauia. king of England for
the deliverie of the king of France: not for that the afflicted fortune of the
French did moue them unto pitie (as it is vsuall to kings, to whom the name of
maiestie seemes holie) but for feare of the imperiall Eagle, which hauing
couered a great part of Europe with her wings,
might gripe and teare in sunder those pettie princes with her tallents: and yet
they themselves had not many yeares before ioyned in league with the Emperour
against king Francis after the battaile of Marignan, and
restored Francis Sforce to the Duchie of Milan; hauing
found by experience how dangerousIt is dangerous to be
neighbour to a mightie prince. the neighbourhood of a mightie Prince
was, for if he be iust and upright, his successor will not resemble him, for
which cause Methridates king of Pontus seeing the Roman
empire to reach up to heauen, he entred into league with the kings of Parthia,
Armenia, and Egipt, and with many cities of Greece against the Romans, who had
seazed upon the greatest part of Europe under coulor of iustice, causing in one
day fortie five thousand Roman citisens to be slaine
throughout all Asia, by a secret conspiracie,
but it was then too late to make a league against a power which was inuincible.
And therefore at this day if great Princes conclude a peace, all others seeke
to be comprehended therein, as well to assure their estates, as to hold those
great princes in an equall counterpeize, least that the one by his greatnes
oppresse the rest: as in the treatie of peace made at Cambray in the yeare
1559, all estates and Christian Princes were comprehended by the king of
France, or the Catholike king, or by them both togither, and any others that
the two kings should name within sixe moneths. But they must be named
particularly, and not in generall tearmes by the names of allies or treaties the parties comprehended must be expresly
named. neuters, for if there be not a speciall expression, they may
iustly pretend ignorance; for that affaiers of state are sometimes managed so
secretlie and so sodenly, as a league is made
before the enterprise can be discouered, notwithstanding all the diligence of
Ambassadors to learne out the conditions of the treatie: as it happened in the
treatie of Cambray made in October 1508, whereas the Pope, the Emperour, the
Empire, the king of France, the king of Arragon and Naples, the king of
Castill, the Dukes of Lorraine, Ferrare, and Mantoue, entred into league
against the seigneurie of Venice, the which was concluded before the Venetians
had any notice thereof, although they had ambassadors in a manner with all
these Princes: and without doubt if they had had any intelligence thereof, they
might easily have preuented it, seeing that after the conclusion thereof, and
the warre begun, they found meanes to withdraw the Pope, and to make him a
mortall enemie to the French, which was the only meanes to preserue their estate from ineuitable ruine. The like happened
unto the protestant Princes, against whome the treatie of Soissons was made in
September in the yeare 1544, betwixt the king of France and the Emperour, where
by the first article it was agreed, that the two princes should ioyne their
forces together to make warre against them, the which they could neuer beleeue,
vntill they had seene the preparations made against them. They might easily
have preuented the storme which fell upon them: for that the Emperour had no
great desier to make warre against them, and the king lesse, who did secretly
favour them; so as in giuing the Emperour some succors, or sending an
ambassador unto him, they had been comprehended in the treatie, for they had no
enemie but the Pope, who was then a neuter betwixt the Emperour and the
King. Sometimes the league is so strong, and
the hatred so great, as it is a hard matter to hinderA
league against Fraunce. it, and much more to breake it, being
concluded. King Francis the first was well aduertised of
the league made betwixt the Pope, the Emperour, the king of England, the
Venetians, the Dukes of Milan and Mantoue, the Commonweales of Genes, Florence,
Luques, and Sienna, all confederates against his estate; yet could he not
preuent it, but in quitting the duchie of Milan. Those which had concluded a
peace and perpetuall amitie with him, and those which were tied unto him by a
defensiue league, brake their faith, and made open warre against him: the which
was not held strange, for many make no esteeme of the breach of faith in matter
of treaties betwixt princes, especiallie if they may reape any profit thereby:
yea some are so treacherous, as they sweare
most when as they intend most fraud, as Lisander was
wont to say, That men must be circumuented and deceiued with oathes, and
children with toyes; but he feltPlu. i Lisand. the grieuous punishment of
his disloyaltie. Doubtlesse, periurie is more detestable than atheisme, for
that the atheist who beleeues there is no God, is not so wicked and impious, as
he that knowes there is a God which hath a care of humane things, yet vnder
coulor of a false and counterfeit oath, is not ashamed to skorne and abuse his
deitie: so as we may rightly say, That treacherie is alwayes ioyned with
impietie and basenesse of mind; for hee that willinglie forsweares himselfe to
deceiue another, shewes plainely that he skornes God,
and feares his enemie. It were better neuer to
call the immortall God, or him they hold to be a God, to be a witnes of their
fraud, but only themselves; as Richard Earle of Poitiers
sonne to the king of England did, who giuing a confirmation of the priuiledges
of Rochell, used these words, Teste meipso, My selfe
being witnes. Seeing then that faith is the only foundation and support of
iustice whereon not only Commonweales, but all humaine societie is grounded, it
must remaine sacred and inuiolable in those things which are not vniust,
especially betwixt princes: for seeing they are the warrants of faith and
oathes, what remedie shall the subiects have against their power for the oathes
which they take amongFaith betwixt allies must be
kept. themselves, if they be the first which breake and violate their
faith. I speake of iust things, for it is a double impietie to sweare to do a
wicked act, and in this case he that breakes
his oath is no treacher, but deserues reward. And in like case, if the Prince
hath promised not to do a thing which is allowable by the law of nature and
iust, he is not periured although he make breach thereof; neither are priuate
men tyed by theirIt is no disloialtie to breake an vnlawfull
oath. oath, if they have promised to do more than is allowable by the
civill law. Those things which are by nature vniust and vnlawfull no man may
promise, neither may any man vrge them if they be promised. But wise Princes
ought not to sweare any thing unto other Princes that is not allowable by the
law of nature and nations, not force any Prince that is weaker then themselves
to sweare to vnreasonable conditions. And to take away all ambiguitie of words,
it shall be needfull to shew what is vniust,
else he that is bound will take the word iust in generall to make vse of it in
some speciall case, as in the treatie made in the moneth of May, in the yeare
1412, betwixt Henry king of England and his children on
the one part, and the Dukes of Berry, Orleans, and Bourbon, the Earles of
Alancon and Armaignac, and the lord of Albret on the other part, who sware to
serue the king of England with their bodies and goods in all his iust quarrels
when they should be required. There was no expresse reseruation of their
soueraigne, against whom the king of England meant to imploy them by vertue of
this contract, the which he could not do. There is neuer any iust cause to take
armes against ones prince or countrie, as an auntient orator said, yet are not
those princes free from the note of treacherie, which infringe their faith in
matters which they have sworne to their
preiudice, being forced thereunto by the victor as some Doctors haue
maintained, being as ill informed of the estate of Commonweales, as of auntient
histories, and of the ground of true iustice, discoursing of treaties made
betwixt princes, as of contracts and conuentions among priuat men, the which is
an opinion of most dangerous consequence, which error hath taken such roote
within these two or three hundred yeares, as there is no league (how firme
soeuer) made betwixt princes, but it is broken, so as this opinion goes now for
a grounded maxime, that the prince which isA daungerous
opinion in treaties. forced to make a league or peace to his hurt and
preiudice, may go from it when occasion is offred. But it is strange that
neither the first lawgiuers and lawyers, nor the Romans who were the patrons of
iustice, did neuer thinke of this shift and euasion. For it is manifest, that most treaties of peace are made by
force, either for feare of the victor, or of him that is the stronger; and what
feare is more iust then of the losse of life? yet neuer any prince or lawgiuer
did refuse to performe that which he had promised unto the victor, as if it had
been forced. Quae enim viro forti, inquit Tullius, vis
potestA resolute man cannot be forcedadhiberi? What force can be vsed▪ sayth▪ Tully, to a valiant and resolute man? It appeared in the
Consull Marcus Attilius Reglus, who being taken prisoner by the Carthaginians and sent to Rome
upon his word, swearing that he would returne vnlesse he could procure some
noblemen that were captaines to be set at libertie, from the which he dissuaded
the Senat, yet did he not refuse to returne, although it were to an assured death, nor yet the Consull Mancinus to
the Spanyards, when as he could not persuade
the Senat to the conditions of peace. What grauer schoolemasters of the lawes
of armes, what better interpreters of the Roman lawes can we desire, than the
Roman Consuls? they went willingly unto torments rather than they would
treacherously breake their faith. The Consull Posthumius
and his companion with sixe hundred Captaines, Lieutenants and Gentlemen of the
Roman armie, being surprized by the enemie in the straights of the Appenine
hills, whereas they could neither aduance, retire, nor yet fight; being set at
libertie upon their words, and hauing disputed of the law of nations in open
Senat, and before all the people, touching accords and treaties made in warre;
they did neuer pretend force nor feare, but it was only said, that they could
not treat of any conditions of peace with the enemie, without an especiall
charge and commission from the people of Rome:
whereupon the Consuls which had sworne the peace, and those which had giuen
themselves as hostages for the whole armie, yeelded themselves willinglie to
the enemie, to dispose of their lives at their pleasure, and so they were
delivered unto them by the Heralds.
In the treatie of Madrill, made the 14 of February 1526, it was said, That king
FrancisThe treatie of Madril. the first being come unto the
first towne of his realme, he should ratifie the articles which he had sworne
in prison, and cause them to be ratified by the Daulphin of France when as he
came to age: and by the last article it was agreed, That if the king would not
obserue the peace which he had sworne, he should returne prisoner into Spaine,
giuing his two sonnes Francis and Henry for hostages. Being at libertie, all Princes offred themselves, and ioyned with him in league
against the Emperour Charles the fift, to pull downe his
power whom they had raised up to heauen. The king hauing assembled all his
princes and noblemen in his court of Parliament to resolue what was to be done
touching the treatie of Madrill: Selua the first
president, seeking to prooue that the king was not tyed unto the treatie, he
grounded himselfe upon the authoritie of Cardinall Zabarella, who held, That whatsoeuer was done by force or feare, was
not to be ratified; confirming it by the example of Ihon
king of Cipres, who being taken prisoner by the Geneuois, gaue his sonne for
hostage, and yet kept not his promise. I wonder the President of so great a
Senat did not blush not only toTreaties made by a prisoner
may not be broken. commend a man that was ignorant of the lawes of
armes, but also to arme himselfe with such
foolish arguments, yet this was the chiefest ground of the breach of the
treatie of Madrill, adding thereunto, that the king could not giue away or
renounce the soueraigntie of the Lowcountries, nor the duchie of Burgongne,
without the expresse consent of the estates. This indeed was sufficient to
breake the treatie, the rest were impertinent. But all these obiections were
neuer brought in question by the antients, they neuer required, That a prince
being set at libertie out of his enemies power, should ratifie that which he
had sworne being a prisoner: a ridiculous thing, that were to call the treatie
in question, and leaue it to the discretion of him that was a prisoner, whether
he shall obserue that which he hath sworne or not. Moreover the antients neuer
regardedAn oath is needlesse where hostages are
taken. the breach of treaties, when as they tooke hostages: for that
he is not tied to any lawes of the treatie,
nor to any other, neither is he forced to sweare; for hostages are giuen to be
pledge for him that is captiue, and to suffer, if he shall make a breach of the
conditions agreed upon. And were not he simple, that hauing a good pledge,
should complaine of his debtor, that he hath broke promise with him: therefore
the Consull Posthumius maintained before the people,
That there was no contrauention in the treatie made betwixt him and the
Samnites, seeing it was no treatie of peace, or league, but a simple promise,
the which did bind them onely which had consented thereunto, Quid enim (inquit ille) obsidebus aut sponsoribus in foedere opu esset, sipraecatione res transigitur?Nomina Consulum Legatorum, Tribunorum militum extant: si ex
foedere res actaesset, preterquam duorum foecialium non extarent, What
need (saith he) should there bee of hostages and sureties in a league or peace,
if it be concluded by intreatie? the names of the Consuls, Lieutenants, and
Tribunes, which vndertooke it, are extant: if it be ended by a league, there
should be no names ioyned unto it, but of the two heraulds. Whereby it
appeares, that king Francis the first, and the king of
Cipres, who left their children for hostages, were absolued of their promises
by their enemies themselves, for that they had pledges, and did not trust in
their prisoners oath. And by the law of arms a prisoner which hath his libertie
giuen him upon his word, is bound to returne to prison againe. And by a
proclamation made by the Senat of Rome, all prisoners were enioyned upon paine
of death (the which were verie many, being let goe uppon their words by king Pyrrhus, to goe visit
their friends) should returne at a certaine day, but no man gaue any hostage.
And if the prisoner be held in bonds, he may escape, neitherA prisoner taken in the war, being kept, may escape without . is he bound to him that tooke him: as king Francis the first said unto Granuella the emperours ambassadour. For as a Roman Consull was wont
to say, Vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam
obligat fidem, every man desires to be beleeued, & a trust reposed,
binds the faith it selfe.
If any one say unto me, That the king had sworne to returne, if the treatie
tooke not effect: and that king Iohn returned prisoner
into England, for that he could not accomplish the conditions of the treatie,
by which he had giuen a great part of the realme to the English, and promised
three millions of crownes: I aunswere, that there was no fault in the king, for the estates opposed against the
alienation of the reuenues of the crowne: and as for his returne, neither he
nor king Iohn were tied unto it, seeing they had taken
their children for hostages. And therefore king Francis
seeing that the emperour would not remit the vniust conditions of the treatie,
with the councell and consent of his princes and subiects hee proclaimed a new
warre against him: wherewith the emperour being moued, said, That the king had
carried himselfe basely; and that he had broken his oath, and that hee would
willingly hazard his life with him in single combat, to make an end of so great
a warre. The king being aduertised by his ambassadour, That the emperour had
touched his honour and reputation; hee caused all the princes to assemble in his court of parliament; and after
that hee had called Perrenot Granuelle ambassadour for
Spaine, he said unto him, That Charles of Austria
(hauingThe French king defies the emperour. said
unto the herauld of Fraunce, That the king had broken his faith) had spoken
falsly, and that as often as he should say so, he did lie: and that hee should
appoint a time and place for the combat, where he would meet him. The king of
England finding in likeThe king of England defies
him. sort that he was touched, used the like chalenge, and with the
like solemnities. It was done like generous princes, to let all the world
vnderstand, that there is nothing more foule and impious than the breach of
faith, especially in princes. Neither was there euer prince so disloyall, that
would maintaine it to be lawfull to breake their faith. But some have pretended
that they have bene circumuented in their treaties, by the fraud of their
enemies: others, that they have erred in fact, or have bene seduced by euill
councell: or that things were so chaunged,
as the wisest could not have foreseene them: or that it should be impossible to
obserue the treaties without the ineuitable losse, or apparent daunger of the
whole state. In which cases they would pretend, That an oath doth not bind, the
condition or the cause of the oath being impossible or vniust. Some there be
which maintaine, That the pope may dispence not onely with the oath of other
princes, but also of himselfe: but they have bene confuted by other Canonists.
So pope Iulio the second finding no meanes to breake his
faith with king Lewis the twelft, that he might fly from
the treatie of Cambray, he did not say, that hee was not tied to his oath, but he tooke occasion to aduance a factor in Rome to the
bishoprike of Arles in Prouence, without the
priuitie of the king or his ambassadour, which did reside at Rome: where with
the king being incensed (as the case deserued) he caused all the fruits which
the beneficers of Rome had in Fraunce, to be seized on: then the pope hauing
found what he sought for, declared himselfe an open enemie unto the king. So
Guichardin writes, That
pope Iulio was woont to bragge, That all the treaties
which hee made with the French, Spaniards, and Germans (all which he called
barbarous) was but to abuse them, and to ruine one by another, that he might
expell them all out of Italy. There are others which curse and condemne
traytors, yet they loue the treason, and hold the fruits thereof sweet: as it
is itten of Philip king of
Macedon: and the Lacedemonians condemned Phebidas their
captaine, for that contrarie to the tenor of the treatie made with the Thebans, hee had seized upon their castle called
Cadmee, & yet they kept the place still, as Plutarch
writes. Some which can find no iust cause norPlu. in
Epawida. colourable to falsifie their
faith, and have any respect to their honour, they aske aduise and councell of
lawyers: as the marquesse of Pesquiere, who aspiring to make himselfe king of
Naples, caused many consultations to bee made under hand, to know if hee which
were vassall to the king of Naples, might (with his faith and honour saued)
obey the pope, who was soueraigne lord of the realme of Naples, rather than the
king, who was but a feudatarie: hauing two strings to his bow, for he made his
account, that if the warre were attempted by the duke of Milan with the popes
consent, against Charles the fift, should succeed well,
he should then be king of Naples: but if hee should faile, then would he begge the dutchie of Milan, as a reward for
his seruice, the duke beeing conuicted of rebellion. But this conspiracie being
discouered, hee caused Maron the dukes chauncellour to
be apprehended and put into the castle, and making of his processe, he suffred
him to escape, fearing he should speake too plainely, if he were ill intreated:
and soone after he died of thought, knowing well that his treacherie and
disloyaltie was discouered, and inexcusable, seeing that he betrayed both the
emperour and the duke, and all those of the league by the same meanes: the
which is the most detestable treacherie of all others. Yet do I not blame him,
that to assure himselfe hath two strings to his bow, so as it be done with a
respect to his faith and honour: as it is reported of Themistocles, who secretly aduertised the king of Persia, That vnlesse
he departed suddenly out of Europe, the
Greekes had resolued to breake the bridge which hee had made upon the sea
Hellespont, to passe his armie out of Asia into Europe: desiring him to keepe
it secret. This he did to assure himselfe of the favour of the king of Persia,
if he did vanquish; or to have the honour to have expelled him out of Greece,
if hee marched away, as he did. But these subtill deuises beeing discouered by
princes that are in league, do oftentimes cause good friends to become sworne
enemies: as the Epirots, who agreed with the Acheans their confederats, to make
warre against the Aetolians, and yet they did signifie by their ambassadour,
That they would not take armes against them. Another time they plaid the like
part with Antiochus, promising him al friendship, so as
they might not be in disgrace with the Romans, Idagebatur
(inquit Titus Liuius) vt sirex abstinuisset Epiro, integra sibi essent omnia
apud Romanos, & conciliata apudregem gratia, quòd accepturi fuissent venientem, That
was done (saith Titus Liuius) that if the king did
forbeare to enter into Epirus, they should continue in favour with the Romans,
and they should purchase grace with the king, that they would have receiued him
if he had come. But their councels being discouered, they procured to
themselves a miserable slauerie with the flight of Perseus. The lawyers hold it for a maxime, That faith is not to be
kept with them that have broken their faith. But they pase on further and say, That by a decree made at the
councell of Constans, it was ordained, That no faith
should be kept with the enemies of the faith: for that the emperour Sigismond hauing giuen
his faith to Lancelot king of Bohemia, and a safe
conduct to Iohn Hus, and Ierosme
of Prague, would not suffer any to proceed against them: but to free him of
that doubt, there were many Lawyers, Canonists, and Diuines, especially Nicholas abbat of Palerme, and Lewis du
Pont surnamed Romain, which concluded in this opinion, the which passed
for a decree, and was confirmed by the councell. So as Iohn
Hus and his companion were executed, although that neither the councell
nor the emperor had any iurisdiction over them: neither was the king of Bohemia
(their naturall lord) of their opinion, to whom notwithstanding the emperour
had giuen his faith, but they regarded it not. Whereat we must not maruell,
seeing that Bartol (the first lawyer ofIf aith be to be kept with enemies of
the faith his age) maintaines, That faith is not to be kept with
priuat enemies, but with captains in chiefe.
According to which decree the cardinall Saint Iulian was
sent Legat into Hongarie, to breake the treaties of peace concluded with the
Turke: against theL. conuentionum F. e Pactis. which Humiades father to Mathew Coruin king of
Hongarie opposed himselfe vehemently, shewing that the peace was concluded with
very reasonable and profitable conditions for the Christians, notwithstanding
the Legat shewed him this decree made by the Councell, by the which they might
not hold no faith with the enemies of the faith. The Hongarians building
thereon, brake the peace. But the Emperour of the Turks hauing notice of this
decree, and of the breach of the peace, leauied a mightie armie, and hath neuer
ceased since, both he and his successors, to increase in power▪ and to build
that great Empire upon the ruine of Christendome; for euen the Emperour Sigismond
himselfe was chased away with all the armie of Christians, and the Ambassador
which had carried this decree, was in his returne slaine by certaine thes that were Christians, whereby it appeared that God
was displeased with that decree, for if it be lawfull to breake ones faith with
infidels, then is it not lawfull to giue it; but contrariwise if it bee lawfull
to capitulate with infidels, it is also necessarie to keepe promise with them.
The Emperour Charles the fift made a league of
friendship by his Ambassadour Robert Inglish with the
king of Persia, who was pursued by the Sangiac of Soria euen unto the frontiers
of Persia, and yet he had no other reproch to make against king Francis the first but that he had made a league with the
Turke. It is well knowne that the kings of
Poland, the Venetians, Geneuois, and Rhagusians have the like with them. And
the same Emperour Charles the fift gaue his faith vnto
Martin Luther (whom the Pope had cursed as an enemie
to the Church) to come to imperiall diet at Wormes, in the yeare 1519, whereas
Echius seeing that hee would not abiure his opinion,
alleaged the decree of Constance, according to the tenor whereof hee vged them to proceed against him, without any respect to
the faith which the Emperour had giuen. But there was not any prince which did
not abhorre this request of Echius, and detested his
decree. And therefore the emperour to maintaine the publike faith, sent Martin Luther backe safe to his owne home, with certaine
troupes of horse. I know not how it came in the fathers minds at the councell
of Constans, to take all faith from heretikes,
when as the pope himselfe at his first installing, doth take an oath of the
Iewes, suffring them to enioy their religion with all libertie. Yea and many
times the princes of Germanie and Italie do admit Iewes to be witnesses in
their suits, the forme of the Iewes oath is set downe in the decrees of the
Imperiall chamber, Lib. 1. the 86 chapter, where it is
said, That they should sweare to keep their faith with the Christians as
loyally as their predecessors did with the Gifans that were Idolaters. So Iosua commaunderFaith must be kept
with Pagans and Idolaters. over the Israelites, hauing bene
circumuented by the Gabionites beeing Pagans and Infidels, in a treatie which
he had made with them, to saue them, and foure townes which
they had: and hauing afterwards discouered their fraud, beeing persuaded
by the Captaines of the Israelites to
breake the peace, he would not do it, saying, That they had giuen their faith,
to the end saith the text, that the furie of God whom they had called to
witnesse should not fall upon them. As for that which we said, That no faith is
to be kept with them that have broken their faith: it is but agreeable with the
law of nature, and all histories are full of them. And in our time Sinan Bascha hauing capitulated with them of Tripoli in
Barbarie, and sworne by his maisters head to sufferFaith is
not to be kept with them that have broken their faith. the knights of
Rhodes to depart with their baggage after, that the towne was yeelded,
notwithstanding his oath he made all the inhabitants slaues, except two hundred
which he set at libertie at the request of Aramont the
french Ambassador: and being challenged of his oath, he answered, That no faith
was to be kept with them, for that they had
sworne at Rhodes neuer to carrie armes against the Turks, reproching them that
they were worse than dogs, which had nether God, faith, nor law, the which
might have been refelled by them of Tripoli, but that might ouercame right, for
that they were not tyed to the oath taken by the knights of Rhodes; nor, if the
Tripolitans had formerly sworne, could he now take revenge thereof by this new
accord. For former periurie and treacherie may not be repeated nor revenged
when as they have oncePeriurie red
by a new treatie, may not be repeated. concluded a peace and
agreement together, else there should neuer be any assurance of peace, nor end
of treacherie. But if one Prince hath broken his promise and deceiued an other,
he hath no cause to complaine if he be required with the like: as the Romans
hauing vanquished the Epirots (who had broken their faith with them, and put
garrisons into their townes during the warres
of Macedonie) presently after the taking of Perseus,
they made it to be giuen out that they would also set the Epirots at libertie,
and withdraw their garrisons, inioyning ten men of the chiefe of every citie to
bring all the gold and siluer, and then sodenly they gaue a watchword to the
garrisons to sackFrad circumunted by fraud. and spoile the cities, the
which was done, and in this sort they spoyled 70 cities. In the punishment of
this treacherie, the Romans behaued themselves more cruelly than was needfull,
for that the revenge should not extend but to them that had committed the
periurie; and this dissembling was against the antient honor of the Romans. But
if periurie were couered by a new treatie, it were not lawfull to revenge it:
yet there are some so base and treacherous as when they sweare, they have no
thought but for to sweare and breake their
faith, as Charles Duke of Bourgongne gaue a safegard to
the Earle of S. Paul Constable of France to sell him dishonorablie to Lewis the II king of France. But Antony
Spinola Gouernor of the Ise of Corsica for
the Geneuois, committed a fouler act, adding crueltie to his periurie; for
hauing called all the Princes of the island together under colour of councell,
and inuiting them to a banquet, he commanded them to be slaine, the historie is
fresh. And the banished men of Cynethe a citie of Greece, being called home,
and receiued by a new treatie made with them which had expelled them, they
sware to forget all iniuries past, and to live together in peace and amitie:
but in swearing (saith Polybius) they studied of nothing
els, but how to betray the citie, as they did, to be revenged of the iniurie
(which they had couered by a new accord)
expelling all their enemies. But God to revenge their disloyaltie, suffered the
Arcadians, to whome they had betrayed the citie, to kill all those which had
put it into their hands. Oftentimes princes and seigneuries forsake their
leagues for feare, whoFear is
ontimes the cause of a breach. commonly
doe follow the victors partie: as after the battaile of Pauia, all that were in
league with the king of Fraunce in Italie, forsooke him: and after the battaile
of Cannes, almost all the Romans associats in Italie left them: and euen the
Rhodians after the taking of the king Perseus (with
whome they were in league) they made a proclamation, That no man upon paine of
death, should say or doe anything in favour of Feare
may well excuse base minded men from giuing aid, but not from
periurie: but what colour or excuse can he
haue, that comes to capitulat with an intent to deceiueFeare
cannot excuse periutie. and circumuent? It is inexcusable to men, and
detestable before God. And yet the emperour Maximilian
the first was wont to say, That he made no treaties with the French, but to
abuse king Lewes the twelft, and to bee revenged of
seuenteene iniuries which he had receiued from the French, although he could
not specifie one: for every man knowes, that for these two hundred yeres,
Europe neuer had prince more religious than Charles the
eight, nor more upright and iust than Lewis the twelfth,
who raigned in the time of Maximilian. Yea the last, who
alone among all others, was called Father of the people, did shew how loyall he
was both in deed and word, hauing treated a peace with Ferdinand king of Arragon, from whome hee had receiued many wrongs and losses, yet when as Ferdinand was come unto the port of Sauonne, the king of Fraunce
entred into his gallie▪, accompanied onely with two or three noble men, Ferdinand beeing amazed at his great assurance and
bountie, went out of his gally, and lodged in the castle of Sauonne. It was in
the power of the king of Fraunce to retaine him (as Charles of Bourgongne did in the like case to Lewes the eleuenth at Peronne) but hee was so free from any so vild
adisposition, as he omitted no pompe nor magnificence to giue him all the
content that might bee. The confidence of both kings is disallowed by
treacherous men, who shew plainely how perfidiously they would have dealt: but
to all good men it must needs seeme commendable, which detest that in others, which they themselves hold dishonest. But if
princes being in warre, have made a truce, and concluded a parle, they must
come vnarmed,What is to be obserued betwixt princes going to
parle. least the one (being secretly armed) should by fraud murther
his enemie, as Iphicrates the Athenian did Iason the tyrant: or as Mithridates, who slue the prince of Armenia his sisters sonne. Or if
the one comes weakely accompanied and with small force, then must he take
hostages from the other, or some places of strength, before he approach, as it
is commonly vsed. So did king Perseus, who being come
with a great traine unto the frontiers of his realme, and would have passed the
riuer which divided the two kingdomes, Q. Martius
Philippus the Roman ambassadour required hostages, if hee meant to
passe with aboue three in his companie: Perseus gaue the
chiefe of his friends, but Martius gaue not any, for
that he had but three men with him. If there be question In what sort hostages are to bee giuen for a prince that
i prisoner. to giue hostages for the
deliverie of some great prince that is a prisoner, it must be done with equall
forces on either side; and in delivering the hostages, to receiue the captiue
at the same instant; as they did when as king Francis
the first came out of Spain from prison: else it were to be feared, that a
disloyall prince would hold both prisoners and hostages: as Triphon the gouernour of Soria did, hauing taken Ionathan by treacherie, he promised to set him at libertie for
threescore thousand crownes, and his two sonnes hostage: hauing delivered him
the ransome and hostages, hee kept the money and slue the hostages with the
prisoner: commaunding his pupill the king of Soria to be cruelly murthered. We
must by all meanes shun these pestilent kind of men, and not contract any league or friendship with them, vnlesse it
be forced. Yea if they had contracted mariage, yet there is no assurance, if
the prince be treacherous and disloyall: as Alphonsus
king of Naples was, who slue Cont Iames the duke of
Millans ambassadour. Such a one they write was Caracalla
emperour of Rome (who neuer shewed a good countenance, but to such as he meant
to murther) hauing made a peace with the Parthians, he demaunded the kings
daughter, the which was graunted him: so as hee went into Persia wel
accompanied to marie-her, being all armed under their garments, who upon a
signe giuen, when as they thought of nothing but of good cheere, he caused all
the noble men that were at the marriage to be slaine, and so fled away: being
not ashamed to boast, That it was lawfull to vse his enemies
in that sort. This murther was not so cruell,
as the excuse was detestable and odious: but God did not let his disloyaltie to
be long vnpunished, suffering one of his houshould seruants to murther him as
he was at the stoole, and to enioy the empire for his reward. They say, that
Caesar Borgias sonne to pope Alexander the sixt, was like unto this monster, whome Machiauel doth produce for the paragon of princes: he had
learned of his father to poyson such as he inuited to a banquet: it cannot be
said, Which did exceed other in treachery: AlexanderThe treacherous disposition of pope Alexander the sixt, and
Caesar Borgias his sonne. the father neuer did that which he said,
and Caesar his sonne neuer spake that which he did: and
both of them did religiously hold, That faith was to be giuen to all men, but
to be kept with no man. Caesar gaue his faith, and sware
great oathes for the assurance of the peace which he had made with the princes
that were in league against him: and hauing
drawne them together upon his faith, hee murthered them cruelly whereat his
father laughing, said, That he had shewed them a Spanish tricke. But it was an
extreame folly for the princes to put their lives into the hands of the most
disloyall and perfidious man liuing, and knowne for such a one: and euen at
such a time as he was but subiect to the pope, and had no power to giue his
faith to them he put to death: so as the pope might have excused them as his
subiects and vassals, without any note of treacherie. But the pope was poisoned
with the same poison which hee had prepared for his friends and companions: and
his sonne escaping the force of the poyson, was ouerreacht with the same fraud
that he had circumuented his enemies. For when as Consaluus Viceroy of Naples had giuen him his faith (not being so
skilfull in the law of armes and herauldry, as
he was to commaund in warre) Borgias came to Naples,
which when as king Ferdinand vnderstood, he commanded
him to keepe BorgiasTreacherie paied with treachery. prisoner: the
Viceroy shewes his charge, and Borgias did vrge him with
his oath and faith: but the Viceroy could not giue his faith without the kings
expresse commission, much lesse release a subiect that is captiue, when as the
king forbids it. Neither should Borgias have entred
rashly into his enemies countrey. We read that Albret
earle of Franconie committed the like errour to the duke of Valentinois: for
beeing besieged by the emperour Lewis of Bauiere, Othon the Archbishop of Ments persuaded him to come vnto
the emperour upon his faith, swearing, That if hee were not reconciled to the
emperour, he should returne safe with him unto his castle. This good bishop being gone forth, made shew as if he had
forgotten something in the castle, and returned backe with the earle. After
that he had delivered the earle into the emperors hands, being vrged of his
promise, he said, That he was returned: like unto the souldiour in Polybius, who notwithstanding his shift, was sent backe
by the Senat of Rome, with his hands, and feet bound to the enemie. But
although the Archduke could not giue his faith unto a rebell, without warrant
from the emperour, yet for that hee had fraudulently drawne a man into danger,
who was ignorant of the laws of armes (otherwise than Consuluus had done) he was not free from the foule crime of
treacherie: like unto Paches, who persuaded Hippias, that he should come forth of his castle to a
parle, swearing, That he should returne safe: the captaine being come forth,
the castle was easily taken: then did he bring
Hippias backe safe into the castle according to his
promise, and there slue him. In like sort Saturnius the
Tribune with his complices, hauing seized upon the capitoll by conspiracie and
rebellion, comming forth upon the Consuls faith and safegard, they were slaine,
and their memorie condemned. The like chance happened in Luques in the yeare
1522, when as Vincent Poge and his companions had slaine
the Gonfaloniet in the palace, the magistrats gaue them their faith and
assurance, that they should not be called in question for the fact, so as they
would depart the citie: for that they were then in armes, and the stronger: yet
soone after they were pursued and punished as they
deserued. And to the end that by the promise of magistrats, the publike faith and assurance should not be broken, the
Seigneurie of Venice made a decree in the councell of ten, published in the
yere 1506, That no gouernor nor magistrat should giue any safeconduct to a
banished man: the which was reserued for the Seigneurie onely; who by another
decree made in the yeare 1512, did forbid to take any one prisoner, to whome
the Seigneurie had giuen a safeconduct: not that princes and soueraigne states
are bound to giue their faith unto subiects, and much lesse unto banished men;
but hauing once giuen it they must keepe it inuiolable. We have no better
schoolemasters of the lawes of armes, and of the publike faith, than the
auntient Romans, and yet we read that Pompey the Great
did capitulat with pirats, giuing them a sure retreat in some townes &
prouinces, to live there under the obedience of the Romans: for he was aduertised, that the pirats had nine hundred
sayle of ships, and aboue five hundred townes upon the sea coast, commaunding
the whole sea, so as the gouernours could not passe to their prouinces, nor
marchants traffique: and that so great a power could not be defeated, without
exposing the estate of the people of Rome to apparent daunger; the maiestie
whereof stood and was absolute by meanes of this treaty: and if he had not kept
the faith which he had giuen them, or if the Senat had not ratified the
treatie, he had polluted the honour of the Romans, and blemished the fame of so
worthy an exploit. Not that I would have states to enter into any league, or
have any commerce with pirats and theeves, (for that they ought not to bee
partakers of the law of nations, as I have said before.) And although that Tacferin chiefe of an armie of theeves in Affrike, sent ambassadours to Rome, to the end
they should appoint lands & places for him and his to inhabit, else he
would proclaime perpetuall warre against the Romans; yet the emperour Tiberius taking this for an indignitie, would not so much
as heare his ambassadours, saying in open Senat, That the auntient Romans would
neuer heare, nor treat in any sort with Spartacus the
slaue, by his profession a Fencer, and captaine of the theeves, although he had
gathered together threescore thousand slaues, and defeated the Romans in three
battailes: but after that he had bene vanquished by Crassus, all that escaped were hanged. Whereby it appeares, that it is
dishonourableIt is dishonourable for a prince to deale
with theeves. for a prince or state, to treat with theeves: but
hauing once plighted their faith unto them, it
is against their dignitie to breake it. There is a rare example of the emperour
Augustus, who made a proclamation, That whosoeuer
could bring unto him Crocotus, captaine of the theeves
in Spaine, should have 25000 crownes: whereof he being aduertised, he went and
presented himselfe to Augustus, and demaunded the
reward: the which the emperour caused to be giuen unto him, and withall
pardoned him, toA notable deed of the emperour
Augustus. giue an example to others, that they must keepe their
faith, without any respect to the parties merit.
There is great difference, whether faith be giuen to a theefe, a friend, an
enemie, or a subiect: for a subiect which ought to maintaine the honour,
estate, and life of his soueraigne prince, if he proue treacherous and
disloyall unto him, and that hee hath giuen him a protectiō, or if he come to
capitulat with him, if the prince doth infringe his oath with him, he hath not so great cause to complain as a
theefe, if the theese be not his subiect: as the legion of Bulgarian theeves,
which being come into France to dwell there, king Dagobert gaue them his faith, finding it daungerous suddenly to breake
such a troupe of loose and desperat men: but soone after upon a certaine day, a
watchword being giuen, they were all slaine. But there is a great difference,
whether a soueraigne prince doth capitulat with his friends or his enemies,
& that those subiects which have rebelled against his maiestie, be
comprehended in the treatie: Many have made a question, if the prince breaking
his faith with those rebels, and seeking revenge of them,
whether the enemie be thereby wronged, and if the assurance giuen, or the
truce, bee thereby broken? as it oftentimes
falles out, the which doth most afflict princes: as Titus
Liuius saith of Philip king of Macedon, Vnares Philippū maxime angebat, quod cum leges a Romanis
victo imponerentur seuiendi ius in Macedonas, qui in bello ab se defecerant
ademptū erat, One thing tormented Philip, that
hauing laws prescribed him by the Romans, he might not tyrannize over the
Macedonians who had fallen from him duringA prince giuing
his faith to his subiects, must keepe it. the wars. I hold that in
this case the treatie is broken, and that the enemie or the prince which hath
contracted securitie for an other princes subiects, may take it for an iniurie,
& seeke his revenge, although the subiect were guiltie of treason in the
highest degree. As the Barons of Naples, who went to Naples upon assurance
giuen, and an oath taken by Ferdinand king of Naples,
unto the Pope, soueraigne lord of Naples, the king of Spaine, the Venetians, and the Florentines, who were
bound, and had all sworne to entertaine the treatie, yet they were imprisoned
by Ferdinand king of Naples, who put them all to death,
although he had receiued them under his fathers assurance and his owne. But
there is no breach of the treatie if a priuat person seekes revenge of former
wrongs of them that are comprehended in the treatie vnlesse; he hath precisely
promised that he shall not suffer any pursuit to be made against them for any
thing that had been committed before the treatie; or that assurance was giuen
them in generall tearmes to returne unto their houses. For a generall clause in
generall tearmes hath the same force that a speciall clause in a speciall case,
which may not be stretcht from the places, times, persons and cases, contained
in the articles of the treatie or safeconduit:
all which notwithstanding were neglected by pope Leo the
tenth, who hauing giuen his faith and a pasport unto Paul
Baillon (who had expelled his nephew out of Perouze) when he came to
Rome he was committed prisoner, and his processe made, not only for his
rebellion, but for many other crimes, for the which he was conuicted and
executed. The historie reports, that the pope had not only giuen his faith vnto
him, but to all his friends in generall: true it is they were all his vassals.
He did the like unto AlphonsoLeo the tenth periured to be revenged. Cardinall of
Sienne, being accused that he had attempted to poyson the Pope: to draw him
into his snares he gaue him his faith, and to the Ambassador of Spaine in the
name of the Catholike king; yet he came no sooner to Rome but his processe was
made: whereupon the ambassador of Spaine complained greatly, but the Pope (who
wanted no lawyers) answered him, That a
safegard or protection how ample soeuer, is of no force, if the crime committed
be not expresly set downe: so as presently after the Cardinall was sttangled in
prison. But the Spanish Ambassador could not stipulateAmbassadours cannot promise nor take assurance from another, without an
especiall commission. a protection for any one without a commission
from his maister, as we have shewed before; the ignorance whereof hath
oftentimes been a great plague and ruine to princes. Pope Clement the 7 circumuented the Florentines in our age with the like
fraude, hauing promised the Spanish Ambassador to maintaine their estate free:
but hauing seazed of the citie, he made it subiect to Alexander his brothers bastard, who put the chiefe men to death, after
the proscription of many, saying, That treason was alwayes excepted: the which
was a friuolous and idle excuse, seeing that he was neuer lord of Florence. Therefore in all treaties it is most safe to
set downe particularly the number and qualitie of the iudges, for the
differences that may arise among the associates, so as the number be equall of
either side; with authoritie to the arbitrators to chuse an vmpier, if they
cannot agree among themselves: as in the league made by the foure first Cantons
in the yeare 1481, where it was sayd in the fourth and fift Article, that in
all controuersies they should chuse an equall number to determine of them. And
in the alliance betwixt the house of Austria and the twelue Cantons, the
Bishops of Bohemia and Constance are named: but in the treatie betwixt the king
of France and the Swissers, in the yeare 1516 in the
17 Article it is said, that in matters of controuersie, every one should chuse two arbitrators, and if they could
not agree, the plaintife should chuse a fift out of the Valesiians or from
Coire to be vmpier, who might not alter any thing of their opinions, but chuse
the one of them. It were more convenient that the fift had been chosen by the
foure which could not agree, for that the Swissers were alwayes demanders, and
named whom they pleased, so as the king had alwayes the worser cause.
There is an other point which doth commonly deceiue Princes, which is, to
treate with Ambassadors, deputies, or Lieutenants, without an especiall
commission: for notwithstanding any promise which he shall make to have it
ratified by his maister, yet is there no assurance, for that the Prince which
promiseth stands bound for his part, and the
other remaines at libertie to accept or reiect the conditions of the treatie;
and happelie in the meane time there falls out some accident which breeds an
alteration: as it happened betwixt the Samnites and the Numantines, and
(without any farther search) to Lewis the 12, who
treated a peace with the Archduke Philip passing through
France in the yeare 1503, by vertue of an ample Commission which he had from
his father in law, promising moreover to cause him to ratifie it: but Ferdinand attended the issue of the warres of Naples,
whereas the French were vanquished in two battailes, and expelled the realme,
so as he refused to ratifie what his sonne in law Philip
had concluded with the king of France, saying, that the Archduke had no
especiall commission. At the least there must
be a time prefixt for the ratifying of the treatie, or a resolute clause for
the want thereof: for in matters of State, and of treaties betwixt Princes and
Commonweales, a silent ratification is not sure. And this was the cause of the
breach of the treatie of Bretigny, the which Charles the
fift then Regent of France had not ratified touching the soueraigntie of
Guienne. And the same occasion made them of Carthage breake the peace betwixt
them and the Romans: for after the first warre, they had made two treaties, in
the first all the associates of both nations were comprehended in generall
tearmes only; and it was said, that the treatie made with Luctatius the Consull should hold if the people of Rome did like of
it, the which they would not ratifie, but sent an expresse commission into
Affrike with the articles they would have concluded, and Asdruball Generall of the
Carthaginians confirmed them. In this treatie the Saguntines were expresly
comprehended, as allied unto the Romans, but this treatie was not expresly
ratified by the Carthaginians; upon which point the Senat of Carthage stood,
maintaining that Hanniball might lawfully make warre
against the Saguntines: and yet the Carthaginians hauing obserued the treatie
made by their Generall in all other clauses, they had ratified it in fact,
which is more than words. It is therefore the more sure not to conclude
anything without an especiall commission, or expresse ratification, for there
neuer wants excuses and deuises to cover their disloyalties, the histories are
full of them, as of the Calcedonians against the Bizantines, of Cleomenis against the Argiues, and of the Thracians
against the Thessalians, who when as they had
concluded a truce for certaine dayes, they spoyled their fields by night: and
as the Flemings, who fearing to pay two millions of florens into the popes
treasurie, (as it was cōcluded by the treatie of peace, if they did rebell
against the king of France) they councelled Edward the
third, king of England, to quallifie himself king of France, and then they
would take armes for him, the which was done. Others distinguish upon the word,
as king Lewis the II, who making a shew that he had need
of the good councell and aduice of Lewis of Luxembourg
Constable of France, he said, That he wanted his head. And the Emperour Charles the fift by a subtill alteration of a letter
denied that which others thought hee had affirmed, writing touching the
deliverie of the princes of Germanie out of prison. But George Cornarus found a more subtill
interpretation, seeing that he could find no
meanes to breake the treatie made with the king of France, said, That the
treatie was made with the king for the preseruation of his estate, and not to
recover them when they were lost. But when all failes, and that there is no
other excuse, he that is the stronger, is in the right, and the weaker hath
wrong, as Atabalippa king of Peru (being prisoner to Francis Pizarre, Captaine of the Spanyards) he promised
the value of ten millions and three hundred thousand ducats for his ransome,
the which he payed: the Spanyards hauing resolued to put him to death, said,
That there was no meanes for his libertie, vnlesse he became a Christian: he to
saue his life was baptized, but with much griefe of mind, saying, That the
immortall sonne was to be preferred before mortall gods, but terrified with
such imminent danger, he imbraced the
Christian religion. What shall I say more? The Spanyards hauing a king that was
penitent, confessing and obedient to all their lawes, they put him to death,
without any regard of faith or oath, like unto the wicked Millanois, whom it
were a sinne to name, who hauing taken his enemie at an aduantage, set a dagger
at his throat, threatning to kill him, if he did not aske him pardon for all
the iniuries he had done him, the which was done: then he threatned him with
death if he did not denie God; he abiured God and all his works with horrible
execrations, but his aduersarie not satisfied therewith, caused him to repeate
those curtesies often, least they should be counterfer, and then he slue this
blasphemer, saying, That he was revenged both of bodie and soule. Behold the
reward which this denier of God receiued, for
putting his trust in the promises of a murtherer. In the treatie made betwixt
king Lewis the 11 and Charles
Duke of Bourgongne, in the yeare 1475, he made the king to sweare first by the
word of a king, then by the faith of his bodie, and by his creator, by the
faith and law which he had taken in his baptisme, and upon the Euangelists and
theA new kind of oath. Canon of the Masse, and in
the end upon the true Crosse. I omit to write what he profited by this oath,
and what succeeded. But the Earle of S. Paule would not giue anyPhilip Comines. credit to all this, when as the king
gaue him a safeconduit, vnlesse he would sweare by the crosse of S. Lau, which was kept at Angers, the which he refused to
do, hauing resolued to put him to death, and fearing aboue all things this
crosse, whereupon the lord of Lescut required him to sweare before he would
come unto his seruice, and he kept his oath.
The like was done in the treatie of peace betwixt Charles Regent of France, and the king of Nauarre, when as the Bishop
of Lizieux said Masse in a tent pitcht betwixt the two armies, and receiued the
oath upon the hoste: for better assurance of the treatie, the Bishop divided
the hoste in two, giuing the one halfe to the king of Nauarre, the which he
refused, excusing himselfe that he had broke his fast, neither would the Regent
take the other part, so as either suspected the other of periurie. The
Auntients used sacrifices with effusion of bloud, with many imprecations and
execrations against the breakers of the league: and the kings of Parthia and
Armenia when they entred into any offensiue and defensiue league, they tied
their thombs, and drawingTacit. Lib. 4. forth the blood, they suckt it
one after an other: as in the like case the king of Calange In the historie of the Indies. at the East Indies,
making an alliance with the Portugalls, drue blood from his left hand and rubd
his face and tongue therewith. But there is no assurance in any oathes ifIf the prince bee disloyal, his oath is not to be
regarded. the Prince be disloyall: and if he be iust, his simple word
shall be a law unto him, and his faith an oracle. It is forbidden by the holie
scriptures to sweare by any but by the name of the eternall God, for it is he
alone that can revenge the breakers of their faith and the scorners of his
name, and not they which have neither power nor care of humane things, the
which the thirtie Ambassadors of Carthage feared when as the Romans had agreed
to graunt them a peace, an auntient Senator (knowing the disloyaltie of the Carthaginians) asked them in open Senat, By what
gods they would sweare: they answered, that
they would sweare by the same gods which had so sharply punished their
disloyaltie. For he offends no lesse that thinks to mock God, than he which
doth it in deed, neither is he to be credited although he hath sworne. The
princes partisans of the houses of Orleance and Bourgongne did sweare sixe
treaties of peace in lesse then twelue yeares, and not any one was kept, as we
read in our histories. And for that among all the treaties made among princes,
there is not any one that hath more need of assurance, and that is more
difficult to entertaine, than that which is made with the subiect, hauing
conspired against his prince; I am of opinion that in this caseThe maner to capitulat b twixt the
pi and the subie the treatie should be made with neighbour princes, to warrant the
subiects, or else speedily to depart the countrie. And if any one will obiect
that the subiect ought not to have any
safegard or protection from his lord, as it was adiudged by a decree of the
court of Parliament for the Earle of Tonerre, I confesse it: But I say, the
subiect must either do thus, or else depart the countrie, when they have to do
with a soueraigne Prince. For there is no greater torment unto a Prince, than
to be forced to capitulate with his subiect, and to keepe his faith with him.
Lewis the 11 gaue a good testimonie thereof to the
Duke of Nemours, to the Earle of S. Paul, to the Duke of Brittanie, to the
Earle of Armaignac, and to all his subiects that had rebelled, all which almost
hee put to death; and the historie of Flanders puts his owne brother in the
number, affirmingMeierus. that he was poisoned. And
not long since the yonger brother to the king of Fez besieged the king his
brother with an armie, and forced him to conclude a peace with such conditions as he pleased, and then he entred into the
Castell with a small traine to do his homage, but sodenly he was strangled by
the kings commandement, and cast out at a window in view of his armie, which
hauing lost their head, yeelded presently. In like sort the Duke of Yorke
hauing taken armes against Henry the sixt king of
England, hauing gotten the victorie he made an agreement with the king upon
condition that after his decease the Crowne should come unto the house of
Yorke; and the prince of Wales, sonne to king Henry the
6 should be excluded, and in the meane time he should remaine Regent of
England: but soone after being taken he was beheaded with his accord, being
crowned with a crowne of white paper. You must not gall the Lion so hard as the bloud may follow, for seeing his owne
bloud and feeling the smart, if he have his libertie he will be revenged: I
would I had not so many examples as have bin seene in our time. But when as I
say it is necessary that neighbour princes and allies be comprehended in the
treatie made betwixt the prince and his subiects as pledges and warrants, I do
not meane that it shall be lawfull for forraine princes to thrust their
neighbours subiects into rebellion, under coulor of protection or amitie: and
in truth the beginning and spring of all the warres betwixt king Francis the first, and the Emperour Charles the fift, was for the protection of Robert
de la March, whom king Francis receiued, as du Bellay hath well obserued. But a wise prince may
meditate an accord betwixt another prince and his subiects, and if he finds
that the outragious proceeding In what case forren prince may
take upon him the protection of another princes subiects. of a Tyrant
against his subiects be irreconcileable, then ought he to take upon him the
protection of the afflicted with a generous resolution: as that great Hercules did, who purchased to himselfe immortall praise
and reputation, for that he tooke upon him the protection of afflicted people
against the violence and crueltie of tyrants (which the fables call monsters)
whom he went through the world to conquer: wherein the auntient Romans did also
exceed all other nations. And without any more search, king Lewis the 12 receiued into his protection the Bentiuoles, with the
houses of Ferrara and Mirandula, against the oppression of pope Iulio the 2: but he caused to be inserted into the
protection, That it was without preiudice to the rights and dignity of the
Roman church: and for the same cause king Henry the 2 tooke the protection of the same princes of Mirandula against the violence of pope Iulio the 3, and of many princes of Germanie against the
Emperour Charles the 5 for the libertie of the Empire,
and entertained the league of the sea townes which the Emperour sought to
breake, & to change the Empire into an hereditarie kingdome else he which
persuadeth: another Princes subiects to rebell under culour of protection
(which should be as a holie anchor for people vniustly tyranized) he doth open
the gate of rebellion to his owne subiects, and brings his owne estate into
danger, with an euerlasting shame and dishonor. And therefore in all societies
and leagues among princes it is alwaies excepted, That the one shall not take
the protection of anothers subiects, whether the cause be iust or vniust. The
only reason which hindred the treatie of peace betwixt king Antiochus the great, and Ptolomie king of Egipt, was the protection of Acheus, who of gouernor of Asia had made himselfe king,
and had withdrawne it from his soueraigne prince, as Polibius saith. And for this cause Sigismond
Augustus king of Polonia, to have peace with the king of Muscouie, was
forced to leaue the protection of Rigie in Liuonia. And
whatsoeuer some say, that it is lawfull for the vassall to free himselfe from
the subiection of hisWhen the vassal may free himself from
his lord. lord, if he be ill intreated; it is to be vnderstood of an
vndervassall, which hath recourse unto his soueraigne lord, and not of a leege
vassall which holds immediatly, and without the meanes of any other vassall,
who in some other respect may be a soueraigne: as the subiects of Guienne and
of Poitou rebelled iustly against the king of England vassall to the king of
France, for that he denied them iustice, and for that cause he was depriued of those fees which he held on this side the
sea, according to the Canon law, although that many are contented to take away
the iurisdiction only. And of late daies the Geneuois expelled the Marquis of
Final out of his estate at the complaint of his subiects, and tooke them into
their protection: who when as hee complained unto the Emperour of the wrong
which was done unto him, the Geneuois aunswered, That they had freed but their
owne subiects from the tyrannie of the Marquis: yet hee preuailed against them,
notwithstanding they pleaded that hee was their vassall. Else every one might
under colour of ill vsage rebell against his lord, and put himselfe in the
protection or subiection of another: as some subiects of the Duke of Sauoy,
hauing been thirtie yeares or there abouts under the seigneurie of Berne,
seeing now that they would turne them over to
their antient lord, they beseeched the Bernois instantly, not to abandon them,
being afraid of ill vsage: but they were denied their request, as I haue
vnderstood by letters from the Ambassador Coignet. And
although1561. that hee that is banished by his
prince may be receiued into protection by another prince, or into subiection,
without any breach of the treatie (which forbids the receiuing of another
princes subiects into protection) for that those which are banished for euer,
are no more subiects: but if those banished men would attempt any thing against
their auntient Lord, the prince which hath receiued them ought not to suffer
them. And therefore the princes of Germanie sent Ambassadors to king Henry the 2, to require him not to receiue Albert Marquis of Brandebourg into his protection, being
banished by a decree of the Imperiall
Chamber: the king made answere in the moneth of August, in the yere 1554, That
although the house of France had alwaies been the support of afflicted princes,
yet would he not shew any favour unto the Marquis against the holy Empire. Yet
notwithstanding if the prince exceeding others in power and dignitie, be duly
informed that another princes subiect be tyrannized, he is bound not only to
receiue him into protection, but also to free him from the subiection of
another; as the law takes the slaue out of the power of a cruell maister: but
it more befitteth to free the subiect from the subiection of another, and to
set him at libertie, than to subiect him to himselfe,
as the Romans did all Greece and Macedonie, which they delivered from the dominion of kings, to set them at full
libertie. So did pope Agapet (who freed the successors
of Gautier d'Iuetot from the subiection of the kings of
France, for that king Lothair had slaine him with his
owne hand in the Church, at what time as he craued pardon of him) to giue
example to other princes not to vse any such cruelties to their subiects: and
for the like crueltie Henry king of Sweden was expelled
his estate by his owne subiects, in the yeare 1567. But it was held very
strange that pope Iohn the 22 in the treatie made
betwixt Philip the long king of France and the Flemings,
caused it to be set downe, That if the king did infringe the treatie, it might
be lawful for his subiects to take armes against him, to the which the Princes
and Barons of France did oppose, causing that clause to be razed; and it was
more strange that it should come out of the
mouth of a french pope, a naturall subiect to France, and who had once been
Chancellor. But the prince may well sweare that if he breake the treatie made
by him, his subiects shall be freed from their obedience, as it was in the
treatie of Arras, and hath been used among our first kings of this realme: as
in the treatie which was made betwixt Lewis and Charles the bald brethren, the oath which either of them
made was with this condition, That if it chanced, which God forbid, that I
should breake my oath, I then absolue you from the faith which you owe me. Lewis sware first in the Roman toung these words which
follow, the which the President Fauchet, a man well read
in our Antiquities, did shew me in Guytard an historian
and prince of the bloud, Pro
deo amur, & pro Christian poblo & nostro commun saluament dist di en
auant, inquant des sanir podirmedunat, si saluerio cist meon fradre Karle,
& in adiudha, & in cad vna causa si com hom par dreit son fradre
saluar dist, ino quid il vn altre sifaret. Et abludher nul plaid nunquam
prindraij qui meon vol cist, meon fradre Karle in damno sit: That is to
say, For the loue of God and the Christian people, and for our common health
from this day forward, so long as God shall giue me knowledge and power, I will
defend my brother Charles, and will aide him in every
thing as any man by right ought to saue his brother, and not as another would
do: And by my will I will have no quarrell with him, if my brother Charles doth me no wrong. King Lewis hauing made an end of this oath, king Charles spake the same words in the Germaine toong thus, In God est &c. Then both
the armies subiects to the two princes sware thus, Si
Ludouigs sagrament que son fradre Carlo iurat, conseruat, & Carlus meo
sender de suo par no lostaint, si io retornar non luit pois, ne io veuls cui
eo retornar ne pois, in nulla adiudha contra Ludouig: That is to say,
If Lewis keepes his oath made with his brother, and Charles my lord for his part doth not hold it, if I
cannot preuent it, I will not returne with him in peace, nor do him any
obedience. The subiects of Charles sware in the Roman
toong, and the subiects of Lewis in the Dutch. But to
returne to our purpose: it is dangerous to take the protection of another,
especially of those which are subiect to princes allies, but upon a iust cause,
so is it more strange to leaue an associat in danger. But it is a question,
whether a prince may take the protection of another prince vniustly If one that is in league may succour him that is not allied
against his associat, being wrongfully oppressed. oppressed, without
breach of the league: for it is most certaine that we aide priuate allies and
common allies, if they be wronged by one of the allies: but he that is not
comprehended in the league, may not be defended against him that is allied,
without breach of the league: on the other side it is a thing which seemes very
cruell, to leaue a poore prince to the mercie of one more mightie that doth
oppresse him and seekes to take his estate from him.
The Senat of Rome was much troubled herewith, for that the Capouans being
assailed, & vniustly oppressed by the Samnites, had recourse unto the
Romans, who had a good desire to aid them: considering withall, that the
Samnites would be too mightie & insupportable, if they had
once seized upon the Seigneurie of Capoua, and that it was a meanes to subdue the Romans: notwithstanding it was
resolued by the Senat not to giue any succours unto the Capouans, considering
the league which they had sworne with the Samnites, Tanta
vtilitate (saith Titus Liuius) fides antiquior fuit, Faith was of more respect than so great a
benefit. I will set downe word by word, the aunswere which was made unto the
six ambassadours, the which deserues to bee grauen in letters of gold, Legatis Campanorum auxilia contra Samnites petentibus, Consul
ex authoritate Senatus sic respondit: Auxilio vos Campani dignos censet
Senatus: sed ita vobiscum amicitiam iustitui par est, ne qua vetustior
amicitia ac societas violetur: Samnites nobiscum foedere iuncti sunt: itaque
arma Deos prius quàm homines violatura, aduersus Samnites, vobis negamus:
Legatos sicut fas est, precatum ad Socios mittemus, ne qua vobis visfiat, The Consull with the authoritie of the Senat did
aunswere in this sort unto the ambassadours of the Campanois, demaunding
succours against the Samnites. The Senat holds you of Campania to be worthy of
succours, but it is fit so to ioyne friendship with you, as a more auntient
league and societie may not be violated: the Samnites are linkt unto vs in
league, and therefore we denie you armes against the Samnites, whereby we
should wrong the gods rather than men: but we will send ambassadours (as we may
lawfully) to request our associats, not to offer you any violence. The
ambassadours of Capoua had a secret charge, to offer the subiection of Capoua
unto the Romans, in case they should refuse to giue them succours: who seeing
themselves reiected, made this offer▪ Quandoquidem nostra
tueri non vultis, vestra certe defendetis: itaque populumCampanum vrbemque Capouam, agros, delubra Deum, diuina
humanaque omnia in vestram P. C. populique Romani ditionem dedimus. Tum iam
fides agi visa, deditos non prodi, Seeing you will not protect vs and
ours, yet at the least you shall defend your owne: we yeeld therefore into your
power O reuerent fathers, and of the people of Rome, the people of Campania,
and the citie of Capoua, with their fields, churches, and all diuine and humane
rights. Now is your faith ingaged, not to betray them thatA
stranger is not to be succoured against an ally, vnlesse hee make himselfe a
subiect. yeeld unto you. Whereby it appeares, that the stranger is
not to be succoured against the allie, vnlesse he yeeld himselfe a subiect vnto
him whose protection he pretends: for in that case every one is bound to defend
his subiects against the iniuries of the mightie. If the Athenians had made the
same aunswere to the Corcyrians, demaunding aid against the Corinthians their allies, they had not fallen into a
warre which set all Greece on fire for the space of twentie eight yeres, and
was not ended, but with the ruine of the Athenians, who were made subiect vnto
the Lacedemonians, as they had deserued, what colour of iustice soeuer they
pretend, that the league ought to cease if one of the associats doth make warre
vniustly against a straunger. If this interpretation might take place, there
should be no league nor alliance vnbroken. And therefore in contracting of
leagues and new societies, the more auntient associats (although they are held
to be excepted by law) must be precisely excepted: so as no aid is to be giuen
unto the latter confederats against the more auntient, vnlesse they have first
begun the warre. As in the league made betwixt the house of Fraunce and the
Cantons of the Swissers, in the yeare 1521, in
the which the auntient allies were excepted: but there was a derogatory clause,
in these words, If the auntient allies did not make warre against the king of
Fraunce, which was the principall subiect of the treatie. But it may so fall
out, that three princes being in league, one may make warre against the other,
and require aid of the third. In this case there are many distinctions. If the
treatie of alliance be but of amitie and friendship, it is most certaine that
he is not in that case bound to giue any succours, if the treatie imports a
defensiue league, he must aid the most auntient ally by a precident alliance:
If the associats be of one standing, he owes succours unto him that is vnited unto him by an offensiue and desensiue league. If it
be offensiue and defensiue of all parts, he
must not succour neither the one nor the other: but he may well mediat a peace,
and cause their quarrels to bee compounded by their common allies: as it is
commonly vsed, making warre against him that will not referre his cause to
arbitrators, or yeeld to their arbitrement, as it is expresly set downe in the
treatie of Stance, made betwixt the eight Cantons. Arbitrements are not to be
reiected, how great soeuer princes be: as Henry king of
Sueden did upon the controuersies hee had with the king of Denmarke, who
offered to referre his cause to Henry the second, king
of Fraunce: the which the king of Sueden refused, saying, That he was as great
a king as the rest. But the Romans, who exceeded all nations in riches and
power, if they had any controuersie with their allies, they referred it to the
arbitrement of their common confederats, RomanusLegatus (saith Titus Liuius) ad
communes socios vocabat. And if it be not lawfull by the law of armes,
to allow of the combat, when there is any proofe by witnesse orThe Roman legat did appeale to their common confederats.
otherwise, what an iniustice were it, to suffer two princes or states to enter
into warre, if a third may reconcile them, or els ioyne with him that is
wronged. It were a simple part to suffer his neighbours house to burne, the
which hee might quench with his honour. Moreover it may be doubted, whethet the
league be broken, if thou shalt offer violence to any confederats father or
brother, being not comprehended in the league. If they bee subiects, there is
no question: if they bee absolute of themselves, it may be doubted; for that
the father and the sonne are held to be all one: but in my opinion there is
nothing done against the league, vnlesse the fathers person were excepted in
the treatie. And although the father may
pursue an iniurie done unto his sonne by action, yet may he not attempt warre
by the law of armes, for a sonne that is out of the fathers iurisdiction, and
not excepted in the treatie, although hee bee wronged by his confederats: for
that the fathers power hath nothing common with the lawes of armes and
maiestie, much lesse may the league be broken for brethren that are wronged.
But to auoid all these inconueniences, the most safest way is, to limit all
leagues to a certaine time, to the end they may add or take away from the
treatie, or giue over the league altogether, if they thinke it expedient for
them: and especially betwixt Popular estatesLeagues must be
limited to a certaine time. and those which are gouerned
Aristocratically, the which neuer die. For in Monarchies societies and leagues are dissolued by the death of princes,
as wee have said. Yet princes making treaties with Seigneuries and Popular
states, have beene accustomed to continue the time of the league after the
princes death▪ as it was in the league betwixt the Cantons of the Swissers, and
Francis the first, where the time was limited for the
kings life, and five yeares after, and since it hath alwayes so continued: but
that condition did bind the Swissers, and not Francis
his successor, who might at his pleasure hold, or go from the league: for that
an oath is personall, and to speake properly, cannot be taken for the
successor.
But some one will say unto me, That the first clause in all the auntient
treaties and leagues, which the Romans made with other states and Seigneuries,
was, That they should be perpetuall. And therefore the Hebrewes did call the
strongest and best assured alliances, treaties
of salt, for that salt of all things compounded of the elements, is least
corruptible: as they also call a statue or image that is euerlasting, A statue
of Salt, not that the holy Scripture meanes, that Lots
wife was turned into a salt stone, as many beleeue. But in my opinion there is
nothing more pernitious in treaties than to make them perpetuall: for he that
feeles himselfe any thing ouercharged with the treatie: hath reason to breake
it, seeing it is perpetuall: but if it be limited, hee hath no cause to
complaine. Moreover it is easie to continue leagues and alliances alreadie
made, and to renew them before the time prefixt be expired: as hath beene
alwayes done with the Cantons for these fiftie yeares: and
although we were assured of a perpetuall amitie and friendship, and that there should bee no cause of griefe or dislike, yet
friendships grow cold, and have need to be reuiued and quickned by new
treaties. And therefore in the treatie betwixt the Vallesians and the fiue
small Cantons, it is set downe in the last article, that the league should be
renued every tenth yeare. And in the treaties betwixt the eight Cantons it is
said, that the alliances should be renued every five yeares. The Romans did
sweare a league and perpetuall amitie with the inhabitants of Laurentum, and
yet was it renewed every yeare, Cum Laurentibus (inquit
Liuius) renouari foedus iussum, renouaturque ex eo quotannis post diem
decimum Latinarum, Beeing commaunded (saith Liuie) to renew the league with the Laurentines, it was thereuppon
renewed euerie yeare after the tenth day of the Latines. And the same author
saith, Adireiusst sunt Legati Romani Cretam, & Rhodū, & renouare
amicitiam, simul, speculari num solicitati animi sociorum ab rege Perseo
fuissent, The Roman ambassadours were commaunded to go to Creet and
Rhodes, to renew the league, and to discover if their confederats minds had
bene corrupted by king Perseus. There was a league of
perpetuall friendship made in the yeare 1336, betwixt Philip of Valois, and Alphonso king of
Castile:Treaties betwixt the kings of France &
Spaine and afterwards it was renewed betwixt king Iohn and Peter king of Castile, in the yeare
1352: and betwixt Charles the fift, king of Fraunce, and
Henrie king of Castile: and yet euerie one of these
leagues was made perpetuall for the associats and their successors. As was also
betwixt the houses of Scotland and Fraunce, for these three hundredThe league betwixt the French and Scots. yeares, that
they have continued in good and perpetuall league and amitie, unto the yeare 1556. There is also another reason why the
time of leagues and alliances should be limited, for that there is an ordinarie
clause annexed to all treaties, Not to make any peace or truce, or to enter
into league with a common enemie, or with them that are not comprehended in the
treatie, without the consent of all the associats, or of the greatest part: But
if one of the allies will not consent thereunto, must the rest be ingaged in
his hatred, and in a continuall warre, if the league bee perpetuall? That were
against all diuine and humane lawes, if the occasion of this hatred doth cease,
and that a peace may be made without the preiudice to the allies. But this
clause is ill practised, for if any one of the associats hath an intent to goe
from the league, hee is so farre from demaunding the consent of the rest, as
sometimes he doth treat so secretly, as all is concluded before that any thing can be discouered, and oftentimes they
abandon their associat unto their enemies. We have a notable example in our
memorie, of the treatieThe treatie of Chambort. of
Chambort, made in the yeare 1552, betwixt the king of Fraunce of the one part,
and the duke Maurice, the marquesse Albert, and the Lantgraue of Hesse on the other; where it is said in
the two & twentieth article, That if any of the associats should make any
peace or agreement, or have any secret practise with the emperor, or his
adherents, without the consent of his other allies, he should be punished as a
petiured, without allThe princes of the empire in the
protection of the king of Fraunce. remission, in the view of all the
armie. And yet within six moneths after, the elector Maurice agreed with the emperor at a treatie at Passau, neither
aduertising king Henrie (who was chiefe of the league)
nor yet comprehending him in the treatie. Against whome the marquesse Albert exclaimed,
saying, That it was a base and villanous act, calling the duke traitor, and
disloyall to his countrey, the emperour, and the king of France. And yet he did
worse than his companion: for after that he had drawne great summes of money
from the king, he turned to the emperour, and made open warre against the king:
so as the imperiall souldiors called Maurice Bachelor,
or Graduat, &Why Marquesse Albert was called
Doctor.Albert Doctor, for the notable tricks which he plaied.
And of late memorie the Seigneurie of Venice concluded a peace with Sultan Selim, so secretly, as it was published at
Constantinople, at the comming of the French ambassadour, before that any one
of the confederats of the holy league was aduertised
thereof, although it were expresly forbidden
in the treatie, that not any one of the confederats might make a peace or truce
with the Turke, without the consent of all the rest. So the auntient Romans
hauing to doe with faithlesse and disloiall people, they did not willingly
conclude a peace, but a truce for many yeares, as they did with the Veientes,
Veientibus pacem petentibus in annos centum induciae
datae, The Veientes requiring a peace, they had a truce graunted them
for an hundred yeares. And in another place, Indutiae
Veientibus pacem petentibusLiu. lib. 1. Decad. 1. 7. lib. 2. 8. lib. 7. 9. lib. 9.in annos 40 datae, A truce of
fortie yeares was graunted unto the Veientes, who demaunded a peace. And in
another place, Cum populo Cerite inducias in centum annos
factas, There was a truce made with the people of Cerites for an
hundred yeares. And in another place, Hetruriae populi pacem
petentes in annos 30 inducias impetrarunt, The
people of Hetruria demaunding a peace, they
obtained a truce for thirtie yeares. For alwayes a truce is more holy, and
lesse violable than a peace. And if wee shall well obserue the end of those
which have broken any truce, we shall find that it hath bene miserable, and
many times the ruine of states. So the Romans have alwayes punished seuerely
the breakers of any truce: the first example was showne upon the person of Metius Dictator of the Albanois, who was pulled in peeces
with foure horses, and the citie of Alba rased: the people of Veientes were
rooted out, hauing rebelled seuen times against the articles of the truce: the
citie of Carthage was burnt to ashes: the people of Capoua slaine for the most
part, and the rest made slaues: the inhabitants of Corinth massacred, and their citie burnt to ashes: the Samnites were
ruined, hauing infringed their faith seuen times, as we read in Titus Liuius, Strabo, with infinit others, which were
impossible to set downe in particular, which carrie an euerlasting testimonie
of Gods iust iudgements against treacherous and disloyall princes, and
faithlesse people, which mocke at oathes. As for treacherous and disloyall
subiects, they were neuer vnpunished, In Veliternos veteres
ciues grauiter saeuitum, quod toties rebellarent, muri disiecti,Liu. lib. 8.Senatus abductus, They punished the Veliternians (who
were auntient citisens) verie seuerely, their walles were cast downe, and their
Senat carried away. And after the second Punike warre, the Roman subiects which
had bene traitors were excepted, Perfugae (inquit Liuius)
bello punico 380 Romam missi, virgis in Comitio
caesi, & de Saxo deiecti, In the Punike warre 380 runnawayes (saith Liuie) beeing sent to Rome, were whipt in the open
assemblie, and cast downe the rocke. And if the enemie hauing giuen hostages,
did infringe their treaties, the hostages were publikely put to death: as it
happened unto three hundred hostages of the Volsques, which were slaine: and in
like case the hostages of the Tarentines, Fugientes retracti,
ac virgis diu caesi, de Tarpeio deiectiLiu. lib. 35.sunt, Fleeing they were fetcht backe, and being beaten
long with rods, they were cast from the mount Tarpeia (saith Titus Liuius.) But since that they have made a trade of the breach of
faith, they have also made a conscience to put hostages to death: as Narses, who pardoned the hostages of the Luquoies, hauing
broken their faith: and Charles duke of Bourgongne had
no sooner set three hundred hostages of the Leegeois at libertie (the which he might iustly have put to death,
whatsoeuer Comines saith) but they attempted a new warre
against him.
The clause that hostages should be subiect unto capitall punishments, was
vnknowne to the auntients, for it was alwayes lawfull not only to kill hostages
that fled, but also if they that had giuen hostages had infringed their faith.
But since they have thought it fit to expresse those words in their promises,
least that hostages should pleade ignorance of the law of armes, or that it
should seeme too cruell that one should suffer for anothers offence. I will not
denie but the Romans have somewhat blemished the brightnes of their auntient
integritie and iustice, the which happened unto them not so
much through their owne fault, as by the Grecians and Carthaginians, whose
treacherie they had often tried: witnes that
which Liuie writes of the Ambassadors that were sent
into Greece, when as they made report of their charge in open Senat: he saith
thus, L. Martius & Attilius Romam reuersi, nulla alia re
magis gloriabantur, quam deceptoLiu. lib. 42.per inducias & spem pacis Rege, quae magna pars Senatus
probabat: sed veteres moris antiqui memores, nouam istam sapientiam
improbabant, nec astu magis quam vera virtute bellage ssisse maiores,
denunciare bella, & saepe locum finire, quo dimicanturi essent. L.
Martius and Attilius being returned to Rome,
gloried in nothing more, than that they had circumuented the king with a truce,
and the hope of peace: the which the greatest part of the Senat did allow of,
but the most auntient (remembring their customes of old) did disallow of this
new kind of wisedome, for that the auntients did not make warre by craft and pollicie, but by vertue, proclaiming warre,
and oftentimes appointing the place where they would fight. Yea they were
accustomed to renounce their alliance and friendship that had wronged them,
before they would begin any warre. Veteres, saith Suetonius, bellum indicturi, renunciabant amicitiam, The
auntients when theyTacit. lib. 5. Liu. lib.
36. would make warre against any one, they renounced his friendship:
a custome which was obserued among priuat men, euen in the time of the Emperour
Tiberius: for Germanicus being
grieuously wronged by Piso gouernor of Soria, sent him
word that he renounced his friendship: and Henry the 5
king of England sent word to Lewis duke of Orleance by
his ambassador, That he could not defie him, vnlesse he renounced his
friendship, and sent back the alliance. And at this day those which be brethren
in armes, and princes which do weare one
anothers order, they send back the order before they make warre. But the Greeks
who had taught the Romans their deceits and disloyalties, were punished, as we
may see in Liuie, where he saith, Phocenses cum pacti essent nihil hostile se a Romanis passuros port as
aperuerunt, tum clamor est sublatus à militibus, Phocenses nunquam fidos
socios, impune eludere: ab hac voce milites vrbem diripiunt, Aemilius primo
resistere, captas, non deditas vrbes diripi, The Phocenses when they
had contracted that they would not indure any hostile acte of the Romans, they
opened their gates; then began there a crie among the souldiers, that the
Phocenses being neuer faithfull associates did laugh at them vnpunished: at
this crie the souldiers spoile the towne, at the first Aemilius made resistance, saying, That they used to spoyle cities that
were taken by force, and not that yeelded.
But the Romans to repaire this error, left their citie in full libertie, and
restored them the lands they had taken from them. So Polibius who was a Greeke borne, and gouernor to Scipio the Affrican, speaking of the Greeks, saith, That a word among
the Romans was sufficient, but in Greece for the lending of a hundred crownes
they must have ten notaries, and twise as many seales, and yet would they
breake their faith. But it is far worse at this day, where there is no
assurance neither in letters, seales, nor safegards, yea ambassadors are not
assured, for we have seen Rincon and Fregose ambassadors to the king of France slaine by the officers of
the Emperour Charles the 5, and yet no iustice was done
of them: whereas the Romans delivered Minutius and Manlius to their enemies, and at another time Fabius and Apronius, to
dispose of them at their pleasures, for that they had somewhat wronged the
ambassadors, the which is forbidden by the law of armes. If faith be not kept
with ambassadors, what shall we hope of others? yea some have gloried in
killing them, as Helene Queene of Russia, being
intreated by her enemies to make a league, to the end she might marrie with
their king, she buried all the ambassadors alive▪ and before they were
aduertised thereof, she sent them word that she would have ambassadors of
greater worth, whereupon they sent her fiftie more of the noblest of the whole
countrie, all which she caused to be burned alive, and under promise of
marriage she murthered five thousand which she had
made dronke. It is not needfull heere to rehearse how many cities and people have been ruined and rooted out
for the breach of faith with ambassadors, who are and ought to be sacred and
inuiolable. And ambassadors are also to be warned that they exceed not their
charge, nor speake not any thing to the dishonor of the prince or people to
whom they are sent, for a wise ambassador will alwaies deliver his charge, if
in things that be odious sparingly, and in those that be pleasing full, to the
end that he may entertaine princes in friendship, and appease hatred; for that
princes do oftentimes fall into mortall quarrels through the indiscretion of
ambassadours. Amongst many we have the example of Stephen
Vauoide of Valachia, to whome the Procope of Tartaria sent an hundred
ambassadours, threatning to waste all his countrey with fire and sword, if he
sent not backe the Procopes sonne, whom he had
taken prisoner. The Vauoide incensed at these threats, put them all to death,
except one whome he sent home maimed of his members, to bee a messenger of this
strange calamitie. Others revenge not iniuries done unto them by ambassadours
so indiscreetly, but yet as cruelly, least they should seeme to have broken
their faith, dismissing them, and yet sending others after them to kill them:
as Tuca queene of Sclauonia did, who sent some to
murther the yongest of the three Roman ambassadours, hauing threatned her, the
which was afterwards the cause of her ruine, and of her estate. But the fact of
the king of Mofcouie was most barbarous, who seeing an Italian ambassadour to
put on his hat before he was bidden, he caused it to bee nailed fast unto his
head; a most cruell and barbarous deed, yet was there an error in the
ambassador, who should hold the ranke and
dignitie of the prince his maister, so as it bee not with the contempt of the
prince to whome he is sent: for sometimes ambassadours relying upon the
greatnesse of their master, forget themselves to meaner princes, especially men
that are bred up in Popular estates, accustomed to speake with all libertie,
thinke they may doe so with Monarches, who are not accustomed to heare free
speeches, and much lesse that the truth should be spoken unto them: for which
cause Philip the young, king of Macedonie, seeing the
Roman ambassadour question too boldly with him, hee could not forbeare to braue
him with reproaches. And Popilius the Roman Legat vsed
Antiochus king of Asia with greater presumption,
making a circle with a rod about the kings
person, willing him to giue him aunswere, before he went out of that circle:
here Liuie saith, Obstupefactus est
rex tam violento imperio, The king was amazed at so violent a commaund:
and yet he did what the Romans commanded, hauing tried their power. Marius the elder used the like libertie towards Mithridates king of Pontus or Amasia, who although he
neither were ambassadour, nor had any publike charge, yet he said unto the
king, That he must obey the commaundement of the people of Rome, or be the
stronger. Then did Mithridates find that true which was
spoken of the Romans, That they were of a freer speech than any other nation.
