357A - 358E Socrates had thought the conversation at an end, but Glauco revives the theory of Thrasymachus. A threefold classification of goods is first agreed upon. Goods are desirable either (1) for their own sakes, or (2) both for their own sakes and for their consequences, or (3) for their consequences alone. Justice is placed by Socrates in the second and noblest of these three classes. Glauco on the other hand asserts that the Many place it in the third, and proposes to advocate the belief of the Many, not as holding it himself, but in order to compel Socrates to defend Justice and condemn Injustice solely on their merits. Thrasymachus, he thinks, has cried off too soon.

ἐγὼ κτλ. λόγου is abstract =τοῦ λέγειν, not ‘the discussion’ (Jowett), which would be τοῦ λόγου. For τὸ δέ see on I 340 D.

ἦν ἄρα : ‘was after all,’ as in IV 443 C τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα—εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης and Soph. 1172 τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρ’ οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν θανεῖν ἐμέ. With προοίμιον cf. infra VII 531 D, Aesch. 740 f. ο<*>ς γὰρ νῦν ἀκήκοας λόγους | εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι μηδέπω )ν προοιμίοις, and Shakespeare I 3 “As happy prologues to the swelling act Of the imperial theme.” For the sense see the last note on Book I. There is no good ground for supposing (with von Sybel ) that either Book I of the or the rest of Plato's dialogues were intended merely as προοίμια or ‘Programs’ to attract pupils to his lectures.

βούλει κτλ. The antithesis is between δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι and πεῖσαι, and βούλει is used in its natural sense, not (as Ast thinks) with the force of μᾶλλον βούλει.

λέγε γάρ μοι . Other classifications of ‘goods’ in Plato will be found in 631 B ff. and 697 B ff. (with which compare Arist. I 8. 1098^{b} 12 ff.). See also 279 A ff., 467 E, 66 A ff. The nearest parallels to the present classification are furnished by Stoicism, in which goods were classified as a τελικά, b ποιητικά, c both τελικά and ποιητικά, and the προηγμένα as a δἰ αὑτά, b δἰ ἕτερα, c καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα see D. L. VII 96, 107.

χαίρειν ‐‐ ἀβλαβεῖς . These ‘innocent pleasures’ are defined in 667 E as those which bring no consequences in their train, good, bad, or otherwise (cf. καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ χαίρειν ἔχοντα). They are not quite identical with the ‘pure pleasures’ of 51 B, which are not necessarily devoid of all results, but only of pain. The same conception recurs in Aristotle, who regards the ἀβλαβεῖς ἡδοναί both as conducive to the ethical end and as useful for purposes of recreation ( Θ 5. 1339^{b} 25).

καὶ μηδὲν κτλ. The relative passes into a demonstrative (ταύτας) in the second half of the sentence, as in III 412 D, VI 505 D, E, VII 521 B, and elsewhere. The idiom is regular in Greek, but the second pronoun is more usually some case of αὐτός than of οὗτος, e.g. III 395 D, VI 511 C, 452 D, 192 A. Cobet however ( XI p. 167) goes too far in maintaining that αὐτός is alone permissible in this idiom. Cf. Engelhardt III pp. 41—43. μηδέν is used in preference to οὐδέν: for “cogitatione circumscriptum genus significatur” (Schneider). With the sentiment Muretus compared Arist. X 2. 1172^{b} 22 οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ’ αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.

ἔχοντα : sc. αὐτάς (so also Schneider), not the idiomatic ‘to continue rejoicing’ (as Campbell suggests). The essential mark of these pleasures, viz. that they give pleasure only while they last, is brought out by ἔχοντα, which recalls δεξαίμεθ’ ἂν ἔχειν just above, and is used without an expressed object as in 366 E.

τὸ φρονεῖν ‐‐ ὑγιαίνειν . ἀκούειν is added in 367 C. Cf. Arist. I 4. 1096^{b} 16 καθ) αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δἰ ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ) αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν: also A 1. 980^{a} 2 ff. Aristotle himself does not suggest that a special class should be made of things desirable both in themselves and for their results; but integri sensus and bona valetudo are included in the Stoic category of προηγμένα καὶ δἰ αὑτὰ καὶ δἰ ἕτερα (Cic. III 56: cf. D. L. VII 107).

γυμνάζεσθαι κτλ. Cf. 354 A and 467 C, D (where χρηματισμός is again said to belong to this class). ἰάτρευσις as an example of χρηματισμός (in spite of the ἀκριβὴς λόγος of I 342 B ff.) is suggested by ἰατρεύεσθαι. ὁ ἄλλος is ‘the rest of,’ and should not be taken (with Stallbaum) as praeterea: cf. l.c. οἱ πλέοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι and 53 E.

μισθῶν θ’ ἕνεκα κτλ. Herwerden would read μισθῶν τε μὲν ἕνεκα, but for δέ without μέν preceding see I 340 D note The words διὰ δόξαν, which are condemned by the same critic, may no doubt be a gloss on εὐδοκιμήσεων ἕνεκα. I incline however to think them genuine. Plato is not averse to duplicate expressions of this kind (see Schanz pp. 12—15), and the emphatic addition of διὰ δόξαν helps in the absence of μέν to prepare us for the antithesis αὐτὸ δὲ δἰ αὑτὸ κτλ. Cf. 363 A below.

ψέγεται . See cr. n. The words ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται are probably genuine: for the mention of ἀδικία seems to be necessary to justify the pronoun ἑκατέρου just below: cf. also in D βούλομαι καὶ σοῦ ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. For the omission see § 5.

ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθόν . Cf. infra 360 C and VI 493 C τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι κτλ.

ἀμείνων ἄρα . ἄρα disclaims responsibility for the theory: cf. 362 A, 364 B, E al.

Θρασυμάχου ‐‐ ἄλλων . See on I 337 A ff.

κατατείνας κτλ. : ‘I will speak vehemently in praise of the unjust life.’ The explanation of Photius and Suidas (κατατείνας ἐρῶ· ἀντὶ τοῦ μακρὸν λόγον διεξελεύσομαι) does not suit II 367 B ὡς δύναμαι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. For this intransitive use of κατατείνω cf. I 348 A and Boeckh's emendation of Eur. 336 οὔτε κατατενῶ ( καταινῶ MSS) λίαν ἐγώ.

εἴ σοι βουλομένῳ . In 384 A ἐστί is again omitted in this phrase. A still bolder example is cited by Stallbaum from Antipho 6. 8 ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις. See Schanz pp. 31— 35.

οἷόν τέ τι . The reading of A τί ὄν τε καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε involves the separation of ὅθεν from γέγονε, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider's περὶ τούτου ἅκουε τί οἴονται, καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οἷόν τε and οἴονται occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on 1 329 E), but the specific reference in ὃ ἔφην πρῶτον ἐρεῖν to 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην οἷον εἶναί φασι καὶ ὅθεν γεγονέναι points to the presence of οἷον here. The reading οἷόν τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τί in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οἷόν τέ τι (SC. ἐστί), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τί) wrongly inserted before οἶόν (where it remained in Π), οἷον itself being afterwards changed to ὄν in order to provide a kind of construction (‘being what, and whence, it arises,’ J. and C.). This ὄν was itself fortified by τυγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell's suggestion that “τί ὄν τε may be a corruption of τί ἐστί” is improbable: still less can Herwerden and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker's conjecture τί τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὅθεν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests ἄκουέ τι, οἷόν τε καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my in 1898 p. 296 οἷόν τ’ ἐστί κτλ.

358E - 359B Glauco will first describe the origin and nature of Justice according to the theory which he has undertaken to maintain. According to nature, to commit injustice is a good, to suffer injustice an evil. But as there is more evil in suffering than good in committing injustice, experience causes men to enter into a compact neither to commit nor suffer wrong. The collective prescriptions of this compact are called Law and Justice. Justiceis accordingly a compromise between the best policy, i.e. doing wrong without incurring any penalty, and the worst, i.e. suffering wrong without being able to exact vengeance. No one will accept the compromise who is strong enough to do wrong successfully.

ff. In thus resuscitating the theory of Thrasymachus, Glauco removes a serious stumbling-block by introducing the distinction between φύσις and νόμος. Civilisation revolts against the anti-social doctrines of Thrasymachus in their application to itself, but receives them more favourably when its own existence is safeguarded by relegating them to an age anterior to society. The view maintained by Glauco is allied to that of Callicles in 482 E ff.; and it has already been pointed out (on 1 337 A, 344 B) that similar views were tolerably widely entertained in Plato's time. To the evidence previously adduced may be added 690 B, 889 E, Eur. 509 and 912 ἡ φύσις ἐβούλεθ’ ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει. But whereas the doctrine of Callicles breaks down in explaining the origin of Law ( 483 C, cf. 488 D—489 D), Glauco's theory endeavours to solve this difficulty by postulating a social contract. A kindred solution is ascribed by Aristotle to the Sophist Lycophron: Γ 1280^{b} 10 ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων. The theory of a Social Contract was revived by Epicurus: see D. L. X 150. The views of the “incomplete Protagoreans” in 172 B (with which cf. 889 E), though they do not offer an explanation of the origin of Law, are parallel in so far as they regard it as depending for its binding force solely upon the sanction of society.

πεφυκέναι γὰρ ‐‐ κακόν . Cf. 483 A φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἴσχιόν ἐστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. That the natural relation between man and man is one of war is a view expressed in 626 A ἢν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνην, τοῦτ’ εἶναι μόνον ὄνομα, τῷ δ’ ἔργῳ πάσαις πρὸς πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀεὶ πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. A similar theory is contained in the myth of Protagoras ( 322 B ff.).

τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις κτλ. : i.e. (according to the theory of Callicles) τοῖς ἀσθενέσι ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ( 483 B). In place of δοκεῖ in 359 A I have adopted Ast's conjecture δοκεῖν. Throughout this paragraph Glauco consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. ἀδικεῖν, ἀδικεῖν 360 D, and for the error itself § 5.

ξυνθήκας αὑτῶν : ‘covenants between one another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ Reading αὐτῶν, Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἀδικεῖν and ἀδικεῖσθαι—a very improbable view.

νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον · φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates ( IV 4. 12).

τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ. Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero's work corresponds to that of Glauco here) in Cic. de Rep. III 23 “nam cum de tribus unum esset optandum, aut facere iniuriam nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digladiari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendis iniuriis.” Cicero is following Carneades (ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. ἀγαπᾶσθαι below (as J. and C. observe) “implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.”

ἐπεὶ τὸν δυνάμενον κτλ. is further elaborated with much vigour in 484 A. With ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα should be compared the emphatic ἀνήρ in that passage (ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ), and Eur. 509 ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅστις ἀπολέσας | τοὔλασσον ἔλαβε.

359B - 360D Secondly (urges Glauco), no one is willingly just. Give the just and the unjust the fullest power to work their will, by ensuring them against all evil consequences—give them the faculty of becoming invisible, such as Gyges possessed through his ring, and the just man will shew himself no better than the unjust. If, with this power to screen himself, the just man still refused to do wrong, no doubt men would praise him openly, but in secret they would judge him wholly miserable and foolish.

εἰ τοιόνδε ‐‐ δόντες . δόντες κτλ. explains τοιόνδε. εἰ need not be twice expressed: cf. I 351 C note

νόμῳ ‐‐ παράγεται . The language is perhaps suggested by the lines of Pindar cited in 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων— ἄγει δικαιῶν τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτᾳ χειρί κτλ. (cf. 337 D). but the preposition in παράγεται adds the further notion that equality is not Nature's highway. For βίᾳ i.q. βιαἴως in conjunction with another dative Schneider cites VIII 552 E οὓς ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. In the next line it is better to regard τοιάδε as explained by εἰ—γενέσθαι, than as balancing οἴαν, in which case εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο would be superfluous. The opportunity (ἐξουσία) of working their will comes from the possession (εἰ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο) of a certain active faculty (δύναμις) like that of Gyges.

τῷ Γύγου κτλ. Cf. X 612 B τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον. In Appendix I I have given reasons for believing that the Gyges of the proverbial ‘Gyges' ring’ was not “Gyges the Lydian”—the hero of Herodotus' story (I 7), but a homonymous ancestor of his. If so, we must (on the hypothesis that the text is sound) suppose that Plato here omits the name of the original Gyges either because he wishes tacitly to contradict a prevalent misconception, or (more probably) because his readers might be presumed to know or to be capable of inferring that the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian was also called Gyges. The MS reading is supported by Proclus (τῷ κατὰ τὸν Γύγου πρόγονον διηγήματι in Schöll p. 60. 30). For other views of this passage see App. I.

ὡς φαίνεσθαι : with νεκρόν, as Schneider saw: “utrum vere mortuus fuerit, an specie, fabula incertum reliquit.” Stallbaum wrongly interprets ‘nimirum videbatur Gyges cernere’ etc.: this would be expressed by δοκεῖν. Ast connects the phrase with μείζω ἢ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον: but this is very weak in point of sense. The words are omitted by Cicero ( III 38).

ἔχειν . See cr. n. and (for the omission in A) § 5. ἔχειν in the sense of ‘have on’ ‘wear,’ i.q. φορεῖν, is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase s.v. For the change of subject in ἔχειν—ἐκβῆναι cf. III 414 D note Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

χειρί . Herwerden's δακτύλῳ is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with δακτύλιον so near. Cf. χρυσόχειρες in Luc. 20. “Etiamnunc homines ita loquuntur” (Hartman).

ἵν’ ἐξαγγέλλοιεν κτλ. : ‘to report, as was done every month.’ The present expresses the habit (J. and C.).

σφενδόνην : the ‘collet’ or ‘bezel’ (Lat. funda or pala annuli)— which is as it were the sling in which the stone is set.

ὡς δόξειεν . “Optativus eandem vim habet, quam solet in oratione obliqua habere, efficitque, ut verba οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο οὕτως etc. ex aliorum ore missa videantur" (Schneider). This explanation appears to me better than any other, although I can discover no exact parallel in Greek. Glauco is most careful throughout the whole of this section to disclaim responsibility for the views he advocates: cf. ὡς ὁ λόγος 359 B, ἐπεὶ— ἀδικεῖν in C, ὡς φήσει κτλ. in D below: also 361 E al. Tucker would translate ‘as it might seem,’ defending the optative by Ar. 180 ὥσπερ εἴποι τις and Eur. 929 ὡς εἴποι τις. Others erroneously hold that ἄν may be supplied from ἂν γένοιτο, while Ast is desirous of inserting the particle on conjecture. I do not think that the optative can be explained as an instance of irregular assimilation or attraction.

ἂν μείνειεν . For ἄν cf. 179 A and other examples in Kühner II p. 934.

ἰσόθεον ὄντα . The halfconscious irony of ἰσόθεος foreshadows Plato's attack on the popular theology.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος here and in 366 D sums up the Thrasymachean theory in a phrase which suggests the Socratic and Platonic antithesis οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρός .

περὶ ‐‐ λέγων . περί can hardly be for ὑπέρ, nor dare we write ὑπέρ for περί (as Badham suggests). The words mean simply ‘qui de hoc argumento verba facit,’ ‘the exponent of such a theory.’ Cf. 362 D ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶτοῦλόγου. Muretus seems to have desiderated πατήρ for περί: cf. expressions like 275 E ( λόγος) τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. On the strength of this Herwerden would read ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου, rejecting λέγων (“posteaquam ex πήρ factum est περί, corrector addidit λέγων”). The ‘father of the theory’ would mean Thrasymachus: see on ὦ παῖδες in 368 A. It is just possible that πατήρ was read by Ficinus (“ut sermonis huius perhibent auctores”), and if so, the variant may have some ancient authority now lost; but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, and the text is probably sound.

ἀθλιώτατος . Apelt conjectures ἠλιθιώτατος, but cf. (with Hartman) I 344 A τοὺς δὲ—ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους.

360D - 362C In the third place, the life of the unjust man (according to our theory) is far better than that of the just. Let us suppose that each is the perfect embodiment of his character—the one a consummate artist in iniquity, able to coerce where needful, and so apt at concealment that he enjoys the highest reputation for justice, while guilty of the worst acts of injustice; the other wishful not to be esteemed, but to be, good, and labouring until he dies under the imputation of the worst injustice, although he remains just. Only by means of this supposition can we make sure that the just man has not been attracted by the rewards of justice, but by justice itself. What will be the result? The just will be wholly miserable and unsuccessful, the unjust wholly prosperous and happy, doing good to their friends and evil to their foes; nay more, the unjust will be dearer to the gods than the just, because they have wherewith to win their favour.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν κτλ. αὐτήν opposes the third division of Glauco's speech to the other two (see 358 C), and marks it as the most important. A kindred use of αὐτός recurs at 370 E ἀλλὰ μήν,—κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν —ἀδύνατον. I formerly read αὖ τὴν for αὐτήν, but the MS reading is quite de fensible. It should be noticed that κρίσιν is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards “resumed as a cognate accusative with κρῖναι” (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίσιν=‘choice.’ The word means of course (our) ‘judgment’ concerning etc. Cf. 361 D ἵν’ ἀμφότεροι —κρίνωνται and εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις.

εἰς goes with τέλεον: cf. δόξαν εἰς 361 A.

οὕτω ‐‐ λανθανέτω . ἐπιχειρῶν ὀρθῶς means of course attempting possible, and abstaining from impossible, ἀδικήματα. But as an ἀδίκημα is possible only if the ἀδικῶν is able to conceal it (the alternative of open violence is recognised later 361 B), it is necessary that the unjust man should escape detection. Hence λανθανέτω, although λανθάνειν was not attributed (because not essential) to the pilot and doctor (360 E).

φαῦλον means a ‘bungler’ (D. and V.). With the sentiment cf. 317 A τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπξδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος: also 845 B, and the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught (Xen. 2. 8). With ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία κτλ. the editors compare Cicero de Off. I 41 “totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior est, quam eorum, qui, cum maxime fallunt, id agunt, ut viri boni esse videantur.”

κατ) Αἰσχύλον ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . 592—594 (of Amphiaraus) οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος, ἀλλ’ εἶναι θέλει | βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος, | ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα. Herwerden would expunge ἀγαθόν (“mente repetatur ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον”), on the ground that if Plato had added any adjective, it would have been δίκαιον. (The Scholiast substitutes δίκαιος for ἄριστος in Aeschylus.) ἀγαθόν gives excellent sense, and is nearer to the poet's words.

εἴη is explained by Stallbaum as an optative of wish (though in a subordinate clause): ‘it is not clear therefore whether he is fain to be just,’ etc. This gives a fair sense, but the idiom is obscure, and unsupported by other examples. J. and C. remark that “the optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future,” taking ἄδηλον as for ἄδηλον ἂν εἴη. But an omitted ἂν εἴη cannot be responsible for the mood of τοιοῦτος εἴη, nor could ἂν εἴη easily be omitted (see Schanz p. 33). Still less should we accept Hartman's ἄδηλον <ἂν> οὖν, sc. εἴη. Madvig ejects εἴη altogether, understanding ἐστι after τοιοῦτος. This may be right, but its intrusion is not easy to explain. I think the word is genuine, and means ‘was’: ‘it is not clear then, say they, whether he was just,’ etc. Glauco again disclaims responsibility: cf. 360 B note εἴη would in direct speech be ἦν: and the idiom is like that in III 406 E, where see note. For the sequence of moods and tenses cf. VI 490 A note Failing this interpretation, the word must (I think) be spurious. Herwerden's proposal—τοιούτῳ εἶναι, ἄδηλον ὄν (retaining εἴη)—does not surmount the difficulty and is also wrong in point of sense.

ἀπ’ αὐτῆς . See cr. n. The sense required is not ‘what is produced by’ (ὑπό) ‘it,’ but ‘what results from it’: cf. γίγνεσθαι ἀπό (in a similar connexion) 357 C and 358 B. The scribe no doubt assimilated the preposition to the preceding ὑπό.

ἔστω . See cr. n. I formerly read ἴτω with A^{1} and the majority of editors, but I now agree with Schneider that ἔστω is right. ἴτω cannot be used by itself as a synonym for ‘live,’ or as a copula: we should require ἴτω διὰ βίου, instead of ἴτω μέχρι θανάτου (to transpose the two phrases would of course be too violent a change). The sole authority for ἴτω is the first hand in A: and this is certainly insufficient to outweigh the inherent superiority of ἔστω. Most MSS have ἤτω, a late form for ἔστω.

ἐκκαθαίρεις : not ‘polish up’ (J. and C.) but rather ‘scour clean’ (D. and V.), ‘purge’ from all extraneous matter: see 361 C γυμνωτέος δὴ πάντων πλὴν δικαιοσύνης.

ἀγροικοτέρως is said with reference to the exaggeration and coarseness of the description: cf. 32 D, 509 A.

δεδήσεται : ‘will be kept in chains.’ δεθήσεται (so v and some other MSS) is required by Herwerden, and may be right. But in Xen. IV 3. 18 δεδήσομαι is similarly combined with several first futures.

ἐκκαυθήσεται κτλ. Schneider refers to Hdt. VII 18 θερμοῖσι σιδηρίοισι ἐκκαίειν—τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, and 473 C ἐὰν—στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκάηται. That ἐκκαυθήσεται (and not ἐκκοπήσεται, the reading of some inferior MSS, and of the ancient authorities who cite this passage) is right here, is probable also from X 613 E ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι ἀληθῆ λέγων, εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθήσονται, whether the last clause is genuine or not. It is not clear that Cicero (de Rep. III 27) did not find ἐκκαυθήσεται in his text; for though he has effodiantur oculi, he adds afterwards vinciatur, uratur. Herwerden recasts the words of Plato to suit Cicero's translation, but Cicero is a much less trustworthy witness than Paris A.

ἄρα : see on 358 C. τῷ ὄντι in the same line belongs not to φήσουσι, but to τὸν ἄδικον—ἐθέλειν.

βαθεῖαν κτλ. : “reaping in his thoughts the fruit of the deep furrow, from which good counsel grows” (Verrall). Plato takes τὰ κεδνὰ βουλεύματα more concretely, and places in apposition thereto ἄρχειν and the other infinitives down to ὠφελεῖσθαι, δοκοῦντι being the dative of interest after βλαστάνει. For the change from the dative δοκοῦντι to the accusative κερδαίνοντα cf. 5 A and infra IV 422 B, C.

κοινωνεῖν . Cobet deletes this word, as well as καὶ κοινωνήματα in 738 A πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ ξυμβόλαια καὶ κοινωνήματα. In view of the same passage Platt ( III p. 72) would read καὶ κοινωνεῖν. No change is necessary, for κοινωνεῖν is a term of wider connotation than ξυμβάλλειν (see I 333 A note), and the asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. III 407 B, V 465 C, VI 488 C, IX 590 A notes

πλεονεκτεῖν recalls I 343 D, E, 349 B ff., as τούς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν κτλ. recalls the theory attributed to Simonides in I 334 B. Here however it is not Justice, but Injustice masquerading as Justice, which is said to benefit friends and injure enemies.

μᾶλλον προσήκειν . The comparative is attached to the verb as well as to the adjective, so as to combine the force of two expressions, viz. (1) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλῆ αὐτὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν and (2) ὥστε καὶ θεοφιλέστερον αὐτὸν εἶναι προσήκειν. In cases like λαθραιότερον μᾶλλον 781 A, μᾶλλον is quite redundant: in 285 A ἔστι δέ γε—ὠφελιμώτερον—παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κτλ. it is resumptive. See on the whole subject Kühner II p. 25.

παρεσκευάσθαι ‐‐ ἄμεινον . For ἄμεινον Richards would read ἀμείνον) or ἀμείνονα: cf. 358 C πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείνων ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος. The change is tempting at first sight; but Plato generally uses ἀμείνω and not ἀμείνονα, and the adverb expresses what is virtually the same meaning, since a βίος ἄμεινον παρεσκευασμένος (cf. πόλιν εὖ παρεσκευασμένην 751 B) is (according to the views here described) a βίος ἀμείνων. Hermann's χείρον) for χεῖρον in 85 B, though adopted by Schanz, is also unnecessary, for ἔχειν may be intransitive.

362C - 363E At this point Glauco gives way to Adimantus. Glauco had maintained the superiority of Injustice over Justice by directly praising Injustice: Adimantus will uphold the same thesis by describing the arguments usually advanced in favour of Justice. In the first place, when parents and friends exhort the young to follow Justice, they do not praise Justice herself, but the rewards which Justice earns from men and gods. Homer and Hesiod describe the benefits derived from Justice in this present life, while Musaeus and his son guarantee to her votaries sensual bliss hereafter, and others promise to the pious a long line of descendants, but relegate the wicked to punishment after death and unpopularity during life.

ἔφη . See cr. n. ἔφη is present in the majority of MSS, and cannot be dispensed with, where the interlocutor is specified, as here. See § 5.

ἀδελφὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη : frater adsit fratri. Ast proposed to insert ἂν before ἀνδρί, making the sentence interrogative. The rhythm would thus approximate to the usual paroemiac rhythm of proverbs: but the brevity and force of the proverb would suffer. If change were needed it would be better to adopt Shilleto's elegant suggestion ἀδελφεὸς ἀνδρὶ παρείη (note on Dem. § 262), but even if this was the original expression, it would be quite in Plato's manner to substitute the modern for the archaic word, in defiance of rhythm. The source of the proverb (with which compare συγγνώμη ἀδελφῷ βοηθεῖν § 264) is found by the Scholiast in XVI 97 f. ἤ τι κασιγνήτοις ἐπιμέμφεαι, οἷσί περ ἀνὴρ | μαρναμένοισι πέποιθε, καὶ εἰ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρηται. Cf. also XXI 308 f. and Xen. II 3. 19.

ἐναντίους . Adimantus' λόγοι are ἐναντίοι, because they praise Justice, and censure Injustice: whereas Glauco had done the reverse: κατατείνας ε<*>ρῶ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἐπαινῶν (358 D).

αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην . Not αὐτοδικαιοσύνην (with the second hand in A), which would be the (chiefly postPlatonic) expression for the Idea of Justice (cf. αὐτοάνθ ρωπος and the like). αὐτό is ipsum, ‘by itself,’ as in αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν: cf. 146 E γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὄ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν, and infra V 472 C, X 612 B (cited by J. and C.). αὐτό may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present, e.g. 361 A αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή: cf. also 411 D.

γίγνηται . The nominatives are treated as equivalent to a neuter plural, whence the singular verb. Cf. 188 B, 925 E, Andocides I 145. γίγνεσθαι is the verb in each of these examples. See also infra V 462 E.

τῷ δικαίῳ . Schneider is right in refusing to change the δικαίῳ of A, II and most MSS to ἀδίκῳ, which has the authority of a few inferior MSS. The reference in διῆλθεν ἄρτι is no doubt to 362 B, where the benefits accrue to the man who seems to be just, although in reality he is unjust. But ὄντα etc. should be taken, not with διῆλθεν, but as part of the parents' exhortation. This yields a better rhythm, and much better sense. The parents exhort their children to be just, in order that (ἵνα depends on χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι) they may obtain the rewards ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ. They very properly assume that the surest way to seem to be just (and so to obtain the rewards of justice) is to be just: cf. Xen. II 6. 39 συντομωτάτη τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη καὶ καλλίστη ὁδὸς—ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν πειρᾶσθαι and ib. I 7. 1 with Heracl. 137 ed. Bywater συντομωτάτην ὁδὸν—εἰς εὐδοξίαν τὸ γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν. Glauco's picture of the just man as one who seems to be unjust is untrue to the facts of experience, as Socrates points out in X 612 D: nor did even Glauco go so far as to say that the unjust man, qua unjust, ηὐδοκίμει, but only ὁ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι (who may, of course, be unjust). The divorce between appearance and reality is purely argumentative, and out of place in parental exhortations. Further, in order to make ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα etc. represent what Glauco said, we should have to read τῷ ἀδίκῳ μὲν δοκοῦντι δὲ δικαίῳ: otherwise the words δοξαζομένων δὲ ἀδίκων in the corresponding phrase (363 E) might just as well be omitted. If ὄντα is construed with διῆλθεν, the words τῷ δικαίῳ must (with Ast) be expunged: but that the clause represents what the parents say is further proved by the exact correspondence of ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ὄντα τῷ δικαίῳ with τὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῆς (sc. δικαιοσύνης ) εὐδοκιμήσεις, which is what the parents praise. I have dwelt on this point at some length because recent English editors (except Tucker) have wrongly deserted Paris A.

τοῖς ὁσίοις depends on ἀγαθά (‘good things for the pious’): cf. ἀγαθὰ διῆλθε τῷ τοῦ ἀδίκου I 348 A note This is much simpler than to punctuate ἀγαθά, τοῖς ο<*>σίοις ἅ as the other editors do. Such a postponement of the relative is rare, and here, I think, unduly harsh, in spite of the analogy of III 390 B and IV 425 C. Cobet felt the difficulty when in an unhappy moment he suggested ἀγαθά, ἃ τοῖς ὁσίοις κτλ.

Ἡσίοδός τε κτλ. Hesiod and Homer are appealed to as recognised theological authorities: see Hdt. II 53.

ἄκρας ‐‐ καταβεβρίθασι . 232 f. τοῖσι (i.e. ἰθυδίκῃσιν ἀνδράσι) φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν β<*>ον, οὔρεσι δὲ δρῦς | ἄκρη μέν τε φέρει βαλάνους, μέσση δὲ μελίσσας· | εἰροπόκοι δ’ ὄϊες μαλλοῖς καταβεβρίθασι. Further rewards of justice (ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθά) are enumerated in vv. 227—231, and 235—237. Many other illustrations in support of Plato's attack on Greek religion throughout this passage will be found in Nägelsbach's and passim.

ὥστε τευ ‐‐ ἰχθῦς . XIX 109 ff. The ἤ before βασιλῆος is difficult: apparently the author intended to give two comparisons, but dropped the second. We are hardly justified, I think, in abolishing the anacoluthon by reading (with Platt) ὥστέ τεο βασιλῆος or (with Ameis) ὥστε τευ ἦ.

Μουσαῖος κτλ. By Musaeus' son Plato probably means Eumolpus (cf. Suidas s. vv. Εὔμολπος and Μουσαῖος). In this section of the argument Plato directs his attack against certain forms of the Orphic conception of a future life: see Lobeck p. 807 with Rohde ^{2} II pp. 127, 129 notes, and Dieterich pp. 72 ff. 77 ff. notes Lobeck refers to Plut. 2 Πλάτων ἐπισκώπτει τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ὀρφέα τοῖς εὖ βεβιωκόσι φάσκοντας ἀποκεῖσθαι γέρας ἐν ᾅδου μέθην αἰώνιον and id. 1105 B, where the allusion to Plato is less clear: also D. L. VI 4.

συμπόσιον τῶν ὁσίων . ὅσιοι was the regular appellation of the μύσται (ὁσίους μύστας hymn. Orph. 84. 3 ed. Abel). For the συμπόσιον cf. [] 371 D συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ καὶ εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα δίαιτα. The stock example in antiquity of earthly virtue rewarded by the delights of a sensuous paradise is Heracles: see e.g. Pind. I 71, Theocr. XVII 28 f. and Horace III 3. 9 f., IV 8. 29 f. A somewhat higher note is struck in Pind. II 61 ff. and 129 f. Several of these passages shew traces of Orphic influence, but the special instance of Heracles is traceable to Homer ( XI 602 f.).

μέθην αἰώνιον may be illustrated from the fragment of Pherecrates ap. Athen. VI 268 E ff.

ἀποτίνουσιν . See cr. n. The reading of A is defended by Stallbaum as an abbreviation for μακροτέρους λόγους ἀποτείνουσι περὶ μισθῶν παρὰ θεῶν; but no other example of this harsh condensation has been adduced, and the sense is far from satisfactory. A better meaning is conveyed by Schneider's translation, “Andere aber lassen die Belohnungen der Götter noch weiter reichen als diese”: for it is clear from the next clause that μακροτέρους (‘more extensive,’ not, of course, ‘greater,’ which would be μείζους) refers to the extension of the rewards of virtue beyond the personality of the individual concerned. But μακροτέρους ἀποτείνουσιν μισθούς is (to say the least) an obscure and difficult expression; and ἀποτίνουσιν (i.q. λέγουσιν ἀποτίνεσθαι) receives strong support from the parallel use of διδόασιν in C above, and κατορύττουσιν, ἀναγκάζουσι, and ἄγοντες below. The collocation of μακροτέρους with ἀποτίνουσι may easily have led to the corruption ἀποτείνουσι, owing to the frequency of such expressions as μακροὺς λόγους ἀποτείνειν. For the error see § 5.

παῖδας ‐‐ κατόπισθεν . The Scholiast remarks ἐξ Ἡροδότου (VI 86) ἀπὸ τοῦ δοθέντος χρησμοῦ Γλαύκῳ τῷ Λάκωνι ὡς Ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων. The story of Glaucus admirably illustrates the view herein expressed; but Plato is more probably thinking of Hesiod 285 (a line which is identical with that quoted from the oracle), and also perhaps of some such lines as those of Tyrtaeus 12. 29 f. καὶ τύμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρίσημοι | καὶ παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω.

εἰς πηλόν τινα κατορύττουσιν . τινα is contemptuous: ‘something which they call mud’: cf. 372 B infra and 210 D (ἀνθρώπου τινός). The ‘mud’ is Orphic: see Abel p. 247 and cf. 69 C, VII 533 D, and the σκῶρ ἀείνων of Ar. 146, with Blaydes' note. See also Rohde ^{2} I p. 313 note and Dieterich pp. 82 f. The employment of the Danaid legend in Orphic teaching is illustrated by 493 B: cf. also Dieterich pp. 69 f., 75.

δοξαζομένων δέ . For δέ without μέν see I 340 D note

ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν : sc. λέγειν τιμωρήματα. Adimantus means that they dissuade men from injustice merely on account of its results, ignoring τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (358 B). J. and C. aptly cite 176 D, E ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ’ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, viz. “that by their wicked acts they become like the pattern of evil.”

363E - 365A Secondly (continues Adimantus), both by poets and in private life virtue is called honourable but difficult, vice easy, and disgraceful only by convention. Injustice, men say, is in general the best policy: they admire the vicious rich, and despise the virtuous poor. Strangest of all, the gods themselves are said to be sometimes kind to the wicked, and unkind to the good; and seers profess to have power from the gods to atone for unjust dealing by pleasurable rites, and undertake to damage enemies for a trifling expenditure of money. In support of such teaching they quote the poets, Hesiod for example, and Homer. There are likewise books containing sacrificial formulae, by the use of which men are persuaded that their sins may be pardoned both in life and after death.

ff. The phase of Greek religious life here censured is illustrated by Dieterich pp. 81 f. and Rohde ^{2} II 74 ff.: cf. also Lobeck pp. 643 ff.

ἰδίᾳ has been understood of writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons, e.g. parents, etc.)(to poets, who were in a sense the professional teachers of Hellas: cf. X 606 C, 890 A ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν, and 366 E below.

καλὸν μὲν ‐‐ ἐπίπονον . See cr. n. For the omission of τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη see § 5. The sentiment may be illustrated by Hesiod 289—292 and Simon. ap. Pl. 339 B ff. ἄνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν κτλ.; cf. also Simonides' imitation of Hesiod ( 58 ed. Bergk).

ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος : i.q. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. So also 275 B. The sentiment recurs in Isocr. de Pace § 31.

πονηρούς is the substantive, and ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἔχοντας balances πλουσίους. πλούτους, parallel to ἄλλας δυνάμεις, and also dependent on ἔχοντας, might appear neater. But there is no reason for deserting the MSS, although Plato is fond of the plural of πλοῦτος (cf. e.g. VI 495 A, X 618 B, 619 A). The sentiment is best illustrated from Polus's description of the happiness of Archelaus in 471 A ff.

ὡς ἄρα ‐‐ μοῖραν . ἄρα hints dissent: cf. 358 C note The gnomic poets often express themselves in this vein: e.g. Solon 15. 1 πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεῦσι κακοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται, Theogn. 373— 380. A kindred sentiment occurs in Sophocles 447—452. For the most part however it is held that Justice asserts herself in the end: see for example Solon 4. 15 f., 13. 7—32. Euripides expresses the general teaching of Greek tragedy on this subject when he writes ( 1621 f.) ἐς τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀξίων, | οἱ κακοὶ δ’ , ὥσπερ πεφύκασ’ , οὔποτ’ εὖ πράξειαν ἄν. There is no occasion to write (with Richards) πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς.

ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἰόντες . This semi-proverbial expression (cf. VI 489 B, C) stigmatises the avarice of seers and mendicant priests (ἀγύρται from ἀγείρω, cf. infra 381 D). Plato's contempt for μαντική in general is expressed in the and sporadically in various dialogues (see e.g. 71 E, with Archer-Hind's note); but his attack is here particularly directed (cf. infra 364 E) against such Ὀρφεοτελεσταί or Orphic friars as Theophrastus speaks of in his description of the δεισι‐ δαίμων ( 16) καὶ τελεσθησόμενος πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοτελεστὰς κατὰ μῆνα πορεύεσθαι μετὰ τῆς γυναικός, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σχολάζῃ ἡ γυνή, μετὰ τῆς τίτθης καὶ τῶν παιδίων. The kind of ceremonies which they practised may be seen from Dem. de Cor. §§ 258 ff. Plato agreed with the more enlightened section of his countrymen in condemning such degrading cults and superstitions on the ground of their immoral tendency: see especially Foucart des Assoc. religieuses chez les Grecs pp. 153 —157, where the opinions of ancient writers on this subject are collected. On ἀγύρται in general reference may be made to J. H. Wright in VI p. 66 note

ἐάν τε ‐‐ βλάψειν is in oratio obliqua: ‘et si quis inimicum laedere velit, nocituros se parvo sumptu iusto pariter et iniusto’ (Schneider p. 11). This explanation (which Tucker also proposes without knowing that Schneider had forestalled him) is by far the best and simplest. For other views see App. III.

ἐπαγωγαῖς ‐‐ καταδέσμοις . ἐπαγωγαί are ἀγωγαὶ δαίμονος φαύλου ἐπί τινα γενόμεναι (Timaeus s.v.). The datives are usually construed with πείθοντες, and καταδέσμοις understood as the binding formulae “by which the seer compels the invisible powers to work his will” (Rohde ^{2} II p. 88 note). But in the κατάδεσμοι which have been discovered it is the victim and not the god who is bound down; see e.g. CIG 538 (an Athenian inscription of about 380 B.C.)—καταδῶ Κτησίαν—καὶ Κλεοφράδην καταδῶ—καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Κτησίου ἅπαντας καταδῶ. This and other instances from leaden tablets found in graves are given by Wachsmuth XVIII (1863) pp. 560 ff.: cf. also Marquardt Röm. Staatsverwaltung III p. 109 note 6. On this account I think it better to connect ἐπαγωγαῖς τισὶν καὶ καταδέσμοις with βλάψειν, exactly as in 933 D ἐὰν δὲ καταδέσεσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἤ τισιν ἐπῳδαῖς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων φαρυακειῶν ὡντινωνοῦν δόξῃ ὅμοιος εἶναι βλάπτοντι—τεθνάτω. Plato is still alluding to the debasing forms of oriental superstition which had gained a footing in Greece in his day: see Foucart l. c. p. 172.

θεοὺς ‐‐ σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν : whereas true religion consists in man's ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς 13 D ff.

οἱ μὲν κτλ. : ‘some declaiming about the easiness of vice, how that’ etc. οἱ μὲν—ᾄδοντες recalls 364 A, while οἱ δέ refers to the ἀγύρται καὶ μάντεις of 364 B. The reference in the first case is as precise as possible: πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον· ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρόν (364 A). Those who ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς—ἀκολασία—καὶ ἀδικία—εὐπετὲς κτήσασθαι can be accurately described as κακίας περὶ εὐπετείας ᾄδοντες, but scarcely by οἱ κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες, because ‘to offer facilities for vice’ is not the same thing as to say that vice is easy. Stallbaum attempts to evade this difficulty by taking διδόντες as equivalent to διδόσθαι λέγοντες, but neither is ‘saying that facilities are offered for vice’ quite the same as ‘saying that vice is easy.’ It is also difficult to find another instance of the plural of εὐπέτεια. The verbal echoes seem to me very strongly in favour of περὶ—ᾄδοντες. For ᾄδοντες=‘harping on’ (like the ὑμνοῦσιν to which it refers) cf. 205 C ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει and 205 D ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι (with reference to the proverbial γραῶν ὕθλος): the use of ᾄδειν in 854 C is different, but akin. For the corruption of ᾄδοντες to διδόντες see § 5. The conjectures of Liebhold ( 1888 p. 107) and Zeller ( II p. 694) κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διελθόντες and κακίας πέρι εὐπέτειαν διδόντας have little in their favour.

, D 20 ὡς τὴν ‐‐ ἔθηκαν . Hesiod 287—289. ὡς is due to Plato: Hesiod has τὴν μέν τοι κτλ. For λείη the MSS of Hesiod read ὀλίγη: λείη (also in 718 E, Xen. II 1. 20 and elsewhere) proves the existence of a different recension. Cf. G. E. Howes VI p. 165. The verses are partially quoted or referred to again in 718 E, 340 D; their influence is also seen in 272 C.

καί τινα ὁδὸν κτλ. : Hesiod 290 μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν | καὶ τρηχὺς κτλ. The last two words account for the marginal addition καὶ τραχεῖαν in A.

, E 26 λιστοὶ ‐‐ ἁμάρτῃ . See cr. n. The words are spoken by Phoenix to Achilles in IX 497—501. Plato edits the lines to suit his own purposes. For λιστοί our text of Homer has στρεπτοί. The word λιστοί (though implied in ἄλλιστος, τρίλλιστος) does not occur elsewhere, a fact which is strongly in favour of its genuineness here. We must suppose that the recension which Plato used had λιστοί. The theology contained in these lines meets us continually in ancient literature: cf. also the words of the king in III 3 “And what's in prayer but this twofold force To be forestalled ere we come to fall Or pardoned being down?” Plato expresses his dissent in 716 E ff., 905 D: in II 149 E we read οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἶον κακὸν τοκιστήν.

βίβλων ‐‐ ἐγγόνων . The allusion is to Orphic liturgies. Musaeus was the son of Selene, according to Philochorus quoted by the Scholiast on Ar. 1033: cf. φαεσφόρου ἔκγονε Μήνης | Μουσαῖε in Abel 4. Orpheus' mother was the Muse Calliope (Suidas s.v. Ὀρφεύς). There is no solid basis for the old view that ἔκγονος means ‘son,’ and ἔγγονος ‘grandson.’ The etymological form is ἔκγονος, but ἐκ‐ was often assimilated to ἐγ‐ before γ during the 4th century B.C., particularly in this word: cf. also ἐγγειτόνων etc. on Inscriptions. See Meisterhans^{3} p. 107. Elsewhere in the ἔκγονος is the regular spelling.

καθ’ ἃς θυηπολοῦσιν : sacrificial liturgies. A θυηπολικόν is mentioned by Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφεύς) as one of the ‘works’ of Orpheus: see also Lobeck p. 371 and Rohde ^{2} II pp. 112, 113 notes

πόλεις : as for instance when Epimenides the Cretan purified Athens (see Grote III 85—89). Plato may be thinking of this event, which in defiance of chronology he placed ten years before the Persian wars ( 642 D, E). Cf. also infra 366 A and 909 B.

λύσεις ‐‐ καθαρμοί . λύσεις means ‘modes of absolution’ (Lobeck p. 810): cf. 366 A οἱ λύσιοι θεοί and Arist. B 4 1262^{a} 32 τὰς νομιζομένας λύσεις. The Scholium on Ar. 1033 contains the remark: οὗτος (i.e. Musaeus) δὲ παραλύσεις καὶ τελετὰς καὶ καθαρμοὺς συντέθεικεν. For παραλύσεις Blaydes proposes λύσεις, while Rutherford reads περὶ λύσεις (apparently with the Ravenna Codex), inserting also on his own conjecture ποιήματα after συντέθεικεν. I have no doubt that the Scholiast wrote παρὰ λύσεις: ‘besides Absolutions, he has composed also τελεταί and καθαρμοί.’ καθαρμοί formed a distinct class of religious literature, and were written by Epimenides, Empedocles, and others: see Grote I p. 27 note 3.

παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν : ‘pleasures of play.’ παιδιᾶς depends on ἡδονῶν, and is here used abstractly: cf. Thuc. III 38. 7 ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ and (with Schneider) Paus. I 21. 7 θέας ἡδονήν. Madvig would eject ἡδονῶν, but without ἡδονῶν Plato would probably have written παιδιῶν (cf. 829 B): other suggestions, such as καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιᾶς διὰ ἡδονῶν, or καὶ παιδιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν are open to graver objection. For παίζειν and the like in connexion with religious celebrations Stallbaum cites Hdt. IX 11 Ὑακίνθιά τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε and VIII 99 ἐν θυσίῃσί τε καὶ εὐπαθείῃσι: add 276 B, 666 B. Plato's point is that atonement if it is made a pleasure and not a penance sets a premium on sin.

τελευτήσασιν ‐‐ τελετάς . The Orpheotelestae connected τελεταί with τελευτᾶν, sometimes on the ground assigned by Plato here, sometimes because they alleged that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the great mysteries (Plut. 725). This and other ancient derivations are given by Lobeck pp. 124, 126, 172. For περιμένει Cobet needlessly conjectures περιμένειν.

365A - 367E Finally, what is the effect on the souls of the young? Young men of ability are encouraged to practise Injustice, while outwardly pretending to be just. To escape detection by their fellow-men, they form political clubs, and employ persuasion and force. The gods they can afford to ignore; for either there are no gods, or they regard not man, or— according to those who are the sole authorities for their existence—they can be propitiated out of the proceeds of Injustice. There are special rites and gods who can deliver us from punishment after death: so the gods' own children say. So strong are the arguments in favour of Injustice that even those who can refute them make allowances, recognising that no one is voluntarily just except from innate goodness of disposition or scientific knowledge.

It rests with you, Socrates (says Adimantus), now for the first time to praise Justice and censure Injustice in and by themselves, apart from their accessories. Nay more; you must assign to each the reputation which is enjoyed by the other. Do not merely shew us that Justice is better than Injustice; tell us what effect they severally produce on their possessors, in consequence of which the one is good, and the other evil.

τιμῆς i. q. τοῦ τιμᾶν. Cf. (with J. and C.) 359 C above.

τί ‐‐ ποιεῖν . The subject to ποιεῖν is ταῦτα πάντα—λεγόμενα: ψυχάς is its secondary object. Cf. infra 367 B τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα κτλ. and 367 E. This view, which Schneider also holds, is better than to make ψυχάς subject to ποιεῖν and ταῦτα πάντα κτλ. dependent on ἀκουούσας.

ἐπιπτόμενοι . The image, as Jowett remarks, suggests a bee gathering honey: cf. 534 B λέγουσι γὰρ—οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, Simon. 47 ὁμιλεῖ δ’ ἄνθεσιν (viz. the poet) ὧτε μέλισσα ξανθὸν μέλι κηδομένα and Pind. X 53 f.

πότερον δίκᾳ ‐‐ ἀναβάς . The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk ( 213) Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον | ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβαίνῃ | ἐπιχθονίων γένος ἀνδρῶν | δίχα μοι νόος ἀτρέκειαν εἰπεῖν. It is, I think, unlikely that θεσπέσιος βίος and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας below “si non a Pindaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt” (Bergk).

ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Dobree and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with ταῦτα πάντα— λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just (ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that Justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὐδοκιμήσεις (363 A) are: see 358 C, E, 360 C (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδιᾳ ὄντος), 362 A (οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν). The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean ‘if I also seem unjust,’ for οὐ δοκῶ δίκαιος εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὐ δίκαιος εἶναι, is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκεῖν prevails over εἶναι in human life (οὐκοῦν—βιᾶται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 E): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, C): therefore δοκεῖν is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦτο τρεπτέον ὅλως.

φασιν . Is τὰ λεγόμενα the subject? or is the sentence an anacoluthon? (“nam quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dicuntur, talia sunt, ut iusto mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur” Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt III p. 40.

οἱ σοφοί . Simonides (σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνήρ I 331 E) 76 Bergk. Plato himself sets no small store by a good name (coupled with virtue) in 950 C.

πρόθυρα ‐‐ σχῆμα : ‘as my porch and trappings.’ The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic: cf. VII 527 D note With σχῆμα (any kind of external or adventitious means of impressing others or hiding one's own deficiencies) cf. 511 E περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι.

σκιαγραφίαν (‘perspective drawing’ VII 523 B, X 602 D) with its cognate words is continually used by Plato of things unreal, counterfeit, illusory: cf. infra IX 583 B note, 586 B al., and Wohlrab on 208 E.