And sometimes too great libertie without any iniurie offends princes. For which
cause Marc Anthonie caused an ambassador which was sent
from Augustus to be whipt, for that he talked too freely
to queene Cleopatra. But those princes are wisest, which
hauing receiued any affront from ambassadours,
demaund reparation from their maisters: as Charles earle
of Charolois, said unto the ambassadours of Lewis the
eleuenth, That his Chauncellour had braued him, but the king would shortly
repent it; and so it fell out: for the same yere he imbarqued the king in a
most daungerous warre, with the hazard of his estate. And therefore king Francis the first, doubting that he should heare
something of an herauld which was sent from the emperour Charles the fift, that might bee some impeach unto his maiestie, he
caused a gibe to be set up before the court gate,
when he heard that hee approached, letting him vnderstand, that he would hang
him, if he opened his mouth, for hauing giuen the emperour the
lie, he knew well that the herauld could not bring him any aunswere, without some touch to his honour and
dignitie. Some there bee that will attempt warre against their associats for
any small iniurie: as the Scots did in old time against the Picts, for taking
away their dogges, hauing lived together almost six hundred yeares in great
peace and amitie. A good prince must trie all meanes, and dissemble many
things, before he come to armes. I do not agree with Bartol, who saith, That the peace is not violated, if any one hath
vndertaken that hee shall not bee wronged, and yet his things are stolne away
by him with whome he hath made a peace: for that there was nothing that did
sooner moue the antient Romans to make warre, than for things taken away, and
iniuries done. M. Aurelius the emperour said well, Putasne non aliter vim inferri quam si homines vulnerentur:
vis est etiam cum quod per Iudicemdebuit, per te ipse arripis, Doest thou thinke that
violence is not offered, vnlesse that men be wounded. It is violence, when thou
takest that of thine owne authoritie, which thou shouldest recover by law. But
some make breach of their faith, by a craftie interpretation of the law. As
that which Bartol proues, If by the truce it be lawfull
for a French man to passe into England, upon condition, That if after the truce
he be found within their limits, it shall be lawfull to kill him: if before the
end of the truce he depart out of England, and by a storme is driuen backe into
England after the truce expired: in this case he saith, they may lawfully kill
him. In my opinion they may ransome him by law, but not kill him: for that he
doth nothing against the truce, that by tempest is cast upon his enemies countrey. It would seeme vniustand iniurious, to
repaire that which happens accidentally with the losse of life.
Finis Libri quinti.
THE SIXT BOOKE OF OR CONCERNING A COMMONVVEALE.
CHAP. I. ¶ Of Censuring or Reformation, and wheher it be
expedient to inroll and number the subiects, and to force them to make a
declaration, or giue a certificat of their priuate estates.
HItherto wee have described at large the first part
of the definition of a commonweale: that is,
the true gouerning of many families with absolute power, and that which depends
of the said definition. It remaynes now to speake of the second part: that is,
of that which is common to an estate; and which consists in the managing of the
treasure, rents, and reuennues, in taxes, imposts, coynes and other charges for
the maintenance of a commonweale. And for the better understanding hereof, let
vs first treat of Censuring. Census in proper tearmes is
nothing else but a valuation of every mans goods: and for that wee are to treat of reuenues, it is verie needfull to
speake of censuring, and to shew, that of all the Magistrats of a commonweale,
there are not many more necessary: and if the necessitie be apparant, the
profit is farre greater, be it either to vnderstand theThe
commendation of censuring, or estimating the subiects estates. number
and qualities of the citisens, or the valuation of every mans goods; or else
for the well gouerning and awing of the subiect. And calling to mind the
farthest bounds of antiquity, I doe much wonder, how so goodly a charge, so
profitable and so necessarie, hath bene laid aside so carelesly, seeing that
all the ancient Greeks and Latines did vse it, some yearely (saith Aristotle) others from three, foure, or from five yeares
to five yeares, making an estimation of every mans wealth and priuate estate:
whereof Demosthenes hauing made an abstract out of the
publike registers, said (speaking unto the
people) that all the reuenues of the countrey of Attica did amount vnto
threescore thousand talents, or thirtie six millions of crownes. EuenCensors used by the Greeks and Romans. Liu.
ann 310▪ ab v. c. so the Romans (who did imitate the Grecians) could wel imbrace this
custome, and bring it unto Rome: for which cause king Seruius is much commended in histories. And although the people of
Rome had disanulled and abolished all the edicts and ordinances of their kings,
after they had expelled them, yet this law of censuring or surueying continued
still, as the foundation of their treasure, imposts, and publike charges,
&c. was continued in the Consuls persons. But after that the Consuls were
distract & drawne away for warlike imployments, they then created Censors,
threescore and six yeares after that the Consuls
had executed it. L. Papirius, and L. Sempronius being the first that were called Censores, and they held the office five yeares: but ten
yeares after L. Aemilius Mamercus limited the time of
the Censors office to eighteene moneths. And soone after, this custome was
followed by all the cities of Italy, and namely by the Roman Colonies, who
brought their Registers and Inrollments to Rome. Afterwards this charge was
still continued; and euen Caesar the Dictator tooke the
paines to go from house to house to supply the Censors charge, although he
called himselfe Magister morum, or Master of the
manners. And as soone as the Emperour Augustus was
returned to Rome, after his victorie against Marc
Anthonie, the Senate by a publike decree gaue him the office of
Censor,Caesar and Augustus were both created
Ceniors. calling him Prefectus morum, or
Controller of manners, who thrice numbred the
citisens of Rome, and valued euerie mans goods: and not onely of the Citisens
of Rome, dispearsed throughout the whole empire, but of all the subiects of
euerie prouince: And was there euer Emperour that left so goodly an estate of
an empire, as he did?
Afterwards it was discontinued under the tyranny of Tiberius and Caligula, and reuiued againe by
Claudius the Emperour, which made the 74 Lustre. It
was left againeLustrum. under Neron, and continued againe under Vespatian,
who made the 75 Lustre: and then it left under the tyranny of Domitian, who called himselfe Perpetuall Censor, and yet made no
suruey. A hundred and fiftie yeres after, or thereabouts, the Emperour Decius caused the Senate to declare Valerian Censor, with ample authoritie. And since that this office was laid aside, the empire hath alwaies declined.
True it is, that the Emperours of Greece did erect an office, which they called
Magistrum Census, or The master of inrollments, who
kept the publike registers containing all testaments and publike acts, with the
names and ages of euerie person; yet not with such dignity and power as the
auntient Censors. But it is certaine, that all townes subiect to the Roman
empire, had their Censors, euen under Traian the
Emperour, and that the Senators of euerie owne were
chosen by the Censors, as wee may read in an epistle written by Plinie they younger to the Emperour Traian. And (not to goe out of this realme) we read, that king Childebert, at the persuasion and instance of Marouëus Bishop of
Poitiers, made an edict, commaunding all his subiects to be inrolled, and their
goods to bee valued; the which is yet sometimes put in practise at Venice,
Genes, and Luques, whereas there bee Censors created: and namely at Venice in
the yeere 1566 they made three Magistrats to reforme the peoples manners, whom
they called, I Seignori sopra il ben viuere de la citta:
The Magistrats for the well liuing of the citisens: for that the name of Censor
in a free citie abounding with all kind of delights, seemed harsh and
seuere.
Few yeares before the creation of this Magistrat, hauing set forth my booke of
the Method of Histories, I did therein much maruell, that in so great a number
of officers, wherein the Venetians did exceed other cities, they had forgotten
Censors, which were most necessarie. The
commonweale of Geneue in stead of Censors have deputed ten Antients, the which
are chosen as magistrats, whereof foure are of the counsell of threescore, and
six of the counsell of two hundred; which hold theCensors in
effect created at Venice. subiects of that state in such awe, as few
offences remaine vnpunished: so as without doubt this commonweale will
flourish, if not through armes and wealth, yet by their vertues and pietie, so
long as they shall maintaine the authoritie of those Auntients. Whereby it doth
plainely appeare, that the best and most flourishingCensors
not to be wanted in a well ordred commonweale. cities could not long
subsist without Censors: wherein many ignorant diuines abuse themselves, in
thinking that Dauid was grieuously reprehended by God,
and punished, for that he commaunded his people should
bee numbred; when as God Num. 1. 2. 3. 4. 21. 26. commaunded Moyses the Emperour of the Israelites to doe it after their departure
out of Fgypt, and againe before they entred into the land of promise; and not
only to number them, but to note euerie family, and to take the name of euerie
particular person before they had conquered anie thing, the which hee should
leaue to posteritie: but the fault which Dauid
committed, was in forgetting Gods commaundement, charging him, that when he did
number the people every one should offer unto God two groats of siluer (as Ioseph hath verie well obserued) being commaunded in the
text of the law, to exact that holy tribute for an expiation of their sinnes,
so often as he should please to have the people numbred: then he adds, Least a
plague should be among the people. But in my opinion heerein was the greater
offence, that the prince too arrogantly
trusting more in the force of his legions, than in the power and helpe of the
Almighty, did not number all his people, but those onely that were able to
beare armes, omitting the tribe of Leui (which attended
the sacrifice) and the tribe of Beniamin. And whereas
the law commaunds euerie one to put halfe a sickle, or two siluer groats; that
is done in my opinion, to abolishThe numbring of the people
appoynted by God. the impietie of the heathen, who taking the number
of their subiects, offred a piece of siluer for euerie one unto their gods: as
also God commaunded they should sprinckle the bloud of the sacrifice aboue, and
of eyther side of the altar, forbidding them expressely, not to offer any more
bloud unto their deuils, that he might call his people from the inhumane and
hatefull worship of deuils. And it seemes that king Seruius had borowed this ceremony from the people of the
East, when as hee commaunded a boxe to be set in Iuno
Lucinas temple, into the which they put a denier
for euerie one that was borne: and another in the temple of Iuuenta, where they did also put a denier for
euerie one that had attayned to seuenteene yeres of age, at what time they put
on a playne gowne without purple: and the third was in the temple of Venus Libitina, into the which they put a denier for euerie one that died: which custome continued
inuiolable, euen when as the office of Censor was neglected.
We read, that the Athenians were inrolled in the publike registers at the age
of 14 yeeres, yet wee find no mention made of
the tribute. But the numbring of the people which God commaunded to be made,
was but of such as could cary armes, from 20 yeeres upward; in the which it
seemes that old men aboue 60 were not comprised, & yet they were found by
pole to amount to six hundred thirtie thousandThe number of
the Israelites. five hundred and fifty, besides the tribe of Leui which made twentie two thousand, from a moneth old
upward, which was in all six hundred fifty two thousand five hundred and
fiftie. And fortie yeeres after the number was taken, when as all those which
came forth were dead, except Moyses, Iosua, and Caleb, they were foundExod. 120
to bee six hundred twentie foure thousand seuen hundred seuenty three,
comprehending the Leuits, besides the women, slaues, old men, and youth vnder
twentie yeres, which were at the least twice
as many. But Titus Liuius speaking of the number of the
citisens that were found in Rome, sayth in his third booke, Censa sunt ciuium capita 415 millia, preter orbos orbasque, the number
of the citisens is 415000 besides the blind. Florus in
his 59 booke saith, Censa sunt ciuium capita 313 millia 823
preter pupillos & viduas, the citisens are numbred at 313823
besides widdowes and pupils. five yeeres after he sayth, Censa sunt ciuium capita 390 millia 936, The number of the citisens is
390936. And in the following suruey, 394356. And in the next inrollment 450000
and in the other after that 150000. I omit the former surueyes, which are all
greater than this last: but it seemes the Citisens of Rome were not excluded, as it may appeare in that which I have noted, for
that there were none but widowes and
orphelines excepted: and yet Florus saith in his 27
booke, Censa sunt 137000 ciuium, ex quo numero apparuit
quantum hominū tot preliorum aduer sa fortuna populi Romani
abstulisset: The number of the citisens were 137000: wherby it appeares
how many men the Romanes lost in their vnfortunate warres. And in the former
view he sayth, Censa sunt ciuium capita 270 millia: The check-roll of all the citisens comes to
270000. as if he would inferre, that the losses which they had receiued against
Hanibal, had carried away 133000 citisens: for if the
women had beene comprehended which went not to the war, there had remayned none
but women, for that they be alwayes as many or more than men, as I have before
shewed. And in Athens there was a suruey taken, whereas the number of women was
greater than that of men, as Pausanias saith. But the scruple is decided by Titus
Liuius, where he saith, speaking of the seuenth inrollment, Ciuium qui puberes essent, supra centum decem millia erant:
mulierum autem & puerorum, seruorum{que} & mercatorum, &
sordidas artes exercentium (siquidem Romanorum nemini cauponariam, aut
operosam artem tractare licuit) triplo plus quàm turbae ciuilis. The
citisens of full age were aboue 110000 of women, children, slaues, marchants:
and of those which used base trades (for no Roman might be a victualer or
handycrafts man) the number was thrice as many as of the civill sort: whereby
it appeares, that marchants, handycraftsmen, women, nor children, were not
registred: as for slaues they were not nūbred among the citisens, but among
moueable goods, the which were commonly fiftie for one: and euen in Athens there were found a hundred times more
slaues than free men, by a suruey that was taken, whereas for ten thousand
strangers, and twentie thousand citisens, there were foure hundred thousand
slaues. And of the number that was taken at Venice about thirtie yeares since,
there were found two thousand women more than men, as I have formerly
noted.
The benefits which redounded to the publike by this numbring of the
people,The profit that may be gathered by the numbring of
the people. were infinite: for first they knew the number, age and
qualitie of the persons, and what numbers they could draw foorth, either to go
to the warres, or to remaine at home; either to bee sent abroad in colonies, or
to bee imployed in publike works of
reparations, and fortifications: thereby they shall know what prouision of
victuals is necessarie for euerie citie, and especially in a time of siege, the
which is impossible to preuent, if they know not the number of the people. And
if there were no other benefit but the knowledge of euerie mans age, it cuts
off a million of sutes and quarrels the which are inuented touching the
minoritie and maioritie of persons:A meanes to cut off
sutes. for which cause king Frauncis the first
commaunded his chauncellour Poyet, to puplish an edict,
inioyning all curats to keepe a register of all such as should bee borne: but
for that the registers are not kept as they ought, this law is ill obserued.
And in regard of the quality, we see an infinit number of sutes touching the
nobility, which should be auoyded by this meanes: and the sutes of forgerie
& falshood, for the disguising The citisens estates are knowne by the Censors. and
concealing of names of the parents, countrie, estate, and qualitie, of euerie
one, whether hee bee a citisen or a stranger, a bastard or lawfully borne, a
nobleman or a patrician, a plebeian or a nobleman, and of what name & house
he comes, for want of registers and censors can hardly be found out.
This appeared plainely, when as Pericles numbred the
citisens of Athens, for the prerogatives and priuiledges they had aboue
strangers, where there were found thirteene thousand three hundred and sixty
citisens, and five thousand strangers which carryed themselves as citisens, and
were sould for slaues by a publicke decree.The citisens
order is knowne. Moreouer, to order and gouerne the bodies &
colleges of citisens according to the estate and age
of euerie person, as they did vse in Rome and in Greece, it is more than necessary to know the number of the subiects; to
gather their voices in elections the number is also requisite; to deuide the
people into tens, hundreds, and thousands, it is also necessarie to know the
number of them. But one of the greatest and most necessary fruits that can bee
gathered by this censuring and numbring of the subiects, is the discouery of
every mans estate and faculty, and whereby he gets his liuing, therby to expell
all drones out of a commonweale, which sucke the honyIt
expels vagabonds & idle persons out of an estate. from the Bees,
and to banish vagabonds, idle persons, theeves, cooseners, & ruffians,
which live and conuerse among good men, as woolues do among sheepe, spending
their lives in theeuing, dising, robbing, drinking and whooring; who although
they walke in darkenesse, yet hereby they should bee seene, noted and knowne.
And as for the valuation of goods, it is no
lesse necessarie than the numbring of persons. Casiodorus speaketh thus, Orbis Romanus agris
diuisus censu{que} descriptus est, vt possessio sua nulla haberet incerta,
quam pro tributorum susceper at quantitate soluenda, The Romane
territories were deuided, and every priuate mans land laid out, that no mans
possession should bee vncertaine, the which he had taken for the payment of a
certaine rent or tribute. If then a suruey were taken of all the Roman empire,
and the lands distributed accordingly, that it might bee knowne what burthen
every oneA means to equall the charges and imposts according
to every mans estate. was to beare in regard of the goods he inioyed;
how much more necessary is it now, when as there bee a thousand sorts of
imposts in every commonweale, which the auntients did neuer know? This poynt is
of such consequence, as it should suffice, if
it serued for nothing else, but to cause every one to bring in a declaration of
his goods and reuennues: as was done in Prouence in the yeare 1471: whereby it
did afterwardes plainely appeare that the commons were oppressed by the
cleargie and nobilitie, if it had not beene prouided for by an edict made by
Frauncis the first, in the yere 1534, and by another
of his successors: wherupon the three estates of Prouence (beeing growne into
great sutes) were called before the Parliament at Paris, where a prouinciall
decree was made, That all men of what qualitie soeuer, should pay their charges
& imposts according to the register made in the yeare 1471, when as there
were three thousand houses charged with a soulz upon the pound, without
respect of families or persons, but to the
lands subiect to contribution. They were also constrained in the yere 1516 to
make a suruey and declaration of all the benefices of this realme, in regard of
the tithes, the which by reason of the daily alterations and changes require a
newe suruey or numbring: for some Incumbent payes more than a moytie of his
benefice, when as another payeth not the thirtith part for the tithes. The like
was required by Marill as the kings aduocate for the
subsidie of Prouence.
By this meanes the poore mens iust complaints shall be releeued, whom the rich
are accustomed to ouercharge, and to free themselves throughout all the realme
of Fraunce, as well as in Prouence & Languedocke: By this meanes, mutinies
(which are vsuall in euerie commonweale, for
the vnequalitie of charges) shall cease: and moreover all sutes depending
before Iudges for reliefe, should be quite cut off: byA
meanes to auoid concussion and favour in them that make deuision of the
subiects. this meanes the concussions, malice or favour of the
assessors and other officers, who have charge to make an equall distribution of
the tribute or impost, shall bee discouered, or at least the controuersie shall
be decided by the Censors register: or else they might put in practise the
custome of the antient Athenians, wheras if any one were ouercharged that had
lesse wealth than another, hee might force him that was lesse taxed to take his
charge, or to change estates with him: as Isocrates, who
lost against Lysimachides, and wonne against Megalides.
By this meanes yow shall know who be miserable, who
prodigall, which be banquerouts, who rich,
which poore, who cooseners, which vsurers, & by what gaines some get so
much wealth, and others are oppressed with so great want, and how to redresse
it: for that by the extreame pouerty of some, and the exceeding wealth of
others, we see so many seditions, trouble, & civill warres arise. Moreouer,
all edicts and decrees, and generally all iudgements and sentences touching
fines & amercements, should be ordred, and justice equally administred,
when as every mansestate were knowne, seeing that the punishment may not exceed
the offence. Also, all deceits in mariages, in bargaines and sales, in all
priuat & publike negotiations should be discouered and knowne.
I omit a multitude of sutes touching successions, diuisions, and morgages, the
which are concealed for the most part, and
should bee made plaine by the registers without search, the which should ease
the subiects charge, and preuent the falshood of witnesses. It may bee some
will say unto me, That it were a hard thing to expose the pouertie of some to
be scorned, and the wealth of others to bee enuied. Behold the greatest
argument that can bee obiected to hinder so good and commendable a thing. But I
answere, That all enuy will cease against those whom they hold to bee rich and
are not, and the mockerie against such as have wealth and were held poore. And
shall the enuie of the malicious, or the derision of the scorner, hinder so
good and commendable a thing? Neuer wise prince nor good law-maker did regard
enuie or scorne, when there is question of good lawes. Although this law
(whereof question is made) concernes onely
moueable goods and not lands. To say, that it is neither good nor comely to
know priuate mens wealth or wants, the course, traffike and negotiation of
marchants, which consists most commonly in bookes of credit, nor to lay open
the secrets of families; I answere, that there are none but cooseners &
deceiuers that are loth to have their lives laid open, & their actions
knowne: good men that feare not the light, will bee alwaies glad to have their
estates knowne, with their qualities, wealth and maner of liuing. An Architect
said one day to Liuius Drucius the Tribune, That he
would make the lights of his house in such sort, as no man should ouer-looke
him: To whom Drusus answered, I pray you make it in such
sort A notable answere of a Tribune. as every one may
looke into it & see mine actions. Velleius
Paterculus who writes the historie saith, that this man was sanctus & integer vitae, of a holy & upright
life. But the office of Censor is chiefly against the wicked: And in old times
every Roman kept a register of his actions and expences, and of all his goods:
But uppon the declining of the empire, when as vices began to spring up, they
neglected it, saith Asconius, for that many were
condemned by their registers. And I find not that euer any but tyrants theeves
and bankerouts hated the office of Censor, and have hindredThe Censor hate full to the wicked all they could the valuation of
goods, as I have noted of Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and
Domitian. It is therefore a meere mockery, to pretend
that this would bee a meanes for tyrants to
oppresse their subiects with exactions: for there is no tyrant so cruell, but
he wil more willingly take from the rich than from the poore; whereas for want
of a Censor the poore are pinched, and the rich saue themselves. We also see
that by the practises of the vsurers & the rich citisens of Rome, of six
Censors chosen successiuely in one yeare, not anie one could intend his charge:
whereupon the Tribunes making their complaints before the people, said, That
the Senatours feared the registers and publike informations, which discouered
euerie mans estate, and their actiue and passiue debts, whereby they should
find, that some of the Citisens were oppressed by the others, and ruined by the
vsurers. And then the tribunes protested, that they would not suffer any
debtour to bee adiudged to his creditors, nor inrolled to go to the warres, vntill they had first seene a declaration of the
debts, to the end they might prouide as they
should find it needfull. Then did the debtors flocke together about the
Tribune, to giue him ayd and assistaunce. Why should a good creditor feare to
have his debts and contracts viewed, or his lands (lawfully purchased) knowne?
why should he hinder the knowledge of his goods, lawfully gotten by his
industie and labour? It shalbe alwaies honorable unto him; and if he be an
honest man, if he loues the preseruation of the commonweale, and the reliefe
of the poore, he will make no difficultie to giue a declaration of his goods
for the reliefe of the publike, if need shall require. If he be wicked, if hee
bee an vsurer, an extortioner, a publike theefe, and a obber of priuate men, he
hath reason to oppose himselfe all he can, that his goods, his life, nor his
actions may be knowne: but there is no reason to aske the vinteners aduice if they shall suppresse alehouses; or the
strumpet, if they shall put downe the stues; nor of bankers, if they shall
abolish vsurie; nor of the wicked, if they should have Censors.
The auntient Greeks and Latines have alwaies spoken of censuring, as of a
diuine thing, the which hath alwayes preserued the greatnesse of the Roman
empire so long as Censors were in credit. Titus Liuius
speaking of king Seruius, who first ordained that euerie
one should giue a certificate of his goods, saith, Censuminstituit rem saluberimamThe opinion of the auntients touching Censors.tanto imperio, He instituted the office of Censor, a
wholesome thing for so great an empire. But after that Censors were created in
the Consuls place, and that by little and little they began to take knowledge
of the life and manners of euerie one, then
began they to respect the Censors, and to reuerence them more than all other
magistrats: whereof Titus Liuius saieth, Hic annus Censurae initium fuit, a parua origine ortae, quae
deinde incremento aucta est, vt morum disciplinae{que} Romanae penes eam
regimen, Senatus, equitum{que} centuriae, decoris, dedecoris{que} discrimen
sub ditione eius magistratus, publicorum ius, priuatorum{que} locorum
vectigalia populi Romani sub nutu atque arbitrio essent, This yeare was
the beginning of the Censors office, springing from a small matter, the which
was afterwards so augmented, as hee controlled the manners and discipline of
the Romans, the assemblies of the Senate, and of knights, also the distinction
of honour and infamie were subiect to this magistrat; and the publike
rites, with the reuenues of priuat places
belonging to the people of Rome, were censuredThe charge of
the auntient Censors. by him. The Censors office then was to receiue
the number of the persons, and the valuation of their goods, to be
superintendant of the treasure, to farme out the imposts, customes, and all the
reuenues of the commonweale, to reforme abuses, to place and displace
Senatours, to dismisse the men at armes, and to censure the life and manners of
euerie one. Plutarch speakes in a higher stile, tearming
the office of Censor, Most sacred and mightie. It may be some will say, that
the charge was over great: yet two Censors were sufficient in so great an
empire. But their charges may be deuided: for to place and displace Senators,
that charge was giuen unto the Censors, to ease the people, saith Festus: the which could not be done in a
monarchie,The Censors reformers of abuses. whereas the prince
makes choyce of all magistrats, especially of his counsell. Yet it were
necessarie, that the ouerseers of the treasure should be true Censors, that is,
men without blame or reproch: for you must alwayes commit the purse to the most
trustie, and the reformation of abuses to the most upright. As for the
reformation of abuses, it is the goodliest thing that euer was inuented in any
commonweale, and it hath best maintained the greatnesse of that empire: for euen as the Censors were alwayes chosen out of the
most vertuous men of the commonweale, so did they striue to conforme the
subiects to the true patterne of honour and vertue. This was done from fiue
yeres to five yeres: & after that they had setled the estate of the treasure, and farmed out the reuenues. And if they
discontinued this charge (as oftentimes it
fell out by reason of the tediousnesse of the warres) then did it plainely
appeare, that the people grew corrupted in manners, and that commonweale
declined, like unto a bodie which leaues his ordinarie purging: this was
manifest during the second Punike warre, when as they had no time to attend
that charge conveniently, but as soone as Hannibal was
retired into the territories of Naples, then the Censors (saith Titus Liuius) Ad mores hominum regendos
animum aduerterunt, castigandaquè vitia▪ quae velut diutinos morbos aegra
corpora ex sesegignunt, nata bello erant, The Censors applyed
themselves to reforme mens maners, and to punish vices, the which had sprung up
by reason of the warres, as continuall feauers doe in sicke and corrupt bodies.
And yet they dealt not with any abuses, but such as were not to be censured
by the Iudges: for the magistrats and the
people tooke knowledge of murthers, paricides, thefts, concussions, and such
like crimes, the which are punished by the lawes. Is it not sufficient, will
some one say, to punish crimes and offences by the law? My answere is, That the
lawes punish those offences onely, which trouble the quiet of a commonweale:
and yet the greatest offendors doe easily escape the punishment of the law,
euen as great beasts do easily breake through the spiders web. And who is so
ill aduised, as to measure honour and vertue by the lawes? Quis est (saith Seneca) qui
se profitetur legibus omnibus innocentem? vt haec it a sit, auàm augusta est
innocencia adlegem bonum esse: quanto latiùs patet officiornm quàm iuris
regula? quàm multa pietas,humanitas, liberalitas, iusticia, fides exigunt, quae extra
publicas tabulas sunt! What is he that professeth himselfe an innocent
by all lawes? how strict is innocency, to bee good according to the lawe? how
much larger are the rules of dutie than of law? how many things doe piety,
humanity, liberalitie, iustice, and faith, challenge at ourThe greatest viees are punished by the Censors. hands, the which are
not inserted in the publike tables? It is manifest, that the most detestable
vices, and that most corrupt a commonweale, are neuer called into iudgement.
Treacherie is not punished by the law, beeing one of the most abominable vices:
But the Censors (saith Tully) were not so curious of any
thing, as to punish periury. Drunkennesse, gaming, palliardise, and loosenesse
of life, are suffered with all impunity; and who can redresse these disorders
but the Censor? We see most commonweales
swarme with vagabounds, idle persons, and ruffians, who by their deeds and
examples corrupt good citisens; and there is no meane to expel this vermine,
butA necessarie reason to confirme the Censors
office. by the Censor. There is yet one speciall reason which shewes
that the Censors office is now more necessarie than euer: for that in old times
the master of every family had absolute commaund, the father over his children,
the master over his slaues had absolute power of life and death, without any
appeale; and the husband had the like authority over the wife in foure cases,
as wee have shewed elsewhere: but all this now ceasing, what iustice may we
expect of the impiety of children against their fathers and mothers? of the ill
government of maried couples? of the contempt of masters? How many virgins doe
we see sold and dishonoured by the parents themselves, or that rather suffer them to live loosly than to be maried,
thinking it better to cast forth their children, or to kill them, than to
nourish them? and how can all this be preuented but by a Censor?
I dispute not of the conscience to God, the which is the chiefest and most
principal thing that ought to be cared for in euerie family & commonweale;
the which care although it hath beene alwayes committed unto Bishops,
ministers, and other spirituall officers, yet the magistrat ought to have a
speciall regard that it be aboue all things held in reuerence: for although the
law of God commaunds that euerie one appeare before him at the three great
feasts of the yeare at the least, yet there are some
which neuer goe, and so by this contempt of religion, hath sprung up by little
and little, the detestable sect of
Atheists, which have nothing but blasphemy in their mouthes, and contempt of
diuine and humane lawes; whereby do follow infinite murthers, paricides,
poysonings, treasons, periuries, adulteries, and incests: neither is it to bee
expected, that eyther prince, or magistrat shall reduce those subiects vnder
the obedience of the lawes, that have trodden all religion under foot. But this
depends of the ouerseears or Censors, who vse diuine lawes when as mans decrees
are of no force: for that Legum metus non scelera, sed
licentiam comprimit, The feare of lawes doth not suppresse the crimes,
but the libertie. There have beene and are at this day infinite numbers, who
although they offend not the princes lawes, yet live they most wickedly, and as
Lactantius said well, Possunt enim
leges delicta punire, conscientiam munire non possunt. Lawes may
well punish offences, but they cannot fortifie and amend the conscience. And as
for the bringing up of youth (the which is one of the chiefest charges of a
commonweale, whereof as of yong plants they should have the greatest care) wee
see it is neglected, and that which should be publike, is left to every mans
discretion, vsing it at his pleasure, some in one sort, some in another, the
which I will not touch heere, hauing treated thereof in an other place. And for
that Licurgus said, That thereon consisted the
foundation of a commonweale; he appoynted the great Pedonome to be Censor of the youth, and to gouerne them according to
the lawes, not at the parents discretion: for as the scope and end of a citie is all one, so the education of all
the citisens, according to Aristotles opinion, should be
all one: and so did the Atheniens decree by a publike edict, made at the
request of Sophocles, knowing well, that in vaine were
lawes made, if youth (as Aristole said) were not
instructed in good manners. All this depends on the care and vigilancie of
Censors, first to have a care of the manners and behauiour of
schoolemasters.
I will passe over with silence the abuses which are committed in suffering of
commediesCommedies and playes pernitious to a
commonweale. and enterludes, the which is a most pernitious plague to
a commonweale: for there is nothing that doth more corrupt the citisens good
manners, simplicitie, and naturall bountie; the which hath the more power &
effect, for that their words, accents, gesture,
motions, and actions, gouerned with all the art that may be, and of a most
filthy and dishonest subiect, leaues a lively impression in their soules which
apply thereunto all their sences. To conclude, wee may well say that the
Commedians stage is an apprentiship of all impudencie, loosenesse, whooredome,
coozening, deceit and wickednesse. And therefore Aristotle did not without cause say, That they must have a care least
the subiects went to commedies: he had said better, That they should pull downe
their theaters, and shut the commedians out of the citie gates: Quia (said Seneca) nihil tam moribus alienum, quàm in spectaculo desidere:
For there is nothing more contrarie to good manners, than to haunt plaies. And
therefore Philip Augustus king of Fraunce, did by a
publike edict banish all players out of his
realme. If any one will say, that both Greeks and Romans did allow of plaies: I
answere, that it was for a superstition they had unto their gods; but the
wisest have alwaies blamed them: for although a Tragedie hath something in it
more stately and heroike, and which doth make the hearts of men lesse
effeminat, yet Solon hauing seene the Tragedie of Thespis plaied, did much mislike it: Whereof Thespis excusing himselfe, said, It was but a play: No
(replyed Solon) but this play turnes to earnest. Much
more had he blamed Commedies, that were then vnknowne: and now adayes they put
at the end of euerie Tragedie (as poyson into meat) a comedie or jigge. And
although that comedies were more tollerable among
those that dwell in the Southerne parts, beeing more heauie and melancholy
by nature, & for their naturall
constancie lesse subiect to change; yet should they be vtterly defended to
those that live towards the North, being of a sanguine complexion, light and
inconstant, hauing in a manner all the force of their soule in the imagination
of the common and brutall sence. But there is no hope to see playes forbidden
by the magistrats, for commonly they are the first at them.
It is the proper charge of the graue and wise Censors, who will bee carefull to
entertaine the honest Gimnasticall exercises, to keepe the bodie in health: and
of musike to restraine the appetites under the obedience of reason: I meane
musike, which doth not onely signifie harmonie, but also all liberall and
honest sciences;Two meanes to maintaine a citie.
hauing a speciall care, that this naturall musike be not altered, nor
corrupted, as it is at this day, seeing there
is no thing that slips more sweetly and insensibly into the interiour
affections of the mind. And if we may not preuaile so much as to have the
Ionique and Lidian songs, that is to say, the fift and seuenth tunes banished
out of a commonweale, and defended from all youth (as both Plato and Aristotle said it was necessarie) at
the least let not the Diatonie musike (which is more naturall than the
Chromatique or Enharmonique) be corrupted by other medlies: and that the Dorien
songs, or of the first tune (the which is proper to sweetnesse and seemely
grauitie) be not disguised into manie tunes, and so deuided, as most part of
musicians become fooles or mad men, for that they cannot tast of a naturall
musicke, no more than a weake stomake corrupted with delicates, can digest good
and substantiall meat. All this depends of the
Censors dutie: for that neither Iudges no any other
officers will euer regard it.
They also complaine of excesse in apparell, and that the sumptuarie lawes are
trodden under foot. It shall nueer be reformed, if therebee not Censors to see
the lawes executed, as in old time the Nomophylaces, or
Law keepers, did in Athens. And therefore an auntient Oratour said, That the
Tribune which first restrained the Censors authoritie, had ruined the
commonweale: It was Clodius, one of the wickedest men of
his time, which law was sixe yeares after disanulled by the law Caecilia.
Seeing then that to censure is so goodly, profitable, and necessarie a thing,
let vs now see, if Censors ought to have any jurisdiction: for it seemes it
should be but a iest without some jurisdiction. Yet I say, that the Censor
ought not to have anyThe Censors ought to have no
iurisdiction. jurisdiction at all, to the end that his charge be not
intangled with sutes and controuersies. In like sort, the auntient Roman
Censors had no jurisdiction; but a looke, a word, and a dash with a pen, was
more bloudie, and touched more to the quick, than all the decrees and
iudgements of the magistrat. When as they made their scrutiny or suruey, you
should have seene foure or fie hundred Senators, the
order of horsemen, and all the people stand trembling before them: the Senatour
fearing lest he should be put from the Senat; the horseman from his horse,
& rankt among the baser sort: and the
simple citisen to be rased out of his order and from his line, and placed among
the tributaries: as Titus Liuius doth testifie, That 66
Senators were rased at one time out of the register, and excluded the Senat.
And yet lest this great honour and authoritie of the Censors should make way to
aThe Censors have no power not iurisdiction.
tyranny, if they were armed with power and iurisdiction, or if any should be
condemned without hearing; it was therefore wel aduised they should haue
nothing but the censuring and reformation. And therefore Tully said▪ That the iudgement of the Censors did onely make men
blush: and for that it did but touch the name, the Censors correction was
called Ignominia, Ignominie; the which differs from infamy, depending upon the Iudge that hath publike
iurisdiction, and in causes that L. 1. de ijs qui ntant
infam. make men infamous. And therefore the Pretor did note them as
infamous, that were cassiered with ignominy, the which had beene ridiculous, if
they had beene infamous. And yet the doubt which Lawyers have made, If
ignominious men should suffer as the infamous; shewes plainly, that Ignominy
and Infamy is not all one, as manie have supposed.
By the auntient custome of Greece, it was lawfull to kill any one, or any of
his children that was noted infamous, as the Orator Libanius saith in his pleading for Halirhotius.
Now although the Censor had rased any Senator out of the Register booke, yet if
he would make petition unto the people he was admitted, and sometimes absolued
and restored: but if there were any accuser that did second the Censor, or if the Censor himselfe would accuse any as
a priuate man, if the accusedA censure is no
iudgement. were found guiltie, and condemned by the people, or by
Commissioners deputed by the people, then was he not onely ignominious, but
also infamous, and declared incapable euer to beare office: and therfore those
which were censured, they were not iudged, but yet they were as a man may say,
foreiudged: and if the Censor were an eloquent man, he would oppose himselfe as
an accuser of those that would seeke to bee restored against his censure: as
Cato did against Lucius
Flaminius, making an oration against his filthy and disordred life,
hauing rased him out of the register of Senators. But those that were better
aduised, and had some hope of restitution, sued
for some office, or honorable commission from the people, the which if they
obtained, they were freed from all censure of ignominie, or else they were
restored by the other Censors five yeares after: if hee did performe neither
the one nor the other, he was not admitted into the Senat: neither could a
horseman recover his horse nor his ranke. And (Vlpianus
speaking of these men) doubts whether they are to be admitted as witnesses. And
for the better confirmation hereof, Cicero brings in an
example of Caius Geta, who was excluded the Senate by
the Censors,Pro Cluentio▪ and yet afterwards he was
chosen Censor: and a little after speaking of censuring, he saith▪ That the
auntients would have the Censors office to carrie a certaine feare, and not a
punishent. The which was partly the cause why the Claudian law was disanulled, the
which would not have any Senator excluded the Senat, nor rased out of the
registers, if he were not accused before both by the Censors, and condemned by
either of them, the which had imbased the office of Censor, being so reuerend,
as the Senate of Rome would not permit the Censors (after their charge expired)
to bee accused, or called in question for anie thing that they had done during
their charge: the which was lawfull against all other magistrats. And it seemes
for the same reason the Emperour Constantine did teare
the libels of accusation propounded against the Surueilans or Ouerseers at the
Councell of Nice, saying, That he would not iudge them that were Censors of
euerie mans life. And for the same cause Charlemaine in
his constitutions hath made a Canon, That no prelate should be iudged without 72 witnesses, freeing the Pope from
the censure of any man: the which hath bene obserued vntill the councell of
Constance, where it was decreed, That the Pope should be iudged by the
Councell. I will not heere dispute if the ecclesiasticall iurisdiction be well
grounded; but it is to be feared, that hauing presumed so much, they are likely
to lose both iurisdiction & all ecclesiasticall censure, the which hath
alwaies bene of great consequence: for euen as the auntient Diuides (who were
antient Iudges and Prelats in Gaule) did excommunicat kingsCaesarin Coment▪ and princes that would not obey their decrees, euen
so the ecclesiasticall censure amongst Christians, hath not onely maintained
discipline and good manners for many ages, but hath
also made Tyrants to tremble, and reduced Kings and Emperours unto reason, pulling oftentimes their crownes from their
heads, and their scepters out of their hands, forcing them to make peace or
warre, to chaunge their dissolute life, to do justice, and to reforme the
lawes. All the histories are full, but there is none so famous, as of Saint Ambrose, who did censure Theodosius the Great, and Nicholas 1 Pope, who
censured Lothaire King of Italy: and Innocent, who did excommunicate Lewis 7 King of
Fraunce, to whom for three yeres space no priest durst administer the
Sacrament.
True it is, that the abuse of a censure of so great consequence, hath made the
ministers, the discipline, and their censure to be contemned, the which
consisted in interdiction, suspension, and excommunication: for many uppon
light causes, and without cause did
excommunicate, yea they have set downe 39 causes wherin a man did incurre
excommunication ipso facto, without iudgement or
sentence; and which is more, they did excommunicate Corporations, Colleges,
Vniuersities, Emperours, Kings, and Kingdomes, without distinction of age,
sexe, innocents, or mad men, although since (but too late) they have somewhat
corrected this abuse: but in this kingdome it was decreed by the statutes of
Orleance, that they should not vse any excommunication, but in crimes and
publike scandall. The Prelats, Bishops, and Popes, have alwayes pretended the
censure of manners and religion to belong unto them, as a thing whereof judges
and magistrats take no knowledge, but in case
of execution. And since the auntients and ouerseers have used the like
prerogative in many places, a thing which is verie necessary, if there be no
Censors, as well to reforme the peoples manners, and to watch over them, as to
countenance the dignity of Pastors Bishops and Ministers, whom we cannot
esteeme and honour too much, for the charge and dignitie which they beare; God
did wisely prouide, making choice of his ministers, and giuing the prerogative
of honour unto the tribe of Leui, aboue all the tribes,
and to the family of Aaron, of the which the Priests
only were, aboue all the Leuits, giuing them the tenths of cattell, fruits, and
of all heritages, with great honours and priuiledges: and by an article of the
law of God it is said, That he that shall disobey the sentence . 17. of the high Priest, shall be put to
death. And they that shall abase the estate of the Ministers, Bishops, and
Auncients, and seeke to take from them, all ecclesiasticall censure, with their
goods and honours, to see them poore and scorned, they contemne God, and regard
not religion, the which is a matter verie considerable: andThe pouertie and contempt of the ministers makes religion to bee
contemned. it was partly the chiefe cause, why the chiefe Minister of
Losanna forsooke the towne, for that the heads of the Cantons could not indure
that the Antients should have the censuring of manners: yet the one is most
necessarie in euerie well gouerned commonweale, either to create Censors▪ or to
submit themselves to the censure of the Bishops.
The Seigneurie of Geneue reserues this prerogative to their Bishops,
Ministers, and Auntients, to have the
priuiledge of a Corporation, and to censure the lives, and manners of men in
their consistorie, and yet without any iurisdiction to commaund, or to execute
their sentences, either by themselves, or by the officers of the Seigneurie,
but for disobedience they excommunicate him, a matter of greater consequence:
for the person excommunicated, after a certayne time is pursued criminally
before the magistrate, by the Inquisitour of the faith, as in the catholike
church, but not so soone: for there hath beene some one excommunicate fifteene
yeeres, and afterwards conuented before the Inquisitor of the faith, who meant
to proceed against him, hee hath appealed to the Parliament, where his
appellation was reiected, & he condemned in a
fine, decreeing, that he should be seized on, and carried to the Bishops prison, commaunding the Inquisitor to
proceed in his triall, euen unto a definitiue sentence, and to certifie the
Court. It was in those daies, when as it was lawfull to excommunicate any man
euen for pettie debts, although the debtors had made it knowne that they had
not any thing. But after the edict made at Orleance, and confirmed by the
Parliament, the Bishops and Auntients could not vse such censures within this
realme. At Lions Mrde Moulin was much discontēted
against the consistorie, saying, That under colour of their censure they
attempted uppon the temporall iurisdiction, and yet hee blamed it in the
catholike church. But taking away suspension, interdiction, and
excommunication, the ecclesiasticall censure is of no force, and by the same
inconuenience, good manners and discipline is
abolished: but there is no reason, that for disobedience in slight matters,
they should vse such censures.
The auntient Censors did set notes and marks uppon the registers against those
that deserued it, to aduertise their successors in their charge of those that
were so noted, if they did not amend. In my opinion that should suffice, and
not to proceed against them by any amercements, or to excommunicate them for
want of paiment. I leaue it to the wise to decide, whether it bee better to
diuide the temporall censure (touching maners & other things aboue
specified) from the ecclesiasticall censure, or to ioyne them together. But yet
it were better to allow both to the Bishops & Antients, than to take all from them, and thereby to depriue the
commonweale of that which is most necessarie: for wee see those estates which
doe vse it, to flourish in lawes and good manners: we see whooredome, vsurie,
mummeries, and excesse in all things rooted out, the blaspheamer, ruffian, and
idle vagabound banished; and without doubt, those commonweales which shall vse
such censure, shall continue and flourish in all vertues: they which neglect
lawes, vertue, and religion, will bee contemned, as it happened in Rome not
long before the ruine of the empire; when as in stead of Censors, they created
an office which they called The Tribune of Plaisirs, as we may note in Cassiodorus. But for that the Censors office was first
instituted in regard of taxes, subsidies, and imposts, and to make a stocke for
publike necessities, let vs also speake of
treasure.
CHAP. II. Of Treasure.
IF Treasure be the sinewes of a commonweale, as an
auntient Orator said, it is verie necessary to have the true knowledge thereof,
firstMony the sinewes of a Commonweale. to see by
what honest meanes to gather money together; secondly, to imploy it to the
profit and honour of the commonweale; and lastly, to spare and to reserue some
part for all needfull euents, least the
publike treasurie being exhaust, the commonweale might bee oppressed with
sudden calamitie. We will therefore handle these three poynts euerie one in
order.
Touching the first poynt. There are many craftsmasters in matters of imposts,
which know many meanes to raise up great summes of money, but they neuer had
the true knowledge of honour and honestie. But leauing these cunning
politicians I will follow those, who as they have had a great care of the
treasure, so have they sought by honest meanes to increase the reuenues of the
commonweale, lest the citie by want should be drawne into danger, and the
prince forced by vnlawfull meanes to sucke the priuat
wealth and bloud of his subiects, as it hath happened to those that seemed best acquainted with politike affaires: amongst
the which the Lacedemonians are named, whom not content with their owne
territories, as their master LicurgusPolib. l. 6. de milit. ac domest.
Rom. disciplino. had taught them, taking from them all vse of gold and siluer, inioyning
them to make money of iron, least that strangers should grow in loue with the
Lacedemonians countrie, or they with that of strangers, supposing thereby not
onely to free his citisens from iniuries, but also from forraine vices: But
they had no sooner past their frontiers but they fell to borrowing, some of the
king of Persia, as Lysander and Callicratides: some of the king of Egypt, as Agesilaus, and Cleomenes, kings of Lacedemon.
For which cause the Seigniorie of Sparta hauing soone wonne all Greece, and
gathered together a great masse of treasure, they decreed, That all the
gold and siiluer which they had taken from
their enemies, should be kept in the publike Treasurie, to serue them at their
need, with defence not to vse it for anie priuat occasion: but their treasure
without ground or supply beeing soone wasted, they were forced to returne to
borrowing to make warre (the which is not entertayned and maintayned by diet,
as an auntient Captaine said) whereby their commonwealeWar
is not maintained by a diet. decaied under king Cleomenes. Euerie commonweale therefore must prouide to have their
treasure built of a sure and durable foundation. There are onely seuen meanes
in generall for the making of a publike treasure, in the which all other are
conteined. The first is, by the reuenues of the commonweale: The second, by
conquestSeuen meanes to gather treasure. from the
enemie: The third, by the liberalitie and gift of friends: The fourth
by the pensions & tribute of their
alies: The fifth, upon traffike: The sixt, upon marchants, which bring in and
carrie out marchandise: And the seuenth uppon the subiects imposts.
Touching the first, which growes by the reuenues, there is not any seemes to
mee more honest & sure. So we read that all the antient monarchs and
law-giuers, which builded new cities, or transported new colonies, they
assigned (besides the streets, temples, theaters, & the possessions of
priuat men) certaine places fit for the commonweale, and free to all in
general; the which were called Commons, and let out to priuate men for a
certaine time, or for euer, paying a yeerely rent into the Treasurie or
Reuenues the chiefest meanes to make a treasure.
Exchequer, to supply the charges of the commonweale. We read that Romulus the founder of Rome & of the Roman
commonweale, divided all the lands into three parts; appoynting a third for the
temporall of the Church, a third for the rents of the commonweale, and the
surplusage to be deuided among priuate men, the which at that time were three
thousand citisens, euerie one of the which hauing two iournies,The deuision of the lands about Rome. or acres of land:
so as of eighteene thousand iournies or acres of land, lying in the territories
of Rome, they reserued six thousand for the sacrifices, six thousand for the
reuenues of the commonweale and intertainment of the kings house, and six
thousand for the citisens. Yet Plutarch sets downe twise
as manie citisens, and saith that Romulus would set no limits of the territorie of Rome,
lest it should be seene what heThe first beginning of
publike rents. had vsurped from his neighbours, and that his
successor Numa divided the reuenues to poore citisens:
but the first opinion is the more likely and the more common; for the deuision
of two iournies or acres continued a long time, as Pliny
saith, speaking to Cincinatus the Dictator, the which
was two hundred and threescore yeares after Romulus: Aranti
sua duo iuger a Cincinato viator inquit, vela corpus & audi mandata
Senatus: Cincinatus plowing his two acres, Passenger (saith he) vncouer
thy bodie, and heare the commaundements of the Senat. And Denis Halicarnasseus holds the first opinion; hee was in houshould
with Marcus Varro, the true Register of all Roman
antiquities. But since by the law Licinia, euerie
citisen was allowed to have seuen journies or acres of
land. If it be true which wee read in Pliny, or Collumella:Post exactos Reges Liciniana illa septem iugera, quae plebis
Tribunus viritim diuiserat, maiores questus antiquis retulêre, quàm nunc
nobis praebent amplissima veruacta, After the expulsion of the kings,
those seuen acres which the Tribune deuided to euerie one by the law Licinia, did yeeld our auncestours more profit, than now
our large fields. And the oration of Marcus Curius is
well knowne, noting him as a pernitious citisen that could not be contented
with seuen acres. In this diuision Romulus did imitate
the Egyptians, who in old time divided all the reuenues of Egypt into three
parts: The first was for the sacrifices and sacrificers; The second, to
entertaine the kings house, and to defray the publike charges; And the third
for the Calasiris, the which were the men of
warre, alwaies entertained to serue at need: all the other citisens were either
husbandmen, or slaues. Wee read also, that Ezechiel, in
reforming the abuses of the princes of the Hebrewes, appoynted certaine lands
for the sacrifices, some common for the people, besides the reuenues for the
entertainement of the kings house, and to serue for publike expences. To the
end (saith hee) that the princes shall no more grieue my people with exactions
and imposts. Although from the beginning of the Israelits kingdome, the kings
had some reuenues; for the towne of Ziceleg, with some land being giuen to Dauid by king Achis, continued for
euer as part of the kings reuenues, and was neuer alienated. Of the regall
reuenues some are publike, some are priuate, the last may bee sould and made
away, the first neuer. And to the end that
princes should not bee forced to ouercharge their subiects with imposts, or to
seeke any vnlawfull meanes to forfeit their goods, all Monarchs and States haue
held it for a generall and vndoubted law, That the publikeThe publike reuenues by nature are inalienable. reuenues should be
holy, sacred, and inalienable, either by contract or prescription. In like
sort, kings (especially in this realme) graunting their Letters pattents for
the reunion of crowne lands, declare, that they have taken an oath comming to
the crowne, in no sort to sell or make away the reuenues: and although it were
duely and directly made away, were it for euer, yet is it alwayes subiect to
bee redeemed, and in such sort as the prescription of a hundred yeares, which
giues a iust title to the possessor, doth not touch the reuenues of the crowne.
The edicts, decrees, and Nulla preseriptia occurrit Regi. ordinances of this
realme are notorious, not onely against priuate men, but euen against princes
of the bloud, who have beene put from the deuision of the reuenues, & the
prescription of a hundred yeres. And this is not peculiar to this realme alone,
but common to the kings of England, Spayne, Poland, and Hungarie, who are
accustomed to sweare not to alienate the reuenues of the crowne. The which is
also obserued in popular & Aristocritall states: and euen at Venice the law
allowes no prescription (the which many would limit to six score yeares:) nor
yet the Cantons of the Swissers: for king Henry 2 hauing
requested the Siegniorie of Lucerne to ingage themselves for a certaine summe
of money, Hugo the chiefe magistrat made answere vnto
the Ambassador, That both the Senat and Commons of Lucerne had sworne, neuer to pawne nor ingage their lands. Wee read
also, that the same ordinances were religiously obserued in two the most goodly
commonweales that euer were, Athens and Rome, whereas two great personages, Themistocles and Cato the Censor,
caused all the publike reuenues to bee seized on, the which had through tract
of time, and sufferance of magistrats beene vsurped by priuate men, saying in
their orations, Nec mortales contra deum immortalem, nec
priuatos contraPlut. in Catone Censorie, & Themist.Rempub▪ praescribere posse, That mortall men could neuer
prescribe against the immortali God, nor priuate men against the commonweale.
And therefore the court of Parliament uppon a civill request obtained by the
kings Proctor generall, against a decree made in
favour of the successors of Foelix of Nogaret, to whom
king Philip the faire 260 yeares before had giuen the
lands and Seigniorie of Caluisson, for his vertues and well deseruing of the
commonweale, whereby it was reuoked unto the Councell: shewing therby that
prescription hath no place, when there is any question of the reuenues of the
crowne. And the court of Parliament at Rouan, by a sentence giuen the 14 of
Februarie, 1511, betwixt the kings proctor and the religious of S. Omer, adiudging the possession of certaine goods vnto
the king, allowing the religious to releeue themselves by some other meanes,
and to proue it duely, by way of inquest, and for cause,
which words (and for cause) are not to bee vnderstood for the poore subiects of
the countrie onely, but generally for all. And oftentimes the treaties made
betwixt princes have no other difficulties, but for the preseruation of the reuenues, the which princes cannot
alienate to the preiudice of the publike. Henry 8 king
of England in a treatie made with the Pope and potentates of Italy, in the
yeare 1527, caused this clause to be added, That they might not giue away any
thing of the crowne of Fraunce, for the redeeming of king Frauncis: and upon this poynt the breach of the treatie of Madrid was
grounded, for that the auncient custome of this realme, conformable to the
edicts or ordinances of other nations, requires the consent of the three
estates: the which is obserued in Poland, by a law made by Alexander king of Poland, according to the disposition the common law,
vnlesse the sale were made at such time as the enemy had inuaded the
countrie: and that the forme be obserued
from poynt to poynt, as in the alienation of pupils goods (the commonweale
being alwayes regarded as a pupill) and if there be any thing omitted, it is
all of no force, or at the least it is subiect to rescission, without
restitution unto the purchasor of the thing purchased. Neyther can the prince
challengeL. si secundum C. de
Reip. that unto himselfe which belongs unto the publike, no more than
a husband can his wiues dowrie, wherin the prince hath lesse right; for the
husband may abuse the fruits of his wiues dowrie at his pleasure, but a prince
may well vse, but not abuse the fruits of a publike dowrie: as the citisens
that were in societie with the Athenians complained, that the publike money was
to be put in Apolloes treasury, and not to be wasted by
the Athenians.
Our kings have and doe acknowledge, that the proprietie of the crowne lands is
not the princes: for king Charles the 5 and 7, would not
have the crowne lands pawned, vnlesse the Parliament at the instance of the
kings Proctor had so decreed, as we may see in the auntient registers of the
court of Parliament, and chamber of accounts; and the reason is, for that the
reuenues belong unto the commonweale, as wise princes have alwaies
acknowledged: & when as king Lewis the 8 died
(hauing giuen much by his testament to poore widdowes and orphans) hee
commaunded all his jewels and moueables to be sould to performe his legacies,
least that any thing belonging to the crowne should be sould, as hauing no
interest in it. And for this cause Pertinax the Roman
Emperour caused his name being written uppon the publike lands, to be rased out, saying, That it was the very inheritance of
the commonweale, and not the Emperours, although they enioy the rents for the
maintenance of their houses and the commonweale. And we doe also read, that Antonius Pius lived of his owne inheritance, applying
nothing that belonged to the publike, to his priuat vse: whom king Lewis 12 (called the father of his countrie) doth seeme
to imitate, who would not mingle his patrimony & reuenues, with that of the
publike;The publike renues and
the princes patrimony differ. erecting the chamber of Blois for his
lands at Blois, Coussy, and Montfort: and yet many have erroniously confounded
the publike with the princes priuate lands. Neyther is it lawfull for
soueraigne princes to abuse the fruits and reuenues of
the crowne lands, although the commonweale be in quiet and free from all
trouble; for that they have the vse onely, and
ought (the commonweale and their house being maintained) to keepe the
surplusage for publike necessitie: although that Pericles said to the Ambassadours of the confederats, That they had no
interest in the imployment of the treasure, so as they were maintayned in
peace: for it was contained in the treatie of aliance, that the money which
should be raised in the time of peace, should be gared in Apolloes temple, and that it should not bee imployed but by a common
consent. But there is great difference betwixt the Treasurie or Exchequer in a
monarchy, and in popular states: for a prince may have a treasurie of his
priuate patrimony, the which was called Fiscus by the
Auntients, and that ofAsconius et vlp. in l. 2. §. hoc
interdictum. Ne quid in loc pub. the publike reuenues Aerarium: the one being
divided from the other by the auntient lawes,
the which can have no place in a popular or Aristocraticall estate. Yet there
neuer wanted flatterers to persuade princes to sell the reuenues of the crowne
to make a greater benefit; the which is a tyrannical opinion, and the ruine of
a commonweale: for it is well knowne, that the publike reuenues consist chiefly
in that which Dukes, Marqueses, Earles, and Barons did sometimes possesse, the
which, either by succession, dowrie, or by confiscation, have come unto the
state in Lordships, coppiholds, in fees, alienations, sales, seazures, rents,
amercements, rights, confiscations, and other regalities, the which are not
subiect to imposts and ordinarie charges, and oftentimes are gotten by them
which are free from all charges. Moreouer,
commissions graunted to sell the publike reuenues, for the making of money
speedily, allow it to be sould for ten yeares purchase, when as priuate
landsBy the edict of Francis 1, in the yeare 1544.
in fee with iustice are sould for thirtie yeares purchase, and those that haue
dignities at fiftie yeres and more: so as some with purchase of the publike
lands, reape in one yeare more profit by the iurisdiction, than they paid for
the land. Others have paidThe great preidice that comes by publike sales. nothing at
all, taking the valuation of the reuenue by extracts from the Chamber of
accounts, giuen in by the receiuers in ten yeares, who oftentimes have not
receiued any thing, for that the profit of inferiour iustice is made in the
chiefe and regall court. As for sales, the purchaser hath more profit, than the
interest of the money which they have payed can amount vnto: as also the
receiuers of the reuenues are not accustomed▪
to giue any account of casualties, but for a small part. But in farming out the
crowne lands, the farmours are lyable to subsidies, and are charged according
to their abilities.
There are infinite more abuses which the commonweale sustaines by the sale of
their reuenues, but the greatest is, that the money which is made is not put
out to rent (like unto those that thinke to be good husbands) but is most
commonly wasted and giuen unto them that have least deserued, and so for want
of money to redeeme this land, the commonweale falles to decay: then doe they
also sell the commons wherby the poore are releeued. It were more fit to sell
the waste lands of the commonweale,The waste lands may be
sold. the which no man will hire, and brings no benefit to the
commonweale, to the end the Treasury may bee
enriched, and that the citisens may profit by the tilling thereof: but if they
may have a farmour, it is not lawfull to sell it, although that Aristotle commends them of Constantinople, who sould
their lands for a continuall rent, the which is a meere alienation, and money
taken before, diminisheth the rent: the which was expressely defended by an
edict made by Charles the ninth. And although that
afterwards he made an other edict for the renting out of waste lands, and
paying of fines, by the persuasion of such as sought to make money: yet the
Parliament of Paris upon the verification of the said edict, decreed, That the
rents should not be redeemed, and that there should bee no fine payed at the beginning; and for that the Commissioners for this
sale did sue unto the King that it might bee
lawfull to giue money at the entry, the Court (all the Chambers being
assembled) decreed, That the purchasers might not giue aboue a third of the
summe at the entry, in regard of the value of the lands: the which third part
should7. May 1566. be receyued by the Receyuers of
the reuenues apart, to bee imployed to redeeme the reuenues that were sould,
imposing a quadruple penaltie to bee leuied, as well uppon the receyuers, as of
those that had gotten any assignation of the said money. And it is not heere
needfull to relate what losses the king and commonweale have sustayned by such
alienations of waste lands. King Frauncis the second
commingIn the yeare 1559 to the crowne, commaunded
his Proctors and magistrats to redeeme the publike reuenues from priuate
occupiers: wherein he complayned, that the crowne lands and reuenues were so dismembred and wasted, as that which
remayned did not suffice for the charges that were laid upon them. But our king
hath farre greater cause to complayne now, when as there scarce remaynes any
thing that is to bee sould. In the generall accounts of the treasure made in
Ianuary, in the yeare 1572, there wasIn the yeare
1572 no receit made of any reuenues, although there were six &
thirtie thousand crownes a yeare in the receit, when as king Frauncis died, as it appeareth by an account of the treasure made in
the yeare 1569: and by the same estate the alienation of the reuenues,What the alienation of the reuenues of Fraunce amount vnto. A
liure is two shillings. impositions, and subsidies amounted to
fourteene millions nine hundred sixtie and one thousand foure hundred and
seuentie liures, fifteene soulz, and eight deniers; not comprehending twelue
hundred thousand liures for the fourth and halfe fourth, and foure hundred and fiftie thousand liures, in regard of fifteene
liures uppon the strike of salt, the which the country of Guienne redeemed in
the yeares 1549, and 1553. whereby is plainely appeares, that the kings
reuenues are almost all ingaged and made away, for fifteene or sixteene
millions at the most, the which is worth aboue fiftie millions: for that
Earledomes, Baronies, and other Seigniories have not beene sould for aboue nine
yeares purchase: and if it were redeemed and let to farme, it would amount
yearely to almost three millions, the which would suffice to entertaine the
kings house in state, and to pay most of the officers their wages, not medling
with any of the other ordinarie or extraordinarie charges. And if wee may compare a small kingdome with a greater, the
reuenues of the crowne ofThe reuenues of the realme of
England. Herein the Author is deceeiued. England, comprehending the
land subsidies, taxes, customes, imposts, and all other charges, amount to
little more than sixscore and ten thousand pounds starling a yeare, hauing a
good part of the temporall lands of the church annexed unto it, and yet the
Queene doth maintayne her Court and the estate of her realme verie royally and
redeemed the reuenues.
True it is, that a setled peace for these fifteene yeres hath much preuailed
for the maintenance of the state of England; and warre for the ruine of
Fraunce, if God had not sent our King Henrie 3 from
heauen to restore it to his first beautie. But we must obserue that for the
preseruation of the reuenues of a commonweale, most commonly that of a monarchy is better husbanded than in a
popular state, or inIn a popular state the reuenues are ill
husbanded. that which is gouerned by few of the better sort; whereas
the magistrats and ouerseers of the treasure conuert the publike to their owne
priuate profit: and every one striues to gratify his friends, or to purchase
the peoples favour with the preiudise of the commonweale: as Caesar did in his first Consulship, who deuided the territory of Capua
among the people, and abated the rents of the farmes a third part, after that
hee had beene well bribed. And ten yeares after Quintus
Metellus Tribune of the people, to winne their favour, published a law
to take away the toles in all the ports of Italy. In like sort, Pericles to have credit with the people of Athens, made
distribution of great summes of money, the which
had come into the treasure. This happens not
in a monarchie, for Monarchs which have no more certaine reuenues than their
lands, and that have no power to impose subsidies or other charges upon their
subiects but with their owne consents, or uppon vrgent necessitie, are not so
prodigall of their crowne lands. It is not needfull to discourse any further of
reuenues, being impossible to order it better than was by the edict of king Charles 9 if it were duely executed.
The second meanes to gather treasure together, is by conquest upon the
enemyThe second means to gather treasure. to
recover the treasure wasted in warre: So did the antient Romans; for although
the sacke and spoyle of townes forced, belonged to the Captaines and souldiers,
yet the treasure was carried into the
treasurie of Rome. And as for the townes yeelded or taken by capitulation, the
armie had but their pay, and sometimes a double pay, (before that the
discipline of war was corrupted) & the treasure of the vanquished was
carried to Rome, if they had not otherwise capitulated. All the gold and siluer
(saith Titus Liuius) and all the brasse that was taken
from the Samnites, was carried to the treasurie. And speaking of the Gaules
beyond the Alpes, he saith, That Furius Camillus carryed
into the Capitoll 170000 pounds of siluer which hee had taken from them: and
that Flaminius caused to bee brought out of Spaine of
the spoyles of Greece, the value of three millions & eight hundred thousand
crownes, besides siluer, rich moueables, armes and ships. Paulus Aemilius brought thrice as
much out of Macedony. Caesar caused aboue fourtie
millions to be delivered into the publike treasurie, by the report of Appian. Wee may see from the 33 booke of Titus Liuius to the 34, infinite treasures brought to the
Treasurie of Rome of the spoyles of conquered nations. And although all were
not brought in by the Generals, yet fearing to bee charged with corruption, or
to bee frustrate of their tryumphs, they alwayes delivered in great summes: for
Scipio Asiaticus was accused and condemned of
corruption, in a great fine, and yet he brought into the treasurie aboue two
millions of gold: and Scipio the Affrican his brother,
was also included in the accusation, although he had brought aboue fiue
millions of gold of his conquests into the treasurie, besides the value of ten
millions and five hundred thousand crownes:
wherein king Antiochus was condemned: by meanes of the
victorie they had obtayned, and yet both of them were exiled and died poore.
And although that Lucullus was the first (as Plutarch saieth) that inriched himselfe with the spoyle
of his enemies, yet did he bring more into the Treasurie than any of the rest,
except Caesar: the which I thought fit to obserue, for
that commonly wee imploy the treasure for the charge of the warres, and yet in
all victories and conquests there neuer comes a crowne into the Exchequer, and
oftentimes the sacke & spoile is giuen before the townes be taken or
yeelded.
The Romans were not contented with their treasures and spoyles, but they
condemnedThe punishment of the vanquished. the
vanquished to loose a part of their territories, the which commonly was the seuenth part. Since, some have bene condemned
to loose a fourth or a third part of their lands, as in Italy, beeing subdued
by Odocres king of the Herules. And soone after Hortarius king of the Lumbards condemned the vanquished
to pay him yerely the moytie of their reuenues: as also the Romans had done
unto the Doriens long before. But William the Conqueror,
after he had conquered the realme of England, declared all the countrey in
generall, & every mans inheritance in particular forfeyted unto him by the
law of armes, intreating the Englishmen as his farmours. Yet the Romans haue
alwayes shewed themselves courteous and affable in that poynt, sending Colonies
from their citie to inhabit the conquered countryes, distributing to every one a certayne quantitie: and by this meanes they
freed their Citie from The great benefit which growes by Colonies. beggers,
mutinies, and idle persons, and did fortifie themselves with their owne men
against the vanquished, the which by little and little did linke themselves in
marriages, and did willingly obey the Romans, who by this meanes also haue
filled the world with their Colonies, with an immortall glory of their iustice,
wisdome, and power: wheras most part of conquering princes plant Garrisons,
which serue onely to spoyle and oppresse the subiects. If our kings after the
taking of Naples and Milan had practised this course, they had yet continued in
obedience to our kings. And it is no maruell if they reuolt against the
Spanyard uppon the first occasion, asPessimus diutur custos est metus. well as the countrey of
Flaunders hath done, hauing nothing but Garrisons there without Colonies. Yet
wee find, that Sultan Mahumet king of the Turkes, found
meanes to inrich his treasure by meanes of
Christian slaues, which hee sent in Colonies into conquered countries, giuing
to every one fifteene acres of land and two oxen, and seed for one yeare: and
at the end of twelue yeares he tooke the moytie ofThe Turks
order to make many, & for the warre. their fruits, the which hee
continued for euer. Amurath the first dealt more mildly
with the Timariots, giuing them certayne lands and rents, to some more, and to
others lesse, upon condition they should attend him in the wars when they were
called, with a certayne number of horse: and if the Timariot chanced to die,
the fruits should acrue unto the Prince, vntill that hee had aduaunced some
other, by way of gift. And generally the tenth of all successions belonged to
the prince (the which grew by the law of
armes, and by the princes conquering another mans countrey) and not by way of
imposition uppon the auntient subiects. Whereby it appeareth, that the greatest
and clearest reuenues which the Turke hath, are in manner casuall, and the
warre is defrayed without any new charge.
The kings of Castile have done in manner the like at the West Indies, and
namely the Emperour Charles 5, hauing conquered Peru,
gaue the lands to the Captaines and Spanish souldiers by way of gift onely; and
beeing dead, they returned to theThe Emperors order at
Peru. Emperour, vntill that another were aduaunced in his place:
taking moreover the fift of all the pearle and mynes; so as euerie two yeares
there comes clearely into the kings treasurie in Spayne, neere foure millions
of gold, the which is called, The port of
civill. But it is reason, that the conquests which are made upon the enemie,
and which augment their treasure, should also ease their subiects: as they did
in Rome after the conquest of the realme of Macedon, the Romans were freed from
taxes, imposts, and subsidies.
The third meanes to augment the treasure, is by liberalitie of friends or
subiects, be it by legacie, or by donation during life: the which wee will
speake briefly of, forThe third meones to gather
treasure. that it is vncertaine, besides there are few princes that
giue, and fewer that receiue without requitall: for if a prince giues to one
that is more rich and mightie, it seemes it is for feare, or upon some bond,
& somtimes he that receiues it, accounts it as a tribute. The Emperour of
the Turkes sets to the view of all the world, as The magnificence of the Emperours of Turky. well
those presents which are sent him from his friends, as those that come from
tributaries, to shew how much hee is feared of strangers, defraying the
Ambassadors charges with great bountie, the which neuer prince nor people did.
But we find that the Auntients used an other kind of bountie and liberalitie
than they doe at this day: for at this day they giue not often but to such as
are in greatnesse and prosperitie, and the Auntients gaue in aduersitie. When
as Hannibal had in a manner quite vanquished the Romans,
and taken from them almost all Italy, the king of Egypt sent the value of 400
thousand crownes to Rome in pure gift; the which the Romans refused, giuing
great thanks to the king. They did the like to Hierom king of Sicile, who gaue them a crowne of gold
waying 320 pound, and a Victorie of gold, with
five thousand bushels of wheat: but they accepted nothing but the image of
Victory as a happy presage. They shewed the same resolutions to the
Ambraciotes, and to many other Princes and Seigniories, who at that time
offered them great presents, although they were in extreme necessitie: so as
there was a combate of honour, in the one to giue, and in the other to refuse.
But the Romans have surmounted all other nations in courage and resolution in
their aduersities: as for other princes and people they were not so nice to
take, yea oftentimes they demaunded; as the Seigniorie of the Rhodes, when
their Colossus fell downe & brake some of their ships, they sent
Ambassadors to kings and princesA good policie of the
Rhodiots. to beg, hauing small meanes, and it succeeded well: for
king Hierom sent them
threescore thousand crownes in guift, and many others imitated him: yea the
king of Egypt gaue them in gold the value of eighteen hundred thousand crowns,
and in siluer much more, with twentie thousand bushels of wheat, and three
thousand beasts for sacrifices, besides great store of stuffe, and an infinite
number of Architects and workemen the which hee entertayned at his owne charge
for the building of a Colledge: so as the Seigniorie of Rhodes for an old
broken image, and some crased ships, were greatly enriched by the bountie of
other princes.
It was common to the kings of Egypt to glorie in their bountie to others: for
wee read in a manner the like of Ptolomie the first, toward the citie and inhabitants of
Ierusalem, to whom he sent the value of two hundred threescore and
sixteeneIoseph in anti.
thousand crownes, to redeeme a hundred thousand slaues of their nation; and
ninetie thousand crownes for the sacrifices, besides a table of massy gold to
set in Gods Temple: and the great presents he gaue to the 72 Interpreters,
which translated the Bible out of Hebrew into Greeke. And as it was and will be
alwayes tollerable for pettie princes and small Siegniories to accept the
honorable gifts of great princes and monarchs: so was it convenient for the
Romans to refuse such liberalities (and to beg it had beene infamous) and to
accept, by guift or legacie, great realmes and royall successions; which they
gaue them which had raigned peacefully vnder
their protections, for an honest recompence of their justice, when as they died
without heires males lawfully begotten. By this meanes Ptolomie king ofSix kingdomes giuen to the Romans
by legacie. Cyrene, Attalus king of Asia, Eumenes king of Pergame, Nicomedes
king of Bithinia, Coctius king of the Alpes, and Polemon king of Pontus, left the people of Rome heires of
their goods & kingdoms. As for guifts from the subiect, the which the
antients called oblations, there were few or none at all: for charitable gifts
which beVoluntary gifts of the subiects. voluntarie,
are now demaunded: and although the kings of Spaine, England and others vse
intreaties to obtaine them, yet most commonly there is more force in these
requests, than in commissions and letters of commaundement. I vnderstand by the
word Gift, that which is liberally offered by the subiect unto his prince; as
the gold which they called Coronarium, the which the Iewes gaue unto the Emperours,
to be maintayned in the priuileges of their religion; and the magistrats of the
townes and communalties of the empire: the which in time proued a forced
subsidy, vntill that this force was taken away, the guifts remaining voluntary
to gratyfie the Emperour, when as hee had obtayned any victorie against his
enemies.
The like may bee sayed of the imposts which in Spayne they call Seruice,
theSeruice of Spaine. which was freely graunted to
the kings of Spayne to entertayne their estate more honorably; and since it was
almost conuerted into an ordinary charge. Wee find
likewise that the kings of Persia contented themselves with the voluntary gifts
and presents of diuers kinds that came from
their subiects: but Darius Histaspes (he that got the
kingdome by the neying of his horse) chaunged those kinds into coynes of gold
and siluer, and the gifts into tributes and necessary charges, appoynting
TreasurersThe reuenues of the realme of Persia under the
first Darius. and Receyuers in euerie government (which were 127 in
number) to make a diuision of the taxes and subsidies, which amounted then to
foureteene thousand five hundred and threescore Euboique talents, the which is
valued at ten millions one hundred fourescore and twelue thousand crownes. But
this antient custome of Persia is maintayned at this present in Aethiopia,
whereas the gouernours of fiftie governments bring unto the Negus, king of Aethiopia, the gifts and oblations ofThe custome of Aethiopia. his subiects in graine, wine, cattell,
handy works, gold and siluer, without any other commission, or letters patents: so as for the greatnes of his maiesty, it is
more befitting to have them obedient unto him, than to send foorth his
commissions to exact and beg of his subiects. As for successions and
testamentary legacies giuen to princes by their subiects, it is at this day
very rare, and yet in old time it was one of the greatest meanes whereby
princes did augment their treasures: for wee read that the Emperour Augustus hauing giuen by will the value of eleuen
millions and two hundred thousand crownes to be distributed among the people of
Rome, and the legions; he withall protested, that he left not to his heyres but
three millions and seuen hundred thousand crownes, although he shewed, that he
had receyued from his friends not many yeares before his death, the summe of
thirtie and five millions of crownes. True it
is, that hee was accustomed to leaue unto the children of the Testators, the
legacies and successions that were giuen him, neuer taking any thing of their
testaments whom he had not knowne: wherewith Cicero
reproched Marc Antonie in open Senat, That hee had
inriched himselfe by their testaments whom hee had neuer knowne; and yet Cicero confesseth that hee himselfe had gotten by
testaments a million of crownes. But tyrants tooke all without any distinction:
for there was no better meanes for any one to assure his testament, than to
giue somewhat unto the tyrant: but if the testament were imperfect, the tyrant
seazed uppon the whole succession, the which is reproued by the law, for which
cause the custom to make Emperours and Princes
their heyres, ceased.
The fourth meanes to augment and intertayne the treasure, is by pensions from
their alies, which are payed in time of peace, as well as in warre, for
protection andThe fourth means to gather treasure.
defence against their enemies; or else to have counsell, ayd, and comfort at
need, according to the tenor of the treatie. I say, that a pension is payed by
friends and alies; for a soueraigne prince which hath capitulated with another
to pay him some thing yearely to have peace without any treatie of amitie or
alyance, is a tributary:Who bee tributaries. as Amiochus king of Asia, the Seigniory of Carthage, the
kings of Sclauonia, and many other princes and states were tributaries to the
Romans, the kings of Arabia and Idumea to Dauid, and the
princes of Asia to the kings of Persia. And for this reason the treaties of aliance betwixt the house of Fraunce,
and the Cantons of the Swissers, specify, That the king shall giue an ordinary
pension of a hundred pounds to every Canton for a peace, and two thousand for
an aliance, besides all extraordinaryThe difference of a
pension and tribute. pensions, and their pay in time of warre, &
they to do him seruice in his court for the guard of his person: which doeth
shew, that the Swissers and Grisons are pensioners to the king, considering the
mutuall aliance, and the seruice they owe for this pension. In like sort he is
no tributary that corrupteth his enemies Captaynes, as Pericles did to the Lacedemonian Captaynes, not (as Theophrastus sayd) to purchase a peace, but to deferre the warre. But
wee may say, that the Cantons neuer made a more
profitable league for their estate, both to inrich themselves, & to traine
The Swissers pensions came to 14000. pound sterling a
yeare. their subiects up in armes at another mans cost, and also to
send swaggerers and idle persons out of their countrie. By the account of him
that payed the Cantons, the ordinary and extraordinarie pensions came yearely
at the least to six score or seuen score thousand liures: and in the yere 1573
they came to two hundred eighteene thousand liures. The pensions that were payd
to the Germaine Commaunders21800 pound. the same
yeare, amounted to six score and twelue thousand liures, besides their12300 pound. entertainement in warre.
It is necessarie for great princes to giue pensions to the Secretaries, spies,
Captaines, Orators, and houshold seruants of their enemies, to discover their
counsels and enterprises: and experience hath
often taught, That there is no greater meanes to maintayne his estate, and to
ruine his enemies: for the strongest place is easily taken, so that an asse
laden with gold may enter it; as Philip the first king
of Macedon said, who by his gifts & liberalitie subiected almost all Greece
unto him. And the kings of Persia had no better means to keepe the forces of
Grece out of Asia, than by goodly pensions: for it is hard that he which
receiueth should not doe some seruicePlut in Lisand▪ &
Agesilao. in requitall of his money; for he is tyed by bond, or
forced through shame, or mooued with hope of a greater benefit, or with feare
least hee that had corrupted him should accuse him: for princes do seldome giue
any great pensions unto strangers, vnlesse they first sweare against their
natiue countrie: as a Germane prince sayd at Whereunto pensioners are bound. a dyet at Wormes in
the yeare 1552. There was the same yeare a prince, who since is dead, the which
offered to an Ambassador in his masters name, that for two thousand crownes a
yeare pension, he would discover unto him all the secrets, practises, and
negotiations of his countrie, and to imploy all his meanes to preuent any thing
that might be done in preiudice of him that should pay the pension. These men
are much to be feared, especially in a popular estate, in the which it is more
easie for a few priuat men that gouerne the commonweale to betray it, than in a
monarchy, wherein the prince accounts all that is publike his owne, and
therefore hath care of it as of his owne. But such rewards and corruptions can
neuer bee profitable to them that giue it, if it bee not kept secret, the which
is impossible, if there be many.
The kings of Persia and Macedone gaue none pensions but a small number of
Orators and Captaynes of the Grecians: and the king of Egypt for seuen thousand
crownes pension, which he gaue to Aratus, had the whole
estate of the Atheians at his deuotion. And therefore it seemes strange to me,
why our kings (besides the ordinary pension of the Swissers) have giuen
extraordinarily to about two thousand of them which exceeded the rest in credit
and dignitie; as king Henrie the second did, the which
were knowne by their names and surnames, and gaue their acquittances; beside
the priuate pensions, the which were payed by roll, and came yerely to 49299
liures: happely it had bene better to have giuen the moity of these pensions to
few men of authoritie, and secretly without any acquittance: for sometimes
4929 pound 4 shillings. a pensionar had rather lose
the greatest reward of any prince, than to giue a note of his hand for the
receit of the money: as that English lord Hastings, to
whom king Lewis 11 gaue 2000 crownes pension, the
bringer demaunded an acquittance for his discharge onely unto the king as he
said; whereunto the lord Hastings answered, That he
would receiue his pension, but he would giue him no acquittance: the which the
king demaunded earnestly, to make vse of it in time, and to bring him in
suspition of a traitor to his countrie. There are also somethings not only
secret, but also dishonest, for the which pensions are giuen, although some
hold nothing foule nor vnlawfull that is done for the benefit of his country;
for my part I hold this fact no lesse odious, that
shall suborne the houshould seruants of princes to murder their masters, or if they cannot kill them by force, to
poyson them, than hee that shall take a reward for so fowle a fact. Wherein Pericles was commended, who giuing up his accounts, set
downe an article of ten thousand crownes disbursed without warrant, shewing
neither acquittance nor cause of it: the which the people allowed without any
further inquiry, knowing well the wisdome and loyaltie of the man in the
government of the commonweale. It is most certaine, that a secret pensionar
giuingPlut. in Pericl. an acquittance, is alwayes
in feare to be discouered, whereby hee shall neither dare, nor be able to doe
any thing in favour of him that giues him a pension. Besides, it is dangerous
when pensions are giuen publikely, the iealousie of such as have none will be a
cause of quarrels and partialities, as hath oftentimes happened in
Swisserland, in such sort, as those which
had lesse than others, or none at all, were very vehement to have the priuat
pensions put into the receiuers hands with the generall pensions: the which the
king denyed, saying, That he would rather restraine his liberalitie.
The fift meanes to gather together treasure, is by trafike, which the prince or
the state vseth by his factors; although there be few princes that doe vse it:
and by theThe fift meanes to gather treasure. lawes
of this realme, England, and Germanie, it is not lawfull for the gentry to
trade in marchandise, else must he lose his qualitie: and by the law Claudia, no Senator of Rome might have a vessell at sea
contayning aboue fourtie bushels. Questus omnis (inquit
Lauius) patribus indecorus visus est, All gaine (saith Titus Liuius) was held vnseemely for the fathers. And afterwards by the Emperours decrees it
was generally defended for all gentlemen and souldiers, and by the Canons for
all church men to trade in marchandise. And the Persians in a mockery called
Darius, Marchant, for that he forced them to those
charges, which at the first they gaue him voluntarily. But yet in my opinion it
is more seemely for a prince to be a marchant, than a tyrant; and for a
gentleman to traffike, than to steale. Who is ignorant, that the kings of
Portugall being restrayned within straight limits, and not well able to
maintaine their estates, yet loth to oppresse their subiects, have for these
hundred yeares traded without reproch, and to the great inriching of their
states? In the yeare 1475 they discouered the
rich mynes of gold in Guinee, under the conduct of Iohn
bastard ofThe traffike of the kings of Portugal
Portugall; and twelue yeares after the spices of Calicut, and of the East; and
continuing their course to the Indies, have so wel traffiked there, as they are
become lords of the best ports of Affrike, and have seazed uppon the Ile of
Ormus in despite of the king of Persia: they have taken a great part of the
kingdome of Marocco, and of Guinee, & forced the kings of Cambar, Calecut,
Malache, and Canauor to do them homage, treating a league & commerce with
the great Cham of Tartaria: they have pulled from the
Turks & Sultans of Egypt the greatest riches of the Indies, and filled
Europe with the treasures of the East, passing euē to the Molucques: which the
kings of Castile pretend to belong to them, by a deuision made by pope Alexander 6, notwithstanding the marchants of Genua & Florence desired to free it for
35000 duccats, which Iohn 3 king of Portugal had paid
unto the emperor Charles 5, & to giue 100000 ducats
more that they might have free passage to those ilands which; the K. of
Portugal would not yeld vnto, making acount of the profit he draws from thence
as of an infinit treasure, besides the gaine that comes to his subiects, hauing
much impaired the wealth of the princes of the East, & of the Venetians,
who have indured so great a losse, as of all the calamities they indured during
their warres with king Lewis 12, they receiued no such
losse as from the Portugals, taking from them their gayne of the Easterne
parts. Neither doth the Trade of Marchandize ingrosse
dishonour, or imbase the The Gentlemen of Italie trade in marchandie. the Signiories and nobilitie of Italie,
neither did Tully disallowe of it, but of such as sold
by retayle, whome hee tearmed Sordido. As for the
traffique which Princes practise upon their Subiects, it is no traffique, but
an impost or exaction: which is, to forbid them to trade, and to put his
subiects corne and wine into his receiuers handes, to pay them at an vnder
rate, and to sell it unto strangers, or to the Subiects themselves, at his owne
pleasure. This was one of the reasonsThe tyrannicall and ba
e traffique of king Alphonso. which made Alphonso King of Naples most odious; for that he gaue his Swine to his
Subiects to make fat, and if by chaunce they died, he made them pay for them:
he bought the oyle in Apulia, and gaue his owne price; and the wheat in grasse,
and sold it a gaine at the higgest price he could, forbidding all others to
sell vntill he had sold his. But of all the
traffiques and marchandize which PrincesThe most pernitious
traffick. vse, there is not any more pernitious nor base, than the
sale of honors, offices, and benefices, as I have formerly sayd, the which may
neuer be tolerated, but in the extreame necessitie of the commonweale, as the
Venetians did, hauing spent in seuen yeres, that Lewis
12 made war against them, five Millions of Duckats, whereof they had made 50000
Duckats of the sale of Offices. The like reason mou'd King Francis 1 in the yere 1527, to diuide the Ciuile from the criminall
Magistrates, setting all Offices to sale to them that would giue most. The
which was more sowle and dishonorable in Pope Adrian,
who three yeares before, not onely sold offices, but also benefices, as he did
the Bishopricke of Cremona for 20000 Duckats,
and had also resolued to leaue two hundred and twentie thousand Duckats, by
halfe a Duckat for euerie chimney within the territories of the Church, making
his pretext of warre against the Turke. But for that these traffiques are so
filthie, and of such dangerous consequence, the which being once begun, doe
neuer cease, it were better to trie all other meanes, than once to giue way
unto them.
The sixt means to encrease treasure, is upon the marchandize that are
broughtThe sixt means to make money. in, or
carryed out, the which is one of the antientest and most vsuall in euerie
Common-weale, and grounded upon equitie; which kind of custome the Latines
called Portoria, as they did the tribute of the publique
farmes Decimas, and of
pastures Scripturam, and it is reason, that hee that
will gaine by another mans subiects, should pay some right to his Prince or
commonweale. Wherof there be diuers kindes, the which were reduced within this
Realme to one impost of twenty Deniers upon the liure or pound, by an Edict
made by King Henrie the 2.Anno 1551. 1556. and after reuoked, lest the customes
and imposts should bee confounded, the which might prooue preiudiciall. King
Charles 5 abated the custome halfe, but afterwardes
he restored it, the which was the twentieth part of the price, or five in the
hundred, and so the ancient Romanes tooke for custome of forraine marchandize:
but afterwards the Emperours exacted the eight part, the which they called Octuarium vectigal, as in our time they have demaunded
the twelfe part of the price. The Emperour of
Turkie takes ten of the hundred of all Marchant strangers going out of
Alexandria, and of his Subiects five in the hundred. But in this Realme the
contrarie is practised touching the salt, for the which the stranger payes
nothing, but the duties of a Marchant, and the subiect payes fortie and five liures upon the measure, contrarie to the Marchants rights. And although
the Salt of France bee the best and most plentifull in all Europe, wherewith
the lowe Countreys, England, and Denmarke doe store themselves, yet is it farre
deerer to vs, than to them: for since that the Store houses of Salt were let out, and the officers of the Custome suppressed, the
measure of Salt which the Marchant sold for
ten shillings starling, is now come to fiftie foure shillings: and since these
warres, to eight pounds besides the Kings rights, and the carriage: so as all
comprehended, it hath been sometimes sold for a hundred and eighteene Crownes
the measure, whereby the poore subiect hath beene ruined and the stranger
enriched, yea sometimes the stranger brings it againe secretly to sell in
France. This priuiledge was giuen unto strangers by Francis the 1. that they might bring commodities and money into this
Realme, rather than into Spaine: notwithstanding since it hath been verie
manifest, that the stranger cannot be without the Salt of France: for Charles the 5. hauing forbidden his
subiects of the lowe Countreys not to fetch any Salt in France, the estates
of the countrey made it knowne, that their
fish (which is their greatest marchandize) grew drie, and was spoyled with the
salt that came from Spaine and Bourgongne, getting leaue with great
importunitie to fetch their salt out of France, being the sweeter. It is most
certaine that no salt can bee made of salt water on this side the 47 degree, by
reason of the cold: and the salt of Spaine is too corosiue: so as if the
stranger payd but a fourth part of that which the subiect payes for the Kings
rights, there would come an infinite masse of money into the Treasorie, for we
often see the ships of England and the low Countreys come into France, onely
with their ballast (hauing no commodities to exchange with them) to buy salt,
wine, and corne, the which abound in this Realme, and The mynes of Fraunce are neuer wasted. will neuer
fayle; whereas the Mynes of mettall, which growe in the bowels of the Earth,
are wasted in few yeares: yet strangers seeke it in the center of the earth to
bring into this Realme, and to carrie away commodities necessarie for the life
of man: which a wise Prince should not suffer to be transported, but for the
ease of his subiects, and encrease of his Treasure, the which cannot be done
without raysing of the foraine custome: for the greater the forraine custome
shall be, the greater benefite shall come into the Exchequer: and if the
stranger fearing the impost, shall buy the lesse, then the subiect shall haue
it the better cheape; for all wares, the greatest treasures will be where there
are most thinges necessarie for the life of
man: although there be neither Mynes of gold nor siluer, (as there are fewe or
none at all in this Realme,) yet notwithstanding doth feed a great part of
Europe as King Agrippa sayd; and the countrey of Egypt
hath neither Mynes of gold nor siluer, and yet both Affricke and Europe, are
much releeued with corne which growes there. If anyone will say, that by the
treaties of traffique betwixt Princes, they cannot raise a forraine custome, I
must answere, that this may take place amonge those which have treated with
that condition, but there are few of them; and yet it hath neuer been much
regarded: for euen in the lowe countreys and in England, the french Marchants
were forced in the yeare 1557 to pay a crowne upon
euerie tunne of wine thatImpost in Engand upon wine. came into the port, and the
subiects payd nine french crownes for the impost, without any regard to the treatise of trafficke. And the yeare following,
the the Queene of England did raise the forraine custome a third part, imposing
thirteene shillings and a pennie upon euerie peece of cloth, the which is a
matter of great consequence: and I have been assured from a Marchant of
Antwerpe, that in the yeare 1565 there came in lesse
than three moneths into the lowe countreys a hundred thousand peeces of cloth,
accounting three karsies or three cottons to a cloth. It is therefore expedient
to raise the forraine customes to strangers of such commodities as they cannot
want, and by that means increase the treasure and ease
the subiects; and also to abate the custome of marchandise comming in, if the subiect cannot passe without them, you
must raise the custome of things made by hand, and not to suffer any to bee
brought out ofNo raw stuffs to be transported▪
strange countreys, and not to suffer any raw stuffs to be caried out of the
land, as iron, copper, steele, wooll, flaxe, raw silke, and such like, that the
subiect may have the benefit of the workmanship, and the prince the forraine
custome, as Philip king of Spaine, had forbidden his
subiects by an edict made in the yere 1563, to requite the queene of England,
who had made the like three moneths before, the like edict was made in France
by King Henrie the second in the yeare 1552, concerning
wools: but there was a Florentin, who hauing gotten a pasport by aA trade forbidden to the subiects, and allowed to strangers, is
the ruine of a countrey. courtiers means, caried away more wooll at
one instant, than all other marchants had done
before in a yere; and hauing it made into cloth at Florence, hee returned it
into France, by the which he gained infinitly, the workmanship exceeding the
stuffe fifteen parts: the which is a great incongruitie in matter of state and
reuenewes, to forbid a traffique unto the subiect, and then giue leaue unto a
stranger: for both king & Commonweale in generall receiue an irreparable
losse, and the marchants in particular are ruined. Behold six means to gather
together treasure without oppression of the subiects, vnlesse the custome of
forrain marchandise that be necessary for the life of man were excessiue. The
seuenth meansThe seuenth means to make money. is upon
the subiect, the which they must neuer vse, vnlesse all the rest faile, and
that necessitie forceth them to have a care of the Commonweale, being sodenly
oppressed either by the enemie, or by some
other vnexpected accident; in this case seeing the defence of euerie one in
particular, depends upon the preseruationThe honestest means
in time of publicke necessitie to make money. of the generall, it is
fit that euerie man straine himselfe; then are impositions laide upon the
subiects most iust and necessarie, and those charges which are then imposed
upon the citisens are religious and godly, without the which the citie were
quite ruined. But to the end this extraordinary charge imposed during the
warre, may not continue in time of peace, it is fit to proceed by way of
borrowing; for that money is easilier found, when as he that lends hopes to
receiue both his money againe, and thanks for his willingnesse. For when as Hannibal was in Italie, and did besiege euen Rome it
selfe, the senate hauing consumed their
treasure, would not impose new tributes upon their subiects and confederats, (a
verie daungerous thing, being then prest by the enemie) but the senators with
one consent, brought their gold and siluer unto the receiuers, being followed
by the people with great ioy. And Titus Liuius saith;
Senectatores prosequisque aurum, argentum, aes in publicum
conferunt, tanto certamine iniecto, vt prima inter primos sua nomina vellent
in publicis tabulis esse, vt nec Triumuiri mensarij accipiendo, nec scribae
referendo sufficerent. The senators bought their gold and siluer into
the publicke with great contention, who should bee inrolled, so as the
receiuers were not sufficient to tell it, nor the registers to inroll them.
After the victorie obtained against the Carthaginiens, the senate decreed to pay what had been borrowed; but for that
there was not sufficient in the common coffers to satisfie them, the creditors
presented a request to have part of the citie lands assigned unto them, the
which shuld be valued by the consuls, upon condition, that it might be alwaies
redeemed, and to pay an asse of smal rent to the receiuers for euerie acre,
only for a marke, and as a witnes that it was the city lands, the which was
done. If the commonweale hath not wherwithall to pay▪ neither in mony nor
lands, & the enemy doth presse it, then is there no redierCeassing used in old old time▪ means, than to make
choise of those which are ablest to bare arms, which shuld be armed and entertained at the charge of others, as the antient
Romaines did, so Liuius lib. 26. as the common good and health of the
citisents was defended by some, with the wealth of others. This kind of tribute
is called rash and extraordinarie. From hence these extraordinarie charges
first tooke their beginning, the which afterwards became ordinarie. As we read
that Denis the tyrant, sometimes sought occasions of
war, or of fortifications, to the end he might have cause to raise newDetestable inuentions of a tyrant. imposts, the which he
continued, after that he had treated with the enemie, or discontinued the
fortresses begun.
If my wishes might take place, I would desire that such detestable inuentions
might be buried with the author. There be three kinds of tributes that bee
leuied of the subiect, some extraordinarie;
others ordinarie; and the third which holds of both, and is called casuall:
under which kinds is contained as well theThree kindes of
impositions. reuenewes that rise of iurisdictions, seales, coynes,
waights, and measure, as the money that is receiued upon things sold, of what
nature soeuer, or by gifts, legacies, or successions, or by the sale of
offices, or in manner of a taxe, be it in the regard of euerie mans person,
(which kind of tribute is called Capitatio by the
Latines:) bee it in respect of the moouable or immoouable goods, and of fruits
which grow aboue or within the earth, as mynes and treasures, or that which is
gathered at ferries, or passages, the which is rightly called Portorium vectigal, or of any other imposition that may be imagined,
how filthie and beastly soeuer, for tyrants alwaies thinke the sauor of them
sweet; as that tribute which was vsually
exacted from professed whores at Rome; and the sauing of vrine commaunded by
Vespasian, the which his sonne taking vnworthily, the
father held the first money that hee receiued next of that tribute, to his
nose, asking him if it smelt ill, and hee denying it, Atqui
inquit è lotio est, But sayth he, it comes of the vrine. Of which
charges and impositions, the most ancient are reputed reuenewes, as the
forraine custome; others are ordinarie, as taxes; and the last are
extraordinarie, the which the Latines called temerarium
tributum, a rash tribute: as subsidies imposed upon free townes and
priuiledged persons, tenths, charitable gifts equiualent to tenths, the which
are leuied by commission. And to speake properly, the taxes, ayds, grants,
tolles, and such like were meere subsidies and
extraordinarie charges, before Lewis the ninth, who
first leuied the taxe, as president le Maistre hath
obserued: but hee doth not say, that it was as a necessarie subsidie during the
warres; and that hee made an ordinarie receit thereof; but contrary wise
adressing himselfe to Philip his eldest sonne and
successor, he vseth these words in his testament, the which is yet found in the
treasurie of France, and is registred in the chamber of accounts: Fili, religiosus imprimis erga Deum esto: benignus &
liberalis aduersus egentes, legum ac morum huius imperij custos. Lewis his testament.ac vindex acerrimus: à vectigalibus & tributis abstineto,
nisi te summa vis necessitatis ac vtilitatis publicae iustissima causa ad
hoc impellat, sin minùs, tyrannum te potiùs, quàm regem futurum putato,
&c. Sonne, be first deuote and religious towards God, be mild and charitable to the poore, obserue the good
lawes and manners of thy realme seuerely, exact no taxes nor subsidies of thy
subiects, vnlesse that vrgent necessitieor the profit of the Commonweale presse
thee unto it; if thou doest otherwise, thou shalt be esteemed a tyrant and no
king, &c. Some one will say unto me, That king Clotaire did exact the third part and reuenewes of churches: and Chilperis the 8 part of every mans wine growing, and it
seems that the impost of the 8 part of the wine, the which now is imposed upon
vinteners, tooke his beginning from hence: and that Lewis the yong during 4 yeres, tooke the
twentieth part of his subiects reuenewes in the yere 1167; yet it is most
certaine that this was but an extraordinarie
subsidie during the warre, as that temerarium tributum
imposed by king Charles the sixt, for it was decreed in
our open Parliament, called by Philip of Valois in the
yeare 1338, that no impost should bee raised upon the people without the
consent of the three estates: and in stead of three hundred and fortie thousand
pounds starling, which king Lewis the eleuenth did leuie
the yeare that he died, besides the ordinarie reuenewes of the crowne, the
deputies of the three estates held at Tours, offered unto Charles the eight, his sonne comming to the crowne, in manner of a
beneuolence for two yeares, the like graunt that was made unto Charles the seuenth, and for his entrance a hundred
thousand crownes to bee paide for once onely, the which he might not afterwards challenge as a due, nor call
the graunt a taxe or impost. The which hath been alwaies, and is still obserued
in Spaine, England, and Germanie: as Philip Comineus
said in open parliament, in the raigne of Charles the
eight, That no prince had power to lay any imposition upon his subiects,
norNo Prince can lay any subsidie upon his subiects
without their consents. to prescribe that right without their
consents. And wee see in all commissions sent out for the leuying of taxes, and
subsidies, the king vseth that antient protestation to free them, as soone as
necessitie would suffer him.
And althogh that Philip the long did exact but the fift
part of a peny upon everyThe beginning of the custome of
salt. two shillings worth of salt that were sold, yet he publickly
protested to discharge the subiects of it. Philip of
Vallois used the like protestation, being forced by the extremitie of warre to double the sayd custome,
declaring by his letters patents in the yeare 1328, that he meant not to haue
the imposition upon the salt incorporate to the reuenewes; and yet there is no
custome seems more easie than that of salt, the which is common to all the
subiects: yet in the popular estate of the Romaines, and in the hottest of
their Punicke warres, the impost of salt being set on foot by Liuius and Claudius censures; Liuius was called Salinator in derision: but a
peace being graunted to them of Carthage, it was taken away againe: either for
that there was nothing more necessarie for the life of man, or for that it was
done without the peoples commaund. And for that the lightest kinds of tributes
and imposts seeme heauie and burdensome unto the poore and weake, yet could not the senators maintaine the treasurie of Rome
without new impositions: the people being freed from all taxes and customes by
the law Valeria, after the expulsion of their kings: therefore C. Manlius theLiuius lib. 2.
Consull made a law with the authoritie of the Senate, (the Armie lying at
Sutrium) that such as were made free, should pay the twentieth part of all
their substance into the Exchequer: with which tribute, although the citisens
were nothing oppressed, yet being vnderstood, the Tribune made a defence upon
paine of death, That no man should attempt the like without the peoples
priuitie. And Augustus made the law Iulia, That
whatsoeuer should come to any one by inheritance,The tribute
of the twentieth part most pleasing. legacie, or gift for death, the
twentieth part thereof should belong unto the
common treasure, both these impositions were profitable to the Commonweale, and
pleasing to either of them: to the one, for that they possesse anothers
inheritance; and to the other, for that they obtaine their liberties. But for
that the emperours which succeeded Augustus exacted the
twentieth part of all inheritances and legacies, Traian
therefore abrogated the said law Iulia, the which many have labored to reuiue,
changing the name of it: yet had they not then the hundred part of those
tributes, which since the necessity of some, and the couetousnesse of others
have inuented. And when as Samuel prince of the Israelites spake unto the people, who demaunded a King of
him, he added threats of bitter tributes, Ergo inquit regem habituri estis qui decimas fructuum,
imperaturus est, Therefore sayd he, you shall have a King which shall
commandThe tenths of the subiects fruits was the first
tribute. the tenths of your fruits. Neither did Cipselus the first Tyrant of Corinth, exact any other tribute of his
subiects, but the tenths of their fruits: there were then no taxes, subsidies,
tolles, and a thousand such like. So the greatest part of the Inuenters of
these new Imposts have lost their lives; as Philistus
parasite to Dyonisius the tyrant, who being drawn out of
the tyrants castle, was slaine by the people of Syracusa: and Parthenius or Proclerus, who was slaine by the people ofInuenters
of new impositions most commonly slaine. Treues, for giuing counsell
to king Theodoret to oppresse his subiects with new
subsidies: and of late daies George Prescon Parasite to
Henrie king of Sueden, was cruelly put to death in the kings pallace, and the king
himselfe expelled his estate. What shall I speake of Achaeus King of the Lidiens, whom his subiects did hang by the feet
with his head downeward into a riuer, for the subsidies which hee imposed uppon
his people: and Theodoric king of France lost his crowne
for it. How comes it that the Netherlanders have reuolted from the Spaniard,
but for that the duke of Alua would exact the tenth pennie of euerie thing
which was sold, whereby he would have gathered an infinite treasor, or rather
the wealth of all the countrey, being most certaine that one thing might besold
often in a short time, and well knowne that the marchandise sold in one day
amounted to seuentie thousand ducats, as a Spaniard himselfe did
write. The Histories are full of these
examples, for nothing doth sooner cause changes, seditions, and ruines of
States, than excessiue charges and imposts. But as the Prince must have a care
not to impose any charges, but when warre doth force him, so must he take them
away when he hath obtained a peace: yet must they not runne from one extreame
unto another, and abolish all imposts and taxes, hauing neither lands nor
reuenewes to maintaine the commonweale; as NeroAll Impositions are not to be abolished. the Emperour
would have done, who hauing wasted all the treasure, sought to abolish the
tributes, whereof the Senate being aduertised, they thanked him for his good
will to the people, yet they dissuaded him from doing it, saying it would be
the ruine of the Commonweale. Many seditious citisens, and desirous of
innouations, did of late yeares promise
immunitie of taxes and subsidies to our people: but neither could they doe it,
or if they had could, they would not, or if it were done, should we have any
Commonweale, being as it were the ground and foundation of a Commonweale. There
were more reasons to have the excessiue gifts cut off and reuoked, and that an
account should be made of the treasure wasted: but to take away all impositions
before that the reuenewes bee redeemed and the debts payd; it were not to
repaire, but to ruine the state. And most of these men which seeme to
vnderstand the affaires of state so well, are greatly abused with an old
inueterate opinion, that all charges and imposts must be reduced to that
proportion that they were in the time of king Lewis the
12, and consider not that since that time
gold and siluer hath come in so great abundanceAbundance of
gold and siluer hath made things deere. from the new found Lands,
namely from Peru, as all things are growne ten times deerer than they were; as
I have prooued against the Paradox of Malestroit: the
which may bee easily seene in the antient customes and contracts of this
Realme, where wee shall find the value of fruits and victuals to bee ten, yea
twelue times lesse than it is at this day. Wee find in the Registers of the
chamber of Accounts, That the Chancellor of France in the time of S. Lewis, had for the charges of himself, his horses, and
seruants, seuen soulz Parisis allowed him a day; the
which is not eight pence halfe-penie of our money: and if hee stayd in any Abbey, or other place where he spent nothing
for his horses, it was then abated in his wages. I have shewed that Charles the 5. king of France payd but 31000 crownes for
the countie of Anxerre: and that the duchie of Berrie was bought by Philip the 1 of Herpin, for threescore thousand crownes:
and the countie of Venice and Auignon were engaged for fortie thousand Florins.
To conclude, I have made manifest that many Earledomes, Baronies, and great
Signiories have beene sold a hundred or sixe score yeares since, twentie times
better cheape than they are nowe, for the aboundance of gold and siluer that is
come frō new found Lands: as it happened at Rome, when as Paulus Aemilius brought such infinit store of gold and siluer from the
realme of Macedon, suddenly the value of lands
did rise to bee treble in price: and at what time Caesar
brought the treasure and spoyles of Egypt to Rome, then did Vsurie fall, and
the price of lands did rise: euen as it happened to the Spaniards after the
conquest of Peru by Frauncis Pizara, a small vessell of
wine in that country cost 300 ducats, a Spanish cape of Frizado a thousand
ducats, and a Iennet sixe thousand; the which was by reason of the aboundance
of gold and siluer which they found at Peru, and brought into Spaine: and
namely of the ransomeThe great treasure taken at thy
Conquest of Peru. of king Atabalipa; who paid
the value of ten millions, three hundred twentie and sixe thousand ducats,
besides twise as much that came to priuate men, captaines, soldiors, and euen
to the receiuers themselves, as Augustus Zarata master
of the Accounts to the king of Spaine doth
testifie. Since great store of gold and siluer hath beene brought out of Spaine
into France to buy corne and other necessarie commodities, which are
transported into Spaine in great abundance, so as the prices of all things haue
risen: and so by consequence the wages of officers, the pay of souldiors, the
pensions of captaines, and in like sort euerie mans employment, and by the same
reason the rents of Farmes haue, risen; for he that had but ten pounds a yeere
rent, hath now a thousand of the same fruits he then gathered: wherein they are
greatly abused that would reduce the prices of corne and victuals to the
antient orders. We must then conclude, that the account of the reuenewes vnder
king Charles the 6 in the yere 1449, which came but to fortie thousand pounds starling; was not
much lesse (inThe Reuenewes of France under Charles 6. &
9. regard of the value of things) than the reuenewes of fourteen
hundred thousand pounds starling, the same yeare that Charles the ninth died, in the yeare oneThe Lord of
Ieinuisle in the life of Lewis. 9. thousand, five hundred▪ seuentie
& foure; and yet the people complained at both times that they were
oppressed with tributes. And the ransom which king Lewis
the 9 paid to the sultan of Egypt of fiftie thousand pounds starling, was not
much lesse than that of king Francis the 1 of three
millions of crownes: and although that king Iohn were
set at the same ransome by the king of England, yet was it held so excessiue,
as they were six yeares in leuying of it; but Frauncis
the same yeare a peace was concluded, sent his ransome into Spaine. We must
iudge the like of the yearely pension of 900.
pounds, that was assigned unto Charles the faire, sonne
to Philip, not to be lesse, than that of ten thousand
pounds starling yearely, that was giuen first to Henrie,
and then to Frauncis dukes of Aniou from king Charles the 9 their brother. And much more honourable
might they live with that pencion, which I made mention of under Philip, than with that which Charles the 9 gaue unto his brethren. Nor the Dowries of 400000
crownes assigned to euerie one of the daughters of king Henrie the 2, were not so great as those of sixtie thousand crownes
assigned to the daughters of France by the law of king
Charles the 5. The like may be spoken of other
people, as in old time in the East, so at
this present in the West. For we read in Strabo, that
Ptolomie the piper, the last king of Egypt of that
race, did raise upponThe reuenewes of Egypt vnder
Ptolomie. the countrey of Egypt the value of seuen millions, and fiue
hundred thousand crownes a yeare, and sultan Solyman did
leuie but a hundred thousand ducats of the same countrey, as appeared by an
extract of the reuenewes made by Gritty a Venetian, in
the yeare 1520, when as the estate of the whole reuenewesThe
Turks reuenewes. came not to aboue foure millions; for foure yeares
after he raised it unto six millions, as Paulus Iouius
saith, and now he leuieth aboue twelue millions yearly, for the great abundance
of gold and siluer, that is brought out of the West and East; which summe
notwithstanding may seeme but little, for that we read in Plutarch, that the dictator Silla
did taxe the charges of Asia the lesse, before the conquests of Lucullus and Pompee, at twelue
millions of crownes, the which is not aboue the sixt part of the Turks
empire.
Sometimes the bountie of the land, and the great trade, and oftentimes the
vnreasonable greedinesse of princes to heape up treasure, make some richer than
others: It is well knowne that Charles the fift gathered
more reuenewes out of the duchie of Milan; then king Francis the first, at the same time did leuie in this his realme,
which flowed in all abundance; who doth not know that he commaunded more out of
the lowe Countreys, than the reuenewes of England were esteemed in those daies. Some one not long since,
(seeking to perswade Charles the ninth to encrease his
taxes) did pernitiously maintaine in open counsell, that Cosme duke of Florence did raise out of his estate six millions,
hauingThe reuenewes of the Due
of Florence. but a small territorie: the which was false, for hee
receiued out of the estate of Florence, but twelue hundred thousand crownes,
and out of that of Sienna two hundred thousand at the most. But a new prince
shall doe wisely at his first entrance, to cut off the extraordinarie exactions
of his predecessor, or at the least a great part of them, as well in regard of
his owne dutie, as to get the good will of the people, if he be required; yea
before he be required, and not to imitate Roboam, who
following the wicked counsell of wicked men, did not onely refuse the humble
petitions of his subiects, but vowed openly that he would bee crueller than his father had been, whereupon ten tribes fell
from him, and created them a new king. True it is, that to hold a certaine
estate of impositions, they must be made in their proper kinds, as in corne,
wine, and oyles; and as for marchandise in siluer, it is the forme which the
kings of Poland have alwaies, and doe still vse, and the king of Ethiopia
receiues cloth and other marchandise for his custome. But to require to haue
taxes and subsidies quite taken away, or reduced to the antient custome,
without any regard of the value of things, or the changes that have happened;
this were not to relieue, but to ruine an estate.
It is an ordinarie thing in changes from a tyrannie to a popular estate, to
abolish all imposts, taxes, and subsidies for
a signe of libertie, as they did in Rome, at the request of the consull Valerius, after they had expelled their kings: but euerie
man was faine to goe to the warre at his owne charge▪ then afterwards to pay
the soldiors, and afterwards to taxe themselves by the raising of new imposts.
True it is, that the Romaines did therein shew themselves verie iust: for at
that time there were none that bare the charges, but the noble and the rich,
the poorer sort went free; and now adaies we see none but the poore pay, and
the rich goe scot-free. The like was in Suisserland, and at Lindaw, after they
had expelled their Lords. Other doe free the chife
cities and great Lords, and charge the weaker
lort: as the Athenians did, when they were the stronger, they did free their
owne citie against the tenor of the allyance made with the other cities of
Grece, and in stead of sixtie tallents, they so augmented it, as in lesse than
threescore yeares they made them pay twelue hundred yearly, the which amounts
toThe reuenewe of the
Athenians. 720000 crownes. And when as Themistocles captaine of the Athenians, demanded the tribute of the
Adriens, saying; That hee would bring with him twoPlut▪ in
Themist▪ mightie gods, Force and Loue: they answered, That they had
two more mightie, Pouertie and Impossibilitie.
And commonly the greater cities lay the burthen upon the champian
countrey, and the richest peasants upon the
poorer, as it hath been heretofore in this realme, whereas the great cities
were freed; and in old time the citie of Babilon (the greatest that euer was)
remained free from all charges: the which is done lest the greater should
hinder the imposts. But it fals out as in mans bodie, where as the strongest
and noblest members cast all superfluous and vicious humors upon the weaker,
and when as apostume is so swolne as the weaker part can endure no more, then
must it breake or infect all the members: euen so it fals out when as the rich
cities, the nobilitie and the clergie, lay all the charge upon the poore
labourer, he sinks under his burthen like unto Aesops
Asse, and the horse which would carrie nothing; that is to say, the nobilitie
and the clergie, are forced some to carrie the tenths and extraordinarie
subsidies, others to sell their goods, to make
warre at their owne charge, and to pay the taxes and imposts directly or
indirectly. For the like cause, the nobilitie and clergie of the realme of
Denmarke have been forced to taxe themselves since the yeare 1563, to maintaine
the charges of the warre; but it was upon condition, that the king should not
meddle with the money. The nobilitie and clergie of England, euerie man
(according to his abilitie) was subiect to taxes & subsidies, according to
the antient custome of the Grekes and Romaines; yea almost of all nations. I
except ourThe French cōtemne the common people.
nation the French, with whom, as Caesar saith rightly:
Nihil est plebe contemptius, Nothing is more
contemptible than the common people.
To remedie this inconuenience, the antients did wisely order, That all charges
Taxes must be reall to ea the
poore. should be reall, and not personall; as it is put in practise
in Languedoc, and since in Prouence by prouision, according to the disposition
of the lawes, to the end that the rich and the poore, the noble and the
peasant, the priest and the laborer▪ should pay the charge of their land that
is to be taxed: the law exempts neither bishop nor nobleman. In other
governments, if there be a clergieman, a noble man, a counsellor, & a
vigneron, the last paies for all, and the others are free,Vniust distribution of subsidies in France. not only for their sees,
but also for other tailable lands. If then necessitie force the prince to raise
some extraordinary imposts, it is needfull it should be such as euerie one may
beare his part, as is the impost of salt, wine, and such like things. And to
take away occasion of seditions, which doe often chaunce for the impost of
small things sold by retaile, it were
expedient to conuert that impost into a generall summe, as it was put in
practise by Charles the fift, with the consent of
theNot pennie farthing. estates, for the freeing
of king Iohn, the which was 12 deniers upon euerie
liure, or two shillings of goods that were sold; the which was changed to an
equiualent, first in the countrey of Languedoc in the time of king Lewis the eleuenth, yeelding for the said impost 6000
pounds starling yearly: and the like hath been also done in Auuergne for the
salt, the which the countrey hath exchanged into a certaine summe: and for the
same reason the impost which was taken upon all small
wares, have ben abolished in many Commonweales, for the complaints,
seditions,Iauelleur or Gabelleur. and exclamations of the poore
people against the toll-gatherers, who alwaies tooke more in the kinde than
they ought. But if any one shall demaund of me, which kind of imposts are most
pleasing unto God, most profitable to the Commonweale, and most desired of good
men, for the reliefe of the poore: it is that which is layd on those things
which serue onely to corrupt the subiects, as all kinds of dainties, perfumes,
cloth of gold and siluer, silkes, cipresse, laces,What
impost is most honourable, profitable, and necessarie. rich colours,
womens painting, pearles, precious stones, and all kinds of works of gold,
siluer or enamell, & such like things, which are not to be forbidden: for
such is the nature of man, as they esteem nothing more sweet & goodly than
that which is stricktly forbidden them; and the more superfluities are
defended, the more they are desired,
especially of men that are simple and ill bred: you must therefore raise them
so in price, by means of the impost, as none but the rich and those that are
curious shalbe able to buy them. And therefore these princes that live towards
the North, lay great imposts upon wine, the which although it be dere, yet
their subiects are so desirous thereof, as they drinke themselves drunke. And
for this cause Cato the censor was commended, for that
he layd a great impost upon the sale of slaues, that should exceed fiftie
crownes price, for that such marchandise could not be warranted.
The emperour Augustus did more wisely, who to correct
the disordinateThe wisedome of the emperor Augustus.
lust of his subiects, made lawes for marriages, by the which he imposed a taxe
in manner of a fine, upon those that did
not marrie after the age of 25 yeares, or that were married and had no
children, inioyning them to bring a part into the treasurie of such successions
or legacies as were casually left them, giuing goodly immunities and
priuiledges to such as had children: by which lawes Augustus purchased the commendation of a wise prince. For hereby he
did both punish whoredome, adultery, & sodomie, and also force every one to
seek him a lawfull wife and children, taking away nothing of any mans present
estate, but onely the tenth part of that inheritance which came unto him
accidentally from his friends, filling the treasury with money, and the
Commonweale with good and vertuous citisens.
Which law Iustinian the emperour did vnaduisedly blame,
and likewise Constantin, who abrogated the law for
punishing them that lived vnmaried, or that had no children. But the emperors
Honorius and Theodosius gaue
the priuiledge of children to all subiects, which was to giue way to adulteries
and to all detestable vices, causing marriages and the procreation of children
to grow in contempt, whereby the citie grew bare of citisens, and the empire
being found in a manner wast, was seazed on by a deluge of Gothes, and other
barbarous nations of the North. These kinds of impositions which are inuented
for the punishment of vice, seeme not onely iust, but verie profitable.
There was also another impost of ten shillings upon euerie sute in law
thatAn impost upon sutes. was not criminall, to
punish those that were too apt to plead, the which many have found strange, and in the end have taken it away: but
there was neuer any more needfull in this realme, where there are more sutes
than in all the rest of Europe, the which have much increased since the time of
king Charles the sixt, when as an edict was made, to
take away the antient custome, by the which no man was condemned to pay any
charges that had lost his sute: for in formerThe cause of
many sutes in France. times they were not so apt to plead: and it may
be▪ our antient fathers▪ knowing the dispositions of the French, had brought in
this custome (although it were vniust of itselfe) to diuert the subiects from
attempting of sutes rashly. And although the Romaines
in a free Commonweale could hardly beare any imposition or tributes, yet did they willingly endure a taxe set upon
sutes and controuersies, much more heauie than that which was imposed in the
time of Charles the ninth, by the which, he that did
attempt a sute against any man, was forced to consigne two crownes into an
officers hands; the which hee should receiue againe from the aduerse partie, if
he did recover his suit, or if he were vanquished, to loose them as a
punishment of his rashnesse: but the Romaines tooke the tenth part in all
ciuile causes, and the fift in criminall, as Pompeius
Festus doth witnesse: yet Marcus Varro writes,
that either of the parties did lay downe five hundred asses, which coms to
about 10 shillings of four mony; and he which won, recouered his money which he
had consigned, and this was besides the thing
for which they contended, the which was called Sponsio &
sacramentum, and if any one refused to consigne, hee yeelded to the
other. The Hebrews did alwaies cause him that did willingly denie a debt, to
pay it double, as wee read in their pandects. And although the consignations
which were made in Rome uponThe extorsion of
Caligula. suits were diuers, yet the emperour Caligula extorted against reason, the fortieth pennie of all that was
demaunded by law, without any prefixion or limitation, whether the cause were
iust or vniust. But of all marchandise which tend to pleasure▪ lust, and pompe,
the imposition is honest and profitable, seruing to no other end but to corrupt
the simplicitie of the subiect, the deerest of all (which is Amber gris) the
which is valued but at twelue pounds starling, should be prised at 300 crownes.
The law sets no impost upon marchandise, but upon spices, and such
pretiousInterdum & de vectigal. marchandise,
as are specially named, as skins of Parthia and Babilon, silkes, fine linnen
cloth, painting, Indian haire, wild beasts, and Eunukes. Such impositions are
alwaies commendable, and farre more supportable without comparison, than that
which is layd upon the asse, the oxe, wine, and such like. And all good princes
have abhorred that impost which they called Capitatio,
for to lay a charge upon mens persons for their worke, were to make warre to
good wits, if they have not some great trade, and by that means have gathered
together great wealth, for the which they must beare some charge; the which is
not properly Capitatio, but with the weaker sort they must deale
mildly, especially with the husbandman, which doth not till his own land.
Neither are those impositions to be allowed which employ all their studies to
inuent new taxes & exactions, seeking by all means to incorage princes
thereunto; as that multiplier (whose name I concele for honors sake) who not
many yeres since at a parliament held at Blois, made a declaration, That the
king (besides al other ordinary charges) might with oppression or grieuance of
poore or rich, raise thirtie millions: the king sent this man to the three
estates, to expound the heauenly gift of God.
And although we had many excellent wits and of great iudgement, yet had he
abused many with his opinion, if we had not laid open his errour and
deceit. He supposed that France was two
hundred leagues long from Bologne to Marseilles, and as much from Mont S. Bernard, to S. Iohn de Luz; and
by this he concluded that France had fortie thousand leagues in square, and
that euerie league contained five thousand acres of ground, which amounted to
two hundred millions of acres, of the which he abated the one halfe for waters,
waies and wast land, and of the rest hee would have the king take a soulz for
an acre, theA soulz is not a pennie farthing. which
amounts to five millions: then he made an estimate of six hundred thousand
townes and villages, and in them twentie millions of fiers, of the which he would have the king take six pence of euerie fier,
which comes to six millions 625000 pounds starling. and two hundred and fiftie
thousand liures. Moreover he made an account of fifteen millions of all sorts
of marchandise, of the which he tooke a soulz of the marchant for euerie
thousand liures, making the former twelue millions. And upon the said six
hundred thousand townes and villages, one with another eleuen soulz apeece, the
which comes to twelue millions, and six millions and a hundred of liures more,
which then the foure tenths came vnto, all which make thirtie millions, besides
the aids, taxes, customes, grants, imposts, subsidies, and reuenewes of the
crowne, which came then to fifteen millions, wherein his deceit was verie
apparent; first making France square, the which is in fourme of a Lorange much
lesse than a square; next he makes the fertill land equall to that which is wast and fruitlesse (although there is not
any land, be it neuer so fertill, whereas two third parts at the least lyes not
wast) taxing the nobilitie and the clergie as well as the rest. And as for
600000 townes and villages, it is an impudent lye; for that by the extracts
drawne out of the chamber of accounts, and brought to Blois to the estates,
there were found to be twentie seuen thousandIn France there
are but 27400 parishes. and foure hundred parishes in France, taking
the greatest towne but for one parish, and the smalest villages hauing a parish
for another: and in truth the number of parishes taken by king Henrie the second in the yeare 1554, came but to 24824
parishes, besides Bourgogne & Poictou, and the impost of three pounds
starling upon euerie parish, came but to threescore and fourteen thousand foure
hundred eightie one pounds. Ierosme Laski a Polonois, father to the Palatin Laski, whom we have seen Ambassador in France, inuented
another manner of meanes than this former, to encrease the treasure, giuing
aduise to raise threeThe aduise of Ierosme Laski for the
heaping up of treasure. imposts upon the subiects, and to make three
mounts of pietie (for so he calleth them.) The first was in taking the moitie
of euerie subiects reuenews, for once: the second was the twentieth part of his
reuenewes yearely; and the third was to have the eight part of things sold in
grosse, or by retaile. But his aduise was reiected as pernitious and most
impossible: for in matter of impositions there is nothing that doth more kindle
seditions, than to charge the subiect with many things at once, especially a
war-like people, and bred up in libertie, as those of Polonia bee. And yet he gaue a goodly name to a wicked
and pernitious inuention, calling the grounds of such impositions, Mounts of
pietie. For theThe mounts of pietie n Italie honest and profitable. mounts of pietie in the cities of
Italie are profitable, honest▪ and charitable, & inuented to ease the
poore; and those of Laski do ruin them. There are mounts
of pietie at Florence, Sienna, Luques, and other cities, whereas he that hath
one daughter, the day of her birth hee may put what summe he will into the
mount of pietie, upon condition to receiue ten times as much to marrie her
withall, when she comes to the age of eighteene yeare; but if she dies before,
then doth it accrue unto the mount, vnlesse the father hath other daughters, to
whom the portion shall come successiuely. Another mount of pietie is, for the
lending of money to poore men at five in the
hundred, giuing a sufficient pawne, and not aboue ten crownes; if the debter
paies not his ten crownes at the time prefixt, the pawne is sold to him that
wil giue most, and the surplusage delivered unto the debtor: this is done to
preuent excessiue vsuries, (wherewith the poore in those countreys are ruined)
and the seazure and selling of moouables at an under price.
Notwithstanding I find that the emperour Antonine
surnamed the Pius or godly, inuented a better mount of
pietie, which was to deliver out the money that came
cleere into the treasurie, all charges paid for five in the hundred upon
A commendable institution made by Antoninus Pius.
good and sufficient caution. By whose example Seuerus
restored the treasure that was wasted, and the marchants and poore men gained
much by traffique: and the publicke in a great summe did also gaine much: for
if they lent a million, at the yeares end they did get fiftie thousand crownes
for the publicke, and priuate men got twise as much by traffique: and besides
all this, the greatest benefit that did arise, the publicke treasure was
assured out of the pawes of theeves and horse leeches of the court. And for
this reason onely as it seems, the emperour Augustus
long before, was accustomed to lend the money which came cleereTranquil. in August. into the Exchequer, without any
interest, giuing good assurance of land; and upon a penaltie to forfeit the
double, if it were not paid at the day: by this means the publicke treasure was not idle, nor wasted by the princes
prodigalitie, nor exhausted by theft, but a great benefit redounded to all in
generall, and to many inA forfeiture of the double forbidden
by the law. . pecun. de vsur. particular.
And here some one may obiect, that although Augustus did
not lend the publicke money for interest, yet hee imposed a penaltie of the
double, if it were not paid at the prefixed day, the which is greater than any
vsurie and therfore forbidden by the law. In my opinion, that penaltie is then
disallowed by the law when we stipulate any thing fraudulently, and aboue the
lawfull interest: but he that hath taken the publicke money, and restores it
not at the appointed day, he commits theft; it is therefore the penaltie of
theft, and not of vsurie.
Those princes therefore did wisely in old time, which prouided for the necessitie of the Commonweale, and the profite of
priuate men. But the contrarie is used in our daies; for princes in stead of
giuing out upon reasonable interest, borrow and pay vnreasonable vsurie: and
not onely princes,The ruine of princes is to take up at
interest. but also lords and Commonweales, some more, some lesse:
those which have been held the most frugall, as the Venetians, borrow alwaies
at five in the hundred, without any hope to recover the principall, or at
foureteene in the hunded, so long as the creditor shall live. The colledge of
Saint George at Genes takes money of all men at five in
the hundred, and delivers it out againe at the highest interest to princes and
marchants; whereby they are so enriched, as they have redeemed the Isle of
Corsica, and the lands of the Commonweale.
Priuate men had rather take five in the hundred of the colledge, to bee assured
of their principall, than much more of priuate men, who oftentimes become
Bankerupts: the Venetians have alwaies lost, and shall loose, so long as they
shall take eight in the hundred or more: or else they must abate their
interest, as they have by little and little abated Mount Vecchio, cutting the
creditors so short, as they dare not so easily put in their money as they were
woont.
This meanes was also brought into Fraunce by the cardinall of Tournon, at such
time as hee was in credit with king Frauncis the first,
whom he persuaded (by the instigation of certaine Italians) that there was no
other meanes The originall of the banke of Lion. to draw the money
from all parts into Fraunce, and to frustrate the enemie hereafter, than to
settle a banke at Lion, to take euerie mans money, and to pay him eight in the
hundred, so as in short time hee should get into his hands all the money of
Italie and Germanie: but in effect the cardinall sought to assure an hundred
thousand crowns which he had in his coffers, & to get all the interest he
could. Letters patents being granted, at the opening of the bank, every man
came running from France, Germanie and Italie, so as king Frauncis the first, when he died, was found indebted to the banke of
Lion, five hundred thousand crowns, the which he had
in his coffers and sometimes more, and a peace concluded with all the princes of the earth. But the raigne of Henrie his sonne grew most lamentable, for hauing wasted
his fathers treasure, and standing in need of money in the yeare 1554 borrowed
at ten, twelue, and sixteene in the hundred, of the Caponyes, Albicis, and the
Foucquers of Germanie, and when he was not able to pay the interest, he
promised the creditors interest upon interest. The emperour Charles 5 did the like for his part; true it is, he payd but ten and
twelue in the hundred. And the same yeare Henrie the
eight king of England, borrowed a hundred thousand crowns of the German
marchants at twelue in the hundred: euerie one hoping to draw money and wealth
unto him by the desire of vsurie. And whereas our king Henrie the second thought to draw most money unto him by paying of more interest than the emperour or king of
England, he began to loose his credit, for the wisest husbands concluded that
in the end he would not be able to pay neither principall nor interest; for the
interest of sixteene in the hundred, came at the least to eighteene in the
hundred▪ detaining the interest which he could not pay: whereas the emperour
made shew that he would free himselfe, giuing cities and communalties for
cautions, paying the old debts with new borrowing, and euerie man lent him
seeing him pay so willingly. But at this day many will free both principall and
interest, to have but thirtie paid them for a hundred; so as after the death of
Henrie, all was filled with the complaint of
creditors: and such princes and Signiories as had money in the banke at
Lion, were much altered, and not onely the
Signiories of the Cantons, the princes of Germanie and others had their parts
there but also Bashas & marchants of Turkie were there in their Factors
names for aboue five hundred thousand crowns;The Bashas of
Turquie had money at interestin the bank at Lion. and nothing did
more with hold the great Turke from succoring of the French in their last
voyage of Naples, under the duke of Guise, than the not paying of foure
thousand crownes for interest to Rustan Basha, besides
the ten thousand which la Vigne the ambassador carried
him in the yeare 1556, fearing to loose his principall, as I have learned by
letters and instructions from la Vigne, for many did not
buy rents for a certaine summe of money, but would have the interest pure and
simple, and uppon condition that they should have their principall againe: as many Italians doe with priuate men, to whom
they lend their moneyThe policie of Italian vsurers.
simply hauing them bound both bodie and goods, without making any mention of
interest, and yet by a verball agreement, they promise sixteene or twenty in
the hundred; if he faile to pay the interest, they seaze uppon bodie and goods
for the principall: and although the interest be paid, if they have need of
their principall▪ they proceed by way of execution against the debtor, for he
hath neuer any quittance nor witnes for the interest which hee receiueth.
Behold by what meanes they draw the money out of this realme.
There are other trickes which I forbeare to touch, but for this cause king Lewis the ninth in the yeare 1254, and Philip the Faire in the yere 1300 did banish all Antient laws against▪ Italian vsurers. Bankers and
Italian marchants out of Fraunce, confiscating their goods: and to discover the
debts that were owing them, it was decreed that the debtors shuld be freed from
all arrerages and interests, paying the principall to the treasurers. And
since, in the yeare of our Lord one thousand three hundred fortie and seuen,
Philip of Valois for the like cause did forfeit all
their goods: for it was verified by the processe that was made, that for foure
and twentie thousand pounds starling, they had in few yeares profited two
millions and foure hundred and fortie thousand pounds starling: and in hatred
of such vsurie the Lombards letters have been alwaies
taxed in the Chancery at double▪ and although
these people have been often banished the realme, yet there were neuer more in
any place, nor will euer bee wanting, so long as princes take up at interest.
Since and before that the banke of Lion was broken, most of the cities of this
realme have lent unto the king upon the reuenews, customes, imposts, and tenths
for reasonable interest, and those which held themselves to be of best iudgment
in matters of state and treasure, aduised it for two ends, the one to haue
money at need; the other to bind the cities and communalties more unto their
prince, yet we have neuer seene more rebellions since the establishment of this
realme. And as for the treasure, it hath been so well husbanded, as in lesse
than twelue yeares that king Henrie the second raigned,
hee did owe more than his The debts of king Henrie the second. predecessors had
leuied fortie yeares before, for all charges: for by an account made in the
yeare 1560, king Frauncis the second, successor to Henrie, did owe two millions three hundred twelue
thousand six hundred and ten liures, eighteen soulz six deniers, of money lent
freely, for the which he paid no interest: and fifteene millions nine hundred
twentie six thousand five hundred fiftie and five liures, 12 soulz and 8
deniers, for the which he paid interest: and he ought more for arrerages seuen
hundred threescore and fifteene thousand, nine hundred threescore and nineteene
liures, foure soulz, and foure deniers: besides the debt of Ferrara, and other debts for marriages, which came to eight millions
five hundred and fourteen thousand five hundred fourescore and twelue liures,
eighteene soulz and eleuen deniers: and other
remainders due, to the summe of fifteene hundred threescore and foure thousand,
seuen hundred fourescore and seuen liures, two soulz, and six deniers: so as by
the last article the king remained indebted one and forty millions, a hundred
fourescore three thousand, one hundred threescore and fifteen liures, three
soulz, six deniers: comprehending fourteene millions nine hundred threescore
and one thousand seuen hundred fourscore and seuen liures fifteene soulz and
eight deniers, for the aides, reuenewes, and customes engaged, to cities,
corporations, and colledges, and to priuat men: amōgst the which the citie of
Paris hath had yerely three millions one hundred & so many thousand liures,
comprehending the tenths: moreover the clergie hath furnished aboue threescore millions in the time of king Francis 2, and Charles 9. Although
the emperour Charles 5, and his successor have run the
same fortune, for that they took up at interest, being indebted aboue fifty
millions, for the whichThe debts of Spaine. all the
lands, and reuenews of Naples and Milan were engaged to the Genewais and other
priuate persons, who now are called in question, for that they had taken of the
king of Spaine in his necessitie thirtie and fortie in the hundred; and to
effect it, they have caused the catholicke king to be censured by an admonition
from the Pope, if he continued those excessiue vsuries; who embracing this
occasion, defrauded his creditors of ten yeres interest. We must not think that
the Spaniards will suffer themselves to bee easily gulled by the bankers of
Italie, as the French do, who suffer them to
inioy the farmes & al the best reuenews of France, the taxes, imposts,
customes and doanne of Lion, by meanes of which farmes they ransome the
subiects, and transport the coynes, contrary to the laws of this realme, which
forbid to suffer strangers to enrich themselves by the reuenews of the crowne:
nay, it hath been more insupportable to preferre them before naturall subiects,
which offered much more, & yet they had an abatement of twentie thousand
crownes at one instant out of the custome of Lion, to the perpetuall infamie of
the French: and least they should be molested and drawn in question of theft, they have gotten an euocation of all their
causes to the priuie councell. The originall of
all these miseries growes from Frauncis the first, who
began to take up money at intrest, hauing 1800000 crowns in his coffers, and
peace within his realme: no well aduised prince will euer take that course, for
thereby hee shall ruine the foundation of his treasure, if he will keepe his
faith and pay; but if he will not, or cannot pay, then must he breake and loose
his credite, which is the ruine of an estate: for he must borrow, leuie taxes,
impositions, and in the end by slaunders, and tyrannies forfeit his subiects
goods. Then is it most fit and necessarie for a prince to borrow money upon
interest of his allies and subiects, if that hee bee in danger to loose his
estate, by some generall reuolt, or the conspiracieMeans to
assure the estate of a desperat prince. of some great men against
him▪ for extreame remedies are to be sought in
extreamest dangers: as we read that Eumenes did, who
borrowed a great sum of money at extreame interest, of those that had conspired
his death. Agrippa king of Iudea, recouered his realme
by the meanes of his creditors, who troubled both heauen and earth for the
assurance they had to bee payd: and this was also the chiefe meanes to restore
Edward the fourth king of England, being expelled his
kingdome. But if the princes creditors have assurance to bee paid by his
successors, or that they have lands in pawne, then this course is vnprofitable.
I have set downe the meanes which in my opinion are profitable and honest to
gather together treasure, the which is the first point of this chapter: the
second is how to employ the treasure of the Commonweale well and honourably,
the which wee have partly toucht in the
chapter of rewards and punishments. Let vs adde hereunto what remaines.
In old time the first article set downe in the expences of the treasure, was
for almes deeds; the second for the kings house; and the third for reparations:
but the order is quite changed. As for almes-deeds, the wise and antient
princesMeans to employ the treasure. of the
Hebrews, have left this discipline to posteritie, the which they receiued from
the holy Prophets, who sayd, That the surest preseruation and defence of
treasure, were Almes deeds, and liberalitie to the needie; the which they
restrained to the tenth part of euerie mans goods, which should bee employed
upon the ministers of the church and the poore. And if we will looke aduisedly
into it, we shall not find any prince, state,
or family that hath flourished more in riches, honours, and all happinesse,
than those which had most care of the poore and needie. In old time there were
no princes under heauen more charitable than our kings of Fraunce, since Robert sonne to Hugh Capet, who
gaue the first example to his subiects and successors to be charitable to the
poore, feeding aThe charity of the kings of Fraunce to the
poore. thousand daily, giuing them horses to follow the court, to
blesse him and pray for him; and to speake truly, there was neuer king in this
realme that raigned longer and in greater peace. We may iustly say of our
kings, that there is no race under heauen that hath so entertained the greatnes
of their maiestie in armes and laws, and out of the which there hath issued
more princes▪ or that have raigned longer
without offence to all other princes, Christians, Turks, Tartars, Persians,
Indians, and Ethiopians. What prince euer was more charitable to the poore,
than Lewis the ninth, who hath founded twentie eight
hospitals and colledges in this realme; and had commonly in his traine six
score poore folks, and in Lent twelue score, feeding them with meat from his
owne table? he also lived in great honor, being feared of his enemies,
reuerenced of his friends, honored of his subiects: and after that he had
raigned 44 yeres, he left five sonnes, and foure daughters, and a kingdome
flourishing in armes and laws to his successor, recommending unto him aboue all things to be deuout to God, and charitable
to the poore. Neither may we forget Iames the fift king of Scotland, who was called Rex egentium, The king of the needie; who as he exceeded
all the princes of his time in bountie, so did he surmount all his predecessors
in riches. And contrariwise we see great families, states, realmes, and empires
come to pouertie and ruine, hauing contemned the poore, and abandoned the
subiect to the spoile of the soldior, and the thefts of toll-gatherers: when as
king Henrie the second in the yeare 1549, did exact that
extraordinarie tribute which they called Taillon, he
promised not to employ that money to any other vse, than to the entertainment
of his men at armes, and not to confound it with the ordinarie receits, that
the subiect might be freed from the spoile of souldiers. The like was said,
when as the realme was charged with the
paiment of 50000 footmen in the time of king Frauncis
the first, the which should be leuied upon walled townes and their suburbes,
which felt nothing of the oppression of the souldier; but notwithstanding since
they have made it equall to towne, village, and hamlet, in the yere 1555,
whereby the poore countreyman hath ben doubly oppressed, for they pay, and are
spoiled of all sides. And yet with all these charges, they would hold
themselves happy, if they might bee freed in prouiding corne and victuals for
the souldiors at an vnder▪rate, what may then bee hoped for in those cities
whereas the souldiers robbe and spoile the poore subiects with all
impunitie,The souldior must be payd to preuent all thefts
and insolencies. and insult more over the citizens than against the
enemie? but for an excuse, they pretend they
are not paid, neither would they be, to the end they might have some colour for
their thefts. There is no meanes to redresse these calamities, and to restore
in some sort militarie discipline, which is now quite decaied, but in paying
the souldiers: for as Cassiodorus said, Disciplinam seruare non potest ieiunus exercitus, dum quod
deest semper presumit armatus, A fasting armie can neuer obserue good
discipline, for what they want, they will presume to take by force: the which
cannot bee done vnlesse there bee a great care had of the treasure. The kings
house therefore entertained, the souldiers and the officers payd, and due
rewards giuen to them that deserue them, it is great reason the poore should be
remembred. And if the treasurie bee well furnished, a part would be employed to repaire townes, to fortifie upon the
frontiers, to furnish places of strength, make the passages euen, build
bridges, fortifie the ports, send ships to sea, build publicke houses,
beautifie temples, erect colledges for honor, vertue, and learning: for besides
necessitie of reparations, it brings great profiteThe
benefit of reparations and fortifications. to the Commonweale. For by
this means arts and artificers are entertained, the poore people are eased, the
idle are set to worke, cities are beautified and diseases expelled: finally
hatred against princes (which doth often times stirre up the subiects to
rebellion) is quite suppressed, when as the impositions which he hath leuied,
redounds not only to the general, but also to every priuat mans good. And
therefore the emperour Alexander Seuerus was accustomed
to leaue many imposts and tolles to cities, to
be employed in the necessarie reparations thereof.
This which I have sayd is more expedient in an Aristocratia, or a Popular state, than in a Monarchie; for that the
subiects being many, are with more difficultie maintained in peace and vnion by
few commaunders: vnlesse the multitude being employed in the publicke works,
may make some gaine, and not to inure them to the distribution of corne and
money, as they vsually did in Popular states, and especially the Tarentins: the
which is not only the ruine of the treasure, but likewise of the citie. So Pericles was also blamed, hauing
first accustomed the Atheniens to these distributions: the which he did to
gaine the peoples fauor. But when he was once
master of them, he emploied the publicke treasure, not only to fortifie the
citie, but also to beautifie it, and to fill it withAn
infinit treasure in the citie of Athens. good artificers: yet durst
hee not attempt this before the citie was in peace and their treasure full,
hauing then a hundred thousand tallents; that is to say, threescore millions of
crownes, if we may beleeue Demosthenes: which summe
becauseDemosthenes in . it
is vnreasonable, it may be, we should read a hundred tallents, which make
threescore thousand pounds, for that wee shewed before, that the Athenians
(when as they had charged their allies with great tributes) did neuer leuy
aboue two thousand tallents yearely at the most, and in Pericles time they did scarce exact a thousand tallents. And being
accused by his enemies to have misemploied the
publicke treasure, hee made this resolute answere unto the people, That ifPlut. in Pericle. they were not well pleased with the
walles, fortresses, and temples which hee built, hee would take the charge upon
himselfe, upon condition, that his name should be grauen thereon, and that it
was his git: but the people allowed the charge,
knowing well that all men in generall, and euerie man in particular, reaped
profit and honour thereby, for that the marchant did gaine in furnishing of
stuffe; sea-men, and those that brought it, for their carriage; and artificers
in working it; so as the profit was distributed to all sorts of people, and the
glorie of their stately workes, gaue a perpetuall testimonie to posteritie of
the greatnes of this Commonweale. But the greatest benefit, and which doth most
import the preseruation of an estate is, That
the two greatest plagues of a commonweale, Idlenesse and Pouertie, are
banished: a verie necessarie thing in a popular and aristocraticall state; and
especially in those countries, where they have great spirits, and but barren
soyle, as at Athens: if idlenesse get footing in such a countrey, it will neuer
be without mutinies and thefts, which Solon
foreseeing,Idlenesse seuerely punished he did
inflict great punishments upon idle persons: and so did Amasis king of Egypt, who condemned idle men to be put to death, if
they had not wherewithall to live, knowing the Egyptians to be the most
ingenuous in the world, and the most subiect to mutinie, if they were not
employed. We see Piramides built in that countrey almost three thousand yeares
since, lest the pleople should have languished
with idlenesse: we have also presidents of the wisest emperours of Rome, which
have in like sort emploied their treasure, & giuen the subiects example to
imitate them: as Augustus, who did iustly vant, That he
had found Rome built with bricke, but that he had left it built with marble:
and in truth he employed foure millions and five hundred thousand crownes in
building of the Capitoll alone: he was followed by the emperour Vespasian, who made great and excellent workes throughout
the whole empire, rather to entertaine the meaner sort, than for any other end:
for when as an excellent workeman promised him to set up pillers in the
Capitoll, of an excessiue greatnes, with small charge and few labourers; he
recompenced him verie well, saying, Let me I pray you, nourish the poore: and yet he protested in open senate
comming to the empire, That there was need of a milliart of crownes to free and
restore that CommonA thousand millions of crowns.
weale.
What shall I say of the emperour Claudius, who enioying
an assured peace, caused the chanell of Fucina to be made, to accommodate the
citie with good waters, employing dayly thirtie thousand men for eleuen yeares
together. And without search of antient histories, it is well knowne that the
signiorie of Venice doth entertaine continuall in their Arsenall, three or
foure thousand persons which get their liuing by the
labour of their hands, the which doth much
content the citisens, seeing the publicke treasure employed so charitably. But
these employments are goodly and befitting a great prince which is not
indebted, when the reuenewes are not pawned, when as the Commonweale is in
perfect peace, when the soldiers are paide, and rewards duly administred to
euerie one: otherwise to increase the subsidies to build great pallaces, more
stately than necessarie, being indebted, and to suffer the buildings of his
predecessors to runne to ruine, thereby to purchase vaine glorie, that were to
leaue a marke of his tyrannie, and a perpetuall testimonie to posteritie, I hat
he hath built with theA tyrant builds with the bloud of his
subiects. bloud of his subiects: and often times the subiects ruine
the buildings of tyrants, to deface their memory from off the earth, wheras
they shuld by vertuous and charitable actions,
graue their names in heauen. The golden pallace of Nero,
which comprehended a great part of Rome, was contemned by his successors, who
would not vouchsafe to lodge in it, for the crueltie and villanie of him that
had built it; and soone after it was ruined▪ as being made of spoiles,
exactions and confiscations, the which follow a prodigall prince at the heeles:
for of necessitie, of a prodigall he must become an oppressor, and of an
oppressor a tyrant.
There were neuer two tyrants more cruell and prodigall, than Nero and Caligula;The strange prodgalitie of Nero
and Caligula. for the first, in fifteen yeares that hee raigned, had
giuen away the value of fiftie and five millions of crownes: and the last, in
one yere had wasted threescore and seuen millions, so as hauing not where
withall to deay his houshold charges, he was forced to beg the offrings in his owne
person: then falling to prescriptions of priuate men, after that he had wasted
the publick tresure, he filled all with cruell confiscations. This miserie of
excessiue prodigalitie happens often to princes, through forgetfulnesse of the
gifts which they have beowed, not well vndestanding
the botome of their treasuries. And for this cause, it was wisely decreed by
Frauncis the first▪ that euerie yere the generals of
the treasure, should send unto the treasurer, two briefes of the publicke
reuenewes of every prouince: the one by coniecture the first day of the yeare;
the other a true note of the yeare that was past: and in like case the
treasurer should make two briefs of the whole treasure in generall, to the end
that the king and his counsell might plainly
know what money was in his coffers, thereby to gouerne his gifts, rewards, and
expences: but most commonly hee that hath power to dispose of it, seeth
nothing. I will put for an example an estimate of the treasure which was made
in lanuarie in the yere 1572, where in a chapter of the receit, there was an
article set downe of 200000 pounds starling of casuall things: and by a true
accountArticles of parties casuall in the yeare
1572. made in the end of the yeare, it was found, that they amounted
to two hundred and fourescore thousand pounds starling, and yet it was
verified▪ that there was but fiftie thousand pounds employed to the kings
profit. Such was the calamitie of those times when as children and women ruled.
But in my opinion, the king had done better, if he had seen the generall
account of his reuenews, the which is contained
in two sheets of paper, and withall had had a register of his gifts and
rewards: or if his priuie gifts be not inrolled, that he had a small briefe or
remembrance of that which he had giuen to whom, and wherefore: which are three
chiefe points, whereof a prince must be verie carefull, to the end, that if he
will be liberall, it should be to such as deserue it. And to thisA prince should have a list of matters of state and of his
chefe men. end, it were expedient the prince had a briefe register of
affaires of state, and a rolle of the worthiest men of his realme, for there is
no memorie so perfect, but may be confounded with the multiplicitie of
affaires, whereby he shall commit great incongruities
in matters of state: for a briefe note of affaires shall put him in mind of that which he hath to do, and of all
enterprises, the which oftentimes remaine imperfect and ill executed through
forgetfulnesse. There is no better example hereof, than that of king Lewis the eleuenth, who was held one of the most
politicke princes of his age, yet hee ran willingly into the snare of Charles earle of Carolois, hauing forgotten that hee had
sent his ambassadors into the countrey of Liege, to stirre them to warre
against him: the earle aduertised hereof, detained him prisoner: the which had
not happened, if he had kept a register of his former actions. If any
flatterers of the court will obiect, That the register would be too great, that
the prince should be too much troubled, and that hee could not live long: why
then have those princes and great monarchs which have been so carefull of matters of state, and gouerned the whole world with
their lawes, lived so long? as Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian,
Traian, Adrian, and the Antonines, all Romaine
emperours and politicke gouernours, who themselves made registers of their owne
affaires, imitating the example of Augustus, who lived
74 yeares, leauing three Bookes written with his owne hand; the first wasThe diligence of Augustus. his deeds and publicke
actions; the second was his testament; the third was an estate of all the
Romaine empire, wherein was contained a particular estate of euerie prouince,
what troupes of souldiers, what treasure, what armes, what shipping and what
munition, with a diligence worthie of a great monarch: yet for all this he did
not omit to doe iustice ordinarily and to heare all commers, reading all the bookes of politike government, that he could
get, as Suetonius saith, remembring that which Demetrius the Phalerien said unto Ptolome Philadelph king of Egypt, that he should find goodly secrets
in bookes, which no man durst tell him. Vespasian in
like sort, made an excellent abridgement of the empire, and yet he lived 70
yeares.
The empire of Persia was greater than that of the Romaines, stretching from the
farthest bounds of India, unto Hellespont, and the desert of Libia, hauing
under it 127 Prouinces, and yet the kings of Persia carried with them
continually a register of their affaires of state and of their gifts: and when
as Darius Longuemain had escaped the conspirators hands,
by the aduertisement which Mardocheus had giuen him, the king a while after reading
this register by night, and finding that Mardocheus had
receiued no reward for so great a seruice done unto the king hee caused him to
bee sent for, giuing him great honours and preferments. But without any further
search, the king of Spaine doth vsually looke upon a register of his affaires,
carrying an abridgement of letters which he writes to gouernors, captaines, and
ambassadors, if the matter be not verie secret. For the same cause Charles surnamed the wise, king of France, made a
Register of his priuie councell, and the first was Peter
Barrier, who was not busied (as at this day) with expeditions and acts
of ustice, but onely to inroll the affaires of state.
But aboue all it is necessarie for a prince to have a register in his counsell,
of gifts, offices, benefices, & exemptions:
the which is most commonly in the hands of a secretarie▪ and et the hundred part of the gifts are not entred. For
the redressing whereof, there are two antient lawes, the one made by Philip of Valois, of the which I have formerly made
mention, by the which the gift was reuoked, if the donatarie made not mention
of the benefits graunted to him and hisGood s abrogated. predecessors: the other is of
Charles the eight, whereb
all gifts aboue ten pounds were of no force, if they were not verified in the
chamber of accounts. The first law was soone taken away by another, saying,
That it was sufficient by the Letters of gift, if it
were derogated from the first decree. And as for the law made by Charles the eight, it is
out of practise, under color of secret gifts and pentions, the which must not
be knowne: so as the antient laws (decreeing, that the articles set downe in
the chapter of expences, shall not bee allowed without an order, a
commaundement, and a discharge) are now of little or no force in that respect:
for the treasurer is discharged, bringing the kings hand onely, without any
mention of him to whom the reward was giuen, nor wherefore. There was yet a law
made by king Frauncis the first, and confirmed by his
successor, wherby it was decreed, There should be foure keys to the place where
the treasure was kept, whereof the king should have one, and the rest should be
in Commissioners hands appointed by him: and the distribution of money should
bee made by the kings commaundement, in the
presence of the treasurer and comptroller of the Exchequer: But king Henrie the second by a speciall edict discharged the
treasurers and officers of the treasurie, that afterwards they might not be
called to any account. True it is, that one of these commissioners had giuen
him at one time a hundred thousand crownes, if the common report were true; the
which was much at that time, but little in regard of prodigalities
practisedThe reuocation of excessiue g is necessarie. of late. For after that king
Frauncis the first had ordred it by sparing, all the
publike treasure lay open to the spoile of great men and flatterers. But an
edict made in fraud should be no hindrance, but that such as had mannaged the
publike treasure might bee called to an account; as it was required at a
Parliament held at Orleans; and that excessiue
gifts should be reuoked or at the least cut lesse: as the Emperour Galba did, who reuoked Neroes
gifts, leauing but the tenth part to the donatorie; not that they should
enquire too curiously of all gifts bestowed by the prince, the which might
prooue verie dangerous.
Charles the seuenth did limit by a law, what summe of
money the king might take yearely to dispose of at his pleasure: which summe
being verie little, seemed in those daies exceeding great. There is nothing
more profitable for the prince, nor necessary for the subiects, than to haue
the rewards which they giue, knowne and examined by their officers: for that
princes shall alwaies maintaine their fafauors, giuing liberally, and the
officers shalbe subiect to the hatred and dislike of such as have their gifts reuoked or cut lesse: so as by
means of recouerie, the money should returne into the treasurie againe, and few
would beg, yea they would scarce take it when it should be offered them, if
they knew their gifts shuld be reuoked or examined in the chamber of accounts.
If bountie be commendable and worthie of a great and rich Monarch, it is ill
beseeming a poore and needie prince, for he must flea his subiects, and racke
them to the verie bones. KingBounty not fit in a poore pince.Frauncis the first, leauing a goodly kingdome,
flourishing in armes and laws, and in all arts and sciences, to his successor,
with seuenteen hundred thousand crowns in treasure, and the quarter of March
readie to be receiued; yet did he not giue away the hundred part in rewards in
32 yeares that he had raigned, as his sonne Henrie did in two: for he had scarce closed his eyes,
when as the confirmation of offices (which is due to the king at his first
comming to the crowne) whereof an infinit masse of money was then made, was
giuen to one horse leech in court. And although that Frauncis the father gaue pensions to Germans, English,An infinit masse of money giuen to a woman. Italians,
Suisses, Albaneses, Spaniards, and Grisons; yet all his pensions, besides the
Cantons were but 13000 pounds starling a yere at the most, as I have seene by
an extract out of the chamber of accounts, the which was made theThe bounty of great King Frauncis. yeare that hee dyed:
and in the same extract there is but 42769 pounds,
foure shillings starling, which hee gaue in pension to his subiects, princes of
bloud, knights of the order, captaines in
great numbers, lieutenants, councellors of state, men of iustice, ambassadors,
scollers studying, and many excellent workmen, and learned personages. O noble
prince, who could so well make choise of worthy persons, and moderat his
bountie.
We have entreated of two points of this chapter: first how a Commonweale should
gather together, and then how they shall employ: the last point is, what
reserue they shall make for any necessitie, that they be not forced to begin
warreRenation of
treasure. by borrowing, or subsidies; whereof the Romanes were verie
carefull: for although they had continuall warres vntill Augustus time, after the defeat of Marc
Anthonie, yet had they neuer toucht the treasure which grew of the
twentieth pence of slaues infranchised,
vntill that Hannibal had reduced themThe treasure of the Romaines called Sanctius acarium. to extreame want; then was there found foure hundred and
fiftie thousand crownes in their treasurie, the which was one of the chiefest
meanes to saue their estate.
The emperour of Turkie obserues this order carefully, for besides the treasury
of ordinarie receits, which is in the princes Seraigle, there is another in the
castle of seuen towers at Constantinople, where the antient treasure is
reserued,The Turks treas. the which they meddle not with, if the necessitie bee not verie
vrgent. Our Ancestors were accustomed in time of necessitie, when the treasure
was wasted to have recourse to the kings forrests, where there was an infinit
number of tall timber▪trees fit for all vses,
of the which they made great summes of money; but during the ciuile warres,
they are so cut downe, as hereafter they will bee onely fit to make faggots:
whereby the commonweale is much damnified, and will be more dayly, vnlesse
there be some speedie remedie: for there is such want of timber, as they shall
bee forced to fetch it out of other countreys for their ships and buildings;
they do also cut them downe so hastily, as the trees cannot grow to beare any
fruit to feed our swine; and in the end we shall be forced to fetch wood from
other parts for firing. And for that it hath been alwaies held a matter of some
difficultie to keepe treasure safely, beeing verie hard for princes to shake
off importune beggars: therefore the kings of Persia and the Romaines, that they might preserue this holy treasure from
selth, they reducedThe means
how to keepe treasure. a great part of their money into thicke
brickes. It is also sayd, that Charles the fift king of
Fraunce, had caused the great Hart in the pallace at Paris to be made after the
same forme that they should cast one all of gold, of the treasure which he had
gathered together. And the better to assure it against theeves, the antients
did lay their treasure in temples, as the Greekes in the temple of Apollo, Delphique, and Deliaque:
the Romaines in the temple of Saturne and Opis: the antient Gaules in hallowed Lakes: the Hebrews
sometimes in temples, sometimes in sepulchres: for wee read that the high
priest and king of the Iewes, Hircanus, found great
treasures in Dauids sepulchre. But seeing there
are no sepulchres so religious, no temples
so holy, that theeves will not force and enter: therefore the kings of Morocco hauing moulten a great quantitie of gould in
forme of a bowle, pierced through with a barre of yron, they did hang it on the
toppe of the pinnacle of the great Church at Marocco.
The antient Egyptians fearing to giue occasion to their neighbours and enemies
to inuade their estate, and make warre against them for their treasure (as they
did to king Ezechias, hauing shewed his treasures to the
ambassadors of the king of Assiria) employed it for the
most partIsaie 30. in building of their Pyramides, beautifying of cities,
bringing of riuers, and repayring the bankes
of Nile. The law of God forbids to heape together much gould and siluer; lest
that thereby the prince should bee auredDeut. 17. to oppresse his subiects, or the enemie to
inuade the citisens; inuiting the prince thereby to bee charitable to the poore
and needie: yet a meane is to bee vsed.
No man in my opinion will allow of the insatiable couetousnesse of Iohn 22 Pope of Rome, in whose coffers they found (hee
being dead) twentie three millions of gold, as many have written; or of Sardanapalus, who left fortie millions of crowns; or of
Cyrus, who left fiftie millions; or of Tiberius Caesar, who had gathered together seuentie seuen
millions, the which his successor wasted in
one yere; or of Darius Ochus the last king of the
Persians, in whose treasury Alexander the great found
fourscore millions of gold. We read in the holy scripture that Dauid left sixscore millions, the which is the greatest
treasure that was euer22. Paralip. .
1. The greatest treasure that euer was. heard of: but there is some
question touching the valuation of their tallent; for they write that he had
gathered together a hundred thousand tallents of gold, and a thousand thousand
tallents of siluer, which summe, if it bee accounted by tallents of Attica,
although they be small it will seeme wonderfull: our interpreters of the Bible
doe falsely thinke them Attike tallants. I find Siclum
in the scriptures to be taken two waies, the which the Greeks call Statera, and the Latines Talentum,
one waie it is a pound of six ounces, as in the first booke of Paralip the 21 chapter;
another way it is taken for halfe an ounce, as in the first booke of Samuel, the 24 chapter. If Dauids
treasure be numbered by the sicle or tallent of halfe an ounce, the summe will
not seeme great; if it be referred to six ounces, it will comprehend fiftie
thousand pound waight of gold, and ten times as much in siluer: but if it be
valued by the Attike tallent, the wealth of the Romanes neuer came nere it; as
we may see by an extract out of the treasury under the empire of Traian, at which time it was at the greatest; for the
whole sum of their treasure (the which was kept in Egypt) came but to 74
thousand tallents, the which amountsThe treasure of the
Romaines. to 44 millions, and foure hundred thousand crownes; vnlesse
they had another treasurie at Rome, as it is likely, (although it appeare not
by the extract) hauing 200000 foot, and 40000
horse in garrisons on the frontiers of the empire and in the prouinces
entertained: three hundred Elephants for the warre, two thousand chariots for
warre, and munition to arme 00000 men, fifteen
hundred galleys of three and five owers on a side, besides two thousand vessels
for the sea, and furniture to arme and rigge twise as many, with fourescore
great ships stately adorned.