τοῦ σοφωτάτου κτλ. Archilochus seems to have canonized the fox as the embodiment of cunning in Greek literature: fragments are preserved of at least two fables of his in which the fox appears (86—88 and 89 ed. Bergk). In the second (89. 5, 6) occur the lines τῷ δ) (sc. πιθήκῳ) ἆρ’ ἀλώπηξ κερδαλέη συνήντετο | πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον. The κερδαλέαν καὶ ποικίλην of Plato corresponds in meaning to κερδαλέη—πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον, and may have ended one of the iambics in this or another Archilochean fable: it is at all events clear that they are from Archilochus. ‘The crafty and subtle fox of Archilochus’ means simply ‘the crafty and subtle fox of which Archilochus speaks’: the rest of the imagery is due to Plato. With the general sentiment cf. St Matth. vii 15 ἔρχονται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ἐνδύμασι προβάτων (this is the σκιαγραφία ἀρετῆς), ἔσωθεν δέ εἰσιν λύκοι ἅρπαγες: with ἑλκτέον ἐξόπισθεν (opposed to πρόθυρα μὲν καὶσχῆμα) Milton 358— 360 “Why are his gifts desirable, to tempt Our earnest prayers, then, given with solemn hand As graces, draw a scorpion's tail behind?” Unnecessary difficulty has been caused by an erroneous gloss of Timaeus (τὴν ἀλωπεκῆν· τὴν πανουργίαν), which seems to imply that he read ἀλωπεκῆν ‘fox's skin’ for ἀλώπεκα in this passage. Ruhnken (followed by Ast and Stallbaum) while retaining ἀλώπεκα explained it of the fox's skin; but it would be pointless to ‘drag behind a fox's skin.’ With ἀλώπεκα—‘fox’ for ‘foxiness’—cf. infra 382 D ποιητὴς—ψευδὴς ἐν θεῷ οὐκ ἔνι , 77 E, and the well-known “astutam vapido servas sub pectore vulpem” Persius V 117.

ἀλλὰ γάρ ‘at enim,’ like ἀλλὰ δή (infra D, X 600 A al.), introduces an objection: cf. infra 366 A al.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ‐‐ μεγάλων : an audacious application of the proverb χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά .

ὡς ‐‐ φέρει . For ὡς we might expect ᾗ (Ficinus has quâ). ταύτῃ must be taken as referring to what precedes, though further explained by ὡς—φέρει. ἴχνη and φέρει shew that the metaphor is still the ὁδὸς βίου. The words ἴχνη φέρει may be from Archilochus. For the sentiment cf. III 394 D.

ξυνωμοσίας ‐‐ ἑταιρίας . An allusion to the political life of Athens: cf. 36 B, 173 D, Thuc. VIII 54 ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς. In the , Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πειθοῦς διδάσκαλοι mentioned presently are the Sophists.

ὡς for ὥστε (except in idiomatic phrases like ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὥς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν) is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon (e.g. I 2. 8, V 2. 5, VI 4. 16, VIII 5. 1 and 7. 27), but almost unexampled in Plato. The (330 E) furnishes an instance with οὕτως preceding (cf. Xen. IV 2. 13 ). ὡς in 108 E is perhaps to be explained in the same way: cf. also II 141 B and 213 B παραχωρῆσαι γὰρ τὸν Σωκράτη ὡς ἐκεῖνον καθίζειν. See also on ὡς δή in I 337 C. As βιάζομαι can be followed by the simple infinitive, it might seem preferable to connect ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες as a participial explanatory clause either with βιασόμεθα or with δίκην μὴ διδόναι (‘not to be punished for aggrandisement’); but the first alternative gives a wrong sense to πλεονεκτοῦντες, and the second involves too harsh an inversion.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. Cf. 885 B θεοὺς ἡγούμενος εἰναι κατὰ νόμους οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔτε ἔργον ἀσεβὲς εἰργάσατο ἑκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφῆκεν ἄνομον, ἀλλὰ ἓν δή τι τῶν τριῶν πάσχων, ἢ τοῦτο ὅπερ εἶπον οὐχ ἡγούμενος, ἢ τὸ δεύτερον ὄντας οὐ φροντίζειν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τρίτον εὐπαραμυθήτους εἶναι θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς παραγομένους. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in 886 A—899 D, 899 D— 905 D, 905 D—907 B. It is clear both from this passage and from the that the air was full of such heresies in Plato's day. The first was doubtless fostered by the sceptical attitude of Protagoras—περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι οὔθ’ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν (ap. D. L. IX 51): for the second cf. Aesch. 369—372 οὐκ ἔφα τις | θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν | ὅσοις ἀθίκτων χάρις | πατοῖθ’ · ὁ δ’ οὐκ εὐσεβής: the third—the most pernicious of all, according to Plato 948 C—furnished the raison d'être of a degenerate priesthood.

τί καὶ ἡμῖν κτλ. ‘If the gods do not care for us, why should we in our turn (καί) care’ etc. For the text see cr. n. and App. III.

ἀκηκόαμεν ‐‐ ποιητῶν . The first ἤ is ‘or’ and the second ‘than.’ In λόγων Plato may be thinking inter alia of the works of early λογογράφοι like Pherecydes, who wrote genealogies of gods and heroes in prose; but there is no occasion to change λόγων into λογίων with Muretus. γενεαλογησάντων ποιητῶν refers to Homer and the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies.

θυσίαις ‐‐ ἀγανῇσιν : see 364 D.

ἀπό : ‘from the proceeds of.’ Cf. 906 C, D τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν τὸν λέγοντα ὡς εἰσὶ συγγνώμονες ἀεὶ θεοὶ τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκοις καὶ ἀδικοῦσιν, ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμῃ, καθάπερ κυσὶ λύκοι τῶν ἁρπασμάτων σμικρὰ ἀπονέμοιεν, οἱ δὲ ἡμερούμενοι τοῖς δώροις συγχωροῖεν τὰ ποίμνια διαρπάζειν.

ὑπερβαίνοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες are subordinate to λισσόμενοι: “by praying when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them,” etc. There is again a reference to λισσόμενοι ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβήῃ καὶ ἁμάρτῃ quoted in 364 E. The position of the participles is justified by the allusion to this line.

ἢ ‐‐ ἤ . It was a common Greek belief that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children: see the passages cited by Nägelsbach pp. 34 ff. If we take Plato at his word, Adimantus represents this vicarious punishment as extending even to the other world.

ἢ παῖδες παίδων . Baiter conjectures <ἢ παῖδες> ἢ παῖδες παίδων, and so I formerly printed. But παῖδες παίδων means little more than ‘descendants’ (cf. 927 B), and the text may stand. Similarly in Ruskin Ch. 1 “all those labours which men have given their lives and their sons' sons' lives to complete.”

ὦ φίλε ‐‐ λογιζόμενος . ὦ φίλε is the objector who urges ἀλλὰ γὰρ—παίδων. In φήσει Plato recurs to the singular of 365 B λέγοι γὰρ ἂν κτλ. λογιζόμενος is not ‘reasoning,’ but ‘making his calculation,’ ‘calculos subducens’: such a man's morality is nothing but a balancing of profit and loss. Hermann's devotion to Paris A led him to conjecture ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἰ τελεταί rather than admit a simple case of omission arising from homoioteleuton: see cr. n. Vermehren proposes ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν αἱ νομιζόμεναι τελεταί ( p. 90), but we should certainly follow Π here. See also § 5.

λύσιοι : ‘givers of absolution’: cf. 364 E. Certain Chthonian deities of the Orphic theology are meant, such as Hecate, Demeter, Dionysus λύσιος or λυσεύς, and above all Ζεὺς μειλίχιος. See Lobeck p. 303.

θεῶν παῖδες : e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus (Σελήνης τε καὶ Μουσῶν ἔγγονοι 364 E). Madvig's rejection of οἵ (so also Ficinus) before ταῦτα in the last clause seriously impairs the rhythm of the sentence.

ἄκρων . ἄκρος was a fashionable expression to apply to the élite of any profession or art: cf. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, 292 E, supra 360 E, infra III 405 A, V 459 B.

ὡς δή τοι : see on I 337 C.

θείᾳ φύσει ‐‐ ἐπιστήμην . θείᾳ φύσει means a disposition which is good by divine grace or nature, not as the result of knowledge or compulsion. The virtue of such men is θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ ( 99 E): they are ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, αὐτοφυῶς, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθοί ( 642 C), resembling Wordsworth's “Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot, Who do thy work and know it not.” Cf. VI 493 A note ἐπιστήμην is scientific knowledge of the good in the Socratic, not yet in the Platonic, sense.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν δίκαιος gives the lie to the Socratic οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν ἄδικος: cf. 360 C. For ἀνανδρίας below see on 359 B.

ἡρώων . J. and C. think “Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes.” It is simpler to understand the expression of Orpheus, Musaeus, and other θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι: see 366 B note So also Dreinhöfer Plato's Schrift üb. d. Staat nach Disposition u. Inhalt p. 2 note 16.

ἄλλως ἤ . Praise of the δόξαι of Justice is somewhat inaccurately spoken of as praise of justice itself: but it is unnecessary to insert διά (with Richards) before δόξας. Cf. 367 D τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀποδεχοίμην ἂν οὕτως ἐπαινούντων δικαιοσύνην καὶ ψεγόντων ἀδικίαν, δόξας τε περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μισθοὺς ἐγκωμιαζόντων καὶ λοιδορούντων.

ἰδίοις : see on 363 E.

ἀλλ) αὐτὸς ‐‐ ξύνοικος ᾖ . This thesis is developed and elaborated in 472 D—481 B.

ὑπέρ is here little if anything more than περί, cf. 777 A ὑπὲρ τοῦ Διὸς ἀγορεύων. This usage, which appears on Inscriptions after 300 B.C. (Meisterhans^{3} p. 222), is very rare in Plato. It occurs occasionally in the Attic orators, especially with λέγειν, and is tolerably common in Polybius and later Greek: see Stephanus-Hase s. v. ὑπέρ and Jannaris § 1685. I do not think we are justified in translating (with Tucker) ‘on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.’

κατατείνας : 358 D note

ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν : I 343 C note

ὡμολόγησας : 358 A.

πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον . The sequence of δέ after τε is frequent in Plato with δὲ καί, εἰ δὲ βούλει, τί δέ, ἔτι δέ, μέγιστον δέ, τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον and the like. For a classified list of examples see Hoefer de part. Plat. pp. 15—17.

ἀκούειν is added to Glauco's list (357 C) by Adimantus, who is also responsible for the exaggeration πολὺ μᾶλλον.

καὶ ‐‐ δή with ὑγιαίνειν marks it as different in kind from the other examples: cf. (with J. and C.) 87 E καὶ πλοῦτος δή and infra 373 A.

γόνιμα : i.q. γνήσια, but more forcible: cf. 151 E, Ar. 96.

καὶ ἀδικία βλάπτει . The sense is: καὶ ψέγε τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἀδικίας ὃ αὐτὴ δἰ αὑτὴν τὸν ἔχοντα βλάπτει. Hartman would cancel the words, needlessly, although the zeugma is bolder than usual. For the stylistic effect cf. ἀδικία δ’ ἐπαινεῖται 358 A above.

ἀποδεχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην are equally good Greek (cf. 339 D, 92 A, E al.), but as ἀπο‐ is supported by both Α and Π, it is more probable that the error lies in ‐σχοίμην than in ἀπο‐, especially as ἀποδεχοίμην is found also in the margin of A. The ἀπο‐ is at least as old as the Scholium, which mentions the two readings ἀποσχοίμην and ἀνασχοίμην. The latter is an obvious correction of ἀποσχοίμην, and has survived in Ξ and a few inferior MSS besides.

367E - 369B In a short interlude Socrates, after complimenting Glauco and Adimantus, remarks on the magnitude of the task before him—none other than the defence of Justice against her slanderers. As the weak-sighted are better able to recognise small letters at a distance if they have previously studied the same letters on a larger scale and on an ampler ground, so (says Socrates) let us first study Justice in magno, that is, in a state, and afterwards look for her lineaments in parvo, in other words, in the Individual. The contemplation of a State in process of creation will shew us Justice and Injustice coming into existence.

ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός . This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. 36 D, where Protarchus is addressed in the words ὦ παῖ ἐκείνου τἀνδρός. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has bequeathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appears from 11 A, B, 11 C δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν, 12 A, 16 B, 19 A: cf. also 15 C and 28 B. In precisely the same way Glauco and Adimantus are the ‘children of Thrasymachus.’ They are διάδοχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 A, 358 B (ἐπανανεώσομαι τὸν Θρασυμάχου λόγον), 367 A and 367 C, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 E), so Glauco and Adimantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός of Thrasymachus, Stallbaum is therefore not “ridiculous” (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in X p. 237.

ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής may be Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed; but there is no evidence in support of the conjecture: see Bergk ^{4} II p. 283.

τὴν Μεγαροῖ μάχην : perhaps in 409 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XIII 65. If so, Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, supposing that the scene of the dialogue is laid in 410. See § 3.

παῖδες ‐‐ ἀνδρός . By Ἀρίστωνος, the author of the line of course meant Aristo, father of Glauco and Adimantus; but Ἀρίστων suggests ἄριστος (cf. IX 580 B) and the pun conveys a friendly, if halfironical, compliment to ‘his excellency’ Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the argument is concerned) Glauco and his brother are: see on ὦ παῖδες above. In 174 B, when inviting Aristodemus to come as an uninvited guest to sup with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a similarly playful pun: ἕπου τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν διαφθείρωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν αὐτόματοι ἀγαθοί. (The διαφθορά consists in the substitution of ἀγαθῶν for δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which Plato had in view being αὐτόματοι δ’ ἀγαθοὶ δειλῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν, as the Scholiast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to read Ἀγάθων) i.e. Ἀγάθωνι for ἀγαθῶν: see X p. 238.) Other plays on proper names in Plato are collected by Riddell pp. 250 f. In κλεινοῦ Stallbaum finds a ‘lusus facetus’ on ἐκείνου; but this particular lusus (if it exists) is accidental and unmeaning.

θεῖον . The addition of τι (proposed by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III 388 D note θεῖος is here used, like ἔνθεος, of inspiration: if the speaker does not understand or believe what he says, he is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: cf. 245 A, 533 E, 535 E— 536 D.

τί τέ ἐστιν ‐‐ ἔχει recalls the conclusion of Book I (354 B, C).

οἵανπερ ἂν sc. ἐποιησάμεθα, the verb being omitted as it frequently is with ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ.

ἕρμαιον ‐‐ τυγχάνει . I have followed Schneider in printing a colon before ἕρμαιον: for the sentence ἕρμαιον— τυγχάνει is not the grammatical apodosis to the εἰ clause, but a further result. The asyndeton with ἕρμαιον is the usual asyndeton of ampliative clauses. For the principle underlying the method of inquiry here enunciated, see 218 C ὅσα δ’ αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δέδοκται πᾶσι καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς καὶ ῥᾴοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις and 286 A. (Contrast 48 B, where the opposite course is recommended.) In the special case of the State versus the Individual, the words ἐν σμικροῖς, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν are not applicable, but ἐν ῥᾴοσιν πρότερον δεῖ μελετᾶν is the essential part of the principle, and Justice in the State is ῥᾴων καταμαθεῖν (368 E) than in the Individual. Cf. also infra 377 C ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν—μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους. Illustrations from letters are tolerably frequent in Plato: cf. e.g. IV 402 A f., 205 D—206 A, 277 E ff.

33—369 A 3 πρῶτον ‐‐ ἐπισκοποῦντες lays down the method to be pursued in the rest of the treatise, except in books V—VII, which are professedly a ‘digression,’ and X, which is of the nature of an epilogue. At each suc cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato reminds us more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 E; in connexion with the φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις 372 E; before entering on the theory of education 376 C, D and again in III 392 C, when he has finished the treatment of λόγοι; at Adimantus' objection IV 420 B, C; at the end of the picture of the just state IV 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual IV 434 D ff.; at V 472 B ff., where the question is raised ‘Is this State possible?’; on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 B; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 577 C.

τὴν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοιότητα . Justice in the State is in fact to be used as a means of explaining Justice in the Individual, which is after all the real Justice: cf. IV 443 B ff. notes The relation between the two is that of a παράδειγμα and that which the παράδειγμα is intended to explain: see 278 C οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειλήφαμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ) ἐστὶ τότε γένεσις, ὁπόταν ὂν ταὐτὸν ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ, δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφω μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελῇ; Φαίνεται. Plato has been severely blamed (as e.g. by Grote III pp. 123 ff.) for representing the Commonwealth as the Individual “writ large.” Plato, however, laid stress upon this view, as tending to cement the union between the citizen and the State, which was rapidly dissolving in his day. This is well brought out by Krohn p. 5. Cf. also Pöhlmann etc. pp. 146 ff.

εἰ γιγνομένην ‐‐ ἀδικίαν . This would lead us to expect that we are to discover Justice and Injustice in the same State. In the sequel we find Justice only in the Ideal City: it is the degenerate Cities of VIII and IX that furnish the picture of Injustice. Plato does not expressly announce his change of plan till IV 420 B, C: ᾠήθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἂν εὑρεῖν δικαιοσύνην καὶ αὖ ἐν τῇ κάκιστα οἰκουμένῃ ἀδικίαν—νῦν μὲν οὖν—τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν—αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεψόμεθα. The discrepancy must, I think, be admitted (see Krohn p. 32, and Kunert die doppelte Recens. d. Pl. St. pp. 10 ff.), but such corrections and developments of plan are characteristic of the dialogue as a form of literature, and do not establish the theory of a double recension of the Cf. Grimmelt de reip. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 19, and Westerwick de Rep. Pl. pp. 43—45.

369B - 372D The First Sketch of a City-state.

A city is called into being by the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient. We may regard it as the union of many men mutually helping one another in one place. The individual gives and takes because he thinks it better for himself to do so.

Now man's first need is food, his second housing, his third clothing and the like. The smallest possible State will therefore consist of a farmer, a builder, a weaver and a shoemaker etc.—four or five men in all. Each of these must work for all, because Nature has adapted different men for different kinds of work, and because every kind of work has its critical moment when it must be done and cannot be neglected. Our principle is — One man, one work. We shall accordingly require carpenters and smiths to make instruments for the farmer, weaver, and shoemaker, as well as various kinds of herdsmen, to furnish cattle for ploughing and carrying, together with hides and fleeces for the makers of clothing. Since it is almost impossible to make the city self-supporting, we shall require middlemen to introduce imports; and as imports necessarily imply exports, the number of farmers and manufacturers in our city will increase, and we shall need travelling merchants to dispose of their produce. Owners of transport-ships will also be necessary, if there is traffic by sea.

Moreover, to facilitate exchange within the city, there must be a market, and coined money, and retail traders to act as middlemen between the producer and the consumer. The retail traders should be those who are physically unfit to engage in any other pursuit. There will also be hired labourers in our city.

Where then in such a commonwealth are Justice and Injustice? Along with which of the component parts of the State do they make their appearance? Adimantus suggests that we should look for them in the reciprocal intercourse of the various classes in the city. Let us see, says Socrates. The citizens will live the simple easy-going life of vegetarians, satisfying only the modest demands of their natural appetites. On a hint from Glauco, a few additional vegetarian luxuries are conceded.

γίγνεται ‐‐ πόλις κτλ. The present episode is ostensibly an historical account of the genesis of society, and from this point of view should be compared with III 676 A ff. Some of the features are derived from an analysis of the industrial basis of society as it exists in civilised times: others (see 372 B—D), are semi-mythical and idyllic, recalling pictures of the golden age such as we find in 269 C ff., and in the caricatures of the comedians (e.g. ap. Athen. VI 267 E ff.). But the prevailing atmosphere is not historical or legendary, but idealistic (note δεῖ in 369 E and elsewhere), and Plato's πρώτη πόλις (Arist. Δ 4. 1291^{a} 17) should primarily be regarded as—in its essential features—a preliminary and provisional description of the industrial foundation on which the higher parts of his own ideal city are to rest. Cf. also on 372 B, D, Rettig p. 42 and Steinhart p. 156.

τυγχάνει as a mere copula is very rare in Attic prose, and it would be easy here to insert ὤν after πολλῶν: see Porson on Eur. 782. In the Platonic dialogues this usage recurs in 263 C, 502 B, I 129 A, 133 A, 300 A, 918 C, 61 C, nor is it possible in the last three examples to account for its omission by lipography. The idiom occurs in Sophocles and Euripides, once in Aristophanes ( 1141), and (though condemned by Phrynichus) must also be admitted (though rarely) in prose: see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. (l.c.) and cf. Rutherford's p. 342.

πολλῶν ἐνδεής . In the account of the genesis of society given in the (676 A—680 E), more stress is laid on the social instinct of man: in 322 B ff the operating cause is man's defencelessness against wild beasts. Grote ( III p. 139 note) censures Plato for not mentioning the “reciprocal liability of injury” among the generative causes of civic life; but this (as well as assistance against external aggression) is hinted at in βοηθούς.

ἄλλος ‐‐ χρείᾳ . The words are short for ἄλλος ἄλλον, τὸν μὲν ἐπ’ ἄλλου, τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου χρείᾳ (for the omission of τὸν μέν cf. 330 A, 181 D al.): ‘one taking to himself one man, another another—the one man for one, the other for another purpose.’ Essentially the same meaning would no doubt be conveyed without τὸν δ’ ἐπ’ ἄλλου, which Herwerden following two inferior MSS would omit; but the fuller form of expression is chosen in order, I think, to prepare us for the principle of ‘One man, one work’ to be presently enunciated.

ταύτῃ τῇ ξυνοικίᾳ . Stallbaum rightly regards the sentence as an anaco luthon, the antecedent to ταύτῃ being the words from παραλαμβάνων to βοηθούς. If the subject to ἐθέμεθα (a gnomic aorist) were ἄλλος—δεόμενοι—ἀγείραντες, we should probably have had παραλαμβάνοντες for παραλαμβάνων: and besides, Plato is not yet describing the particular city which we are ποιεῖν λόγῳ (infra line 19), but laying down the law as to the γένεσις of cities in general. For the anacoluthon see Engelhardt III p. 40.

τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα : neuter, not masculine; otherwise Plato would have written θεραπευτῶν (as in q and some other MSS).

ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις . Referring to this passage, Aristotle ( Δ 4. 1291^{a} 10—19) attacks Plato for making the end of his city not τὸ καλόν, but τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. No doubt, the end of this ‘first city’— so Aristotle calls it—is primarily τὰ ἀναγκαῖα; but Plato would reply that the cities of the farmers, the auxiliaries, and the rulers, are in reality one city, γινομένη μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (Arist. A 2. 1252^{b} 29. Cf. 828 D δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν καθάπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ζῆν εὖ).

ἕνα ἕκαστον κτλ. Cf. 161 E δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ· νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κτλ.;

οὕτω ῥᾷον ἢ )κείνως . οὕτω refers to the alternative which is more familiar, although mentioned first: cf. (with Ast) Xen. I 3. 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον—τοσούτῳ δεινότερόν ἐστι τῶν φαλαγγίων ὅσῳ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἁψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ’ ἁπτόμενον—ἐνίησί τι. On the corruption ῥᾴδιον for /ῥᾷον (also in 94 E) see § 5.

φύεται strikes the keynote of the City of Books II—IV. The first critic to lay sufficient stress on this point was Krohn: see pp. 59—62, where he collects the references to φύσις throughout Books I—IV. The City of II—IV is a κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθεῖσα πόλις. What is meant by φύσις? Not inorganic Nature, but the ‘nature’ of a πόλις or aggregate of πολῖται, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendent Ideas is excluded from the first four books (see on III 402 C), Idealism at all events is present. See also Krohn pp. 8—11, and (for the connotation of φύσις) Benn's article on ‘The Idea of Nature in Plato’ in IX pp. 24 —49 and Pöhlmann l.c. pp. 110 ff.

ὅταν ‐‐ εἷς μίαν . This principle—the cardinal principle of the , reiterated also with great emphasis in 846 D—847 B—is deduced by Plato from φύσις, whose rule is specialization: cf. 370 C ὅταν εἷς ἓν κατὰ φύσιν—πράττῃ. Plato (as usual in the ) is thinking of Man's nature, one man being naturally fitted for one pursuit, another for another: cf. III 395 B, IV 433 A, 434 A, B. The principle of specialization had already been enunciated by Socrates: see e.g. Xen. III 9. 3, 15, VIII 2. 5, 6. Aristotle widens it into a general law of Nature: οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἓν πρὸς ἕν ( A 2. 1252^{b} 1 ff.). In its application to politics, the principle becomes in Plato's hands a weapon for attacking the foundations of Athenian democracy (see 455 A—C), to which, in this respect, his own Ideal City was a kind of counterblast.

κάλλιον . Did Plato write καλλίω? κάλλιον γίγνεται may no doubt mean ‘are better made,’ which is fairly satisfactory in point of sense, but καλλίω forms a better balance to πλείω τε, and is more suited to καλόν just below. With ῥᾷον immediately following, the corruption would be easy. On the other hand the collocation καλλίω καὶ ῥᾷον is unpleasing, and it is probably safer to adhere to the MSS.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν . See on 372 B.

αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν : ipsam urbem: the city as opposed to the inhabitants (τέκτονες, χαλκῆς etc.). Cf. 360 D note It is not necessary to adopt Hermann's conjecture αὖ for αὐτήν, or (with Hartman) to eject τὴν πόλιν.