But our kings of Fraunce have not offended in this point
against the lawes of God, by heaping up of too great treasures, and it is not
to be feared that they will hereafter breake it: for they which say, that king
Charles the fift left in his treasurie eighteene
millions of crownes, are much deceiued, for he found the coffers empty, he paid his predecessors debts, he redeemed the
reuenews of the crown, conquered Guienne from the English, purchased the
countie of Anxerre, and a great part of the earledome of Eureux, restored Henrie king of Castill being expelled his realme,
maintained and succored the kings of Scotland, against the kings of England,
and raigned but 17 yeares, and yet he did not leuie for all charges aboue 43756
pounds starling yerely, comprehending the reuenews of the crowne lands:
although that in his time the ayds and custome of 8 shillings uppon euerie fire
were laid upon the subiects: and his successor fortie yeares after did leuie but 45000 pounds starling: and Charles the seuenth, the yeare that he The reuenews of Fraunce under Charles the 5, 6, 7, Lewis the
11, and Charles the 8. died, receiued for all charges and reuenews,
but 170000 pounds starling, as it appeares plainly in the chamber of accounts,
& yet had he imposed the tax in forme of an ordinarie impost, the which at
that time came but to 1800 pounds: and twentie yeares after when as Lewis the eleuenth died, the whole receit came but to
470000 pounds, the which was reduced to 120000 pounds, at the request of the
Parliament, held at Tours at the comming of Charles the
8 unto the crowne,Diminution of halfe the chage at the comming of Charles 8. besides the
reuenews of the crowne which amounted yearely by estimation to 100000 pounds:
so as the whole reuenews when as Charles the eight died,
came not to aboue 250000 pounds. The like request was made unto king Charles the ninth, by a parliament held at Orleans, at
his comming to the crowne: but the necessitie
was found so great as there was more need to augment than to diminish the the
charge. Yet there was great hope to free the king out of debt, and to take away
the subsidies & extraordinary charges, (if the realme had not ben plunged
in ciuile warre) considering the good order was taken the first yeare: for the
interest was moderated to five in the hundred, all officers wages for that
yeare were diminished and halfe taken awaie, and the confirmation of offices
graunted them freely. And as for the expences, all was so well ordred, as by
the accounts of that yere, there came into the kings coffers 230577 pounds
starling: so as in few yeares all had been discharged, without any diminution
of the kings houshold seruants, the which were six hundred, besides such as
were entertained for hunting & hawking,
for they may well be spared without deminution of the maiestie of a king or the
dignity of his house, by cutting off his ordinary traine and houshold seruants,
the which oftentimes doth cause strangers to contemne him, and his subiects to
rebell against him: as it chanced unto Lewis the
eleuenth, who hauing put the nobilitie from him & discharged the gentlemen
of his house, used his taylor for an herald at armes, his barbar for an
ambassador, and his Phisition for chancellor, (as Antiochus king of Syria did his phisitian Apolophanes, whom he made president of his counsell) & in mockerie
of other kings, he ware a greasie hat, and very course cloth in his apparell:
and euen in the chamber ofThe basenesse of Lewis the
eleuenth in his apparell. accounts, there is set downe in a note of
expences two shillings for a new paire of
sleeues to an old dublet: and in another Item three halfe pence for a box of
grease to blacke his boots withall; and yet he raised the charges more than his
predecessor did by 300000 pounds starling a yeare, and sold much of the
reuenews. As for the officers of the crowne, it was wisely aduised at the
estates of Orleans, to reduce them to the antient number, as they were in the
time of king Lewis the twelfe, by suppression without
any disbursement. But there were some good husbands which gaue them afterwards
to vnderstand, that the suppression of offices was a decrease of parties
casuall, wherby the number was afterwards much augmented: And Balley president of the accounts told the king boldly and plainly,
being at S. Maur desfosses, that the suppression of
those officers which had been created by the
new law, was both pernitious to the publicke, and hurtfull to his treasure,
seeing but for three augmentations in the chamber of accountsAnno 1566. 20 Maie. onely, they had payd aboue threescore thousand
pounds starling: but he doth not say that it is like unto cold water which
encreaseth the fit to him that hath a burning Feuer: for it is well knowne that
the king or people pay wages to most of these officers after ten or twentie for
the hundred, which was the principall cause of the suppression of subalternall
offices by a law made by Frauncis the second. Moreouer
they set not downe the prerogatives which belong to
the officers of the chamber of accompts, that is to say, their ordinarie wages,
their rights of wood, their liverie at Easter,
their rights at Hallontide, their roses, their prerogativeThe right of the offices of the chamber of accounts. of herings,
their rights at Twelfetide, their rights of the stable of vertue, and of white
salt, besides paper, parchment, pens, counters, purses, waxe candles, red waxe,
penkniues, bodkins, scrapers and strings: they did not shew also that the other
profits of offices came to much more than their wages: they will not confesse
that whereas there be now seauen chambers of accompts, there was then but one;
and whereas now there be two hundred officers or thereabouts in the chamber of
accompts at Paris, thereErection of the chamber of
accounts. was wont to be but one Treasorer of France President of the
chamber, and oure masters of accompts that were
Clarks, by an erection that was made at Viuiers in Brie in the yeare 1319,
afterwards they added foure lay men, which sufficed for all that were
accomptable: the kingdome of Nauarre, and
all the Lowcountries being then in the hands of the kings of France. And yet we
have seen in our daes, that those which have stollen
the kings treasure and the subiects wealth, have escaped, being indebted in
great sommes of money; and infinit others which have neuer accompted. And which
is more, not long since an accomptant had gotten into his possession a great
and notable somme of money, wherewith he stood charged by his accompt, who by
collusion with a nobleman that should have a third part, he obtained the rest
by gift, and for his discharge, he produced the kings bl signed to the nobleman. So as to call accomptants to their duties, they
must oftentimes depute Commissioners with double charges, and the fault cannot be imputed to any other, but to those
officers that are created to that end. And although that all treasorers,
receiuers, comptrollers, and other accomptants should make a good and loyall
accompt, and pay what remaines due; yet notwithstanding there is so great a
number in this realme, as a third part of the receit is spent in gages,
charges, vacations, riding voyages, and the conduct of money; as hath been well
verified by the estates of the countrie of Languedock in the yeare 1556, where
I was then present: who for that cause deputed Martin
Durant, Syndic or Procurator of that countrie, to present a request
unto the king to be discharged of all officers of receit,An
offer made by the estates of▪ anguedoc, to king
Henry th. making offer to bring all the money that was
to be leuied upon the subiect freely into the kings cofers, without any charge
either for officers wages, or for carriage:
shewing also particularly that the third part of the receipts went to officers,
promising to deliver unto the king a full crowne, whereas hee did not receiue
foure shillings, whereby he should saue 20000. pounds starling yearely in the
two generalities of Languedoc, only for ordinarie charges: for then the charge
of Languedoc came to threescore thousand pounds yearely. But since the officers
of the finances or treasor are so increased, as Maximinus
Lullier, Prouost of marchants at Paris, and President of the chamber of
accompts, said in open Parlament at Blois, That of the crowne there came not
eighteene pence cleere into the kings coers: the
which seemes incredible, yet he was held a man most expert in accompts. We must
then conclude, that the subiect was much opprest by the polling of officers,
seeing they made these offers: which we may
not thinke new, for that in old times they had no other receiuers but the
Viconts, Bayliffes, and Seneshals. That request made by the Syndic of Languedoc
did much please king Henry, but it displeased the
flatterers in court, and the officers of the accompts, so as it was reiected,
for the friuolous difficulties they made which had interest therein, the which
is not heere needfull to rehearse, so as it was concluded that receiuers and
treasorers were necessarie. Seeing then that accomptants and masters of
accompts is a necessarie euill (as Alexander Seuerus
said) The ewer there are, the better shall it be for
the Commonweale; for the kings treasure will still decrease when it passeth
through the hands of so many officers. These were the complaints and
expostulations which the estates of France made vnto
king Charles the 6 in the yeare 1412, for that he had five Treasorers, and that in old time there
were but two: and that in like sort there were but three Iudges of the reuenues
in the yeare 1372, and now there are almost three hundred within this realme.
And in the yeare 1360 there was but one Receiuer generall, who did reside at
Paris, & now there are 34, what would they now say to see so great a
multitude. The Romans in old time had but one receiuer in every Prouince: all
customes and duties were let out to farme, and the farmers brought in their
rents to the receiuer. The first office that was giuen to gentlemen of good
families, and that aspired to greater dignities, was the office of Questura, or
Receiuer for a yeare only, and without any comptroller to make triall of their
diligence and loyaltie. He that was found guiltie of extorsion, was declared
incapeable neuer to beare any honorable A meane to make deceiuers true and iust. charge,
besides infamie and the losse of his goods, the which was a wise course to
assure their treasure. But it is a strange thing and very absurd in this
realme, to see so many men giue money to their maister to pick his purse. The
Emperour of Turkie doth otherwise, for he neuer sels office, and for so great
an Empire there are verie fewThe order of the receit in
Turkie. Treasorers: the Collectors (which they call Protogeres) giue
the money unto the Subachis (which are as it were the Viconts of Normandie, who
in old times had the same charge) then they deliver it to the Sangiacs (who are
as it were gouernors of the countrie) who conuey it unto the Bellerbeis, and
they send in safety unto the Defrerderlers, which are two generals of the
Treasor, the one in Asia, and the other in Europe, who deliver it to the great
Comptroller, and he giues it to Casmander Baschi, great
maister of the treasor, who hath ten
commanders or deputies under him for extraordinarie payments, there is but one
treasorer, and for all officers of accompts, there are but 25 Comptrollers
which examine the accoumpts. One thing is worthie obseruation, that they haue
no treasorers nor receiuers but Eunukes, after the Persian and old Grecian
manner, and that wisely, for they that neither have children, nor can be
seduced with the flatteries and inticements of women, it is not to be feared
that they will steale the publike treasor with the hazard of their lives and
ame. As for Treasorers in France, it is more then
necessarie that such offices be giuen to gentlemen of honor and of noble
houses, as it was vsuall in old time, and is yet practised in England for the
reason that I have said. By an Edict made by king Henry
the second in September in the yeare 1554 it
was decreed, that the chiefe Treasorers should take their places before the
Stewards of the kings house, of the councellers of the court of Parliament, of
the accompts and aides, if they be not in their assemblies: and by an Edict
made by Charles the 9, he commaunds all vassals which
hold directly of the king, to do homage and fealtie unto the Treasorers of
France, the which would much discontent an infinite number of Dukes, Earles,
Barons, and great personages, who would not for any thing kneele before a base
fellow that had bought his office. Thus much concerning treasure, and for that
it consists in coyne of gold, siluer, copper and buillon, it is necessarie to
write something thereof.
CHAP. III. Of Coines, and the meanes how to preuent that
they be not altered, nor falsified.
LOoking well into the best grounds, and strongest
supports of a Commonweale; in my opinion, hee must exactly vnderstand this
point, that will wisely settle an estate, or reforme the abuses: for that there
is nothing that doth more trouble and afflict the poore people, than to
falsifie the Coines, and to alter the course thereof: for both rich, and poore,
euerie one in particular, and all in generall, receiue an infinit losse and preiudice, the which cannot precisely
in every point bee described,Daungerous to a state to alter
the coine. it breeds so many inconueniences. The Coine may not be
corrupted, no not altered, without great preiudice to the Commonweale: for if
money (which must rule the price of all things) be mutable and vncertaine, no
man can make a true estate of what he hath, contracts and bargaines shall be
vncertaine, charges, taxes, wages, pensions, rents, interests, and vacations
shall be doubtfull, fines also and amercements limited by the lawes and
customes shall be changeable and vncertaine: to conclude, the estate of the
treasure and of many affaires both publike and priuate shall be in suspence:
whereof the Edict made by Gratidianus the Tribune at
Rome is a good argument, who (contrarie to the opinion of his fellow Tribunes)
set a certaine price of a kind of coyne called
Victoriatus, upon a penaltie, whereby he purchased so
great glorie to himselfe and his posteritie, as they did erect his statues in
every streete, and offred frankinsence and waxe unto them. And Tully saith, Neminem vnquam multitudint
ob id vnum fuisse cariorem, Neuer any man (for that cause only) was
deerer to the people. The Prince may not make any false money, no more than he
may kill or rob, neither can he alter the weight of his coyne to the preiudice
of his subiects, and much lesse of strangers, which treate with him, and
traffick with his people, for that he is subiect to the law of nations, vnlesse
he will lose the name and maiesti of a king, and be
tearmed a counterfetter of money: as Dante the poet
called Philip le Bel, for that he did first among
our princes corrupt the coyne, and mingle
copper with siluer, which was the cause of great troubles among his subiects,
and a pernitious president to forraine Princes: whereof he repented himselfe
too late, restoring the coyne, and inioyning his sonne Lewis
Hutin not to abate the goodnes of his coynes. And for this cause Peter the 4 king of Arragon did confiscate the estate of
the king of Maiorque and Minorque, whom he pretended to be his vassall, for
that he had abated the coyne: and yet theThe prince cannot
alter his coyne. kings of Arragon themselves did erre in that point,
so as pope Innocent the 3 did forbid them as his vassals
not to vse it: whereupon the kings of Arragon comming to the crowne doth sweare
not to change the waight and price of their money, which hath been allowed. But
it is not sufficient to make such protestations, vnlesse the value and waight
of money be ordred as it ought, to the end that neither prince nor subiect may
falsifie it if they would, the which they
will alwayes do, hauing the meanes, what punishment soeuer be inflicted. The
ground of all these counterfet coyners, washers, clippers, and boylers of
money, growes by the mixtures which are made of mettals, for one mettall being
pure and simple cannot be supposed for another, differing by nature in colour,
waight, substance, and sound. To preuent all these inconueniences, you must
ordaine that in every Commonweale the coynes be of one mettall without mixture,
and publish the Edict of the Emperour Tacitus, who
defended upon losse of life andCovnes should be simple
without any mixture. goods, to mingle gold with siluer, nor siluer
with copper, nor copper with tinne or lead. But we may
except from this law the mixture of copper with tinne, which makes the sounding mettall, whereof bels and ordinance are
cast, not so much used in old times as now: for it is not necessarie to mixe
the twentieth part of lead with pure tinne to make it more malliable, seeing it
may be cast and put in worke without any such mixture, the which hurts the
bountie of the tinne, and can neuer be drawne from the lead. This law must not
only hold in coynes, but in all plate and works of gold or siluer, in the which
falsehood and corruption is more ordinarie than in coynes, for that the triall
is not so easie, and oftentimes the workemanship is as deere as the substance
it selfe: wherein Archimides is much deceiued, seeking
to find out what the goldsmith had stolne out of that great crowne of king Hieron, and not to deface the fashion, (for as then they
had no vse of the touchstone) he tooke two lumps or masses one of gold, and another of siluer, putting either of them
into a vessell full of water, and by the effusion of the water he iudged the
proportion of the gold and siluer, then filling itArchimides
error in triall of mettals. againe with water, he put the crowne into
it, the which cast forth lesse water then the masse of siluer, and more then
that of gold, whereby he coniectured that the goldsmith had stolne a fift part:
but his iudgement was vncertaine, for he supposed the mixture or allaie to be
of pure siluer, when as the goldsmith to make the gold more firme, and to giue
it the better luster, makes it most commonly of copper, being also of lesse
charge, the which is much lighter then siluer, which makes the gold looke
paler; and so by consequence copper hath a greater bodie then siluer in a masse
of an equall waight, and differs as much as thirteene do from eleuen: and if
the allaie or mixture were of copper and
siluer, it was impossible to make a true iudgement, vnlesse he could
distinguish how much there was of either; and although it were knowne, yet
shall he erre insensibly in measuring the drops of water, through the
difference of the masse and proportion of the mettals: there is no refiner nor
goldsmith in the world so cunning that can precisely iudge by the touchstone
how much siluer or copper is mixt with gold, if the allaie be not of one pure
mettall. And although that goldsmiths and iewellers have falsly complained that
they cannot worke in gold under two and twentie Carrats without losse, or in
fine gold aboue 23 Carrats and three quarters, according to the decree of king
Francis the first published in the yeare 1511: yet
notwithstanding all good orders they make worke at twentie, yea oftentimes at
nineteene Carrats, so as in twentie foure
marks there is five marks of copper or siluer, the which in time is made into
base money by those which vse to counterfe. It is
therefore necessarie to obserue the same proportion and mixture in gold that is
wrought, as in coynes upon the like penalties, to the end that the vse of gold
in plate and moueables may be pure. And for that it is impossible (as refiners
say) to refine gold to 24 Carats, but there must be a little of some other
mettall with it; nor siluer at twelue deniers, but there must be some allaie,
and euen the purest refining according to the lawes is of 23 Carrats and three
quarters, and hath a fourth part of a Carrat of allaie, and of siluer eleuen
deniers, two graines and three quarters, such are the royals of Spaine, or else
eleuen deniers and eighteene graines, as is the siluer at Paris, the which is
of all others the best, for that it hath but a
fortie sixt part of copper mixt with it. And in the best Spanish siluer there
is a thirtie sixt part of copper, and without any great charge (besides the
difficultie and length of time) they may worke gold in plate, or in coyne of 23
Carrats, and siluer of eleuen deniers twelue graines pure, without any allaie:
for in so doing, the proportion of gold to siluer shall be equall, for the
allaie shall be alike in the one and the other, that is to say, that in 24
pounds of siluer at eleuen deniers and twelue graines; and in 24 pounds of gold
at 23 Carrats: there is a pound of other mettall in the gold which is not gold,
and so likewise in the siluer which is not siluer, be it copper or any other
mettall, and such siluer is called in this realme,
the kings siluer, in the which the 24 part is
copper, and by this meanes the coynes of gold and siluer shall be stronger, and
more durable, whereby they get much in the working in the fier, and in sodring,
and they keepe it from wasting and brittlenes.
And to the end the iust proportion of gold to siluer, obserued in al Europe
& neighbour nations, (of twelue for one, or thereabouts) may bee also kept
in the weight of money: it is needfull to coine money of gold and siluer of the
same weight of sixteen, two and thirtie, and threescore and foure peeces to the
Marke, without any alteration either in raising or abating; to auoid on the one
side the difficultie of stamping it, and on the other side the brittlenesse of
fine gold and siluer, if the coine were lighter than one denier. Whereas on the
other side also, if they make any come weighing aboue halfe an ounce, it is easily counterfeited, by reason of the
thicknesse thereof: as we see in the Portugueses of gold, and the Dollers of
siluer, which weigh aboue an ounce: as also that coine of three Markes and a
halfe, which the emperour Heliogabulus caused to be
made: and that which was coined with the stampe of Constantinople, weighing a
marke of gold, whereof the emperour Tiberius presented
fistie to our king Childeric. By which meanes neither
chaungers, nor marchants, nor goldsmiths, shall euer be able to deceiue the
common people, which is ignorant of the bountie and weight: for they shall be
alwayes forced to giue twelue peeces of siluer for one of gold; and every one
of the peeces of siluer, shall weigh as much as the peece of gold of the same
marke: as we see in the single Royals of
Spaine, which weigh as much as the French Crowne, which are (according to the
weight set downe in the yeare 1540) two deniers sixteene graines; and that
twelue single are iust the value of a French Crowne. Why then may not all
coynes of gold and siluer be equall in weight? and all of one weight of both
mettals have one stampe, or caracture? Why may there not be the same likenesse
& proportion of both mettalls? If this might be effected (as I hope it
will) all meanes to falsifie money would be taken away. And to the end the
simpler sort may not be abused in the chaunge of the said peeces, as well of
gold, as of siluer; nor to take the single for the double (as they do
oftentimes in Royals of Spayne, and in the new coyne of king Henry the second) it is needfull that the stampes be diuers, and not
alike as those of Spaine. And yet as touching
siluer, to the end they shall hold the certaine titles of Soulz, pettie Denier,
and Liure, as it is specified in the edict of king Henry
the second, made in the yeare 1551; and by reason of the payment of rents,
amercements, and the lords rights, according to the customes and ordinances;
the Soulz shall be of three Deniers weight of the kings siluer (as it is said)
and of sixtie three to the Marke: so foure shall be worth a Liure, as it hath
gone heretofore, the which is the iustest price that can be giuen: and every
peece may be divided into three, so as every one shall weigh a Denier, and
shall goe for foure small Deniers or Pence, and shall be called a common
Denier, to the end the Soulz may alwayes be worth twelue Deniers: & that
the complaints of the lords for their rents and rights, beeing vsually paid in
blanch, or copper money, may cease, being now
conuerted unto Soulzes, such as they were in the time of Saint Lewis▪ that is, sixtie foure to a Marke of the kings
siluer. And as for other growing out of annuities, purchased for money, the
rent must be paid according to the value of the Soulz which it held at that
time, when as the rent was purchased; the which was but foure Deniers an
hundred yeares since, and is now but the third part of the auntient Soulz: the
which it will be needfull to put in vse. Such was the Drachma, or Groat of
siluer, used throughout all Greece, which was the eight part of the ounce,
which wee call a Gros, and of the same weight with the Soulz which Saint Lewis caused to be coined, the which were called Gros
Tournois, or of Tours, and Soulz Tournois: By the
which Soulz Tournois, or of Tours, all antient contracts are ordered, and many
treaties not onely within the realme, but also
among straungers: as in the treatie made betwixt the Bernois, and the three
small Cantons of the Swissers, where it is said, That the Souldiors pay, should
be a Soulz Tournois. The like was in this realme, and for that cause it was
called Sold, and it was like unto the pay of the Romans, as Tacitus said, and of the Grecians, as we read in Pollux. For the Drachma, or Groat, is of the same weight with the
Soulz Tournois. The Venetians have followed the antients, and have made the
ounce of eight Groats, or Drachmaes, and the Drachma of 24 Deniers, and the
Denier of two Halfepence, or twentie foure graines: as we vse in France, from
which order we may not stray, as being most auntient in all Greece, and the
Orientall regions.
True it is, that the auntient Romans hauing their ounce equall with the Greeks,
that is to say, of 576 graines, they divided it into seuen Deniers of their
money, and their Denier was in value an Atticque Drachma, or groat, & three
seuen parts more. WherinDrachma Attica seuen pence
starling.Buda was deceiued, saying, That there were eight Deniers
in the ounce, and that the Romans Denier, or Peny, was equall with the Attique
Drachma, and the Roman pound like unto the Attique Myne; being most certaine
that the Roman pound had but twelue ounces, and the Greeke Myne sixteene
ounces, according to the marchants pound weight within this realme: the which
George Agricola hath well obserued by the calcull of
Plinie, Appian, Suetonius, and Celsus. But at this day it is straunge to see the great diuersitie of
pounds and ounces in all nations, nay in one and the same kingdom there are in a manner an infinit sort of pounds:
whereof I will make mention of some few. An hundred weight at Paris, make 116
pound at Lion, at Rouan 96⅔, at Tholouse 121 pound, at Marseilles 123, at
Geneua 89, at Venice 165½, at Genoa 155, at Basil 98, at London 109½. That of
Pais and Strausbourg agrees, so do they of Basil,
Nuremberg, and Francford, and they of Thoulouse, Mompellier, and Auignon, agree
in the same pound weight: but they of Tours have a lighter pound, for fifteene
ounces at Paris makes sixteene at Tours. The like difference of weight is to be
obserued in the East, and in Affrike, for 100 rowls at Thessalonica, make 91
pounds at Paris: 100 rowls at Damasco, make 120 pounds at Paris, 100 rowles in
Siria, make at Paris 503 pounds and foureteene ounces: the like may be written
of many others. But the lightest pound weight
of all, is that of Naples, for there an hundred pound weight, make but seuentie
foure at Paris. But all this diuersitie of weight may easily bee reconciled in
coynes, if they coine their peeces of gold and siluer of the same weight, the
same name, and the same bountie, that is to say, that there be no more
abatement in the gold, than in the siluer, whereby they can neither raise nor
abate the price; as they do oftner than there are monethes, either at the
peoples pleasure, or of those that have authoritie and credit with princes, who
borrow all the money they can, and then they raise the price of money: so as
one hauing borrowed an hundred thousand crownes, raised it suddenly six pence
in the crowne, whereby he gained two thousand and five hundred pounds starling.
Another abated the course of money in March, and raised it againe in Aprill,
after he had receiued the quarters rent. By
this meanes also you shall cut off all falsifying and counterfeiting of coines,
and the most ignorant shall know the bountie of the one and the other coine by
the sight, the sound, and weight, without either fire or touchstone. For seeing
that all nations for these two thousand yeares and more, have alwaies kept, and
still do keepe an equall proportion from gold to siluer, it will bee impossible
either for the subiect or the prince, to raise, pull downe, or to alter, the
prices of coines of gold or siluer, if base money bee banished the Commonweale,
and gold set at 23 carats. And yet for that the smallest coines are profitable
to the poorer sort, it is needfull to coyne a third
kind of money of copper, without any other mixture, as they haue
begun, and as it is practised in Spaine and
Italie: or else diuide the marke of silue in 15036 peeces, euerie peece
weighing nine graines, that the poore may buy the smallest things therewith.
For whereas the queene of England hath banished all base and copper money, and
reduced all her coines to two kinds onely, the least peece of money, which is a
peny, being in value about ten Deniers, shee takes from her subiects the meanes
to buy any thing at a lesse price; and which is worst, they cannot giue lesse
alms to a poore bodie, than of a peny, which holds many from giuing, as I haue
shewed in the Paradox against Malestroit: the which the
Chauncelour of England caused to be translated in the yeare 1569, hoping to
redresse it. But it were farre more expedient, to have no other coine but of
gold and siluer, if it were possible to coyne any money lesse than the
penie, and that they would diuide the Marke
of siluer (as in Lorraine) into a thousandThe French copy
saith 8000. peeces, which they called Andegauenses: for that Rene duke of Aniou and of Lorraine caused them to be
coined, two hundred whereof make but sixpence; and fortie, one Soulz of our
base money: and yet they are of reasonable fine siluer. But making it but halfe
so little, it would be more firme, and of the same hieght that I have spoken,
and they may be cut and stamped at one instant. For the price of copper being
vncertaine in all places, it is not fit to make money of, the which must
alwayes be kept as certaine as may be: besides, there is no mettall so subiect
to rust, the which doth consume both the stampe and substance: and contrariwise
neither gold nor siluer do euer rust. And as for the price, we read, that
during the Punike warres, the pound of siluer was worth eight hundred and fortie pound weight of copper, after
twelue ounces to the pound; & then the Denier of pure siluer, which was but
the seuenth part of an ounce, was raised from ten pounds of copper to sixteene
(as Plinie saith) which was after the rate of eight
hundred ninetie six pounds of copper, for one pound weight of siluer, the pound
weighing twelue ounces. Afterwards the least coine, which was a pound of
copper, was halfe abated by the law Papiria, so as the price of copper was
double that which it wasFest. lib. 17. in verb.
sestertius. before: and when as siluer came in great aboundance, it was reduced to
a fourth, remaining in the same value, which was 224 pound of copper for a
pound of siluer: the which is neere the estimation of copper in this realme,
whereas one hundred pounds, at sixteene ounces
to the pound, are worth but thirtie six shillings starling: and in Germanie it
is better cheape, although their mouables are thereof; yea in some places the
churches are couered with copper: but in Italy it is deerer, and in Spaine and
Affrike much more, for it is very scant there.
Some one may obiect, That the aboundance of siluer may also cause an abatement
of the price, as we read in Titus Liuius, that by the
treatie made betwixt the Aetolians and Romans, it was said, That the Aetolians
should pay for ten pounds of siluer one pound of gold: and yet by a law made by
Constantine, the pound of gold is esteemed at 41
pound⅖: for he would have them pay five Soulz of gold for one pound of siluer,
making seuentie two Soulz of gold in a pound; so as five Soulz is iust the
fourteenth part of a pound, and two fifts more: and now the price is twelue for
one, or little lesse. True it is, that
heretofore the 18. lib. 10. sh. Marke of pure
gold was esteemed one hundred eightie five Liures; and the 31. sh. 6. d. starling. Marke of siluer fifteene Liures
fifteene Soulz Tournois: so as for one Marke of pure gold vnwrought, they must
have eleuen Markes, five ounces, twentie three Deniers, and five graines, of
the kings siluer vnwrought. Towards the North, where there are many mynes of
siluer, and few of gold, gold is somewhat deerer. The pope of Rome more greedie
of gold than of siluer, did value the Marke of gold at 12 Markes and foure
fifts of siluer: the which is at this present the price of gold and siluer, and
was almost two thousand five hundred yeares since. For wee read in Herodotus, that the pound of gold was valued at thirteene pounds
of siluer: and the Hebrewes in their Pandects,
set a Denier of gold for five and twentie of siluer, the coines of gold being
double to them of siluer; which were twelue and a halfe for one. Wee read also,
that in the time of the Persians, & when as the Commonweals of Greece did
flourish, that an ounce of gold was worth a pound of siluer: for Stater Doricus of the weight of an ounce, was valued at a
pound of siluer, as Iulius Pellux saith. And in Augustus his time, the king of the Indians, had the same
estimation of gold to siluer, the which was then brought to Rome: and therefore
hee commended the iustice of the Romans; as wee read in Plini. Whereby we may coniecture, that
the price of these two mettals holds in a manner throughout all Europe, after
the auntient estimation. But the value of gold was raised under the last
emperours, by reason of the spoyle therof
which had bene made for the guilding of things: as Nero
his great pallace all guilt, the which had galleries of one thousand paces
long: and after him Vespasian, who imploiedA wonderfull masse to guild the Capitoll, seuen millions
and two hundred thousand crownes, to guild the Capitoll. And Agrippa couered all the temple Pantheon with copper, and then guilt
it, to keepe it from rusting. And oftentimes siluer is guilt, although of it
selfe it will neuer take rust. Doubtlesse we may well allow the holy ornaments
to be of gold, for that the law commaunds it: but to have vessels of gold,
beds, bookes, yea and their bridles guilt, argues the madnesse of frantike men:
the which if the prince doth not punish very seuerely, the price of gold must
of necessitie rise: whereof our nation did vehemently complaine unto the
prince, at the estates held at Blois. Moreover siluer hauing no hold, is little
imployed to siluer withall: besides, the mynes
of the North yeeld great store of siluer, & no gold: yet the alteration of
price which is made, in processe of time is insensible, which can be no let but
the valuation of coines made of these two mettals shall be equall in all
states, banishing away all base money. Moreover a generall traffique dispersed
more now over the face of the whole earth than euer, cannot allow of any great
alteration of gold and siluer, but by a common consent of all nations. But it
is impossible to hold the price of things, retaining this base money, the which
is altogether diuers and vnequall: for euen as the price of all things doth
fall, as the value of money decreaseth, (as the law saith) so doth it rise in
raising the price of mony. And it must rise & fall, for that there is no
prince which holds the laws of mynting equall with other Commonweals, nor yet in his owne: for that the Aloy of the Soulz
differs from that of the Teston, and of pettie Deniers Doubles, Lyards, &
peeces of six, and three blankes, the which continue not long in one estate.
The first beginning in this realme to abase the siluer coine, and to mixe the
24 part of copper therewith, was to giue occasion to marchants to bring siluer
into this realme, where there is none growing: for eleuen Deniers and a halfe
in Fraunce, was as much as twelue Deniers in another countrey. But this deuise
was needlesse, considering the great riches of Fraunce, the which they will
alwaies fetch bringing gold and siluer from all parts. This mischiefe tooke
deeper root in the time of Philip the Faire, who did
impaire the blanched money the one halfe, in the yeare 1300, adding as much
copper unto it, as there was siluer: a while after it was brought to a third, so as the new Soulz was worth but a third
part of the auntient. And in the yeare 1322 the Aloie of Soulzes was so weake,
as the Marke of silue was worth 80 8. lib. starling. Liures Tournois, and had 1600 peeces
for a Marke of copper. True it is, that in the same yeare that Charles the seuenth recouered his crowne which had beene
taken from him, he caused a new coine to be made in the moneth of October, the
which was strong and good, so as the Marke of siluer was set at eight 16. . Liures: but in the
yeare 1453, e caused Soulzes to be coined of fiue
Deniers of Aloie, and since they have still decreased: so as king Francis the first, in the yeare 1540, caused some to bee
coyned of three Deniers of sixteene graines: king Henry at three Deniers and twelue graines: so as the auntient Soulz of the kings siluer was worth
almost foure: and king Charles the ninth brought it to
three Deniers, the estimation still continuing alike: for that the price of the
crowne did arise. And in the yeare 1577, under king Henry the third, they decrease almost halfe in weight, and a fourth
part in goodnesse, from those of Francis the first.
Other princes have done no better; for the Crutzer of Germany, which in old
time was siluer at eleuen Deniers & foure graines, is now at foure Deniers
and sixteene graines: the Soulz of Wirtzburg, and the Reichs groschem at six
Deniers, that is halfe siluer, and halfe copper. The Scheslind, the Rape, the
Denier of Strausbourg, at foure Deniers and twelue graines: the Rapephening at
foure Deniers three graines, and the Florines of siluer at eleuen Deniers foure
graines: as also the peeces bee of five and of
ten Crutzers, the Soulz of Flanders or Patars, whereof twentie are worth
twentie and foure of ours, are but three Deniers and eighteene graines of
Aloie, and more than two third parts is copper: the peece of foure Patars is at
seuen deniers ten graines: the Brelingues of Gueldres, are at eight deniers,
and the third is copper. In former times the Soulz, or Groat of England, was at
ten deniers twentie two graines: and neuer did all this base coine continue
aboue twentie or thirtie yeares at one rate or standard, or at the same weight;
and from thence growes the difference of the great Liure Tournois, of the
lesse, and of the meane, the Liure or pound of Normandie, the Liure of
Brittanie,A Liure is two shillings starling and
the Liure of Paris, the which are all different, as wee may yet see it in the
taxes of the popes chamber. And in Spaine the Liure or pound of Barcellona,
Toledo, Molorque; In England the pound
starling is worth ten of ours: And in Scotland there are two sorts of Pounds,
the one starling, the other ordinarie. There is no prince in Italie, that hath
not his Pound different from others: as in like case the Marke hath generally
eight ounces: but the ounce of the Low countries is weaker by six graines than
ours, and then that of Cologne by nine graines, that of Nuremberg six graines,
and contrariwise that of Paris is stronger by an ounce. The Marke of Naples
hath nine ounces, that of Salerne hath ten: and there is no towne almost in all
Italie, but differs in his Marke, which makes the value of their coines so
diuers, being so different in their weight & standard: the which troubles
the poore people much, who loose greatly by
exchange, and generally they which vnderstand not the poier, as they say, or
the difference, as the Banquers speake: that is the value of money of exchange
from one place to another. And therefore they say of a man that is well
practised in affairs, That he vnderstands the poier, as a matter of hard
conceit. For they have made the matter of coines so obscure, by reason of their
mixtures, as for the most part they vnderstand nothing therein. For euen as
artisans, marchants, and every one in his facultie, disguiseth oftentimes his
worke: and as many Physitians speake Latine before women, vsing Greeke
caracters, and Arabike words, and Latine words abridged, yea some times they
blot their paper that it may not be read, fearing that if their secrets were
discouered, they should be little esteemed: so these Mynt-maisters, in stead of
speaking plainely, and to say, that the Marke of gold of twelue parts, hath two
of copper, or of some other mettall, they say,
It is gold of twentie carats: and in stead of saying, that a peece of three
blankes is halfe copper, they say it is siluer of six deniers fine, two deniers
of weight, and fifteene deniers of course, giuing to deniers and carats, the
essence, qualitie, and quantity, of gold and siluer against, nature. And in
stead of saying, the Marke hath threescore peeces, they say, it is of fiue
Soulz currant. Againe they make some coines certaine or stable, some vncertaine
and variable, and the third imaginarie, when as nothing can bee called firme in
matters of coine, hauing so diminished the weight, and impaired the bountie of
the gold and siluer. For the Ducat which goes currant at Venice, Rome, Naples, Palermo, and Messna,
is an imaginarie coyne; it was in old time the same peece of gold weighing an Angell, or else a Medin of
Barbarie, or an Imperiall of Flanders, almost of the same weight and touch with
the auntient Ducat, worth ten Carlius of siluer, and the Carlin ten Soulz of
the countrey, at 46 peeces to the Marke of gold, and six to the ounce, the
which they diuide into thirtie Tarijs, and the Tarij into twentie graines, the
which is one grosse upon the ounce, more than the common ounce, which hath but
eight grosse. The law calleth this coine of gold Solidus, the which (as the
Angell) hath fortie eight peeces for the marke, and seuentie two for the Roman
pound at twelue ounces, the which hath long time bene currant; as it appeareth
by the lawes among the Grecians, Germans, English, French, and Burguignons, and
it is nothing els but our French Crowne of the Sunne. But our Mynt-maisters
hauing not well vnderstood the word Solidus, have within these fiftie yeares set the Sunne
uppon it, tearming it erroneously Aureum Solarem: but
the common people retaining their old speech, call it yet the Crowne Sold, of
Solidus; the which in old time weighted four deniers,
as the Angell. But since princes by little and little, and by graine and
graine, have brought it to three deniers, the which is the old Crowne. And in
the time of king Iohn the old Crowne being diminished by
little and little, as by the auntient Crowne Sold of three graines, they did
coyne Crownes of two deniers and twentie graines weight, of the same standard
with the auntient, the which they called Francs, on foot, and on horsebacke
(for then they called all French men Francs, as yet in all the East all the
nations of the West are called Franques) at which time the Crowne of
Burgongne, which they call Ride, was also
coyned of the same weight and goodnesse: the which have continued vntill the
time of Charles the eight, that the Franc Crowne was
diminished six graines in weight, and three quarters of a Carat in finenesse:
for the old Crownes were of twentie three and three quarters of a Carat, and
the Crownes with the Crowne at twentie three Carats. Afterwards king Francis the first correcting somewhat the Crowne with a
Crowne, caused the Crowne Sold to be coined at two deniers and sixteene
graines, and of the same goodnesse with the other, hauing an eight part of
Aloie put to it: the which continued unto king Henrie,
who added foure grains of weight unto it: and by Charles
the ninth it was diminished five graines, in the yeare 1561. But the old
Crownes, or Ducats of Venice, Genes, Florence, Sienna, Castile, Portugall, and Hongarie, have kept twentie three Carats
three quarters, and two deniers, and eighteene graines of weight, vntill the
yeare 1540, that the emperour Charles the fift impaired
the fioenesse of the Crownes of Spaine, of one Carat and three quarters, and
three graines in weight, causing them to be coined at twentie two Carats, and
two deniers fifteene graines of weight. The Crownes of Castile, Valencia, and
Arragon, the which they call Pistolets, giuing an ill example to other princes
to do the like: as the princes of Italie did, who have caused some to be made
at twentie two Carats & vnder, weighing two deniers and sixteene grains, as
be the Crownes of Rome, Luques, Bologne, Salusses, Genes, Sienna, Sicile,
Milan, Ancona, Mantoue, Ferrara, Florence, and the new Crownes of Venice. True
it is, that Pope Paul the third, began to make
Crownes to be coined in his name at twentie
one Carats and a halfe, and two deniers, and foureteene graines of weight; and
those of Auignon, which were made at the same time under the name of Alexander Farneze legat and the Popes nephew, are baser,
and five deniers lighter in weight; the which brings an infinit losse to the
subiect, and benefit to counterfeit coyners, myntmen, and marchants, which draw
the good money out of the countrey, and coine baser in another place. The which
is more ordinarie in siluer coine of high value, and aboue eleuen deniers pure,
as the Royals of Castile, which hold all eleuen deniers three graines of pure
siluer: out of the which other princes heretofore haue
gained verie much: for being conuerted into French Testons out of ten
thousand pounds starling, they did gaine
six hundred and fiftie pounds, nothing impairing the goodnesse of the Teston of
Fraunce, which holds ten deniers 17 grains of fine. And by the same meanes the
Swissers which conuerted the testons of France into testons of Soleure,
Lucerne, and Vnderuall, gained upon every marke one and fortie4. sh. 2. d. ob. soulz and eleuen deniers tournois: and
for those of Lucerne, Soleure, and Vnderuall, were but of nine deniers and
eighteene graines, which is in the whole marke 23 graines of pure siluer lesse
then those of France, the which were worth 25 soulz tournois. And as for the
waight, those of France are at the least of 25 testons, and five eight parts of
a teston to the marke, so as the testons of Soleure, are lighter in waight
three eight parts of a teston in the marke, the which was worth foure soulz
three deniers tournois. And for that the
testons of Soleure & Lucerne cannot be valued but for siluer of base aloye,
the which they call Billon, being under ten deniers of fie siluer, after the estimation ofBillon. fourteene liures seuenteene soulz foure deniers tournois,
the marke of pure siluer, and the testons of France for that they were aboue
ten deniers of fine siluer were valued for siluer of high aloye, the which are
worth after the same proportion fifteene liures thirteene soulz tournois, the
marke of fine siluer; and by reason of the difference of the bountie of the
siluer the said testons were lesse then those of France 41 soulz eleuen deniers
tournois in the marke, abating for every peece of the said testons one soulz
eleuen deniers. Those of Berne for that they were of nine deniers twentie
graines of fine siluer for the marke were
worth one denier tournois in every peece more then those of Soleure, in gayning
therefore but twelue pence upon a marke it is a great gaine. The Flemings do
the like, conuerting the testons of France in royalls of Flanders. every Prince
hath prouided well by his lawes that neither gold nor siluer should be
transported unto strangers upon grieuous punishments, but it is not possible to
have them well executed, but that much will be transported both by sea and
land. And although none should be transported, yet the subiects should alwayes
have good means to melt, alter and falsifie both gold and siluer coyne, if
there be diuersitie of standards; which growes either by licenses graunted to
some goldsmiths, or done against the lawes; for they purse up that which wants
in the fines of the siluer which they worke, as
well for the abatement which is allowed them, as for the enamell and solder
which they vse, mocking the lawes which are made upon the price of the marke of
gold and siluer, setting what price they please upon their works, so as it is
alwaies sold at a higher rate by the goldsmith then the lawes do allow, siluer
by fortie and five soulz, and gold at twelue or thirteene liures upon the
marke, so as gold and siluer is bought dearer from the goldsmith and marchant,
then from the mint master, who cannot exceed the kings lawes, neither in buying
of stuffes nor in coyning. And as soone as the gold or siluer is coyned into
money of better waight and goodnes then that of neighbor princes, presently it
is molt by the refiners and goldsmiths to put into plate, or to have it coyned
by strangers after their standard, wherein the changers serue as instruments,
and under colour of furnishing the people with
money, trafficke with the goldsmiths and marchant strangers: for it is certaine
and hath been found true, that within these 25 yeares that the pettie soulz was
decried, there hath been coyned in this realme aboue two millions five hundred
thousand pounds starling, besides the peeces of three & sixe blanks,25. Millions of Liures. which are no more to be found,
for that the refiners and goldsmiths found profit in them, so as they which
have great store of gold and siluer plate, can make more vse of it▪ for hauing
bought it deere from the goldsmiths, they are loth to sell it with so great
losse: and euen king Charles the 9 lost much, hauing
exchanged his plate into coyne, whereas before the standard of money coyned was
equall with that of the goldsmiths, so as they could
lose nothing in plate but the fashion, the which continues yet as a
prouerbe, It is siluer plate, there is
nothing lost but the fashion. Therefore to preuent all these inconueniences,
the standard of coyned money, and of works of gold and siluer, must be all one,
that is of three and twentie Carats without any alaie or mixture, in gold; and
eleuen deniers, and eleuen graines in siluer. They had found some meanes to
reforme these abuses, letting out to farme the reuenues of the mint, and the
confiscations and amercements that should grow by forfeitures, the which was
let out in the yeare 1564 for five thousand pound starling a yeare: yet it was
abolished at Moulins in the yeare 1566, and the mints were farmed out to such
as offred to coyne the greatest quantitie of marks of gold and siluer: by this
meanes some branches were cut off, but the rootes of these abuses remained
still, so as the fraud will neuer cease. The root of abuses is the confusion of three mettals, gold, siluer, and
copper; which ceasing, neither shall the subiect nor the stranger be able to
commit any fraud, but it shall bee soone discouered. But euen as copper and
brasse money was not allowed in this realme, for that there was none coyned, so
billon or mixture being forbidden, the strangers base moneyBillon. shall be also banished the realme: but so long as the Prince
or Commonweale shall coyne base money, there is no hope that strangers subiects
will euer cease to counterfet in priuat, or to receiue all strange coynes.
There is also another benefit both to the generall and particular, which growes
(as I have said) by the defence of the mixture of mettals, whereby they shall
auoide hereafter the losse of siluer, the which is accounted for nothing in
gold of 14 Carats and upward, and is lost for the charges of the
refining, the which is done by strong water:
for they must have sixe shillings starling at the least, yea eight to deuide a
marke, yet the losse is very great in a great somme, as all the florins of
Germanie are but sixteene Carats, or sixteene and a halfe at the most, so as in
a hundred thousand marks there are thirtie three thousand marks losse, and of
foureteene Carats fortie thousand marks and more. And besides that which I haue
said, the abuses of officers of the mint shall cease in regard of the
abatements, cut of the whichEscarcetes, & blages. the officers were
payed their wages; for the abolishing whereof, Henry the
2 king of France ordained, that they should be payed by the receiuers of the
same places: which decree although it were holie and good, yet was it
afterwards disanulled by king Charles the 9, for that
the chamber of accompts at Paris gaue the king to vnderstand that hee lost yearely aboue a thousand pounds starling,
whereas hee should reape profit by his mints; for now the officers were paied,
and did in a manner nothing. But the true meanes to preuent all, is to
suppresse all the officers of mints, but only in one towne, where they should
coyne all sorts of moneys, and to cause them to be payed by the receiuer of the
place, the lords right remaining: the which notwithstanding the auntients did
not know, and there was nothing deducted out of the money, no not the right of
Brassage, as it were verie necessarie, or rather that a taxe were laied upon
the subiect for the coyning of money, thereby to take away the lords right, or
any other duties, as they did in old time in Normandie, and at this day in
Polonia, to preuent the notable losse which the subiects do suffer. By this
meanes also the diuersitie of the price of the
marke (which breedes a million of abuses) shall cease, and forraine coynes
shall not be receiued but only to melt, without reckning of any thing for the
lords rights, notwithstanding letters of permission obtained by neighbour
Princes, to deliver forth their money in his realme at the same rates as in
their owne territories. And for the taking away of all occasions for the
falsifying, altering, or changing the standard receiued for coynes of gold
& siluer, it shall be needfull to have all the money coyned in one citie
only, whereas the iudges of the mint shall remaine, and to suppresse all others
(if the monarchie or Commonweale have not so large limits, as of necessitie they must have more) in which place all the refiners
shall worke▪ with a prohibition upon paine of
death not to refine in any other place, for from them come the great abuses,
and to giue notice unto the ordinarie iudges by preuention to punish all abuses
that shall be committed; for it is well knowne what abuses there have been in
this realme in the coyning of money. It is therefore necessarie to imitate the
Romans, who for all the subiects of Italie had the temple of Iuno only where they did coyne three sorts of money pure and simple,
gold, siluer, and copper, and there had three maisters of the mint, who caused
it to be resined and stampt publickly in view of all the world. And to the end
that no man should be abused in the price of the coynes, there was also a place
appointed where to take the essay or triall of money, at the request of Marius Gratidianus. We reade also that in this realme by
a law made by Charlemaigne, it was forbidden to coine any money but in his Pallace, although
his Empire stretched over all Germanie, Italie, and the greatest part of
Spaine: but since that king Philip the faire, Charles his sonne, and king Iohn
had established many mints in this realme, and many masters, prouost and other
officers in every mint, abuses have also multiplied. But here some one may
obiect, that the Persians, Greeks and Romans did coyne money of pure gold,
siluer and copper at the highest value that could be, and yet did they falsifie
it, as we reade in Demosthenes oration against Timocrates. I answere, that it is impossible to purge the
Commonweale cleane of these people, but for a thousand that are now you shall
not then find ten, the value of gold and siluer being knowne to every
man as I have declared. And if there be any
prince so ill aduised as to alter the bountie of his money to gaine thereby, as
Marc Anthonie did, who coined siluer that was very
base, it will be sooner reiected, besides the blame he shall receiue of all
men, and the hazard of the rebellion of his subiects, the which was great at
such time as Philip the faire imbased the money.
Whatsoeuer the reasons be, it is most certaine there were neuer fewer coyners
of counterfet money than in the Romans time, when as they had no money either
of gold or siluer but of a high standard; and therefore Liuius Drusus the Tribune was blamed, for that he had presented a
request unto the people to have an eight part of copper mingled with the siluer
money, or as the mintmen say, they should coine money of ten deniers and twelue
graines fine: which shewes that euen in those
daies they would not admit any confusion or mixture of gold or siluer, and that
their siluer was of the highest rate, as also their gold, as we may see in
their medalles of gold, the which are of 23 carats and three quarters; and we
find some marked with the Emperour Vespasian, where
there wants but the 32 part of a Carat but it had been 24 Carats; the which is
the purest and finest gold that can be seene. But it sufficeth for the reasons
that I have alledged, that the gold be of 23 Carats, and the siluer at eleuen
Deniers and twelue graines pure. And let them not excuse themselves that they
cannot command the fire, and therefore they demaund a fourth or an eight part
of alaie: the which is the cause of many abuses. Yet some may say that it is
more expedient to coine dobles and deniers of baser siluer, to auoide the
heauines of copper money. I say, that if it be
allowed to coyne base money how small soeuer, that it will proue very
preiudiciall, and will be practised in liards and soulzes. And although they
did coyne nothing but Dobles and Deniers, yet should they alwaies open a gap
for coyners to deceiue the common people for whom this money is made, in the
which he hath no knowledge, neither doth he care to have any, for the small
value, without inquiring of the bountie thereof. I have a letter of Iames Pinatel written to king Henry the 2, in the which are these words: Sir, I thought good to
aduertise you that within these sixe moneths they have coyned in one of your
mints, soulzes that are too base by foure shillings in waight upon every marke,
and foure soulz in the goodnes of the mettall: when i
shall please your Maiestie I will shew you the worke,
and I will acquaint you with the losse which
you and your subiects do receiue, the which will grow greater if you preuent it
not with all rigour. It was at that time that he coyned the peeces of sixe
blanks, or three pence by the kings commandement, of foure deniers of siluer,
and two deniers of copper, and foure deniers and foureteene graines of waight;
the which was the best mixture of base money that was then in France, so in
like sort they were soone molten, and few of them are now to be seene. every
man knowes that the losse which the king and the subiect receiued of two
shillings five pence upon the marke, came to aboue five and twentie in the
hundred, and yet the same Pinatel (hauing gotten vnder
hand a commission from the generals of the mint, in the yeare 1552) caused
Dobles and Deniers to be coined at Villeneufue of Auignon, and at Villefranche
of Rouergue, which were valued but at twelue
soulz the marke; and that it was verified that by this meanes he had stollen
little lesse than fortie thousand pounds starling, and had purchased his pardon
for five thousand pounds, the which he gaue unto a Ladie, a fauorite of the
kings, who did only defer this wicked mans punishment, but not quite free him.
I conclude therefore that we must not by any meanes allow of any mixtures, no
not in the smallest coynes, if we will purge the Commonweale of all counterfet
money. By this meanes also the domage shall cease which the poore receiue by
the decrying of money, or deminution of the price thereof, after they have made
them baser; neither shall they have any credit with princes which suggest vnto
them the profit that they may receiue by their mints, as a certaine officer of
the mint did, who gaue the councell of the
treasor to vnderstand, and did also write unto king Charles the 9, That he might make a great proffit of his mints for the
ease of his people: and in truth by his computation it was found that every
marke of pure gold wrought would yeeld unto the king sixteene shillings
starling, whereas he receiued but two shillings sixe pence, and foure deniers:
and for the marke of siluer wrought the king should get foure shillings,
whereas now he gained but sixteene deniers being wrought in testons. He aduised
to coine money of the kings siluer of twelue soulz tournois currant, and of
thirtie peeces to the marke, of the waight of sixe deniers nine grains, the
halfe and the quarters after the rate; and of gold coines of 24 Carat, and one
Carat of alaie, of thirtie peeces to the marke, & of the same waight with
the siluer of six liures tournois. He would also have them coine small base money of three deniers of goodnes, and
320 to the marke, and of three deniers currant, and all other kind of billon or
base money under ten deniersBillon. fine, rating the
marke at foureteene 28. sh. starling. liures
tournois. This was his aduice, but it was reiected as it deserued, for it is a
very ridiculous thing to thinke that the king can draw so great a profit from
his mints, and yet ease his people, if that be true which Plato saith, That no man gaines but another looseth: and the losse by
an ineuitable necessitie fell upon the subiect, seeing the stranger felt not of
it. It is very necessarie that some great prince should mediate that by his
ambassadors with other princes, to the end that all by a generall consent
should forbid the coining of base money, setting the value of gold and siluer
as it hath been formerlie said, and vsing the marke at eight gros or drachmas, and of 570 graines to the ounce, the which
is the most common; and therefore should not be of any great difficultie, for
that the Catholike King and Queene of England have alreadie banished all base
money, and all the coines of gold in Spaine (except the Pistolets, and the
money of Portugall) are at the highest value, and their coines of siluer at
eleuen deniers and three graines, the which is the highest that is. And it
should be good to have the money cast in forme of a medall, as the auntient
Greeks, Latins, Hebrews, Persians and Aegiptians did, for the charge should be
much lesse, the facilitie greater, and the roundnesse more perfect, to preuent
all clippers, it should not be subiect to bow and
breake, and the marke would continue for euer, we should not be troubled with hammering, neither should there
be any need of a cutter, of the cisers, or of any helpe at the waight, which
falls not out so in that which is stampt; moreouer, they shall make more in one
day than they can do now in a yeare. They should also take away all meanes from
false coyners to mingle mettals so easily as they do with the presse and the
stamp, whereas the peece stretcheth out in breadth which couers the thicknes,
whereas the mould would make all medalls of the same mettall equall in bignes,
waight, breadth and forme: whereas if a counterfetter would mixe copper with
gold more than the allowance of 23 carats, the volume of copper which is in an
equall waight twise as big and an eight part more, than that of gold, or twise
and an eight part lighter than gold in an equall masse, would make the
medall much greater, and discover the
falsehood. For it is most certaine, that if a masse of gold equall to a masse
of copper doth waigh 1550 ferlins, that of copper shall waigh but 729 ferlins,
the which is as seauenteene to eight in a grosse waight; as I have learned of
Francis de Foix that great Archimedes of our age, who first discouered the true proportion of
metalls in waight and quantitie. We will hold the same opinion of siluer, which
hath a greater masse than gold in an equall waight, and that gold is heauier
than siluer in an equall masse, once more and foure five parts, which is 1551
in comparison of 998, or of nine to fiue: and of copper to siluer, as of eleuen
to thirteene, or precisely, as 729 to 998, which approch neerer in waight and
substance than the rest, except lead, the which
is heauier than siluer, and differs as fifteene to foureteene, or more
precisely, as 998 to 929; but they can make no vse of it to counterfet, for
that it flies from all other mettalls but from tinne: and much lesse can they
vse tinne, being a poison to all other mettalls, and cannot be cast for siluer,
for that it is lighter as much as nine is to thirteene, or precisely as 600 is
to 929: and much lesse being disguised for gold, the which is heauier than
tinne in an equall masse, or of a lesse volume in an equall waight, as much as
is betwixt eighteene and seauen, or ustly betwixt
1551 and 600, the which is twise and two seauen parts heauier. As for ron, those that do counterfet can make no vse of it by
melting, for that it will not be mixt neither with gold nor siluer; and the
brasing of plates upon iron is not hard to discouer. Plinie calles it Feoruminatio, and we, brazing or soldring, the which the
counterfetters of his time did vse. The Seigneur of Villemor, Commissarie of
the warres, did shew me an auntient medall of iron couered with siluer, yet the
waight and the bignes doth easily discover the falsehood, if they looke
narrowly into it, for that siluer is heauier than iron in an equall masse, or
lesse in quantitie being of equall waight, as much as is from foure to three,
or precisely from 998, to 634. And as for gold, it is impossible that this
ferrumination and soldring can any thing auaile coyners, seeing that gold is
lesse of bodie than iron in an equall waight, or more heauie in an equall
masse, as much as is from sixe to nine, or of 1556 to 634. It is not to be
feared that quicksiluer can falsifie these two mettals, although it approcheth
as neere to gold in waight as three to foure, or 1558 to 1551, for that they have not so great knowledge to fixe it,
but it euaporates into smoke. And thus much as touching the forme of coynes,
and the profit that shall come by casting, as it was in old time, and vntill
their mines of gold and siluer were worne and spent, and these two mettals
worne, lost, hidden, and dispersed, then were they forced to make their money
so thin, as they could not marke them but with the hammer, the which hath since
been the occasion of many abuses; but euen as the first man hauing little gold
and siluer, stampt it with the hammer, and afterwards hauing greater store
began to cast it, in like sort must we now returne to casting. They began to
come with a mill, but by proofe it appeared that it did not marke well, and
that there was alwaies thirtie marks of clippings upon
a hundred marks of substance, whereas there is
but one or two at the hammer, and the sound also did differ from that which was
stampt: and which is more, the peeces were found not to be alwaies of one
waight, for that the plates were sometimes drawne thinner of one side then of
another. As for that which I have said, that the marke of gold and siluer
should be divided into peeces equall of waight, without fraction of peeces upon
the marke, nor of deniers upon the peece, nor of graines upon the denier, the
profit is very apparant, as well for the changes of marks of peeces, as for the
value, waight, and vndoubted course: so did the auntients for the peece of gold
or siluer waighing foure drachmas, the which is halfe an ounce, shall be equall
to the sicle of the Hebrews, and the peece of two drachmas or of 32 to the
marke shall be equall to the stater Atticus, to the old Philip, to the rose
noble, and to the medalls of gold of the
auntient Romans, which the law called Aureus: and the peece of one groat, sold
tournois or drachma of 64 to the marke, shall be equall to the Attique drachma,
and to the Zuza of the Hebrews, the which in Greece, and throughout all the
East was a hirelings daies worke. True it is that the siluer pennie of the
Romans was more in waight than three seuen parts, then a souldiers daies pay in
Augustus time, the which is a little more then a
single roiall of Spaine. And if the alterations and changes which are made
sodenly be hurtfull and pernitious, they may proceed by little and little,
causing money to be coined as I have said. upon these difficulties (being
deputed for the Prouince of Vermandois, at a Parliament held at Blois) I was
called with the first President and three Generals of the mint, and Marcel Superintendent of
the Treasure, to repaire the abuses of money, and in the end all that I haue
heere said was held to be very necessary, and yet the difficultie and diseases
of the Commonweale which were incurable, would not at that time allow of it:
which was as much to say, that it were better the sick should perish in
languishing, than to cause himBillon. to drinke a
troublesome potion to cure him. I confesse that siluer mixt will come but to a
moitie, being purified to eleuen deniers, twelue graines; but it will continue
for euer if the standard be once setled as I have said, if it be not done the
Commonweale must needs come to ruine.
CHAP. IIII. A Comparison of the three lawfull
Commonweales, that is, a popular estate, an Aristocraticall, and a royall; and
that a royall Monarchie is the best.
WEe have hitherto in my opinion discoused at large of all the parts of a Commonweale, it
remaines for a conclusion to know the commodities and discommodities of every
kind of State, and then to make choise of the best, the which was necessarie to
reserue unto the end, after that we had
discoursed both in generall & in particular of all the points of a
Commonweale. Seeing then there are but three sorts of Commonweales, that is,
when as the whole people, or the greatest part commaunds with absolute power,
or else the least part of the citisens, or one alone; and that either of the
three may be honest and commendable, or vicious, we must not only flie that
which is most vicious, but also chuse the best. The tyrannie of one absolute
prince is pernitious, & of many much worse: but there is no tyrannie so
dangerous as that of a multitude; for so doth Cicero call it: yet is it not so bad as Anarchia, where there
is no forme of a Commonweale, no man commands,
and no man obeyes. Let vs therefore she those that be vicious, and make choise
of the best of these three lawfull governments: and to the end that all may be
made plaine, I will set downe the commodities and discommodities of every one
apart. First, some one may say, that a popular estate is the most commendable,
as that which seekes an equalitie and indifferencie in all lawes, without
favour or acception ofReasons for a Popular estate.
persons, and which reduceth their civill constitutions to the lawes of nature:
for euen as nature hath not distributed riches, estates and honors more to one
than to another, so a popular estate tends to that end, to make all men equall,
the which cannot be done, but by imparting riches, honors & iustice equally
to al men without priuilege or prerogative whatsoeuer; as Licurgus did, hauing changed the royall estate into a
popular, he burnt all obligations, banished
gold and siluer, and divided the lands by equall lots; then tooke he great
pleasure to see the shocks of corne equall in the field, thereby cutting off
couetousnes and arrogancie, two of the most pernitious plagues of a
Commonweale, and not only those, but he also banished rapine, theft, extorsion,
slanders, partialities and factions, which can have no place when all are
equall, and that one can have no preheminence over another. If then societie
betwixt man and man cannot be maintained without friendship, and that the nurse
of friendship is equalitie; seeing there is no equalitie but in a popular
state, of necessitie that forme of Commonweale must be the best: in the which a
naturall libertie and iustice is equally distributed to all men without feare
of tyranie, crueltie, or exaction; and the sweernes of a sociable life seemes
to draw men to the felicitie which nature
hath taught vs. There is one point that seems very considerable, to shew that a
popular estate is the goodliest, the most excellent, and the most perfect,
which is, That in a Democraty there have alwaies been greater commanders in
armes, and worthier men in lawes, greater orators, philosophers and handicrafts
men than in the other two estates: whereas the faction of few great men among
themselves, and the iealousie of a Monarke keepes the subiects from all noble
attempts. And it seemes that the true marke of a Commonweale consists in a
popular estate only, in the which the whole people inioyes the publick,
diuiding the common treasure amongst them, with the spoiles, rewards, honors
and conquests, whereas few noblemen in
Aristocratia, and one in a Monarchie seeme to conuert all the publicke good to
their owne priuate commodities. To conclude, if there be nothing more to be
desired than to have the magistrates obedient to the lawes, and the subiects to
the magistrates, it seemes it is best obserued in a popular state, whereas the
law alone is ladie and mistres over all. These reasons are produced by popular
men to maintaine a popularReasons against a Popular
estate. estate; they have a goodly shew, but in effect they are like
unto spiders webs, the which are very subtill and fine, but have no great
force: for first of all, there was neuer Commonweale where this equalitie of
goods and honors was obserued, as we have shewed before concerning goods; and
as for honors, they should do therein contrarie to the law of nature, which
hath made some more iudicious and more ingenious than others, and by consequence hath ordained some to gouerne,
and others to obey; some she hath made wise and discreet, others foolish and
mad; to some she hath giuen excellencie of wit to gouerne and command, to
others force of bodie to execute their commandements. And as for the naturall
libertie they so much preach of in a popular estate, if that were of force,
there should neither be magistrates, lawes, nor any forme of state whatsoeuer;
else there should be no equalitie: and yet there is no forme of Commonweale
which hath so many lawes, so many magistrates, nor so many comptrollers as a
popular estare. And as for the publick reuenues and treasor, it is most
certaine that there is no Commonweale where it is worse gouerned than by the
people, as we have declared elsewhere. Whereof amongst
many others, Xenophon is a worthy witnesse: I cannot (said he) allow of the Athenians estate, for
that they have followed that for me of Commonweale, whereas the wicked are
alwayes in greatest credit, and men of honour and vertue troden under foot. If
Xenophon (who was one of the greatest captaines of
his age, and who then carried away the prize to have happely ioyned the
mannaging of affaires with armes and Philosophie) hath giuen such a censure of
his Commonweale, which was the most popular, and amongst the popular the most
esteemed, and best ordered; or to speake more properly, the least vicious (as
Plutarch saith;) What iudgement would he have giuen
of other Democraties, and Ochlocraties? Wherein Machiauel is much deceiued, to say, That a Popular estate is the best:
and yet forgetting his first opinion, in anther place hee said, That the onely
meanes to restore Italie to her libertie, is
to have one prince, labouring to frame the most Tyrannicall estate in the
world. And in another place he confesseth, That the estate of Venice is the
goodliest of all, the which is more Aristocraticall: so as no man can iudge
what this wicked and inconstant man meanes. If we shall beleeue Plato, wee shall find that he hath blamed a Popular
estate, tearming it, A Faire where every thing is to bee sold. We have the like
opinion of Aristotle, saying, That neither Popular nor
AristocraticallA Popular estate condemned of many great
men. estate is good, vsing the authoritie of Homer,. And the Orator Maximus Tirius holds, That a Democraty is pernitious,
blaming for this cause the estate of the Athenians, Syracusians, Carthagineans
and Ephesians: for it is impossible (saith Seneca) that
he shall please the people, that honours vertue. And therefore Phocion (one of the wisest, and most vertuous men that
euer was) was alwaies opposit to the people of Athens, and the people to him:
and as on a certaine day the Athenians allowed of his counsell, he turned to
his companions, saying, Quid malū mihi accidit, vt populi
sensus cum meis congruerent, What ill have I done, that the people
concur with me in opinion? And how can a multitude, that is to say, a Beast
with many heads, without iugemēt, or reason, giue any good councel? To aske
councell of a multitude (as they did in oldtimes in Popular Commonweals) is to
seeke for wisdome of a mad man. The which Anacharsis
seeing, & that the magistrats and antients delivered their opinions in open
assembly, and then the people concluded; he said, That in Athens wise men
propounded, and fooles disposed. And admit one might draw a good resolution
from a multitude, who is he so sencelesse,
that would thinke it fit to publish a matter of state in an open assembly? Is
it not to prophane holy things? and yet holy things beeing prophaned, may be
purified: but a secret concerning affaires of estate, being once published and
spred abroad, there can nothing be expected but preiudice and dishonour to the
Commonweale. And for this cause especially the Commonweale of Athens, of
Siracusa, and of Florence, have bene ruined. I omit the difficultie to assemble
the people in one place, the disorder that is in a multitude, the varietie and
inconstancie of people gathered together of all sorts: and yet (if it please
not the magistrat) neither shall Senat nor people be assembled: as it happened
in Caesars Consulship, who to preuaile in his attempts
(hauing terrified Bibulus his companion, and drawne his
sword upon him) he would not suffer the Senat
to be assembled so long as his office continued. And if the Tribune were vnited
with the Consull, neither there the Senat nor the people could be assembled: so
as the authoritie of the Senat, and the soueraigne maiestie, was by this meanes
subiect unto six or seuen: whereby the state was brought into great danger, in
not resoluing speedily in vrgent affaires. For by the lawes of Solon, and of the twelue tables, the people must bee
assembeld three times, before they should allow of any law that was published.
Oftentimes it chaunced, that the flying of a bird on the right hand, or the
crying of a rat, or the falling sicknesse (it may be of some drunken man)
hindred the assembly; or at the least protestation of
some stamering sooth-sayer, or the opposition
of a magistrat, all was dissolued. Whereof Cicero and
Cato himselfe complained verie much, for the power
and favour of competitors (which were alwaies many in number) to have offices,
and being enemies one to another, hindred the assembly of the people, or
troubled it being assembled; and the magistrats which were in office supported
them, to continue their power: so as sometimes a whole yeare was spent without
the creation of a new magistrat: as it happened when as Pompey the Great was chosen Consull alone. And therefore the Grisons,
who maintaine a Popular estate, assemble the people but every two yeares at
Coire, for the creating of new magistrats, andThe Grisons
assembled every two yeares. the making of new lawes. For there is
nothing more daungerous, nor more contrarie to a Popular estate, than to
continue magistrats long in their office. What is more absurd, than to allow of the rashnesse of a light and inconstant
multitude for a law, who in discerning and giuing of honours, are commonly
carried away with a blind and inconsiderat violence, rather than with any
setled iudgement? What is more foolish, than in the greatest extremities of a
Commonweale, to seeke councell from a mad multitude? for the magistrat can do
nothing without commaund, and if they might they would not; neither dare they,
being terrified with the peoples furie, who impute all mischaunces, and their
owne errours, unto the magistrats. So as Philip the
first, king of Macedon, hauing inuaded and spoyled the confines of Attica,
there was not any magistrat that durst assemble the estates, the people came to
the place of assemblies vncalled,A multitude is amazed in
danger. whereas they found no man that durst speake unto them, as Demosthenes writeth. The
like happened at Florence, when as the emperours armie approached to besiege
them, at the instance of pope Clement the seuenth, al
the people were so amazed, as they knew not what to resolue: For by the lawes
of Florence, all the citisens should assemble before the Towne house, to
resolue upon the articles propounded by the chiefe magistrat, and then they
were quite daunted. It is the weaknesse of a multitude (saith Titus Liuius) to waxe proud, and to insult with all licentiousnesse in
prosperitie, and to be deiected and amazed with any aduersitie. And how is it
possible that the soueraigne maiestie of an estate shall be maintained by a
multitude, guided by a magistrat, who oftentimes must keepe them in awe by
seueritie, Et in qua regenda plus poena, quam obsequiumvalet (said Titus Liuius) In the
government whereof punishment more than obedience preuailes. So Phocion, seeing that the Athenians would not giue him
audience, he cried out, O fustuarium Corcyraeum, quous talento pretio sius, O scourge of Corfu, moreA multitude cannot
maintain a maiestie. pretious than any
talent: Which shewes the maiestie doth perish and decay in a multitude, whereon
the chiefe ground of a Commonweale consists. But passing on, all men that haue
written of estates, do hold, That the chiefe end of all Commonweales, is to
flourish in pietie, iustice, valour, honour, and vertue; by the which humane
society is preserued. But a Popular estate hath bene alwaies opposit, and an
enemie to all good men. For the preseruation of a Popular estate (if we shall
beleeue Xenophon) is to aduance the most vitious and
vnworthy men to offices and dignities. And if the people should be so ill
aduised, as to giue offices of honour unto vertuous men, they loose their
The end of Popular estates, is to banish vertue.
power: for that good men would favour none but the good, which are alwayes
fewer in number: and the wicked and vicious (which is the greatest part of the
people) should be excluded from all honour, and by little and little banished:
so as in the end wise men should seize upon the estate, and take that from the
people. The Athenians therefore (said Xenophon) gaue
audience to the most wicked, knowing well, that they would speake pleasing
things, and profitable to the vicious, as most of the people be. I cannotXenophon giues a true iudgement of a Popular estate.
(said Xenophon) but blame the Athenians, to have chosen
the most vicious forme of a Commonweale: but hauing chosen it, I doe much
esteeme them they doe so carefully maintaine it, in
reiecting, chasing away, and banishing the noble, wise, and vertuous;
& aduancing the impudent, wicked, &
vicious: for the which vice thou so much blamest (saith he) is the preseruation
of a Popular estate. And as for iustice, the people (saith hee) have no regard
of it, so as they may get profit by their iudgements, which they sell to them
that will giue most, seeking by all meanes to ruine the rich, the noble, and
the vertuous, whome they torment continually, for the capitall hatred they
beare against all good men, being contrarie to their naturall dispositions. And
therefore a Popular state is the sinke and refuge of all turbulent spirits,
mutines, seditions, and banished men, which giue councell, comfort, and aid,
unto the people to ruine great men: For as for the lawes they have no respect
of them, for that in Athens the peoples will is a law. This is Xenophons opinion, touching the Commonweale of
Athens, who saith, it was the best ordered
of al the Popular Commonweals in his time: neither would he have them to change
any thing to maintain the people in their greanes.
The like censure Marcellus the lawyer hath of a
strumpet, saying, That shee hath not well done to have abandoned her honour;
but hauing lot all modestie, it was not ill done, to
get what she could by her trade. So Xenophon concludes,
That a Popular estate is nothing worth, but to maintaine it so being once
setled, they must banish all honor and vertue: that is to say, the greatest
tyranny is not so daungerous, as a Popular estate thus gouerned.
But there is yet one plague more capitall in Popular estates, the which is,
ImpunitieImpunitie of vice in a Popular estate. to
the wicked, so as they be citisens, that is to say, pettie kings: and euen in
the Popular estate of Rome, it was forbidden
to all magistrats upon paine of death, To condemne to death, or to banish any
citisen, nor to depriue him of his libertie or priuilege of a citisen, nor to
whip him with rods. For it is a setled law almost in all Popular estates, Ne ciuis quisquam quantumcumque scelus siue in deos, siue in
homines admiserit, capite feriatur, That no citisen should die the
death, what offence soeuer he had committed either against the gods, or men.
Therefore Verres (omitting the rest) being accused and
condemned of theft, and of a hundred thousand concussions, extortions, and
false iudgements; was thought to be seuerely punished, for that hee was
enioyned to depart out of Rome: and why, for that Popular states would haue
their libertie defended with the lenitie of lawes, and not with the sharpnesse
of punishments. And yet they banished Rutiius, Metellus, Coriolanus,
the two Scipions, brethren, and Tully: as in Ephesus they banished the vertuous Hermodorus: in Athens they expelled Aristides
the iust, ThemistoclesThe most vertuous are banished, and he wicked escape, in a Popular estate. died in exile, Miltiodes in prison, Socrates by
poyson. And although that Phocion the most iust and
vertuous man of his age, had bene chosen Generall fortie and five times,
without any reproach or blame, yet (without any accusation or information
against him or his companions) a base pleader, of the scumme of the people,
steps up before the multitude, and demaunds, If they would have Phocion and his companions put to death: wherewith all in
generall did arise up, and holding up their hands, condemned him, not excluding
any slaue, woman, nor straunger from this condemnation, for the which many ware
garlands of flowers. Which Phocion hearing, said, Mequidam a vobis damnari facile patior: sed cur isti? For
my part, I am contented to bee condemned by you: but why these men? To whome
the people being mad, aunswered, Quoniam tibi sunt
amici. Neither was the furie of this mad people pacified, vntill they
were all without sentence, accusation, or cause, put to death. Neither is there
any hope, if a multitude begin once to insult over the good, that either shame
or reason shal reclaime them from their furie and madnesse. Yet notwithstanding
the wicked do commonly escape the peoples hands: which Demosthenes seeing, and that they had absolued Antipaphon, a most capitall offender, he proceeded, and caused him to
be condemned, and afterwards put to death by a decree
of the Areopagits, little regarding the people,
for the which he was not blamed. Whereby it appeares, that there was neither
iustice nor maiestie in a Popular estate. And as in a Popular Commonweale thus
gouerned, all offices are sold to them that will giue most, so the magistrats
sell by retaile that which they have bought in grosse. And euen Marus durst carrie bushels of
siluer into the assemblies at Rome, to purchase the peoples voices: the like
wee read of Pompey. It is no maruell then if we read of
infinit corruptions and concussions in Rome: but it was more fowle and odious
in Athens, whereas when Stratocles and Damoclides entred into their offices, they did openly brag▪ That they
went to a golden haruest. If offices, lawes, iustice, and honours, were so
vnworthily sold in these great Commonweales, being inriched with the spoyles of
other people; what shall we iudge of Popular
estates opprest with want and need? Wee have the example of the
Megarences,Popular estates exceed in all
licentiousnesse. who hauing expelled their prince Theagines, established a Popular estate so licentious, as it was
lawfull for the poore to goe and spoyle the rich, as it is in Plato. Euen so wee read, that the Swissers did long after they had
expelled the nobilitie. If they would have any one spoyled by the multitude,
they did set the picture of a man with boughes under him at his doore, and then
was he presently stript of all that he had, were he the richest or most
innocent citisen. And they which doe so highly commend the Popular estate of
the Romans, should rather have extolled the worthy deeds of noble and valiant
men, than the cities forme: they should set before their eyes the seditions and
civill warres, wherewith that citie had bene
shaken, and represent the people of the one side of a mountaine, and the
nobilitie of another, divided three times; and many times the furious Tribunes
with their turbulent Orations, to threaten death or banishment to the best
citisens: Sometime Saturnine the Tribune, with a rabble
of rascals, slaues, and artisans, armed with staues and stones, to come into
the open assembly of the people, and to expell the honester partie, and kill
him that was chosen Consull by the peoples suffrages. The which the Tribunes
alone did not, being enraged against the Consuls, but euen the Consuls among
themselves. How many murthers of citisens have beene seene in the middest of
the citie, in the field of Mars, in the court, in the
temples of their gods, yea in Iupiters capitoll, Tiberius and Caius Gracehus, Drusus,
Saturninus, and Sulpitius, were cruelly slaine: when as the Consull Cassius made a proclamation, That all the Latines, and
Heniques, which had no houses within Rome, should depart the citie. Virginius his companion made a decree to the contrarie,
not so much to crosse his companions authoritie, but to set the citisens and
straungers together by the eares in the middest of the citie. What was more
vnworthy, or more contrarie to civill societie, than to see a citisen under an
innocent gowne, to come armed to the assembly, to sue for offices, as if they
went to warre, and oftentimes the contrarie factions fell to blowes. And Tully saith, Lapidationes in foro saepe
vidius, non saepe▪ sed tamen nimis saepe
gladios, We have oftentimes seene stones cast in the assembly of the
estates, and swords drawne, not so often, but yet too often. And a little
after, Meministis (inquit) corporibusciuium Tiberim compleri: cloacas refarciri, e foro spongijs
effundi sanguinem, You remember (said he) that the riuer of Tibe hath bene filled with the bodies of citisens, that the
common priuies have bene stuffed full, and the blood suckt up in the market
place with sponges. To conclude, if we shall rip up all the Popular estates
that euer were, we shall find, that either they have had warre alwayes with the
enemie, or within the state: or else that they have bene gouerned in shew by
the people; but in effect by some of the citisens, or by the wisest among them,
who held the place of a prince and monarch. Whilest that the Commonweale of
Athens did flourish, it was gouerned by the Senat of the Areopagits: and when
as their power and authoritie was restrained, Pericles (saith Thucidides) was a
very Monarch, although in shew it were Popular.
And Peter Soderin (in an Oration hee made unto the
people of Florence, to change the estate) said, That in the time of Laurence de Medius, the CommonwealePericles and Lau▪ rence de Medicis, Monarchs of Athens, and
Florence. in shew was Popular, but in effect a meere Tyranny, for
that Laurence gouerned all alone: but he doth not say,
that it was neuer more flourishing, and that before they were neuer ten yeares
free from seditions, and the most bloody factions that euer were. In like sort
the Popular estate of the Romans, which had bene afflicted with so many forren
and intestine warres, was it not maintained and flourished both in armes, and
laws, by the Senat, and was not the authoritie thereof supported, by Menenius Agrippa, Furius Camillus, Papirius Cursor, Fabius
Maximus, Scipio, Cato, Scaurus, Pompey, and diuers others? who
maintained the beautie of the Senat, and restrained the people, keeping
them within the bounds of honour? We do
also read, that Pelopidas, and Epaminondas, were as it were lords of the Popular estate of the
Thebans, after whose death the people found presently, that they had lost their
chiefe pilots: as it happened in the like case unto the Athenians, after the
death of Pericles, Then (said Plutarch) the people didA Popular estate is
preserued by a few wisemen. float up and downe, like a ship without a
helme: and as every one would gouerne and commaund, some to set saile, others
to go to harbrough, a storme came (saith Polybius) and
the ship perished. And although the Athenians, after they had lost the
soueraignrie of Greece, gouerned their citie & territorie popularly, yet
Demosthenes spake plainely, and openly before the
people, That the estate of Athens was under the power of Orators and Pleaders,
of whome the captaines depended, who had at the least three hundred men bribed, to passe whatsoeuer they pleased for
money. A common diseaseCorruptions common in Popula estates. (saith Plutarch) in all Popular estates. Liuius
writeth thus of the Popular estates of the Tarentines, In
potestate Iuniorum plebem, in manu plebis, rem Tarentinam esse, The
estate of Tarentum was in the peoples hands, and the people in the power of the
younger sort. And a little before the declining of the Popular estate of Rome,
Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey,
whome they called a triple head, gouerned and held all the Senat and people in
their power and subiection: but two of them being slaine, the third became an
absolute Lord. Whereby we may gather, that a Popular commaund cannot subsist
without a wise pilat and gouernor, and leauing it to the most sufficient, in
the end they make themselves masters, and the people serues but for a
maske.
But some one will say, Doe we not see that the Cantons of the Swissers haue
setled aThe reasons why the Swissers▪ maintaine their
Popular estate. goodly Popular estate, & have continued their
government aboue three hundred and fiftie yeares, and by this meanes have not
onely preserued themselves from tyranny, but have also chased away tyrants
their neighbours? The aunswere hereunto is double: First, the situation of the
countrey, and the disposition of the people agrees best with a Popular estate.
Secondly, the most seditious, & mutinous, go to the seruice of other forren
princes: and the rest of the common people being more mild & tractable, are
easily kept in awe. Moreover all the heads of the Cantons & Popular states,
hauing entred into an offensiue and defensiue league, are strictly tied and
vnited together; like unto those that goe by night, or that are in a slipperie
or daungerous way, holding one another by the
hand: and in this sort they maintaine themselves against the power of Monarchs,
as in old time the Athenians and Thebans did. Besides, the foundation of their
Popular estate was built and cimented with the blood of the nobilitie, and of
the chiefest, especially at the battaile of Sampac; then afterwards at that at
Basil, when as king Lewes the 11 (beeing then but
Daulphin) had the victorie: then all the nobilitie of the countrey, which had
followed him, were banished, and the rest retired themselves willingly, after
the treatie of the ten Cantons, made in the yeare 1510, and at the chaunge of
religion in the yeare 1529: so as there remaines but a very few at Berne and
Zurich, whereas the estate is Aristocraticall. And
not only the Cantons, but also those at
Strausbourg, Lyndaw, Sienne, Genes, and Florence (to settle a popular libertie)
slue or banished the nobilitie: as they have done in many townes of Germanie.
After they of Florence had made away their nobilitie, they divided themselves
into three factions, the greater, the meane, and the popular: and as the
greater sort entred into factions, and slue one another, the meaner thought to
become maisters, who were so incensed one against another, as the whole citie
was nothing but fire and blood, murthering one another, vntill that the scumme
of the people tooke upon them the government, they alwayes hated them that
looked like gentlemen, or that ware a sword, or that had gotten to any degree
of honour, in what Commonweale soeuer, or that had gathered together more
riches than the rest: which made them of Strausbourg (after they had slaine all the nobilitie, to settle a Popular estate)
to decree, That whosoeuer did aspire to be Grand Bourgmaster, should proue that
his grandfather was a day labourer, an artificer, a butcher, or of some such
like condition. And the auntients (to assure Popular estates) did striue to
equall all citisens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were
more vertuous, more iust, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I
have shewed before, seeking to make an equalitie, if it were possible: and euen
Plato did wish, That wiues and children should be
common to all, to the end that no man might say, This is mine, or, That is
thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of discord, and the ruine of states.
By the which there will grow many absurdities: for in so doing, a citie shall
be ruined, and become a houshold (as Aristotle said) although that a houshold or familie
(which is the true image of a Commonweale) hath but one head. And for this
cause an auntient Bias. lawmaker, beeing
importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (saith
he) in thine owne house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to vnite
citisens and a citie, as to make one houshold of it, they must then take away
the pluralitie of heads and commaunders, which are in a Popular estate, to make
a Monarch, as the true fathers of a familie; and to cut off this equalitie of
goods, power, honour, and commaundement, which they seeke to make in a Popular
estate: for that it is incompatible in a familie. But the greatest
inconuenience is, that in taking away these words of Mine, and Thine, they
ruine the foundation of all Commonweales, the
which were chiefly established, to yeeld vntoTaking away the
proprietie of goods, we ouerthrow a Commonweale. every man that which
is his owne, and to forbid theft; as it is commaunded by the word of God, who
will have every man to enioy the proprietie of his owne goods: and we may not
say, that nature hath made all things common, for the law of the mother is not
contrarie to the commaundement of the father (as Salomon
said) figuring by an Allegorie the commaundements of God, and the law of
nature. But the true popular libertie consisteth in nothing else, but in the
enioying of our priuat goods sincerely, without feare to be wronged, in honour,
life, wife or familie, the which euen theeves & robbers labour to keepe.
And as for the power of commaund, which popular men would make equall, there is
lesse reason than in goods: for discretion and wisedome is not equally giuen to all men, and in a Popular estate they
must of necessitie chuse theWisdome is not equll in all men, to impart offices equally.
most sufficient magistrats, to commaund, and to administer iustice. Moreouer,
whereas there is no forme of soueraigntie, nor of a Commonweale, yet ae the people constrained to chuse a magistrat or
captaine to commaund them, and to doe iustice: as in the countrey of Gusula in
Affrike, where there is neither king, nor any forme of a Commonweale, the
people on their Faire day chuse a captaine to doe iustice, and to assure the
course of traffique. And on the frontiers of the kingdome of Fez, the
inhabitants of the mountaine of Magnan (who in like sort have no forme of a
Commonweale) if they see any straunger to passe by, which seemes to excell the
rest in wisedome, him they stay by force, to
administer iustice unto them. It is a maxime in Popular states,A rule in Popular states. That when as the persons
are equall which are to vndergo a charge, to cast lots: and if one exceeds
another, then they chuse the most sufficient. And who doth not see the great
difference among men, that some have lesse iudgement than bruit beasts; and
others have such cleere marks of diuine light, as they seeme rather angels than
men? andAn error in equalitie. yet those which seeke
equalitie, will have the soueraigne power of life, honour, and goods, giuen
unto furious, ignorant, and mad men, as well as unto iudicious and wise men:
for the voices in all assemblies are numbred, without any due consideration of
euerie mans worth: and alwayes the number of fooles, wicked and ignorant men,
doth farre exceed the good, if that be true which Salomon saith, That there is not one among a thousand: the which is
confirmed by the Poet,
A good man and a wise, one such as out of all mankind,Though Apollo sought and searcht himselfe, yet could he scarcely find.
And yet there is a naturall reason, which doth teach vs, that the equalitie
they seeke, doth ruine the grounds of all loue and amitie, the which can hardly
subsist among equals, for that there are neuer more quarrels & dissentions,
than among them that are equall; either for that the one seekes to supplant the
other, or for that the one may liveAll nations have need one
of another. without the other. And it seemes that God hath imparted
his benefits and graces, to countries and nations, in such a measure, as there
is no man but hath need of another: to the end
that through mutuall courtesie and good offices, euerie nation in particular,
and all in generall, should be constrained to contract alliances and
friendships together: as it is seene in a mans bodie, the which is the figure
of a wel ordered Commonweale, there is no member but receiues helpe and succour
from the rest, and that which seems most idle, disgests the nourishment for all
the rest: as Menenius Agrippa a Roman Senator,Equalitie and friendship are incompatible. did wisely
shew unto the common people, which were fallen from the nobilitie, & did
seeke to equall themselves unto them in power and authoritie. Popular
governments in the beginning seeme pleasing and goodly, contrarie to
Monarchies: the which are like unto great riuers, which at their first springs
have small and weake currents, but increasing by their long course, their
streames grow bigger, & more rough, and run with more spacious chanels, the farther they are from their heads
and springs. But Popular states are like unto the wind, the which is most
vehement where it riseth, but at the length it is broken and groweth weake. I
have discoursed hereof the more at large, to shew the inconueniences which
follow a Popular estate, to the end I might reduce them to reason which seeke
to withdraw the subiect from the obedience of their naturallA Popular estate a pernitious tyranny, i not
wisely gouerned. prince, through a false hope of libertie, in framing
of Popular states: the which in effect is nothing else, but the most pernitious
tyranny that can be imagined, if it bee not gouerned by wise and vertuous men.
And therefore among the Cantons of the Swissers (those which are best ordered)
although they have established a forme of Popular Commonweale, yet they gouerne
themselves Aristocratically, hauing two or three councels, to the end the people deale not in affaires of state as little as
may be; assembling seldome but by quarters, or parishes, which they call
Schaffes (as in old time the inhabitants of Mantinea a Popular state did)
fearing the tumults and rebellions whichGenerall assemblies
are dangerous in Popular estates. fall out commonly when they are
altogether. But seeing it is not in the power of good citisens, nor of wise
polititians, to change a Popular estate into a Monarchie: the chiefe grounds
then of a Popular estate consists in the strict obseruation of lawes and
ordinances, being of it selfe quite different and disagreeing from the lawes
and order of nature, which giues the commauud unto the wisest: a thing verie
incompatible with the people: for if a multitude
(being impatient of command) have not good lawes and statutes before their eyes, as lights to guide them, the
estate will be soone ruined. And therefore the Swissers do obserue their lawes
verie seuerely, else their estate had not bene so durable: for euen as weake
& crased bodies fall soone into diseases, if they leaue the good diet and
order prescribed them by the Physitian; so is it in a Popular state, if they
doe not obserue their laws and ordinances. And thus much to satisfie them which
are not contented, although the greatest men that euer were, have disallowed of
a Popular estate.
Let vs see now if an Aristocraticall government bee any thing better than the
rest, as many hold opinion: for if a mediocratie be commendable in all things,
and that weReasons for an Aristocraticall estate.
must flie all vicious extreames; it followes then, that these two vicious
extreams being reiected, we must hold the
meane, which is an Aristocritie, or a certaine number of the most apparant
citisens: as if there were ten thousand citisens, let them make choyce of an
hundred; the which were a iust proportionable number betwixt one & a
thousand: increasing or diminishing the number according to the multitude of
the subiects, wherin they shall hold that commendable & desired mediocritie
betwixt a Monarchy and a Democratie. There is yet another argument of no lesse
efficacie, to proue that an Aristocraticall estate is the best, which is, That
the power of soueraigne commaund, by naturall reason, is to be giuen to the
most worthy: and dignitie cannot consist but in vertue, in nobilitie, or in
riches, or in all three together. If then wee desire to chuse one of the three, or to ioyne them all together, the
estate shall bee alwaies Aristocraticall: for the noble, rich, wise, and
valiant men, make alwayes the least part of the citisens, in what place soeuer;
by naturall reason then that government must bee Aristocraticall, when as the
least part of the citisens commaund the state, or whereunto the best and most
vertuous men are admitted.
A man may also say, that the soueraigntie should be giuen onely to the most
rich, asThe government of a Commonweale must be giuen to
them that have the most interest in the preseruation thereof. to them
that have most interest in the preseruation of the whole state. Without doubt
the most rich have the greatest interest, and beare a greater charge than the
poore, who hauing little to loose, abandon the Commonweale at need. And
therefore Q. Flaminius did wisely commit the government
of the cities of Thessalie, to the most rich, as to them that had most interest in the preseruation of the state. Moreover it
seems that necessitie doth guide vs to an Aristocraticall estate: for although
that in a Popular estate, and in a Monarchy, the monarch or the people in shew
have the soueraigntie, yet in effect they are forced to commit the government
to the Senat, or priuie Councell, who consult, and many times determine of
greatest affaires: so as it is alwaies an Optimacie. And if the monarch, or
people, be so ill aduised as to gouerne otherwise than by a wise councell,
there can nothing bee expected but an ineuitable ruine of the state. I omit
other reasons lesse necessarie, as every one may coniecture, to conclude, that
an Aristocratie is the most commendable state. And yet I say, that all together
are not sufficient to proue it: for as for that commendable mediocritie which
we seeke, it is not reall, diuiding things in
the middest, but consists in reason: as liberalitie a meae betwixt two vicious extreames, yet doth it approach
neerer unto prodigalie than unto couetousnesse. The
meane which they seeke betwixt one and all in generall, is reall; neither can
it euer be alike, for that there are some cities which have not a thousand
citisens, and others that have aboue three hundred thousand: so as an
Aristocraticall estate shall be alwaies mutable and variable, for the
vncertaintie of the number: and it will often fall out, that a great
Aristocraticall estate shall have more commaunders, than a Popular state in a
small citie shall have citisens: as if there be foure hundred thousand
citisens, to obserue a true Geometricall proportion, there must be foure
thousand gouernours or commaunders: so as by a
necessarie consequence, the inconueniences which are incident to a Popular estate, will also fall out in an Aristocratie,
by reason of the multitudeMany commanders, cause many
factions. of lords: for the more gouernours there be, the more
factions will grow, their consultations will be more hard to determine, and are
sooner discouered. And therefore thoseThose Aristocraticall
estates most durable, that have fewest lords. Aristocraticall estates
are more durable and assured, that have fewest lords: as the Lacedemonians, who
had but thirtie gouernours, and the Pharsalians twentie; they did long
maintaine their estates, whereas others decaied soone. It is not then the
middle number betwixt one and all, which makes that commendable meane, seeing
that there be as many kinds of vicious Commonweales, as of commendable and
vertuous.
As for the other point, That they must giue the soueraigntie unto the most
worthy, It is true; but the argument makes more for a Monarchy, than for an
Aristocratie: for among the most noble, the
most wise, the most rich, and the most valiant, there is alwayes some one that
doth excell the rest, to whome by that reason the soueraigntie doth belong: For
it is impossible to find them all equall in all respects. And as for the Senat,
or Councell, we have shewed before, that it is divided from maiestie, and hath
no power to commaund, in what estate soeuer: else doth it loose the name and
marke of aNo councell in any estate hath any power to
command. Senat, the which is ordained to no other end, but to giue
councell to them that have the soueraigntie, to whome belong the resolution
& decision of the councell. But Plato had another
argument for an Aristocratical estate, saying, That it was verie hard to find
any one man so wise and vertuous, as was requisit for the government of an
estate, and by that meanes a Monarchie were not sure. But this argument is
captious, and may be Platoes argument captious. used against himselfe: for
if it be hard to find any one prince so wise as he desireth, how shall they
find out so great a number as is needfull in a Seigneurie. And Peter Soderin Gonfalonier of Florence, speaking unto the
people against an Aristocraticall estate, he used the same argument which Maecenas did before Augustus
against Marcus Agrippa,The estate of few lords, is the estate of ew tyrants. saying, That the government of
few lords, is the government of few tyrants: and that it was better at all
euents to have but one tyrant. For if any one will say, that among many there
will haply be some number of good men, we must then rather chuse a Popular
estate, for that in a great number there will be found more vertuous than in a
lesse. But both the one and the other is vnprofitable: for as well in all
Aristocraticall and Popolar estates, as in all corporations and colledges, the
greatest part doth still ouer-rule the sounder
and the better: and the more men there be, the lesse effects are there of
vertue and wisedome (euen as a little salt cast into a great lake, looseth his
force:) so as the good men shall be alwayes vanquished in number by the
vicious, and ambitious: andIn all colledges, corporations,
& states, the greatest number carries it. for one tyrant there
shall be a hundred which will crosse the resolution of the lesser but of the
sounder part: as it is alwaies seene as well in the diets and assemblies of the
princes of Germanie, whereas the spirituall princes of the empire, being the
greatest number, have alwaies crost the princes temporall: so as by their means
the emperour Charls the fift, caused the empire to
declare it selfe an enemie to the house of France, the which had not bene so in
many ages: to the end the temporall princes should have no hope of any succours
from Fraunce in their necessities, whereinto they soone after fell. And
Anno. 1543. The princes spirituall of the empire, are
more in number than the temporall. to make short, it hath bene
alwayes seene, that the more heads there be in a Seigneurie, the more
controuersies arise, and lesse resolution. And therefore the Seigneurie of
Venice to auoid these inconueniences, commits all affaires of state to the
mannaging of a dozen persons, and most commonly to seuen, especially to keepe
their affaires secret, whererein consists the health and preseruation of an
estate.
But let vs suppose, that a priuie Councell in an Aristocraticall estate, bee so
secret, as nothing is discouered; yet is it a difficult thing for few
commaunders to maintaine their estate against a multitude, which hath no part
in honourable charges: for that most commonly the
lords scorne and contemne the popular, and the poore carrie alwaies a capital hatred against the great: so as upon the
least dissention among the nobles (the which is ineuitable if they be men of
faction, and giuen to armes) the most factious andThe cause
that doth most ruine Aristocraticall estates. ambitious flieth vnto
the multitude, and ruines the state: as I have noted before of the Seigneuries
of Gènes, Florence, Cologne, Zurich, Strausbourg, Lindaw, and the auntient
Phocians, Samians, Therenecians, Amphipolites, Corcyrians, Cnidians,
Mytelenians, and Hostienses; in the which the multitude hath expelled,
banished, spoyled, and slaine the nobles. And what guard soeuer they keepe, yet
do they live in continuall distrust, and sometimes in such feare, as they doe
not assemble together but in places ofThe commanders in an
Aristocraticall estate are in continuall feare and distrust strength:
as in the citie of Benizee, lying in the realme of
Telesin in Barbarie, all the lords and commaunders keepe themselves in forts,
fearing the people should mutine against them,
or that one of them should murther the rest. So in old time the inhabitants of
Miletum, after they had expelled their two tyrants, they fell cruelly o armes among themselves, the nobles against the
people: but in the end the rich hauing vanquished the poore, they framed an
Aristocraticall estate, where they lived in such feare, and distrust, as they
went into ships to hold their councels, fearing (saith Plutarch) to be surprised and slaine by the people: like unto the
lords of the Samiens, who were all massacred by the multitude, at such time as
they were in councell. So as in an Aristocraty the lords dare not traine the
people up to arms, nor put weapons into their hands: neither can they go to the
warre, but they are in daunger to loose the estate, if they bee once defeated:
neither can they assure themselves of straungers, fearing they should bee
subiected by them. To which daungers a
Popular estate is not subiect, euerie one hauing a part in the state. An
Aristocraticall estate then, is not onely in daunger of forraine enemies, but
of the people, whome they must content or keepe in awe by force: to content
them without making them partakers of the government, were very hard; & to
admit them to charges of honour, without alteration of the state, from an
Aristocratie to a Popular, were impossible: to keepe them in subiection by
force, that were not safe, although it might be done, for that were to shew an
open feare and distrust of them whome they must win by loue and courtesie: else
upon any forraine war against the state, or among the gouernours themselves,
the people will bee easily drawne to armes,
and to shake off their yoake. And therefore the Venetians to maintaine
theirHow the estate of Venice bene
preserued. Aristocraticall estate, impart some small offices unto the
people, contract alliances with them, borrow of them to bind them to the
maintenance of the state; and disarme them quite: and to make them more mild
and pliable, they giue them full scope and liberie to
all sorts of pleasures: and sometimes they make their richest citisens
bourgesses. If they have any warre against the straunger, they soone compound
it at what price soeuer: and aboue all things they labour to quench and pacifie
all partialities and hatred among the gentlemen: so as the rich being drunke
with delights, and the poore hauing meanes to traffique, and to exercise
themselves in mechanike arts, with the commoditie of the place, lying upon the
sea, being by nature strong, they have no great occasion, & lesse power to rebell. By these meanes the Venetians
(next under God) have maintained their estate, and not by the forme of an
Aristocraticall government, as many do hold. And although the nature of the
situation of Venice, the honour of the people, the wisedome of the Seigneures,
and the lawes, be fit for an Aristocraticall estate, yet is it not aboue foure
hundred yeares, that they have instituted this forme of Commonweale, neither
could they auoid many seditions and civill warres; as of the Bochonians,Gianot. Donat. de Repub. Vene.
Faleriennes, Topoliennes, Baiamontaines, and the cruell factions of the
Iustinians, the Sceuoles, Seliens, Bassiens; the murther of eighteene dukes,
and of a great number of Senators, as we may read in their histories. Wherein
Paulus Iouius was deceiued,
who held, That the estate of Venice had continued eight hundred yeares: and PaulusManutius, and du Moulin, haue
erred more, saying, That it had bene of twelue hundred yeares standing: for it
is well verified by the auntient registers of their Seigneurie, that before Cebastian Cian duke of Venice, in the yeare 1175, it was
a meere Monarchy: and yet there hath not bene any Aristocraticall estat, to our
knowledge, that hath so long continued, but have bene for the most part
chaunged into cruell Tyrannies, or bloodie Popular estates, as we have shewed
elsewhere. And to make it more apparant, I will produce for a new example the
state of Genes, who hauing peace with the Venetians, by meanes of the
protection of Fraunce, soone after the Adornes, and Fregoses, divided the state
(the which at that time was Aristocraticall) into two factions, whence ensued
many murthers of the chiefe men: so as the people fell to armes, freed
themselves from subiection, and tooke the
government of the state from the gentlemen: and in succession of time made a
law, whereby none might bee duke of Genes, vnlesseAnno. 1506. The estate of Genes, and the change
thereof. hee were a Plebeian: and since they have published another
law, prohibiting the nobles to have aboue a third part of all other officers.
And soone after in a sedition they expelled all their gentlemen, chusing eight
Tribunes, and after they had reiected the protection of Fraunce, they chose a
Dyer of silke for their duke, whome king Lewes the
twelft caused to bee hanged▪ after that hee had taken the citie: but when as
Andrew Doria reuolted, and that hee had power to
dispose of the state at his pleasure, hee made choyce of all such as had six
houses within the citie, and of some others of name and marke, which were not
so rich, and divided them all into eight and twentie tribes, the which they called Alberghi,
making them gentlemen, and giuing them the government of the state, and
debarred the rest of the common people, onely with this exception, To haue
libertie euerie yeare to make ten of the Plebeians gentlemen, and to receiue
them into the number of the nobilitie: the which notwithstanding was not well
executed. So of foure and twentie thousand citisens, there were not aboue
twelue hundred, or thereabouts, that had any part in the state: and of this
number it was decreed, That every yeare there should be a great Councell made
of foure hundred, the which should chuse the Duke and the eight Gouernours,
which they call the Seigneurie, to manage all affairs of state for the space of
two yeres that they should be in charge, vnlesse matter were of great
importance, then to assemble the Senat of an hundred gentlemen. And as for the duke, hee might not bee chosen but out of the
noblest families, with a guard of 500 Lansquenets, besides the generall of the
armie, and the fortie centiners. I omit other officers, as the Procurators of
the Seigneurie, the Podestat, or Maior, the Iudges of the Rota, the seuen
extraordinarie Iudges, the five Syndiks, the Censors, and the officers of Saint
George. The estate of Genes hath continued in this
sort 43 yeares, under the protection of the house of Austria. From the yeare
1528, unto the yeare 1549, that Iohn Flisco beeing
chosen duke of Genes after Benedict Gentil, would haue
made his power perpetuall, and to effect it, he laboured to subiect the
Seigneurie of Genes unto the crowne of France, hauing alreadie defeated Andrew Dories armie, & slain his nephew, he fell into
the seal leaping from one gally to another, the which ouerthrew all his desseins. Since the seigneury hath taken again
the forme established by Andrew Doria, the which was
cōtinued unto the yere 1574, that it was divided into two factions; the one of
the antient, the other of the new gentlemen, who are yet at civill war: and the
antient seeing themselves expelled by the new, have ceized upon the places of
strength, and forts without the citie, being in danger to be quite ruined, or
at the least to fall into a Popular estate, as they did in the yeare 1506. The
sedition happened for the qualitie of their nobilitie: for after that Andrew Doria had setled the state (as I have said) &
excluded the Plebeians from being dukes of Genes, the gentlemen of the antient
houses (which were but foure, the Dorias, the Spinolas, the Grimoaldes, and the Fiesques)The cause of factions at Genes. caused their
genealogies to be drawne and registred in publicke acts, diuiding themselves by
this meanes from the Plebeians that were newly ennobled; who disdaining
thereat, and finding themselves the greater number and the stronger, they haue
chased away the antient houses, and if they be not soone reconciled, the people
in the end will expell them all.
I have shewed before, that the great Councell or Senat in an Aristocraticall
estate, ought to be perpetuall, to the end there may be some firme ground, or
foundation whereon the annuall change of all officers may relie. And as for the
Duke, it were strange if he should not ceaze upon the Soueraigntie, hauing fiue
hundred men for his guard, seeing that he hath two yeares to remaine in charge:
considering the factions that are made to
attaine unto this dignitie of honour. We see then that the chiefeThe ground and support of an Optimacie. ground and
support of an Aristocratie, consists in the mutuall loue of the commanders: for
if they agree and be of one mind, they will maintaine themselves, and gouerne
much better than the people: But if there be any factions among them, then
there is no State so difficult to maintaine, for the reasons before mentioned;
especially, if the Commanders be martiall men: for souldiers hate nothing more
than peace. And we may not marueile if the Aristocratie of the Venetians,
Rhagusians and Luquois, have continued some ages: for they are not giuen to
armes, neither have they any thing in greater recommendation than their
trafficke and commoditie. And to conclude The best kind of Optimacie. briefly, there is no
forme of Aristocratie more perfect and goodly, nor more assured, than whereas
they make choise of men of vertue and reputation to commaund; or at the least
that they be not infamous: and if any one dies, to substitute another in his
place by election, as they do vse at Geneua. If any one of the Councell of 25
dies, the most antient of the 60 succeeds him most commonly, although it be
done by election: and the most antient of the great Councell of 200 comes into
the Councell of 60, and the two hundred chuse one of the honestest Burgesses or
citisens that is without reproch. Whereby few command and gouerne the state,
and yet every man hopes to attaine unto it, not by mony nor ambition, but by
honour and vertue. This may properly be called an Aristocratie, the which is
least subiect unto dangers, and to the rebellion of Lords or subiects.
Such a Seigneurie will obserue the lawes duly, and administer iustice
uprightly: if they be contented with their estate, and seeke not ambitiously to
wrest from another, as the Lacedemonians did. For it is impossible that a
Seigneurie of few Lords and Commanders, should get and maintaine a great
Empire, as a Monarke may: also the ruine and change of so great a Seigneurie is
not so much to be feared, as of a great and mightie Monarchie, which draweth
after it the ruine of the greatest familes, and oftentimes of allies and of
neighbour States that are in his protection: Like unto a great building which
raised on high, blind the sight of others, and falling, ruines with her weight
those that are neere it, with a fearefull noyse to them that heare it. Behold
the commodities and discommodities of a
popular and Aristocraticall estate. Now weThe discommodities
of a Monarchie. are to speake of a Monarchie, which all great men
have preferred before all other Commonweales: yet we find it is subiect vnto
many dangers, whether the change of the Monarke be from bad to good, or from
good to better: although there were noPlato lib. 4. de Legib. Mutatines in republica putat esse . other thing but the change of him that hath the Soueraigntie: yet is it
much to be feared in all states: for we commonly see in the change of Princes,
new desseines, new lawes, new officers, new friends, new enemies, new habits,
and a new forme of liuing: for most commonly all Princes take a delight to
change and alter all things, that they may be spoken of; the which doth many
times cause great inconueniences, not only to the
subiects in particular, but also to the whole bodie of the state. But if this
were not, and the Prince were as wise and
vertuous as might be desired, yet the leagues and treaties made with his
Predecessor end with him: whereupon alliances being ended, Princes fall to
armes, and the stornger assailes the weaker, or prescribes him a law. The which
cannot chance in popular and Aristraticall estates, when as they make
perpetuall leagues, for that the people dies not; so as other Princes and
priuat men desire rather to contract with a Seigneurie than with a Prince, for
the assurance of treaties and bonds, wherunto the successors of Princes are not
tied, vnlesse they be their heires, as manie maintaine and practise. The other
inconuenience in a Monarchie is, the danger to fall into civill warre, by the
diuisions and factions of such as aspire unto the crowne, especially if it be
electiue, the which doth oftentimes draw after it the ruine of the state: Yea, in a successiue right there is no small
danger, if there be many in one degree, who many times kill one another, or at
the least diuide the subiects. We have too many examples before our eyes: and
oftentimes the lawfull successour is expelled by an vsurper. But admit there
were no contention for the Monarchie, yet if the Monarke be a child, there will
be some diuision for the gouernement, betwixt the mother and the Princes, or
betwixt the Princes themselves. And God (to be revenged of his people)
threatens to giue them for Princes children and women. And although theIsaie. cap. 5. infant have a tutor by the appointment of
his predecessour, or by the custome, yet is it to be feared, that he will make
himselfe absolute Lord▪ as Triphon did, who cruellyThe tutors to Monarchs do oftentimes make thmselues absolute
Lords. slue his pupill the king of Siria, to make himselfe king. The
which is more to be feared, if the tutor
marrieth the pupils mother, as Lewis Sforce did, who by
that meanes murthered the young prince, and made himselfe duke of Milan. And
although for the auoiding of this danger, they giue the gouernement to the
neerest of kinne, and the nourishment of the infant to the mother; yet haue
there bene murthering mothers since, who have not onely sold and betrayed the
state, but euen the lives of their children, as the mother of Charilaus king of Lacedemon did. And sometimes the tutorPlutar. in Licur. continues his government, and leaues
nothing unto the king but the title, as the duke of Northumberland did to Edward the sixt king of England: and Appelles to young Philip king of Macedon, who
could not inioy his estate, vntill he had slaine his tutor.Poib. lib. 7. And if the prince comes
to the crowne being yong and out of government, there is no lesse danger: for then when as he should have a dozen wise
maisters to restraine his licentious appetits, the which are then most violent,
he is altogether free and at liberty: so as commonly the courts of yong princes
abound in follies, maskes, and licentiousnesse, and the subiects follow the
princes humor; so as for one vice there multiplies ten, as I have said before.
If the prince be warlike, he will hazzard his subiects, his estate, and his
person, to make proofe of his valour. And although he come unto the state being
of a competent age and wise, the which is rare, and the greatest gift which a
people can craue at Gods hands: yet soueraigntie hath his mischiefe, most
commonly the wise become foolish, the valliant cowards, and the good grow
wicked. It wereSoueraigntie altereth the h mors of princes. time lost to repeat
examples, the which are too ordinarie. To conclude, if the prince be subtill and wicked, he will plant a tyrannie: if he
be cruell, he will make a butcherie of the commonweale; or a brothell house if
he be licentious, or both together if hee be couetous, he will pull both haire
and skinne from his subiects: if he be prodigall, he will sucke their bloud and
marrow to glut some dosaine of horseleeches that are about his person. And yet
he will do worse than all this, if he be a sot and ignorant, as we have sayd
elsewhere. Yea, so much the more is a tyrannie to be feared, for that a tyrant
hath no maister nor companion to oppose against him. These bee the dangers of a
Monarchie, the which in truth are great, but there is greater perill in an
Aristocraticall estate, and much more in a Popular:
for the dangers which we have set downe for the most part cease, when as the
Monarchie comes by right of succession, as we will shew hereafter. But
seditions, factions, and civill warre, are in a manner continuall: yea,Comparison of dangers. sometimes greater for the
attaining unto offices, in Aristocraticall and Popular commonweales, than for
the state in a Monarchie; the which admits no sedition for offices, nor for the state, but after the death of the prince,
and that very seldome. But the chiefe point of a commonweale, which is the
right of soueraigntie, cannot be, nor subsist (to speake properly) but in a
Monarchie: for none can be soueraigne in a commonwealeCommodities of a Monarchie. but one alone: if they be two, or three,
or more, no one is soueraigne, for that no one of them can giue or take a law
from his companion. And although we imagin a bodie of many lords, or of a whole
people to hold the soueraigntie; yet hath it
no true ground, nor support, if there bee not a head with absolute and
soueraigne power, to vnite them together: the which a simple magistrat without
soueraigne authoritie cannot do. And if it chance that the lords, or the tribes
of the people be divided (as it often fals out) then must they fall to armes
one against another. And although the greatest part be of one opinion, yet may
it so happen, as the lesser part hauing many legions, and making a head, may
oppose it selfe against the greater number, and get the victorie. We see the
difficulties which are, and alwayes have bene in Popular states and
seigneuries, whereas they hold contrary parts, and for diuerse magistrats: some
demaund peace, others warre, some will have this law, others that; some will
have one commander, others another; some will treat a league with the
king of France, others with the king of
Spaine, corrupted or drawne some one way some another, making open warre: as it
hath bene seene in our age among the Grisons. Moreouer, sometimes it happens by
the custome of the countrey, that a law, the prince, or a magistrat, is not
admitted, if all that have voices giue not their consent: as in Polonia whereas
the lesser part must change their opinion, and ioyne with the greater number,
either by loue or force, and for this cause they come armed to the field to
chuse their king, and to force the lesser part to consent: the which cannot
happen where there is a soueraigne head, of whom depends the resolution of all
things. Moreouer, in a Popular and Aristocraticall estate, alwayes the greater
number will bee beleeued,In Popular and Aristocraticall
estates the lesser part is always ouerruled by the geater, the which is contrarie in a Monarchie. although the wiser
and the most vertuous bee fewest in number; so as most commonly the sounder and the better part is forced to yeeld
unto the greater, at the appetite of an impudent Tribune, or a brasen faced
Orator. But a soueraigne Monarch may ioyne with the sounder and the better
part, and make choise of wise men, and well practised in matters of state:
whereas necessitie doth force them in other commonweales to admit wise men and
fooles and altogether to offices and councell. It is also impossible for a
Popular state, or an Aristocratie, to command with soueraigne power, or to do
any act which cannot bee done but by one person onely: as to conduct an armie
and such like things: but they must create magistrats and commissaries to that
end, who have neither the soueraigne power, authoritie, nor maiestie of a
Monarch. And what power soeuer they have by vertue of their places, yet Popular
and Liuie lib. 3. Lib. 2. Lib. 7. Lib. 4. Aristocraticall
commonweales, finding themselves imbarked in any dangerous warre, either
against the enemie, or among themselves, or in difficultie to proceed
criminally against some mightie citisen, or to giue order for the plague, or to
create magistrats, or to do anie other thing of great consequence, did vsually
create a Dictator, as a soueraigne Monarch: knowing well that a Monarchie was
the anckor whereunto of necessitie they must have recourse, Trepid patres, saith Titus Liuius, ad summum anxilium decurrunt, Dictatorem dici placet,
The fearefull fathers flie unto their last refuge, they thought it best to name
a Dictator. And when as Hanniball made all Italie to
tremble, Ad Dictatorem dicendum remedium iamdiu desideratum Ciuit as
confugit, The citie fled Liis lib. 22. vnto
the remedie so long desired, which was to name a Dictator. And the reason was,
for that they held the Dictator for a god, and his commandements for oracles,
Dicttoris Edictum pro numine
semper obseruatum, The Dictators Edict was alwayes religiouslyLib. 6. obserued. And euen the enemies
besieging the citie of Rome, abandoned the siege, hearing that they had created
a Dictator, Tantus erat Dictatoris terror apud hostes, vt eo
creato statim a menibus disceserint, So great was the feare of a
Dictator with the enemies, as he was no sooner created, but they departed from
the wals. ForLib. 5. oftentimes euen the Consuls and their
commaundements were neglected and troden under foote: and such as had offended
retired to their companions, that is to say, to the people, to whom they might
appeale. The which Appius the Consull seeing, hee
Lie lib. 2. sayd,
Minas esse Consulm non imperium,
vbi ad eos qui vna peccauer unt prouocare liceat agedum, Dictatorem a quo
prouocatio non est creemas, They were but the threats, sayd he, of
Consuls without any commanding power, seeing they might appeale unto them who
had offended in the like manner, Go to then, let vs create a Dictator from whom
there is no appeale. The impunitie of vices, and the contempt of magistrats in
a Popular estate, doth sufficiently shew that Monarchs are necessarie for the
preseruation of the societie of mankind, seeing that the Romans who for the
error of one Prince, had all kings in hatred, made a Dictator for the conduct
of all their great affaires. So did the Lacedemonians in their extremities
create a magistrat with power like unto the Dictator, whom they called
Harmoste: and the Thessaliens, him whom they called Dionys. Hali. lib.
6. Archus: as in the like case the Mityleniens their great Aezimnere;
to whom the great Prouidador of the Venetians may be in some sort compared:
finding by experience that an absolute power vnited in one person, is more
eminent and of greater effect▪ and that the same power imparted to two, three,
or many lords, or to a whole communaltie, declines and looseth his force, like
unto a agot vnbound and divided into manie parts. And
therefore Tacitus saith, that for the execution of great
exploits the power of commanding must be restrained to one alone: the which is
confirmed by Titus Liuius, who sayd, that three Tribunes
created with Consularie power, gaue a sufficient testimonie that the force of
command imparted to manie, is fruitlesse: and especially in millitarie causes,
the which Hanniball did find, hauing against him an
armie of 60000 Plurium bell vtil. men, commanded
by two Consuls, Paulus Aemilius, and Terentius Varro, whom hee defeated: and Amurath
against the Christian Princes at the battell of Nicopolis: and the emperour Charles the fift against the two commaunders of the
protestants. And we may not marueile if the duke of Vrbin with a few hierlings
made head against so mightie an armie, led by the chiefe commanders or
generals, the which depended not one of another, that is to say, Rance Vitelli, and Laurence de
Medicis: for euen Leo writes in his historie,
that the people of Affricke hold it for an infallible Maxime, that a
princeAn antient opinion of the Affric. which is but weake in forces, shall alwayes
defeate a stronger armie that hath two generals. For whilest that Cleomenes king of Lacedemon did gouerne absolutely alone,
he obtained great and goodly victories, and was neuer vanquished: but after
that hee had called home the king which was
banished to impart his soueraigne authoritie unto him, soone after he was
ouerthrowne and put to flight. And for this cause Aristides the iust, being chosen generall with Miltiades to commaund the armie either of themPlut.
in Aristid. his daie, (as the Romane
Consuls were wont to do) he resigned all his power and authoritie to his
companion, who gaue the Persians a great ouerthrow. There are a thousand such
like examples, which do shew vs the necessitie to have one head or commander,
not onely in warre (where there is greatest danger) but also to obey one
soueraigneOne soueraigne commander most
necessarie. prince in a Commonweale: for euen as an armie is ill led,
and most commonly defeated that hath many Generals;
euen so is a Commonweale that hath manie
lords, either by diuision, or a diuersitie of opinions, or by the diminution of
power giuen to manie, or by the difficultie there is to agree and resolue upon
any thing, or for that the subiects know not whom to obey, or by the discouerie
of matters which should be kept secret, or through altogether. And therefore
whereas we sayd before, that in a well ordered state, the soueraigne power must
remaine in one onely, without communicating any part thereof unto the state
(for in that case it should be a Popular government and no Monarchie) and that
all wise Politicians, Philosophers, Diuines, and Historiographers have highly
commended a Monarchie aboue all other Commonweales, it is not to please the
prince, that they hold this opinion, but for the safetie and happinesse of the
subiects: And contrariwise, when as they shall limit and restraine the soueraigne power of a Monarch, to subiect him to
the generall estates, or to the councell, the soueraigntie hath no firme
foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchie, which
is the plague of all states, & Commonweales; the which must be duly
considered, not giuing credit to their goodly discourses, which perswade
subiects, that it is necessarie to subiect Monarchs, and to prescribe their
prince a law; for that it is not onely the ruine of the Monarch, but also of
the subiects. It is yet more strange, that many hold an opinion that the prince
is subiect to his lawes, that is to say, subiect to his will, whereon the
civill lawes (which he hath made) depend; a thing impossible by nature. And
under this colour and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion
of civill lawes with the lawes of nature, and of both ioyntly with the lawes of God: so as they suppose, when as the
prince forbids to kill, to steale, or to commit adulterie, that it is the
princes law. But for that we have layd open this poynt at large, I will now
passe it ouer. It shall suffice that we have made apparant demonstration, that
a pure absolute Monarchie is the surest Commonweale, and without comparison the
best of all. Wherein many are abused, which maintaine that an Optimacie is the
best kind of government: for that many commanders have moreAliud est consulere aliud imprare.
iudgement, wisedome, and councell then one alone; But there is a great
difference betwixt councell and commandement: The aduice and councell of many
graue and wise men may be better than of one, as they say commonly that many
men see more than one alone: but to resolue,
to determine and to command, one will alwayes performe it better than many: and
then he which hath aduisedly digested all their opinions, will soone resolue
without contention, the which many cannot easily performe: Besides ambition is
so naturall among commanders that are equall in power, as some will rather see
the ruine of the Commonweale, than acknowledge any one to be wiser than
themselves: Others know what is good, but shame keepes them from changing of
their opinions, fearing to loose the least point of their reputations: So as it
is necessarie to have a soueraigne prince, which may have power to resolue and
determine of the opinions of his councell.
If then a commonweale be but one body, how is it possible it should haue
manieOne body cannot have many heads. heads, but
that it must proue a monster, as the emperour Tiberius
sayd unto the Senate, else it were no bodie,
but a hideous monster with many heads. But some one will say that new princes
make new lawes, new institutions, new ordinances: we will confesse that it
happens in some, who to shew their power make lawes sometimes without any
reason, but this is more frequent and usuall without comparison in Popular and
Aristocraticall estates: For new magistrats so often created, and which play
the pettie kings in their Commonweales, would bee loth the yeare should passe
away without giuing some cause to speake of them, either for good, or euil: for
proofe whereof we find more lawes published at Rome and at Athens, then
throughout all the world: For alwayes through
iealousie one vndid what another had made: and all, as they said, was to make themselves famous, and to rob the honour
of their companions, with the preiudice of the Commonweale. But to auoid these
inconueniences, and insatiable ambitions in an Optimacie, or Popular state, you
must not in any sort suffer the law or ordinance to carrie the name of the
magistrat, as they used in Rome and Athens, which was the cause of so many
lawes. And to say that treaties and leagues die with the Prince, that happens
not alwayes, for most commonly they are continued and prorogued by an expresse
clause, some yeares after the death of the prince, as it hath bene alwayes
obserued betwixt the house of France and the Cantons of the Suissers, the which
have beene for the kings life, and five yeares after. Moreouer, we haue
formerly shewed, that it is expedient allyances and leagues should not bee
perpetuall; and for this cause states and
commonweales do oftentimes limit their treaties to a certaine time. And as for
bonds and treaties of peace, they are accustomed for their better assurance to
have them confirmed by the estates, or published in soueraigne courts, and
oftentimes they bind in particular the greatest noblemen: although there bee
farre greater assurance in matter of obligation and promises made by a prince
than by a multitude: and the rather for that the lawes of honour are in much
more recommendation to a soueraigne prince, than to a multitude of artisans or
marchants, who are kings in aThe lawes of honour are in
greater recommendatiō to a Monarch than to a multitude. name
collectiue, and nothing in particular. And as for the troubles which the
gouernement of a young king do cause, that happens rarely, and is more incident
at the election of magistrats: For at the chusing of a Gonfalonier of Genes for
two yeares onely, the Commonweale is euer in
combustion. There is no reason to ballance the cruelties and extorsions of a
tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know wel that a peaceable
Optimacie and wisely gouerned, if it may be, is better than a cruell tyrannie.
But the question is, whether it be better to have a iust and upright king, or
manie good lords: and whether a tyrannie of fiftie tyrants be not more
dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in
Popular and Aristocraticall estates, than in a Monarchie. Yea it is most
certaine that a tyrannicall Monarchie is sometimes more to be desired than a
Democratie or Optimacie, how good soeuer:Many gouernors
hinder on another. For if many wise and
skilfull pilots hinder one another in striuing to gouerne the helme; euen so
will many lords do, every one seeking to gouerne the Commonweale, be they neuer so wise and vertuous. Although it be not
needfull to insist much upon this proofe, that a Monarchie is the most sure,
seeing that a familie which is the true image of a Commonweale can have but one
head, and that all the lawes of natureA Monarchie is
naturall. guide vs unto a Monarchie, whether that we behold this
little world which hath but one bodie, and but one head for all the members,
whereon depends the will, mouing and feeling: or if we looke to this great
world which hath but one soueraigne God: or if we erect our eyes to heauen, we
shall see but one sunne: and euen in sociable creatures, we see they cannot
admit many kings, nor many lords, how good soeuer. Solyman emperour of the Turkes used this example, hearing the great
cries and acclamationsAnno. 1552. of ioy which the whole armie made
unto Sultan Mustapha his son returning out of Persia, he put him to death through iealousie,
causing him to be strangled in his withdrawing chamber, and his dead body to be
cast out before the whole armie: then he made a proclamation, that there was
but one God in heauen, and one Sultan upon earth: Two
dayes after he put Sultan Gobe to death, for that he had
wept for his brother; and Sultan Mehemet the third
brother, for that he fled for feare; leauing but one sonne liuing, to auoid the
danger of many lords. We also see that all nations of the earth from all
antiquitie, euen when they were guided by a naturall instinct, had no other
forme of gouernement than a Monarchie, that is to say, the Assirians, Medes,
Persians, Aegyptians, Indians, Parthians,
Macedonians, Celtes, Gauls, Scythians, Arabians,Examples of the greatest Monarchies of the world.
Turks, Moscouits, Tartars, Polonians, Danes, Spaniards, English, Affricans, and
Perusians, where there is no mention of any Optimacie, or Popular estate. Yea
all the auntient people of Greece and Italie, before they were corrupted with
ambition, had none but kings and monarches, as the Athenians, Lacedemonians,
Corinthians, Acheans, Sicyonians, Candiots, Sicilians, Ethiopians, Latines, and
Hetrusques, the which have flourished in arms & laws, foure, fiue, six,
& seuen hundred yeres; yea some have continued eight or nine hundred
yeares, others twelue or thirteen hundred yeres. And yet some wonder that the
Popular estate of the Romans▪ or the Seigneuries of Lacedemon, and Venice, had
continued foure hundred yeres, or thereabouts, after they had expelled their
kings doubtlesse they have reason to maruel, to see two or three Cōmonweales
among a hundred, able to continue any time,
beeing instituted against the order of nature: but no man is amazed to see many
great & mightie Monarchies continue a thousand, or twelue hundred yeares,
for that it is according to the right lawes of nature. And although the name of
a king were hatefull unto the Romans, yet many of the
in particular affect to be soueraignes: for not many moneths before Augustus his birth, it was found out by oracles, that
nature should soone bring forth a great MonarchSueton. in
August of the Romans. For this cause the Senat decreed, That all
infants should bee slaine that were to be borne that yeare: but every one in
particular did hinder the carrying of this decree into Saturnes temple, for
that every one (saith the historie) did hope
his sonne should be a Monarch. In like sort the princes of Persia being
assembled together to consult which forme of gouerment were the better, they
concluded a Monarchy. The same argument was called in question by Augustus among his friends, being desirous to live at
rest, and to leaue the state, after that hee had pt
the nauie of Mare Anthonie to flight: but it was
resolued, That a Monarchy was the most safe without all comparison, and the
effects did verifie it: for in former times the Romans could not live ten
yeares together without civill warres, or some sedition: and Augustus maintained them quietly in peace almost fiftie yeares, the
which continued long after his death. Experience is the mistresse of all
things, and as the touchstone, resolues all doubts. Therefore the Capadocians
hauing lost their king, they were persuaded by the Romans, to take a Popular estate: but they refused it, and
demaunded a king: so as the Romans gaue them power to chuse one, and they
aduanced Ariobarzanes; finding the calamities of Popular
states▪ To conclude, if we seeke authoritie, we shall find that the greatest
schollers that euer were, have held a Monarchy to be the best: as Homer, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Plutarch,
Philon, Apolonius, Saint Ierosme, Cyprian, Maximus
Tirius, and many others. And euen in the law of God, it is said, When
as the people shall chuse a king, like unto other nations, he shall not take a
straunger: Wherby he not onely sheweth, that God approueth a Monarchy, teaching
a king how hee should gouerne, but also that other nations in those dayes had
nothing but Monarchies, as Samuel saith. He also made
Moyses king over his people, for so hee is called
Sam. 1. 12. Deut. 33.
in the law of God. And although that God gouerned his people or a time without a king, sending them alwaies by an
especial fauor certaine captains, as princes & judges to free them from the
subiection of their neighbors, whome the holy Scripture calls Messies, and
Sauiours: yet was there neuer any Optimacie, or Popular estate among them,Nehem. 10. but contrariwise they were a long
time without either prince or magistrat, beeing guidedSam. 2. c. 12. onely by
the grace of God, who for this cause is called their king. And after their
returne out of Babilon, they were still subiect to the kings of Persia, or of
Aegypt, or ofA Monarchy allowed by the law of God.
Syria: vntill that Iudas Machabeus of the familie of the
Azmoneans, descended from Aaron (hauing rebelled against
Antiochus the Noble, king of Syria) brought the
office of high priest, and the soueraigntie unto his
house, who were afterwards subdued by the
Romans. For as for their Senat, which consisted of seuentie one, the king
making the seuentie two, and the most part of the line of Dauid; they busied not themselves in any thing else, but in iudging of
causes of great consequence, as of the high priest, or of some tribe, or of
crimes of high treason, or of false prophets: & for this cause they were
onely called Iudges, whome by the corrupt Greeke word they called Sanedrim. The
Caldean interpretor saith, That although they had power to make lawes, euen
under kings, yet was it no soueraigne authoritie. True it is, that Rabin Magmon calling them Doctors or Informers, saith,
That they had also power to create twentie three criminal Iudges, whome they
called Iudges of soules; and seuen Iudges for civill causes, whom they tearmed
Iudges of goods in euerie citie; and ten Iudges for gouenment, among the which there was one priest, or as Ioseph saith, two Leuites assistant to every magistrat:
and three other Arbitrators, whereof either of the parties did chuse one, and
the two that were chosen did name a third. The which I have particularly set
downe, to confute their opinion, which maintaine with Ioseph the Historian, That the HebrewesLib.. c. 6. antiq. have used a kind of Aristocraticall government, taking the Senat of
seuentie one for soueraigne lords: all whome Herod, the
eldest sonne of captaine Antipater put to death, for
that they had condemned him, and had executed him, but for the favour of Hircanus king and high priest, who gaue him his pardon,
or at the least staied the decree of the Senat; and afterwards he murthered his
sauiour. Which sheweth plainely, that the Senat had no soueraigne power, and
that it was no Optimacie: although that IosephusIoseph. de antiq. lib.4. c. 5. brings in
the Iewes complaynig, Quod Hircanus & Aristobulus formam
Reipub▪ in regnum mutarent, That Hircanus, and
Aristobulus, had chaunged the forme of the
Commonweale into a Monarchy. In my opinion these reasons, with many others
(which are not needfull to be here particularly exprest) are sufficient to
shew, that of the three kinds of lawfull governments, a perfect Monarchy is the
most excelleu: and among the disordered, the
Democratie the most vicious. A lawfull Monarchy (as a strong and able bodie)
may easily be maintained: but Popular states, and Aristocraties, as feeble and
weake, and subiect to many infirmities, must be preserued by diet and good
government. And for that it is not alwayes in the power of wise and politike
states-men, to chuse the best kind of government, nor to alter and change the
worst, they must in this case doe like vnto
skilfull ship maisters, which yeeld unto the tempest; they strike their sailes,
and cast forth euen their most pretious marchandise, to attaine unto a safe
port. Euen so a wise man that seekes to change a state from bad to good, or
from good to better; he must first insinuat with the greatest, and by
obsequious obseruation draw them to his will. But if he be not assured to
effect it, let him not attempt it: as Dion did, who
ruined the Tyranny of Siracusa, suddenly to erect an Optimacie, by the councell
and aduice of Plato: and not able to effect it, he was
slaine: so as it became an estate of a turbulent multitude, much more miserable
without all comparison than any tyranny. As also the Pithagorians did, who
laboured suddenly to change all the Popular estates of Italie, into meere
Optimacies, hauing not force sufficient to effect it, but they were all slaine, or banished. But if this
Popular infirmitie cannot be cured by any physicke, it must bee borne withall,
beeing better to have a bad Commonweale than none at all; and attend the time
vntill the tyranny of one, of few, or of many, be mounted to the highest
precipice or downfall, from whence at the first storme they may be cast downe,
or fall of themselves. Else if the tyrant be but shaken, and not quite
ouerthrowne, he will commit horrible murthers of the best citisens, to fortifie
andA tyrant is insupportable that hath escaped any nspiracie. settle his tyranny. For a tyrant
that hath once escaped the hands of such as had conspired against him, he
becomes mad and furious, like unto a wild beast that sees his owne blood. We have too many examples, and without any further
search, we have seene Cosmo de Medicis (whome the banished men of Florence
called Tyrant, although hee were esteemed of many others to be a good and a
wise prince) build forts, & increased his Monarchy with the ruines of such
as had conspired against his life and state, and yet neuer any one conspiracie
tooke effect. Besides, a Tyrannie is much more insupportable, if the tyrant
hath no large limits and great territories: for being poore and hungry, he
oppresseth and deuours his subiects continually; & if he be cruell, he
soone attaines to his desire: whereas a rich and mightie Monarch hath
wherewithall to glut his appetite,The subiects are happy
under a great Monarch. and if he be cruell hee will stand in feare
that some one in so great a multitude will take revenge. Euen then as the
subiects are happie under a great and mightie Monarch, if he have any sparke of
iustice before his eyes: so a small estate is best befitting an Aristocraticall government, who will maintaine their
subiects more happily than a poore tyrant should do. We see eighteene Cantons
of the Swissers, besides the Grisons, whose governments are Popular, and
Aristocraticall, hauing in length from Geneua unto Constance but two hundred
and fiftie thousand paces, and a hundred and threescore in bredth from the
Alpes unto mount Iura, most of which countrey is full of rockes, and very
barren; yet have they maintained their subiects a long time in great
happinesse: but if they should enuie and desire their neighbors estate, they
should soone loose their owne. And contrariwise the greater the Monarch is, the
more goodly and flourishing it is, and the subiect more happie, liuing in an
assured peace. But if it chance to be divided
into Democraties, or Optimacies, or into many tyrannies, the people are either
tyrannised, or in sedition among themselves, or in continuall warre against
their neighbours. Seeing then a Monarchy is the most sure of all Commonweales,
and amongst all Monarchies a Royall is the goodliest: let vs say, whether it
bee better to have it by a successiue right, or by election.
CHAP. V. That a well ordered Commonweale dependeth not
either of lot, either of choyce, and much lesse of women; but by discent to be
deriued from a most honounourable stocke: and
that it ought to be giuen but to one alone, without partition.
IT is not enough to say, that a Royall and lawfull
Monarchy isWhat Royal onarchie is
best. better than either a Democratie, or an Aristocratie, except a
man say also, such a Monarchy as is by successiue right diuolued unto the next
heire male of the name, and that without partition. For albeit that the lawfull
Monarchy be alwayes to bee preferred before other Commonweals, yet
neuerthelesse so it is, that amongst Monarchies that which commeth by a
successiue right unto the heires males, of
name, neerest in blood, and without partition, is much more commendable and
sure, than are the other which come by lot, or by choyce, or will, to the heirs
male, but not to the neerest; or unto the neerest, but yet by the mothers side;
or that is the neerest by the fathers side, but yet is to make partition of the
whole Monarchy with other the coheires; or else of some part thereof. All which
it is needfull for vs by necessary reasons, and examples, to declare; to take
away the opinion that many imprint into another princes subiects, and by that
meanes entertaine rebellions, so to chaunge well ordered Monarchies, and to
moue as it were both heauen and earth. All which they do under the vaile of
vertue, of pietie, and of iustice. Yea some there are to be found, which have bene so bold, as to publish bookes, and to maintaine
against their naturall prince, come unto the
crowne by lawfull succession, That the right of choyce is better in a Monarchy:
as was done in England the seuenth of September, in the yere 1566, the queene
then present at the disputation of the schollers of Oxford; the questionThis question was indeed then in Oxford disputed, & the
right of succession notably defended, and before election preferred.
being, That it were better to have kings chosen by election, than by
succession. Which new doctrine not a little troubled, not the queene onely, but
euen the nobilitie also of that kingdome, then there present. For why, from
such beginnings wee see the subiects to proceed unto mutinies, unto rebellions,
and at length euen unto open wars. And who is he that would not be moued to
heare the inuectiue speech of an eloquent man, detesting the cruelties, the
exactions, and rapines of a tyrant? who neither hath the honour of God, neither
the truth, neither iustice, in regard: who driueth away the good men, and ioyneth himselfe unto the euill: and in the
end ioyneth thereunto this exclamation, O how happie is that Monarchy, wherein
the estates of the people makeTo possesse the people with
n opinion, that have the king by election, is better than to have him by
succession, a thing most dangerous unto soueraigne princes. choyce of
a iust and upright king, who aboue all things feareth God, and honoureth
vertue: who regardeth the good, and chastiseth the euil: who unto the honest
appointeth due rewards, and unto the wicked condigne punishments: who abhorreth
flatterers, who keepeth his faith and promise; who banisheth the blood suckers
and deuisors of new exactions out of the court, who spareth his subiects blood
as his owne, who revengeth the wrong done to others, and pardoneth the iniurie
done unto himselfe; and who in briefe more esteemeth of religion and vertue,
than of all other things in the world. And so hauing set these prayses, with
the counterpoise of a tyranny repleat with all
vices, the vulgar sort forthwith conceiueth an opinion, that there is nothing
more happy, than the Monarchy which falleth into election: yea and not they of
the simpler sort onely, and such as have small understanding in the knowledge
of matters of policie, but euen they also which are accounted of all others the
most sufficient, are oftentimes deceiued, and much mistaken, in regarding
nothing but the apparant good on the one side, without respect unto the
innumerable absurdities and inconueniences which are to be found on the other.
For euen Aristotle himselfe is of opinion▪ That Monarchs
should be created by election, calling the people barbarous, which have their
kings by right of succession. And for which cause he deemed the
Carthaginensians more happy than the Lacedemonians, for that these had their
kings by succession from the fathers to the
sonne in the stocke and line of Hercules, whereas the
othersMost people to have had their kings by successi on,
rather than by election, contrary unto the opinion of Aristotle.
still had them by election and choyce. But so he might call the Assyrians
barbarous, the Medes, the Persians, the Aegyptians, the people of Asia, the
Parthians, the Armenians, the Indians, the Affricans, the Turkes, the Tartars,
the Arabians, the Moscouites, the Celtes, the Englishmen, the Scots, the
Frenchmen, the Spaniards, the Perusines, the Numidians, the Ethiopians; and an
infinit number of other people, who still haue, and alwayes before had, their
kings by right of succession. Yea and wee find in Greece (the countrey of Aristotle himselfe) that the Athenians, the
Lacedemonians, Sicyonians, the Corinthians, the Thebans, the Epirots, the
Macedonians, had more than by the space of six hundred yeares, had their kings
by right of lawfull succession, before that
ambition had blinded them to chaunge their Monarchies into Democraties and
Aristocraties. Which had likewise taken place in Italie also, whereas the
Hetruscians and Latines for many worlds of yeares had their kings still
descending from the fathers to the sonnes. Now if so many people and nations
were all barbarous, where then should humanitie and ciuilitie have place? It
should be onely in Polonia, in Denmarke, and in Sweden: for that almost these
people alone have their kings by election: and yet of them almost none, but
such as were themselves also royally descended. Cicero
saith, humanitie and courtesie to have taken beginning in the lesser Asia, and
from thence to have bene divided unto all the other
parts of the world: and yet for all that the people of Asia had no other kings, but by succession from the
father to the son, or some other the neerest of kin. And of all the auntient
kings of Greece, we find none but Timondas, who was
chosen king of Corinth, and Pittacus of Nigropont. And
at such time as the royall name and line sailed, oftentimes the strongest or
the mightiest carried it away▪ as it chaunced after the death of Alexander the Great, who was in right line descended from
Hercules, and the kings of Macedon, who had continued
aboue five hundred yeares: whose lieutenants afterwards made themselves kings,
Antipater of Macedon, Antigonus of Asia the lesse, Nicanor of the
upper Asia, Lysimachus of Thracia: so that there is not
one to be found among them, which was made king by election. So that euen
Greece itself (the nurse of learning & knowledge) shuld by this reason, in
the iudgement of Aristoile, be deemed barbarous. Howbeit that the word Barbarous, was in auntient time no word of disgrace, but
attributed unto them which spake a strange language and not the naturall
language of the countrey. For so the Hebrewes called also the auntient
Aegyptians, then of all nations the most courteous and learned, Barbarous, that is to say, , for that they used the Aegyptian tongue,
and not the Hebrew.Psal. 113.
But in all Monarchies which go by election, there is one daunger thereunto
alwaiesGreat daungers incident unto an estate or
kingdome, where the king or other oueraigne
prince, is to be chosen by election. incident, which is, that after
the death of the king, the estate remaineth a meere Anarchy, without king,
without lord, without government, still in danger of ruine; as a ship without a
maister, which oweth the wracke of it selfe unto the first storme or wind that
ariseth: theeves and murderers in the meane time at their pleasures committing
their murders, and such other their most
hainous outrages, with hope of impunitie; as the common manner is after the
death of the popes, of the kings of Tunes, and in former times after the death
of the Sultans of Aegypt. For there have bene such as have committedThe great disorders in Rome, in the vacancie of the papacie,
and before the new pope be chosen. fiftie sundrie murders, and yet
have alwayes had the popes pardon therefore: the popes at their first entrance
into the papacie, still pardoning all men their offences whatsoeuer: and so
murders and revenges commonly referred unto the popes death, remaine then
vnpunished. So that in the yeare 1522, there were two executed at Rome, whereof
the one tearmed himselfe Pater noster, and the other Aue Maria, who at diuers times had stabbed and murdered
an hundred and sixteene men, as was then proued. And the first thing that they commonly doe, the Papall seat being vacant, is
to breake open the prisons, to kill the gailors, to enlarge the offendors, to
revenge iniuries by all meanes: which continueth vntill that the colledge of
cardinals have agreed of a successor, wherein sometime they have beene at such
discord and variance among themselves, as that the seat hath bene vacant two
yeres and foure moneths together: as it chanced after the death of Clement the 5: yea & sometime 10 yeres, as after the
election of the duke of Sauoy surnamed Foelix. We read
also oftentimes two or three popes, and as many emperors, to have bene chosen
at once; and the empire to have stood vacant a yeare or two together, yea whole
eighteene yeares, after that William countie of Holland
the emperour, was slaine. And albeit that the princes electors made offer
of the empire unto the king of Spayne, Alphonsus the tenth, yet so it was that he would not
accept thereof, for the manifest daunger that he was to put himselfe into by
taking upon him sueh an estate, exposed unto the will and pleasure of the
subiects, unto the enuie of princes, and the violence of murtherers: all which
time of vacancie the wicked neuerthelesse are out of frame in all kind of loose
libertie. Which in some sort to remedie, the Polonians (who have their kings by
election) double the penalties for the offences committed during the choyce of
the king, as I have learned of Zamoschy now Chauncellour
of Polonia, but as then ambassadour in Fraunce. So wee read also that during
the elections of the Sultans of Aegypt (before it was by the Turkes subdued,
and by them unto their empire vnited) the poore
subiects, and the best townes and cities in
the whole kingdome, were sacked and rifled by the Mammalukes: vntill that some
one of them by the consent of all the rest was chosen Sultan.
Now if some (to remedie the matter) shall say, That in the meane time there
mightNo lesse dangerous in the vacancy of a kingdome, to
make choyce of a soueraigne gouernor than of a king himselfe. a
gouernour be established: he is therein deceiued, it being a no lesse hard
matter, to make choyce of a lieutenant or gouernour, than of a king. But admit
he might so bee made without any contradiction, by the consent of all the
estates to whome it belongeth, to name their gouernour, yet who should be the
suretie and warrant for his faith? Who should let him (hauing the power in his
hand) to inuade the estate? who should disarme him being not willing thereunto?
Wee see how Gostauus father of Iohn king of Sweden behaued himselfe, who of a gouernour made himselfe
a king, without expecting of any other
election at all, and so lest the regall power by strong garrisons confirmed
unto his posteritie. And to leaue the government unto the Senat, as they do in
Polonia, and did of auntient time in Rome, is no lesse daungerous, least in the
meane time some of the stronger and bolder sort should possesse themselves of
the fortresses and stronger places: as did Pompey
Columna, and Anthonie Sauelle, who ceized uppon
the Capitoll at Rome, proclaiming unto the people libertie. And in the time of
such vacancie civill warres and dissentions are impossible to be auoided, not
only amongst the most warlike nations, but euen amongst the church men also: so
that it was neuerMany popes flaine or poisoned, about their
election. possible to prouide so well, but that two and twentie popes
had their heads chopt off, and many moe of them by strong factions driuen out
of their seats: not to speake in the meane
time of them (in number almost infinit) who have by poyson (the common death of
the bishops of Rome) perished. Yea we read that euen in the primitiue church,
viz. in the yeare of our Lord 356, there were six
hundred persons slaine in the verie citie of Rome, about the election of Damasus and Vrsicinus, whether of
them should bee pope. Neither was that onely done at Rome, but almost in euerie
towne and citie,Why the choyce of bishops, and
ecclesiasticall presements was taken from the
people. which had in them any bishops, all places were so filled with
so many of Laodicia, that from thence forward it should not be lawfull for the
people, to meddle with the choice of the bishops and prelats, or the bestowing
of the ecclesiasticall preferments. Wherefore Athanasius, and Augustine, both bishops,
appointed whome they would have to succeed them in their bishoprikes, the one
at Alexandria, and the other at Hippona. What
should I speake of the Roman civill warres, and after them of the Germans,
about the choice of their emperours? their bookes, their histories, and all
their monuments, are full thereof. Wherein we cannot without iudignation and
horror, remember the miserable wasting countries, the mutuall slaughter of
citisens, and sacking of most noble cities, mischiefs still done either by the
one side or the other.
And yet there is another inconuenience also, not to be omitted, which is, That
kingdomesThe publike demaine most com monly dissipated or
embeseled by princes electiue. going by election, have nothing in
them which at one time or other is not subiect unto all mens spoiles: so that
euen the publike demaines, and such as before were common, and wherein euerie
man had a common interest: we see them in a little time conuerted euen vnto
particular mens vses: so as we see it to have happened in the demaine
of Saint Peter at
Rome, as also in the demaine of the German empire. For the princes elect
knowing wel that they cannot long raigne, nor that they cannot leaue unto their
children any thing of the estate, more than what they thinke they can by deceit
and fraud purloine and hold, care not to giue any thing unto the magistrats
their friends: or by open sales and donations, to make their owne profit of the
publike reuenues and possessions. So Rodolph the
emperour for money exempted all the towns and cities of Tuscanie from the
fealtie and obedience which they ought unto the German empire: Robert also the emperour, gaue three of the imperiall
townes unto his sonne: Henry
the first ceased upon Saxonie: Fredericke the second
enfranchised Nuremberg:Otho the third enfranchised Isne: Lewes of Bauiere did the like for the towne of Egre: Henry the fist sold all he could: and Charles
the fourth being not able to pay the hundred thousand crownes which he had
promised to every one of the princes electors, sold unto them all the tributes
of the empire, to have them to chuse his sonne Charles
emperour, as he indeed was: but afterwards againe thrust out euen by the same
princes who had before made choice of him. So that the principall and strongest
sinewes of that Commonweale being cut in sunder, the whole body of the empire
became so weake and feeble, that Charles duke of
Burgundie doubted not to wake warre upon the Germaine princes.Nothing more intollerable than a man of base degree suddenly
mounted up unto great honor.
Another point there is also well worth the consideration, which is, That a man
of base degree suddenly mounted unto the
highest degree of honour, thinketh himselfe to bee a god upon earth. For as the
wise Hebrew saith, There is nothing more intollerable than the slaue become a
lord. And on the other side such is the feruent loue of the father toward his
sonnes, that he will rather confound heauen and earth together (if he haue
power so to do) than not to leaue unto them the crowne, but to let it rest in
the voyces and choice of the ignorant people,
But let vs yet go further, for why these are not the greatest inconueniences.
ForAnother great inconuenience about the election of
soueraigne princes. where the people is to chuse their king, they
must either make choice of a stranger, or of a naturall subiect: Now if choice
bee to bee made out of the naturall subiects, then every the most impudent and audatious fellow will by all
right and wrong seeke to aspire unto the soueraigntie: and if there bee many of
them of equall power andNo accord where every man would be a
lord. grace, it is impossible but that there should be great
factions, wherin the people should become partakers: or in case they were not
equall, neither in vertue nor wealth, yet so it is that they would presume
themselves to be equall, and neuer agree one of them to obey another, but
wishing rather to endure the commaund euen of strange and wicked princes, than
of another subiect their equall. As it happened in Armenia (as Tacitus reporteth) where the nobilitie could endure none
to bee their king but a meere stranger. And of late in Polonia Sigismundus Augustus the king beeing dead, and a
controuersie arising amongst the nobilitie, every one of them longing after the
kingdome; a decree was made whereby all the
naturall subiects were embarred from obtaining of the kingdome: as I learned of
the Polonian embassador, whom I was commanded to attend after they were entred
into the confines of this kingdome, to conduct them unto Henry the king.
And in the remēbrance of our fathers when as the Aegyptian Sultans were chosen
by the voyces of the pretorian souldiers or Mammalukes, & they not able to
endure one of them to be greater than another, had slaine diuerse of their
Sultans: they at last to stint the strife, by their common consent sent their
embassadors unto Campson king of Caramania to become
their Sultan, and to take upon him the kingdome of Aegypt being by them offred
him. With the same calamities the Germaine princes also troubled, after diuerse murthers of the emperours of their owne
country, oftentimes made choyce of strangers, yea and those right small
princes: as of one William earle of Holland, and of Henrie earle of Lutzembourg, one while also making choice
of the king of England, and another while of the king of Spaine: yea, sometime
such forraine princes refusing that same empire so offered them: For so Alphonsus the tenth king of Spaine refused the imperiall
crowne by the princes electors offered him, which afterwards stood emptie aboue
eighteene yeares, as we have before sayd. Sigismund
alsoThe imperiall crowne of diuers▪ strange princes
refused. the first king of Polonia, refused the kingdome of Hungarie,
of Bohemia and Denmarke, being thereunto inuited by the Estates. So also Lewes the twelfth refused the
Seignorie of Pisa: and the antient Romans (as saith Appian) refused diuerse people which
would have submitted themselves under their obeysance. But admit that the
strange prince do not refuse a kingdome so offered him: which if it bee farre
off from the bounds of his owne kingdome, hee must than either leaue his owne,
or gouerne the strange kingdome by his deputies or lieutenants: both things
absurd and inconvenient.A strange kingdome hard to be
gouerned by lieutenants or deputies. For who is he so foolish that
had not rather to looke to his owne things than to other mens? and what nation
or people can with patience endure to be gouerned by deputies? so to have him
whom they would not, and to want him whom they made choice of. So Lewes king of Hungarie at the request of his wife
daughter to Casimire king of Polonia, tooke upon him the
kingdome of Polonia conferted unto him by the voyces of the people: into which
kingdome he was inuested, and receiued with
the greatest acclamations, and applauses of all men that might be: who yet
shortly after, whether it were for that he found himselfe offended with the
sharpnesse of the Polonian aire: or that he was allured with the pleasures and
delights of Hungarie, or that he was by the vowes and requests of his owne
people recalled: returned home, leauing his wife unto the Polonians (her
countremen) with a traine of the Hungarians to attend upon her: where so it was
that the Polonians mindfull of the Great Casimire her
father, for a space endured the womans soueraigntie, but could in no wise
endure her traine of Hungarians. And so also not long ago Henry, Charles the French kings brother called unto the kingdome of
Polonia, his brother being dead, withall speed returned unto his owne naturall
kingdome: howbeit the Polonians would by no
meanes endure the gouernement of his deputies or lieutenants, but by voyce
chose unto themselves a king: although that they could by no right or reason do
so, but by the consent of Henry, unto whom they had
giuen all the soueraigne rights, whereunto they had not annexed any clause or
condition (when as question was of the kingdome of France to fall unto him)
that hee should not in his absence by his deputies or lieutenants gouerne that
kingdome bestowed upon him: as hath bene alwayes lawfull for all princes to do.
For it is an old axiome, a donation once consummate and perfected not to admit
any moe conditions. But admit both the kingdomes confine together, as doth
Polonia and Hungarie; what doubt is there but that he will, if he can, make one
kingdome of two? or change an Aristocratique estate into a right
Monarchie: yea, and that by force of armes,
if the nobilitie or people shall withstand him, whereof we have an example of
the Emperour Charles the fifth, who after the ouerthrow
of the Germaine princes had changed the Aristocracie of the Germaines into a
kingdome, and had caused his sonne Philip to be sent for
out of Spaine into Germanie, to have made him king of the Germaines, had not
Henry the second the FrenchCharles
the fift about to have made his sonne Philip king of Germanie. king
most mightily withstood him, and so broken his designes. The occasion of Iulius Pflugius the Bishop is yet extant wherein hee
laboureth to persuade that one thing especially, viz. that the most sure
foundations of the Germaine empire might be layd. And in case that the prince
cannot ioyne the kingdome which he hath got by election confining upon him,
unto his owne naturall kingdome: yet will he so much as in him lieth draw all the profits, fruits, and reuenues of the
strange kingdome unto his owne: and hauing taken away the voyces from the
nobilitie whom hee hath in his power, shall appoint or cause them to chuse
whomsoeuer pleaseth him to succeed him: as the kings of Denmarke, of Thunes,
yea and the Germaine emperours also themselves by a custome of long receiued
from their ancestors have used to do: in such sort as that the rights of
elections by voyces, seeme to be vtterly taken away. So Ladislaus king of Bohemia, the sonne of Albertus, and the emperour Fredericke the third
his nephew,Kingdomes electiug oftentimes changed into
hereditarie. by the voyce of the people chosen king of Hungarie by a
certaine bond of fealtie, left that kingdome unto his
nearest kinsmen all most hereditarie. And albeit that MatthiasCoruinus the sonne of the noble Huniades (Ladislaus being dead without issue) by the voyces of the
people obtained that kingdome (they alwaies pretending that the right of the
choice of the king belonged to them; and that the succession of the next of
kinne was not to take place) yet for all that Fredericke
his nearest kinsman was about both with his owne power, and the strength of the
whole empire to have inuaded that kingdome, and had vndoubtedly so done, had
not Matthias by his promise put him in hope of the
kingdome for himselfe and his posteritie: if he should himselfe die without
issue, as by chance he did. Howbeit, yet neuerthelesse that Matthias being dead, the Hungarians made choice of another Ladislaus king of Bohemia and Polonia also: without
regard of the conuention and agreement before made with Fredericke, which was the cause of a
most great and cruell warre for the kingdome of Hungarie: which could by no
meanes be appeased: vntill that by all the degrees of the people of that
kingdom it was decreed that it should from thenceforth be hereditarie: and that
after the death of Dadislaus Maximilian the sonne of Fredericke should succeed in that kingdome, as indeed he
did: But his nephew being left under age, and the estates of the kingdome
pretending them to have the right to make their choice of his gouernours;
against Fredericke who sought to step into the
gouernement of Hungarie, and to take upon him the guard and protection of the
yong king his nephew: the people of Hungarie, yea, and the sister of Ferdinand (the yong kings mother) chose rather to cast
themselves into Solyman the great Turkes lappe, and so
to betray both king and kingdome, rather The Hungarians for the maintenance of their electiue right
now fallen into the perpetuall sernitude and slaf the Turk. than to endure the gouernement
of the emperour Ferdinand in such sort, that they for
the maintenance of the right of their election, are now fallen into the
perpetuall seruitude of the Turke: hauing not onely lost the right of their
election, which they so striue for; but in hazard also to loose their lawes,
libertie, and religion: as the common custome of all strange princes is (as
much as in them lieth) to change the lawes, customes, and religion of the
people by them subdued, or oppressed, and to enure them, or otherwise to
enforce them to embrace and follow their fashions, manners, and religions: and
was as should seeme the principal cause why God forbid his people to make
choice of a strange prince to raigne over them.
And yet in matter of election the way being open to manie competitours, if the
Princes by election created still to be in great
danger. matter be to be tried by force, alwayes the most wicked and
deceitfull: or else the most hardie and aduenterous, put all upon hazard to
attaine thereunto: And if it hap the most vertuous to be chosen, his life is
still in danger of the competitours being of greater power: as in Germanie it
hath bene seene: where within this 360 yeares, since that Monarchie fell into
election, there have bene eight or nine emperours slaine or poysoned,Diuerse electiu emperours and princes
murthred, or els shamefully deposed. and
among others, William of Holland, Rodolph, Albert, Henry the seuenth, Fredericke
the second, Lewis of Bauaria, Charles the nephew of Henry, and Gunther: besides all them who were most shamefully thrust
out of the imperiall seate. And of 15 Sultans which were chosen kings of
Aegypt, there were seuen of them slaine: namely, Turqueman,
Melaschall, Cothus, Bandocader, Mehemet, Cercasse, and Geapalt. And of the
Romane emperours after the death of Augustus, there were
seuen one after another massacred, poysoned, or strangled: and that three of
them in one yeare, oppressed only by the conspiracie of citisens. Yea, the
pretorian souldiers sometimes slew the emperours to have a new, onely upon hope
of gifts and largesses. But still hee of whom the Senators made choice,
displeased the legions and men of warre: yea oftentimes every armie created an
emperour, in such sort as that at one time there were thirtie Romane emperours
chosen in diuerse places, and among them one woman, viz. Zenobia: all the empire being in civill warres and combustion who
should carry away the state, no end thereof being to
be found vntill that the rest were by the power of one all oppressed. Neither was there any assurance in the estate, if the
sonnes either lawfull or adoptiue succeeded not their fathers without election,
so as did Tiberius, Titus, Traian,No assurance in the estate where the succssion is not established.Adrian, Antoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus. But if any of the emperours gaue not order for
the adopting of his successour, in case hee had himselfe no children, the
commonweale alwayes fell againe into civill wars. And for this cause theThe great care the good Roman emperours had for the
certainti of the succession, lest after their
death the empire should fall into the dangers ensuing upon election.
emperour Adrian fearing lest the estate should fall into
election, he himselfe hauing no children, thought it not enough to adopt Antoninus Pius, but also caused him to adopt Marcus Aurelius, and Aelius Vetus:
following therein the wisedome of Augustus, who to
preuent the warres oftentimes arising about election, adopted his two little
nephews Caius and Lucius: who
both dying without issue, hee adopted also his third nephew Agrippa, and with him Tiberius his sonne in law: yet with condition that hee
should first adopt Germanicus. And they which were so
adopted and appointed heires of the empire, were called principes iuuentutis, or princes of the youth: and afterward of the
Germaines; reges Romanorum, or kings of the Romans: to
the end that euen in estates and Monarchies going by election, there might yet
be some certaine successor. For so Henry the third the
emperour whilest he yet lived caused his sonne to be chosen king of the Romans,
and his grand child to be also by him adopted. And Charles the fourth after that caused his sonne Wenceslaus by the electors to bee designed to the empire, but not
without a great summe of money: unto whome succeeded his brother Sigismund, who afterward adopted his sonne in law Fredericke the third; who againe caused Maximilian his sonne to be
adopted emperour. Neither was it to be doubted but that Philip, Maximilian his sonne, should have raigned over the Germaines,
had not his vntimely death preuented his fathers hope. And all bee it that the
estates and princes of the empire, the imperiall seae
being as then vacant, had many great princes competitors in the same; yet so it
was that they deemed the grand child of Maximilian
(Charles, then a very yong man, and neerest unto Maximilian in bloud) by a certaine successiue right worthie to be
preferred before the rest of the princes. And allbeit thatGreat regard had of succession, euen in kingdoms going by election.
the Bohemians, the Polonians, the Hungarians, Danes, and Tartars, will by no
meanes suffer the election of their kings to bee taken from them; yet they
thinke that their kings sonnes ought still in their choice to be preferred
before all others, that so by the benefit of
succession all the occasions of civill wars might bee preuented and taken away.