σχεδόν τι ἀδύνατον . Plato nevertheless endeavours to secure this advantage in the : see 704 A—705 B. Cf. Arist. H 5. 1326^{b} 26 ff.

ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται . All exchange with foreign cities is to be in kind: money is used only for transactions within the city: see infra 371 C ff. Here again Plato is constructing his city κατὰ φύσιν: cf. Arist. A 9. 1257^{a} 28 ἡ μὲν οὐν τοιαύτη μεταβλητικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἷδος οὐδέν.

ὧν ἂν αὐτοῖς χρεία . αὐτοῖς is of course emphatic (ipsis). For the rare omission of ᾗ cf. III 416 D and Schanz p. 33 with Cope's Vol. II p. 328.

ὧν ἂν δέωνται . ὧν is masculine in spite of ὧν ἐκεῖνοι δέονται just above. The reading of q ἐκείνοις ἄξουσιν, οἳ μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν δέωνται is a free correction (after 371 B) intended to make ὧν neuter.

τῆς ‐‐ ἐργασίας is not the work of a seaman (as Jowett seems to suppose), but a special department of ἐμπορία, viz. ναυκληρία: see Arist. A 11. 1258^{b} 21 ff. The ναύκληρος owned a ship and conveyed passengers and cargo for payment (cf. 511 D, E): he is frequently mentioned along with the ἔμπορος, e.g. 290 A ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους καὶ καπήλους, 831 E, Xen. 3. 4, 5. 3.

ὧν δὴ ἕνεκα . ὧν can hardly (as J. and C. suppose) refer to μεταδώσουσιν: it must denote the same objects as the previous ὧν. The meaning is ‘for the sake of which things we established the principle of community and founded a city.’ Cf. 369 C κοινωνοὺς—μεταδίδωσι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ κτλ.

νόμισμα ‐‐ ἕνεκα . Cf. 742 A νόμισμα δ’ ἕνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ’ ἡμέραν. See also 370 E note Plato regards coined money as a necessary evil— the offspring, not of φύσις, but of νόμος (cf. Arist. V 8. 1133^{a} 30 ff. διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ἐστί and A 9. 1257^{b} 10 ff.), a mere conventional symbol, the private possession of which is denied to the highest classes of the State (III 416 D ff.).

οἱ ἀσθενέστατοι κτλ. Cf. 918 A—920 C, where καπηλεία is confined by Plato to those ὧν διαφθειρομένων οὐκ ἂν γίγνοιτο μεγάλη λύμη τῇ πόλει (919 C).

καπήλους ‐‐ ἐμπόρους . 223 D τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἡ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγή, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἥμισυ μέρος ὄν, καπηλικὴ προσαγορεύεται; Ναί. Τὸ δέ γε ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλλαττόμενον ὠνῇ καὶ πράσει ἐμπορική; Τί δ) οὕ;

ἀξιοκοινώνητοι : worthy of being admitted into the κοινωνία of our city. This explanation (Schneider's) is better than ‘worthy of one's society’ (L. and S.).

τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην . ταύτην is idiomatic for ταύτης: see I 333 B note

μισθωτοί . Plato does not admit slave labour in his city, unless perhaps in the persons of barbarians. The exclusion of slaves is also a touch of ‘Nature’: cf. Arist. A 3. 1253^{b} 20 τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν (sc. δοκεῖ) τὸ δεσπόζειν with Suse mihl and Hicks ad loc. If barbarians may be enslaved, it is because they are φύσει δοῦλοι: cf. V 469 B ff., with 470 C and Arist. A 2. 1252^{b} 9 ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον.

ἐν αὐτῶν ‐‐ ἀλλήλους . The reply is to the first question, not to the second: see on V 465 E. In so far as δικαιοσύνη can be said to exist in so elementary a state, Plato would have identified it with the performance by each class (farmers, artisans, etc.) of their own work and no more. This is the first view of δικαιοσύνη in the : for the second see IV 432 ff., 441 D ff., and for the third or metaphysical VI 504 B note

ὑποδήματα . I have placed the mark of interrogation after ὑποδήματα, as it is only the present participles which belong to διαιτήσονται. ‘And when they have built themselves houses’ marks a fresh start, no longer interrogative, for which reason I have also departed from the usual punctuation after ἱκανῶς (in B) and πόλεμον (in C).

θρέψονται κτλ. The picture which Plato proceeds to draw represents the working of well-regulated ἐπιθυμία or appetite—the psychological groundwork of the third or lowest order in Plato's city. τὰ μέν is the wheaten meal (ἄλευρα), τὰ δέ the barley-meal (ἀλφιτα). Only the wheaten meal was (as a rule) baked (πέσσειν or ὀπτᾶν) into loaves (ἄρτοι): the barley-meal was “kneaded into a simple dough (μάσσειν, whence μᾶζα), dried in a mould, and afterwards moistened with water and eaten” (Blümner, p. 218). μᾶζαι made of barley meal was the staple food of the common Greek: the wheaten loaf was a luxury. The double chiasmus ἄλφιτα, μάξαντες, μάζας )( ἄλευρα, πέψαντες, ἄρτους is noticeable: cf. 47 C.

It will be observed that the inhabitants of this ‘First City’ subsist upon a vegetable diet. Cattle are used for ploughing and carrying, and supply wool and skins to make clothing and shoes (370 D, E), but animal food is unknown. It is improbable that Plato deliberately borrowed this trait from the current legends about the golden age (cf. 271 D ff.): for he allows the slaughter of cattle for skins, whereas in the golden age animal life was held sacred (see Empedocles ap. Arist. I 13. 1373^{b} 14 ff. and Robertson Smith pp. 282 ff.). But he no doubt regarded vegetarianism as characteristic of the primitive innocence of a pastoral community ( 782 A—D). In Plato's days, as now, the Greek peasant was almost a vegetarian. To argue from this and kindred passages (esp. 77 A—C and 80 E) as Teichmüller does ( II pp. 187—202), that Plato was himself a vegetarian, is somewhat hazardous. Whether Plato wished his farmers to be vegetarians or not, he permits the soldiers to eat flesh: cf. III 404 B ff.

τὰ μὲν πέψαντες κτλ. The asyndeton (as usual) is ampliative. The punctuation in the text avoids the difficulty of the two verbs θρέψονται and εὐωχήσονται. Schneider places the colon before μάζας, but this is much less natural. For μάζας γενναίας, ‘noble bannocks’ (J. and C.), cf. (with Stallbaum) 844 E τὰ γενναῖα σῦκα ἐπονομαζόμενα. κάλαμον is not ‘a mat of reeds’ (Jowett, with L. and S.), which would be much too artistic, but ‘reeds,’ κάλαμον being collective as in Arist. IX 36. 620^{a} 35; and τινα is contemptuous (cf. II 363 D note).

παραβαλλόμενοι is also contemptuous for the παρατιθέμενοι of civilised society: it suggests throwing food before animals (cf. 372 D).

στιβάδων : not ‘mattresses’ (L. and S.): why should they ‘strew’ mattresses? The whole point of the passage is that instead of reclining on manufactured couches they lie on natural ones of bryony and myrtle boughs: contrast 372 D. στρωννύναι στιβάδας is simply ‘to make couches of leaves’: cf. στορέσαι λέχος. The word μῖλαξ means bryony (as Schneider saw): cf. Sandys on Eur. 107 χλοήρει μίλακι καλλικάρπῳ. The ‘yew’ of the English translators would make a sombre and lugubrious couch.

ἐπιπίνοντες . ἐπί means ‘after’: cf. Xen. VI 2 28 μετὰ δὲ τὸν σῖτον εἰ οἶνον ἐπιπίνοιμεν. In Greek banquets there was little or no drinking during dinner. The conjecture ὑποπίνοντες (Stephanus-Hase s. v. ἐπιπίνω) is unnecessary.

ἢ πόλεμον . The origin of war is over-population (373 D).

ἄνευ ὄψου κτλ. ὄψον is meant by Glauco in its narrower sense of animal food (whether fish or flesh); Socrates on the other hand uses the word in its wider sense of anything eaten in addition to, or along with, bread, e.g. vegetables (see Blümner p. 223). A spirited and athletic Athenian like Glauco cannot tolerate a vegetarian diet: cf. 372 D.

ἑστιωμένους : sarcastic, with reference to εὐωχήσονται: ‘you call it feasting when they have nothing but dry bread!’ (J. and C.).

ἅλας ‐‐ ἑψήσονται . ‘Of course they will make salt and olives and cheese and vegetables whether wild’ (βολβούς) ‘or cultivated’ (λάχανα) ‘into such boiled dishes as can be prepared in the country.’ ἕψημα is not ‘something for boiling,’ but something boiled; and ἑψήσονται is used with two accusatives, one external (ἅλας, &c.) and the other internal (ἑψήματα). Plato hints that cookery in the country (ἐν ἀγροῖς, cf. κατ’ ἀγρούς III 399 D) is inferior to that in the town. For the kind of dishes in question cf. Ath. II 64 E περὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν βολβῶν σκευασίας Φιλήμων φησὶ τὸν βολβόν, εἰ βούλει, σκόπει | ὅσα δαπανήσας εὐδοκιμεῖ, τυρὸν μέλι | σήσαμον ἔλαιον κρόμμυον ὄξος σίλφιον· | αὐτὸς δ’ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ )στὶν πονηρὸς καὶ πικρός .

φηγούς : ‘acorns,’ not ‘beech-nuts’ (D. and V.): see Blaydes on Ar. 1137.

ὑποπίνοντες . Wine was sipped during dessert. ὑπο‐ in ὑποπίνοντες emphasizes the moderation already expressed in μετρίως: cf. 223 B ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις. Dr Jackson connects πρὸς τὸ πῦρ with ὑπο πίνοντες, comparing IV 420 E, Ar. 751 al. This may be right, but the ordinary view seems to me somewhat more natural.

372D - 373C Glauco protests against the swinish character of such a life: more comfort, he thinks, should be allowed. While expressing his opinion that the healthy State is that which he has already described, Socrates is willing to describe the ‘inflamed’ ( φλεγμαίνουσα) City, in case Justice and Injustice should be discovered in it (372 D—372 E).

(372 E ff.).

Some will not be satisfied with the provisions of our first city, but will demand a variety of physical comforts and delicacies, and artistic delights. A crowd of hunters and imitative artists of different kinds will accordingly spring up, and the race of middlemen will be largely increased. As a flesh diet will come into fashion, swineherds will be in demand, and cattle will multiply. The new style of living will bring doctors to the front.

ff. The provisions of the πρώτη πόλις are insufficient for the satisfaction of human needs: for there is θυμός as well as ἐπιθυμία in the soul of man. Hence we must advance a stage further. Plato's method is as follows. He begins by enumerating many of the features of ordinary Greek life, as he found it, without distinguishing the good from the bad. The resulting picture he calls a τρυφῶσα or φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις. The next step is to purge this τρυφῶσα πόλις (cf. III 399 E λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν) by excluding some of the features, and correcting and regulating others, both by prescriptive enactments and still more by the influence of education. It is this κεκαθαρμένη πόλις which forms what we may call Plato's δευτέρα πόλις (II 372 E—IV): his third and crowning effort, the City of the Rulers, is contained in Books V—VII. Cf. VIII 543 E note and Hirzel der Dialog I pp. 235 ff.

ὑῶν . The city of Pigs is supposed by Zeller^{4} II 1 pp. 325, 893, and Dümmler pp. 5 ff., p. 61, to be a contemptuous allusion to Antisthenes' ideal commonwealth (on which see Susemihl in 1887 pp. 207—214). This conjecture requires us to interpret Plato's first sketch of a State as wholly ironical and intended ‘to warn us against the false ideal of a Nature-City’ (Zeller l. c.). I agree with Henkel ( pp. 8 f.) in thinking that there is no solid ground for Zeller's theory. The πρώτη πόλις is not of course Plato's ideal republic, and his description of it is plentifully bestrewn with irony, but it is nevertheless the foundation on which his city is built, and, in point of fact, although some of its features are implicitly corrected or superseded in the sequel, it still remains on the whole, and as far as it goes, a not unpleasing picture of the life of the lowest stratum in Plato's city, and it is nowhere expressly cancelled or abolished. See also on 369 B and 372 E. The εὐχερὴς βίος ( 266 C) of the πρώτη πόλις is fitly compared to that of pigs, the εὐχερέστατον γένος τῶν ὄντων (ib.); and it is appropriate that Glauco, who is nothing if not θυμοειδής ( § 2), should thus express his contempt for a life which hardly if at all rises above the level of ἐπιθυμία.

καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι : e.g. fish, flesh, fowl: see on 372 C. The words ἅπερ—ἔχουσι are to be taken with τραγήματα as well as with ὄψα. Glauco is thinking of delicacies like the preserved sorb-apples (ὄα τεταριχευμένα) alluded to in 190 D. See Blümner p. 222 note 2.

τρυφῶσαν πόλιν . Krohn ( pp. 34, 72) thinks that Plato originally meant to look for ἀδικία in this τρυφῶσα πόλις: but see on 369 A.

ἀληθινὴ ‐‐ φλεγμαίνουσαν . There is a vein of irony in ἀληθινή: for the πρώτη τόλις is not the final form of Plato's city. The epithets τρυφῶσαν, φλεγμαίνουσαν are not however ironical (as Dümmler seems to hold p. 62): see III 399 E.

εἰδ)αὖ ‐‐ ἀποκωλύει . I have adopted Richards' suggestion, and printed a comma after βούλεσθε, a colon before οὐδέν. The meaning is: ‘but if you wish it, let us contemplate also’ etc. The scribe in Paris A must have understood καὶ θεωρήσωμεν in the same way, for he assigns the words οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει to Glauco. We are hardly justified in making θεωρήσωμεν the subjunctive after βούλεσθε, in the absence of other examples in which the subjunctive follows a dependent βούλει ( βούλεσθε). A possible view would be to take θεωρήσωμεν as=δεῖ θεωρῆσαι and construe ‘but if you wish it and we are to contemplate’ etc., cf. 425 D εἰ μὴ ἄρα δἠ (MSS δεῖ)—καὶ ἡμεῖς— ἀπαλλαγῶμεν (‘unless we too are to get quit’), and Postgate in III Pt. I pp. 50—55. But Richards' proposal is a better one.

ταῦτα ‐‐ τισιν . γάρ is introductory and means not ‘for’ but ‘well.’ τισιν contains a sly allusion to Glauco: cf. V 465 E, VI 504 C.

καὶ ὄψα δή . For δή see 367 C note

ἑταῖραι . G. W. Nitzsch ( 1857, pp. 471 f.), Richter ( 1867, p. 141), Madvig, and Stallbaum take offence at the juxtaposition of ἑταῖραι and πέμματα and suggest respectively ἀθῆραι (apparently an error for ἀθάραι, cf. Ar. 673), ἐραῖα (=ἑψήματα in Schol. on 445 C), ἐσχαρῖται ‘panes delicati,’ and ἕτερα (with the following καί deleted),—conjectures which are altogether needless and refute one another. The text is successfully defended by Hug ( 1876, p. 254), who cites an exact parallel in Ar. 1090 —1092 κλῖναι, τράπεζαι, προσκεφάλαια, στρώματα, | στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγήμαθ’ , αἱ πόρναι πάρα, | ἄμυλοι πλακοῦντες, σησαμοῦντες, ἴτρια | (varieties of πέμματα). Cf. also Amphis ap. Ath. XIV 642 A οἶνος ἡδύς, ᾠά, σησαμαῖ, | μύρον, στέφανος, αὐλητρίς and infra III 404 D, IX 573 D note From these passages it may fairly be doubted whether Plato's mention of ἑταῖραι is in any way even παρὰ προσδοκίαν (as the Oxford editors suggest): for αὐλητρίδες were almost as common a feature at dessert as the cakes ( πέμματα) etc. which accompany them here: see e.g. Xen. I 5. 4 , 2. 1, Pl. 176 E, 347 D. Vahlen ( 1875—6 Berol.) quotes also Catullus' cenabis bene si tecum attuleris bonam atque magnam cenam non sine candida puella et vino et sale et omnibus cachinnis (13. 1 ff.).

καὶ τὴν ποικιλίαν . ποικιλία means variety of colour as e.g. in embroidery: cf. 378 C, III 401 A, 6 C. On the omission in A see § 5.

χρυσὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντα : with reference to chryselephantine statuary. Note that (according to Plato) the demand for decorative arts does not arise till the physical necessities of man are satisfied. Cf. Nettleship , II p. 73.

μείζονά τε αὖ τήν . τέ is ἀνακόλουθον (Hoefer de part. Pl. p. 14): for other instances in the see V 463 D, VII 522 B, IX 575 A. In this passage Richter would change τε αὖ τήν into τοιαύτην, comparing 372 E; but the text is sound, and τοιαύτην would be quite wrong. αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν (cf. 370 E), conjectured by Heller instead of αὖ τὴν πόλιν, is neat but needless.

πλήθους ἅ : i.e. πλήθους τούτων ἅ, as Ficinus understood the words. Stallbaum's alternative suggestion (that ἅ refers directly to ὄγκου and πλήθους) gives a poor sense. Cf. infra 373 E note

θηρευταὶ πάντες . The addition of πάντες shews that θηρευταί is used in a wide sense, including every variety of fishing as well as hunting: 823 B θήρα γὰρ πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστί, περιειλημμένον ὀνόματι νῦν σχεδὸν ἑνί. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνύδρων, πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτηνῶν, πάμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ θηρεύματα. In 290 B—D, 219 E ff., and (l.c.), Plato makes θηρευτική include ‘fishing for men’ e.g. in war, or by Sophists etc. This wider meaning clearly rests upon a Platonic—or rather Socratic (see Xen. II 6. 29, quoted by J. and C.)—metaphor, and is not intended here. Cf. Benseler in 1881, pp. 236 ff. Aristotle on the other hand regards hunting as characteristic of the most primitive society ( A 8. 1256^{a} 35 ff.), and so too Plato himself in 679 A.

ῥαψῳδοί ‐‐ ἐργολάβοι are the poet's servants. In Athens and elsewhere they formed regular guilds or σύνοδοι τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν: cf. Arist. XXX 10. 956^{b} 11 οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται. The ἐργολάβος contracted with the poet for the performance of his play, acting as a kind of financial agent or middleman between him and the σύνοδος to which he belonged. See Müller Bühnenalterthümer, pp. 392—414.

παιδαγωγῶν ‐‐ κουρέων . We infer that in the ‘healthy’ State fathers were παιδαγωγοί, mothers suckled (τιτθῶν) and nursed (τροφῶν) their own children, and the professional hair-dresser was unknown.

συβωτῶν . See on 372 B.

χρείαις . Cobet's χρείᾳ is not, I think, necessary. The plural (for which cf. 369 D al.) refers to the different occasions when we may require the help of doctors.

373D - 376C In consequence of the increase of population we shall require more land. We must accordingly appropriate some of our neighbours' territory, just as under similar conditions they will lay hands upon ours. Herein we have the genesis of War. The duties of War— according to our principle of the subdivision of labour—will involve us in a standing army of professional soldiers or ‘Guardians.’ Now as War demands not only concentration and application, but also a certain natural aptitude, our Guardians must be qualified by Nature for their duties: that is to say, like generous dogs, they must be quick to perceive, swift to pursue, and strong in actual fight. They should also be brave and spirited, but gentle to their fellow-citizens and one another. The union of gentieness with spirit in the same nature is rare, but not unknown among men, any more than it is among dogs. Our Guardians must in fact be ‘philosophic’ ( φιλόσοφοι), like the dog, who is a true philosopher when he defines friend and foe respectively by knowledge and by ignorance, hating the unknown, and welcoming the known. In brief, we shall require a guardian to be naturally philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong.

λέγομεν . λέγωμεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms ( § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here: cf. (with Schneider) 377 E ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποῖα;

πολεμήσομεν . Stallbaum adds δή after πολεμήσομεν with some inferior MSS. The effect of its omission is to lay special stress on the first mention of πόλεμος in πολεμήσομεν, which should be pronounced with emphasis. Cf. IV 432 C, IX 583 C.

πολέμου ‐‐ γένεσιν . War then arises from the acquisition of territory and wealth: cf. 66 C διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι ἡμῖν γίγνονται, where war is farther traced to the body and its desires, to satisfy which we seek to multiply our possessions. Cf. Arist. A 8. 1256^{b} 23 ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται.

ἐξ ὧν ‐‐ γίγνηται defines γένεσιν. War comes ἐξ ὧν i.e. ἐκ τούτων ὧν κτλ. (ὧν for ἐξ ὧν, according to the usual Greek idiom, cf. 10 C, and III 402 A ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι al.), from that which involves both cities and individuals in calamities, viz. from the desire of money. Cf. 373 B note and (for the sentiment 870 A ff. ἡ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίαν τὴν κακὴν κτλ. The love of money —so Plato held—is the root of all evil. This explanation is due to Schleiermacher; others (Schneider, Stallbaum, J. and C. as an alternative) refer ἐξ ὧν to war and the like=‘ex cuiusmodi rebus’ (Stallbaum). It is an objection to such a view that it makes Plato say that evils come from War (and the like), directly after he has declined to say anything of the sort (μηδέν γέ πω — ἐργάζεται). Further, if ὧν referred to war, the sentiment would in itself be a platitude and almost deserve to be expunged from the text, as it is by Herwerden. On the other hand ἐξ ὧν—γίγνηται is on Schleiermacher's view quite consistent with μηδέν γέ πω— <*>ργάζεται, for although war arises from that which harms a State, in itself it may (and does) actually do good. Good in other words may come out of evil; which is exactly the principle on which Plato evolves his ideal city out of the τρυφῶσα πόλις. ὅταν γίγνηται (sc. κακά) is equivalent (as J. and C. remark) to ἑκάστοτε: cf. 68 D φόβῳ μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι τὸν θάνατον <*>ταν ὑπομένωσιν.

ὅλῳ . Herwerden's conjecture μεγάλῳ seems to shew that he connected σμικρῷ with στρατοπέδῳ, but the meaning is ‘not by a small amount, but by a whole army.’ For the datives cf. IX 579 C note

αὐτοὶ οὐχ ἱκανοί ; Glauco speaks as an Athenian citizen-soldier. In making war a profession, and citizens synonymous with soldiers, Plato is laconizing. The language which Isocrates ( 81) applies to Sparta might in point of fact be used of Plato's State: τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηνόχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθε<*> τῆς πόλεως, οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ) ὅτι τὴν πολιτείαν ὁμοίαν κατεστησάμεθα στρατοπέδῳ καλῶς διοικουμένῳ καὶ πειθαρχεῖν <*>θέλοντι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. Cf. Grote III pp. 176, 209.

ὡμολογοῦμεν : without εἶναι as in X 610 C ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, and 246 E. The analogy of these cases shews that ἀδύνατον here is not neuter but masculine, agreeing with ἕνα. The reference is to 370 B.

ἀλλ’ ἄρα . As διεκωλύομεν is certainly interrogative, Ast conjectured ἆρα for ἄρα, but ἄρα (nimirum) is regularly present in a fortiori arguments of this kind, either in the δέ clause ( 34 C, 37 C, D, 46 D) or in both ( 50 E, 325 B, C). In place of the second ἄρα is here written δὴ (τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον κτλ.). For the combination ἀλλ’ ἄρα cf. 243 E ἀλλ) ἄρα τὰ ἄμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν ὄν; Ἴσως.

ἀλλὰ σκυτοτόμον . See cr. n. and § 5. The homoioteleuton as well as the presence of the clause ἵνα—γίγνοιτο is in favour of the genuineness of these words: and the construction itself, which requires ἐκελεύομεν or the like to be supplied out of διεκωλύομεν (see Heindorf on 457 C and Kühner II p. 1072), is too idiomatic to have been readily invented by a scribe.

ἐφ’ ᾧ : with σχολὴν ἄγων (Schneider): cf. 36 D. The phraseology here recalls 370 B and C.

ἢ οὕτω ῥᾴδιον : singular in spite of the plural τὰ περί. Cf. (with Schneider) 299 A, 708 D.

τε καὶ ὀργάνων is ejected by Herwerden, who is also inclined to denounce τὰ ὄργανα below. But it is just these words which “point the analogy: the weapons of the warrior are his tools.” (J. and C.) On similarly inadequate grounds τῶν νέων has been condemned in 3 A τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας: see my note ad loc. τινος ἄλλης μάχης below refers for example to ψιλοί or πελτασταί; the ἀσπίς (it should be remembered) was worn by the ὁπλίτης (whence ἀσπίδα μὲν λαβὼν—ὁπλιτικῆς). The necessity of special knowledge and training for success in war is insisted on by the historical Socrates in Xen. III 1.