For which cause Sigismundus Augustus king of Polonia and
last of the house of Iagellon, hauing but two sisters, assembled the estates of
the kingdome to consult concerning his successor; hauing before vnited the
dukedome of Lituania unto the kingdome of Polonia: whereunto for all that the
estates would not consent, fearing to loose their right of election; or that he
should have giuen them a king contrarie to their good liking. And at the same
time as it were, the parliament of England was holden at London in October
1566, where the estates preferred a request unto the Queene for the prouiding
of a successor unto the crowne, to auoid (as they sayd) the euident dangers
whereinto the kingdome was like to fall, if it were not foreseene and prouided
for; and that they were resolued not to speake of any subsidie, or other thing
whatsoeuer, vntill that matter were
determined. With which request howbeit that the Queene was much troubled;
saying, That they would make her graue before she were dead: yet so it was that
she promised them therein to follow the counsell and aduise of such as were the
wisest in her land. For a kingdome going by succession still falleth into
eelection when there is none left neere of kin, neither of the fathers side nor
of the mothers;Kingdomes going by succession how they
sometimes fall into election. in which case it is necessary to
prouide before that the matter so fall out, whereas otherwise the estate is in
great hazard to be quite ouerthrowne: as it happened unto the estate of Milan in the yeare 1448, after the death of Philip Maria the last of the eires male of the house of Anglerie, which in
successiue right had holden Milan soure hundred yeares: when as the people
seeing themselves in full libertie without any lord or soueraigne, resolued to
maintaine a Popular estate: razed the castle Ioue,The
dutchie of Milan dismembred the line of the visecounties of the house of
Anglerie failing. burnt the last dukes testament, chose twelue
Senators; and after that hauing made choice of Charles
Gonzaga for their generall, most cruelly butchered all them which tooke
part with Frances Sforce, who being a man but basely
borne aspired to the soueraigntie, as hauing maried the base daughter of Philip the last duke, as also by the adoption which the
duke had made of him. At which selfe same time the emperour Fredericke the third claimed that dutchie, as a fee deuolued to the
empire for default of heires males. And Charles of
Orleans on the other side claimed it as belonging unto him in the right of his mother Valentine,
both the naturall and lawfull sister of the last duke. During which quarrels
the Venetians (as their vsuall manner is) to fish in troubled water, without
any right at all, possessed themselves of Cremona, Laude, & Placence, all
members of the dutchie of Milan. The duke of Sauoye tooke also Nouarre and
Versel: Sforce, Pauie, and Derthone: and the people of Milan vnable now to mannage their estate
at home, or to defend their territorie abroad; and yet abhorring the
gouernement of one, and not well knowing unto what Saint to commend themselves,
voluntarily submitted themselves with their citie unto the Venetians, by whom
for all that they were reiected. So that in fine all the Christian princes and
states their neighbours, were up in armes and together by the eares for the
estate; and for all that the last duke
prouided not for his successor as he ought to have done, in following that
which was resolued and agreed upon at the treatie of the mariage made betwixt
Lewes duke of Orleans and Valentine his sister: neither in taking unto him Charles of Orleans his nephew, and right heire of his dukedome so to
have adopted him, and brought him up neere unto his person, but adopted Sforce who had maried his base daughter, being but the
first gentleman of his house.
But the royall stocke being extinct, the last thereof may by right adopt vnto
himselfeWhether the last of the royall stocke may by
right adopt unto himselfe his successor. his successor, except the
nobilitie or people claime the right of the choice of their prince to belong
unto themselves. For if the last prince of the bloud shall appoint no
man to succed him, the soueraigntie is to
fall unto the people. It beeing a common matter for Monarchies neuer to fall
into election, but when the Monarch dying without heires hath not prouided a
successor. For so the line of Charles the great beeing
vtterly extinct, when as the last king of the Germaines had adopted none to
succeed him, Henry the Faulconer duke of Saxonie was by
generall consent of all men created emperour: wherein for all that the Germaine
writers are at varience among themselves: one of them thinking Arnulphus; and another Charles the
sonne of Lewes kingAbout what time
the seuen princes electors were first appointed for the choice of the
emperour. The error of thē which have thought the kingdome of France to
have in antient time gone by election, reiected. of the Germaines to
have bene chosen emperour, and that not by the voyces of the people, but of the
fiftie princes onely: and that electiue right to have beene at length conferred
unto seuen of them who were thereof called the princes electors: and that to
have happened about the yeare 1250. But let vs now come unto our owne
histories. Many there be which have reported
the kings of France in antient time to have bene created by choyce, and so that
kingdome to have fallen into election: but all that vntruly. For why that must
needs have bene done in the raigne of the Merouignes, or the Carlingues, or of
the Capets.
Now concerning the first line which is of the Merouignes; Agathius a Greeke
author of great authoritie and antiquitie (for he flourished about the yeare
500) writeth the French nation hauing chosen the best forme of a Commonweale
that was possible (that is to say the royall Monarchie) to have therein
surpassed all their neighbours: neither to have had
any other kings but by the right of succession. And the same author in another place sayth, Theodebert the sonne of Theodoric and nephew
o Clodoueus, being yet
under age and the gouernement of his tutor, to have beene called unto the crown
according unto the maner and fashion of their ancestors. Cedrinus also another Greek author, and he also very antient (who writ
in the yeare 1058 in the time of Philip the first the
king of France) reporteth the French men to have had no other kings, but by a
successiue right, after the antient manner of their ancestors. Wherein he
sheweth the aforesayd three lines of the kings of France to have used the right
of succession. And if so bee that first Charles, and
after him Carlomaine the children of Pipin caused themselves to be both chosen by the nobilitie (as indeed
they were) yet was not that done but onely so by the power and favour of the
nobilitie to assure their estates, & to
stop the mouths of such as were yet left of the house of the Merouignes, as in like case some of them did also of the house of Capet, who had thrust out them of the house of Charlemaigne. As for that which is reported of Otho, him by the consent and voyces of the nobilitie to
have bene created king: he at the time of his death hauing called together the
princes of the kingdome, protested him to have so done, not so much that he
himselfe might reigne, as to keepe the kingdome and the Commonweale wherewith
he was put in trust, in safetie unto Lewes the Stammerer
to whom he was appointed tutor. Robert Otho his brother
in chalenging the kingdome as it were in the right of succession after him, was
slaine in the battell of Soissons. Rodolph also sonne
unto the duke of Bourgundie caused himselfe also to be chosen, to exclude Charles the Simple, from
whom in the castle of Berone wherin he then was kept prisoner, Harbert countie of Vermandois had in favour of this Rodolpe extorted his resignation of the crowne. And after
that Hugh Capet had wrested the scepter out of the hands
of Charles of Loraine, he caused his sonne Robert whilest hee himselfe yet lived, to bee crowned;
and he likewise his sonne also, Henry the first; and Henry, his sonne also: and so vntill that one of the
daughters of Baldwin earle of Holland and regent of
France, descended from the eldest daughter of the aforesaid Charles of Loraine, and so lineally from Charlemaigne, was maried unto Philip the first,
and was mother unto Lewes the Grosse: wherby the secret
grudgings & hatred of the people against the Capets
were appeased, & the fire of ioy and blisse kindled, to see one of the race
of Charlemaigne, and so of the bloud of Saint Arnulph, ioyned with
the stocke of Capets. And if any coniecture there be,
wherfore any man should thinke the kings of France to have bene by election
created; it may best seeme to be drawne from the manner of the coronation of
the kings: For before the king that is to crowned take his oath, the two
Bishops of Laon andThe antient manner of the coronation of
the kings of France. Beauuois standing on both sides of the king, and
lifting him up a little from his throne, and then turning themselves unto the
people there present, demaund of them whether they will have that man to reigne
over them or not: whereunto they giuing their consent, the Archbishop of Reims
taketh his oath. So that they which write the kingdome of France to go by
election, have had no further regard but onely unto the manner and forme of the
chusing of the king (if it ought at all to bee called a choice) the manner whereof isyet to bee seene in the Librarie of
Beauuois, and which I have also taken out of the Librarie of Rheimes, and
deserueth well to be set downe at large, whereby it is to bee vnderstood, in
what sort our kings have beene in antient time crowned.
The title of the antient written booke of Rheimes is this, LIBER IVLIANI AD
ERRIGIVM REGEM: The booke of Iulian unto king Errigius:
(meaning Errichius the father of Philip the first) The words of the booke are these, Anno 1058 indictione xij Henrico regnante xxxij,
& iiij Cal. Iunij, in die Pentecostes Philippusrex hoc ordine in maiore ecclesia ante altare sanctae Mariae
à venerabili Archiepiscoprconsecratus est incoata Missa antequam epistola legeretur,
Dominus Archiepiscopus ver ad eum, & exposuit
ei fidem catholicam, sciscitans ab eo vtrum hanc crederet, & defendere
vellet: quo annuente delata est eius professio; quam accipiens ipse legit,
dum ad huc septennis esset, eique subscripsit: erat autem prosessio eius
haec: EGO Philippus, Deo propitiante mox futurus rex Francorum, in die
ordinationis meae promitto coram Deo, & sanctis eius, quòd vnicuique de
vobis commissis canonicum priuilegium, & debitam legem, atque iustitiam
conseruabo, & defensionem adiuuante Domino, quantum potero, exhibebo,
sicut rex insuo regno vnicuique Episcopo & ecclesi sibi commissae per rectum exhibere debet: populo
quoque nobis credito me dispensationem legum in suo iure consistentem,
nostra auctoritate concessurum. Qua perlecta posuit eum in manus
Archiepiscopi, ante stante ArchiepiscopoSuessionensi, &c. Accipiens Archiepiscopus baculum S.
Rhemigij, disseruit quietè & pacifice, quomodo ad eum maximè pertineret
electio regis & consecratio, ex quo sanctus Rhemigius Ludouicum
baptizauit & consecrauit. disseruit etiam quomodo per ìllum baculum hanc
consecrandi potestatem & totum Galliae principatum Ormisdas papa sancto
dederit Rhemigio: & quomodo victor Papa sibi & ecclesiae suae
concesserit. Tunc annuente patre eius Henrico, elegit eum in regem post eum.
Legati Romanae sedis, cùm idsine Papae nutu fieri licitum non esse dissertum
ibi sit: honoris tamen & amoris gratia tum ibi assuerunt: Legati
Lotarius Sol; Archiepiscopi, Episcopi, Abbates, Clerici; Dux Aquitaniae,
filius, Legatus Ducis Burgundiae, Legati Marchionis, & Legati Comitis
Andegauensis: pòst ComitesVandensis, Vermadensis, Ponticensis, Suessionensis, Aruer
nensis, pòst milites & populi tam matores quàm minores vno ore
consentientes laudauerunt, ter proclamantes: LAVDMVS, VOLV MVS, FIAT.
In the yeare 1058, the twelft of the indiction, of the raigne of king Henry the xxxij, the iiij of the Calends of Iune, on
Whitsunday, king Philip was in the great church, before
the altar of blessed Marie, by the most reuerend
Archbishop in this order crowned: Masse now alreadie being begun, & before
the reading of the Epistle: the Lord Archbishop turning himselfe unto him,
declared unto him the Catholike faith, asking him whether he beleeued the same,
and would also defend it? Wherunto he graunting, his profession of the same was
brought forth, which he taking read it, (being as then but seuen yeares old)
and subscribed to the same, whose profession
was this, I Philip, by the grace of God, by and by about
to be the king of France, upon the day of my inuesting do promise before God
and his saints, to keep canonicall priuilege, with due law and iustice to every
one of you the committies: as also so much as in me lieth by the helpe of God,
to defend you, as a king in this kingdome of right ought to doe unto euerie
Bishop, and to the church committed to his charge: as also by our authoritie to
graunt unto the people committed unto vs, the administration of our lawes,
standing in their full power. Which profession so read, heeThe archbishops of Rheims pretend to have the choyce of the French
kings. put it into the Archbishops hands, &c. (Here are twentie
Bishops and many Abbats by name reckoned up, and immediatly aster) The
Archbishop taking the staffe of Saint Rhimigius, calmely
and quietly declared, How that unto him especially belonged the choice and consecrating of the new king, euer since
that Rhemigius baptized and consecrated king This Iewes is rher to e calle Co ioues, otherse in ntient ti called Hndwich.Lewes: declaring also, how by that staffe of Hormisdas the pope gaue unto Saint Rhemigius this power of consecrating the kings, with all the kingdome
of Fraunce: and how the Pope Victor graunted the same
also unto him and his church. And so his father Henrie
consenting thereunto, chose him to bee king after him. The Legats of the See of
Rome hauing there reasoned it, not to be a thing lawfull without the licence of
the Pope, were yet for loue and honours sake there present: as were also other
ambassadours, as Lotarius Sol, with other Archbishops,
Bishops, Abbats, Clarks, the young Duke of Aquitane, the ambassadours of the
Duke of Burgundie, the ambassadours of the Marquesse,
the ambassadors of the Earle of Angiers, after them the Earls of Vandosme, Vermandoise, Soissons, and Auuerne: after that
the souldiors, and people, as well the greater as the lesser, with one consent
commended him, crying ut thrice aloud, We prayse him, We will have him: Let it be done. These
things wee have word for word written, the which were neuer yet put in print.
They therefore which thinke the kings of Fraunce to have beene in auntient time
created by the voyces of the people, vnderstand not the bishops of Rheimes to
have affirmed, that to have bene giuen unto them by a certaine singular
priuilege from the bishops of Rome: howbeit that it can in no wise agree with
the faith & obedience which the archbishops of Rheims have used to giue
unto the kings of Fraunce. Wee read also, that Charles
(he which for want of wit was surnamed the simple) was crowned by Fulke the archbishop of
Rheims, in the right of his neerenesse of blood, and not in the right of any
election by voyces. Whereby Otho so chosen, prerended
himselfe to be king: and unto whom complaining of the iniurie done him by the
archbishop in crowning of Charls: Fulke aunswered, That
he had made choyce of Charles, according to the manner
and custome of his auncestors, who had not used to chuse kings, but of the
royall stocke & race of kings. Whose letters written unto that effect to
Otho are yet extant. Wherby it appeares, that if euer
any man had the right of election, it belonged unto the archbishop of Rheims,
or that at leastwise he was in the possession thereof: and yet for all that,
that he could not make choyce of any other king, but of the princes of the
blood. But to shew that the right of the crowne of Fraunce still descended vnto
the heire male next of blood and name, it
appeareth not onely by the authoritie of them whome wee have before noted, but
yet more also by the cruell and bloodie warre, that was betwixt Lotaire, Lewes, and Charles the
Bauld, grounded upon this, That their father had giuen the better part, and the
regall seat of Fraunce, to Charles the Bauld his
youngest sonne: howbeit that all the three brethren were kings, gouerning their
divided kingdoms with royall soueraigntie. And for that Henry the first, king of Fraunce, the younger sonne of Robert, had bene chosen by his father, and his elder
brother the duke of Burgundie reiected: he fearing least the children of his
elder brother, should in their fathers right lay claime unto the crowne, and so
put all France into civill warres, as it had before bene in the wars betwixt
him and his brother; to preuent the same, hee caused his son Philip, so soone as he was but seuen yeares old▪ to be
crowned king of Fraunce. Which yet was done without any forme of election at
all: except perhaps, that some would absurdly say, The election of the kings to
belong unto the archbiships of Rheims, as giuen them by the pope, mistaking the
consecration, for the creation of them. Howbeit that the verie consecrating of
them, properly belonged not unto the archbishops of Rheims alone: king Lewes the Grosse being consecrated by the archbishop of
Sens, in the citie of Orleans. Besides that the archbishops of Rheims foolishly
pretend them to have that from the pope: wherein the popes themselves have no
right, no more than they have unto the empire, which they have made subiect
unto their elections; and by thrusting the sickle into another mans haruest (as
saith Albericus the lawyer) have against al right made lawes concerning the estate of princes,
binding the emperour to giue unto him the oath of fidelitie: chalenging vnto
himselfe the power to depose him; as all other kings also. Howbeit that the
bishops of Rome do themselves by their decrees confesse, the French kings to be
altogether free from the popes obedience & seruitude: neither to
acknowledge any one greater than themselves, next unto God. And that is it for
which they say in this realme, That the king neuer
dieth. Which auntient prouerbHow it is to be
vnderstood. That the king neuer deth. sheweth well, that the kingdome neuer went by election, & the kings
thereof hold their scepters neither of the pope, neither of the archbishop of
Rheims, nor of the people, but onely of God alone. And
I remember a lawyer, a most famous pleader of his time, who to serue the cause he had in hand, said in his pleading,
That the people of Fraunce had giuen the power unto the king: alleaging
therefore the words of the great lawyer Vlpian, where he
speaking of the Roman emperour saith, Lege Regia de eius
imperio lata, populus ei & in eum omnem suam potestatem Contulit,
By a royall law made concerning his power, the people conferred unto him and
upon him all his power: whereat the kings people suddenly arise, requesting the
court in sull audience, That those words might be rased out of the plea;
shewing that the kings of Fraunce had neuer receiued their power from the
people. Yea the court therefore sharply reproued the said lawyer, causing the
words, at the request of the Attourney generall, to bee rased out of the plea,
forbidding him any more to vse such speeches: who neuer after, as every man
knoweth, pleaded cause in that court. But
yet this is made more plaine by the solemnitie commonly used at the kings
burials, where the kings garments, weapons, scepter, and armes, are so soone as
the king is buried cast away; an herauld at armes with a loud voyce proclaiming
thrice, Rex est mortuus, or, The king is dead. And euen
he the same man, presently after aduancing a banner with the Lillies in it, the
proper armes of this nation, crieth likewise, Viuat Rex N.
eique vitam diuturnam ac felicem Deus largiatur, God saue king N. and
graunt him long and happy life. The like manners and customes vse the English,
the Scots, and Spaniards, with whom (as with vs) the kingdom is by right of
succession giuen unto the neerest of kin. The like ceremonies are used also
amongst the Bohemians, the Danes, and
Polonians, but yet not before that another king be by voyces created.
But now those daungers which we have said to follow the election of a prince,
belongElection no lsse
daungerous unto the electors, than vo the kings
and soueraigne princes themselves so elected. not more unto the kings
and princes themselves, than unto them that chuse them: for if the king be to
be chosen by the voyces of the whole people, all must needs be full of
seditions, factions, and murders. But if the nobilitie, or some other estate
onely, shall chalenge unto themselves alone the right of chusing of the prince,
the rest of the estates will grudge and repine thereat, that which is of right
due to all, to be giuen to some few.Election of princes
btter to bee made by some few, than by
many. yet could nothing be deuised more commodious or expedient for
the auoiding of the factions of the seditious, and of civill warres, than to
take from the multitude of princes and
magistrats, the election of the soueraigne prince or king, & to communicat
it with some few. For so the German princes (who in auntient time were fiftie
foure, and now almost foure hundred) have giuen all the right of their voyces,
for the chusing of the emperour, unto the seuen Princes Electors. Neither yet
in so great fewnesse of them, doe they still well agree, but sometime being at
discord among themselves, have chosen two emperours at once: as namely Albert of Austria, and Lewes of
Bauaria, who for the space of eight yeares made most cruell warres, which of
them should as emperour rule and raigne one of them over the other, all that
while one of them still spoiling and ruinating the townes, castles, and
villages, of the others favourits and part takers. So in like manner the
cardinals (who were but twelue) after the death of pope Clement the 4, for the great
dissentions and factions of the mightie, differred the election of the next
pope three yeares▪ and in fine chose the archdeacon of Leedes▪ who was then
gone to Hierusalem, and was afterwards called Gregorie
the tenth: & who for that cause bound the colledge of cardinals unto most
strait laws in the choyce of the pope, and yet could he not so prouide, but
that after his death, they at once made choyce of three popes, and oftentimes
of two; insomuch that at the last it was needfull to shut them up, and to
starue them with hunger, if within a certaine appointed time, they did not
denounce him pope, who had at the most two parts of the voyces: which yet is
more straitly kept in the chusing of the Grand Maister of the Knights of the
order of Saint Iohn: for they mure up the twentie foure electors, before
nominated by the knight, without The strait order obserued in chusing the Grand Master of the
knights of Malta either meat or drinke, who must chuse one who is not
of that number of the twentie foure, and that within a short time limited them.
There have bene seene also such factions, suits, and murders, to have happened
in this realme, about the election euen of the inferiour bishops, as haue
oftentimes troubled the state euen of the most famous cities, and wherein he
that was the most vitious and ignorant most commonly carried away the matter:
than which no greater cause seemeth to have beene, wherefore the voyces for the
chusing of bishops have bene taken from the colledges of priests and monkes,
and giuen to princes: as the Chauncellour Prat declared,
at such time as question was in parliament, for the verifying of the agreement
made betwixt king Francis the first, and Leo the tenth: For which cause also the bishops and
abbats in Moscouie, are drawne out by lot.
And yet neuerthelesse the onely colour that men have to maintaine election, is
toEuill men more commonly preferred than the good, where
men are by election promoted. say, That the more worthy men are so
chosen to be emperors, popes, bishops, and prelats. Wherein I referre them vnto
the histories of all ages, which will say the contrarie: and that there haue
seldome bene more vicious and wicked men, than were the most part of them who
were by choyce and election preferred; which wee need not now by examples to
verifie: but thus much onely I say, that if the right of succession had taken
place, Nero, Heliogabalus, Otho, Vitellius, and such
others, the monsters of nature, had neuer come unto the Roman empire: Augustus, Traian, Adrian, both the Antonines, with other the emperours excelling in vertue and wisedome,
who by adoption (as by the lawfull right of
succession) obtained the empire, should have beene excluded. But were it so
that the better princes were still to bee chosen by the suffrages and voyces of
the nobilitie, or of the people, or of other the wiser sort: yet so many and so
great inconueniences are on every side attending, as that it were better to
want good princes (howbeit that we cannot by this meanes have them) than to
have them with so great daunger of the subiects created and chosen, especially
so long as the right of succession may take place. But the line of the monarchs
fayling, and the right deuoluedA good meanes, the line of
Monarchs failing, to preuent the dangers still attending upon
election. unto the estates: in this case it is much surer to proceed
by lot, hauing made choice of the most worthiest persons, or of such as be
equall in nobilitie, or in vertue, or in power, to the end that one of them may
be drawne by lot, rather than to enter into
tearmes of election: prouided that the name of God be first called upon, in
following the forme of the auntient Hebrewes, who still said, Lord God direct
thy lot, to the end that all sorcerie and witchcraft may be from hence absent.
So the great Prophet Samuel, when question was for the
making of a new king, caused all the people to bee assembled, and the lot to be
drawne for all the twelue Tribes, which falling uppon the Tribe of Beniamin, and lot cast also upon the families of that
Tribe, in the familie of CisSome kings first chosen by lot, & yet their children to
have obtained their kingdomes as by a successiue right. the lot fell
upon Saul, whome Samuel by the
commaundement of God had before annointed, to the end that the people should
not thinke that the kingdome was unto him by chaunce onely fallen. But after
that the Monarchy is once established, men have commonly had regard unto the
prerogative of successiue right, without vsing either of election, or lot. So the seuen great princes of Persia, Cambyses being dead without issue, used lot, or rather
the neying of an horse for the chusing of their king. Yet wee see Darius hauing once by lot got the kingdome, the
soueraigntie of the state to have bene afterward by successiue right deriued
unto his posteritie.
Now it is not enough that successiue right take place in the descending of a
kingdome,The successiue right of the eldest sonne, common
to al people but that the neerest of kin unto the soueraigne monarch
succeed him also: my meaning is, among the males, and those of his name, which
is (to speake properly) the elder, as the first descended of him. For so the
order of nature willeth that the elder should goe
foremost next after the father, and that the rest should every one of them
follow in their degree, and so by
consequence, that he should be preferred before the others. And this law a man
may say to be naturall, and such as hath beene alwayes almost to all people
common. For so said Perseus, that by the right of nature
common unto all nations, and by the custome inuiolably obserued in the kingdome
of Macedon, the elder was still to succeed into that kingdome. And for that
reason (as saith Diodorus) Alexander the Great carried
away the crowne of that kingdome, from the rest of his brethren. As the manner
was also in the kingdome of Parthia, where the eldest of the house of Arsaces their first king, and the neerest of his blood
succeeded: following therein (saith Iustin) the auntient
custome of the Parthies. In like manner amongst the Hebrewes, the kingdome of
Iuda was giuen to Ioram, for that (as saith the
Scripture) he was the eldest. And so Herodotus himselfe (the most auntient of all the Greeke
historiographers) saith, That generally in all kingdomes the custome was, that
the elder should by right of succession have and enioy the scepter and diadem:
yea and more than foure hundred yeres before Herodotus
(as saith Coruinus Messala, in his booke dedicated to
Augustus the emperour) Ilus as
the elder brother, was preferred unto the kingdome of the Latines, before Assaracus the yonger brother. We read them also of the
West Indies (although men of all others most deuoid of humanitie) to have also
used this same natural▪ law, for the eldest to succeed before the younger. And
that when Francis Pizarra Generall of the Spaniards,
conquering the kingdome of Peru, caused Attabalippa the king to be put to death: all the people
thereat reioyced, to see him die that had caused his elder brother to be
slaine, so to become king himselfe, contrarie to the custome of the countrey,
and his fathers will conformable thereunto: who hauing two hundred children,
yet by his will appointed that Gaca his eldest sonne
should alone succeed him in his kingdome, without diuiding of the same. And
albeit that the children were twins, yet so it is, that the prerogative of the
kingdome is to be kept unto him that is first borne, & so to be left,
witnessed by most manifest proof: least such like quarrell should arise for the
prerogative of birthright, as did betwixt Iames king of
Scots, and the duke of Albanie, being twins: which kingdome the duke complained
to bee wrongfully taken from him: king Iames maintaining
the contrarie, for that he was the first
borne. And so alwayes when men would force and violat this naturall successiue
right, great troubles and civill warres have thereof ensued: as it happened for
the kingdomGreat troubles to have still arisen, where the
naturall successiue right of the eldest hath bene violated, and the yonger
brother preferred. of Alba, inuaded by Aemulius, being of right due unto Numitor the
elder brother: & to Aristobulus king of Iudea,
thrust out of the kingdome by the sentence and doome of Pompey the Great, to make an end of the civill warres and seditions:
the kingdome being so restored unto his elder brother Hircanus, without respect to that which Aristobulus alleaged, his said brother not to have bene fit to beare
armes, neither yet to gouerne a kingdome. A reason and colour for which the
fathers and favourits have oft time troubled the right of their children, to
set the crowne due unto the elder, upon the head of the younger. As did Ptolomey the first of that name king of Aegypt, who
contrarie unto the law of nations (as saith
Iustin) preferred the younger brother unto the
kingdome before the elder, which was the cause that one of them slue the other.
In which errour Ptolomee surnamed Physcon offended also, who persuaded by his wife Cleopatra, preferred the younger brother before the elder: but was no
sooner dead, but that the people expulsed the younger, and restored the scepter
unto the elder. Anaxandrides also king of Lacedemonia,
preferred Dorieus before Cleomenes his elder brother, for that he was the more civill: and yet
the historie saith, that the people thereof grieuously complained, as of a
thing done contrarie to the law of nations. And albeit that king Pyrrhus said, That his will was, that he of his children
should succeed him, which had the sharpest sword;
meaning thereby the most valiantest of them: yet the people after his death preferred the eldest, although vnfittest for
warres. For whatsoeuer valour, courtesie, beautie, or wisdome there be in the
yonger more than in the elder; yet should not the father therefore, contrarie
unto the law of nations, preferre the younger before the elder: howbeit that
the exteriour forme and feature of the bodie hath deceiued many. Foolishly
therefore do those parents, which ouercome with the flatterie of their younger
sonnes, and disinheriting the elder of their kingdomes, have incensed their
children most cruelly to murther one another: so as did the father of Atreus,Great murders & civill warres to have ensued, for hauing
preferred the yonger brother before the elder. and Thyestes, who willing to preferre the younger before the elder, as the
fitter for the mannaging of the affaires of state, so filled and foyled his
house with most cruell and horrible tragedies. But more foolelishly doe they,
which search into the natiuities of their
children, so to bestow the kingdome upon him whom the starres seeme to favour
most: as did Alphonsus the 10, king of Castile, who by
this means would have preferred the yonger brother before the elder: who for
the disgrace so offered him, slue his yonger brother, and caused his said
father for griefe to die in prison. In like case almost Gabriel the yonger sonne of the Marquesse of Salusse, by the consent
of his mother cast his elder brother into prison, pretending that he was out of
his wits: who yet breaking out of prison, recouered his principalitie, &
hauing chased out his brother, coupt up his mother in the same prison, wherein
hee himselfe had but a little before beene shut up. And not to seeke further
from home, wee have seene all this realme on fire with civill warres, for that
Lewes the Deuout, at the intreatie of his second
wife, had preferred Charles the Bauld, before Lothaire his elder brother. Wherefore pope Pius
the second did wisely, in reiecting the request of Charles the seuenth the French king, desirous to have preferred Charles his yonger sonne before Lewes the 11 his elder brother: howbeit that the king had reason so to
do, considering that Lewes had without any iust
occasion, twice taken up armes against him, so to have taken from him the
crowne, and to have pluckt the scepter out of his hand.
Now it is so farre from that the first begotten, or eldest sonne, should for
cowardise or want of courage, be imbarred to succeed unto the crowne, as that
if he be misse shapen and deformed also, yet ought not the prerogative he hath
unto the crowne by his birthright for that to be taken from him. Howbeit that
it much concerneth the Commonweale to haue
kings that be not deformed. Wherunto Lycurgus and Plato, would great regard to be had, and especially Lycurgus, who willed the deformed children to be slaine.
But the Deut. 21. The elder brother euen by the law of God to
be preferred before the yonger. law of God hath decided this doubt,
commanding the yonger not to be preferred before the elder, for what loue or
favour soeuer. Which is not onely to take place when question is of the right
of the elder, but also when the next heire male of the fathers side is to
succeed unto the crowne, albeit that he bee deformed. For one ought not for one
inconuenience to break so good a law, or to open a gap so dangerous vnto
Monarchies: which to be so the estates & people of Hungarie shewed by a
mostA notable example. notable example: contrarie
unto the will & disposition of Ladislaus their king,
who hauing no issue, adopted Alme his brothers yongest
son, so to make him king after him, reiecting Coloman his elder brother, whom he in a sort banished,
sending him a great way off, to studie in Paris: causing him also afterwards to
enter into the orders of priesthood, & withall bestowing upon him a
bishoprike, so to take from him all the hope for him to succeed unto the
crowne. For he was a man altogether deformed, goggle eyed, euill spoken, lame,
& crooked backed; & yet for all that Ladislaus
being dead, the estates of that kingdom draue out the yonger, refusing to haue
any other king but the elder brother, whome they called home, and by their
ambassadors afterward obtained of the pope, to have him dispenced with, and
discharged of his orders, and married also. In like
case Agesilaus, a lawe dwarfe, hauing by the meanes of
Lysander a prince of the same bloud excluded Leotichides as
Alcibiades his bastard, succeeded into the kingdom,
not as the kings son, but as next of the fathers side, and of the bloud of Hercules: his aduersaries in vaine complaining the
kingdom to hault. And howbeit that Lysander who had
preferred Agesilaus to the kingdome afterwards did what
he might to have abrogated the antient royall law, and to have published an
edict whereby the nearest of bloud should not have succeeded into the kingdome,
but that the most sufficient of the bloud royall should still be chosen; yet
was there none found of his opinion.Whether a kingdome ought
to descend unto the yonger sonne borne whilest his father was king: or to
the elder, borne before his father had obtained the kingdome.
Some there bee which would adiudge kingdomes unto the yonger being borne kings
sons, their elder brethren being borne before that their fathers were king: as
was iudged for Xerxes, declared king against Artabazus his elder brother begot by Darius before the kingdom of Persia fell unto him:
which iudgement was yet grounded upon equitie: For that the kingdome was but
lately fallen, not by any successiue right, but euen by lot or rather as it
were by chance unto Darius. But where the kingdome is
descended by a lawfull succession from former ancestors, the eldest or neerest
of the fathers stocke is to succeed, although he be borne before his father was
possessed of the kingdome. Whereby is vnderstood what is to be iudged of the
question, which Bartholus writeth to have happened in
his time; as whether Philip earle of Valois his son
borne before his father was king of France, should as king succeed him in the
kingdome; or else his yonger sonne which he had after that he was king? Howbeit
that I read in our histories him to have left
behind him none but his onely sonne Iohn. But this same
question might well have bin disputed in the time of king Charles the second, who before he was king had his sonne Lewes: who yet without any question obtained the
kingdome, although he had his brother Charles borne
whilest his father was king. For now question was of an antient kingdome
deuolued unto the next of name: wheras otherwise the yong sonne of a king
conquering a new kingdome should be preferred before his other brethren borne
before their father was a king. For as the children of base men are not
ennobled, being borne before their father was made noble; neither he to be
accounted a priests sonne, which was borne before his father was a priest: so
he also which is borne of a father before that he was king, not capable of the
kingdome by right of succession, cannot
pretend any right to the crowne, although he be the eldest or neerest of kin:
but if he be enabled to attaine thereunto by lawfull succession, the kingdome
of right belongeth unto him, how be it that hee were not the soone of a king.
As was obserued in the kingdome of Persia whereinto Artaxerxes succeeded, although he was borne before his father was
king: as claiming the kingdome from his great grandfather. And albeit that his
mother Parysatis thrust all Asia into civill warre to
turne the estate unto her best beloued sonne the yong Cyrus, yet so it is that by the iudgement of God he was in battell by
his elder brother ouerthrowne and so slain. In like sort and upon the same
doubt which happened about the succession of the kingdome of Hungarie, Geica the elder brother borne before his father had
obtained the kingdome, was by the consent of
all the estates proclaimed king: which neuer after was called in doubt, in what
kindome soeuer. Whereas otherwise there would ensue many intollerabe
absurdities: for if the king should leaue but one sonne borne before that he
was king, he could not succeed him. But yet whereas we have sayd, The
soueraigntie to be due to every one that is next of kinne; extendeth farre, not
onely unto them who the eldest being dead come in stead of the eldest, but vnto
their infinit posteritie also. For so Demetrius reasoned
in the Senat at Rome, his brother Antiochus king of
Syria being dead: for as (sayd he) the right of nations hath before giuen the
kingdome unto mine elder brother, euen by the selfe same right ought I now to
succeed him in the same.
But it may de doubted if the grandfather yet reigning, the eldest sonne shall
die leauingWhether the elder brothers son (his father being
dead before he was king) be to succeed into his
grandfathers kingdome before his vncle, his grandfathers yonger
sonne. a sonne, the grandfathers nephew; Whether the kingdome be due
unto the next brother or to the nephew, who is one degree farther off. upon
which question many have resolued it to be due unto the next brother. And
indeed Scipio Africanus willing as an vmpire to haue
appeased the like controuersie betwixt Corbis and Orsua the vnkle and the nephew, for the kingdome of
Numidia, and not knowing what in this point to resolue upon, appointed the
kingdome to be tried by combat betwixt them two: they both of themselves
refusing to have any other god or man for iudge but Mars: In which combat Corbis being both the elder and the cunninger ouercame
his nephew, as Liuie writeth. Which like kind of combats
betwixt the vncle and the nephew Liuius li. 38. have ofted in antient time
beene vndertaken among the Germaine princes: which was the onely cause that
stirred up Barnard king of Italie to take up armes
against the emperour Lewes the Deuout; alleadging that
the empire of right belonged unto him as the onely sonne of Pepin the eldest sonne of Charlemaigne, and not
to Lewes the Deuout the yonger brother of Pepin: howbeit that Lewes yet
caried it away, though not so much by right as by force of armes, and so
preuailing against Bernard kept himThe manner and order of the succession of the kingdome of Moscouie.
shut up in perpetuall prison. And euen yet at this present the kingdome of
Moscouie is alwayes giuen unto the yonger brother, after the death of the
grandfather, without respect unto the children of the elder brother: and that
more is, the yonger brother succeedeth in the kingdome unto the elder brother,
although the elder brother being king leaue
behind him a sonne yet under age: For so Basilius the
Great, king of Moscouie succeeded in the kingdome after his elder brother who
had children. For which reason also Henry of Lancaster
the sonne of Iohn of Gaunt deposed Richard the eldest sonne of Edward the Blacke
prince: alleaging that his father beeing by death preuented, he could not
succed Edward his grandfather in the kingdome: which yet
was but an vniust quarrell pickt. So in like case Robert
of Naples the yonger brother, by the sentence of the Pope and of the colledge
of cardinals, obtained the kingdome of Naples: the sonne of the elder brother
king of Hungarie being so excluded. An vsuall matter amongst the Vandals, as
Procopius writeth: for so Honorius got the kingdome of Gensericus his
grandfather, howbeit that Gerso his eldest sonne dying
had left sonnes; which he obtained not so much
by his grandfathers will, as by the antient law of almost all the Nomades and
Northren nations.
And which I see to have bene common euen unto our ancestors also: for so Gontran preuailed against Childebert the eldest sonne of Sigisbert in the
obtaining of the kingdom of France. So Mauld ouercame
Robert her nephew, the son of Robert her elder brother, for the countie of Arthoise, the Senat of
France desciding the matter; and so obtained her fathers whole inheritance. Henry also sonne to Theobald earle
of Champaigne in like sute ouercome his eldest brothers sonne. But when Iohn Montfort in like sute for the dukedome of Britaine
was ouerthrown, by his aunt the daughter of Vide of
Britaine; what by right he could not, he by force obtained, not without a most
cruell and bloudie warre. And so (as we sayd)
Robert the sonne of Charles
the second, by the iudgement of the Pope obtained the kingdome of Naples, Charles his nephew the elder brothers sonne, king of
Hungarie, in vaine reclaiming. Sanxius also the sonne of
Alphonsus the tenth king of Castile, his father
favouring of him thrust his elder brothers sonnes out of the hope of the
kingdome. Iohn also hauing slaine Arthure, Godfrey his elder brothers sonne, tooke upon him the kingdome
of England. Vnlike was the quartell of Siluius, who
after the death of Ascanius, in the right of his mother
tooke from Iulus, Ascanius his sonne, the kingdome of
the Latins: For that Lauinia had Siluius by Aeneas but not Ascanius. But not fewer, yea and I know not whether moe
nephews to have obtained their grandfathers
kingdomes, their vncles yet liuing, according to the antient law of the
Lacedemonians. As for Lycurgus, he gaue unto Charilaus his eldest brothers sonne, his kingdome, which
he might easily have taken unto himselfe, the childs mother consenting
thereunto. Arcus also the elder brothers sonne, after
the death of his grandfather obtained the same kingdome, his vncle Acrotatus yet liuing. So also Iohn
the sonne of Ferdinand succeeded to Alphonsus his grandfather king of Portugall, Henry his vncle being yet alive. And not long after Sebastian the son of Iohn the eldest brother
tooke upon him the kingdome of Emanuel his grandfather,
and not Henry his vncle, Lewes of
Niuers also after the death of his grandfather got the counties of the Low
countries his vncle yet liuing and looking on. But Robert the second, king of Naples
(whose father by the sentence of the Pope had ouercome his elder brothers
sonne) when question was betwixt the vncle and the nephew for the countie of S.
Seuerine, by the councell of the lawyers gaue sentence on the nephews side. The
like sentence was giuen by the iudges of the court of Paris betwixt the heires
of Iohn Vaste the sonne of the earle of Foix, and the
heire of Francis Phebe, who being the sonne of the elder
brother had got his grandfathers inheritance, his vncle yet liuing. So also was
it iudged for the dukedome of Britaine against Iohn
Montfort. Others have left it as a thing doubtfull to be tried by
combat. For as Scipio Africanus permitted the combat
betwixt Orsue and Corbis whom hee
could not by law appease: the same we read to have happened first under Otho the Great, and after that under Henry the first in Germanie; and the
vncle to have bene ouercome by their brothers sonnes. But the nephew of Agathocles king of Syracusa slew his vncle, going about
to have taken upon him his grandfathers kingdome.
Neither want there probable reasons on both sides. For the nephew it
auailethReasons for the succession of the nephew before
his vncle. that his father being dead he falleth into the power of
his grandfather, & so is made his heire by the law of the twelue tables:
and together with his vncles is admitted into his portion of his grandfathers
inheritance, he dying intestat. And if the father substitute an heire unto his
sonne, that substitution ceaseth if the sonne beget children, onely upon the
coniecture of the fathers kind affection towards his sonne, as Papinian the lawyer hath answered. Yea, by the Roman
lawes, brothers sonnes are admitted unto their
vncles inheritance: but then how much more true and iust is it for them to bee
admitted unto the inheritance of their grandfathers? That is also moreouer,
that by the antient customes of Fees the nephew may by right receiue the whole
benefit, his vncles being quite excluded. But no reason is more effectuall,
than that an inheritance neither entered upon, neither so much as yet fallen,
is not onely deriued from the grandfather to the nephews; but euen the verie
vncertaine hope of a matter in trust being so but under a condition
conceiued.
Neither yet for all this is the vncles cause on the other side altogether
without reason,Reasons for the succession of the vncle
before his nephew. if a man will but more neerly looke into these
matters, and without guile interpret the law of the twelue tables. For why this
law still admitteth the nearest of kinne vnto
the inheritance: but now the sonne is nearer unto the father than the nephew,
who but by a false supposall and fiction is deemed to be the same person with
his dead father. But admitting that a faigned supposall is in some cases to bee
borne withall: yet seemeth it not reason that such a false fiction should
preuaile against the truth, especially unto another mans harme or preiudice of
his right. Neither doth the kindnesse of nature suffer the sonnes to be spoyled
of their fathers wealth and goods, that all might be giuen unto the nephew, who
is farthest off from the grandfather: which must needs be not onely in the
obtaining of a kingdome, but also of a dukedome, or of an earledome, or of an indiuisible fee, by reason of that imaginarie
fiction whereof wee have spoken, the nephew to
be supposed to represent the person of his dead father. And so farre it was
from that the Roman lawes should suffer the sonnes to be disturbed by the
nephewes, as that things committed euen but upon trust come not unto the
nephewes before that all the sonnes one of them substituted unto another, be
dead. But admit that the sonnes, contrarie unto the lawes both of nature, and
of the Romans, may be disinherited, that so way may be made for the nephew
(which we see in indiuisible succession to be still done) yet is it an
vnreasonable, and vniust thing, an infant, a child, or one under age, of no
experience in matters of warre, or in the other civill and weightie affaires of
the Commonweale, to be called unto the soueraigntie of a kingdome; and another
neerer than he, that excelleth both in yeares and wisedome, to be in the meane
time debarred of his fathers kingdome. For
which reason the lawyers have giuen the tuition of the fathers enfranchised
slaue unto the vncle, the nephew being excluded: but by how much more then is
the tuition of the kingdome to be committed unto the vncle, rather than vnto
the nephew? And last of all so it is, that vncles unto whom the tuition of
their yong royall nephewes is almost still committed, commonly thinke of
nothing else, but of the murthering and killing of them: whereof innumerable
examples (and yet not all) are in histories reported, all which if I should goe
about to gather together, I should so become tedious. Besides that, it is in
sacred writ set downe, Esay. 3.That Commonweale to be miserable and vnfortunat, where
children beare rule.
Howbeit that the old receiued custome of our auncestours, and iudgements in
this case often giuen, have called me backe
from this opinion. For those inconueniences which we have spoken of, happen but
seldome: which being such, the lawmakers are not greatly to respect. For if we
would rehearse all the kings of Fraunce euen from the time of Charles the Great, we shall scarcely, or els not at all, in the space
of twelue hundred yeares, find the vncle and the nephew, after the death of the
grandfather, to have met together as competitors in the succession of this
kingdome. Wee read it in the space of about five or six hundred yeares to haue
happened once in England, once in Castile, twice in Portugall, and once in
Sicilia. Wherefore let the sentence as well of the auntient, as of the later
lawyers preuaile for the nephew against the vncle: not only in direct, but euen
in oblique, and collaterall succession also. Which we have somewhat the more curiously reasoned of, for that succession of
the kingdome of Fraunce, which seemeth to be euen neere at hand. But if cosin
Germans, or the vncle and the nephew, shall in the right of themselves without
any fained supposall of representation, lay claime unto the crowne of a king
their kinsman, dead without heires male, be it that they were fiftie degrees
off, yet he that is descended of the elder, albeit that hee were himselfe the
younger, shall carry it away from the elder: as it may and hath oftentimes enow
happened in this realme. And yet neuerthelesse in particular successions in
collaterall lines, they shall equally diuide the diuisible inheritance into
parts: but if the inheritance be indiuisible, the elder of the two in like
degree is to bee preferred before the younger, and to enioy the right of his
eldership, albeit that the younger bee descended from the more auntient auncestors: as was adiudged in the court of Paris,
betwixt Villiers, and Baynecourt,
cosens germans, for the inheritance of Francis Bloqui,
without any regard unto the race of the elder auncestours, considering that
they came unto the succession of their chiefe ot head, and not by false
supposall, or by the way of representation.
And yet is it not sufficient, that the next heires male of name succeed, but it
is needfull also, that the kingdome, how great soeuer it be, with all the
soueraigne rights therof, bee wholly giuen to one without partition: as Gensericus king of the Vandales
wisely appointed. For otherwise if a Monarchy be divided, it is no more to be
accounted That a kingdom how great soeuer is not to be divided, but to
be wholly giuen to one without partition. a Monarchy, but rather a
Poliarchy, or Monarchy divided into many Monarchies. Which was not by the law
Salique with vs (as some suppose) prouided for, or fooreseene. For we find that
Aribert, brother to Dagobert
the eldest sonne of Clotaire the second, was also king
with his brother, one of them holding nothing of the other. Clodoueus also the eldest sonne of Dagobert,
was king of Paris, and Sigebert his brother king of
Metz. And after the death of Clodoueus his foure sonnes
divided the realme into foure kingdomes: for Childebert
was king of Paris, Clodoueus king of Orleans, Clotaire of Soissons, and Theodoric of Metz. But the rest being dead, all in fine came to Clotaire, whose eldest sonne Cherebert was king of Paris, Chilperic of
Soissons, Gontran of Orleans, and Sigebert of Metz, all kings: which multitude of kings were scarece
euer quiet from civill warres. For which it
was wisely prouided by the successors of Hugh Capet, who
ordained three kings of great consequence for the maintaining of this Monarchy
in the greatnesse thereof. First they excluded the bastards of the house
ofThree things of great consequēce ordained for the
maintainance of the kingdome of France in the greatnesse therof.
Fraunce, from all entrance unto the kingdome, not allowing them so much as to
be accounted in the number of their naturall children: that so from thenceforth
they might thinke of the begetting of lawfull children, their base borne
children being now quite excluded from the crowne. Howbeit that it was
permitted unto the bastards of other princes of the blood, and of other noble
houses, to be by their fathers auouched, and to beare the name, the armes, the
stile and noble titles of their naturall fathers: prouiding also better, by
taking away of the masters of the palace, whose power was now become dreadfull unto the people, and daungerous unto the
kings. Secondarily they ordained all the soueraigne royall rights, to be wholly
and entirely giuen to the eldest brother alone, and from thenceforth not to be
communicated with the younger brethren, but to be all enforced to yeeld vnto
their elder brother all obedience and fealtie. And lastly, that such lands as
by the kings appointment were assigned unto the kings sonnes, to be holden in
fealtie, they dying without heires male, should againe freely returne unto the
crowne. And the kings sisters to have their dowrie in money onely: that so not
onely the rights of soueraigntie, but euen the crowne lands also, might so much
as possible was be kept whole & entire unto the eldest brother. And as for
the bastards of France, we find them in former
times to have had their parts in the kingdome together with the kings other
lawfull sonnes: as the bastard brother of Charles the
Simple, had part in the kingdome, and so after the manner of our auncestors was
called a king. True it is, that Theodoric the kings
bastard was excluded, for that he was begot of a bondwoman, who yet
neuerthelesse demaunded his part of the kingdome, unto whome for all that
aunswere was giuen, That he must first be made a free man.
And as for diuiding of a Monarchy, I have said, that being divided, it is no
more aA Monarchy divided, no more▪ to be accounted a
Monarchy. Monarchy, no more than a crowne or robe divided into parts,
is any more to bee acconnted a robe or a crowne: the inuiolat nature of unitie
being such, as that it can abide no partition. Neither find we the auntient
kings of Persia, Aegypt, Parthia, or Assyria,
at any time to have divided their most great and spatious kingdomes: neither
yet any other kings to have used any such partition of their realmes. Iosaphat king of the Iewes hauing six sonnes, left his
kingdom whole and entire unto his eldest sonne Ioram,
assigning unto the rest certaine yearely annuities, or pensions. The first that
opened this daungerous gap, was Aristodemus king of
Lacedemonia, who yet divided not his kingdome unto his two sonnes, Proculus and Euristhenes, but left
the kingdome vndivided unto them both: and so thinking to have made them both
kings, tooke from them both all soueraigne authoritie and power. After whose
example the kingdome of the Messenians, neere unto the Lacedemonians, was by
the father giuen vndivided unto Leucippus and Amphareus, being
brethren: the chiefe cause why those two kingdoms were chaunged into Aristocraties. And yet two inconueniences
propounded, it is betterTo diuide a kingdome, a thing
dangerous two kingdomes to be giuen unto two kings, than one kingdome
to be giuen to many: as it hath sometimes happened, the father to have divided
unto his sonnes diuers kingdomes, before they were into one vnited: for so Iames king of Aragon appointed Peter his eldest sonne to be king of Aragon, and Iames his younger sonne to bee king of Maiorque: howbeit that
afterward the elder brother tooke the yonger prisoner, and in prison starued
him, whome much lesse he would have endured to have bene partner with him in
the kingdome, and so vnited both the kingdomes into one. So it befell also the
children of Boleslaus the second, king of Polonia, who
hauing divided the kingdome unto his foure sonnes, and leauing nothing unto the
fift, kindled such a fire of sedition, as could
not afterward be quenched, but with much blood of the subiects. YetHow the diuision of kingdoms may be borne. this diuision
of kingdomes is well to bee borne withall, when it is made by him which hath
conquered them, who may giue his conquests got by his owne prowesse and valour,
unto his yonger sonnes, as he seeth good, according to their age or deserts:
leauing yet still unto the eldest, the auntient kingdome or territorie: as did
William the Conquerour, who left the dukedome of
Normandie, and the other countries which he had from his father, unto his
eldest sonne Robert Curteyse, who succeeded him not in
the kingdome of England, for that he was not the sonne of a king (as saith the
Norman historie) but left that kingdome which he had conquered unto William Rufus, which hee had not as yet vnited unto his
other countries: leauing unto Henrie his third sonne
nothing but a yerely pension: and yet for all
that Robert the eldest brother, desirous also to haue
had the kingdome from Henry the third brother, who after
the death of William Rufus his brother, had ceised
thereon, in seeking too greedily thereafter, lost both the one and the other:
and being taken by the third brother (who now carried away all) was by him cast
in prison, and so depriued of his sight there miserably died. And albeitThat a new conquered kingdom with all the soue raigne rights
thereof, is better left wholly unto one, than to be divided among many. that this disposition of the
Conquerours was right iust, as grounded both uppon reason and authoritie, yet
had it bene much more saftie, to have left the whole kingdome, and all the
soueraigne rights thereof unto one alone: as was done amongst the children of
Charles Countie of Prouince, and of Philip Valois king of Fraunce, where the eldest had all: which is by
farre the surest for the estate, without respect unto the other legitimat children, which are not to have place, where
question is of soueraigntie, or of demaines vnited to a Monarchy. For if
honourable fees be not to be divided, by how much lesse can kingdomes
themselves, and soueraigne rights so bee? As dukedomes, counties, and
marquisats, yea and in many places baronies also, are not suffered to fall into
partition: prouided yet that the yonger brethren bee in some sort recompensed:
which recompensing is not in a Monarchy, which suffereth neither diuision nor
estimation to take place. But well of long time the vse hath bene, to giue
certaine landsHow the kings younger sonnes are prouided for
in Fraunce. and fees for the maintainance of the younger brethren of
the house of Fraunce: which have bene again adiudged unto the crowne, they
which had them being dead without issue: as was decided for the inheritance of
Robert earle of Cleremont brother to saint Lewes, unto whome that inheritance was adiudged: his
other brethren Charles and Alphonsus earle of Poitiers both excluded. The like iudgement being
also giuen against Charles, concerning the succession
into the inheritance of Alphonsus, dying also without
issue: Charles his brother enioying no part thereof, the
inheritance by a decree of the Senat, being adiudged from him, and giuen vnto
the crowne. For which cause the succeeding kings better aduised, and to the
intent that the matter should bee no more doubted of, have prouided, that in
the letters patents concerning the lands and pensions giuen unto their younger
brethren, it should expresly be comprised, that they dying without heires male, those lands unto them so giuen should
againe returne unto the crowne: as was done in
the graunt of the lands giuen to Lewes duke of Aniou,
king Iohn his sonne. And albeit that Renate the yonger sonne of Lewes the third,
duke of Aniou, succeeded his elder brother into the inheritance, yet was it
rather by sufferance, than for any right he had so to doe as heire male. For
otherwise the earle of Niuers after the death of Charles
duke of Bourgundie (his nie kinsman dead without any heires male) might iustly
have claimed the dutchie, considering that in the letters patents of Philip the Hardy, the dukedome of Bourgundie was giuen
unto him and to his children, as well females as males, without any exception
of sexe. Yet pretended the earle no right thereunto, but the duke being dead,
king Lewes the eleuenth in his owne right claimed the
dukedome of Bourgundie. True it is, that the French kings in that point sometime favour the princes of the blood,
suffering them to enioy the inheritance of their kinsmen, dying without heires
male. So Philip of Valois obtaining the kingdome,
resigned the earledome of Valois unto his younger brother Charls. And Charles the sixt the French king
being dead, Charles of Angoulesme succeeded unto the
dutchie of Orleans, and yet his sonnes sonne Iohn of
Angoulesme succeeded not unto the said dutchy of Orleans, Lewes the twelft hauing got the kingdome, annexing the same dukedome
unto the crowne. For they are deceiued which write Peter
of Burbon, lord of Beauieu, to have succeeded his brother Iohn into the lands which hee had receiued from the kings his
auncestors, by lawfull right rather than by the graunt and favour of king Lewes the eleuenth, whose sister Anne the said Peter had maried, whom he most entirely loued. And so Lewes the twelft was content also, that Susan
of Burbon the onely daughter of Peter of Burbon,
marrying Charles of Burbon, should hold such lands, long
before giuen to the crowne: but the said Susan beeing
dead without issue, those lands were forthwith ceized upon, and againe annexed
unto the crowne, namely the counties of Auergne, and Clermont, and the dukedome
of Burbon, howbeit that it was not in the letters patents comprised: which
thing is thought especially to have moued Charles of
Burbon to have entred into rebellion against the king. So also we find, that
after the death of Iohn the third, duke of Alanson, the
dutchy of Alanson was at the motion of the kings Attourney generall ceized upon
for the king; howbeit that the duke had left two daughters his heires, vnto
whome were reserued onely the lands by their
father purchased. All which was done to the intent so much as was possible, to
keepe the kingdome vndivided, and so to come whole and entire unto the kings,
and not rent and torne, with the parts thereof as the limmes pluckt away: as it
hath also bene wisely foreseene, and prouided for, in the dutchies of Sauoy,
Milan, Loraine, Mantua,The reason why women inherit not
land▪ by thei auncestors descending unto them,
which lands sometime belonged unto the crowne of Fraunce. and Cleue,
which indiuisibly belong unto the next of kin. And albeit that the German
princes do equally diuide all the fees of the empire, excepting the princes
electors, yet is that contrarie unto the custome and manner of their
auncestours (who as Tacitus writeth) gaue all their
lands and inheritances unto the eldest, and their mouables & money onely
unto the rest. And so we read Abraham the Patriarch to
have done, giuing his whole inheritance unto his eldest sonne, and money vnto
the rest, whome hee sent from him whilest he
himselfe yet lived.
But haply here some man may say, it to be expedient if the Monarchie be great,
asGreat kingdome and monarchies, not to be with any
safetie divided into many. were those of the Persians, the Romans,
the Frenchmen, and the Spaniards; and that the prince or monarch have many
children, or that there be many competitors, that then the surest way is to
diuide it: so as did Augustus, Marcus Antonius, Sextus
Pompeius, who by lot divided the Roman empire, and so of one great
Monarchie made three. And this expediencie should seeme unto me good, if that
princes after that they had bounded out their frontiers, could bound out also
their desires. But there are no mountaines so high, no
riuers so broad, nor seas so deepe, that were euer yet able to stay the course of their ambitious and insatiable desires:
as these three great men of whom I but euen now spoke, by proofe shewed: not
onely the island of Sicilia (although it were but a most strait prouince) but
euen the ayre which we breath, together with life it selfe, being taken from
Sextus Pompeius, the bonds of confederacie being in
short time broken amongst the consederats. Neither could Antonius endure the government of Augustus,
neither Augustus the government of Anthonie, although he were a great way off from him▪ So that one of
the three being before slaine, the other two could neuer be at quiet, vntill
they had one of them quite ruinated the other. And if at any time it haue
happened, some of the emperours of the East, and of the West, in so great an
empire to have lived in peace, it was not long, but almost a miracle, neither
such as to be drawne into examples for vs to
imitate: whereas to the contrarie for one example of them, which have in unitie
and concord gouerned together, there are to be found an hundred which haue
massacred one another. Whereof there is no more notable example, than the
mightie Othoman familie, wherein many most horrible
murders have bene for the empire committed, the parents not sparing their owne
children, neither the children their parents: insomuch that within this two
hundred yeares past, they have not ceased still to kill one another, vntill
there be but one of them left alive. And in theSoueraigntie
admitteth no partnership. little isle of Gerbe, six kings have in
lesse time than fifteene yeares beene slaine one of them by another, being not
able to endure a companion or partaker one of them with another in the
soueraigntie. And albeit that Galeace the second, and
Barnabas, two most
louing brethren, brought up euen from their cradles together, hauing oftentimes
endured like daungers; being both banished, and both at one and the selfe same
time called home againe, and both two established lieutenants of the empire,
and alwayes companions in armes together; had equally divided the principalitie
of Milan betwixt them, which they so held and defended, as that it seemed a
thing impossible to seperat them a funder: yet at length Galeace onely for the ambitious desire of soueraigntie, most cruelly
slue his said brother, together with all his children. So Abimelech the bastard slue threescore and nine of his brethren, that
he might all alone raigne. And Berdeboc king of Tartarie
with like slaughter, and for like cause, slue his twelue brethren. Sephadin also caused the ten sonnes of his brother Saladin to be all murthered, that he might himselfe
alone raigne in Aegypt. The successors of
Alexander also most part of them slue one another,
not sparing either their parents, or children. For as for one brother to kill
another, it was so common a matter (as Plutarch writeth)
as that it seemed almost a miracle unto the ambassadour of Ptolomey, that Demetrius standing on the right
hand of Antigonus his father, with a boare speare in his
hand, could abstaine from killing of his father. But yet greater was the
crueltie of king Deiotarus, who at one time slew twelue
of his sonnes, for no other cause, but so the better to assure his kingdome
unto the thirteenth, whome he best loued▪ For alwayes amongst equals, the
ambitious desires they have to be one of them greater than another, still
armeth them one against another: Wheras in a Monarchy, where there is but one
soueraigne, and unto whom the princes of the
blood are all subiect, being prouided of yearely pensions, or lands giuen them
for their maintenance; it is certaine, that to have alwaies some farther favour
from their soueraigne, they will still yeeld them more obeysance. And therefore
our kings whichPlaces of too much power and command, not to
be committed unto princes of the blood, or otherwise great lords.
have bene better aduised, have not giuen unto their brethren, or the princes of
the blood, the places of lieutenants generall of their armies, either of the
high constable: but rather unto some other of the meaner nobilitie, such as
were Bertrand, Gueschlin, Oliver Clisson, Simon earle of
Montfort, with others of like qualitie, men of great seruice, and under whome
the princes of the blood might march; and yet neuerthelesse without all hope of aspiring to the soueraigntie. So as did the
auntient Romans, and namely Augustus, who amongst other the secrets of his government, had this
for one, Not to giue the place of a Generall, or of a Gouernour of the
frontiers, and especially of Aegypt, unto any the noble Senators of auntient
houses, but onely unto men of meaner estate. And albeit that the kings of the
Northerne parts have as it were alwaies called the princes of their blood vnto
their councell; yet so it is, that other Monarches keepe them backe so much as
they can: whether it be for the distrust they have in them, or to keepe their
councell in such libertie, as that it may not be diminished by the greatnesse
of the princes of the blood: or that it is to take away the ambition and
iealousie which is ineuitable amongst princes of the same blood, if the king
shall chance to fauor one of them more than another. And although there be many
princes neere unto the Othoman blood, as namely the Michaloglies, the Ebranes, the Turacanes; yet
are they neuer of the priuie councel, either yet admitted to any great place of
honor, or command. And in the Monarchy of the Aethiopians (which is one of the
greatest, and most auntientestA right strange custome vsed
among the Aethiopians. in the world) there is no prince of the blood,
which commeth neere the court, but are all trained up in all honour and vertue,
within a most strong castle, built uppon the mountaine Anga (one of the highest
in all Affrike) kept with a perpetuall & strong garrison: from whence at
such time as the king dieth, he which excelleth the rest in vertue, is from the
mountaine called unto the kingdome. Which (as they say) was first ordained by
one Abraham king of Aethiopia, by diuine reuelation, to
auoid the factions and civill warres of
princes among themselves; as also the massacres which oft times happen in other
kingdomes, about the soueraigntie; as also to have alwaies princes of the blood
roiall, whome they call The Children of Israel
(assuredly supposing them to be of the blood of the Hebrewes: beside that, the
Aethiopian language taketh much of the Hebrew) to the intent the estate should
not fall into combustion, the kings line fayling: or els for that the princes
of the blood should not at libertie seeke to aduance themselves by force: or
being aduanced, should not seeke to inuade the estate. For aMaster of the forces, master of the estate. man may hold it for a
maxime, That in every Commonweale, if too much power be giuen unto a prince or
great lord of the blood, it is alwayes to be feared, least he should at one
time or other ceize upon the estate; seeing that euen the basest companions
mounted unto hie degree, are not without
cause to be feared. So Sultan Solyman made Abraham Bassa of a slaue so great, by heaping honors upon
honours upon him, as that in fine fearing his power, he was glad to cause his
throat to be cut as hee was sleeping, and afterwards found him be worth thirtie
millions of gold. But this is more to bee feared in a little kingdome or
estate, than in a great: for that the subiects coupt up as it were all in one
place, are the more easily kept under by the power of the stronger. So when Iames Appian prince of Sienna, too much favouring Peter Gambecourt, a man of base degree, had made him too
great in honour and wealth, he was by him (before he was aware) thrust out of
his estate. The like pranke Calippus serued Dion; Brutus, Caesar; Macrin, Caracalla; Maximinus, the
emperour Alexander; Philip, the yong Gordianus: and an infinit number of others, who exalted
from most base degree, have driuen out their maisters by whome they grew, and
so made themselves lords. Who would have thought that Agathocles a Potters sonne, of a common souldior chosen a Generall,
durst have slaine all the nobilitie and richer sort of the citisens of
Syracusa, & made himselfe a king? Now if such a base companion as he durst
doe so much, how much more warily is it then to be foreseene, that too great a
commaund or power bee not giuen unto princes or great men, either at home, or
in seruice abroad? And this is it for which many have holden, that by law the
poynts reserued unto the maiestie of a soueraigne prince, are neuer to bee
communicated unto a subiect, no not so much as by
commission, to the intent that no gap by any way be opened for the subiect to
enter by into the soueraigne estate of his
prince.
We have said also, that a Monarchy ought to descend unto the heires male,
consideringThat a Monarchy, in the opinion of the author
ought to descend onely unto the heires male. that the rule and
government of women, is directly against the law of nature, which hath giuen
unto men wisedome, strength, courage, and power▪ to commaund; and taken the
same from women. Yea the Genes. 3. law of God hath expresly ordained,
That the woman should be subiect unto the man, and that not onely in the
government of kingdomes and empires, but also in every particular mans house
& familie: he Esay. 8. threatning of his enemies, To giue
them women to be mistresses over them; as of all miseries and calamities the
worst. Yea and the law it selfe forbiddeth women all charges and offices proper
unto men; as to iudge, to sue, and other such like things: and that not
onely for lacke of wisedome (as saith Martian, when as amongst all the goddesses onely Pallas had no mother, but was borne of Iupiters braine, to shew that wisdom proceeded not from women) but
also for that mens actions are contrarie unto their sexe, and to feminine
modestie and chastitie. Neither was there any thing which more incensed the
Senat of Rome, against the emperour Heliogabalus, than
to see his mother to come into the Senat, though she came but only to see,
& not to say any thing. Which was also thought a right strange thing to our
auncestors, that Maud, grandmother toThis French opi nion is by the examples of many worthy women, and
experience of their most happy governments so fully refelled, as that there
needeth no further reasons to be vsed, to proue the contrary.Philip the Long, should be assistant unto Robert Contie of Artoise, and Margret Countie of Flanders, at the iudgement of the Countie of
Clairmont. Now if it be an absurd and rediculous thing, for women to busie
themselves in mens publike actions and
affaires, belonging properly unto men: much more vnseemely is it, those things
which belong unto soueraigntie, to lie open unto womens pleasure. For first the
woman unto whome the soueraigntie is deuolued, of these two things must doe
one; either shee must marrie, or else continue vnmarried, and so her selfe
rule. If shee shall marrie, yet is it stil a Gynecocratie, or womans
government; for that the marriage is made with that condition, That the
soueraigntie is still with the woman, and not with the husband: as was expresly
excepted at such time as Isabella queene of Castile
marde Ferdinand king of Arrogon: and in our time,
betwixt Mary queene of England, and Philip prince of Spaine, whome they called the queenes husband. And in
like case in the matrimoniall contracts betwixt Sigismund archduke of Austria (who was afterward emperour) and
Mary queene of Hungarie, whome the subiects in scorne
called King Marie. In which case the husband is chiefe
of his familie, and maister of his domesticall houshold; and yet for all that
in publike affaires remaineth subiect unto his wife. For why, the publike power
(as saith the law) is neuer bound unto the domesticall power. And for this
cause the Consull Fabius caused his father (the great
Fabius) to alight from his horse to doe him honour,
as to the Consull in publike: who yet for all that by vertue of his fatherly
power, might without giuing cause or reason why, have put him to death at home
in his owne house. But if the queene shall remaine vnmarried (which is the most
true womansAll these dangers with many mo incident vnto
womens soueraigntie, are and have bene right well auoided and preuented, by
the wisedom of worthy women, who with no lesse discretion▪ than many men,
have maintained the maiestie of their soueraigntie, with the reputation of
their sexe. soueraigntie) the Commonweale must needs so be in great
daunger: For that the people being of a great and couragious spirit, will deeme
a womans government but ignominious, and not
long to be endured; some both by their speaking & writing, scoffing and
deriding their sexe, othersome their womanly wantonnesse, and others their
womannish intollerablenesse: whereas nothing is more daungerous unto an estate,
than to have them which beare the soueraigntie contemned and derided of their
subiects, of the maintenance of whose maiestie, dependeth the preseruation both
of the lawes, and of the estate, which should bee troden under foot for the
womans sake, against whome there shall neuer want mockings, reproaches,
slaunderous libels, and so in fine rebellions & civill war, especially if
she (impatient of such vnworthy reproach) shall seeke
to bee thereof revenged, which can hardly without civill tumult bee
done. But if she shall chance to beare but
the least extraordinarie fauor to any one of her subiects, beside the enuie
which he is to endure, to whome such favour is showne, men will still on her
part misconster the same. For if the wisest, and most chast have euen in that
respect had much adoe to keepe themselves from false reports, much lesse can a
soueraigne princesse cover her favours; no more than can a light firebrand set
upon an high watch tower: which may serue for cause enough to kindle the fire
of iealousie among the subiects, and to arme them one of them against another▪
Besides that, it is almost naturall unto women, to take pleasure & delight
in the number and quarrels of their suters. But if the subiects be so minded,
as by force or otherwise to suffer in the soueraigne estate a womans
government, then is it not to be doubted, but that euerie one of the subiects shall be constrained to endure the like in
their owne priuat houses also. For itWhat▪ so is good in
publike, is alwayes good in particular. is a rule in policie, that
whatsoeuer thing is found good, and sufferable in publike, the same is to be
drawne into consequence and example in particular. Which was the cause the
Persian princes preferred a request unto Darius Memnon
(whome the holy Scripture calleth Assuerus) That the
disobedience of the queene Vasthi his wife, should not
remaine vnpunished, least her pride should giue occasion unto the other
subiects wiues to he disobedient unto their husbands. For as the familie is out
of order, where the woman commaundeth over the husband, considering that the
head of the familie hath lost his dignitie to become a slaue: euen so a
Commonweale (to speake properly) looseth the name, where a woman holdeth the
soueraigntie, how wise soeuer shee The euill examples of some few ought not to bee preiudiciall
unto others that be good. be; but so much the more if she be vniust
withall, and not able to rule her owne immoderat lusts and desires. I suppose
there is none which knoweth not what tragedies Ione
queene of Naples (who of her vnchastitie was called Lupa, or a shee wolfe) stirred up of her selfe, who most cruelly
murthered three kings her husbands, and was therefore her selfe also strangled,
as she well deserued. I speake not of the horrible and brutish lusts of Semyramis, the first that by a straunge meanes set foot
into the Assyrian Monarchy. For hauing obtained of the king, to have the
soueraigne commaund but for one day, she the same day commaunded the king
himselfe to be slaine. What should I say of Athalia
queene of Iuda, who seeing her husband slaine, put to death all the princes
of the blood (excepting one which escaped)
and so by force held the soueraigntie, vntil that she was at last by the people
her selfe also murthered. With like wickednesse also Cleopatra flue her brother, that so she might alone enioy the kingdom
of Aegypt. There was also one Zenobia, who stiled her
selfe an empresse (together with the thirtie▪ vsurping tyrants) and was by the
emperour Aurelian ouercome. And in like case did Hirene empresse of Constantinople, coupt up at last into
a monasterie her selfe. In briefe I find no people to have liked of the
soueraigntie of womans government: howbeit that many have endured the same: as
did the Neapolitans the government of Constance, last of
the race of the Norman kings, that raigned in Naples. And after that of Ioland the daughter of Iohn
Brenne, married to the emperor Frederike the
second, who gaue that kingdome to Manfred his base sonne, whose daughter Constance marrying into the house of Aragon, kindled the fire of the
warres which continued two hundred yeares, betwixt the houses of Aniou and
Aragon; and could neuer bee quenched but with the great effusion of the blood
of many most valiant and worthy men; and all for hauing▪ giuen an entrance vnto
a daughter into the succession of the kingdome of Naples. But when the colledge
of cardinals saw the Christian Commonweale, and especially Italie, to haue
endured so many and so great slaughters, in so long and such mortall warres,
and all for distaffe soueraigntie; it was by them decreed, That from that time
forward, the kingdome of Naples should no more descend unto women; as in the inuestitute made to Alphonsus
king of Arragon, in the yeare 1455, and
afterward to Ferdinand king of Arragon, in the yeare
1458, it is expresly set downe, That the daughters should not succeed unto the
kingdome of Naples, so long as there were any heires male, either in the direct
or collaterall line, euen unto the fift degree. But that gap for the succession
of daughters being opened in Italie, was afterwards also put in practise in the
kingdomes of Hungarie, and of Polonia, which fell to Marie andThe kingdoms of Hungarie, Polonia, Sweden,
Norway, & Denmarke, Castile, Arragon, Nauatie, and England, to haue
fallen into Gynecocraty, or womens soueraigntie.Hedwige, the daughters and heires of Lewes king of Hungarie, and of Polonia; which had neuer before bene
seene. At which selfe same time almost, Mary Volmar
(contrary unto the lawes and auntient customes of the countries) succeeded into
the kingdomes of Norway, Sweden, and Denmarke. The like example was after also
followed in the kingdome of Castile, whereinto Isabel of
Castile succeeded her father, hauing gained
the favour of the nobilitie: who albeit that shee was one of the wisest
princesses that euer were, yet did the estates of the countrey thereof
complaine, and the people thereat grudge, complayning themselves, Neuer before
to have endured a womans government. And whereas she alleaged Socina the daughter of Alphonsus, to haue
before in like manner brought the kingdome of Castile unto Sillon her husband: aunswere was thereunto made by the subiects, That
to have bene done rather by force, than by any right; and that from that time
the estates of Castile had protested, That it was contrary unto the lawes of
the country. Which hasted the marriage betwixt Ferdinand
and the said Isabella, so to keepe the people vnder. And
albeit that Henry king of Castile, had by his last will
and testament at the time of his death declared, That the kingdome of
Castile after him belonged unto Lewes the ninth the French king▪ in the right of his
mother Blaunch of Castile; and that the barons of
Castile had writ unto the said French king, that he should come to take
possession of the kingdome: yet so it was, that hee neuer durst vndertake to
lay claime unto the same, howbeit that he had the consent of the nobilitie of
the kingdome by letters under their hands and seales, which are yet to bee
seene in the records of Fraunce. Now by the same craft that Isabel had wrested unto her selfe the kingdome of Castile, did Ferdinand the sonne of Leonore
also gaine the kingdome of Arragon: as did also after him the earle of
Barcelone, hauing married Petronella the daughter of the
king of Arragon. Which happened also in the kingdome of Nauarre, whereunto Henry the Large, earle of Champaigne succeeded in the
right of his wife, the king of Nauarres
daughter: whose daughter and heire Ioane, married vnto
Philip the Faire the French king, brought unto him
the carledome of Champaigne, with the kingdome of Nauarre: but the heires male
of Philip the Faire failing, that kingdome of Nauarre in
the right of three women fell unto the houses of Eureux,
of Foix, of Albert, and of Vendosme: so that this kingdome in lesse than foure
hundred yeares, was transported into six strange houses, and unto seuen
straunge princes, the queenes husbands. But yet by the way it is worth the
noting, foure women all of one name to have opened the way unto womens
soueraigntie, in the kingdomes of Hungatie, of Norway, of Sweden, of Denmarke,
of England, and Scotland. True it is, that Maud daughter
to Henry the first, king of England, before brought the
kingdome of England unto the house of Aniou in
Fraunce: but that was after the death of But what
troubles ensued upon this intrusion of Stephen, and the wrongfull excluding
of Maud, the Croni les will declare.Stephen earle of Bolloine nephew o Henry, in the right of his sister Adela; in
such sort, as that a cosin descended of a daughter was preferred before the
kings own daughter: which daughters sonne yet succeeded king Stephen, in such sort as that no womans government seemed at all to
have bene. For which reason Edward the the third, king
of England, upon the difference which he had for the crowne of Fraunce,
alleaged the kingdome of Fraunce by the right meaning of the law Salique, to
belong unto him: saying, That law to stand in force and take place, when the
next heire male descended of the daughter (as was he
frō Isabel sister to Charls the
Faire) was preferred before him, who was
descended of the heirs male farther off. Which exposition for all that was
reiected by the councell of France, as neuer to take place, but when heirs male
of the same name and stocke, in what line and degree soeuer it were vtterly
failed: & that the kingdome were in daunger to fall into election. And so
albeit that the emperour Charles the fift marrying of
his sister unto Christiern king of Denmarke, and caused
this clause to be inserted into the matrimoniall contracts: That the males
fayling, the eldest daughter issuing of that marriage, should succeed unto the
kingdome: yet so it was neuerthelesse, that the estates of that countrey had
thereof no regard, for that the kingdome went by election: yea so farre off was
it, that such the kings priuat agreement could take from the nobilitie of
Denmarke, the power to chuse their kings: or yet neuer any one of the
same kings three daughters to raigne ouer
them: as that the said king himselfe was by the estates thrust out of his
kingdome banished, and so afterwards also miserably died in prison. The
Polonians also after the death of Sigismundus Augustus,
excluded not only the kings sister, but euen his nephew the king of Sweden his
sonne also, who gaue a million of gold unto the Commonweale, to have his sonne
afterward chosen: how beit that their predecessours had before receiued Hedwig the daughter of Lewes: and
that when as there was no heire male, neither in the direct nor collaterall
line of the house of Iagellon, they neuerthelesse made
choyce of Henrie of Fraunce.
Now if the princesse the inheritrix shall marrie (which is necessarie, so to
have an The inconueniences by the author supposed to ensue of a
Gynecocratie, or womens soueraigntie. assured successour) her husband
must either be a straunger, or a subiect: if a straunger, hee will instruct the
people in straunge lawes, in straunge religion, in straunge manners and
fashions: yea and giue the honourable places and commaunds unto straungers
also. But as for a subiect, the princesse would thinke her selfe much
dishonoured, to marrie her seruant, seeing that soueraigne princes still make
great difficultie to marrie a subiect. Ioyne hereunto also the iealousie that
is to be feared, if shee shall marrie him whome she best loueth, reiecting the
more noble and greater lords, who alwaies contemne them which are of base
degree.
And not to speake of many difficulties which fell out about these matters, euen
the verie same, yea and greater too, presented themselves at the treatie of the
marriage agreed upon betwixt Philip prince of Castile, and Mary queene of
England: wherein the first article contained, That no straunger being not a
naturall English man borne, should bee preferred to any office, benefice, or
charge whatsoeuer. And in the fourth article it was set downe, That Philip prince of Castile should not carrie the queene his
wife against her will out of the realme of England, neither the children begot
betwixt them two: the which articles were confirmed by the estates of the land,
the second of Aprill, in the yeare one thousand five hundred fiftie three,
where beside that which I have said, it was also more solemnly prouided, That
the queene alone and of her selfe should enioy all the royalties, and
soueraigne rights of the said realms, lands, countries, and subiects,
absolutely; without that her husband should by the courtesie of England
pretend any thing unto the crowne and
soueraigntie of the realme, or other right whatsoeuer: and that the letters and
mandates should be of none effect, if they were not signed by the queene,
whatsoeuer signe or consent they had of her husband: and yet without which the
consent of the queene should suffice. I have also learned by the letters of Nouaile ambassadour of Fraunce, who then was in England,
that it was also decreed, That no Spaniard should have the keeping of any
fortresses or strong holds belonging unto the Crowne of England, either on this
side, or beyond the sea: neither that the Englishmen should by the Spaniards be
constrained to goe unto the wars out of the realme.
And albeit that a most gallant & mightie prince
flourishing with kingdoms, wealth, youth, and
friends, had married an old woman (for why, he seemed not to have married a
wife) and such an one as by whome he was not to hope for any issue, yet could
not the Englishmen patiently endure the Spaniards to set any foot into England,
with whome for all that they had neuer before had any hostilitie, but had
alwayes bene great friends. Yea the emperour Charles the
fift on the other side wisely foreseeing all things, and fearing least some
treason might be wrought against the prince his onely sonne, whome alone he had
begot unto the hope of so great an empire, required to have fiftie young noble
English gentlemen delivered unto him to be kept as hostages, so long as his
sonne Philip was in England: howbeit that as such
distrust drew after it the hatred of the English nation, so was also that
article taken away, and nothing thereof obtained. But the marriage made, shortly after aboue 18 hundred English men, for
religions sake went out of their countrey, into voluntarie exile and
banishment. And yet beside all this, the fame was, how that the English men had
conspired at one and the very selfe same instant, to have slaine all the
Spaniards: for that (as the report went) they under the colour of a marriage,
and of religion, went about to aspire unto the soueraigntie of England. Neither
was it to have bene doubted, but that the conspiracie of the English men had
sorted to effect, or els that the Spaniards had effected their designes, and so
taken unto themselves the soueraigntie, had not the death of the queene (very
profitable for the kingdome) giuen an end unto the designes both of the one and
of the others.
For neuer strange prince can be assured of his life, commaunding in a strange
countrey,The gree daungers
strange prin ces commanding in a straunge countrey, are still exposed
vnto. if he have not strong guards, for the assurance of his person,
and sure garrisons for the keeping of his castles and strong holds. For being
maister of the forts, hee must needs be also maister of the estate: for the
more assurance whereof hee must alwayes aduance straungers; a thing
intollerable to every nation in the world. Whereof wee have a million of
examples, out of which we will remember but one of our own: what time king William raigned in Sicilie, in the yeare 1168, the people
of the kingdome of Naples were so incensed to see a French man promoted to the
honour of the Chauncellourship amongst them, as that they conspired at once to
kill all the Frenchmen that then were in the kingdomes of Naples and Sicilie,
as indeed they did. But if the domesticall
seruant of a straunge prince, shall chaunce to kill a naturall subiect in a
strangeSmall occasions serue to stirre up the natural
people of any countrey against strangers dwelling amongst them.
countrey, or passe himselfe in any insolence, dannger by and by hangeth ouer
all the straungers heads, the least quarrell that may be seruing to cut the
strangers throats, if they be not all the stronger. As it happened in Polonia
during the raigne of the daughter of Cazimire the Great,
king of Polonia, and wife to Lewes king of Hungarie,
chosen also king of Polonia, to the great contentment of all the estates of
that realme: and yet neuerthelesse for one Polonian slaine by an Hungarian
gentleman, all the people of Cracouia ranne upon the Hungarians, and in that
hurle slue them all, except such as by chaunce saued themselves in the castle,
who yet were there besieged together with the queene: neither was there any
meanes to appease the peoples rage, but that the queene the inheritrixe and mistresse of Polonia, must with all the
Hungarians her followers void the realme. But yet greater butcherie was there
made of them of Austria, in Hungarie, when Mary the
eldest daughter of Lewes king of Hungarie, had married
Sigismund archduke of Austria, who going about to
take upon him the government, was by his wiues mother (a most ambitious woman)
driuen out of the kingdom: who not able to endure to see him raigne▪, to be
sure to shut him quite out, was about by her ambassadours to have called in Charles the French king, and so to have put the kingdome
into the power of the French. Which the Hungarians perceiuing, sent for Charles the king of Naples, and vncle to Mary, Sigismund his wife, to take uppon him the government of the kingdome of Hungarie: who was no
sooner come, but that he was by the practise and commaund of the cruell queene
Mother (whome hee least feared) slaine: which murder was with like crueltie
also revenged, shee her selfe being by like treason by the gouernour of Croatia
slaine, and her bodie throwne into the riuer. After whose death Sigismund returning with a strong armie, put himselfe in
full possession of the kingdome, wherof he now disposed at his pleasure, and
filled all places with the slaughter of them which were of the faction against
him. But let vs come to our owne domesticall examples, and unto those wounds
which but lately receeiued, bleed with the least touching, neither can but with
most bitter griefe be felt. Frances duke of Alanson
being sent for, came to take upon him the government of the Low
countries, where he was with great ioy and
triumph receiued: but hauing no strong garrisons, no strong castles, nor cities
to trust vnto, neither could by my intreatie (who foresaw what would afterwards
happen) be persuaded so to haue; receiued such a slaughter and disgrace, as I
cannot without much griefe remember the same. And to go farther, we haue
examples of the Scots yet fresh in memorie, who for the space of seuen hundred
yeares, had with the straitest alliance that might be, bene allied unto the
house of Fraunce, and from thence receiued all the fauors that it was possible
for them to hope for: yet when Mary queene of Scots had
married Frances the Dalphin of France, and that the
Frenchmen went about to dominier over the Scots, they forthwith chose rather
to cast themselves into the lap of the
English, and so to put themselves into the protection of them with whome they
had not before so well agreed, than to endure to see the Frenchmen to commaund
in their countrey: neither ceased they vntill that by the helpe and power of
the English, they had driuen the Frenchmen againe quite out of Scotland.
Neither are strange princes to hope, by reason to rule the desires of
soueraigne princesses their wiues: from whom if they will seeke to be diuorsed,
they must also banish themselves. For what prince euer bare himselfe more
modestly, than did the wise emperour Marcus Aurelius?
And yet when he with too much patience bare with the wantonnesse of his wife
Faustine (as some of his friends thought) who for her
too dissolute life ▪would have persuaded him to have bene diuorced from her;
Then must we (said he) againe unto her restore
her dowrie: which was euen the Roman empire, howbeit that he had the empire in
the right of himselfe also, by the adoption of Antoninus
Pius the father of Faustine.
And yet there is another daunger also, if the princesse heire unto a soueraigne
estateNeighbor princes iealous of the marriage o a soueraign princesse their neighbour. be
disposed to marry a straunger; which is, that the neighbour princes and people
also, as wooers, enter into diuers iealous conceits one of them against
another: & so striuing for another bodies kingdome, oftentimes turne the
queene from marrying at all. Yea sometimes also seeking euen by force of armes
to have her: as did the wooers of Venda queene of
Russia, who hauing long ought who should have her,
the victor thought at last by force to have obtained that which he by long sute
and entreatie could not gaine: howbeit that she
seeing no other remedie, but to fall into his hands, for despight drowned her
selfe, chusing rather to loose her life, than by force to loose her chastitie.
Neither are queenes marriages so easily made as are kings: for why, kings are
oftentimes deceiued with painted tables, and counterfeits, marrying them by
their deputies whom they neuer saw: whereas queenes will most commonly see the
men themselves alive, talke with them, and make good proofe of them: yea and
oftentimes refuse them alsoWomen commonly more curious in
choice of their husbands, than are men in choyce of their wiues.
after that they have seene them. For neither would Isabel queene of Castile, marrie Ferdinand
before she had seene him: neither could Elisabeth queene
of England be by any man persuaded to promise marriage unto any man, but vnto
himselfe present. And so it was aunswered unto Henry king of Sweden, seeking the long ambassage of Iohn his brother, who
now raigneth, to have married her: aunswer (I say) was made, That of al the
princes in the world, there was none unto whome (next unto almightie God) shee
was more in kindnesse beholden, than unto the king of Sweden, for that hee
alone had requested to have had her for his wife, whilest she was yet a
prisoner, and so out of prison to have brought her unto a kingdome:
neuerthelesse to have so resolued and set downe with her selfe, neuer to marry
any man whom she had not before seene. Which aunswere made also unto the
archduke of Austria, suing unto her for marriage, in part brake off the hope
which both of them had conceiued of marriage, both of them fearing in presence
to suffer the disgrace of a deniall; and especially he, least he should be
enforced with shame to returne home. As afterwards it happened unto Francis duke of Alanson,
seeking to have aspired unto the same marriage, who although hee had twice
passed over into England, and thought the queene by long and honourable
ambassages, as it were affianced unto him, yet returned hee, fed up but with a
vaine hope, and the matter left vndone.
Now if the law of nature be violated in the soueraigne government of women, yet
much more is the civill law, and the law of nations thereby broken, which will
that the wife follow her husband, albeit that he have neither fire, nor
dwelling place. Wherein all the lawyers and diuines in one agree; and that she
ought to reuerence her husband: as also that the fruits of the wiues dowrie,
yea euen of all the wiues goods, belong unto her husband; not onely such as
arise of the lands themselves, but euen such as fall unto her by escheat, or confiscation of the goods of the
condemned; howbeit that such goods be a thousand times better, or more worthy,
than the wiues fee brought in dowrie unto her husband: yet neuerthelesse do all
such things in proprietie belong unto the husband, what lordship soeuer that it
be, which is so fallen by escheat or confiscation: as also all fruits of
dowrie▪ and the rights of patronage depending of the wiues dowrie: which we see
to have bene used not of priuat men onely, but euen of kings also: as if a
straunger shall marrie a queene, the profits of the kingdome shall belong vnto
the husband, although the soueraigntie, and kingdome it selfe belong still vnto
the wife. For so the interpretors of the law decide it, and that by the example
of Isabella and Socina. Moreouer
it is holden in law, That the wiues vassall ought to succour the husband before
the wife, in case they be both of them in
like daunger: all which is directly contrarie to such conditions, and lawes, as
princes straungers are enforced to receiue from their wiues, being princesses
inheritors. Besides that, honor, dignitie, & nobilitie, dependeth wholly of
men, and so of the husband, and not of the wife: which is so true by the
receiued customes and laws of all people: as that noble women which marrie base
husbands in so doing loose their former nobilitie: neither can their children
chalenge unto themselves any nobilitie by the mothers side: which Ancaran the lawyer saith to take place euen in queenes
which marrie base men, no princes: of which opinion the rest of the lawyers are
also.
All these absurdities and inconueniences follow womens soueraigntie in
government,The beginning of womens soueraigntie. which thereof
tooke beginning: for that they which had no male children, had rather their
daughters should succeed in their lands and fee, than such as were not of their
stocke and house, and especially the heires male failing, both in the direct
& collaterall line: after which point so by them gained, they began to
succeed also unto lands and fees in the right line, and were preferred before
the males in the collateral line: which manner of inheriting was by little and
little permitted to be vnderstnod, and extended also unto Honours, Dignities,
Counties, Marquisats, Dutchies, Principalities, yea and at last euen vnto
Kingdomes. Howbeit that by the lawes of Fees, women
were excluded from all succession in fee, although there were no heires male
either in the direct or collaterall line,
except it were so expresly set downe in the inuestiture of the fee. But the law
Salique cutteth the matter short, and expresly forbiddeth, That the woman
should by any meanes succeed into any fee, of what nature or condition soeuer
it were: which is no late, new, or fained law, as many suppose, but written and
enrolled in the most auntient lawes of the Saliens, the words of which law are
these, De terra vero Salica nullo portio haereditatis mulieri
veniat: sed ad virilem sexum tota terrae haereditas perueniat: In
English thus▪ But of the land Salique no portion of the inheritance shall come
unto a woman: but all the inheritance of that land shall come unto the male
sexe. And so also in the edict or decree of Childebert
king of Fraunce, is euen the very same comprehended which is in the lawes
Salique, where the nephewes being in direct
line, by way of Representation is▪ when diuers
children together represent their dead fathers person, and so in his right,
together with their vncles succeed into their grandfathers
inheritance representation together called unto the succession of
their grandfather, the women are still excluded. And yet if there had bene no
law Salique, at such time as contention was for the kingdome of Fraunce,
betwixt Philip earle of Valois, and king Edward of England: Philip
alleaging for himselfe the law Salique, according to the law Voconia; and Edward defending his cause and right by the antient Roman
lawes, concerning inheritance: a decree was made by the generall consent of all
the Senators and princes of Fraunce, Ne quis in ea
disceptatione peregrinarum legum auctoritate vteretur: sed legem quisque
Salicam pro suo iure interpretari studeret, viz. ThatPoore French shifts, for the auouching and proofe of the Salique
law. no man in that controuersie should vse the authoritie of
forraine lawes; but that every man according to his right should interpret the
law Salique. And why so if there had bene no
Salique law at all? And howbeit that after the death of Lewes
Hutin the king of Fraunce, the duke of Burgundie called Iane the daughter of Hutin, vnto
the succession of her fathers crowne and kingdome: yet was it by the generall
consent of all the estates assembled in parliament at Paris, resolued to the
contrarie, As that daughters should not succeed unto the crowne: & so the
opinion of the duke was reiected. About which time, or a little before, Baldus called the law Salique, or the custome for the
males onely to succeed unto the crowne, Ius gentium Gallo, The law of the French nation. Neither is it
long agoe, since that in a suit in the parliament of Burdeaux, betwixt certaine
gentlemen about the right of their gentrie; a will was brought out, written in
most auntient letters, wherein the testator
divided unto his sonnes his Salique land; which the judges interpreted to be
his prediall fees, or reuenewes in land. Which was alwayes in Germanie obserued
also, vntill that the emperour Frederike the second gaue
this priuilege as a singular benefit unto the house of Austria, That the line
of the males failing, the daughters or females might succeed. Which thing the
emperour could not doe, without the expresse will and consent of the estates of
the empire. For which cause Othocarus king of Bohemia,
being also of the house of Austria, without regard of Frederikes graunt, by right of kindred claimed the dukedome of
Austria, and leuied a strong army against Rodolph, who
by vertue of Frederikes graunt, claimed the dukedome as
belonging unto himselfe. Which priuilege for women so to succeed, was
afterwards extended unto the princes of the house of Bauiere also. Yet was
there neuer people so effeminat, or cowardly,
as under the colour of succession in fee, to endure that women should step into
the soueraigntie: and yet lesse in Asia, and in Affrike, than in Europe.
Howbeit that with whatsoeuer madnesse other princes and people have bene
astonied, which have endured womens soueraigntie, yet have the Frenchmen (God
be thanked) by the benefit of the law Salique, alwayes hitherto preserued
themselves from this disgrace. For why, this Salique law which M. Cirier Councellour of the parliament, said to haue
bene made with a great quantitie of the salt of wisdome, was not onely alleaged
and put in practise, in the raigne of Philip Valois, and
of Charls the Faire, against whome the daughters pretended no
claime unto the kingdome: but also in the time
of Clothare, Sigebert, and Childebert, who were all preferred before the kings their
predecessours daughters, who neuer laid claime unto the crowne. And that is it
for which Baldus the notable lawyer, speaking of the
house of Burbon, holdeth, That the male of the ame
blood and name, beeing a thousand degrees off, should sooner succeed unto the
crowne and kingdome of Fraunce, than any woman much neerer. Which is not onely
to take place in kingdomes, but euen in dukedoms and other principalities also,
which have the marks and rights of soueraigntie belonging unto them. Which
lawes also we see all people, excepting some few, to have alwayes before
embraced. And so the princes of Sauoy, by the authoritie of this Salique law,
have alwayes excluded the women from the government: for so wee read Constance the daughter of the duke of Sauoy, to have by
Peter of Sauoy her vncle bene excluded from the
government: and that euen by the sentence and doome of the judges and
arbitrators, chosen for the deciding of the matter in the yeare one thousand
two hundred fiftie six. Yet doubt I not but that many are afraid of womens
soueraigntie, who yet indeed doubt not to shew themselves most obedient vnto
womens lusts. But it is no matter (as old Cato was woont
to say) whether that the soueraigntie it selfe be giuen to women, or that the
emperours and kings bee themselves obedient unto womens pleasures and
commands.
Seeing then it appeareth plainely enough (as I suppose) the estate of a
Monarchy to be of all other estates most sure; ad
amongst Monarchies, the Royall Monarchy to bee
best: as also amongst kings them to excell which bee descended from the race
and stocke of kings: and in briefe, that in the royall race the neerest of the
blood is still to be preferred before the rest that were farther off: and that
the soueraigntie (the female sexe excluded) ought to bee still vndivided. Let
vs now also at last see how itIustice the foundation of all
Commonweales: ought to be gouerned, as whether by iustice
Distributiue, Commutatiue, or Harmonicall. For why, the fairest conclusion that
can bee made in this worke, is to conclude of iustice, as the foundation of all
Commonweales, and of such consequence, as that Plato
himselfe harh entituled his bookes of Commonweals, Bookes of
Law, or of Iustice, howbeit that he speaketh in them rather like a
Philosopher, than a Lawgiuer, or Lawyer.
(▪)
CHAP. VI. Of the three kinds of Iustice, Distributiue,
Commutatiue, and Harmonicall: and what proportion they have unto an estate
Royall, Aristocratique and Popular.
LEt vs then say in continuing of our purpose, that
it is not enough to maintaine, that a Monarchy is the best estate of a
Commonweal, & which in it hath the least inconuenience; except wee also (as
we said) add thereunto, a Monarchy Roiall.
Neither yet sufficeth it to say, that the Royall Monarchy is most excellent, if
we should not also shew that unto the absolute perfection thereof it ought to
be fast knit together by an Aristocratique and Popular kind of government: that
is to say, by an Harmonicall mixture of Iustice, composed ofThat a Royall Monarchy ought to be knit together with a certains kind of
mixture of the Aristocratike & Popular government, the royalty yet sanding whole and pure, without any mixture of those
estates. Iustice Distributiue, or Geometricall; and Commutatiue, or
Arithmeticall: which are proper unto the estates Aristocratique, and Popular.
In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the
government so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kind
of Estates, or Commonweales. For wee have before shewed, that there is great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather
confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether
impossible) and the making of the government of a Monarchy, to bee
Aristocratique and Popular. For as amongst Monarchies, the Royall Monarchy so
gouerned (as I have said) is the most commendable: euen so amongst kingdomes,
that which holdeth most, or commeth neerest unto this Harmonicall Iustice, is
of others the most perfect. Which things for that they may seeme obscure,
neither are to my remembrance by any mans writings declared; I must endeuor my
selfe that they may by manifest and plaine demonstration be vnderstood. Iustice
therefore I say to be The right diuision of rewardsThe definition of Iustice.and punishments, and of that which of right unto every man
belongeth; which the Hebrewes by a
straunge word call Credata: for the difference betwixt
this and the other Iustice giuen unto men by God, whereby we are iustified,
which they call Tsedaca. For that by these, as by most
certaine guides, wee must enter into this most religious and stately temple of
Iustice. But this equall diuision which we seeke for, can in no wise be
accomplished, or performed, but by a moderat mixture, and confusion of
equalitie, and similitude together, which is the true proportion Harmonicall,
and whereof no man hath as yet spoken.
Plato hauing presupposed the best forme of a
Commonweale, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannicall and Popular estate:
in framing the same, is contrarie unto himselfe, hauing established a
Commonweale not onely Popular, but altogether also Popularly gouerned; giuing unto the whole assembly of his
citisens, the power to make, and to abrogat lawes, to place and displace all
manner of officers, to determine of peace and warre, to iudge of the goods, the
life, and honour, of every particular man in soueraigntie: which is indeed the
true Popular estate, and Popularly also gouerned. And albeit that he had so (as
we say) formed his Commonweale, yet neuerthelesse hee said▪ That the
Commonweale could neuer be happie, if it were not by Geometricall proportion
gouerned; saying that God (whome euerie wise lawmaker ought to imitat) in the
government of the world alwayes vseth Geometricall proportion. The same Plato hauing also (as some say) oftentimes in his mouth
these three words, , which is to say, God alwayes to be playing the Geometritian: which
words indeed sauour well of Plato his stile, howbeit that they be not in all his
works to be found.
Now certaine it is, that Distributiue, or Geometricall Iustice, is most
contrarie unto the Popular estate and government by Plato set downe: the people still seeking after nothing more, than for
equalitie in all things; a thing proper unto Commutatiue, or Arithmeticall
Iustice. Which was the cause for which Xenophon (Plato his companion,Plato couertly by
Xenophon reproued, for appointing his Commonweale to be gouerned by
Geometricall Proportion. and both of them iealous one of anothers
glory) being of opinion, That Commonweales ought to be framed, and the lawes
administred according unto Arithmeticall proportion and equalitie, bringeth in
Cyrus yet a boy, corrected and chastised, for that he
being chosen king, had chaunged but the seruants garments, appointing better
apparell unto them of the better sort, and
meaner unto them of the meaner sort: as hauing therein regard unto decencie,
and the proportion Geometricall. After which chastisement, Cyrus is by his maister taught, to giue unto every man that which vnto
him belongeth, and to remember that he was a Persian borne, and was therefore
to vse the Persian lawes and customes, which gaue unto every man that which was
unto him proper: and not the manners and fashions of the Medes, who thought it
meet, that to be unto every man giuen, which was decent and convenient for him.
Which writings of Xenophon, Plato hauing read, and
knowing right well that it was himselfe, and not Cyrus,
which had bene corrected; forthwith reproued the Cyropaedia, without naming of
any partie. This diuersitie of opinions, betwixt Xenophon and Plato (famous among the Greeks) was the cause of two great factions, the
one of the Nobilitie and richer sort, who held for Geometricall Iustice, and
the Aristocraticall estate; the other of the baser and poorer sort, who
maintained Commutatiue or Arithmeticall Iustice, and therefore wished to haue
had all estates and Commonweales Popular. Now of these two factions arise a
third, which was of opinion, That in euerie Commonweale Arithmeticall Iustice
was to be kept in iust equalitie, when question was of the goods of any one in
particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if
question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or
for the diuision of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common
punishments, that then Distributiue, or Geometricall Iustice, was to be
obserued and kept, hauing regard unto the good
or euill deserts, and the qualitie or calling of every man: insomuch that these
men used two proportions, and yet for all that diuersly, sometime the one and
sometime the other: as Aristotle said it ought to be
done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string.
But as for Harmonicall Iustice, not one of the auntient writers either Greekes
orHarmonicall Iustice of all others the best.
Latines, neither yet any other, euer made mention, whether it were for the
distribution of Iustice, or for the government of the Commonweale: which for
all that is of the rest the most diuine, and most excellent and best fitting a
Royall estate; gouerned in part Aristocratically, and in part Popularly. But
forasmuch as this point we heare speake of, euill vnderstood, draweth after it
a number of errours, whether it be in making of laws, or in the interpretation of them, or in all sorts of
iudgements; and to the end also that euerie man may vnderstand, that this third
opinion of Aristotle can no more be maintained than the
other; it is needfull for vs to borrow the principles of the Mathematitians,
and the Lawyers resolutions. For why, it seemeth that the Lawyers for not
regarding the Mathematitians, and Philosophers, as not hauing iudicial
experience, have not declared or manifested this point, which is of right great
consequence (as I have said) and that as well for the administration of
Iustice, as for the maintaining of the affaires of state, as also of the whole
Commonweale in generall.
Now the Geometricall proportion is that which is made
of an vnequall excesse of Three kinds of proportion▪ Proportion Geometricall, 3, 9,
27, 81. Proportion Arithmeticall, 3, 9, 15, 21, 27. Proportion Harmonicall,
3, 4, 6, 8, 12. like magnitudes among themselves: but the
Arithmeticall proportion is every way both in progression, and excesse equall:
and the Harmonicall proportion is of them both, by a wonderfull cunning
(confused and combined together) made, and yet is unto them both vnlike: the
first of these proportions is semblable, the second is equall, & the third
is in part equall, and in part semblable; as is to be seene by the examples in
the margent set: where the proportion is treble of 3 to 9, and of 9 to 27, and
of 27 to 81: and the proportion Arithmeticall following, beginneth of the same
number of 3, and the same difference of 3 to 9: but the difference of 9 to 15
is not like, but yet equall: for betwixt these numbers there are alwayes six
differing. And the proportion Harmonicall beginneth of 3 also, but the
differences are not alwayes alike, neither altogether equall also, but therein is both the one and the other
sweetly mixt and combind together▪ as may well by Mathematicall demonstrations
be vnderstood, whereinto it is not needfull for vs further at this time to
enter: howbeit that certaine markes of them manifest enough, are in the
auntient Roman lawes to be found; and by numbers in Geometricall proportion set
downe and reported. But the difference of the GeometricallThe difference betwixt Geometricall and Arithmeticall proportion.
and Arithmetical proportion, is in this to be noted, That in the proportion
Arithmeticall are alwayes the selfe same reasons, and the differences equall:
whereas in the Geometricall proportion they are alwayes semblable, but not the
selfe same, neither yet equall: except a man would say, that things semblable
are also equall; which were nothing else, but
improperly to speake: so as Solon did, who to gaine the
hearts both of the nobilitie, and of the people of Athens, promised to make
them lawes equall for all sorts of men: wherein the nobilitie and better sort
of the people thought him to have meant the Geometricall equalitie; and the
common people, the Arithmeticall; and so to have bene all equall: Which was the
cause that both the one and the other by common consent made choyce of him for
their lawmaker. Wherefore the GeometricallThe Geometrical
government of an estate. government of an estate is, when like are
ioyned with like: as for example, by the laws of the twelue Tables, the
Patricij, or Nobilitie, was forbidden to marrie with the comminaltie, and order
taken, that noble men should marrie none but noble women: and they of the baser
sort such also as were of like condition with themselves, slaues also
marrying with slaues, as differing from
both the other sort. Which law is also yet inuiolably kept among the
Rhagusians. So were to be deemed also, if the law were, that princes should not
marrie but with priuces, the rich with the rich, the poore with the poore, and
slaues with slaues, by a Geometricall proportion. But if it were by lawThe government of an estate by Arithmeticall proportion.
prouided, that marriages should be made by lot; that law would bee unto the
people most acceptable and pleasing, to make all equall: for that so the noble
and rich ladies should by lot oftentimes fall unto the poore and baser sort of
men; the slaue might marrie the prince, the base artificer might have to wife a
woman honourably descended, most vnlike to his estate: So that by lot should
the Popular equalitie bee preserued, agreeing with the Arithmeticall
proportion: but the wealth and dignitie of the nobilitie and richer sort be quite ouerthrowne. And that is it for
which Euripides saith, AThe
government according unto the Geometricall or Arithmeticall proportion
hurtfull, the one unto the common people, and the other unto the nobility:
whereas the Harmonicall government preserueth both the one and the
other. lawfull equalitie to be most agreeable unto mans nature, . But both these formes
of government according to either Arithmeticall, or Geometricall proportion,
draw after them diuers inconueniences: For in the one the poorer and vulgar
sort are cast downe, and in the other the nobilitie and richer sort are
contemned and disgraced. Whereas the Harmonicall manner of government, with a
most sweet consent, preserueth both (so much as possibly is) not confounding
all sorts of people hand over head together. And not to go out of the example
by vs propounded of marriages, he that would keepe the Harmonicall government,
should not require in the marriages of the nobilitie,
the noble descent too farre fet both on the one The wonderfull curiositie of the Germans, in the marriage of
the nobilitie. side and the other: as many of the Germans most
daungerously doe, who most curiously search out their great great grandfathers
fathers, of like nobilitie on both sides, to ioyne together their nobilitie in
marriage: which is too farre to remoue and seperat the nobilitie, not from the
baser sort onely, but euen from it selfe also; considering that they content
not themselves, that the gentleman be noble by the father onely, as it
sufficeth in the kingdome of Polonia, by the decree of Alexander king of Polonia: or by the father, and the grandfather, as
is sufficient in this realme, by a law of king Frances
the 1: or by father, and mother, and grandfather, on both sides, as is set
downe by the new decrees of the knights of Sauoy: but they will that the right
gentleman shew that hee is descended of two hundred and threescore noble
persons, if the interpretation that many giue
of a right gentleman be true: Some others will have seuen degrees of nobilitie
to suffice, deriued from the fathers and mothers side without disparagement.
But such lawes are daungerous, and full of seditions: and for this cause the
law concerning marriages, which Appius the Decemuir is
said to have put into the Twelue Tables, was at the motion of Canuleius the Tribune as daungerous, repealed: for that thereby the
subiects loue was rent in sunder, and the citie by seditions ouerthrowne: which
tumults and seditions the law being once abrogated, and alliances made betwixt
the nobilitie and the comminaltie, upon the sudden ceased: howbeit that noble
women have seldome married from the nobilitie, but noble men have oftentimes
married with meane women: for that nobilitie is still to bee obtained from the
father. And indeed it best Harmonical proportion good to be in marriage obserued, and
so likewise in the government of the whole Commonweale. agreeth with
Harmonicall proportion, if a rich base woman marrie with a poore gentleman; or
a poore gentlewoman with a rich common person: and she that in beauty and
feature excelleth, unto him which hath some one or other rare perfection of the
mind: in which matches they better agree, than if they were in all respects
equall: as amongst marchants there is no partnership or societie better, or
more assured, than when the rich lazie marchant is partner with the poore
industrious man; for that there is betwixt them both equalitie, and similitude:
equalitie, in that both the one and the other have in them some good thing: and
similitude, in that they both two have in them some defect or want. And this is
it for which the auntient Greekes aptly fained, Loue to have bene begotten of
Porus and Penia, that is to
say, of Plentie and Pouertie, loue growing betwixt them two: so as in song
the Meane betwixt the Base and the Treble, maketh a sweet and melodious consent
and harmonie. For why, it is by nature to all men engrafied, for them still to
loue most, the thing themselves want most: so commonly the foule seeketh after
the faire; the poore, the rich; the coward, the valiant: whereas if the rich
and noble should likewise marrie with the noble and rich, they should one of
them make lesse account and reckoning of the other, for that one of them little
wanted the others helpe. For as the maister of a feast ought not without
discretion to place his guests hand over head, as they first came into the
house, without any respect had of their age, sexe, or condition: so also ought
he not to set all his best guests in the highest and most honourable places:
neither all the wise men together with the
wise, neither old men with old men, nor young men with young men, women with
women, nor fools with fooles: following therein the Geometricall proportion,
which seeketh after nothing else but the semblablenesse of things; a thing of
it selfe foolish and vnpleasant. But the wisest maister of a feast will place
and enterlace quiet men betwixtHarmonical proportion
declared by the order to be kept in a feast. quarrellers, wise men
amongst fooles; that so they may by their talke in some sort as with a medicine
be cured: so betwixt cauillers shall he set a quiet man, and unto an old babler
ioyne a still and silent man, so to giue him occasion to speake, and teach the
other to speake lesse: by a poore man he shall place a rich, that so hee may
extend his bountie unto him, and he againe for the
same of the other receiue thanks: so amongst
seuere and tetricall men, he shall mingle others of a more civill and courteous
disposition; in which doing he shall not onely auoid the enuie and
heart-burning of such as might complaine themselves to be placed in too low
places, or not in such order as they desired (a thing hardly to be auoided
where question is of degree and place;) but also of such a most beautifull
harmonicall, and orderly placing, shal arise a most sweet consent, as wel of
every one of the guests with other, as also of them altogether. Which
beautifulnesse of Harmonicall order, he which will with Geometricall
semblablenesse, or Arithmeticall confusion, inuert or trouble, he shall so take
from out of the feast all the profit, all the sweetnesse, and loue, which
should still be amongst guests. And for thisScipio blamed
for hauing used the Geometricall proportion in the placing of the Senators
in the Theater. cause men say, Scipio
Africanus to have bene blamed by the wiser sort of men, and such
as saw farthest into matters of state, for
that hee first of all others had made lawes concerning the Theatre, giuing
therein the first places unto the Senators, and so in the beholding of the
playes separating them from the people; when as by the space of 558 yeares
before, euen from the foundation of the citie, the Senators had indifferently
together with the poore stood to behold the playes: which sepation so made,
much alieanated the one of them from the other, and was the cause of many great
and daungerous tumults and broyles afterwards in that Commonweale. Neither is
it enough that the lawes and magistrats constraine the subiects for feare of
punishment to forbeare to wrong one another, and so to live in peace; but they
must also bring to passe, that although there were no lawes at all, yet they
should be at unitie among themselves, and one
of them still loue another. For that the foundation of marriages, as all other
humaneLoue the foundation of all humane societies, not to
be preserued by Geometricall, or Arithmeticall, but by Harmonical proportion
of iustice societies, which are almost innumerable, resteth in loue
and friendship, which cannot long continue without that Harmonical & mutual
concord which I have alreadie spoke of: and which cannot possibly either by
Geometrical or Arithmeticall Iustice & gouernmēt be done, for that the
proportion both of the one & of the other, is for most part disioyned ad separat: wheras the nature of the Harmonicall
proportion alwaies vniteth together the extreams, by reason that it hath accord
both with the one and with the other: as by the examples propounded we are
taught.
Now the equall government and by proportion Arithmeticall, is naturall vnto
Popular The equall government of Arithmeticall proportion▪ bst fitteth Popular estates. estates, who
would that men still should equally diuide estates, honours, offices, benefits,
common treasures, countries conquered: and if lawes be to be made, or officers
ordained, or that iudgement be to be giuen of life and death, their desire is,
that all the people should thereunto be called, and that the voice of the
greatest foole and bedlem should be of as great weight and force, as the voyce
of the wisest man: in briefe, the more popular sort thinke it best, that all
should be cast into lot and weight: as the auntient Greekes, who in three words
set forth the true Popular estates, , which is to say, All
by lot and ballance: or else to measure all things by a most right
rule, and every way with Arithmeticall proportion equall. Which for that it is
most stearne and inflexible, is after our phrase called Right, and to do iustice, is said, To do Right:
which maner of speech seemeth to have bene taken from the Hebrews, who
call their bookes of Law and Iustice, , that is to say, The Booke of Right, or as the Chaldean interpretor
translateth it, The Booke of Rightnesse: either for that
the way of vertue and iustice hath no windings or turnings, nor suffereth vs
this way or that way to turne out of the right way; or else for that it is the
selfe same unto all men, without respect of any mans person, not to bee moued
with loue or hatred towards any man. Such an one as many have though Policletus his rule to have bene, so straight and hard,
as that it might more easily be broken than bowed either unto the one side or
the other: unto the patterne & straightnesse whereof all artificers
directed their rules. Such is also the forme of a
Popular government, when all goeth by lot, and by strait and immutable
lawes, without any iust and indifferent
interpretation, without any priuilege or acception of person: in such sort, as
that the nobles are subiect euen unto the selfe same punishments that the baser
sort are; the fines and penalties being alike uppon the rich and upon the
poore, and the like reward appointed for the strong, and for the weake, for the
captaine, and for the souldiour.
But now to the contrarie, the Aristocratike government according to
GeometricallThe Geometrical proportion best to agree with
the Aristocraticall proportion, is like unto the Lesbian rule, which
being made of lead, was euerie way so pliant and flexible, as that it might be
unto every stone so aptly fitted and applied, as that no part (so much as
possible was) might thereof be lost: wheras others, who were woont to apply the
stone unto the straight rule, oftentimes lost much thereof. So say some, that judges ought in iudgement to apply the
lawes unto the causes in question before them, and according to the varietie of
the persons, times, & places, so to decline from that inflexible
straightnesse. Howbeit in mine opinion▪ as it is impossible for a rule so
pliant every way, as was the Libian Rule, to keepe the name of a rule: so must
also the strength and name of the law perish, which the judge may at his
pleasure every way turne like a nose of waxe, and so become the master and
moderator of the law, whereof indeed e ought to be
but the upright minister.
Wherefore a little to decline from that inflexible straightnesse of Polycletus his rule, as also from the vncertaine
pliantnesse of the Lesbian rule, that is to say, from the Arithmeticall, and
Geometricall proportion of government of estates; a certaine third kind
of rule is by vs to be deuised, not so
stiffe, but that it may bee easily bowed when need shall be, and yet forthwith
become also straight againe: that is to say, Harmonicall Iustice: which I
thinke may well bee done, if wee shall conclude and shut up the government of
estate within those foure tearmes which wee have before combined, viz. the Law, Equitie, the Execution of the law, and the
Office or Dutie of theThe Law. 4. The Execution of the Law.
8.Equitie. 6. The Office of the Iudge. 2. Magistrat or Iudge: whether it be in the
administration of iustice, or the government of the estate: which have amongst
themselves the same proportion which these foure numbers haue, viz. 4, 6, 8, 12. For what the proportion is of 4 to 6,
the same the proportion is of 8 to 12: and againe the same reason is of 4 to 8,
that there is of 6 to 12. So the Law also hath respect unto Equitie; as hath
the Execution of the Law, unto the Dutie of
the Magistrat: or els contrariwise, For Execution serueth unto the Law, as doth
the Dutie of the Magistrat unto Equitie. But if you shall transpose these
numbers before set in Harmonicall proportion, and so make the Magistrat
superiour unto Equitie; and the Execution of the Law, to be aboue the Law it
selfe; both the Harmonie of the Commonweale, and musicall consent thereof,
shall perish. As for Geometricall proportion, the tearmes thereof being
transposed, is yet alwayes like unto it selfe, whether it be in continuall
proportion, as in these foure numbers, 2, 4, 8, 16; or in proportion disioyned,
as 2, 4, 3, 6: conuert the order of the numbers, and say, 6, 3, 4, 2, or 3, 2,
4, 6; or in what order soeuer you shall place them, there shall alwayes be the
same proportion of the first unto the second, which is of the third unto the
fourth; and againe of the first unto the
third, which is of the second unto the fourth. And albeit that a continuat
proportion is more pleasing than that which ariseth of divided numbers, yet
maketh it of it selfe no consent; as for example, 2, 4, 8, 16: and much lesse
if it consist of Arithmeticall proportions, whether that they be divided in
this sort, 2, 4, 5, 7, or els ioyned as 2, 4, 6, 8: both which proportions as
farre differ from Harmonicall proportion, asGeometricall or
Arithmeticall government alone, n fit meane o maintaine a Commonweale. doth warme water
from that which is most cold, or else scaulding hoat. And so in like case may
we say, that if the prince, or the nobilitie, or the people, all together
hauing the soueraigntie, whether it be in a Monarchy, in an Aristocratike, or
Popular estate, gouerne themselves without any law,
leauing all unto the discretion of the magistrats, or else of themselves distribute the rewards and
punishments, according to the greatnes, qualitie, or desert, of every man;
howbeit that this manner of government might seeme in apparance faire and good,
as not hauing therein either fraud or favour (a thing for all that impossible:)
yet for all that could not this maner of government be of any continuance, or
assurance, for that it hath not in it any bond wherewith to bind the greater
unto the lesser, nor by consequence any accord at all: and much lesse shall it
have of suretie, if all be gouerned by equalitie and immutable lawes, without
applying of the equitie thereof according unto the particular varietie of the
places, of the times, and of the persons: if all honours and rewards shall be
giuen to all men indifferently, by Arithmeticall proportion alike, without
respect of honour, person, or desert: in which state of a Commonweale all the glorie of vertue must needes decay
and perish. Wherefore as two simple medicines in the extremitie of heat &
cold, and so in operation and powerA fit comparison
most vnlike one of them unto the other, are of themselves apart unto men deadly
&Harmonicall Iustice compounded of Arithmeticall and
Geometrical proportion of government, best for the preseruation of a
Commonweale. daungerous; and yet being compound & tempered one of
them with the other, make oftentimes a right wholesome and soueraigne medicine:
so also these two proportions of Arithmeticall and Geometricall government, the
one gouerning by law onely, and the other by discretion without any law at all,
do ruinat and destroy estates and Commonweales: but being by Harmonicall
proportion compounded and combined together, serue well to preserue and
maintaine the same.
Wherefore Aristotle is deceiued, in deeming the
Commonweale then to be happy,Lawes necessarie for the good
government of a Commonweale, although the prince be neuer so wise or
vertuous. when it shall chaunce to have a prince of so great vertue
and wisdome, as that hee both can and will with greatest equitie, gouerne his
subiects without lawes. For why, the law is not made for the prince, but for
the subiects in generall, and especially for the magistrats; who have their
eyes oft times so blinded with favour, hatred, or corruption, as that they
cannot so much as see any small glympse of the beautie of equitie, law and
iustice.
And albeit that the magistrats were angels, or that they could not in any sort
bee misseled or deceiued, yet neuerthelesse were it needfull to have laws,
wherewith as with a certaine candle, the ignorant might be directed in the
thickest darknesse of mens actions; and the
wicked for feare of punishment also terrified. For albeit that the eternall law
of things honest and dishonest be in the hearts of every one of vs, by the
immortall God written, yet were no penalties so in mens minds by God registred,
whereby the wicked might be from their iniurious and wicked life reclaimed.
Wherefore the same immortall and most mightie God, who hath euen naturally
engrafted in vs the knowledge of right and wrong, with his owne mouth published
his laws, and thereunto annexed also penalties: before which lawes no penalties
were appointed, neither any law maker so much as once before remembred or
spoken of. For proofe whereof let it be, that neither Orpheus, nor Homer, nor Musaeus, the most auntient Greeke writers; neitherNo mention of law, before the law of God was giuen. any other which
were before Moyses (who was more auntient than all the
Paynim gods) in all their workes so much as
once vse the word Law: kings by their hand, their word,
and soueraigne power, commaunding all things.
The first occasion of making of lawes, was the chaunging of Monarchies into
PopularThe first occasion of the making of lawes▪
and Aristocratique Commonweales: which they first did at Athens, in the time of
Draco, and afterward of Solon:
and in Lacedemonia, in the time of Lycurgus, who tooke
from the two kings the soueraignty. Whose examples the other cities of Greece
and Italie set before themselves to behold and imitate, viz. The Dorians, the Ionians, the Cretensians, the Locrensians, they
of Elis, Crotona, Tarentum, and Rome, with diuers other townes in Italie: in
which cities the people were euer at variance and discord with the nobilitie; the poorer sort still seeking to be equall
with the noble and richer:Laws hatefull unto the rich and mightie. which could
not possibly be, but by the equalitie of lawes; which lawes they of the richer
on the contrarie side vtterly reiected, seeking by all meanes to be therefrom
free & priuileged: as they who with their wealth & power defended the
Commonweale; and therefore thought it reason in honours and preferments, to bee
aboue them of the inferiour sort: who indeed hauing so got the great estates
and principall charges in the Commonweale, alwayes favoured the richer sort,
and them that were like unto themselves, still contemning and oppressing the
poore. Whereof proceeded the hard speeches and complaints of them of the meaner
sort: which that they might in the citie of Rome have some end, Terentius Arsa Tribune of the people, in the absence of
the Consuls, blaming the pride of the Senators before the people, bitterly
inueyed against the power of the Consuls;
alleaging, That for one lord now there were two, with an immoderat and infinit
power, who themselves loosed and discharged from all feare of lawes, turned all
the penalties thereof upon the poore people. Which their insolencie that it
might not still endure, he said, He would publish a law for the creating of
five men, for to appoint lawes concerning the power of the Consuls, who from
thenceforth should not vse further power, than that which the people should
giue them over themselves, and not to have their lust and insolencie any more
for law. Six yeres was this law with great contention and strife betwixt the
nobilitie and people debated, and at length in the behalfe of the people
established. But here it shall not bee amisse out of Liuie to set downe the very speeches and complaints of the nobilitie,
accounting it better to live under the
soueraigne power of a king without law, than to live in subiection unto the
law, Regem hominem esse à quo impetres vbi ius, vbi iniuria
opus sit, esse gratiae locum, esse beneficio, & irasci, & ignoscere
posse, inter amicum & inimicum discrimen nosce, leges rem surdam &
inexor abilem esse, salubriorem melior emque inopi quàm potenti; nihil
laxamenti nec veniae habere simodum excesseris: periculosum esse in tot
humanis erroribus sola innocentia viuere: The king (they said) to be a
man of whom thou maiest obtaine something where need is, in right or wrong:
favour to bee able to doe something with him, as desert also, who knew both how
to bee angry, and to grant pardon: as also to put a difference betwixt a friend
and a foe: as for the law it to bee but a deafe and inexorable thing,
whholsomer and better for the begger than the gentleman; to have no release nor mercie, if thou shalt once
transgresse the same: it to be a very daungerous thing in so many mens
frailties, to live only upon a mans innocencie: Thus much Liuie. After that the lawes of the Twelue Tables were made, where
amongst others there was one very popular, and quite contrarie unto the
commaund and power of the nobilitie, and was this, Priuilegia
nisi commitijs centuriatis ne irroganto: qui secus faxit, Capital esto,
Let no priuileges be graunted but in the great assemblies of the estates: who
so shall otherwise do, let him die the death. By which strict lawes the judges
and magistrats for a time so gouerned the people, as that there was no place
left for pardon or arbitrarie iudgement, to be giuen according unto equitie and
conscience without law. As it also happened, after that king Frauncis the first had subdued Sauoy,
the new Gouernours and Magistrats oftentimes gaue iudgement contrarie unto the
custome of the countrey, and written law, hauing more regard unto the
equitieNothing more contrary unto the minds &
proceedings of favourable or corrupt judges, than to have their iudgements
bound unto the strictnesse of the law. of causes, than unto the law.
For which cause the estates of the countrey by their ambassadours requested of
the king, That from thenceforth it should not bee lawfull for the Gouernours or
Iudges, to iudge according unto arbitrarie equitie: which was no other thing,
than to bind them unto the strict lawes, without turning either this way or
that way, than which nothing can be more contrary unto the minds and
proceedings of favourable or corrupt judges. And therefore Charondas the Carthaginensian lawgiuer (a man
very popular) forbid the magistrats in any thing, to depart from the words
of the law, how vniust soeuer they seemed
for to be. Francis Conan Maister of the Requests, being
commaunded to heare the aforesaid ambassadour of the Sauoyans, writeth himselfe
to have greatly maruelled, that they should request so vnreasonable a thing: as
viz. That it should not be lawfull for their
magistrats to iudge according to the equitie of the cause, but the strictnesse
of the law: and reprehendeth also D. Faber, for saying,
That in this realm there are none but the soueraigne courts, which can iudge
according to the equitie of the cause: saying moreouer, That he himselfe
doubted not so to do, when as yet he was the least judge in Fraunce. Howbeit
that the ambassadors thought their judges by the strict obseruing of the lawes,
to bee better kept within the compasse of their duties, if the colour of
equitie being taken away, they should still The good conncell of Accursius unto vnlearned judges.
iudge according to the very law. Accursius not so
elegantly as aptly unto that he meant it, willed the vnlearned judges, strictly
to stand upon the very words of the law: like vnskilfull riders, who doubting
to be able to sit the horse they are mounted uppon, for feare of falling hold
fast by the saddle.
But for the better understanding and explaining of this matter, it is to be
considered, that the word Equitie is diuersly taken. For
Equitie referred unto a soueraigne prince, is as much as for him to declare or
expound, or correct the law: but referred unto a magistrat or iudge, is nothing
else, but for him to asswage and mitigat the rigor of the law: or as occasion
shall require aggrauat the too much enitie thereof:
or else to supply the defect thereof when as it hath not sufficiently prouided
for the present case offered, that so the
purport and meaning of the law saued, the health and welfare both of the lawes
and Commonweale may be respected and prouided for. In which sence not the
soueraigneHow euen the meanest judges may have power to
iudge according to the equitie of the cause without law. courts
onely, but euen the least judges of all have power to iudge & pronounce
sentence according unto the equitie of the cause; whether it be by vertue of
their office, or that the proceeding before them is by way of request; or that
the prince hath sent them some commission, or other letters of iustice for such
their proceeding, which they may either accept or reiect: following therein the
lawes of our kings, and the clause of the letters carrying these words, So farre forth as shall seeme right and iust: or that the
prince by his expresse rescript or edict committeth any thing unto their
conscience by these words, Wherewith wee charge their conscience: as oft times wee see those
things which for the infinit varietie of causes, cannot by lawes be prouided
for, to bee by the prince committed unto the religion and conscience of the
magistrats, without any exception of such judges or magistrats: in which case
the least judges have as much power as the greatest: and yet neuerthelesse they
cannot (as may the soueraigne courts) frustrat appeales, neither quite and
cleane absolue and discharge the accused, but onely vntill they be commaunded
againe to make their appearance in iudgement, after the manner and forme of the
Lacedemonians (as saith Plutarch) when they are any way
attainted of crime: neither can they also releeue, or hold for well releeued, a
man appealingMany things in iudgements lawfull for the
greater magistrats or judges, which are not lawfull for the lesser.
from a judge royall: nor other such like thing. Neither is it any noueltie,
many things to be in iudgement lawfull for the greater magistrats or judges,
which are not lawfull for the lesser: when as
in the Pandects of the Hebrewes we read it to have bene lawfull onely for the
court of the wise and graue Senators (which they properly call Hacanim, and corruptly Sanadrim)
to iudge of causes according unto equitie: but not for the other lesser judges
also.The judgebound unto the verie words of the law, is
not yet therby embarred to vse the equitie of the law or yet the resonable
exposition therof
But now whereas by the orders and customes of all the cities of Italie, it is
prouided, That the Iudges may not swarue from the very words
of the law, excludeth not thereby either the equitie, or yet the
reasonable exposition of the law: as Alexander the most
famous lawyer of his time, according to the opinion of Bartholus, aunswered: who in that respect put
no difference betwixt the great magistrat and the little. For that to say
truely, the law without equitie, is as a
bodie without a soule, for that it concerning but things in generall, leaueth
the particular circumstances, which are infinit, to be by equalitie sought out
according to the exigence of the places, times, and persons: whereunto it
behoueth the magistrat or judge so to apply the laws, whether it be in tearmes
of iustice, or in matter of estate, as that thereof ensue neither any
inconuenience nor absurditieThat the magistrat ought not to
breake the law although it seem unto him hard. whatsoeuer. Howbeit
yet that the magistrat must not so farre bend the law, as to breake the same,
although that it seeme to be right hard: whereas it is of it selfe cleere
enough. For so saith Vlpian, Dura lex est: sic tamen
scripta, An hard law it is (saith he) but yet so it is written. A hard
law he called it, but yet not an vniust law: for why, it is not lawfull rashly
to blame the law, of iniustice. But yet it is another thing, if the law
cannot without iniurie be applied unto the
particular matter that is in question: for that in this case (as the lawyer
sayth) the law is by the decree of the magistrat to be qualified and moderated.
But when he saith the Magistrat, he sufficieutly sheweth that it belongeth not
unto the other particular judges so to do, but onely unto the Pretor, as
graunted unto him by the Pretorian law, at the institution of his office:
whereby power was giuen him to supply, expound, and correct the lawes.
But forasmuch as that greatly concerned the rights of soueraigntie, princes
afterwardsTo whome it belongeth to correct the
law. (the Popular estate being taken away) reserued unto themselves
the expounding and correcting of the laws, especially in cases doubtful,
arising betwixt the Law and Equitie; about the true understanding and
exposition of the law. And therefore the
judges and gouernours of prouinces, in auntient time doubting of the law, still
demaunded the emperours aduise and opinion, when as the case presented,
exceeded the tearmes of equitie arising of the law: or that which seemed vnto
them iust, was contrarie unto the positiue law: in which case if the prince
were so farre off, as that his exposition was not in time convenient to be had;
and that to delay the cause, seemed unto the estate daungerous; the magistrats
were then to follow the very words of the law. For that it belongeth not vnto
the magistrat to iudge of the law (as saith a certaine auntient Doctor) but
onely to iudge according unto the law: and for that in doing otherwise, he
shall incurre the note of common infamie. And to this purpose I remember that
Bartholemew, one of the Presidents of the enquiries
in the parliament of Thoulouze, in that the
councellors of his chamber, his fellow judges, would have giuen iudgement
contrarie unto the law: he hauing caused all the rest of the judges of the
other courts to bee assembled, by an edict then made at the request of the
kings subiects, compelled the iudges his fellowes, in their iudgements to
follow the law: Which law when it should seeme unto the court vniust, they
should then for the amending thereof, have recourse unto the king, as in such
case had bene accustomed: it being not lawfull for the judges sworne unto the
lawes, of their owne authoritie to depart therefrom, seemed they unto them
neuer so iniust or iniurious. Whereby it appeareth the magistrat to stand as it
were in the middle betwixt the law and the equitie thereof: but yet to bee
himselfe in the power of the law, so as is equitie in the power of the
magistrat: yet so as nothing The magistrat to be in the power of the law, so as is
equitie in the power of the magistrat. be by him deceitfully done, or
in preiudice of the law. For why, it beseemeth the iudge alwayes to performe
the dutie of a good and innocent upright man. For where I say that cases
forgotten by the lawmaker, and which for the infinit varietie of them, cannot
be in the lawes comprised, are in the discretion of the magistrat, it is yet
still to bee referred unto equitie, and that the judge ought still to be (as we
said) an upright and iust man, not in any thing vsing fraud, deceit, or
extortion. Wherein Alexander the most famous lawyer
seemeth unto me to have bene deceiued, in saying, That the judge which hath the
arbitrarie power to iudge according to his owne mind, may if hee so please iudge vniustly: an opinion contrarie unto the law both
of God and nature, and of all other lawyers
also reiected: who are all of aduise, That a judge hauing arbitrary power to
iudge according to his owne good liking, is not to be fined, howbeit that he
have vniustly iudged: prouided that he have therein done nothing by fraud or
deceit. And by the law of Luitprand king of the
Lombards, it is set downe, That the magistrat shall pay fortie shillings for a
fine, if he iudge contrarie unto the law, the one halfe unto the king, &
the other halfe unto the partie: but if he shal vniustly iudge in that
belongeth unto his place and office without law; he is not therefore to be
fined: prouided yet that he have therein done nothing fraudulently or
deceitfully: as is yet also obserued and kept in all the courts and benches of
this realme. Howbeit that the auntient Romans thus held not themselves content,
but caused their judges to sweare, Not to iudge contrarie unto their owne conscience: and still before that they
pronounced sentence, the Cryer with a lowd voyce cried out unto them, Ne se paterentur sui dissimiles esse, That they would not
suffer themselves to be vnlike themselves; as saith Cassiodore. And in like case the judges of Greece were sworne to iudge
according unto the lawes: and in case there were neither law nor decree,
concerning the matter in question before them, that then they should udge according unto equitie, vsing these words, . Whereunto that saying
of Seneca alludeth, Melior videtur
conditio bonae causae si ad iudicem quàm si ad ar bitrum quis mittatur: quia
illum formula includit, & certos ter minos ponit: huius libera, &
nullis astricta vinculis religio, & detrahere aliquid potest &
adijcere, & sententiam suam non prout lex aut iustitia suadet: sed prout
humanit as aut misericordiaimpulit regere, The estate of a good cause (saith he)
seemeth better, if it be referred unto a judge, rather than to an arbitrator:
for that the prescript forme of law encloseth him in, and prescribeth unto him
certaine limits and bounds; whereas the others free conscience, and bound to no
bonds, may both detract and add something, and moderat his sentence, not as law
and iustice shall require, but euen as courtesie and pitie shall lead him.
Which so great a power the wise lawmakers would neuer have left vntoWhy so many things are by the wise lawmakers left unto the
conscience and discretion of the judge. the judges, had it bene
possible to have comprehended all things in lawes: as some have bene bold to
say, That there is no case which is not contained in the Roman law: a thing as
impossible, as to number the sand of the sea, or to comprehend that which
is in greatnesse infinit, in that which is
it selfe contained within a most little compasse, or as it were within most
strait bounds shut up. And therefore the court of parliament at Paris, fearing
least men should draw into the consequence of lawes, the decrees that it should
make; caused it to be registred, That if there were any notable doubt, or that
the matter so deserued, their decree or sentence should not bee drawne into
consequence, or be in any wise preiudiciall, but that it might bee lawfull in
like case to iudge otherwise: & that for the infinit varietie of things
doubtfull: wherby sometimes it commethHow it commeth to
passe, that euen contrarie or most vnlike iudgemēts may be giuen of the
same or verie like cases, and yet both iust. to passe euen contrarie,
or most vnlike iudgements to bee giuen euen of the selfe same or verie like
cases, and yet both most iust: as sometimes it chaunceth two trauellers comming
from diuers countries, to ariue at the same place, by wayes altogether
contrarie. Neither ought the judges or
lawmakers to ioyne their reasons unto their iudgements or lawes, a thing both
daungerous and foolish, as giuing thereby occasion unto the subiects, to forge
therof new suits and delaies, or exceptions of error, or otherwiseThat the reasons of lawes and iudgements ought not to bee vnto
them ioined to deceiue the lawes. And that is it for which the
auntient lawes and decrees were most briefly set downe, and as it were but in
three words, which so cut off all the deceits that could against the same lawes
be imagined or deuised. Wherefore it is a most pernitious thing, to gather
together the decrees or iudgements of any court, to publish the same, with out
hauing red them in the records themselves, or knowing the reasons that induced
the court to make the decree, which the judges oftentimes cause to bee recorded
apart from the sentence or iudgement, least any
should be thereby deceiued. Howbeit that it is
a thing of it selfe also verie daungerous, to iudge by example and not by
lawes, such iudgements being still to be chaunged euen by the least and
lightest varietie and chaunge of the circumstances, of the persons, or of the
places, or of the times: which infinit varieties can in no lawes, no tables, no
pandects, no bookes, be they neuer so many or so great, be all of them
contained or comprehended. And albeit that Solon was
wrongfully blamed for making so few lawes, yet Lycurgus
neuerthelesse madeFew laws made by the auncient
lawmakers. fewer, yea so few as that he forbad them to be at all
written, so to have them the better remembred; leauing most part of causes vnto
the discretion of the magistrats. As did also Sir Thomas
Moore Chauncelour of England, leauing in his Vtopia all penalties, excepting the punishment for adulterie, unto the
discretion of the magistrats: than which
nothing can (as many thinke) be better or more profitably deuised, so that the
magistrats and judges be still chosen not for their wealth and substance but
for their vertue and knowledge. For it is most apparant euen to euerie mans
eye, that the moe lawes there bee, the more suites there are about the
interpretation thereof.Moe lawes, moe suits, and moe
fees.
Wherefore Plato in his bookes of Lawes, forbiddeth lawes
to bee written concerning the execution of the law, or concerning iurisdiction,
traffique, occupations, iniuries, customes, tributes, or shipping. Which
although we cannot altogether be without, yet might we of such laws cut off a
great part. Which is also in this realme of Fraunce to be seene, which hath in
it moe laws and customes than all the neighbor nations; and so also moe suites
than all the rest of Europe beside: which began then especially to encrease, when as first king Charls the seuenth (as I suppose) and other kings after him, to the
imitation of Iustinian, commanded heapes of lawes to be
written, with a whole traine of reasons for the making of the same: contrarie
unto the auntient manner of the lawes and wise lawmakers: as if his purpose had
bene rather to persuade than to command lawes. And this is it for which a
certaine craftie corrupt judge (whom I remember to have bene banished for his
infamous and bad life) seeing a new edict or law (whereafter he still gaped)
brought to be confirmed, commonly said, Behold ten thousand crownes in fees, or
as some others say, Behold moe suites and heapes of gold.The
Frenchmen much giuen to suits in law. For why, the Frenchmen are so
sharpe witted in raising of suits, as that there is no point of the law, no
sillable, no letter, out of which they cannot wrest either true or at least
wise probable arguments and reasons, for
the furthering of suites, and troubling euen of the best judges of the world.
Howbeit the iust and upright judge, which shall not bee constrained to sell by
retaile what others have bought in grosse, may with a right few and good lawes
gouerne a whole Commonweale: as was in Lacedemonia, and other flourishing
Commonweales to be seene, who but with a few lawes right well maintained
themselves; others in the meane time with their Codes and Pandects beeing in
few yeares destroyed, troubled with seditions, or with immortall suites and
delaies. For we oftentimes see suites of an hundred yeares old, as that of the
Countie de Rais, which hath bene so well maintained, as that the originall
parties and the beginners thereof are dead, and the suite yet alive: Not vnlike
that old woman Ptolomais, of whome Suidas speaketh, who so long, and with such
obstinacie of mind and delayes maintained her suite, that she died before that
it could be ended.
Now certaine it is, that of the multitude of laws, with their reasons annexed
vntoThe cause of the multitude of suits in Fraunce
them, and in this realme published since the time of Charles the seuenth, is come the heape of suites; not so many being to
be found in a thousand yeres before, as have bene within this hundred or
sixscore yeares, and yet all forsooth full of reasons: howbeit that there is
not one reason set downe in all the lawes of Solon, Draco,
Lycurgus, Numa,No reasons annexed unto the untient lawes. nor in the
Twelue Tables, neither yet commonly in the law of God it selfe. And howbeit that some may say, That the infinit multitude of people
which aboundeth in this realme, may helpe to
encrease the multitude of suits: so it is▪ that there were a great many moe in
the time of Caesar, and yet moe than there was then
about five hundred yeares before, as he himselfe writeth in the sixt booke of
his Commentaries. And Iosephus in the Oration of Agrippa, sayth, That there were aboue three hundred
nations in Gaule: And yet neuerthelesse Cicero writing
unto Trebatius the lawyer (then one of Caesars lieutenants) meerely saith, him to have gained but a few in
France to his occupation. Wherefore they which have brought in such a multitude
of lawes, as thinking thereby to cut up all deceit by the roots, and so to
restraine suits: in so doing imitat Hercules, who hauing
cut of one of Hydraies heads, see seuen others forthwith
to arise thereof. For euen so one doubt or suit being by law cut off▪ wee see
seuen others of new sprung up, of that heape
of words and reasons without reason heaped together in persuading of the law:
it being indeed a thing impossible in all the bookes of the world to comprehend
all the cases which may happen, and ten thousand suites arising upon every
reason of the law giuen. So that Seneca thereof said
well, Nihil mihi videtur frigidus quàm lex cum prologo:
iubeat lex, non suadeat, Nothing (saith he) seemeth unto me more cold,
than a law with a prologue: let the law commaund, and not persuade: except the
reason of the law be from it inseparable. And howbeit that the Decemuiri,By lawes to prouide for all inconueniences, a thing
impossible▪ or Ten Commissioners, appointed by the Romans to reforme
the lawes, and to establish new, had twelue tables comprehended whatsoeuer
could by mans wit bee foreseene: saying and
thinking also them to have therein comprised all occurrents that might happen:
yet shortly after they found themselves farre from their account, and so many
things to be wanting in those their laws, as that they were enforced to giue
power to the Prouost of the citie, to amend the lawes, to heape lawes upon
lawes, to abrogat the greater part of the lawes of the twelue tables: and in
briefe to leaue unto the magistrats discretion the greater part of the
iudgements concerning mens particular causes or interest. And howbeit also,
that in respect of publike causes, they did what they might to have shut up the
judges within the barres and bonds of the lawes, yet so it was, that in fine
they seeing the inconueniences which continually fell out in all matters, in
seeking to doe equall iustice to all men, according to the Arithmeticall
proportion, were constrained (after that the
Popular estate was chaunged into a Monarchy) to make a great Prouost in the
citie of Rome, to whom they gaue power accordingly to iudge of all the crimes
committed in Rome, and within fortie leagues round about the citie: which power
was also giuen unto the Proconsuls, and other gouernours of prouinces every one
of them within the compasse of his owne iurisdiction. Now he which
extraordinarily iudgeth of offences, is not in his iudgements bound or subiect
unto the lawes, but may giue such iudgement as shall seeme unto himselfe good;
prouided yet that he therein exceed not measure, as saith the law: which
measure consisteth in the Harmonicall proportion which we have before spoken
of.
Yet such extraordinarie power by the prince giuen unto the magistrats, whether
it Many degrees of extraordinary power, by the prince granted unto the magistrat. be for iudgement, or
for mannaging of wars, or for the gouerning of a citie, or for any thing else
doing, hath many degrees: for either his power is giuen him next unto the
prince, greater than which none can be: or else power is giuen him by vertue of
his office, so that he may iudge as he seeth cause, or else may iudge in such
sort as might the prince himselfe; which power little differeth from the
highest, and such as can in no wise by the highest magistrat unto another
magistrat or Commissioner be giuen. But if in the princes rescript or
commission it be contained, That the appointed magistrat shall iudge of the
cause in question according as reason, equitie, religion, or wisedome, shall
lead him, or some other such meane of speech, in all these cases it is
certaine, that his power is stil limited and referred
unto the iudgement of an honest man, and the tearms of equitie: whereunto the prince himselfe ought to referre
all his owne iudgements also. Wherein many are deceiued, which thinke it
lawfull for the prince to iudge according to his conscience; but not for the
subiect, except it be in matters and causes criminall: in which case they are
of opinion, that the magistrat may as well as the prince iudge according to his
conscience: which if it be right in the one, why is it not right in the other?
and if it be wrong in the one, why should it not be so in the other? when
asNot lawful for any man in iudgement to swarue from
equitie and conscience. indeed it is lawfull for no man in iudgement
to swarue from equitie and conscience, and that iniurie like an Ape is alwayes
like unto it selfe, filthy still, whether it bee clothed in purple, or in a
pied coat. And in iudging it is one thing to bee freed from the law, and
another to be freed from conscience.
But if the varietie of a fact in question be not knowne but unto the prince
himself, orWhether a prince or magistrat may be iudge of a
fact the truth thereof beeing unto none other knowne but unto themselves
alone. magistrat alone; neither the one nor the other can therein be
iudge, but witnesses onely: as Azo (the great lawyer)
answered unto the Gouernour of Bolonia Lagrasse, who without any other witnesse
had seene a murder done, telling him, That hee could not in that case be iudge.
Which selfe same aunswere was also giuen unto king Henry
the second of Fraunce, by the judges who were extraordinarily appointed to
iudge of diuers causes at Melun, where the king hauing himself taken an Italian
(one with whom he was familiarly acquainted) in a fact deseruing death,
committed him to prison; who soone wearie of his imprisonment, preferred a
request unto the judges, That for asmuch as he was not conuict of any crime,
neither yet so much as by any man accused, hee
might therefore as reason would, be discharged and set at libertie. Whereupon
Cotellus chiefe judge of the court, with three other
of the judges went unto the king, to vnderstand of him what occasion he had for
the imprisonmēt of the man, or what he had to lay unto his charge? Whom the
king commaunded to bee forthwith condemned, for that he himselfe had taken him
in such a fact as well deserued death, which yet hee would not discouer.
Wherunto the chiefe judge aunswered, Nos iurati sumus, nisi
sceleris conuictum, & ex animi nostri sententia damnaturos esse
neminem, We are sworne (said he) to condemne no man except he be of
some capitall crime conuict, and according to our conscience. With which
aunswere the king (otherwise a most curteous and gentle prince) much moued, for
that the judges seemed to doubt of his fidelitie and credit, deepely swore, That hee himselfe had taken the villaine in a
fact deseruing death. Wherefore Anne Montmorancie Great
Constable of Fraunce, perceiuing the judges to be bound by their oath, to iudge
but according unto the laws, and that in performing the kings command they
should rather seeme manquellers and murderers, than upright judges: taking the
king a little aside, persuaded him to deferre the execution of the man vntill
night, least the people might hap to be troubled with the nouelty of the
matter. And so the guiltie partie the night following was by the commaundement
of the king thrust into a sacke, and in the riuer drowned. Yea the same king
also in a civill cause, serued but as a witnesse in the great suit about the
inheritance of George of Amboise, where he was before
the judges sworne as a priuat man, and his testimonie accounted but for one. Wherefore Paulus
Tertius was not without cause blamed, for that he being Pope, had
caused a certaine gentleman to be put to death, who had confessed unto him
(being then a Cardinall) a secret murder by him done: which thing yet the same
gentleman afterward constantly denied him to have either said or done. Howbeit
it were much better and more indifferent, the prince or the magistrat to iudge
according unto their consciences in civill, than in criminall causes: for that
in the one, question is but of mens good; wheras in the other still mens fame,
yea oftentimes their lives, and whole estates is in daunger: wherein the
proofes ought to bee more cleerer than the day it
selfe.
But yet the difference is right great, and much it concerneth, whether the
magistrats in their iudgements be bound unto the lawes or not, or else be
altogether from the laws loose & free: for that in the one, question is
onely of fact; but in the other, of law, equitie, and reason, and especially
when question is of matter of great importance or consequence, and wherein the
law is to be expounded: which in auntient time was giuen inThe exposition of the law, to whom it was by the law of God
reserued. Rome unto the Great Prouost, as we have before said; but by
the law of God was reserued unto the High Priest; or unto him that was by God
chosen to bee soueraigne judge of the people: or in their absence unto the Leuites. Which power in the latter times of the Iewes
Commonweale (and about two hundred yeares before Christ, under the latter
princes of the house of the Asmoneans) was by custome,
but not by law, giuen unto the Senat of the
wise Sages. As amongst the Celts our auncestours, the Priests and Druides, for
that they were the makers of the sacrifices, and keepers of the holy rites,
were made also the keepers and guarders of Iustice, as of all other things the
most sacred. The president or chiefe of which Druides (as Ammianus reporteth) still carried about his necke a pretious stone,
hanging downe unto his breast, with the picture of Truth
engrauen in it. Which most auntient custome of the Hebrewes, and ofThe exposition of the lawes, and the deciding of most high and
difficult causes both in Asia and Afrike, reserued unto the Mahotan Priest. the Aegyptians, euen yet
continueth in all Asia, and in the greater part of Affrike also, viz. That the Priests should have Iustice in their hand,
and the▪ Great Bishop the exposition of the Lawes, and the deciding of the most
high and difficult causes. So the Great
Bishops, whome the Turkes call their Muphti, hath himselfe alone the expounding
or declaring of the doubts arising of the obscure lawes, especially when
question is betwixt the written Law and Equitie it selfe. Which exposition of
such doubtfull lawes, the Roman emperours reserued unto themselves, as proper
unto the soueraigntie of their imperiall maiestie. So the Persian kings had
also their Muphti, as the sanctuarie both of their publike and priuat lawes,
who was still resiant in the great citie of Tauris. So had the Tartars theirs
in the famous citie of Samarcand: and the kings of Afrike euerie one of them
their Great Bishops also: who at Athens were called Nemophylaces, and in other places Thesmothetae.
Whereby it is to be vnderstood, that such masters and interpretors of equitie
when law aileth, ought still to be most wise and
upright men, as also in most high authoritie
and power placed.
And now verily if the lawes of Arithmeticall Iustice might take place but euen
inArithmeticall Iustice vnfit to bee used euen in priuat
iudgements. priuat iudgements onely, as when question is of the
exchange of things, then no doubt should in such priuat iudgements be seene,
but all the question should consist in fact only: so that no place should be
left for the opinion of the judges, neither yet for equitie, things being
holden and shut up within most strict and strait lawes: which wee said could
not be done, and if it could, yet will we forthwith shew the same to bee most
vnfit and absurd. But yet first let vs shew, that publike iudgements neither
can nor ought toGeometricall pro portion of iustice in
publike or penall iudgements, not to be admitted. be handled or made
according to the Geometricall lawes or proportion of Iustice. Which neuer to
have bene before done, is manifest by all the lawes which carry with them amercements or fines, which are to be found in
the laws of Draco, Solon, or of the Twelue Tables: as
also by the lawes and customes of the auntient Saliens, Ripuaries, Saxons,
English, and French men, where almost all the penalties are pecuniarie, and the
same fines most often indifferently set downe as well for the rich as for the
poore, according unto equall Arithmeticall Iustice. All which lawes were to be
repealed if pecuniarie amercements and fines were according to the opinion of
Plato, after the Geometricall proportion of Iustice,
to be of the offendors exacted. These words also, Ne
magistratibus mulctam poenamue lenire liceas, That it should not bee
lawfull for the magistrat to mitigat the fine or penaltie: a clause most
commonly annexed unto all penall edicts and laws; were
to no purpose, but to be quite omitted, & the matter left unto the discretion of the magistrat, at his pleasure to
aggrauat or ease the fine or penaltie. Yea that law common unto al nations,
whereby it is prouided, That the partie condemned not hauing
wherewith to pay the fine due for the fault by him committed, should
satisfieAn obiection against Arithmeticall proportion in exacting of
fines.the same with corporall punishment to be inflicted upon
him, were also to bee abrogated and taken away.
But here perhaps some man will obiect & say, It to bee great iniustice to
condemne a poore man in a fine of 65 crownes, for a foolish rash appeale by him
made unto any the higher courts (as the maner with vs is) and yet to exact no
greater fine for the same offence of the richest of all. For why, Geometricall
proportion of Iustice, which exacteth sixtie crownes for a fine, of him which
is in all but worth an hundred crownes, requireth threescore thousand crownes of him which is worth an hundred
thousand crownes. For that the like Geometricall proportion is of threescore to
an hundred, that is of threescore thousand to an hundred thousand. Thus we see
the rich man by Geometricall proportion of Iustice, to be much more grieuously
fined than the poore: and so contrariwise the Arithmeticall proportion of
Iustice, in the imposing of penalties and fines, to be the meanes for the rich
to vndoe the poore, and all under the colour of iustice. Which inconueniences
our auncestors foreseeing, by laws gaue leaue unto the judges, beside the
ordinarie fines, to impose extraordinarie fines also upon offendors, if the
weightinesse of the cause so require: which maner of proceeding the antient
Greeks also vsed, calling this extraordinarie manner of amercement or fine,
, as Demosthenes writeth, and which is
yet used by the Roman lawes: which drawethHarmonical
proportion of iustice best. very neere unto the true Harmonical
Iustice, if by the same lawes it were permitted unto the judges, or at
leastwise unto the soueraigne courts to deminish also the fine, hauing regard
unto the equalitie and condition of the poore and simple, as they alwayes do in
the parliament at Roan. And whereas the receiuers of the fines requested of the
the king, That it might bee lawfull for the judges to encrease, but not to
diminish the fines imposed upon such as should rashly appeale▪ Lisores the President, and D, Amours the kings Attourney, were deputed & sent
from the parliament at Roan unto the king, to make him acquainted with diuers
things concerning the demaine, & generall reformation of Normandie (wherein
I then was a partie for the king) and amongst other things, to request him, That it might please his maiestie,
not to constraine them to condemne all such as should rashly appeale unto the
superiour courts, in the selfe same fine of threescore pound Paris: which vnto
me seemed a thing vnreasonable, hauing also in antient time before bin done, by
an edict of the emperor Claudius. In which doing the
true Harmonicall Iustice should be obserued and kept, which in part equall, in
part semblable, are alike; there should be an equalitie betwixt men of the
middle sort of wealth, according to the Arithmeticall proportion of Iustice:
and a Geometricall proportion also betwixt the great lords and the poorer sort:
Whereof the former should in this case be left unto the disposing of the law,
and the other unto the conscience and discretion of the judges. For there is
nothing more vniust, than the perpetuall equalitie of Nothing more vniust, than the perpetuall equalitie of fines
and punishments. fines and punishments. For proofe whereof let the
law but lately made by king Charls the ninth concerning
apparell, serue for an example: whereby a fine of 1000 crownes was imposed upon
all such as should either much or little transgresse the same, without respect
of any the offenders abilitie, age, or condition: with prohibition for the
judges in any sort to mitigat or lessen the same. Which law concerning all men
in generall, and yet made by Arithmeticall proportion of Iustice, was shortly
after by the iniquie of it selfe rent in sunder, and by the magistrats
themselves, as well as by other priuat men neglected. Whereas the law of Philip the Faire concerning apparell was much more iust and indifferent, as neere approaching vnto
Harmonicall Iustice: and appointing diuers
punishments, according to the diuersitie of the offendors; as unto a Duke, an
Earle, a Baron, and a Bishop, a fine of an hundred pound, the Banaret fiftie
pound, the Knight and pettie Landlard fortie, Deanes, Archdeacons, Abbats,
& other clarkes, hauing dignities or ecclesiasticall preferments, 25 pound:
unto the other lay men offending, of what estate soeuer they were, if they were
worth a thousand pound, was appointed a fine of twentie five dound: and if they
were worth lesse, they were to pay an hundred shillings: the other clearkes
without dignitie or promotion, were they secular or religious that offended
against the law, paid the fine of an hundred shillings, as did the others,
Wherein we see vnequall punishments appointed for persons vnequall, following
therein Geometricall Iustice: and yet for all that we see also equall punishments for persons vnequall, following therein
Arithmeticall Iustice: and both the one and the other so mixt together, as that
thereof ariseth also that Harmonicall Iustice which we so much seeke after. The
same proportion is obserued in the law, allowing of every mans apparell and
attire also: as where it is said, That no woman citisen should weare a chaine:
also that no bourgesse or common person of either sexe, should weare any gold
or pretious stones, neither girdles of gold, nor any crowne of gold or siluer,
or any rich furres; which is not forbidden the nobilitie, and yet in them also
there is some difference: as in that it is said, That the Duke, the Countie,
the Baron, which hath six thousand pound land, may make themselves foure new
sutes of apparell in a yeare, but no more; and their wiues as many: and
gownemen, and clearkes, which have no dignities
nor preferments, should not make them gownes of cloath aboue sixtene shillings the elne Paris; & for their followers
not aboue twelue shillings. Many other such like articles there were, and yet
was there no mention neither more nor lesse either of silke or veluet, or other
such like thing. So that hee which would inGeometrical
proportion of iustice not possible to be kept in the making of penall
lawes. penall lawes particularly keepe Geometricall Iustice, in
setting downe the penalties according to the equalitie of the offences, and
abilitie of the offenders, shall neuer make penall law: For that the varietie
of persons, of facts, of time, and place, is infinit and incomprehensible; and
such as should alwaies present unto the judges, cases stil much vnlike one of
them unto another. So also the perpetuall equalitie of penalties according
Arithmeticall equalitie in the appointing of penalties,
vnreasonable and vniust. to Arithmeticall proportion, is as vniust
and vnreasonable, as if a Physitian should prescribe the same medicine to all
diseases: as is to bee seene by the lawes of the Romans concerning the charges
to be bestowed at feasts & banquets: wherby the morsels were equally cut
unto all euen alike, and the penaltie also equall without respect of rich or
poore, of noble or base: amongst whome yet it had bene no hard matter to haue
kept the Geometricall proportion, as neerest unto true iustice, every mans
wealth beeing with them enrolled in the Censors bookes: whereas with vs at this
present it were a thing most hard, or rather impossible so to do▪ as hauing no
Censors, by whom mens wealth might be reasonably knowne. But the Popular estate
of the Roman Commonweale still sought after the Arithmeticall equalitie of
lawes and penalties. Which equalitie the estate being chaunged into a
Monarchie, the princes by little and little changed, and so moderated the penalties before upon the nobilitie
imposed; as is by the rescript of Antoninus Pius vnto
the gouernour of one of the prouinces to be seene: who had in hold a noble
gentleman conuict before him, for murdering of his wife by him taken in
adulterie: wherein he willed him to moderat the penaltie of the law Cornelia;
and if the murtherer were of base condition, to banish him for euer, but if hee
were of any dignitie or reputation, that then it should suffice to banish him
for a time.
Now it is a notable difference in termes of iustice, that the qualitie and
condition of the person should in iudgment deliver him from death, who should
otherwise have bene condemned: for the murtherer sayth
the law, ought to be put to death, i hee be
The qualitie and condition of the person to be in the making
o penall lawes, and inflicting of punishments
much respected. not a man of some dignitie and honour. And the Law
Viscellia willeth that the stealers of beasts, if
they bee slaues, should be cast unto the wild beasts; but if they were freemen,
they should be beheaded, or condemned into the mynes: but if they were of any
nobilitie, it should then suffice to banish them for a time. In like sort also,
that the burners of villages or houses should bee giuen unto the beasts, if
they were men of base condition: but if they were of any noble house, then to
be beheaded, or els confined. And generally, the slaues were euer more seuerely
punished, than were men by state and condition free: for these were neuer
beaten with rods, or with small cudgels, whereas the slaues were still beaten
with clubs, or els whipt with whips made of small coards. Howbeit that Plato sayth, That the free Citisen ought to bee with
greater seueritie punished, than the slaue;
for that as (sayth he) the slaue is not so well taught as is hee: which his
opinion sauoreth indeed of a Philosopher, rather than of a Iudge or of a
Lawyer; yea the law of God delivereth from death the master, who in too seuere
correcting of his slaues, shall by chaunce kill him. And therfore it ought not
to seeme strange, if the father were by the people of Rome openly stoned, for
whipping his son with whippes as a slaue, as Valerius
writeth. And indeed amongst free borne men, the Citisen is lesse to be punished
than the stranger, the noble lesse than the base, the magistrat lesse than the
priuat man, the graue and modest lesse than the vicious and dissolute, and the
souldier lesse than the countreyman. Wee must not (sayeth Labeo the Lawyer) suffer a base fellow to enter an action of fraud
against a man of honour and dignitie: neither
an obscure and loose prodigall man against a modest man of good government; yea
the auntient Romans neuer condemned any Decurion, or Captain of ten men (for
what fault soeuer hee had committed) into the mynes, or to the gallowes. The
night theefe sayth the law, if hee shall with weapon stand upon his defence, is
to be condemned into the mynes; but men of reputation and qualitie offending,
to bee onely for a time banished, and souldiers with disgrace cassiered.