φυλάκων . This is the first occurrence of φύλακες in the technical sense which it bears throughout the It is important to remember that the name includes not only the soldiers, but also—after they have been introduced— the rulers; when it becomes necessary to distinguish between the two classes, the former are called ἐπίκουροι (first named in III 414 B), the latter φύλακες παντελεῖς (III 414 B), τέλεοι φύλακες (IV 428 D) or the like, or more commonly ἄρχοντες (first alluded to in III 389 B, but not expressly separated off until 412 B ff., and finally and fully described only in Books VI and VII).

ὅσον γ’ ἂν δύναμις παρείκῃ . The phrase is not found elsewhere in Plato, although παρείκει is found with a personal subject (ὁ θεός, θεοί) again in 150 D, 934 C. Herwerden would eject δύναμις (cf. 187 E καθ’ ὅσον παρείκει), but such a word is very unlikely to have been interpolated. δύναμις is simply ‘our powers’: the article is omitted as in the idiomatic κατὰ δύναμιν, εἰς δύναμιν.

σκύλακος . A play on σκύλαξ and φύλαξ is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf. Xen. IV 1. 3 καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφυεστάτων, φιλοπόνων τε οὐσῶν καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τοῖς θηρίοις, τὰς μὲν καλῶς ἀχθείσας ἀρίστας γίγνεσθαι—, ἀναγώγους δὲ γιγνομένας μᾳταίους τε καὶ μανιώδεις καὶ δυσπειθεστάτας. Cf. note on φύεται 370 A.

αἰσθανόμενον : ‘the moment he perceives.’ The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.

ἀνδρεῖος . For ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211 εἰ περὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ τοὺς κύνας καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶντες τέχνας ἔχοντάς τινας, αἷς τὰ μὲν ἀνδρειότερα, τὰ δὲ πραότερα, τὰ δὲ φρονιμώτερα ποιοῦσι, περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν μηδεμίαν οἴονται τοιαύτην ηὑρῆσθαι παιδείαν κτλ. See also 196 D— 197 B and Arist. III 11. 1116^{b} 33 ff.

θυμοειδής . The technical term θυμοειδής is here for the first time used in the Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see Xen. IV 1. 3 τῶν τε ἵππων τοὺς εὐφυεστάτους, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ σφοδροὺς ὄντας κτλ.): in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to θυμός (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to ἐπιθυμία. The usual translation ‘spirited’ probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer ὁ θυμὸς ap. Arist. Platonemque (1876), whose conclusion (p. 65) is “τὸν θυμὸν esse eam naturalem vim, qua ductus suam quisque propriam naturam explere studeat, quaque incitatus, quaecunque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conentur, fugiat, quae contra perfectiorem reddere possint, adpetat.” See also on IV 439 E.

ἄμαχόν ‐‐ ἀνίκητον . Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity, θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς ὠνέεται ( 105 Bywater).

οὗ παρόντος ‐‐ ἀήττητος . Cf. Arist. III 11. 1116^{b} 26 ἰτητικὠτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους.

ἐναντία γὰρ ‐‐ φύσις . Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman's foremost duty to blend the θυμοειδές and πρᾶον harmoniously together: see 306 C— 311 C, infra III 410 B ff., VI 503 C, 144 A, B.

ταῦτα ‐‐ ἔοικεν . Van Heusde ( p. 471 note 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies ἀμφότερα ἔχειν after ταῦτα δέ. ταῦτα refers like τούτων simply to the two qualities πρᾶον and μεγαλόθυμον: ‘these’—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—‘are apparently unattainable’: cf. VI 499 D οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν.

ἐνοήσαμεν ‐‐ φύσεις . ἐνενοήσαμεν (with q) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews. νοεῖν is not ‘putare,’ nor— I think—‘perpendere,’ but simply ‘animadvertere,’ ‘notice,’ as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with ἴδοι following. Presently ἄρα is not ‘then’ (J. and C.), but ‘after all.’

τῷ φύλακι : not τῷ σκύλακι, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured ( p. 209). τῷ φύλακι of course depends on παρεβάλλομεν, and ἐν ᾧ is for ἐν τούτῳ ὃ.

αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος . With αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν) cf. IV 428 A note

πρὸς μὲν ‐‐ τοὐναντίον . In XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9) Εὔμαἰ, ἦ μάλα τίς τοι ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ’ ἑταῖρος | ἢ καὶ γνώριμος ἄλλος, ἐπεὶ κύνες οὐχ ὑλάουσιν | ἀλλὰ περισσαίνουσι. See also XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Heracl. 115 (Bywater) κύνες καὶ βαύζουσι ὃν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see 5. 809^{b} 34—36 μεγαλόψυχον καὶ φιλόνικον, καὶ πραΰ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ φιλόστοργον πρὸς ἃ ἂν ὁμιλήσῃ, and IX 44. 629^{b} 10—12.

πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεῖ κτλ. There seems to be no other example in good Greek of προσγενέσθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’: but we may compare προσέσονται II 373 A, προσέχειν VII 521 D, προσείπωμεν X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote φιλόσοφον for φιλόσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’— προσγενέσθαι, i.q. accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting the προς‐ of προσγενέσθαι.

ὅτι ‐‐ προπεπονθώς . Schneider justly observes that ὅτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before ὅν, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of ὅτι is an improvement. For οὐδὲν δή v (supported also by Stobaeus 43. 149) reads οὐδέν, which may be right. Cobet's οὐδὲ ἕν is too emphatic.

οὐ πάνυ ‐‐ τὸν νοῦν : ‘I have hardly thought of the matter till now.’ μέχρι δεῦρο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τούτου in this sense, but Xen. VIII 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering ‘my observation has hardly extended so far’ is (in view of οὔπ ω τοῦτο ἐθαύμασας;) less suitable.

ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφον . ὡς ἀληθῶς indicates that φιλόσοφον is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 C note The dog shews ‘a love of knowledge’ because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt ( p. 10) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as=σοφὀν τοὺς φίλους: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23^{b} 16 ff. τετάρτη δὲ (SC. αἰτία τοῦ κληθῆναι Κυνικοὺς) ὅτι διακριτικὸν ζᾧον ὁ κύων γνώσει καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ἀλλότριον ὁρίζον· ὃν γὰρ γιγνώσκει, νομίζει φίλον εἶναι καὶ εἰ ῥόπαλον ἐπιφέροιτο, ὃν δὲ ἀγνοεῖ ἐχθρόν, καὶ εἰ δέλεαρ ἐπιφερόμενος εἴη. οὕτως οὗν καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς μὲν ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλους ἐνόμιζον καὶ εὐμενεῖς ἐδέχοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιτηδείους ἀπήλαυνον δίκην κυνῶν κατ’ αὐτῶν ὑλακτοῦντες, and Philoponus ib. 35^{a} 5—12. The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmler p. 58 note 2), and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf III 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in pp. 77—79, and Krohn p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the κατάστασις τῶν ἀρχόντων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D note

φύσει is better taken with φιλόσοφον than with πρᾶος. Cf. 375 B.

ἆρά τι προὔργου κτλ. See on 368 E.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ διεξίωμεν . See cr. n. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the MSS are right, the meaning must be “For we do not want to be tedious,”— but συχνός is rather ‘lengthy’—“and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness” (J. and C., comparing for συχνός 185 E, 23 B al.). The conjectures of Teuffel ( 1850 p. 469) and Herwerden ( N. S. XI p. 339)— ἵνα ἢ (so q) ἐῶμεν συχνὸν (so v) λόγον ἢ ἱκανὸν (so v) διεξίωμεν and ἵνα μὴ ἢ ἐῶμεν συχνὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν— improve the antithesis, but are much too violent. It is safest to retain the MS reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests ἵνα μὴ ἐῶμεν ἱκανὸν λόγον ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὸν διεξίωμεν.

376C - 378E Let us next consider how to educate our future Guardians: the enquiry may help us to discover the origin of Justice and Injustice.

‘,’ or culture of the soul, and Gymnastic, or culture of the body. ‘’ must be begun before Gymnastic. Now ‘ ’ includes literature ( λόγοι), and literature is either true or false (μῦθοι). We shall educate our children by false literature before we teach them true; but we shall eschew all legends that inculcate views inconsistent with those which we desire our Guardians to entertain when they are men. Makers of legend or fable must be submitted to a censorship, and most of our present legends rejected. Caricatures of the gods, like the stories about Cronus and Uranus, Zeus and Cronus, are not only false in themselves, but ought not, even if they were true, to be told to children, lest they breed inhumanity and filial impiety; nor should children be persuaded by Poetry or other imitative arts to believe that the gods quarrel and fight among themselves. No plea of a ‘deeper meaning’ (ὑπόνοια ) can justify the telling of such tales to children; for children cannot distinguish the spirit from the letter, and impressions made thus early are difficult to efface.

ff. τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ. The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purgation of the τρυφῶσα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato's second picture of an ideal city: see on 372 D ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (1) that Plato's object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. IV 430 C note), and (2) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 502 E, VII 521 D—522 A notes The best discussion on Plato's theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship's Essay in pp. 67—180. Platon's Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift. dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas Schneidemühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato's criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine's excellent dissertation etc. Vratislaviae 1880, and to Reber's Leipzig, 1864.

ἔστιν δέ που — μουσική . The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 C ff.

εἶπον . Richter ( 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus' conjecture εἶδος: but εἶπον is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ο and ω occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans^{3} p. 24 note 128). See also § 5.

λόγων δὲ ‐‐ ἕτερον . The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different: see 382 B note ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories ( μῦθοι) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεῖς λόγοι are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn ( p. 12).

ἀληθῆ : i.e. truths of fact or history, not yet with reference to moral truth, for nothing has been said to change the connotation of ψευδής or its opposite ἀληθής. In Plato's view legend contains some elements of historical truth.

ἀρχὴ ‐‐ μέγιστον : semi - proverbial, with reference to ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός: cf. 753 E, and (for the application of the sentiment) ib. 765 E.

μάλιστα ‐‐ τύπον . See cr. n. To τύπος there are two objections: (1) the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδύεται should be the same; but the subject of πλάττεται is not τύπος, but the νέῳ καὶ ἁπαλῷ ὁτῳοῦν, cf. πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς in C below: (2) it is more natural and correct to say that an object which ‘is being moulded’ ‘puts on’ a τύπος, than to say that the τύπος sinks into it. Reading τύπον we obtain the proper contrast between ἐνδύεται and ἐνσημήνασθαι: the youth puts on whatever impression or type the educator desires to stamp him with. The metaphor becomes more explicit in Plutarch 3 F καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγῖδες τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐναπομάττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἔτι παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτυποῦνται. Cf. also 191 D and Hor. II 2. 8 argilla quidvis imitaberis uda.

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : ‘carelessly, without more ado’: cf. 378 A and I 331 C. This idiomatic οὕτω is common with adverbs like ῥᾳδίως, εἰκῇ, ἁπλῶς, νῦν, ἐξαίφνης: for examples see Blaydes on Ar. 461 .

καλὸν : sc. μῦθον, which some MSS (including II) insert. For μῦθον understood from μυθοποιοῖς cf. III 399 D, where τοῦτο i.e. αὐλός is understood from αὐλοποιούς, 410 A, where αὐτοί (i.e. ἰατροί) follows ἰατρική, IV 421 E, and (with Schneider) 886 C θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε (sc. οἱ θεοὶ) ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡμίλησαν.

πλάττειν κτλ. Mothers and nurses practised massage on the bodies of infants: cf. 789 E τιθέντες νόμους τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρινον ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῖν σπαργανᾶν, and I 121 D. A trace of massage practised for medical purposes appears in Zeno 180 (ed. Pearson).

ἐλεγέτην . The dual links together Homer and Hesiod as jointly responsible for Greek theology: see on 363 A. Among the first to rebel against their authority were Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus (D. L. VIII 21, IX 18, IX I). Xenophanes' protest was particularly famous in antiquity: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. I 289 and IX 193 ap. Ritter and Preller ^{7} pp. 76, 77. Plato's attack on the Olympian theology in this and the succeeding book was perhaps the severest blow that Paganism received before the Christian era, and pointed the way for those exaggerated diatribes against the heathen gods in which it afterwards became the fashion of early Christian apologists to indulge, beginning with the of Aristides (cc. 8—11). Cf. X 607 B note

ὅπερ ‐‐ ψεύδηται . ὅπερ is τὸ εἰκάζειν κακῶς περἰ θεῶν etc. A distinction is drawn between mere lies and the lie which is in itself οὐ καλόν, unbeautiful and immoral in tendency, e.g. the story of Uranus and Cronus (ὁ εἰπὼν οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο in E below). Such legends not merely misrepresent the gods, but also corrupt mankind.

ε<*>κάζη . It is taken for granted that Poetry is a species of imitation: cf. 668 A—C.

τῶν μεγίστων : masculine, not neuter: cf. 378 B.

Ἡσίοδος . 154—181.

τὰ δὲ δὴ κτλ . δή emphasizes the case of Cronus as the most important (cf. 311 D, 312 E): it is so because the delinquent is Zeus, the reigning king of gods and men. The example set by Zeus on this occasion was no doubt sometimes used to justify wrong-doing: see for example Aesch. 640, 641, Ar. 904—906 πῶς δῆτα δίκης οὔσης ὁ Ζεὺς | οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν τὸν πατέρ’ αὑτοῦ | δήσας ; ib. 1079 ff., Eur. 1317— 1319, and especially Pl. 5 E— 6 A, where Euthyphro urges the analogy in all seriousness to justify his vexatious prosecution of his own father. The pernicious effect of such legends on human conduct is again pointed out in 886 C, 941 B: cf. also Isocr. 38—43, Luc. 3, and Grote III p. 194 note

ῥᾳδίως οὕτω : 377 B note

θυσαμένους ‐‐ ἀκοῦσαι . ἀπορρήτων suggests the mysteries, whence the allusion to the ‘mystic pig’ ( Ar. 764). For ἄπορον, ‘unprocurable’ (Jowett), ἄπνρον has been suggested, absurdly enough. ἄπορον is further explained by ὅπως— ἀκοῦσαι. It should be noted that ὅπως with a past tense of the indicative in clauses of this kind is rare in Plato: it occurs again only in 830 B, 959 C (where ἄν should be expunged). Cf. Weber in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Sprache II 2, p. 64.

οὐδ’ αὖ has been needlessly doubted by Richter ( 1867 p. 142), who suggests οὐδέν. The words ἀδικῶν—ποιοῖ correspond to the conduct of Uranus and Cronus towards their children: οὐδ’ αὖ—τρόπῳ to Cronus' treatment of Uranus, and Zeus' of Cronus. Cf 5 E—6 A. The presents so many parallels to § 378 that some have—erroneously, no doubt—supposed it to be a spurious elaboration of that section: see my edition of the dialogue p. xxix.

πολλοῦ δεῖ ‐‐ ποικιλτέον . πολλοῦ δεῖ is not adverbial (like ἥκιστα), as J. and C assert: otherwise δεῖ would be δεῖν (so Herwerden would read N. S. XI p. 339). The asyndeton is justified by emphasis and the ampliative character of the sentence. The verbals are best explained (with Stallbaum) by supposing an ellipse of εἶναι: cf. Schanz p. 33.

ποικιλτέον . ποικίλλειν is used of depicting in a variety of colours (VIII 557 C), not necessarily by embroidery. Cf. 373 A note There is probably a special reference here to the πέπλος. At the greater, if not also at the lesser, Panathenaic festival, a robe woven by Athenian maidens and representing the triumph of Athena and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis, and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum: cf. 6 B, C and Mommsen pp. 107 ff. The subject was depicted on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister II p. 1185. The allusion to the ceremony is the more appropriate in this connexion, if, as appears to be probable, the action of the dialogue takes place just before the great Panathenaea of 410 B.C. See § 3.

ὡς οὐδεὶς κτλ. Plato desires to obtain a religious sanction for his institutions, as in the myth III 414 B ff. The best δημηγόρος, according to Socrates, is ὁ στάσεις τε παύων καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιῶν (Xen. IV 6. 14): and the Platonic State may from this point of view be regarded as “an attempt to determine the ways and means of securing political ὁμόνοια” (Krohn p. 369).

λεκτέα —see cr. n.—cannot be dispensed with. Madvig's suggestion, that μᾶλλον is corrupt for φατέον or ᾀστέον or the like, and Liebhold's μελητέον for μᾶλλον, are much less probable than the accidental omission of λεκτέα in A. See § 5. Vermehren ( p. 92), rejecting λεκτέα, would carry on μυθολογητέον or the like; but this solution is much too difficult.

καὶ πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις . The dative goes with λογοποιεῖν (‘to make tales for them as they grow older’), and καί before τοὺς ποιητάς means etiam. This explanation was proposed by Richter ( 1867 p. 138) and Vermehren (l. c. p. 91), and is probably right. Cf. Ar. 1054 f. Others connect the words with καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί: old men, old women, and the boys themselves as they grow older, must tell such stories πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθύς. But it is difficult to understand τοῖς παιδίοις with γιγνομένοις unless πρεσβυτέροις γιγνομένοις is construed with λογοποιεῖν.

ὑέος . Hephaestus. Διός is a false reading derived from a mistaken reference to XV 18 ff. The story (according to Clement ap. Suid. s. vv. Ἥρας δὲ δεσμοὺς ὑπὸ υἱέος) was in Pindar: παρὰ Πινδάρῳ γὰρ ὑπὸ Ἡφαίστου δεσμεύεται ἐν τῷ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατασκευασθέντι θρόνῳ—καί φασι δεθῆναι αὐτὴν ἐπιβουλεύσασαν Ἡρακλεῖ. Cf. Paus. I 20. 3.

Ἡφαίστου ῥίψεις . I 586—594.

θεομαχίας ‐‐ οὐ παραδεκτέον . Homer XX 1—74, XXI 385—513. Cf. Xenophanes 1. 19—22 (Bergk) and Pind. IX 43, 44 μή νυν λαλάγει τὰ τοιαῦτ’ · ἔα πόλεμον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν χωρὶς ἀθανάτων.

ἐν ὑπονοίαις : adverbial, like ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει III 389 B (J. and C.). The allegorical interpretation of Homer probably originated in the desire to save his character for piety and morality: πάντη γὰρ ἠσέβησεν (says Heraclides ad init.), εἰ μηδὲν ἠλληγόρησεν. Before the time of Plato it was practised by Theagenes of Rhegium, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos and others: see Wolf pp. 161—166 and Jebb's p. 89. In Plato's day the Cynics were the chief exponents of this school of criticism, especially Antisthenes: examples may be found in Winckelmann's pp. 16, 23—28: cf. also Dümmler pp. 16 ff. Dümmler, many of whose combinations are highly speculative, regards the present passage as directed against Antisthenes, whose rivalry with Plato is well known: but there is nothing to suggest any personal reference. The historical Socrates occasionally played with the same weapons, as appears from Xen. 3. 6, and I 3. 7: so also does Plato, but seldom, if ever, without irony, e.g. 1 332 B ἠνίξατο— ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητικῶς: cf. also 194 C, II 147 B—D al. Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met: cf. Schow's pp. 223—234.

378E - 380C What then are the moulds in which our legends must be cast? God should always be represented as He really is. Now God is good, and as good cannot be the cause of evil, He is the cause of little to the human race, for evil is far more common in the world than good. This is one of the canons which our poets are to observe; but it is constantly violated by Homer and others. Evil must never be attributed to the gods; or, if it is, it must be represented as a chastening visitation for the sufferer's good.

οἷος τυγχάνει ‐‐ ἐν μέλεσιν . τυγχάνει ὤν=‘really is’: cf. I 337 B note On the omission of ἐάν τε ἐν μέλεσιν in A see § 5.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ. It is first proved that good is not the cause of evil (ἀλλὰ μὴν—πῶς γάρ;), and next that good is the cause of εὐπραγία (τί δέ;— ναί): the conclusions are then stated in the reverse order. The step by which each conclusion is reached—the identification of ἀγαθόν and ὠφέλιμον—is Socratic (cf. Xen. IV 6. 8); but it is doubtful if the historical Socrates ever went so far as to deny that God is sometimes the cause of real evil or adversity to man, in spite of his belief in Providence ( I 4 and IV 3; yet I 4. 16 οἴει δ’ ἂν τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἐμφῦσαι, ὡς ἱκανοί εἰσιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἰ μὴ δυνατοὶ ἦσαν;). The moral goodness of the Deity himself was proclaimed before Socrates and Plato by Xenophanes, Pindar, and the dramatists, but the inference, that God, because He is good, is never the cause of evil, is probably due to Plato. Bacchylides expresses a kindred sentiment in 29 (Bergk) Ζεὺς ὑψιμέδων, δ(\ς ἅπαντα δέρκεται, | οὐκ αἴτιος θνατοῖς μεγάλων ἀχέων. Read in the light of Book VI, the theology of this and the succeeding chapters gains, no doubt, in significance and depth; yet it is illegitimate to argue on this account (as Susemihl does II p. 121) that the existence of the Idea of Good is already presupposed, unless it is shewn that Plato could not have purified his theology except by metaphysics. In point of fact, Plato might have written the end of Book III even if he had never thought of the Ideas at all.

οὐδ) ἄρα ‐‐ πάντων . Contrast Aesch. 1485, 1486 Διὸς παναιτίου πανεργέτα. | τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται ; Suppl. 822—824 and many other examples in Nägelsbach pp. 26, 51 ff., and pp. 16, 18, 60 ff., 73 ff.

πολὺ γὰρ ‐‐ ἡμῖν . An old saying, as appears from Pind. 3. 81 ff. μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων· | ἓν παρ’ ἐσλὸν πήματα σύνδυο δαίονται βροτοῖς | ἀθάνατοι, and Eur. 196, 7: cf. also Hom. XXIV 527 ff., Philem. 65 (ed. Meineke). Plato and Aristotle make room for it in their philosophies: see e.g. 273 D, 906 A, and Arist. X 45. 895^{b} 39 ff. ἡ φύσις φαῦλα μὲν πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ πλείους καὶ πλείω, σπουδαῖα δ’ ἐλάττω, καὶ οὐ πάντα δύναται. The counterpart in the sphere of morals is Bias's οἱ πολλοὶ κακοί: with which may be compared IV 428 E, 431 A, 442 A, C, IX 588 D. It is a melancholy cry born of the age of iron: in the golden age—so Plato tells us 273 C —the balance was the other way.

ἄλλ) ἄττα ‐‐ τὰ αἴτια . The dualism should not be taken too seriously, in spite of the good and evil souls in 896 E. Plato is not now constructing a philosophy, but casting moulds for theology and poetry.

δοιοὶ πίθοι . See XXIV 527—532 δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει | δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑαων· | ᾦ μέν κ’ ἀμμίξας δώη Ζεὺς τερπικέραυνος, | ἄλλοτε μέν τε κακῷ ὅ γε κύρεται, ἄλλοτε δ’ ἐσθλῷ· | ᾧ δέ κε τῶν λυγρῶν δώῃ, λωβητὸν ἔθηκεν | καί ἑ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει. In our Homer there is apparently only one jar of good to two of evil (see Leaf ad loc. and cf. 379 C note): in Plato there is one of each. So great a difference is not likely to be due to Plato: it is easier to believe that he used a different recension from the Alexandrian. The use of κῆρες unpersonihed was apparently not admitted by the Alexandrian critics. Cf. Wolf p. 37, and Howes in VI p. 204.

ἀγαθῶν ‐‐ τέτυκται is either from a lost line of Homer, or from some other poet (as Schneider inclines to think): note οὔτ’ ἄλλου ποιητοῦ just above. There can hardly be any reference to IV 84 Ζεύς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται, as Howes imagines (l. c. p. 196). The sentiment is common: cf. e.g. Hes. 669 and Pind. IV 52, 53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει, Ζεὺς ὁ πάντων κύριος.

σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν . IV 69 ff.

θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν . This is usually explained as referring to the Theomachy ( XX 1—74), which was caused by Zeus and Themis in the sense that Zeus sent Themis to summon the gods to the council at which it was sanctioned (v. 4). But (1) Themis' part in causing the Theomachy is very small, (2) the simplest and most natural meaning of κρίσις is not ‘contention,’ but ‘judgment’ or ‘decision,’ and (3) the Theomachy in Homer is not productive of evil to men, but only to the gods themselves: its citation here would therefore be quite irrelevant. W. R. Hardie (in IV p. 182) is, I believe, right in supposing that the strife of the goddesses three and Paris' judgment is meant. ἔρις and κρίσις are regularly thus used: e.g. Eur. 1307 κρίσιν—στυγνὰν ἔριν τε καλλονᾶς; cf. ib. 581, 708, 924. 644 f. Κρίσις was the name of Sophocles' play on the judgment of Paris ( 330). The poem referred to by Plato is the Cypria (so also Wilamowitz p. 367 note 46), which traced the war of Troy to the judgment of Paris, and that to Zeus' deliberations with Themis (Ζεὺς βουλεύεται μετὰ τῆς Θέμιδος περὶ τοῦ Τρωικοῦ πολέμου Kinkel p. 17. Θέμιδος is Heyne's emendation for Θέτιδος: but it is scarcely open to doubt: for the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, at which the three goddesses quarrelled, was an episode of the poem, and Thetis could hardly therefore have been privy to the plot. See Kinkel l. c. pp. 20, 22 and Jebb's p. 153). Themis was Zeus' ἀρχαία ἄλοχος (Pind. 30 Bergk), and still appears as one of the Olympians in XV 87. The Cypria is quoted again by Plato in 12 A. We may fairly suppose that θεῶν ἔρις τε καὶ κρίσις was the heading of one of the introductory episodes in the poem: to this also the omission of the article with ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν seems to point. Mr Hardie thinks Plato may have attributed the poem to Homer; but l. c. (ὁ ποιητὴς ὁ ποιήσας) does not favour this view.