NeitherGeometricall pr potion of punishing, common almost unto all
people. must wee thinke this Geometricall manner of punishing to haue
bene proper unto the Romans, or to any other people in particular onely, but to
have beene common almost unto all other people also, as namely unto the French,
the Saliens, the English, and the Ripuaries: and yet must wee doe as doe the
barbarous Indians, which for the same offences
set downe most grieuous punishments as well for the noble as the base, without
any proportion at all; and yet in the manner of the executing thereof make
great difference: for of the baser sort they cut off their noses and eares, and
for the same offence cut off the noble mens haires, or the sleeues of their
garments: a common custome amongst the Persians, where they whipped the
garments of the condemned, and in stead of the hayre of their heads, pluckt off
the wooll of their caps.
Neither are wee to stay uppon the opinion of Aristotle,
who would GeometricallAristotle his opinion concerning the
execution of Geometricall and Arithmeticall Iustice, reiected.
iustice to take place in bestowing of rewards, and diuiding of spoyles: but
Arithmeticall iustice equally to bee executed in the inflicting of punishments,
which is not onely to ouerthrow the principles
of Philosophy, which will that things contrarie, as reward and punishment,
should be ordered by the same rules, but also the resolution of all the
greatest Lawyers and Law-makers that euer were: with whom also the
Canonists,Nobilitie in penalties to be inflicted,
favoured euen for the vertues of their auncestors: and the iniuries vnto
them done, more seuerely punished the Orators, the Historiographers,
and Poets in opinion agree, and have alwaies more easily punished the noble
than the baser sort: (howbeit that the most easie punishment of all may unto a
noble man seeme most great) that so others may bee the more enflamed vnto
vertue, and the loue of true nobilitie, when as they shall vnderstand the
remembrance of the infinit rewards of the vertue of most famous men, and such as have well deserued of the Commonweale being
also dead, yet still to redound unto their
posteritie. But here I measure nobilitie by vertue, & not by mony, the
flowre of youth, the princes favour, or euill meanes whatsoeuer obtained. The
auntient nobilitie of M. Aemilius Scaurus (as saith Valerius) saued his life euen in flourishing time of the
Popular estate: which respect of nobilitie was yet much better kept after the
change of the estate; for then they began by little and little to behead the
nobilitie with a sword, after the manner of the Northerne people, in stead that
the Romans before used the hatchet in the execution of all sorts of men. And
for that the Centurion sent to execute Papinian (the
most famous lawier, Traian the emperours neere kinsman,
and before proclaimed the defendor both of the emperours and of the empire) had
with an hatchet cut off his head, he was therefore sharply reproued by the
emperour Caracalla, telling him, That he ought to have executed
his command with a sword, as which had lesse paine, and also lesse infamie.
Wherein Gouean the lawyer was deceiued, who writeth more
griefe to have bene in the execution with the sword, than with the hatchet, Men
die (saith Seneca) more easily with no kind of death,
than being beheaded with the sword. And by the same reason and proportion of
Iustice, hee that wrongeth a noble man is more grieuously to be punished, than
hee which wrongeth a common person; & he which doth iniurie unto a citisen,
than he which doth iniurie unto a stranger. For in the lawes of the Salians, if
a Saxon or Frizlander had any way wronged a free borne Salian, he was almost
foure times more grieuously fined, than if a Salian had wronged a Saxon or a
Frizlander. So also by the lawes of Alphonsus the tenth,
king of Castile, a wrong done unto a noble man
was fined at five hundred shillings, and a wrong done unto a common person at
three hundred. And by the like law of Charles the Great,
he that had slaine a subdeacon was fined at three hundred shillings, if a
deacon at foure hundred shillings, if a priest▪at five hundred, if a bishop at
nine hundred: which penalties (the authoritie of the bishops being encreased)
were doubled. I here speake not of the equitie or iniquitie of these lawes, but
vse them onely as examples, to shew that Arithmeticall Iustice by the lawes of
many nations, neither hath had, neither yet ought to have place, when question
is of fines and punishments; and that men of honour, and of marke, ought more
easily to be punished, and their iniuries more seuerely revenged, than those done to the common sort: wherat they yet
oftentimes grudge & murmute, and thinke themselves to be therein greatly
wronged. Yea Andrew Riccee a Polonian writeth it to be a
great iniustice, That the nobilitie offending are not punished with the same
punishment that the common people are; the rich as the poore, the citisen as
the straunger, without any respect of degree or persons: than which nothing
could bee more absurdly written, of him which would take upon him to reforme
the lawes and customes of his owne countrey and Commonweale. The like complaint
was against N. Memmius Maister of the Requests in court,
for that he being by the king appointed judge in the triall of Vlmeus the president, had suffered the man conuicted of
most capitall crimes to escape the punishment thereunto due, and yet had
condemned his clearke to be hanged, who had but done his maisters
commaundement: Which king Francis understanding, merirly said, theeves by a wicked
consent to releeue one another. Howbeit that Memmius a
man most famous not onely in his issue, but also for his wealth, honours,
vertue, and deepe knowledge in the law, is releeued euen by the equitie of his
sentence; whereby he depriued the said president of all his honours and goods,
and afterward hauing caused him to bee most shamefully set uppon the pillorie
naked, and marked in the face with an hoat yron, to bee banished. But for that
his clearke and domesticall seruant, and minister of such his villanies, was
but a base and obscure fellow, hauing neither goods nor office to loose,
neither much regard of his good name, he could not
otherwise worthily be punished than by death,
hauing so well deserued the same. Whereas had he bene his slaue, he had bene
more to have bene favoured, for that then he must of necessitie have obeyed his
maister. Neihad the president bene so grieuously punished, had he not being a
judge, unto his most base and corrupt dealings ioyned also most shamefull
forgerie and extortion, and that in the administration of iustice, which he had
as then in keeping. For this prerogative hath alwayes by our auncestours bene
reserued unto the nobles, and such as otherwise are in honourable place, That
being for any offence or crime condemned to die, they should not therefore be
hanged, for the infamie of the punishment: wherein all writers agree. Howbeit
that concerning other punishments they are not all of one opinion, Seneca (as we said) accounting heading for the easiest:
and the Hebrewes in their Pandects, in the Hanging the most shamefull death, heading the easiest,
stoning the most grieuous. Title of Punishments, appointing stoning
for the most grieuous, the second burning, the third beheading, and the fourth
strangling. Howbeit that they deeme him most infamous, and by the law of God
accursed, which is hanged on the tree.
and in this Bartholus (the famous lawyer) is deceiued,
saying, That the manner and custome in France, was to hang the noble or
gentlemen condemned: and that that punishment was not there accounted villanous
or infamous, seeing that in his time (which was in the raigne of Philip the Long, about the yeare of our Lord 1318) the
nobilitie of Fraunce was as famous and as honourable, as the nobilitie of any
place of the world. Yet true it is, that the noble man which is a traytor vnto
his prince, deserueth to be hanged; so to be more grieuously punished than the
base companion, who offendeth not Noble man for treason against their soueraigne prince, why
to be more seuerely punished than other meaner persons. so much as
he, as not so straitly bound to preserue the life and estate of his prince. For
the more a man is obliged and bound in fidelitie unto his prince, the more
grieuously he is be punished aboue the common person: Viri
fortes (saith Cicero speaking of Catilin the rebell) acerbioribus
supplicijs ciuem pernitiosum quàm acer bissimum hostem coercendum
putant, Worthy men (saith he) iudge the daungerous citisen to bee with
greater punishment chastised, than the cruellest enemie that is. And therefore
Liuie saith, the fugitiue traytors during the
Carthaginensian warre, to have beene more seuerely punished, than the fugitiue
slaues: and the Roman traytors more sharply than the Latines, who were then
still beheaded, but the Roman traytors hanged. Howbeit that in all other
offences the Romans were more easily punished than others. For Scipio Africanus (saith Florius) caused
the Roman souldiour not keeping his ranke, to bee beaten with a vine, but other
souldiors with a trunchion or cudgell of other sadder wood: the vine (as saith
Plinie) being the dishonour of the punishment.
Yet whereas we said, That the punishment of noble men ought to bee more easie
than the punishment of the base and obscurer sort, that so others might bee the
more stirred up unto vertue; it is a common opinion, and almost of euerie man
receiued: but not yet altogether true. For that in right Geometricall
proportion, the noble man forThe noble man for his offence
hauing lost his honour and reputation, to be as grieuously punished, as the
common person that is whipt. his offence hauing lost his honour and
reputation, is as grieuously indeed punished, as is the base companion that is
whipt, who cannot indeed of the honour and reputation which he hath not, loose
any thing: as children and women are no lesse hurt with a soft ferula, than are the strong with cudgels or whips. And
therefore Scipio commaunding the Roman souldiors to be
beaten with the vine, euen for the same cause for which he commaunded the
Latine souldiors to be beaten with cudgels, followed therein the equalitie, or
rather the Geometricall proportion of punishment. For which cause Galba the emperour caused the Gibbet to be painted white,
and set higher than the rest, to lessen the paine of a citisen of Rome,
complayning that hee should bee hanged as other theeves were: howbeit that he
had poisoned his pupill. So if a Physitian or an Apothecarie shall poyson a
man, he is more grieuously to be punished than if another man had done it. And so in the same proportion of iustice, the
judge which doth iniurie, the He which offendeh in his owne
vocation, or in such things as wherewith he is put in trust, to be therefore
more seuerely punished than other offending in the same. priest which
committeth sacrilege, the notarie or register which committeth forgerie, the
goldsmith which coyneth false money, the guardian which rauisheth his pupill,
the prince which breaketh his faith and league; and generally whosoeuer
offendeth in his owne vocation, and in such things as whereof he is himselfe a
keeper, ought to bee therefore the more grieuously punished than others: for
that his offence is therein the more grieuous. And therefore Metius the Dictator of the Albans, was by the commaundement of Tullus Hostilius, with foure horses drawne in peeces, for
hauing broken his faith with the Romans. And Solon
hauing caused his lawes to be published, and sworne by all the Athenians,
appointed the Areopagits to be the keepers and interpretors thereof; and if
they should breake the same, to pay therefore a statue of gold of the
weight of themselves. Now had Aristotle himselfe neuer so little a while bene a judge,
or looked into the lawes of his countrey, he would neuer have written, That the
equal Arithmeticall Iustice were to be obserued and kept in the inflicting of
punishments: but that in all things, and especially in matters of punishments,
the Geometricall proportion of Iustice were much better and more tollerable; as
neerer unto the Harmonicall Iustice which we seeke after, being partaker of
both. Neither by this HarmonicallHarmonicall Iustice to be
indeed unto all men indifferent, howbeit that at the first shew it seeme
more favourable unto some than unto others. proportion is more favour
shewed unto the noble than unto the base, howbeit that unto many it seeme
contrarie. For proofe whereof, let it be, that a rich man and a poore being
guiltie of the selfe same crime, the rich man is in shew more grieuously fined
than the poore: howbeit that in truth the one is not more heauily fined than
the other, but both of them indifferently
according to their wealth and abilitie. There is with vs a most auntient law
extant, whereby the poore common persons which make resistance against the
magistrat commaunding them to be apprehended, are fined at threescore
shillings; but the noble man at a thousand and two hundred. And for that money
isFines oftentimes to be changed, according unto the
varietie of times and places. more plentie in one place than in
another, and in this our age than in antient time, wise lawmakers have bene
constrained to chaunge their pecuniarie punishments or fines, according to the
varietie of times & places. In the flourishing time of the Roman
Commonweal, & namely under Traian the emperor (who
is reported to have extended the bounds of that great empire farthest) he was
by the law accounted a poore man, which was not worth fiftie A crowne was then as much worth as the Roe noble is now. Who was by the auntient Roman lawes
to be accounted a poore man. crownes, that is to say a crowne of
gold. Which decision of the Romans, the
Hebrewes in their Pandects following, have forbidden all them that are so much
worth to begge. The customes of Fraunce in many places, call him a poore man,
who with two or three witnesses of his owne parish, hath sworne himselfe to be
poore.
But when the lawes of the Twelue Tables were made, the pouertie of men was so
great, as that he was accounted a right rich man, which was worth a pound of
gold. And therefore the Decemuiri by those lawes set downe a fine of twentie
five Asses, or small peeces of brasse, for him which should with his fist giue
any man a blow uppon the face: which was an heauie penaltie (as the world then
went) for that it was by Arithmeticall proportion indifferently exacted of all
men alike. But after that mens wealth
encreased, one Neratius a rich fellow (as the time then
was) and most insolentThe insolency of Neratius, the cause
why the lawes of iniuries were changed in Rome. withall, tooke a
pleasure to giue such as he thought good, as he met them in the streets, a good
and sound buffet or box; on the eare and so by and by commaunded a slaue, which
carried a bagge full of such small coyne after him, to pay unto him whome hee
had so strucken twentie five of those small brasen peeces, the ine set downe in the xii Tables: which was the cause
that the law was abrogated, and order taken, that from thenceforth every man
should esteeme the iniurie unto himselfe done yet with power still reserued
unto the magistrat, to do therein as should seeme unto him reasonable. Whereby it was then plainely perceiued and knowne
Arithmeticall proportion not to be good in the
imposing of penalties and fines. So also by the auntient customes of the
Normans, he that strucke a common person with his fist, was fined at a
shilling; but he that strucke him with his open hand, was to pay the fine of
fie shillings: but were he a gentleman that had
receiued such iniurie, he was not to redresse the same by law, but by force of
armes and combat: whereby it oftentimes came to passe, that hee which had
before receiued the iniurie, was also in the quarrel slaine, without any
punishment therfore, and that by the sufferance of the law. The like we may say
of the Athenian law, which condemned him in an hundred crownes fine, which
should presume to cause a galliard to be daunced in the Theatre: which Demades the Orator well knowing,Demades at Athens wilfully transgreseth the law,
and paith the fine. yet to make his playes
which he gaue unto the people more gratious, amongst the musitians brought in also upon the stage a dauncing trull
there to daunce; yet before she entred, paying the aforesaid fine of an hundred
crownes by the law set downe, which was indeed nothing else but a mockerie of
the law, and a cause for others also to tread both it and the rest under foot.
VVhich inconueniences the Polonians to auoid (for that almost all the penalties
of their lawes are fines in money) alwaies ioyne unto their lawes these or like
words, Lex haec quia poenalis est annua esto, This law
for that it is penall let it be but for a yeare in force.
But beside these chaunges of penalties and fines, some others have beene
constrainedPenalties & fines sometimes changed into
corporall and capitall punishments, and why. to chaunge such
pecuniarie penalties or fines into corporall, yea euen into capitall
punishments also: and that especially when the countrey groweth rich, so that
men begin to contemne the fines, or that the
offence groweth too common: in which cases the Hebrew lawyers are of opinion,
That the penalties of the lawes are to bee encreased, and punishment with
rigour executed. And therefore the law of the Britons appointeth theeves to be
hanged, yeelding therefore this reason, Ne eorum ageatur multitudo, Least the multitude of them
should be encreased. An vniust law indeed, and the reason thereof foolish; and
such a law as by the antiquitie of it selfe is almost growne out of vse, for
that it hath no distinction either of place, or of the equalitie of the persons
offending, or of the age, or of the sexe, or of the time, or of the felonie
committed; but punisheth all felons alike. When as in all executions of
punishments, the lighter offences are the more lightly to be punished, yea and
oftentimes also pardoned: as only in respect
of age, the indifferent and equall law would that men should in all iudgements
pardon youth, or at leastwise more easily punish it. So ought the judges
alsoWhy women are more favourably to be punished than
men. more favourably to chastise women than men: either for that
their passions are more vehement than men, or that for want of reason,
discretion, and learning, they are lesse able to gouerne their affections: or
for that they be more tender and daintie, and therefore have the sharper
feeling of punishment than men. Which beeing so, a man may deeme the law of the
Venetians vniust, which for the first felonie committed, condemnethThe iniquitie of the Venetian law in the punishing of
women. the woman to be whipt, and marked with an hoat yron; and after
that her hand cut off: and for the second offence, to have her nose and lips
cut off: whereas the man by the same law, and for like fact, is to lose but one
of his eyes and his hand. By which law women,
contrarie unto equitie, are more seuerely punished than men: & the means
whereby to get their liuing being taken from them, they both have more occasion
to steale than before whilest they had their limmes. Wherefore better it were
according to Arithmeticall Iustice (howbeit that in matters of penalties it be
vniust) to punish them both alike: or else according to Geometrical Iustice,
which commeth much neerer unto the true Harmonicall Iustice, which hath regard
in particular to all the circumstances concurring. But that law and judge is
verie vnust, which more seuerely punisheth the tender
and feeble, young folkes or women, the sickly or old, than the strong and lustie. And in briefe all lawes carrying with them
penalties certaine, and All lawes carrying with them penalties certain, which may
not y the judge or magistrat be in some sort
moderated or aggrauated, to be vniust. such as it is not lawfull for
the magistrat according to the exigence of the cause, to moderat or aggrauat,
are vniust. Wherein euen the wisest and best experienced may well be deceiued,
if they have not this Harmonicall Iustice still before their eyes. For where is
there in the world so great wisedome, so great iustice, such a number of
learned law yers, as in the court of parliament at Paris? who yet without any
restriction or limitation at all, published a law against falsiiers and forgers, made by king Francis the first, whereby capitall punishment was appointed for
forgerie, whether it were in civill or criminall causes, without distinction of
forgers, udges, clearkes, notaries, souldiours, or
plaine countrey men. Which law for all that by the wise conniuence of that
court is since growne out of vse: howbeit that the penaltie thereunto annexed
yet remaineth to terrifie forgers withall:
whome for all that the court punisheth with arbitrarie punishment, according to
discretion, and not according to the rigour of the law, in such sort as that
scarcely one of fiftie is condemned to die. For why, the same court shortly
after perceiued the intollerable inconueniences and absurdities which that law
drew after it, punishing with death him that had falsified but the least
scedule of an hundred shillings, as well as him that had falsified the decrees
of the court, or the kings seale, or borne false witnesse to condemne the
innocent; as also for a meere civill cause, where question were but of fiue
shillings: and all without regard or difference of persons. Neither is the law
of Venice any better or upright, which appointeth no lesse punishment
for falsifying and forgerie, than the
cutting out of the tongue: without any distinction of the manner of the
forgerie, or respect of the degree, sexe, or age of the offendor, or other
circumstances whatsoeuer. But the law of Milan sauoureth more of equitie and
Harmonicall Iustice: for it willeth, That he which forgeth or falsifieth an
act, or beareth false witnesse in a matter which exceedeth not twentie crownes,
shall for the first time be condemned in foure times the value, and three dayes
shamefully to bee carried about with a paper myter upon his head: and for the
second time to have his hand cut off: and for the third time to be burnt. But
if the cause exceeded twentie crownes, and so unto the summe of five hundred,
that then he should for the first time have his hand cut off, and for the
second time be burnt. But if so be that the matter exceeded five hundred
crownes, that then the judge for the first
time might deale with him according to his discretion, but that for the second
offence the forger should be burnt. Wherein both the Geometricall &
Arithmeticall proportion of iustice are in some sort mixt, as in the measure
and proportioning of the fine: but without any regard of sexe, age, or
condition, which it beseemed a lawmaker especially to have marked. The law of
God (of allThe false witne▪ how he
is by the law of od to b
punished. other lawes the best) commaundeth the man conuict of false
witnesse bearing, to endure so much losse himselfe, as he would have done hurt
unto the other: as if he would by his false witnesse take from another man an
hundred crownes, hee should bee forced himselfe to pay the selfe same summe: or
if hee went about by his false testimonie to take away another mans life, that
he himselfelfe should therefore loose his owne life: as for the rest they were referred unto the conscience of
the judges. Neither is it enough for this equalitie of punishment to aunswere
as did Draco the Athenian lawgiuer, who being asked, Why
he appointed death as well for stealing of an apple, as for killing of ones
father: aunswered, That he would have appointed a more grieuous punishment for
killing of a mans father, if he had knowne any punishment worse than death. But
Lycurgus left all kind of punishment, yea and that
concerned every man else as well in publike as in priuat iudgements, unto the
discretion of the magistrats: whom he doubted not to excell in all fidelitie
and integritie, so long as they should keepe his lawes and customes: but yet
haply fearing that in restraining of the magistrats power unto the strait bonds of lawes and penalties, should so fall into such
absurdities and difficulties of iudgements, as
we have before spoke of: and wherewith they are i
Popular estates, but especially in Italie, much troubled. By the law of the
Venetians hee that shall so strike any man, as that he shall draw blood of him,
is therefore to pay twentie five pound: but if he kill him, he is therefore to
be hanged. Which law if it might every where take place, how many men should we
find like unto Neratius, who uppon such a price would
soundly buffe and bastinado such as they liked not
of, as they met them. But how much more wisely did the emperour Adrian in like case take order, appointingThe wise law of Adrian the emperour. him that went about
to kill a man, although indeed he killed him not, to bee therefore worthy of
death: and yet that he which had indeed slaine a man, without any purpose so to
have done, should be therefore acquited. For that offences are to be weighed
Offences how they are to be weighed and punished.
according to the will and purpose of the offendor, and not according to the
euent of the fact: howbeit that the purpose and endeuor is more easily to be
punished, than the effect and deed it selfe; and the conceit of a villanie
lesse than the villanie it selfe done: wherein all the diuines with the lawyers
agree. Howbeit that in truth hee more greeuously offendeth against almightie
God, which persuadeth another man to do a villanie, than he which doth it: for
that beside the wickednesse first by himselfe conceiued, he leaueth also the
lively impression thereof engrauen as it were in another mans hart: whereas he
which of himselfe doth amisse, carried headlong with the force of lust or
anger, seemeth scarcely to have bene willing to have done it: and hee which
hath against her will enforced an honest woman, whome hee could not otherwise
persuade, yet leaueth her soule and spirit
pure and cleane. But judges doe one way punish andIudges and
Philosophers diuersly do consider offences. consider of offences, and
Philosophers another: they punish such offences and transgressions onely as are
sensibly to be seene, and which a man may as it were with his finger touch, and
such as trouble the common rest and quiet: but these men (viz. the Philosophers) enter euen into the most secret thoughts &
cogitations of mens minds: wherein Sir Thomas Moore,
sometime Chauncellour of England, is also deceiued, who maketh the intent
equall to the effect: and the will unto the deed done.
But if an offence be not onely intended, but effected also, and so the effect
ioynedArithmeticall Iustice not to be used in the
punishing of offences unto the intent; we must not in the punishing
thereof vse Arithmeticall proportion of iustice: as in the law of Milan, hee
that shall without the citie steale the value of a crowne or more, is therefore to be put to death; but if
lesse, the punishment is left unto the discretion of the judges: and yet for
all that in this realme he is punished with death as a theefe which hath by the
high way robbed any man, whether hee had money or none: as I have indeed seene
one hanged for taking but eighteene pence from a traueller by the high way. The
Roman lawes commaund notable theeves and robbers to be hanged, and so left
hanging upon the gibbet: which then was accounted the most grieuous punishment:
but they then by the word Latro, vnderstood him whom we
cal an Assasin, or Murtherer, which killeth men upon the
high way: but as for him which but robbeth passengers, the law calleth him Grassatorem, and willeth him also to bee condemned to
death, but yet not hanged as the murtherer. Which wee have here the more precisely set downe, to note the errour of
Accursius and some other the learned lawyers, who
call him also Latronem, or a robber, whome the Latines
call Furem, or a theefe; making them as it were all one:
and hauing in part therein giuen occasion for men to punish theeves with more
grieuous punishment than haply were meet and convenient, viz. with death.
The like absurditie is seene almost in all the lawes of Italie: as in that of
Venice concerningThe vnreasonable law of the Venetians for
the punishing of thef. theft, which willeth
to put out one of his eies which shal steale any thing worth aboue five pound,
unto ten; and from ten unto twentie, to put out one of his eyes, and to cut off one of his hands: and from twentie vnto
thirtie to put out both his eyes, and from
thirtie to fortie to loose his eies & an hand: but if he shall steale aboue
the summe of fortie pounds, then to be punished with death. An vnreasonable law
truly, not onely for the rigour and hardnesse thereof, and the confused manner
of the persons so to be equally punished, but euen in this respect also, that
he which hauing the meanes out of a great masse of gold, to steale a thousand
pounds, and yet contenteth himselfe with fiftie, shall therefore be punished
with death: and hee that breaketh an emptie chest, with an intent to have taken
away a great summe of money if he could, shall yet escape vnpunished. The same
punishments almost are also set downe by the law of Parma. Yet hath it
oftentimes seemed unto me a thing right straunge, why some which vse so seuere
punishment against theeves, yet punished murders but by fines in money. For
we see plainely, that the paine of death is
too cruell to revenge a simple felonie, and yet not sufficient to restraine the
same: and yet the punishment of him that doth both robEqualitie of punishment for vnequall offences, the occasion to has the greater offences committed. and kill,
to be but like: in which doing he hath more suretie to commit the murther, as
also more hope to conceale the same. So that where the punishment for theft and
murder is alike, there it is more saftetie to kill a man, than simply to rob or
steale. And yet more straunge and absurd are the lawes of the Polonians, the
Danes, the Swedens, and Moscouits, and especially the law of Casimir the Great, king of Polonia, which forAn
vnreasonable law for the punishing of murder. the fine of thirtie
crownes, acquiteth one gentleman that hath slaine another: and if he haue
maimed him of an arme or of a legge, then to bee acquited for fifteene
crownes. But if a base fellow shall kill a
gentleman, the fine is double, and if he shall kill a base or common person,
the fine is but ten crownes, without any other corporall punishment, although
he had laine in wait to kill him. Which impunitie for the killing of men being
suffered, or rather by law allowed, innumerable murders thereof ensued. Howbeit
that afterwards the kingdome encreasing in wealth, the penaltie of the law was
doubled in the raigne of Sigismund the first, and order
taken, that the murderer beeing apprehended, should beside the fine be also
kept prisoner in the common gaile for a yere and six weekes. But that which was
in that law worst of all, and the head of all mischiefe, was, that after three
yeares the offendor might prescribe against the murder by him committed,
whatsoeuer it were: neither could the lord which had slaine his vassall
farmer (whome they call Keton) be therefore either civilly or
criminally called into question or sued. For a like edict or law made at Milan
(at such time as the Torresans held that Seigneurie) whereby it was decreed,
That a gentleman might for a certaine fine be acquited for the killing of a
base or common person: the common people therwith enraged, rise up all in a
mutinie, & hauing driuen out the nobilitie possessed themselves of the
Seigneurie. As for the author of the law Napus Tarresan,
he by them cast in prison, there miserably died eaten up with lice, and that
worthily, for hauing therein so much contemned the law of God, which forbiddeth
to have pitie upon the wilfull murderer, commaunding him to be drawne euen from
his sacred alter and put to death: yet leauing unto the discretion of the
magistrat the manner of his execution, according to the greatnesse of the murder committed; to the end that the equalitie of
capitallHainou offences to
deserue more grieuous punishments. punishment common to all murderers
by Arithmeticall proportion of iustice, should so by Geometricall proportion be
moderated, hauing respect unto the circumstances of the place, of the time, and
of the persons, which are infinit. For men right well knowe, that he which
wilfully killeth a man (as lying in wait for him) is more grieuously to be
punished, than he which killeth a man in his rage and choler: and hee which
killeth by night, more than he which killeth by day: and he which poysoneth a
man, more than he which killeth him with the sword: and the murderer by the
high way worse than those: as also he that shhall kill a man in a sacred place,
more than in a prophane: and before his prince, more
than in any other place: (which is the onely irremissible case, by the laws of Polonia) & he that shal kill the
magistrat executing of his office, more than if he were a priuat man: and he
that shall kill his father, more than he which shall kill the magistrat: and he
which shall kill his prince, more than all the rest. Of which varietie of cases
ariseth an incredible varietie of capitall punishments to bee upon the
offendors inflicted. The same we may say also of such persons as are still
under the guard and protection of other men, of whome they cannot possibly be
aware; as the pupill of his tutor, the wife of her husband, the sicke patient
of his physitian; the guest of his hoast, betwixt all whome faith is much more
required: in which cases the murderers are still more grieuously to be
punished. As in like case the breakers of houses, and they which by ladders
clime into houses by night, deserue to be more seuerely punished, than such as shall steale in, the doores standing
wide open. And therefore in Tartarie and Moscouie the least theft of all is
punished with death: for that there are but few townes and houses for them to
keepe themselves and their goods in. And in the West Indies, before the comming
of the Spaniards, the theefe was still alive upon a sharpe stake impaled, for
whatsoeuer theft it was. For why, all their gardens and grounds are bounded
about but with a thrid, beyond which to passe was accounted a great crime: and
yet greater than that it was to breake the thrid; and that in secret also than
openly and in every mans sight. Howbeit that in other crimes, as whooredome,
adulterie, incest, and such other like, the offences publikely committed, are
more seuerelyOpen offences to be openly punished. to
be punished, than such as are secret done: for that the euill example and
scandall thereof, is worse than the offence it
selfe. Wherein both the diuines and layers all agree.
All these circumstances, with a million of others like of diuers sorts, cannot
all after one fashion be cut, or by the selfe same law be iudged, according to
the vnequall equalitie of Arithmeticall Iustice: neither can they in speciall
lawes and articles bee all comprehended, were the volume of the law neuer so
great: so as is in Geometricall Iustice requisit, which leaueth all unto the
magistrats discretion, without any law at all. And yet for all that is this
Geometricall Iustice lesse vniust than the other, which leaueth nothing vnto
the power and authoritie of the judge, more than the examination of the fact,
and the numbring of a sort of beanes, as at Athens: or of tables of diuers
colours,Arithmeticall equalitie in the administration of iustice,
and the punishing of offences, the cause of great iniustice▪ with
letters of absolution or condemnation set upon them, as at Rome: or of certaine
balles and lots, as at Venice: without any power to iudge at all. For why, it
is the law, and not the judge, which appointeth the same punishment for all: of
which equalitie of iustice ariseth the greatest iniustice, some such being
condemned, as deserued much lesse than the penaltie of the law being equal vnto
all: and some others againe acquited, which deserued ten times more: besides
that, sometimes also diuers most vnlike crimes some great, some lesse, and some
almost none at all, are under one law passed, and so with the selfe same paine
punished. As by seuen articles of the Salique law, robbers, poisoners,
adulterers, burners of houses, and such as have slaine or sold a natural French
man, or have digged up the bodie of the dead, are all condemned in the selfe
same fine of two hundred shillings. Which law
altogether ouerthroweth the foundation of iustice, grounded especially upon
that, That the punishment should still bee equall unto the offence done. Which
the auntients declared by this word, , that is to say, The law of Retribution,
or of equall punishment: which first written in the law ofThat the punishment ought to be equall unto the offence done. God,
set downe in the lawes of Solon, transcript into the
lawes of the Twelue Tables, commaunded by the Pythagorians, practised by the
Greeke and Latine cities, and for the antiquitie thereof reuerent; is yet by
Fauorinus, Aristotle, and many others, without iust
cause impugned; they too grossely taking these words of the law, Atooth fora tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye. For
who is so simple, as to think, that he How the words of the law, A tooth for a
tooth, a hand for a hand, and an eye for an eye, are to be
vnderstood. which hath malitiously put out his eye which had but one,
to suffer the like if but one eye be therefore taken from him also? Wherefore
hee is to bee quite depriued of his sight, that is to say, requited with like;
which cannot be, but by putting out of both his eyes: except the blind man may
otherwise be satisfied. As was decreed by the people of Locris, at the request
of one which had but one eye, which his enemie threatned to put out, upon the
penaltie therefore to loose another of his owne. Wherefore then to render like
for like, is to make him also starke blind, who had made another man blind. So
that to requite like with like, is indeed nothing els, but to punish offences
with punishments aunswerable unto them: that is to say, great offences with
great punishments, meane with meane, and so little offences also lightly: which
they also meant, when they said, A hand for a hand, a tooth for a tooth, and an eye for an
eye. And so the auntient Hebrewes, the best interpretors of God his
law, have vnderstood it, expounded it, and also practised it: as is in their
Pandects to be seene, in the Title of Penalties. Yea Rabi
Kanan denieth the law of like punishment to have any where in the
cities of the Hebrewes taken place, in such sort, as that he should have an eye
put out, which had put out another mans eye: but the estimation of the eye put
out, was vsually by the discretion of the judges in money valued. For proofe
whereof let it be, that before the law of like punishment, there was a Exod. 21. law, wherby it was ordained, That if
two men fighting, one of them should hurt another, but not yet unto death, hee
which had done the hurt, should pay the
Physitians for the healing thereof. But to what end should he so pay the
Physitian, if he which did the hurt were in like sort to be himselfe wounded?
It should also thereof folow more absurdly, that many delicat and tender
persons, in receiuing of such wounds as he had giuen to others, should thereof
themselves die and perish. Besides that also, he which had the harme done him,
hauing lost his hand wherewith he should get his liuing, if the others hand
were also to be for the same cut off; he so wanting his hand wherewith to get
his liuing, might haply so starue. Wherfore such a literall exposition of the
law of like punishment, by Aristotle and Fauorin deuised, is but vaine and deceitfull. But Aristotle who so much blameth the law of likeArithmeticall proportion of iustice not indifferent in
punishing of persons of con dition and qualitie farre vnequall.
punishment, is himselfe in such errours entangled as he sought to eschew. For
he saith, That in punishing of him which hath
deceiued his companion, or committed adultery, we are not to respect whether he
were an honest man, or an euill liver before or not; but to punish the offence
with Arithmeticall equalitie, or Commutatiue Iustice, as hee tearmeth it. But
what indifferent equalitie shall that be of the same punishment, if it shall by
Arithmeticall proportion be inflicted upon persons of qualitie and condition so
farre vnlike? Or what Shoomaker is so ignorant or foolish, as to shape one
fashioned shoo, or of the same last, to every mans foot? Creditors also in time
equall, but in theArithmetical proportion of iustice not to
be admitted euen in meere civill cau. summe
of their debt vnequall, are of the goods of their broken debtor to bee paid by
proportion Geometricall: as if thirtie crownes bee made of the goods of the
broken debtor; he of the two creditors to whome there is but an hundred crownes
due, shall receiue ten crownes; whereas the
other creditor to whome there is two hundred due, shall receiue twentie: who if
they were by Arithmeticall proportion to be paid, should each of them receiue
fifteene. And yet in this case question is but of a meere civill particular
cause resting in exchaunge; which in the opinion of Aristotle, is alwaies by Arithmeticall proportion to be ordered: which
is not onely in this case here propoundedAistotle impugned
for saying, no regard ought to be had, whether the offendor wee before the offence committed, good or bad.
false, but euen in all other also, wherein question is of that which unto every
man properly belongeth, as we shall forthwith declare. Yet where Aristotle saith in punishing of offences no regard ought
to be had, whether the offendor were before good or bad: it sufficiently
sheweth him to have had no knowledge of the order and manner of iudgements, or of iudiciall proceedings. For why, nothing is
more diligently enquired after by the judges,
than what the former life of the partie accused hath bene. Neither is it any
new matter, when as the Persians, long before Aristotles
time, not only enquired after the whole lives of them which were accused (as
yet they still doe) but if their good deserts were greater than their offences,
they fully acquited them also: as Xenophon writeth. And
for the same cause the theefe taken in the third theft, is almost every where
condemned to die, howbeit that the third theft be much lese than the first: and so he also which hath the more
often offended, is more seuerely to be punished than he which hath more seldome
gone astray. Wherein Aristotle is againe deceiued, in
that he deemeth a stolne thing ought by Arithmeticall proportion to bee made
euen with particular interest of him from whome it was taken or stolne. Whereas
the lawes of Solon, the lawes of the Twelue Tables, and the emperours
by their lawes, condemne him which hath stolne any thing, to restore the double
or the treble, yea and sometime foure fold the worth of the thing stolne,
beside the perpetuall infamie thereof ensuing. Yea the law of God willeth, That
for an oxe stolne, restitution should bee made iue
old unto him from whom he was so stolne: both for
that a more profitable beast is not by God giuen unto man, as also for the
necessitie there is to leaue such beasts oft times in the field: where they
roaming up and downe, have for their more assurance the greater penaltie set
upon them being stolne: and hereunto some other people have ioyned corporall
punishment, yea euen unto the paine of death.
And not to speake of criminall causes onely, but of meere civill causes also,
one in the Arithmeticall Iustice to faile euen in meere civill
causes. selfe same fact gaineth the cause, & in another place
looseth the same: one hath interest for his debt, and another hath nothing: and
amongst them which shall in the same case have interest, some one shall pay ten
times so much as another: which for that they bee matters common unto all such
as have any experience in iudiciall causes, there need not many examples; one
therefore shall suffice for the manifesting of the matter. A Lapidarie breaketh
a diamond which he by couenant should have enchased in a ring; he is bound to
pay the price of the stone be it neuer so great, yea although hee therein haue
used no fraud or deceit, but euen for that onely that he tooke it upon him to
do it as a workeman: whereas yet had he bene a man of another condition or
occupation, hee should not have paid the price of the pretious stone so broken,
except hee had before taken the daunger
thereof uppon him, or by fraud or deceit broken the stone.
Now all the lawes both auntient and new, with the common course and
experienceHarmonicall Iustice to hue place when question is bu of priua mens right and interest as well as
when question is of penalti and fies. of iudgements, teach vs that Harmonicall
proportion of iustice ought as well to take place when question is but of
priuat mens right and interest, and so in pure civill causes, as well as when
question is of penalties and fines: as also that Arithmeticall equalitie and
proportion is therein most of all vniust. And therefore Iustinian the emperor publishing the law concerning vsurie, ordained,
That the nobilitie should not take aboue five in the hundred, the marchants
eight in the hundred, corporations and colledges ten, and the rest six in the
hundred: and particularly that none should exact of the husbandman aboue fiue
in the hundred. Which law let it seeme in Aristotle his
iudgement vniust, yet doth it carrie a good
shew of that Harmonicall Iustice which wee seeke after, tempered of
Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion: Arithmeticall equalitie being
therein obserued amongst the noble men, who are all under one article
comprised, the great, the meaner, and the least: the marchants in another both
rich and poore: and the countrey men in another article, howbeit that they much
differ one of them from another: and the rest of the subects all in another article beeing of diuers qualities
and conditions also: And then the Geometricall proportion shewing it selfe
betwixt the nobilitie and the marchants, betwixt the marchants and the
colledges, and againe a certaine of the other subiects
compared among themselves, and with their
superiours. And this proportion of Harmonicall Iustice is also in some sort
kept, and yet cut somewhat short by the law of Orleans, established by Charles the ninth at the request of the people: whereby
the debtor condemned for money too long detained, is bound to pay after eight
in the hundred interest unto marchants, and unto other lesse; but vnto
husbandmen, persons hired, and all sorts of labourers, the double of the money
due: both the chiefe points of which law is now growne out of vse, howbeit that
it was with the greatest consent of the courts published. For why, that which
concerneth every priuat mans right and interest, consisteth in matter of fact,
& not in matter of law; as Paulus the lawyer most
wisely aunswered, which his one reason hath euen by the root ouerthrowne all
the long discourses of all the interpretors, so diuers and so vnlike themselves, concerning every priuat mans right and
interest: all which Iustinian the emperour had thought
himselfe to have beene able to have comprehended vnderThat
which toucheth every priuat mans right & how farre it concerneth him, is
not possible to be set downe in law, but better to be left unto the
discretion of the judge. one law. And therefore that which toucheth
every priuat mans right and interest how farre it concerneth him, is by our
lawes wisely left unto the discretion of the judges, for that it can no more
certainly by positiue law be defined or set downe, than can the great Ocean sea
into a small chanell be enclosed or shut up. But yet the inequalitie is much
greater in the law of Venice, which forbiddeth to take interest either in
commodities or in money, aboue six in the hundred: which although it be a thing
tollerable, and is called of the Latines Vsura ciuilis,
or, civill interest: yet is that law not so long agoe made, now againe growne
out of vse, and not either publikely or priuatly kept: for that it in every respect containing Arithmeticall
equalitie, regardeth not the most vnlike condition and qualitie of persons.
And howbeit that in the particular contracts and conuentions, and exchaunge
ofArithmetical proportion of iustice not alwayes obserued
euen in particular contracts and conuentions, wherein it is yet best of all
to be liked. things, that Arithmeticall proportion of equalitie be
best to be liked; yet is it not euen therein alwayes obserued and kept, the
very countrey men and labourers, by a certaine naturall reason well deeming,
that they ought oftentimes to take lesse for their hier of the poore than of
the rich, howbeit that they take as great paines for the one as for the other.
So the Surgeon which taketh of the rich man five hundred crownes to cut him of
the stone, haply taketh of the poore porter no more but fiue: and yet for all
that in effect taketh ten times more of the poore man than of the rich: For the
rich man being worth fiftie thousand crownes,
so payeth but the hundred part of his goods, whereas the poore man being but
worth fiftie crownes, paieth fiue, the tenth part of his substance. Whereas if
we should exactly keepe the Geometricall or Arithmeticall proportion alone, the
patient should die of the stone, and the Surgion for lacke of worke starue:
whereas now by keeping the Harmonicall mediocritie, it goeth well with them
both, the poore man cured with the rich, and the Surgion so gaining wealth, and
the other their health. After which proportion euen the judges themselves haue
used to esteeme their paines, and therefore to demaund their honourable fees:
which we see to have alwayes bene lawfull for them to doe, so that therein they
exceed not measure. As I remember it to have happened unto a certaine Prouost
of Paris, whose name I will Harmonicall proportion to be used by the iudges euen in
taking of their fees. easily passe ouer, who for adiudging the lawful
possession of a litigious benefice, hauing for his owne fees set downe thirtie
crownes, whereas his duetie was but three, and appeale therefore by the partie
grieued made unto the higher court; was thither sent for; where he being by Ranconet President of the court hardly charged for the
wrong by him done: aunswered, That it was a good fat benefice that he had giuen
sentence for: and that forasmuch as he did many such things for poore men
without any fee at all, that it was but right and reason that the richer when
they came should make him an amends therefore in paying of him deeper fees.
Whereunto the President pleasantly▪ said, Him in so
doing to serue them as his Taylor did him, who tooke of him twice as much for the making of him a veluet gowne, as he did
for making of him one of cloth. So the law of Milan, which appointeth, That the
judge may for his fee take the hundred part of the value of the suit, so that
hee exceed not two hundred crownes, would seeme unto Ranconet vniust: every corrupt judge so without any proportion at all,
extorting from all men, what he saw good. For that such the suit may be for a
slight matter but often crowns, as that therein oftentimes more paines is to be
taken by the udge than in a suit of ten thousand
crownes: the marchant so still gaining by the rich, what he looseth by the
poore.
Wherefore both in making of lawes, and in deciding of causes, and in the
wholeArithmetical proportion most necessarie to be
obserued in the whole government of the Commonweale. government of
the Commonweale, we must still so much as possible is, obserue and keepe that Harmonicall proportion, if we will at all
maintaine equitie & iustice: wher as otherwise it
will be right hard for vs in the administration of iustice, not to doe great
wrong. As doth the law of inheritance, which adiudgeth all unto the eldest,
whether he be noble or base; of auntient time used by Lycurgus in the inheritances of the Lacedemonians, and with vs in the
countrey of Caux. Lesse vniust, and yet vniust too, is the law which giueth all
the noble mans inheritance unto his eldest son; and an annuitie of the third or
of the fift part unto the younger brethren, for them to have during their,
lives as they doe at Amboise and Aniou; and yet dealing therein more favourably
with the women, who hold that unto themselves in proprietie, which the yonger
brethren have but for tearme of life. Neither is the custome of the Germans
much lesse vniust, who hauing abrogated the
old law, where of Tacitus maketh mention, diuide the
inheritance equally amongst their sonnes, making the eldest and the youngest
both equall in the succession of their inheritance, according vnto
Arithmeticall proportion, without any difference of persons at all. But how
much more uprightly and iustly hath the law of God dealt herein? which
following the Harmonicall proportionHarmonical proportion of
iustice euen by the law of God obserued in the conferring of inheritance,
& inflicting of punishments. of iustice, giueth onely unto the
sonnes the land, and unto the daughters part of the mouables, or money to marry
them with; to the end the houses should not by them be dismembred: and amongst
the males allotteth two parts unto the eldest, and to the rest euerie one of
them a part: and the father dying without heires male, the same law commaundeth
the women to diuide the inheritance indifferently amongst them, and yet to marrie with the next of their house or tribe,
that the land might not bee carried out of their stocke and kindred. Wherein
Geometricall proportion is to be seene betwixt the eldest and the rest, as also
betwixt the males and the females: and Arithmeticall equalitie betwixt the
younger brethren, as amongst the daughters also. So when it is said by the law
of God, That he which hath deserued to bee chastised or beaten, shall be
punished according to the fault by him committed; yet is it by the same law
forbidden to giue him aboue fortie stripes. Which law is made according to
Harmonicall iustice: For why, it is left unto the discretion of the judge,
after such a proportion, to iudge unto fortie stripes, according unto the
equalitie of the persons and of the offences committed: Wherein the
Arithmeticall equalitie is also seene, in that it is forbidden the magistrat to exceed fortie stripes, the certain number
by the law appointed. Wherin he that hath the more offended, and yet hath not
deserued death, is no more punished in this respect of fortie stripes, than he
which hath lesse offended. Whereof the law yeeldeth this reason, least the
partie condemned, lamed with many stripes, should so become vnprofitable both
unto himselfe and the Commonweale. For that it might have bene obiected, That
he which more grieuously offended, was the more grieuously also to have bene
punished, euen aboue the said number of fortie stripes: howbeit that indeed it
is better to stay within a measure, than through too much seueritie to do any thing vniustly, which unto vs is a certaine
argument drawne from the law of God, That the
true iustice, and the fairest government, is that which is by Harmonicall
proportion maintained.The Aristocratique and Popular
estates, not to be maintained by Geometricall or Arithmeticall iustice,
without a mixture of Harmonicall iustice also.
And albeit that the Popular estate more willingly embraceth the equall lawes
and Arithmeticall Iustice: and the Aristocratike estate contrariwise loueth
better the Geometricall proportion of iustice: yet so it is, that both the one
and the other are for the preseruation of themselves constrained to intermingle
with themselves the Harmonicall proportion. Whereas otherwise the
Aristocraticall Seignorie excluding the common people farre from al estates,
offices, and dignities, not making them in any sort partakers of the spoyles of
their enemies, nor of the countries conquered from them; it cannot be that the
estate can so long stand, but that the common people beeing neuer so little moued, or neuer so small occasion presented,
shall reuolt, and so chaunge the estate, as I have by many examples here before
declared. And therefore the Venetian Seignorie, which is the most true
Aristocratie (if euer there were any) gouerneth it selfe Aristocratically,
bestowing the great honours, dignities, benefices, and magistracies, uppon the
Venetian gentlemen; and the meaner offices which have no power belonging vnto
them, upon the common people: following therein the Geometricall proportion of
the great to the great, and of the little to the little. And yet to content the
common people, the Seignorie hath left unto them the estate of the
Chauncellour, which is one of the most worthy and most honourable places in the
citie, and perpetuall also: and more than that, the offices of the Secretaries
of the estate also, which are places verie
honourable. Yea moreover an iniurie done by a Venetian gentleman unto the least
inhabitant of the citie, is right seuerely corrected and punished: and so a
great sweetnesse and libertie of life giuen unto all, which sauoureth more of
popular libertie than of Aristocraticall government. And that more is, the
creation of their magistrats is made part by choyce, and part by lot: the one
proper unto the the Aristocratique government,The estate of
Venice Aristocratique, and the government for most part Harmonicall.
and the other unto the Popular estate: so that a man may well say, that the
estate of that Seignorie is pure and simply Aristocratique, and yet somewhat
gouerned by Proportion Harmonicall, which hath made this Commonweale so faire
and flourishing.
Now we have oftentimes said, and must yet againe say (for that many have uppon
That the estate of a Commonweale may be of one sort, and yet
the maner of government of another. this rocke suffered shipwracke)
that the estate of a Commonweale may oftentimes be the same with the government
thereof, but yet more often quite different from the same. For the estate may
be Popular, and yet the government Aristocraticall: as in Rome after the kings
were driuen out (wee said) the estate of that Commonweale to have bene Popular,
for that then all the soueraigne rights were in the power of the whole people
in generall; and yet the manner of the government of that citie and Commonweale
to have bene from the Popular government most farre different. For that the
Senators alone enioyed the great benefices, honours, dignities, and places of
commaund: all the wayes and entrances thereunto being by the nobilitie holden
fast stopt up against the comminaltie, yea and that so straitly, as that it was
not lawfull or permitted for any of the common
sort to marrie with any of the nobilitie; either for any noble woman to marrie
but with some one of the nobilitie, but the noble still marrying with the
noble, & the base with such as themselves were: and the chiefe and
principall voyces which were giuen in their greatest assemblies of estate, and
most regarded, were still taken by their wealth and yeares. So that the estate
being then Popular, and the manner of the government Aristocraticall, according
to Geometricall proportion, the people oftentimes reuolted from the nobilitie:
neither was the estate euer quiet from civill tumults and seditions, vntill
that the common people had by little and little got to
be partakers also in the greatest benefices, honours, offices, and places of
commaund, that were in the Commonweale: and
that it was permitted them also to allie themselves in marriage with the
nobilitie, as also to have their voyces as well as they. And so long as this
Harmonical government (that is to say intermingled with the Aristocratique and
Popular estate) continued, the Senat yet bearing the greater sway, so long that
Commonweale flourished both in armes and lawes; but after that the government
(through the ambition of the Tribunes) became altogether Popular, and as the
heauier weight in a ballance ouerweighed the lighter, all then went to wracke:
no otherwise than as when the sweet harmonie of musicke being dissolued, and
the harmonicall numbers altered into numbers of proportion altogether equall
and like, therof followeth a most great vnpleasant and foule discord: the like
whereof there raised amongst the citisens
neuer ceased, vntill that the estate was quite thereby chaunged, and indeed
vtterly ouerthrowne. So may wee also iudge of all other Commonweales; neither
have wee thereof any better 'example than of the popular estates of the
Swissers, which the more that they are popularly gouerned, the harder they are
to be maintained, as the mountayne Cantons, and the Grisons: whereas the
Cantons of Berne, Basil, and Zuricke, which are gouerned more Aristocratically,
and yet hold the Harmonicall meane betwixt the Aristocratike & Popular
government, are a great deale the more pleasing, and more tractable, and more
assured in greatnes, power, arms and lawes.
Now as the Aristocraticall estate founded uppon Geometricall proportion, and
gouerned The Royall estate Harmonically gouerned, to be the fairest,
the happiest, and most perfect. also aristocratically, giueth vnto
the nobilitie and richer sort the estates and honours: and the Popular estate
contrariewise grounded uppon Arithmeticall proportion, and gouerned popularly,
equally deuideth the monies, spoyles, conquests, offices, honours, and
preferments unto all alike, without any difference or respect of the great or
of the little, of the noble or of the base and common person: So the royall
estate also by a necessarie consequence framed unto the harmonicall proportion,
if it be royally ordered and gouerned, that is to say, Harmonically; there is
no doubt but that of all other estates it is the fayrest, the happiest, and
most perfect. But here I speake not of a lordly monarchie, where the Monarch,
though a naturall prince borne, holdeth all his subiects vnderfoot as slaues,
disposing of their goods as of his owne: and yet much lesse of a tyrannicall monarchie, where the Monarch being no naturall
Lord, abuseth neuerthelesse the subiects and their goods at his pleasure, as if
they were his verie slaues; and yet worse also when he maketh them slaues vnto
his owne cruelties. But my speech and meaning is of a lawfull King, whether he
be so by election, for his vertue and religion, by voyce chosen, so as was Numa; or by diuine lot, as was Saul; or that he have by strong hand and force of armes, as a
conquerour got his kingdome, as have many; or that hee have it by a lawfull and
orderly succession, as have all (except some few) who with no lesse loue and
care favoureth and defendeth his subiects, than if they were his owne children.
And yet such a King may neuerthelesse if he will, gouerne his kingdome
popularly and by equall Arithmeticall proportion, calling all his subiects indifferently without respect of persons vnto
all honours and preferments whatsoeuer, without making choyce of their deserts
or sufficiencie, whether it be that they be chosen by lot or by order one of
them after another: howbeit that there beeA Royall estate,
and yet gouerned Popularly and according to Arithmeticall proportion.
few or rather no such monarchies indeed. So the King may also gouerne his
estate or kingdome Aristocratically, bestowing the honorable estates and
charges therein with the distribution of punishmehts and rewards by
Geometricall proportion, making still choice of the nobilitie of some, and of
the riches of others, still reiecting the base poorer sort, and yet without any
regard had unto the deserts or vertues of them whom he
so preferred; but onely unto him that is best monyed or most noble. Both which
A Royall estate gouerned Aristocratically, and according to
Geometricall proportion. manner of governments, howbeit that they bee
euill and blameworthy, yet is this Aristocratique and Geometricall proportion
of government much more tollerable and more sure, than is that popular and
turbulent government, scarcely any where to bee found, as neerer approching
unto the sweet Harmonicall government. For it may be, that the king to assure
his estate against the insurrection of the base common people, may have need to
strengthen himself with the nobilitie, which come neerer unto his qualitie and
condition, than doth the base artificers and common sort of people, unto whom
he cannot descend, neither with them wel have any societie at all, if he will
in any good sort maintaine the maiestie of his royal estate and soueraigntie,
as it seemeth he must of necessitie do, if he shall make them partakers of the
most honourable charges of his estate and
kingdome. But such an Aristocratique kind of government is also euill and
dangerous, not unto the common peaple only, but euen unto the nobilitie &
prince also: who may so stil stand in feare of the discontented vulgar sort,
which is alwayes farre in number moe than is the nobilitie or the rich: and
hauing got some seditious leader, and so taking up of armes, becommeth the
stronger part, and so sometimes reuolting from their prince, driueth out the
nobilitie, and fortifie themselves against their princes power: as it happened
among the Swissers, and in other auntient Commonweales by vs before noted. The
reason whereof is euident, for that the common people is not bound by any good
accord either with the prince, or with the
nobilitie, no more than these three numbers 4, 6, 7: where the first maketh
good accord with the second, that is to say, a fift: but the third maketh a
discord, the most irkesome and vnpleasant that may bee, marring wholly the
sweet consent of the two first, for that it hath not any Harmonicall proportion
either unto the first or unto the second, neither unto both together.
But it may be, and commonly so is, that the prince giueth all the greatest
honoursGeometrical proportion in distributing of offices,
not good. and preferments unto the nobilitie and great lords, and
unto the meaner and baser sort of the people the lesser and meaner offices
onely; as to be clearkes, sergeants, notaries, pettie receiuers, and such other
meane officers of townes, or of some small iurisdictions. Wherein he shall so
keepe the Geometricall proportion, and Aristocraticall government. Which manner of government for all that is yet
faultie, howbeit that it be more tollerable than the former Popular
Arithmeticall government, as hauing in it some equall and semblable proportion:
For as the office of the Constable is proper unto a great Lord, so is also the
office of a Sergeant unto a poore base fellow. But forasmuch as there is no
sociable bond betwixt the prince and the porter; so also is there not any
similitude betwixt the office of the Great Constable and of a Sergeant: no more
than there is amongst these foure numbers disposed by proportion Geometricall
disiunct, 3, 6, 5, 10: where the two first have the same reason that the two
last haue, and the reason of the first unto third, is that of the second vnto
the fourth: yet the reason of the second unto the third is discordant and
different from the others, and so disioyneth
the extreames, which so maketh an absurd and foolish discord. And so also are
the orders of citisens and subiects, disioyned one of them from another, so
that no fast or sure band can bee found amongst them. For that the nobilitie
thinketh it an indignitie for them to bee busied with the small offices of the
comminaltie: and the common people againe take it in euill part themselves to
be excluded from the greatest honours of the nobilitie. As in Rome it was not
otherwise lawfull for any of the nobility, whom they called Patricij, to sue for the Tribuneship, but that first he must renounce
his nobilitie, & become a commoner: for as then the Consulship belonged onely unto the nobilie, and the Tribuneship unto the
comminaltie. Which power once granted unto the
people, they forthwith let their weapons fal, and all the sedition &
tumults before common betwixt them and the nobilitie ceased: For why, the
common sort thought themselves now equall with the best, wherin the welfare of
that citie consisted: whereas otherwise the force of the furious multitude
could by no violence have bin withstood. For what the proportiō was of the
Consulship unto the Tribuneship, the same the proportion was of one of the
nobilitie unto a commoner: & againe, the same respect was of a noble man
unto the Consulship, that was of a commoner unto the Tribuneship, in
Geometricall similitude. But forasmuch as it was not lawfull neither for a
noble man to obtaine the Tribuneship, neither for a commoner to enioy the
Consulship, the people was disioyned from the nobilitie, and a perpetuall
discord betwixt the Consuls and the Tribunes
still troubled the citie: in such sort, as in these numbers thus placed is to
be seene, 2, 4, 9, 18: wherein are found two eights by Geometricall proportion
disiunct, and which yet mixed together make the most hard discord that is
possible, by reason of the disproportion which is betwixt 4 and 9, which is
intollerable, and marreth all the harmonie. So was there also almost a
perpetuall discordThe reasons why the Consuls and Tribunes
were alwayes at discord in Rome. betwixt the nobilitie & the
people, vntill that the Consulship, the Censorship, the Pretorship, and the
chiefe Benefices, excepting some few, were communicated unto the people also.
Whereas might it with the same moderation have beene lawfull for the nobilitie
to have obtained the Tribuneship also, yet so as that the number of the
commoners in that societie of the Tribunes might yet still have bene the
greater, and the nobles not enforced to
renouce their nobilitie: no doubt but that the estate so Harmonically gouerned
had bene much the more assured, better ordered, and of much longer continuance
than it was, by reason of the sweet agreement of the citisens among themselves,
and that Harmonicall mixture of the offices and places of authoritie and
commaund in the estate and Commonweale: as in these foure numbers by
Harmonicall proportion conioyned, is plainely to be seene, 4, 6, 8, 12: where
the proportion of the first number unto the second, and of the third unto the
fourth, is a Diapente, or a fift: and againe the
proportion of the first unto the third, and of the second unto the fourth, is a
Diapason, or an eight: and the proportion of the
second unto the third, a Diatessaron, or a fourth: which
with a continuall proportion ioyning the first with the last, and the middle to both, and so indeed all to all, bringeth
forth a most sweet & pleasant harmonie. But it was so farre off, that
gentlemen of auntient houses were in Rome receiued into the Tribuneship (if
they first renounced not their nobilitie, and caused themselves to be adopted
by some base commoner) as it was for the base commoners to aspire unto the
Consulship: which they neuer did, except they had before obtained the greatest
honours of the field, as did Marius; or else by their
eloquence, as did Cicero; or by both together, as did
Cato the Censor. Which yet was a matter of such
difficultie, as that Cicero boasteth of himselfe vnto
the people, That hee was the first new man (now they then called him a new man,
who the first of his house and familie had obtained honours) who of them of his
ranke had obtained to be Consull: and that the
people under his conduct had cut in sunder and for euer after laid open for
vertue that honourable place, which the nobilitie had before with strong
garrisons holden, and by all meanes shut up. So that it ought not to seeme
strange if the Commonweale were then troubled with the seditions of the people,
when as in such a multitude of the common sort, so few of them euen in Cicero his time aspired unto those so great honours, the
nobilitie of great and auntient houses commonly still enioying of them.The Royal estate gouerned Hrmo
nically, the srest and most perfect.
Wherefore it becommeth a good gouernor in a Popular or Aristocratique estate,
and especially a wise king in his kingdome, to vse Harmonicall proportion in
the government thereof, sweetly intermingling the
nobilitie with the comminaltie, the rich with
the poore; & yet neuerthelesse with such discretion, as that the nobilitie
still have a certaine preheminence aboue the base comminaltie. For why, it is
good reason that the gentleman excelling in deeds of armes and martiall
prowesse, or in the knowledge of the law, as wel as the base common person,
should in the administration of iustice, or in the mannaging of the wars, be
preferred before him. As also that the rich in all other respects equall vnto
the poore, should be preferred unto such places and estates as have more honour
than profit: and the poore man contrariwise to enioy those offices and roomes
which have more profit than honour: both of them so resting reasonably
contented, he which is rich enough seeking but after honour, and the poore man
after his profit. For which cause and consideration, the wise Roman Proconsull
Titus Flaminius taking order for the Thessalian Commonweale,
left the government and soueraigntie of the townes and cities by him conquered,
unto them of the richer sort and of best abilitie: wisely deeming, that they
would be more carefull for the preseruation and keeping of them, than would the
poore, who hauing not much to loose, had no great interest therein. Now if two
or three magistrats were to bee chosen, it were better to ioyne a noble man
with a commoner, a rich man with a poore, a young man with an old; than two
noblemen, or two rich men, or two poore men, or two young men together; who
oftentimes fall out into quarrels betwixt themselves, and so hinder one another
in their charges: as commonly it happeneth betwixt equals. Besides that, of
such a coniunction of magistrats of diuers state and condition (as wee now
speake of) should arise this great profit, That
every one of such magistrats would seeke to maintaineIustice
better administred by magistrats of diuers sort & condition, than by men
all of one estate and degree. the prerogative & right of them of
their owne estate and such as themselves were: As in our soueraigne courts, and
in other corporations and societies also, by our customes composed of men of
all sorts, we see iustice and right to bee commonly better, and more uprightly
unto every man administred, than if they wholly consisted of noble men, or of
commoners, or of clergie men, or of any one estate alone.
But now in civill societies there is no meane better to bind and combine the
little ones with the great, the base with the noble, the poore with the rich,
than by communicating of the offices, estates, dignities, and preferments, vnto
all men, as well the base as the noble, according unto every mans vertues and
deserts, as wee have before declared. Which
deserts both now are & euer were of most diuers sort & condition: so
that he which would stil giue the honorable charges and preferments of the
estate unto vertuous and religious men onely, should vttterly ouerthrow the
whole Commonweale:Diuers sorts of deserts, and that vertuous
men onely are not to be preferred unto the honourable places and charges of
the Commonweale. for that such vertuous and deuout men are alwayes in
number much fewer than the euill and wicked, by whome they might easily be
ouercome and thrust out of their government. Whereas in coupling the poore
vertuous men (as I have said) sometime with the noble, and sometime with the
rich, howbeit that they were deuoid of vertue; yet so neuerthelesse they should
feele themselves honoured, in being so ioined with the vertuous, mounted vnto
honourable place. In which doing all the nobilitie shall on the one side
reioyce to see euen bare nobilitie rspected, and a place for it left in the
Commonweale, together with men excelling in
vertue and knowledge: and all the baser fort of the common people on the other
side rauished with an incredible pleasure to feelethemselves all honoured, as
indeed they are, when they shall see a poore Physitians sonne Chauncellour of a
great kingdome; or a poore souldior to become at length Great Constable: as was
seene in the person of Michael D' l' Hospitall, and Bertrand Guescheling: who both of them, with many others,
for their noble vertues were worthily exalted euen unto the highest degrees of
honours. But all the subiects grieue and take it in euill part, when as men
neither for the honour of their house, nor for any
their vertues noble, but rather for their loose and lewd lives infamous, shall
be placed in the highest degree of honour and
command: not for that I thinke it necessarie the vnworthyVnworthy persons not alwayes to be excluded from certaine offices and
places of commaund in the Cōmonweale. citisens or subiects to be
altogether kept from all offices & places of command (a thing which can in
no wise be) but that euen they such vnworthy persons may bee sometimes capable
also of certaine offices; prouided alwayes that they bee in number but few,
that their ignorance or wickednesse may not take any great effect in the estate
wherein they are. For we must not onely giue the purse unto the trustiest,
armes unto the most valiant, iudgement unto the most upright, censure unto the
most entire, labor unto the strongest, government unto wisest, priesthood vnto
the deuourest, as Geometricall Iustice requireth (howbeit that it were
impossible so to doe, for the scarcetie of good and vertuous men:) but we must
also, to make an harmonie of one of them with
another, mingle them which have wherewith in some sort to supply that which
wanteth in the other. For otherwise there shall be no more harmonie than if one
should separat the concords of musique which are in themselves good, but yet
would make no good consent if they were not bound together: for that the
default of the one is supplied by the other. In which doing, the wise prince
shall set his subiects in a most sweet quiet, bound together with an
indissoluble bond one of them unto another, together with himselfe, and the
Commonweale. As is in the foure first numbers to bee seene: which God hath in
Harmonicall proportion disposed to show unto vs, that the Royal estate is
Harmonicall, and also to be Harmonically gouerned. For two to three maketh
a fift; three to foure, a fourth; two to foure, an
eight; and againe afterwards, one to two,
maketh an eight; one to three, a twelft, holding the fift and the eight; &
one to foure, a double eight, or Diapason: which
containeth the whole ground and compasse of all tunes and concords of musicke,
beyond which he which will passe unto fiue, shall in so doing marre the
harmonie, and make an intollerable discord. So may one say of a point to a
line, as also of the plaine superficies, and of the solid bodie also of any
thing. Now the soueraigne prince is exalted aboue all his subiects, and exempt
out of the ranke of them: whose maiestie suffereth no more diuision than doth the unitie it selfe, which is not set nor
accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their
force and power. But the three estates standThe order of the
three estates in a well ordered Commonweale. orderly disposed as they
are, and as they alwayes have yet beene in every well ordered Commonweale, viz. the Ecclesiasticall order first for the dignitie
which it beareth: & the prerogative of the ministerie and function thereof
towards God, being yet composed both of noble and of base. Then after them
follow the Martiall men, in whose protection all the rest of the subiects in
some sort rest: which order and estate is also composed both of the noble and
vnnoble. And in the third and last, are set the common people of all sorts and
vocations, as schollers, marchants, artificers, and labourers: euerie one of
which estates hauing part and interest into the offices and honourable
charges of the Commonweale, with great
respect and regard still to bee had unto the merits and deserts, as also vnto
the qualitie of the persons, there may therof be formed a pleasant harmonie of
all the subiects among themselves; as also of them altogetherThe well ordered Commonweale in some sort figure deuen in the nature of man
himselfe. with their soueraigne prince. Which is also declared, and
in some sort figured euen in the nature of man himselfe, being the verie true
image of a well ordered Commonweale: and that not in his bodie onely, which
still hath but one head, and all the rest of the members aptly fitted
thereunto; but euen in his mind also, wherein understanding holdeth the chiefe
place, Reason the next, the Angrie Power desitous of revenge, the third, and brutist lust and desire the last. Whereof the mind
or understanding like unto the unitie in
numbers indiuisible, pure, and simple, is of it selfe free from all concretion,
and from all the other faculties of the soule apart separated and divided: the
angry power with desire of revenge resting in the heart, representeth the
souldiors and other martiall men: and sensuall lust and desire resting in the
liver under the midriffe, beokeneth the common
people. And as from the liver (the fountaine of bloud) the other members are
all nourished, so husbandmen, marchants, and artificers doe giue unto the rest
of the subiects nourishment. And as many men for lacke of understanding live
like beast, smoued with that only which is present and before them, without
mounting any higher unto the contemplation of things intellectuall and diuine,
whom the sacred scriptures call also beasts: euen so also the Aristocratique
and popular Commonweales Ionas the last, and Psal. 49. without understanding,
that is to say, without a prince, are in some sort able to maintaine and defend
themselves, though not long: being indeed about to become much more happie if
they had a soueraigue prince, which with his authoritie and power might (as
doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so vnite and bind them
fast in happinesse together: for why no government is more happie or blessed,
than where the reasonable soule of man is gouerned by wisedome, anger and
desire of revenge by true valour, lust by temperance; and that understanding
bearing the rule, and as it were holding the reines, guideth the chariot,
whereafter all the rest follow whether soeuer he will lead them: for so all
honestie, all the lustre of vertue and dutie shall every where flourish. But
when the power and commaund of understanding beaten downe and quite ouerthrowne, anger as a mutinous and vnruly
souldior, and intemperat lust as a turbulent and seditious people, shall take
upon them the gouernement, and so inuading the state, shake wisedome and
understanding, and thrust it out of place: every Commonweale must needs euen
like the powers of the soule and mind needs so fall into all manner of reproch
and filthinesse of vices. So that nothing is more like unto a well gouerned
Commonweale, than that most faire and fit comparison of the soule and the
powers thereof, there being therein so established a most Harmonicall
proportion of iustice, which giueth to euerie part of the soule that which vnto
it of right belongeth. The like whereof we may say also of the three estates of
a Commonweale, guided by Wisedome, Fortitude, & Temperance: which thee morall vertues
vnited together, and with their king, that is to say, the intellectuall and
contemplatiue vertue, there is thereby established a most faire and Harmonicall
forme of a Commonweale. For that as of unitie dependeth the vnion of all
numbers, which haueOne soueraigne prince alwayes most
necessarie in a Commonweale no power but from it: so also is one
soueraigne prince in euerie Commonweale necessarie, from the power of whome all
others orderly depend. But as there cannot bee good musicke wherein there is
not some discord, which must of necessitie be intermingledThat the bad are to be mingled with the good, for the making of a good
Harmonicall proportion in a Cōmonweale to giue the better grace vnto
the Harmonie (which the good Musitian doth, to make the consent of the fourth,
the fift, and the eight, the more pleasing and tunable, some discord running
before which may make the consent much more sweet unto the eare; as do also
cunning cookes, who to giue the better tast unto their good meates, serue in therewith certaine dishes of sharpe and
vnsauerie sauces; and as the cunning painter, to grace his picture, and to giue
a better show unto his brighter colours, still shadoweth the same with blacke,
or some other darke colour (for that the nature of all things in the world is
such, as to loose their grace, if they tast not sometime of disgrace; and that
pleasure alwayes continuing becommeth vnsauorie, daungerous and vnpleasant): So
also is it necessarie that there should be some fooles amongst wise men, some
vnworthy of their charge amongst men of great experience, and some euill and
vitious men amongst the good and vertuous, to giue them the greater lustre, and
to make the difference knowne (euen by the pointing of
the finger, and the sight of the eye) betwixt
vertue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. For when sools, vitious, and wicked
men, are contemned & despised, then the wise, vertuous, and good men,
receiue the true reward and guerdon for their vertue, which is honour. And it
seemeth the antient Greekes in their fables, to have aptly shadowed forth vnto
vs that which wee have spoken of these three kinds of Iustice, giuing unto Themis three daughters, viz.: that is to say, upright Law, Equitie, and Peace:
which are referredThe three daughters of Themis to represent
the three proportions of Iustice. unto the three formes of Iustice,
Arithmeticall, Geometricall, and Harmonicall: howbeit that peace which
shadoweth forth Harmonicall Iustice, is the onely scope and summe of all the
lawes and iudgements, as also of the true Royall government: so as is
Harmonicall Iustice the end both of Arithmeticall and Geometricall government
also.
But these things thus declared, it remaineth for vs to know (as the chiefe
point ofThe world to bee made and gouerned also by
Marmonicall, and not by Geometricall proportion, contrarie to the opinion of
Plato. this our present discourse) Whether it be true that Plato saith, God to gouerne this world by Geometricall
proportion: For that he hath taken it as a ground, to shew that a well ordered
Commonweale ought (to the imitation of the world) to be gouerned by
Geometricall Iustice: Which I have shewed to be contrarie, by the nature of the
unitie, Harmonically referred unto the three first numbers: as also by the
intellectuall power, compared unto the three other powers of the soule: and by
a point compared to a line, a plaine superficies, or other solid bodie. But let
vs goe farther, for if Plato had looked neerer into the
wonderfull Fabrike of the world, hee should have marked that which hee forgot in his Timeo, viz.
The Great God of nature to have Harmonically composed this world of Matter and
Forme, of which the one is maintained by the helpe of the other, and that by
the proportion of equalitie and similitude combined & bound together. And
for that the Matter was to no vse without the Forme, and that the forme could
have no being without the matter, neither in the whole vniuersall, neither yet
in the parts thereof: he made the world equall to the one, and semblable to the
other: equall unto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehendeth
all: and semblable or like unto the forme, in such sort as is the Harmonicall
proportion composed of the Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportions equall to
the one, and semblable to the other, being one of them separate from another
vnperfect.
And as the Pythagorians sacrificed the great sacrifice Hecatombe, not for the
sustendure of the right angle, which dependeth of the two sides (as many
thinke) but for hauing in the selfesame figure found the equalitie and
similitude of two other figures, the third figure being equall unto the first,
and like unto the second: so do we also owe the immortall euerlasting sacrifice
of praise and thanksgiuing unto almightie God, for that he hath by an admirable
bond of Harmonie, bound together this world of matter and forme, equall to the
one, and like to the other: equall indeed to the matter, so that there is
nothing thereof wanting, or yet superfluous:
but yet like unto that euerlasting forme, which he the most wise workeman had
in his mind before conceiued, before he made that so great and excellent a
worke: as we read in the holy * Scripture.en. 1.
And as for the motion or mouing of the celestiall Spheres, wee see that God
hath made one motion equall, which is the swift motion of the superiour Sphere:
and another vnequall, which is the motion of the Planets (contrarie unto the
former:) and the third the motion of Trepidation, which containeth and bindeth
together both the one and the other. And so if we should enter into the
particular nature of other worldly creatures also, we
should find a perpetuall Harmonicall bond, which vniteth the extreames
by indissoluble meanes, taking yet part
both of the one and of the other.The Harmonical bond
wherewith the world and the parts thereof are indissolubly bound and vnited
together. Which coherence is neither agreeable unto Arithmeticall nor
Geometricall, but euen proper unto the Harmonicall proportion onely: wherein
the sweetnesse of the consent consisteth in tunes aptly mixt together: and the
harsh discord, when as the tunes are such as cannot fitly be mingled together.
So we see the earth and stones to be as it were ioyned together by clay and
chaulke, as in meane betwixt both: and so betwixt the stones and mettals, the
Marcasites, the Calamites, and other diuers kinds of minerall stones to grow:
So stones and plants also to be ioyned together by diuers kinds of Corall,
which are as it were stonie plants, yet hauing in them life, and growing uppon
roots: Betwixt plants and liuing creatures, the Zoophytes, or Plantbeasts,
which have feeling and motion, but yet take
life by the roots whereby they grow. And againe betwixt the creatures which
live by land onely, and those which live by water onely, are those which they
call Amphibia, or creatures liuing by land and water
both, as doth the Beuer, the Otter, the Tortoise, and such like: as betwixt the
fishes and the fouls are a certaine kind of flying fishes: So betwixt men and
beasts, are to bee seene Apes and Munkies; except we shall with Plato agree, who placed a woman in the middle betwixt a
man and a beast. And so betwixt beasts and angels God hath placed man, who is
in part mortall, and in part immortall: binding also this elementarie world,
with the heauens or the celestiall world, by the aethereall region. And as a
discord sometimes (as we said) giueth grace unto the sweetest Harmonie▪ so God
also hath here in this world mingled the bad
with the good, and placed vertues in the middest of vices, bringing forth also
certaine monsters in nature, and suffering the eclipses and defects of the
celestiall lights: as also the Surd reasons in Geometricall demonstrations: to
the end that there of might arise the greater good, and that by such meanes the
power and beautie of Gods workes might be the better knowne, which might
otherwise have beene hid and folded up in most thicke and obscure darkenesse.
And therefore it is, that God hauing hardened Pharaoes
heart, which the wise Hebrewes expound to be the enemie of God and Nature,
saith thus unto him, Excitaui ego te vt demonstrarem in te
ipso potentiae meae vim ac decus, vt toto terrarum or be gesta mea omnium
vna commemoratione praedicarentur, I have stirred thee up (saith he) that I might
in thee declare the force & glorie of my power, that so all my acts might
with one report of all men bee praised throughout the whole world. And these
things truely belong unto the most true report of the things then done in
Aegypt: but there lieth hidden therein a more diuine meaning than that,
concerning the great Pharao, the worker and father of
all mischiefe, whome the sacred Scriptures declare by the name of Leuiathan: and yet in this all the diuines agree, this of
all others the greatest enemie of God and man, to bee still by the becke, word,
and power of God, kept in and restrained: and all the force and power of those
mischiefes and euils by him and his wrought (which we so much both fret and
maruell at, and without which the power of the good should neither bee, neither
yet be at all perceiued) to be shut up within the bounds of this elementarie
world: and aboue the same to be nothing but
that which is holy and cleane from all filth and wickednesse; in such sort, as
that that little staine of euils here shall much more profit than hurt. Whereof
Augustine speaking, saith well, Qui
Deum immortalem vllum mali dedecus perpessurum negat, nisi maius bonum
consequi certo sciret, Who denieth that the immortall God would euer
suffer any euill or wickednesse to bee done, but that hee most certainly
knoweth a greater good to ensue thereof. Wherefore as of Treble and Base voyces
is made a most sweet and melodious Harmonie, so also of vices and vertues, of
the different qualities of the elements, of the contrarie motions of the
celestiall Spheres, and of the Sympathies and
Antipathies of things, by indissoluble meanes
bound together, is composed the Harmonie of the whole world, and of all the
parts thereof: So also a well ordered Commonweale is composed of good and bad,
of the rich and of the poore, of wisemen and of fools, of the strong and of the
weake, allied by them which are in the meane betwixt both: which so by a
wonderfull disagreeing concord, ioyne the highest with the lowest, and so all
to all, yet so as that the good are still stronger than the bad; so as hee the
most wise workeman of all others, and gouernour of the world hath by his
eternall law decreed. And as he himselfe being of an infinit force and power
ruleth over the angels, so also the angels over men, men over beasts, the soule
over the the bodie, the man over the woman, reason over affection: and so every
good thing commaunding over that which is worse, with a certaine combining of powers keepeth all things under most
right and lawful commands.Almightie God in the gouernmēt of
the world, to be of all worldly princes imitated in the government of their
estates and kingdomes. Wherefore what the unitie is in numbers, the
understanding in the powers of the soule, and the center in a circle: so
likewise in this world that most mightie king, in unitie simple, in nature
indiuisible, in puritie most holy, exalted farre aboue the Fabrike of the
celestiall Spheres, ioyning this elementarie world with the celestiall and
intelligible heauens; with a certaine secure care preserueth from distruction
this triple world, bound together with a most sweet and Harmonicall consent:
unto the imitation of whome, euerie good prince which wisheth his Kingdome and
Commonweale not in safetie onely, but euen good and blessed also, is to frame
and conforme himselfe.