θεὸς μὲν ‐‐ θέλῃ : Aesch. 160. For other examples of this familiar Greek idea see Nägelsbach p. 321 and pp. 54 ff.

ἐν οἷς ‐‐ ἔνεστιν . I have left these words in the text, although they are certainly open to suspicion, and have been condemned by Platt ( III p. 72). The antecedent to οἷς is apparently τὰ τῆς Νιόβης πάθη: but the play was not called ‘The sufferings of Niobe’ but ‘Niobe,’ and the relative can hardly precede its antecedent in sentences of this kind. If οἷς is referred to ταῦτα understood after ποιῇ, then ἐν is difficult: ‘if any one puts into poetry topics in which these iambics occur’ gives no good sense. Unless Plato is writing very inaccurately, we must pronounce the clause a marginal gloss on τὰ—πάθη .

ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι . An earlier generation looked upon punishment as retributory—δράσαντι παθεῖν. This view appears in Hes. 217, ed. Goettling, and especially in Aeschylus, e.g. 1563 f., 309—314, 400 —404, 886, 927: in Sophocles and Euripides it is rarer ( 1074—1076, 1411 f., 1495 f., 438, 614 —616), and Euripides expressly argues against it in 508 ff. Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine πάθος μάθος ( 176 ff.), as well as in the use of words like σωφρονίζειν, δικαιοῦν, εὐθύνειν, for ‘punish.’ In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is in the soul what disease is in the body (IV 444 C, cf. IX 591 A, B), and the judge is the soul's physician (III 409 E ff., 478 D): hence ( 480 B ff.) the sinner should go before the judge as a patient visits his doctor, and we should even prosecute our guilty friends and relations. See also 854 D, 862 E, 934 A, 944 D τὸν γὰρ κακὸν ἀεὶ δεῖ κολάζειν, ἵν’ ἀμείνων ᾖ. The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure their souls, unless they are incurable: and such as are themselves incurable, help to cure others by their deterrent example (X 616 A): so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato's philosophy, with all due deference to Mr W. S. Lilly, who with much intemperance of language denounces those who attribute such a view to Plato ( N.S. XLVI p. 116).

ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει : ‘in one's own city,’ with reference to the subject of διαμαχετέον, not to τινα. Plato implies that the preachers of such theology must be suppressed in his ideal city. In all this Teichmüller ( I p. 114) detects an assault upon Isocrates, but his evidence is of the slightest.

μυθολογοῦντα is rejected by Herwerden: Ast suggested μυθολογούμενα. The choice of the participle is determined by λέγειν, which is more important than ἀκούειν: for without saying hearing is impossible. μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον belongs both to λέγειν and to ἀκούειν.

νόμων τε καὶ τύπων . All laws are in Plato's view only moulds or outlines, within which our actions should fall. Cf. infra 383 C and especially 294 A ff.

380D - 383C In the second place, God is changeless, and incapable of deceiving. He is changeless, since He is the best. That which is the best cannot be changed by others, and will not change itself, for it can only change to what is worse. Homer and the other poets err in attributing changefulness to the gods. Neither can God deceive, for while the true or veritable lie, that is to say, ignorance of truth within the soul, is hateful alike to gods and men, the spoken lie, which is but an image of the other, is admissible only when used against enemies, or on behalf of friends, or to invest the ancient and unknown with a semblance of reality. God has no need of lying for any of these ends: he is therefore wholly true. In this respect also Homer and Aeschylus misrepresent the divine nature.

ἆρα γόητα κτλ. Although the gods are constantly represented as deceivers in Greek poetry and legend, Plato was by no means the first to uphold the opposite view. In Pindar ( 10. 4) Truth is the daughter of Zeus, and the dramatists often teach a similar doctrine: see Nägelsbach p. 46. There is a close imitation of Plato's argument throughout this passage in Arist. 15. 1476^{b} 14 ff. ed. Rose.

αὐτόν is emphatic: the contrast is between actual and apparent transformations of the Deity. After αὐτόν, Herwerden would insert παντοδαπόν, comparing 381 E; before it, Richards adds ἄλλον, by which Benedictus and Ast replace αὐτόν. Hartman proposes <τι> γιγνόμενον. It has apparently escaped notice that γιγνόμενον, as well as ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος, belongs to εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς in the sense of ‘passing into’: cf. 57 A εἰς ἄλλο τι γιγνόμενον, infra III 400 B εἰς βραχύ τε καὶ μακρὸν γιγνόμενον, IX 588 C, and the frequent idiom γένεσις εἰς e.g. 71 B, 71 E, 26 D, 49 C, 54 B.

ἁπλοῦν : one of the watchwords of Plato's State (370 B, C, 374 A—D al.): his citizens are to be nothing if not ἁπλοῖ. In making the gods a reflection of the type of human character which he desired to foster, Plato is acting strictly in accordance with the method of Greek theology, whose Olympus is an image of human society. The end of human action is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ( 176 B); and Plato's God, changeless and with ‘no shadow of turning,’ furnished the citizens of his ideal city with an abiding standard of human conduct. Cf. 383 C.

τί δὲ τόδε ; Steinhart (Platon's Werke V p. 680) justly observes that the method of reasoning employed here— the disproof of each of the two members of the opposite alternative—recalls the arguments by which Parmenides established the attributes of Being (see RP.^{7} §§ 95, 98); but the resemblance is not close enough to suggest that Plato was thinking of Parmenides when he wrote this chapter. Although the unchangeableness of God was taught by Xenophanes and the Eleatics, there are few if any traces of such a doctrine outside the philosophers before Plato.

ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου κτλ . μέν has its counterpart in ἀλλ’ ἆρα αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κτλ. 381 B.

κινεῖται : a more general word for change than ἀλλοιοῦται: cf. 181 D δύο δὴ—εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν. The doctrine of the permanence and immutability of good enunciated here foreshadows, but does not presuppose, the metaphysical predominance of the Good in Book VI.

καὶ ἀμφιέσματα . See cr. n. and § 5.

ἀνάγκη : sc. ἐστίν. For ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ without ὡς see on I 332 E. Hartman needlessly suggests ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν.

θεοὶ ‐‐ πόληας . XVII 485 f. Cf. Nägelsbach pp. 166—168.

Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος . For Proteus see IV 456—458. Aeschylus also wrote a satyric drama called Proteus: 208—213. The transformations of Thetis to escape marrying Peleus had been celebrated by Pindar ( IV 62 ff.), Sophocles ( 548), perhaps also (as Stallbaum thinks) by Hesiod in his ἐπιθαλάμιον εἰς Πηλέα καὶ Θέτιν (see Goettling's Hesiod pp. XLIX and 304).

ὡς ἱέρειαν ‐‐ βιοδώροις : from Aesch. Ξαντρίαι (Schol. on Ar. 1344). Dindorf (Aesch. 170) restores as follows: ὀρεσσιγόνοισι | Νύμφαις κρηνιάσιν κυδραῖσι θεαῖσιν ἀγείρω, | Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις. Herwerden's βιοδώρου is a wanton change: the sons of the river-god are his tributaries, and lifegiving like himself. It is not clear why Hera was disguised as a priestess. The incident in Inachus' history most suited to dramatic treatment was the persecution of his daughter Io by Hera in consequence of her intrigue with Zeus. As Io was a priestess of Hera, Hera may have disguised herself as another priestess in order to discover her husband's unfaithfulness: see Apollod. II 1. 3 φωραθεὶς δὲ (sc. ὁ Ζεὺς) ὑφ’ Ἥρας, τῆς μὲν κόρης ἁψάμενος εἰς βοῦν μετεμόρφωσε λευκήν, αὐτὴν δὲ ἀπωμόσατο μὴ συνελθεῖν. The subject seems to have been treated by Sophocles in his satyric drama ( 255—278). With ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν cf. ἀγύρται in 364 B and note ad loc.

τοιαῦτα πολλά . For examples see Heyne's Virgil II pp. 146— 152 (cited by Ast on 381 D). πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. said the proverb.

κακῶς : like οὐ καλῶς 377 E.

ὡς ‐‐ ἰνδαλλόμενοι . ἄρα expresses incredulity (358 C note) and τινες contempt. Plato is thinking, inter alia, of the bugbears of the nursery—Lamia, Mormo, and Empusa, whose power of self-transformation was unlimited: see Blaydes on Ar. 293. ξένοις need not here be limited to the masculine gender. Cf. Strab. I 19 παισὶ προσφέρομεν—εἰς ἀποτροπὴν—τοὺς φοβεροὺς (μύθους). ἥ τε γὰρ Λαμία μῦθός ἐστι καὶ ἡ Γοργὼ καὶ ὁ Ἐφιάλτης καὶ ἡ Μορμολύκη.

φάντασμα is said with reference to φαίνεσθαι just above, and should be taken both with λόγῳ and ἔργῳ. The φάντασμα λόγῳ is the spoken lie: an example of the φάντασμα ἔργῳ is a φαντασία or unreal appearance (382 E). The words ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων must not be understood of actual self-transformations of the gods.

τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος κτλ. Cf. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους 189 C, and (for the sentiment) 730 C.

οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κτλ. With Plato, as with Socrates, vice is ignorance, and involuntary. The doctrine reappears below in III 413 A, IX 589 C: it is further implied by the entire scheme of education in Books VI and VII. For other assertions of this view in Plato see Simson der Begriff d. Seele bei Pl. p. 125 note 359. Cf. also Soph. 663 ἡ δὲ μωρία | μάλιστ’ ἀδελφὴ τῆς πονηρίας ἔφυ. The identification of ignorance and vice is in harmony with popular Greek psychology, in which the intellect was not clearly distinguished from the will; it can be traced in the moral connotation of words like ἀμαθής, ἀπαίδευτος, ἀγνώμων. In close connexion with this conception of vice is Plato's view of punishment as remedial: see 380 B note

τὰ ὄντα κτλ. τὰ ὄντα =‘the truth.’ The contrast between the act and state in ψεύδεσθαί τε καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι resembles I 351 B: ἐψεῦσθαι, moreover, suitably bridges the distance between ψεύδεσθαι and ἀμαθῆ εἶναι. ἔχειν τὸ ψεῦδος corresponds to ψεύδεσθαι, κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος to ἐψεῦσθαι: the contrast is between ‘holding, ready for use, that which is already possessed,’ and permanent possession: cf. Soph. 1278 and Jebb ad loc. The words ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ‘in such a case’ (i.e. ἐν τῷ ἐψεῦσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ τὰ ὄντα), are quite satisfactory (cf. III 393 C), and ought not to have caused Herwerden difficulty.

μίμημά τι ‐‐ ψεῦδος . τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος must not be explained (with Bosanquet p. 93) as the state of mind of him who tells a lie: for that is knowledge, and the spoken lie certainly is not an imitation of knowledge. They refer to the ‘true lie,’ which is a certain πάθημα in the soul of the ‘true liar,’ viz. ignorance, and of which the spoken lie is an imitation. It is a tolerably accurate definition of a lie to call it ‘an imitation of ignorance in the soul’: cf. IV 443 C note The spoken lie is ‘not a wholly unmixed lie,’ because it implies that the speaker knows the truth: in a certain sense therefore it is mixed with truth. It is ὕστερον γεγονός, because the spoken lie cannot be uttered until the truth is known. Inasmuch as the spoken lie is mixed with truth, it is better than the ‘veritable lie.’ We have here nothing but a special application of the old Socratic paradox ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων ἀμείνων (see on I 334 A). I have placed a comma after γεγονός, to mark the antithesis between εἴδωλον and ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, and because εἴδωλον is not so much to be taken with τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος: rather it stands for εἴδωλον ψεύδους, as οὐ πάνυ ἄκρατον ψεῦδος shews. The distinction between veritable and spoken lies savours, no doubt, of idealism: but it enables Plato to call his ideal archons ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies, and it is with this object in view that the distinction is introduced. See III 389 B.

πότε ‐‐ μίσους ; τῷ is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles' ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος <*>μῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθομυθεύειν χρεών, ὅπου λώιον (Stob. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅπου λώιον. Cf. Soph. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ψεύδη λέγειν· | ὅτῳ δ’ ὄλεθρον δεινὸν ἁλήθεἰ ἄγει, | συγγνωστὸν εἰπεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. III 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated: cf. Arist. IV ch. 13. See also on III 389 B and Nägelsbach pp. 240 ff.

ἆῤ οὐ ‐‐ πολεμίους κτλ. Cf. I 331 E— 332 B.

τῶν καλουμένων φίλων depends on ἀποτροπῆς. If ὅταν διὰ μανίαν—τότε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπιχειρῶσι: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to οἳ ἂν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οἳ ἂν and τότε to τοῦτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ἕνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπῆς with φίλων. The clause ὅταν—πράττειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλουμένων, ‘so-called,’ involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἀνόητος καὶ μαινόμενος can be a friend to man (any more than to God: cf. 382 E).

μυθολογίαις κτλ. Plato seems to have supposed that ancient history and mythology could be manufactured to order. Cf. Arist. B 9. 1269^{b} 28 and Susemihl ad loc. He attempts the task himself in III 414 B ff., 320 C—322 D (unless this is really an extract from one of Protagoras' own works), 269 A—274 E, 21 A— 25 D, , and 676 B—682 D.

εἰδέναι . The omniscience of the gods was no new doctrine: see Nägelsbach p. 23, pp. 23 ff.

ποιητὴς ‐‐ ἔνι . ‘There is nothing of the lying poet in God.’ Cf. 365 C note I can see no point in Stallbaum's notion that there is a play on the two senses of ποιητής—‘poet’ and ‘creator.’

ψεύδοιτο . ἄν is carried on: cf. I 352 E note

μαινομένων . 265 A μανίας δέ γε εἴο=η δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων γιγνομένην. Plato refers here only to the first variety: the second is discussed in 265 B ff.

κομιδῇ ἄρα κτλ. The words ἁπλοῦν, οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται sum up 380 D—381 E (see on ἁπλοῦν in 380 D), the rest 382 A—D.

οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας . See cr. n. and § 5. φαίνεσθαι and ἔργῳ φάντασμα προτείνων in 381 E, 382 A favour the view that these words are genuine.

ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ . See cr. n. ὕπαρ οὐδ’ ὄναρ is not co-ordinate with οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας etc., but subordinate to them: for φαντασίαι, λόγοι, and especially σημείων πομπαί might be vouchsafed either in waking moments or in dreams: see Stengel and Oehmichen in Iwan Müller's V 3 pp. 37—47. For the doctrine cf. Xen. I 3. 4.

παράγειν . παράγοντας (conjectured by Richards) would be easier, but the slip, if such it be, is excusable. ὡς—ὄντας is not the accusative absolute: if it were, ὡς would express the reason, and here it does not. We are defining the τύπος: and the construction is (they must ποιεῖν) ὡς μήτε αὐτοὺς γόητας ὄντας, ‘represent the gods as neither themselves being sorcerers,’ etc. In παράγειν the construction is changed, but the change is natural, for our rule applies both to λόγος and ποίησις (καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν), and λέγειν takes the accusative and infinitive. Both λέγειν and ποιεῖν affect the construction, which involves a sort of chiasmus. Cf. III 390 B note

τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπήν . II 1— 34.

ἡ Θέτις κτλ. The verses are perhaps, as Schneider conjectures, from Aeschylus' Ὅπλων κρίσις, in which Thetis was one of the characters (Schol. on Ar. 883). Apollo with his harp (ἔχων φόρμιγγα) appears as present at the marriage of Thetis also in Homer ( XXIV 62, 63). Plato accommodates the beginning of the quotation to his own sentence: in Aeschylus perhaps it ran ὁ δ’ ἐνεδατεῖτο τὰς ἐμὰς εὐπαιδίας (so Butler, quoted by Schneider). ἐνδατεῖσθαι, ‘to dwell upon or emphasize,’ is elsewhere always used in an ominous sense (see Jebb on Soph. 205): and here too, perhaps, it strikes a foreboding note. The words μακραίωνας βίους were doubted by Stephanus, who suggested μακραίωνος βίου (so Euseb. XIII 3. 35) or μακραίωνας βίου: but Apollo's prophecies did not refer to Achilles only, so that the plural is justified. ἀπείρους should be taken not with εὐπαιδίας, but with βίους, which is in apposition to εὐπαιδίας. In the next line θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας depends on the compound expression παιῶν’ ἐπηυφήμησεν—a construction frequent in Aeschylus, especially with verbs which denote singing, celebrating, etc. ( 174, 175 al.): after enumerating all the blessings in store for Thetis (ξύμπαντά τ’ εἰπών) Apollo raised a paean over her θεοφιλεῖς τύχας. This explanation— Schneider's—is much better than to connect ξύμπαντα adverbially with θεοφιλεῖς.

κἀγὼ ‐‐ ε<*>ναι . Contrast Aesch. 1032 ψευδηγορεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπίσταται στόμα | τὸ Δῖον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔπος τελεῖ: see on 380 D above.

ἤλπιζον : ‘fancied,’ not ‘hoped’: cf. V 451 A, IX 573 C, and ἐλπίς in VII 517 B. This idiomatic usage is illustrated by Rutherford on Babrius 9. 2.

θεῖοι—οἷόν τε . The object of all worship and all religion, as of human action in general, is assimilation to God: cf. X 613 A note

II 359 D. τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ .

Most of the emendations (e.g. Γύγῃ τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ) which have been suggested in order to bring the present passage into harmony with the allusion in Book X 612 B, assume that the Gyges of ‘Gyges' ring’ is identical with the famous Gyges (who reigned about 687—654 B.C.), founder of the third or Mermnad dynasty of Lydian kings (Hdt. I 8—13). On this assumption τοῦ Λυδοῦ cannot mean ‘Lydus’ (the eponymous ruler of Lydia: see Hdt. I 7), but must mean ‘the Lydian’ i.e. (according to the usual interpretation) Croesus, who was the πέμπτος ἀπόγονος Γύγεω (Hdt. I 13). There is however no proof to shew that ὁ Γυδός could without further specification denote Croesus; and on this ground alone Wiegand's proposal (adopted by Hermann, Baiter, and Hartman) τῷ [Γύγου ] τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ breaks down: while Jowett and Campbell's alternative suggestions τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, and Γύγῃ τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, although satisfactory in point of sense, fail to account for the disappearance of Κροίσου. The proposals of Ast— τῷ Γύγῃ τοῦ Λυδοῦ (or Λυδῶν) προγόνῳ, and [τῷ] Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ [ προγόνῳ]—will hardly win favour, while Stallbaum's τῷ Γύγῃ [τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ] merely cuts the knot.

There is however no solid reason for connecting the Gyges of the proverb with the historical Gyges. In narrating the adventures of the latter, Herodotus makes no mention of a magic ring; but if such a legend had been told of the founder of the Mermnadae, Herodotus is hardly likely to have ignored it. In Plato's narrative, on the other hand, everything hangs on the ring. Nor is the magic ring known to Nicolaus Damascenus, whose account of Gyges seems to follow a different tradition from that of Herodotus: see Müller's III pp. 382—386. It is therefore possible that Plato's story refers not to Herodotus' Gyges, but to some homonymous ancestor of his, perhaps (as Stein suggests on Hdt. I 13) the mythical founder of the family, whose name may have survived in the λίμνη Γυγαίη (Hdt. I 93). The Gyges of history was not the first member of his family to bear that name: his great-grandfather at least was also called Gyges (Nic. Dam. l.c.). The resemblance between the two stories—that of Herodotus and that of Plato—is confined to two incidents, viz. the joint murder of the reigning sovereign by the queen and her paramour, and their succession to the throne. In these two features the history of the later Gyges may well have been embellished from the legends about his mythical namesake, or he may actually have copied his ancestor's example. It is noticeable that Cicero says nothing to shew that he identified the Gyges of Plato's story with the Gyges of history; and in a poem by Nizámí (as Mr J. G. Frazer has pointed out to me), where Plato tells the story of the ring, the name of Gyges is not even mentioned. (See Prof. Cowell's article in the , Vol. 30 pp. 151—157. Prof. Cowell thinks Nizámí became acquainted with the legend through Arabic translations of the ) Thinking it probable, therefore, that the proverbial ring of Gyges belonged not to Herodotus' Gyges, but to one of his ancestors bearing the same name, I have retained the MS reading. I do not think that the suppression of the name is a difficulty, though it would be easy to write (as I formerly did) <τῷ Γύγῃ>, τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ. See § 5. Such a solution would bring the text into strict verbal harmony with X 612 B, with Cicero III 38 (where the story is related, not of an ancestor of Gyges, but of Gyges himself—hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone), with Lucian 41 and 21, and with Philostratus 101. In each of these places we hear of ‘Gyges' ring,’ not of ‘Gyges' ancestor's ring.’ But it is better to adhere to the almost unanimous testimony of the MSS, especially as in this particular passage they are reinforced by Proclus. Schneider can hardly be right in supposing that the older Gyges is an invention of Plato's, although in other respects his note is deserving of attention: “Platoni vero licebat alterum Gygen fingere, ingenio et fortuna similem interfectori Candaulae, quem ideo genus ab illo ducentem facit, prioris nomen, quippe quod commune ei cum posteriori esset, reticens.”

II 359 E. τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι.

If (with A) we omit ἔχειν, the meaning must still be: ‘the corpse (τοῦτον) <had> nothing else upon it, only on its hand a gold ring, which he (Gyges) took off and went out.’ But it is impossible in Greek, as in English, to dispense with ‘had.’

Dr Jackson proposes to read τούτου for τοῦτον, and omit ἔχειν and ὅν, understanding the sentence to mean ‘he took nothing from the corpse except a gold ring on its hand, and then went out’ ( Vol. II 1882, p. 12). In favour of this view he urges that ‘the nudity of the corpse is not mentioned, either in Cicero's paraphrase de Officiis III 9 § 38, or in that of Nizámí’ (see I). Philostratus is also silent on the subject ( 28). If the principle of this solution is correct, I should prefer to retain τοῦτον: for there seems to be no reason why περιαιρεῖσθαι should not take two accusatives like ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, περικρούειν, περικόπτειν, and the like; or, as Dr Verrall remarks (, etc. l.c.)—I think with less probability—τοῦτον might be ‘regarded as a second accusative after ποιήσαντα understood with ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν.’ The reading τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι is adopted also by the Zurich editors (1839) on the suggestion of Winckelmann.

Dr Jackson's view of the passage, in which I formerly concurred, gives excellent sense, and may be right. But it is to be noticed (1) that our chief authority for ἔχειν is Ven. Π, a MS which is quite independent of Paris A and constantly enables us to restore lacunae in that MS, and (2) that there are other examples in Paris A of the omission of a single word without the excuse of homoioteleuton. See § 5. Ξ and Flor. B omit ἔχειν, but add φέρειν after δακτύλιον—an obvious attempt to amend the error which survives in A.

Madvig conjectures πλούτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold ( 1888, p. 107) κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἔχοντ)> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to Π .

II 364 C. ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὁμοίως δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ βλάψειν κτλ.

Instead of βλάψειν, the best MSS read βλάψει. If βλάψει is retained, the subject must be either (1) τις or ὁ ἐθέλων πημαίνειν supplied out of πημῆναι ἐθέλῃ, or (2) the prophet consulted. The latter alternative gives the right sense, but the change from the singular to the plural (in πείθοντες) is very harsh. If we adopt the first alternative (to which J. and C. incline), we must regard the clause ἐάν τέ τινα— βλάψει as semi-parenthetical, and connect πείθοντες with ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντεις at the beginning of the sentence. Such a solution is not less harsh than (2). βλάψει must, I think, be pronounced corrupt. Muretus read βλάψαι, depending, like ἀκεῖσθαι, on δύναμις; but βλάψαι is not likely to have been corrupted into βλάψει, nor is it clear why the aorist should take the place of the present (as in ἀκεῖσθαι). Reading βλάψειν, we might perhaps regard the construction as one of the rare cases in which δύναμις and the like are followed by a future infinitive: see Jebb's Soph. p. 252, Kühner II p. 164, and cf. 73 A οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ’ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιήσειν (so the Bodleian MS). There is still however a serious difficulty in the collocation of the present ἀκεῖσθαι with the future βλάψειν. The explanation given by Schneider in his is linguistically unassailable and gives an excellent sense. For the common confusion of ‐ει and ‐ειν see § 5.

II 365 D, E. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσίν, ἢ μηδὲν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέλει, τί καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν;

The reading of the best MSS, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν, is defended by Shorey ( XVI p. 231), but (as I think) unsuccessfully, and even the most conservative editors abandon it.

We have to choose between (1) <τί> καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον τοῦ λανθάνειν; (found in several inferior MSS besides v), (2) οὐδ’ ἡμῖν μελητέον κτλ. (q Flor. U), (3) καὶ ἡμῖν <οὐ> μελητέον κτλ. (Paris D in margin), (4) καὶ ἡμῖν ἀμελητέον (a conjecture of Baiter's). It is possible that each of these readings is due to conjecture, and we can scarcely hope to restore the hand of Plato with certainty in this passage.

I formerly (with Bekker and others) printed οὐδ’ ἡμῖν. The meaning is satisfactory, but the correction does not seem probable in itself. The same may be said of (3) and (4). I have now followed Stallbaum in supposing that τί was accidentally omitted after the ‐ει of μέλει. Such a slip is easy enough, and would be most likely to be corrected by the introduction of a negative, as in (2) and (3). Moreover, as Stallbaum says, τί καὶ ἡμῖν “huius sermonis alacritati plane est accommodatum,” and καί is, I think, sufficiently justified by the obvious contrast between the gods and ourselves. Tucker objects that ‘“If the gods do not care, why should we also care?” is as bad in Greek as in English’: but καί is hardly so much as ‘also’: it merely points the contrast. Cf. III 414 E note There is no difficulty in οὐκοῦν followed by a question, so long as the question is merely rhetorical. Hermann proposes οὔκουν—καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον, but the negative would require to be reinforced before ἡμῖν. I can see no probability in Tucker's conjecture, viz. οὐκοῦν—<οὐδὲν> καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέον.

386A - 389A So much for the doctrines by means of which we are to foster the sentiments of piety towards gods and parents and mutual friendship among the citizens.

In order to encourage Bravery, we shall require our poets to extol and not to decry the life which awaits us after death: otherwise their poetry will be not merely untrue, but detrimental to our future soldiers. Here again Homer deserves censure. Fearinspiring names like Cocytus must be discarded, as well as lamentations put into the mouths of famous men: for the good man has no cause to bewail the death of a good comrade, either for his comrade's sake or for his own. Homer offends against this canon when he represents Achilles and Priam as indulging in lamentations over their dead; and still more when he makes the gods, and even the greatest of the gods, give way to grief. Moreover, as excessive mirth is apt to rebound into the opposite extreme, our youths must not be laughterloving. Homer errs in depicting good men and gods as overcome with laughter.

τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς κτλ. Rettig ( pp. 61 ff.) and others suppose that the virtue of ὁσιότης is alluded to here—a virtue which in the earlier dialogues is sometimes placed by the side of the four cardinal virtues ( 329 C, 78 D, 507 B). But ὁσιότης is not specifically named (in spite of II 380 C), and it is clear from the words καὶ γονέας—ποιησομένοις that Plato is thinking at least as much of duty to man as of duty to gods: cf. II 378 B C, 381 E, 383 C. See also App. I.

ἀνδρεῖοι . Plato has in view chiefly courage in war: hence the importance which he attaches to removing the fear of death. Cf. Tyrtaeus 10 (τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν κτλ.) and 12. 23 — 32. The poems of Tyrtaeus are not open to Plato's censure in this connexion. Pfleiderer (Zur Lösung der Pl. Fr. p. 23) wrongly represents the present passage as tantamount (or nearly so) to a denial of the immortality of the soul, which is affirmed in Book X. It is possible to criticise the popular conception of immortality without disbelieving in a higher form of the same doctrine, and this is just what Plato does here.

καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μύθων should be taken with ἐπιστατεῖν rather than with λέγειν (sc. αὐτούς, i.e. τοὺς μύθους). Hartman, connecting the words with λέγειν, would expunge τῶν μύθων “cum poetae non de fabulis τὰ ἐν Αἵδου describentibus λέγειν soleant, sed ipsi Orci territamenta narrent”—a just criticism, and conclusive in favour of the construction which Hartman rejects.

λοιδορεῖν . The traditional literary picture of the Greek Hades deserves what Plato says of it (see the quotations in Nägelsbach pp. 397 ff., pp. 396—398), although a brighter prospect was held out in the Eleusinian mysteries and the Orphic theology ( pp. 398—407).

ἁπλῶς οὕτως . 11 377 B note

λέγοντας . For the accusative after the dative ἐπιχειροῦσι cf. 5 A, 51 D. Before λέγοντας Ξ^{1} (with a few other MSS) adds ἄν, as if εἰ λοιδοροῖεν should be understood (cf. II 380 C); but we should supply not λοιδοροῖεν, but εἰ λοιδοροῦσι (Schneider).

τοῦδε τοῦ ἔπους κτλ. The singular ἔπος is sometimes used of more than one verse, e.g. Hdt. VII 143. The lines are addressed by the shade of Achilles to Odysseus: XI 489—491. On the omission of ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη see § 5.

οἰκία ‐‐ θεοί περ . XX 64, 65. The words in Homer are under the construction of δείσας—μή.

ὢ πόποι . The exclamation of Achilles when the ghost of Patroclus eludes his embrace: XXIII 103, 104. On φρένες as the “physical basis of life” in Homer see Leaf ad loc.

οἴῳ ‐‐ ἀΐσσουσι . Tiresias retained in the other world something of the physical reality of his earthly existence: X 493—495 τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν· | τῷ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια | οἴῳ πεπνῦσθαι· τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσιν. Plato allows the force of attraction to alter τοί to ταί: cf. 100 A οἶος πέπνυται τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου, αἱ δὲ σκιαὶ ἀΐσσουσι.

ψυχὴ ‐‐ ἥβην . XVI 856, 857. ῥεθέων, explained by the ancients as μέλη τοῦ σώματος (Hesych. s.v.), more probably denotes the mouth (as part of the face): cf. Leaf ad loc. and IX 409. Leaf plausibly suggests that ἀν in ἀνδροτῆτα, ‘manhood’—found in all but two MSS of the —was only the written sign of the nasalis sonans, and counted as a short vowel.

ψυχὴ δὲ ‐‐ τετριγυῖα . XXIII 100. “The voice,” says Leaf, “is as weak a copy of the living voice as is the εἴδωλον of the αὐτός”: whence τετριγυῖα and τετριγυῖαι again just below.

ὡς δ) ὅτε ‐‐ ᾔεσαν . Said of the souls of the suitors following Hermes down to Hades: XXIV 6—9. Possibly we should read ἤισαν for ᾔεσαν (with Howes, VI p. 190).

ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας . The Scholiast writes: ἐνέρους τοὺς νεκρούς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἔρᾳ (ὅ ἐστι γῇ) κεῖσθαι. Cf. ἔραζε. Early psychology scarcely separated the dead body from the surviving spirit: the latter still lived where the body lay ‘within the ground.’ Hence ‘those within the ground’ (opposed to the ἐπιχθόνιοι or living) became an expression for the spirits of the departed, and the denizens of the lower world in general: see XV 188, XX 61. The Scholiast's derivation is more probable than that of Brugmann, who ( II p. 180) derives the word from ἐν and a nominal suffix ‐ερο. Plato at any rate would have preferred the Scholiast. On ἀλίβαντας (not found in Homer or Hesiod) see Plut. VIII 736 A (cited by Ast) ὁ δὲ ἀλίβας καὶ ὁ σκελετὸς ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γέγονε, λοιδορουμένης ὀνόματα ξηρότητος. The ancients derived the word from ἀ and the root of λείβω λίψ etc., calling the dead ‘sapless’ διὰ τὴν τῆς λιβάδος ἀμεθεξίαν (Schol.). L. and S. object that the ἀ is long, relying perhaps on the line of Callimachus in 63, 51 ἔβηξαν οἷον ἀλίβαντα πίνοντες (where ἀλίβαντα =ὄξος). There, however, the right reading may be ἁλίβαντα, i.e. οἱ ἀλίβαντα. But in Sophocles 751 ed. Dindorf the α is certainly long, unless the text is corrupt. Possibly the word is connected with ἠλίβατος; cf. Hesych. s. v. ἠλίβατον, where we are told that Στησίχορος Τάρταρον ἠλίβατον τὸν βαθὺν λέγει.

τούτου τοῦ τύπου . Instead of writing ἄλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὄντα Plato writes ἄλλα ὄσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα, with precisely the same meaning: τούτου τοῦ τύπου therefore depends on the copula involved in ὀνομαζόμενα. Stallbaum takes ὀνομαζόμενα as “quum pronuntiantur”; but this is pointless. The words mean simply ‘other names of this type which make all who hear them shudder’ etc.

φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ . The remark ὡς οἴεται, which appears in the best MSS— see cr. n.—after ποιεῖ gives no sense, and is admittedly corrupt. ὡς οἷόν τε, found in four inferior MSS besides q, is a rare phrase, occurring, I believe, nowhere else in Plato (except of course in combination with superlatives, e.g. III 412 B, VI 484 C), though found in Aristotle ( E 11. 1313^{a} 39, where Bekker conjectured οἴονται); but ‘to shiver as much as possible’ is painfully frigid. No emendation at all satisfactory has yet been proposed—neither Winckelmann's οἰκέτας, nor Hermann's ὅσα <*>τη (with reference to recitations of the rhapsodists!), nor Madvig's ὡς οἰητέα, nor Campbell's ὡς ἐτεά. Hertz ( 1872 p. 852) supposes the words to be a gloss by some Christian reader, meaning ‘as he’ (i.e Plato) ‘imagines.’ The author of the gloss wished to indicate that he at least could hear such tales without shivering. After ὡς οἴεται found its way into the text, it was probably altered to οἴονται (to suit the plural ἀκούοντας), from which οἷόν τε is a corruption: cf. 11 358 E, where q has οἴονται as against οἷόν τε of the best MSS. See also on VI 504 E.

καὶ ἴσως ‐‐ ἄλλο τι : “videlicet ad suavitatem et delectationem: v. p. 387 B, 390 A, 397 D, 398 A al.” (Stallbaum).

μὴ ἐκ ‐‐ ἡμῖν . φρίκη is a cold shiver, sometimes followed by sweat, whence ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι. Cf. (with Hartman) 251 A ἰδόντα δὲ αὐτόν, οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολή τε καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θερμότης ἀήθης λαμβάνει, where Thompson remarks that φρίκη is used by Hippocrates of the ‘cold fit of a fever.’ In θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι Plato is thinking of the softening effect of heat upon iron: cf. (with J. and C.) infra 411 B ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξε, 666 C, 671 B καθάπερ τινὰ σίδηρον τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν πινόντων διαπύρους γιγνομένας μαλθακωτέρας γίγνεσθαι; see also XVIII 468—477 and Whitelaw on Soph. 651 in v pp. 66, 230. In so far as it associates heat with cowardice, the comparison breaks down, for heat meant courage to the Greeks. For this reason Stephanus conjectured ἀθερμότεροι and Ast ἀθυμότεροι, a reading afterwards found in v. Ast's conjecture is thus refuted by Hartman (l.c.): “Astii coniectura inepta est, quum ἀθυμία vitium sit, non vero iusta ac temperata μαλακία (dixit enim μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος).” In the next sentence Hartman expunges φοβούμεθα without sufficient cause.

τῶν ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν : a subjective, not an objective genitive: see E below, and 388 E, 390 D εἴ πού τινες— καρτερίαι—καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται ὑπὸ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν with X 605 D.

ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ ‐‐ προσδεῖται . This passage is full of Socratic colouring. οὖπερ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστι contains a suggestion that only good men can be comrades: cf. Xen. II 6. 19, 20 and Pl. 214 C. That death has no terrors for the good man is laid down in 41 C ff. The self-sufficiency of virtue was illustrated in the person of Socrates himself ( 1 2. 14. IV 8. 11), and continually preached by him ( II 6. 2, cf. IV 7. 1). Steinhart appears to me to exaggerate the force of αὐτάρκης when he characterises the doctrine of this passage as anti-christian ( p. 160).

ὑέος . The fortitude of Pericles on receiving the news of the death of his two sons was a case in point, and may have been known to Plato. It is commemorated in a fine fragment of Protagoras preserved by Plut. 33. 118 E, F.

ὀδύρεται, φέρει . See cr. n. The infinitives ὀδύρεσθαι and φέρειν are explained by Stallbaum as dependent on λέγομεν, but this is too harsh. The rhetorical repetition of ἥκιστ’ ἄρα proves that like στερηθῆναι they should be under the government either of δεινόν itself, or of some notion supplied out of δεινόν. As the former alternative gives the wrong sense we must, if the text is sound, take refuge in the latter. Hartman by a tour de force resolves ἥκιστα δεινόν into ἥκιστα εἰκὸς αὐτὸν δεδιέναι, and carries on the εἰκός. It would be somewhat easier, I think, though still very harsh, to supply δεινός out of δεινόν, δεινός being used as in δεινὸς καταράσασθαι τῷ λίθῳ (Theophr. 15, cf. infra 395 C): but it is difficult not to believe that the text is corrupt. In q, καί has been corrected to χρή, and the insertion of δεῖ before καί is suggested by Hartman. The question however is not what the good man ought to do, but what he actually does, and for this reason Richards' ἔοικε after ὀδύρεσθαι is better, although otherwise unlikely. Stallbaum's alternative proposal to read ὀδύρεται, φέρει δέ seems to me far the best both in point of sense, and because it might easily pass into ὀδύρεσθαι, φέρειν δέ under the influence of στερηθῆναι. For these reasons I have printed it in the text. Cf. § 5.

ἄλλοτ) ‐‐ ἀτρυγέτοιο . The picture of Achilles sorrowing for Patroclus in XXIV 10—12. Plato accommodates the Homeric narrative to his own ποιεῖν, and reads πλωΐζοντ’ — ἀτρυγέτοιο instead of δινεύεσκ’ ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν’ ἁλός, which appears in our Homer. πλωίζω elsewhere is always used of sail ing in the literal sense (yet ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἐκπλώειν in Hdt. VI 12), but it cannot bear such a meaning here. If the MSS are right, πλωΐζοντ) must be regarded (with Schneider) as a metaphor, the agitated movements of Achilles being compared to the unsteady motion of a ship upon the sea. Achilles is so to speak ‘at sea’ and shews it in his gait; cf. the metaphorical sense of χειμάζομαι. The picture savours of the burlesque, and Howes suggests that πλωίζων may be a deliberate parody on Plato's part ( etc. VI p. 202). As no other example of such a use of πλωίζω has been adduced, the word is perhaps corrupt. Heyne's πρωΐζοντ) “matutinum se agentem” (οὐδέ μιν ἠὼς | φαινομένη λήθεσκεν ὑπεὶρ ἅλα, says Homer) will never command a wide assent: still less πλώϊσοντ) (Benedictus), πρὼ| ἴοντ) (Ast), whose quantity is not above suspicion, or πρὼ| ἰύζοντ) (Liebhold 1888, p. 108). αἰάζοντ) (Herwerden and Naber) is better in point of sense, but the alteration is too great. I have thought of πόλλ’ ᾤζοντ) (ᾤζεις ‘cry ὤ’ and not ὤζεις is the spelling of the Codex Mediceus in Aesch. 124), or ἀφλοίζοντ) (cf. ἀφλοισμός in XV 607). Perhaps, however, πλωΐζοντ) conceals some word meaning ‘to rush wildly from his tent,’ ἐπὶ θῖν) being probably for ἐπὶ θῖνα, not for ἐπὶ θινί. There is apparently a contrast between Achilles' anguish within his tent and without, and some word is needed to mark his exit. Nothing can be made of the variant πλάζοντ) (in a few inferior MSS). In default of anything better we must (I suppose) provisionally acquiesce in Schneider's interpretation.

μηδὲ ‐‐ κεφαλῆς . XVIII 23, 24.

ἐκεῖνος . Homer.

ἐγγὺς θεῶν . Zeus was Priam's seventh ancestor (Apollod. III 12). The phrase has a dash of old-world romance about it: cf. 391 E infra and Stallbaum on 16 C οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες.

λιτανεύοντά τε ‐‐ ἕκαστον . XXII 414, 415.

ὤμοι κτλ. Said by Thetis in XVIII 54.

ὢ πόποι . XXII 168, 169. The words are uttered by Zeus with reference to Hector. For ἄστυ our Homer has τεῖχος.

αἲ αἲ ‐‐ δαμῆναι . XVI 433, 434. The only variant is ὤμοι for αἲ αἴ.

εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ . καί is not ‘even’ (J. and C.), otherwise there would be too much emphasis on ἐπίοι, but ‘also’: ‘if it should also occur to himself’ (sc. as Homer says it occurs to gods). The emphatic word is αὐτῷ. For τοιοῦτον Hartman requires either τοιοῦτόν τι or τὸ τοιοῦτον; but cf. 416 B, IV 426 B, 429 E, IX 590 E and II 368 A note

σμικροῖσιν . See on I 330 B. ἐπὶ σμικροῖσι παθήμασι has a poetical rhythm, and may possibly be from a hexameter.

ἕως ἄν τις ‐‐ πείσῃ . Cf. 85 C, D, 527 A.

ἐφιῇ ‐‐ τοιοῦτον . See cr. n. The present ἐφιῇ is slightly better than ἐφῇ: for τὸ τοιοῦτον denotes the state or condition rather than the act. ἐφῇ comes rather nearer to the reading of A and II, and is preferred by Baiter and Hartman. For ζητεῖ H. Wolf conjectured ποιεῖ, Herwerden τίκτει or ἐντίκτει, in both cases needlessly: cf. with J. and C. ἐθέλει in 11 370 B. The sentiment is generalised in VIII 563 E.

οὔτε ἄρα . οὔτε followed by δέ is rare (examples in Kühner II p. 832) but δέ follows τε very often, especially in πολὺ δέ, μέγιστον δέ etc.: see II 367 C note Cobet's οὔτἆρα i.q. οὔτοι ἄρα, though approved by Hartman, is therefore unnecessary.

οὐκοῦν ‐‐ λόγον . The lines are I 599, 600. Hermann wished to read οὔκουν and reject ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν, placing τὰ τοιαῦτα under the government of ἀποδεκτέον. οὔκουν may be right, but the change is not necessary. τὰ τοιαῦτα does not refer specifically to the verses, but means τὸ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ γέλωτος and the like; while the two verses are themselves the object of ἀποδεκτέον. I have accordingly placed a colon after θεῶν and removed the pause after ποιπνύοντα; a remedy which removes, I think, the objections felt by Hermann to ἀποδεξόμεθα περὶ θεῶν, and by Herwerden to περὶ θεῶν. The asyndeton in ἄσβεστος δ’ ἄῤ etc. is common in ampliative and illustrative sentences.

389B - 392A A high value should also be placed upon truth. The medicinal lie may indeed be permitted to our rulers, in the interests of the State: but any others who lie are to be punished. To lie to the rulers is worse than lying to a physician about one's illness.

Not less necessary is self-control, which will enable our citizens to obey the rulers, and to rule their own appetites. Homer frequently represents heroes and gods as lacking in this virtue—as insubordinate, gluttonous, lustful, avaricious, prone to revenge, and mean. The effect is to discourage in the young the virtue which we desiderate, and all such representations must therefore be forbidden: they are both impious and untrue.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ff. On the place of this section in the general plan of the see App. I.

θεοῖσι μὲν ‐‐ εἴδει . For the dative θεοῖσι see I 330 B note ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (cf. 11 382 C, D) implies the usual Socratic analogy between body and soul: see on II 380 B.

οὐχ ἁπτέον κτλ. Cf. 916 E ff.

τοιούτους is omitted by Hartman, and is certainly open to doubt. The balance of MS evidence is in its favour, although a few inferior MSS and one MS of Stobaeus ( 46. 95), agree with A^{1} in omitting it. It must either mean rulers who act ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ τῆς πόλεως, or else such rulers as Plato's. The former alternative is not altogether satisfactory, and it is difficult not to believe that Plato was in reality referring to his own rulers. The serious objection to this view is that we have not yet heard anything of Plato's rulers: they are not described till 412 B. I think the solution may be that the present section on truth is a later addition made by Plato after he had written his first account of the rulers in Book III. See also App. I.

λέγοντι has caused difficulty, and Madvig would expunge the word. The explanation is simple enough. μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν should be repeated between ἤ and πρός, and μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγοντι ὅπως taken closely together, ‘or to lie’ (μὴ τἀληθῆ λέγειν understood) ‘to a pilot about the ship and its crew by misrepresenting the facts about one's own condition etc.’ One MS of Stobaeus (l.c.) has λέγοντα, which is also possible, and could only be explained in this way. I have removed the comma usually printed after λέγοντι.

λαμβάνῃ : sc. ὁ ἄρχων. Cf. 1347 A note λαμβάνῃς (Ficinus and Benedictus) gives a wrong sense.

τῶν οἳ ‐‐ δούρων . XVII 383, 384. κακῶν is of course neuter. If Schneider could shew that this quotation refers to a case in which a chieftain in Homer did or did not punish a δημιουργός for lying, he would make out a prima facie case for his view that Plato is here prescribing canons for poetical representations, but there is nothing of this in Homer; and we must suppose that Plato is speaking here of his own citizens. See App. I.

ἐάν γε ‐‐ τελῆται does not mean ‘if our theory is carried out’ (J. and C.) or ‘if our ideal city is ever realised’ (Rettig). Such a remark would be frigid and superfluous. The meaning is merely that the ruler will first use words, but, if these fail, he will afterwards proceed to deeds i.e. κολάσει. The first γε assents: the second enters a caveat. ἔργα τελῆται=ἔργων τέλος γίγνηται.

σωφροσύνης δὲ ‐‐ μέγιστα : ‘for the mass of men, are not the cardinal points of temperance such as these?’ (Jebb on Soph. 20 μακρὰν γὰρ ὡς γέροντι προὐστάλης ὁδόν—a precise parallel). There is no authority for interpreting these words (with Stallbaum, Hartman etc.) as ‘plerumque’ ‘in universum.’ Plato is warning us not to regard his account of σωφροσύνη here as scientifically accurate and complete. It is the most obvious and conspicuous aspects of self-control which poets should chiefly impress upon the multitude, and to these Plato confines his attention. On the Greek conception of σωφροσύνη see the passages collected by Nägelsbach, pp. 227 ff.

Ὁμήρῳ . For this Ξ and a few other MSS read παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ. Schneider successfully defends Ὁμήρῳ by Arist. Θ 5. 1339^{b} 7 οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The line is addressed by Diomede to Sthenelus in IV 412.

τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα . The two verses which Plato here quotes do not follow τέττα, σιωπῇ κτλ., and do not even occur together in our Homer. ἴσαν— Ἀχαιοί is from III 8 (οἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἴσαν σιγῇ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί), σιγῇ—σημάντορας from IV 431. Some editors bracket the first verse, but (as Hartman points out) it is not likely that a scribe should have interpolated a line from III before one from IV. Plato may be guilty of ‘contamination,’ or the lines may really have occurred together in his text of Homer. J. and C. suggest that Plato perhaps did not mean the lines to be connected. The objection to this view is that σιγῇ (as in our text of Homer, though there it is in a different place) goes best with ἴσαν, and that ἴσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί is not by itself an illustration of obedience to rulers, and therefore would not be relevant here. See on the whole subject of Platonic quotations from Homer, Howes in etc. VI pp. 153—237, with whose conclusions (p. 210) I heartily agree.

οἰνοβαρὲς κτλ. Achilles to Aga memnon in I 225. The point of this illustration is not in the abusive epithets, but in the insubordination which they and the rest of the speech (τὰ τούτων ἑξῆς) express.

νεανιεύματα . See cr. n. The spelling seems established by the verb νεανιεύεσθαι: e.g. 482 C. νεανισκεύματα has however some authority, for νεανισκεύομαι was used (Photius s.v.). νεανικεύματα, to say the least, is doubtful, nor is νεανικοῦν (Photius s.v.) enough to justify such a form, in spite of Schneider ( p. 19).

παρὰ πλέαι ‐‐ δεπάεσσι . Odysseus in IX 8—10. Our text of Homer has παρὰ δἐ πλήθωσι. I have written παρὰ πλέαι for παράπλειαι or παραπλεῖαι of nearly all the MSS. Vat. r and Vind. B have ε ι περιπλεῖαι, Cesenas M παράπλειαι (sic). παράπλειαι (which Howes l.c. p. 205 thinks Plato found in his text of Homer) is in reality a vox nihili; even if it did occur, it could not mean ‘almost full,’ as L. and S. say: and such a meaning would be ludicrously inappropriate here. With παρὰ δἐ πλέαι cf. Anacr. 94. 1 ed. Bergk κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέῳ οἰνοποτάζων. See my article in XI p. 349.

λιμῷ δ) ‐‐ ἐπισπεῖν . XII 342.

ἢ Δία ‐‐ ἐπιλανθανόμενον . μόνος ἐγρηγορώς refers to II 1—4: the incident itself is narrated in XIV 294 ff. For the postponement of the relative ἅ cf. IV 425 C. The effect is to throw emphasis on μόνος ἐγρηγορώς—that Zeus should forget what he had purposely kept awake to devise makes the scandal all the worse —and brings it into sharper contrast with καθενδόντων—ἀνθρώπων. ὡς must be taken with ἐπιλανθανόμενον, the construction being ἢ ποιεῖν Δία ὡς ἐπιλανθανόμενον: cf. II 383 A. Stallbaum explains ὡς μόνος ἐγρηγορώς as “ut solus vigil”: while J. and C. supply ἀκούειν after ἤ. Neither view seems to me at all satisfactory. The text has been often called in question. Instead of ὡς Hermann reads καί: Herwerden and Richards suggest ὅσα (dropping ἅ before ἐβουλεύσατο). The best emendation is perhaps Jackson's εἷς for ὡς ( IV p. 147), but I see no good reason why ὡς cannot be construed with ἐπιλανθανόμενον. The pause which on this view is necessary after ὡς helps still further to increase the stress on μόνος ἐγρηγορώς, which Plato certainly intended to emphasize.

βουλόμενον ‐‐ τοκῆας . βουλόμενον is not otiose after ἐθέλειν (as Hartman alleges): ‘to wish’ (βούλεσθαι) and ‘to be willing’ (ἐθέλειν) are different ideas. The same critic also rejects καί before λέγοντα “quia ea verba excusationem τοῦ ἐθέλειν humi consuescere continent”; but it is more effective to represent so gross an utterance as an additional part of the picture. For φοιτᾶν πρός cf. Lys. I 15, 19. where the meaning is the same. Herwerden should not have wished to replace the preposition by παρά. In Homer the line εἰς εὐνὴν φοιτῶντε φίλους λήθοντε τοκῆας ( XIV 296) is not said by Zeus, as Plato—doubtless intentionally, to increase the effect—makes it appear to be.

Ἄρεως ‐‐ δεσμόν . VIII 266 ff. δεσμόν is still under the government of πο<*>εῖν.

καὶ λέγονται καὶ πράττονται κτλ. : ‘are either described or done by famous men’ etc.: described e.g. in poetry by Homer's heroes, or done in actual life before our eyes. θεατέον refers to πράττονται, ἀκουστέον to λέγονται by the usual chiasmus. J. and C. translate “performed by famous men or told concerning them,” understanding περὶ ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν with λέγονται, but this cannot be right.

στῆθος δὲ ‐‐ ἔτλης . Odysseus in XX 17, 18.

δωροδόκους κτλ. The excessive love of money is a sign of ἀκράτεια: so that its mention here is relevant enough, although the vice was not specifically named in 389 D.

δῶρα ‐‐ βασιλῆας : an old saying attributed by some to Hesiod (οἱ μὲν Ἡσιόδειον οἴονται τὸν στίχον Suidas s. vv. δῶρα κτλ.). It is referred to by Eur. 964 πείθειν δῶρα καὶ θεοὺς λόγος. Cf. Nägelsbach II p. 64.

συμβουλεύων . IX 515 ff. The gentitive μήνιος, for which a few MSS read μήνιδος, is natural in paraphrasing Homer. Cf. the form Θάλεω in X 600 A.

οὐδ’ ὁμολογήσομεν . “Dele futile interpretamentum” exclaims Hartman. The words are genuine, and add a new point: cf. 391 A φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πείθεσθαι.

δῶρα λαβεῖν . XIX 278 ff. Plato is unjust to Achilles: see ib. 147 ff. (J. and C.).

τιμὴν κτλ. XXIV 502, 555, 594.

ἄλλως ‐‐ ἐθέλειν is again unfair: see l.c. 560.

ἔβλαψας ‐‐ παρείη . XXII 15, 20.

ποταμόν . Scamander: XXI 130—132, 212—226, 233 ff.

καὶ αὖ κτλ . ὡς should be repeated with ἔφη (J. and C.). Herwerden rejects both τοῦ and Σπερχειοῦ, the former because he thinks the article would suggest the Simois. Why should it not specify the other river towards which Achilles (according to Plato) shewed insubordination? Plato (as Hartman remarks) has just as much right to mention the river's name as that of Achilles' tutor (390 E). The reference is to XXIII 140—151. Although the locks were ‘sacred to Spercheius,’ the vow was nevertheless conditional on Achilles' safe return, which he knew was hopeless. This is the reason which Achilles gives for offering his locks to the shade of Patroclus rather than to Spercheius: ib. 150. ὀπάσαιμι—‘suffer me to give’—is in reality a prayer to the Spercheius.

Ἕκτορος ἕλξεις . XXIV 14 ff.

σφαγάς XXIII 175 ff.

τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός . Peleus' father, Aeacus, was son of Zeus.

μηδὲ ‐‐ μηδέ . Bekker read μήτε— μήτε; but μηδὲ τάδε is of course ne haec quidem.

ὥρμησαν ‐‐ ἁρπαγάς . Pi rithous assisted Theseus to abduct Helen: and Theseus Pirithous in his attempt to carry off Persephone from the lower world. οὕτως belongs to δεινάς: the order is regular and idiomatic: cf. 36 A, 192 C al. Sophocles and Euripides each wrote a play called ‘Theseus’: but Plato is probably alluding to some epic Theseis. Cf. Kinkel p. 217.

αὐτά is censured by Heller, who conjectures τοιαῦτα, while Hartman keeps αὐτά but rejects ἔργα. Stallbaum says we should expect ταῦτα for αὐτά: but ταῦτα would be too precise. αὐτά means simply ‘the actions in question.’ Cf. I 339 E note The turn of the sentence recalls II 380 A ἢ οὐ θεοῦ ἔργα ἐατέον αὐτὰ λέγειν ἢ κτλ. Cf. also infra 408 C.

κακά . Hartman approves Cobet's conjecture κακούς, “cum γεννᾶν hic translaticiam vim non obtineat.” Why not? Cf. κακὰ γίγνεσθαι just below. κακούς would be extremely tame and commonplace.

ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν . II 378 B, 380 C.

ἄρα : II 358 C note

οἱ ‐‐ δαιμόνων . From Aeschylus' : see Dindorf 155. The passage is also quoted in part by Strabo (XII 8. 21), from whom it appears that Niobe is the speaker, and that οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι are her father Tantalus and his kindred (οἱ περὶ Τάνταλον). ὧν—αἰθέρι means ‘whose is the altar to ancestral Zeus on Mount Ida high in heaven,’ i.e. their θεὸς πατρῷος is Zeus (who was Tantalus' father), and they worship him on the heights of Ida. Tantalus' territory extended to Ida: see Strabo l.c. ὁ Τάνταλος λέγει σπείρω δ’ ἄρουραν δώδεχ’ ἡμερῶν ὁδόν, | Βερέκυντα χῶρον, ἔνθ’ Ἀδραστείας ἕδος | Ἴδη τε μυκηθμοῖσι καὶ βρυχήμασιν | πρέπουσι μήλων. For ὧν κατ’ Ἰδαῖον πάγον Strabo has οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ, a much inferior reading. καί before οὔπω may be Plato's (so Stallbaum and others),—in which case the last line is from a different part of the play,—but is much more likely to come from Aeschylus, the resolution of κοὔπω being due to Plato. The line follows naturally on the others, and is not sufficiently important to have been selected from a different context. The verses are complete in themselves, and present a stately picture of the sons of the gods, which is the only reason why they are cited here.

—C So much for legends about gods, heroes, daemons, and the unseen world: it remains to determine what shall be said about men. But on this subject we cannot lay down rules until we have discovered the nature of Justice, and proved that Justice benefits the just, apart from all appearances.

τί οὖν κτλ. This is the ἀληθὲς εἶδος λόγων. Plato has prescribed canons for the ψευδεῖς λόγοι or legends about gods etc.; but rules for ἀληθεῖς λόγοι, i.e. λόγοι relating to men and human affairs, cannot be drawn up without begging the conclusion which the seeks to establish. See also on II 376 E.

ἡμῖν . See cr. n. Without ἡμῖν, we should have τοῖς λόγων πέρι ὁριζομένοις. I agree with Hartman and the majority of editors in retaining the word. See § 5.

ἀδύνατον δή . For δή Stallbaum approves Ast's conjecture δέ. δέ would be too weak, if the meaning were adversative, but it is not. δή is only ‘well’: cf. II 368 A (Schneider).

καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοί . On λογοποιοί see II 365 E note; and for the statement itself 660 E ff., 662 B.

ἀλλότριον ‐‐ ἀγαθόν . I 343 C note

ζητοῦμεν . Stallbaum's conjecture —see cr. n.—is now generally accepted. ἐζητοῦμεν would imply that the discussion had changed, but it has not. Cf. IV 420 C ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν.

τότε διομολογησόμεθα κτλ. This is not “an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject” (J. and C.), for if Socrates declared at this stage that justice is a good for its possessor he would in point of fact be presupposing the results of the whole investigation. See IX 588 B—592 B. Others (e.g. Hirzel der Dialog p. 237 note) have taken τότε διομολογησόμεθα as a hint of the additional discussion on Poetry in Book X: but there is nothing either here or in that book to justify any such interpretation. Cf. X 595 A note What Plato's regulations about λόγοι περὶ ἀνθρώπων would have been may be easily gathered from the end of Book IX and X 608 C ff., although the subject is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the Cf. I 347 E note

392C - 394D We have now finished our treatment of the subject-matter of poetry, and have next to discuss its form. All composition is in a certain sense narrative, narrating things past, present or future. Narration in this sense may be either (1) simple and unmixed, (2) imitative, (3) both simple and imitative. Homer furnishes an example of the third kind: his poetry is purely narrative, when he is speaking in propria persona, it is imitative, when he puts his words into the mouth of any of his characters. Tragedy and Comedy exemplify the imitative style. The best example of the purely narrative is the Dithyramb, of the third or mixed variety, the Epic. Which of these forms shall we admit, and on what occasions?

ff. That Poetry and Art are a species of μίμησις, was an accepted canon in Greece even before the time of Plato: see Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art^{2} p. 121. Starting from this principle, Plato gradually deepens and intensifies the connotation of μίμησις as the dialogue advances. At first, the word denotes a specific variety of style— the dramatic as opposed to the narrative (392 D—394 D). But as according to Plato style is at once the expression of, and also exercises a reflex influence on, the soul (400 D note), μίμησις begins to assume an ethical import and is used to express imitation or assimilation in matters appertaining to or bearing upon character and conduct (394 E, 395 C notes: cf. also 401 B—404 C). Finally, in Book X, after the psychological point of view has been superseded by the metaphysical, the word acquires an ontological or metaphysical significance: see on X 595 C. On the subject generally, reference may be made to the dissertation of Abeken de μιμήσεως apud Platonem et Aristotelem notione.

τὸ δὲ λέξεως . Hartman approves the variant τὰ δὲ λέξεως: but the subject of λέξις is better treated as a unity until it has been subdivided.

μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν . μυθολόγων is said so as to include writers of μῦθοι in prose: cf. 394 B and II 365 E note

ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ. Plato means that poor speakers cannot grapple with an abstract notion, but use a part of it, i.e. a concrete example. οὐ κατὰ ὅλον κτλ. may be illustrated from 205 B, C.

καὶ ἐλίσσετο ‐‐ λαῶν . I 15, 16. Leaf. reads λίσσετο because “λίσσομαι apparently had a second initial consonant, and is never preceded by a short vowel.” The word had probably been Atticised by Plato's time.

δοκεῖν ‐‐ ὄντα . δοκεῖν is here ‘to fancy’ not ‘to seem.’ Contrast II 381 E ἡμῖν δὲ ποιοῦσι δοκεῖν σφᾶς παντοδαποὺς φαίνεσθαι—a passage which is cited by Hartman to justify ποιῆσαι as against the variant πεῖσαι.

περί τε τῶν ‐‐ παθημάτων . This clause is rejected by Herwerden. The difficulty—which lies in the collocation of Ἰθάκῃ the place and Ὀδυσσείᾳ the poem—is no doubt lessened by reading (with Richards) καὶ ἐν or κἀν before ὅλῃ, but does not wholly disappear. Possibly the last twelve books of the , in which the scene is Ithaca, were sometimes known collectively as Ἰθάκη.

, E 23 ὅτι ἦλθεν ‐‐ βασιλέων paraphrases I 12—16.

ὡς Χρύσης γενόμενος : ‘as if he had been transformed into Chryses,’ not merely ‘in the person of Chryses’ (Jowett). In ‘simple narrative’ he is Homer: when Chryses begins to speak, he becomes Chryses. Cf. 393 B ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης (‘as if he himself were Chryses’).

ἐλθὼν ‐‐ αἰδεσθέντας . I 17—21. The emphatic αὐτοὺς accurately represents Homer's ὑμῖν μέν. For λῦσαι H. Wolf conjectured ἀπολῦσαι; but Plato is closely following Homer, who has λύσαιτε. τὸν θεόν is Apollo.

ταῦτα δὲ ‐‐ βέλεσιν . I 22— 42. The paraphrasis is accurate, and Plato leaves nothing essential out. There is no sign that his text differed from ours in this passage.

μὴ ‐‐ οὐκ ἐπαρκέσοι . ἐπαρκέσοι presupposes ἐπαρκέσει in the narratio recta: Homer has μή νύ τοι οὐ χραίσμῃ σκῆπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο. It is usual to regard this sentence as final: if so, it is the solitary instance in Plato where the future after a final μή must be admitted. See Weber in Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 60 and Goodwin pp. 45, 91. The nearest parallel is 15 D ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσοις, where μή depends on a verb of fearing. It is better, both in point of grammar and of sense, to regard this sentence also as expressing apprehension (‘for fear lest’), although no verb of fearing is present. It is not final in any proper sense of the word. Bekker read ἐπαρκέσειε, saying that Θ has ἐπαρκέσειεν.

μὴ ἐρεθίζειν . Valckenaer's conjecture μή ἑ ἐρεθιζειν (μή μ’ ἐρέθιζε in Homer) is attractive in view of τὰ ἃ δάκρυα in 394 A for Homer's ἐμὰ δάκρυα, and because it provides an object for ἐρεθίζειν. Plato uses the pronoun tolerably often (e.g. in I 327 B, X 617 E, 175 C, 223 B): other Attic writers seldom, if ever (Kühner-Blass I p. 592). It is not however clear that ἐρεθίζειν could not be used without an object expressed, and I therefore revert to the MS reading.

ἐν ναῶν οἰκοδομήσεσιν shews that Plato understood Homer's ἔρεψα (εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ’ ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα) of building. According to Leaf, ἔρεψα seems to denote the most primitive form of temple —“a mere roof to protect the image of a god standing in a grove.”

τεῖσαι ‐‐ βέλεσιν . Ἀχαιούς is of course the subject to τεῖσαι (‘pay for,’ ‘expiate’): in Homer it is τίσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν. The translation ‘that he would avenge his tears upon the Achaeans’ (D. and V.) is wrong. ἅ is apparently a solitary instance of ὅς=‘suus’ in Attic prose (Kühner-Blass l.c. I 1, p. 602). Plato chooses the word because it expresses Homer's ἐμά briefly and neatly, rather than from any conscious desire to make the paraphrase archaic.

τραγῳδίας . Adimantus quotes a single concrete instance—‘tragedies’—to shew that he now apprehends the meaning of μίμησις. Socrates, out of politeness and because he wishes to make progress, interprets this as a recognition of the imitative character of Tragedy and Comedy in general (ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία), as in point of fact it virtually is. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις is not true in the beggarly literal sense of λέγειν, but it is sufficiently so for polite conversation. To insert—with Herwerden and Hartman—τε καὶ κωμῳδίας after τραγῳδίας seems to me unnecessary and pedantic.

εὕροις δ) ἂν ‐‐ διθυράμβοις . The dithyramb was at first purely narrative or nearly so; it afterwards became mimetic (Arist. XIX 15. 918^{b} 19). Only one of Pindar's dithyrambic fragments appears to be ‘mimetic’ ( 74). On the growth and decline of the Dithyramb see Smyth pp. xliii—lviii.

τε ‐‐ δὲ καί . II 367 C note

εἴ μοι μανθάνεις : ‘if I can make you understand,’ with reference to μανθάνω in 392 C, 394 B, C. Heindorf's εἴ μου μανθάνεις (as in 51 C) is attractive, but the corruption is not easy to explain, and the MS reading is sufficiently defended by I 343 A ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα—γιγνώσκεις (so also Hartman).

τοῦτο ‐‐ αὐτό refers to ὅτι χρείη— μιμεῖσθαι, and ἔλεγον is ‘was saying’ i.e. ‘was trying to say,’ viz. when I digressed.

εἴτε παραδεξόμεθα κτλ. Krohn ( p. 13) declares this passage to be inconsistent with II 373 B, where ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, ἐργολάβοι are admitted. He forgets or ignores the fact that in § 373 Plato is describing the τρυφῶσα πόλις, which he is now engaged in ‘purging’ (399 E). See II 372 D note

ἴσως δὲ ‐‐ τούτων . In this remark J. and C. find “an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book X.” I cannot see that it does more than prepare the way for ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ ἂν—ἰτέον. See on X 595 A.

394E - 397D Our guardians must not be prone to imitation. We have agreed that one man can do but one thing well, and it is impossible for one man even to imitate two things aright, as we may see from the special instances of poetical composition and acting. The sole duty of our guardians is to make and keep the city free; if they practise imitation at all, their models must be such as are appropriate to the free—that is to say, men of brave and virtuous character, for imitation means assimilation. Dramatic poetry continually offends against this canon. In general, the good man will not make use of imitation except when he is narrating the sayings or deeds of the virtuous, or some lapse of the vicious into virtue, or sometimes in mere play. His style of speech will combine plain narrative and imitation, but he will use the latter sparingly; whereas the bad man will imitate more often than narrate, and no kind of imitation will come amiss to him. In respect of mode and time, the language of Virtue will be nearly uniform, that of Vice varied.

πότερον μιμητικοὺς κτλ. The question is not ‘Are our guardians to become dramatic poets?’ but ‘Are they to have the imitative habit of mind?’ The answer is in the negative, and the drama is banished because it fosters this habit in spectators. Cf. 395 D note

ὅτι ‐‐ πολλὰ δ) οὔ explains τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, as Hartman points out, and not τοῦτο, as D. and V. translate. ἔμπροσθεν refers to II 370 B.

πολλῶν κτλ. suggests, perhaps intentionally, πόλλ’ ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δ’ ἠπίστατο πάντα. The words ὥστ’ — ἐλλόγιμος—equivalent to a neuter accusative—are undeservedly cancelled by Herwerden and Hartman. Translate ‘he will fail in all of them to attain creditable distinction’: cf. the adverb κακῶς in κακῶς δ’ ἠπίστατο πάντα.

οὐκοῦν κτλ. The reasoning is a fortiori: if two or more departments of merely imitative art cannot be represented by the same person, still less can imitation be combined with any serious pursuit (σχολῇ ἄρα κτλ.).

οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ‐‐ ποιοῦντες . The reverse is affirmed by Socrates in 223 D τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα καὶ κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. The solution is that in the Socrates is applying to the drama the Socratic principle μία ἐπιστήμη s. δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων: theoretically, therefore, and ideally, the tragedian is also capable of writing a comedy. In the , on the other hand, he is describing Greek dramatic art as he found it: for which reason he writes δύνανται and not δύναιντ’ ἄν (a corruption in v, wrongly adopted by Stallbaum). Cf. 534 C. Aristophanes did not write tragedy, nor the tragedians comedy. The passage in the is interesting as an unconscious prophecy of the Shakespearian drama. Cf. Reber p. 11.

μιμήματα . See cr. n. Former editors variously read μιμήματα or μιμήματε. Either is admissible, so far as concerns the Greek, but the plural was perhaps— owing to the proximity of τούτω—somewhat more likely to be corrupted to the dual in this instance than vice versâ. Cf. X 614 C δύο—χάσματα ἐχομένω ἀλλήλοιν with note ad loc. The reading μιμήματά τε represents the correction μιμήματα. This is, I think, a somewhat simpler view than to suppose that an original μιμήματε became μιμήματέ τε by dittography, and τέ was afterwards changed to τά. Roeper, however, pronounces in favour of the dual (de dual. usu Pl. p. 14), and it must be admitted that duals are peculiarly liable to corruption in the MSS of the See § 5.

ῥαψῳδοί ‐‐ ὑποκριταί . Even ῥαψῳδοί seem to have generally confined themselves to a particular poet: see 531 C, 536 B.

ἀλλ) οὐδὲ ‐‐ οἱ αὐτοί . This was true without exception till comparatively late times: see Müller Gr. Bühnenalt. pp. 185—188. κωμῳδοῖς and τραγῳδοῖς (literally ‘at the tragedians’ etc.) are local—almost adverbial—datives, regularly used to denote the exhibitions of comedies and tragedies: see e.g. Arist. IV 6. 1123^{a}23, Aesch. in Ctes. 36, and cf. the Latin use of ‘gladiatoribus’ for ‘at a gladiatorial show.’

, C 11 ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν . καλῶς should be repeated with πράττειν, and ἤ is simply ‘or,’ not ‘or else.’ The alternative rendering given by J. and C. ‘or else—if able to imitate—is not able to do the things themselves,’ does violence to both grammar and sense.

δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας . An artificial and somewhat strained expression, selected in order at once to compare and contrast the guardians with other artists. They too are artists, and their ἔργον is Freedom. To ἐλευθερία Plato attaches his own meaning: true freedom lies in the subordination of the lower to the higher, both in private conduct and in political life: cf. Xen. I 2. 5, 6 and infra IX 577 D, E, X 617 E notes It is in this sense that ἐλευθέρους is used below.

τούτοις : viz. τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως.

ἵνα μὴ ‐‐ ἀπολαύσωσιν reveals the object of this attack upon the drama: cf. II 383 C and infra 401 B. An admirable illustration of the sentiment is quoted by Susemihl from Plut. 29. 6 μετὰ δὲ τὴν θέαν προσαγορεύσας (sc. ὁ Σόλων ) αὐτὸν (viz. τὸν Θέσπιν) ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τοσούτων ἐναντίον οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τηλικαῦτα ψευδόμενος. φήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Θέσπιδος μὴ δεινὸν εἷναι τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λέγειν τοιαῦτα καὶ πράσσειν, σφόδρα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ τὴν γῆν ὁ Σόλων πατάξας Ταχὺ μέντοι τὴν παιδιάν, ἔφη, ταύτην ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ τιμῶντες εὑρήσομεν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις. To omit μή (with A and a few other MSS), and govern ἵνα by μιμεῖσθαι above is grammatically difficult, and gives an unsatisfactory sense. The genitive τοῦ εἶναι has been called in question by Hartman (following Ast) on the ground that “qui τοῦ εἶναι (sc. αἰσχροὶ) ἀπολαύσωσιν iam sunt turpitudine infecti.” This would be true, if Plato had written the present ἀπολαύωσιν, but the aorist is ingressive, and τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν is virtually equivalent to γένωνται τοῦθ) <*> μιμοῦνται. Few will acquiesce in Ast's conjecture τὸ εἶναι, or in Stallbaum's view that τοῦ εἶναι is a partitive genitive.

καὶ κατὰ σῶμα ‐‐ διάνοιαν . For σῶμα Stallbaum conjectured σχῆμα, but Plato would surely have said σχήματα, as in 397 B. Hartman boldly ejects κατὰ φωνάς and reads καὶ κατὰ <τὸ> σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, remarking that κατὰ τὸ σῶμα by itself includes “gestus, habitus, vocem, vultum, similia.” This is in a sense true, but there is no reason why one particular instance of physical resemblance should not be selected for special remark. Plato differentiates the external from the internal characteristics by combining σῶμα and φωνάς under a single preposition, and repeating κατά before τὴν διάνοιαν.

αὐτούς . For αὐτούς following ὧν see on II 357 B. The rule against the repetition of the relative in such cases is sometimes dispensed with for the sake of rhetorical emphasis, e.g. in II 374 B and perhaps 192 B.

μιμεῖσθαι . In what sense can the guardians be said to ‘imitate’ in such a case, or in those specified in 396 A, B? Not as actors, but as spectators. Acting involves three elements—the character, the actor, and the spectator. In good acting the spectator identifies himself with the actor through sympathy; and as the actor ‘imitates,’ so does he. Such is Plato's theory, though merely glanced at here. Cf. X 605 C ff., 533 D ff., and see the excellent remarks of Nettleship II pp. 100—104.