The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos Sir Richard C. Jebb Perseus Project, Tufts University Gregory Crane Prepared under the supervision of Lisa Cerrato National Endowment for the Humanities Trustees of Tufts University Medford, MA Perseus Project Perseus 3.0 viaf2603144.viaf008.perseus-eng1.xml Available under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeos Sir Richard C. Jebb London Macmillan 1876 1-2 Internet Archive Internet Archive

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Preface
Dedication

To The Reverend J. B. Lightfoot, D.D., Canon of St. Paul's, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, honorary fellow and late tutor of Trinity College, these pages are inscribed, in admiration of his services to the cause of true learning, and in affectionate remembrance of constant kindness, by his former pupil, the author. ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔκδαμος ὁδοιπορέων αὐγάζεται γλυπτοὺς τεχνιτῶν τῶν πάρος ἔργα κολοσσούς, ἁσύχοις μορφαῖσι νόον φθιμένων ἐξαγγελλομένους ἔτ’ ἐοῦσιν, οὐδὲ φρεσὶν δύναταί πω συμμαθεῖν οἱος ἄρ’ ἦν ὁ βίος ὁπόθεν θ’ αἱ φροντίδες τῶν τάδ’ ἐξειργασμένων· ἀλλὰ λεύσσον θέλγεται ἐς τέλος ἐν θυμῷ λαβὼν κάλλος τι πάνταρχον, σκοπέει δὲ πανῆμαρ τὰν προσώποις φαιδρὸν ἐφεζομέναν τοῖς ἡμιθέοισι γαλάναν καὶ μελέων ἁβρὸν εὐρύθμων σθένος, ἐκ δ’ ὀλόλυξε χαρείς, μακρός, ὦ κλεινοί, χρόνος ὔμμε μὴ κάμνοι σέβων· ὧδ’ ἀείμναστοι στομάτων Διὶ τερπνῶν ῥήσιες, ἴς μένει ὑμετέρα, θαῦμ’ ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοδαποῖς οἵ σέλας οὐκ ἴδομεν χρυσανίου τᾷ πρὶν ἐφ’ Ἐλλάδι Φοίβου, οὐδὲ πάτραν ἀνακαρῦξαί κεν ἔχοιμεν Ἀθάνας. ὔμμι γὰρ ἀέλιον μέν φαμι δεδυκέναι, οὐδ’ ἔμμεν σκότον, ἀλλὰ λάμπουσ’ ἀθάνατοι χάριτες λευκὰν πρὸς ἀκτῖν Ἑσπέρου.

Preface.

THE first object of this book is to offer a contribution to a chapter in the history of Greek Literature which has perhaps received less attention than its importance deserves. The oratorical branch of Attic prose has a more direct and more fruitful relation to the general development than modern analogies would suggest. To trace the course of Athenian oratory from its beginnings as an art to the days of its decline is, necessarily, to sketch the history of Greek prose expression in its most widely influential form, and to show how this form was affected by a series of causes, political or social.

The second object of the book is to supply an aid to the particular study of the Attic orators before Demosthenes. The artistic development of Attic oratory is sketched as a whole. But a separate and minute treatment is given only to Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isokrates and Isaeos. The period thus specially determined has more than a correspondence with a practical need: it has an inner unity, resting on grounds which are stated in the Introduction and which are illustrated at each stage of the subsequent inquiry.

As regards the former and larger of these two purposes, the writer may venture to hope that his attempt, however imperfect, will be recognised at least as one for which, in this country, there is room. The History of Greek Literature by Otfried Müller— translated and continued by Donaldson—had been carried only to Isokrates when the author died, at the early age of forty-three, in 1840. Müller's chapters on ‘The beginnings of regular Political and Forensic Oratory among the Athenians’ (XXXIII), on ‘The new cultivation of Oratory by Lysias’ (XXXV), and on ‘Isokrates’ (XXXVI) are, relatively to the plan of his work, very good: that is, they state clearly the chief characteristics of each writer separately. But this very plan precluded a full examination of each writer's works, and even a full discussion of his style. Nor does Müller appear to have regarded Oratory otherwise than as strictly a department, or adequately to have conceived its relation to the universal prose literature. The materials for a more comprehensive estimate had already been brought together in Westermann's Geschichte der Beredsamkeit, which carries the chronicle of technical rhetoric and of eloquence to the days of Chrysostom. But this great work is rather a storehouse of references than properly a history; and, owing to its vast compass and its annalistic method, gives too little space, proportionally, to the best period of Athens. Westermann's thesaurus and Müller's sketch have recently been supplemented by the excellent works of Dr F. Blass: (1) ‘Die Attische Beredsamkeit von Gorgias bis zu Lysias,’ 1868: (2) ‘Isokrates und Isaios’, 1874—of which the latter came into my hands only after my own chapters on Isokrates were almost wholly printed. I desire here to record in general terms my obligations to both these works. Particular debts are in every case, so far as I know, acknowledged on the page where they occur.

For the analyses of the orations it seemed best to adopt no uniform scale, but to make them more or less full according to the interest of the subjectmatter or the nature of its difficulties. In analysing the works of Isokrates, which abound in matter of literary or historical value, I have endeavoured to give the whole of the contents in a form easy of access, and, at the same time, to preserve the most characteristic features of expression. A careful analysis, whether copious or not, is necessarily to some extent a commentary, since the analyst must exhibit his view of the relation in which each part of the writer's meaning stands to the rest.

In this sense, I hope that the analyses will serve my second and more special purpose—to help students of these five orators who have nothing but a Greek text before them. Critical scholarship in England has done some of its best work on the orators before Demosthenes. The names of John Taylor, Markland, Robert Tyrwhitt, Dobree, Dobson, Churchill Babington—to mention only a few—are proof enough. But it is long since the orators before Demosthenes have been taken into the ordinary course of reading at our schools and universities. The commentary of Mr Sandys on Isokrates Ad Demonicum and Panegyricus is (so far as I know) alone in this country. Frohberger's selections from Lysias, Schneider's selections from Isokrates, Rauchenstein's selections from Lysias and from Isokrates, Bremi's selections from Lysias and from Aeschines, are representative of the German feeling that these Greek orators should be read by ordinary students. The principal reason why they have dropped out of school and university favour among ourselves is perhaps not difficult to assign. Demosthenes and (in his measure) Aeschines have a political and historical interest of a kind which every one recognises, and which lends dignity to ancient prose in the eyes of a public that is rather political than philological. Many speeches which Demosthenes did not write have long been studied among us in the belief that they were composed by that statesman; while, on the other hand, comparatively few know, or comprehend, the conjecture of Mr Freeman that every Athenian ekklesiast was equal in political intelligence to an average Member of Parliament. In truth, an oration taken at hazard from Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isokrates or Isaeos, will often be poor food for the mind if it is read alone. What is necessary to make it profitable is some idea of the world in which it was spoken. These orators who were not conspicuous actors in history must be read, not fragmentarily or in the light of notes which confine themselves to explaining what are termed ‘allusions,’ but more systematically, and with some general comprehension of the author and the age. Brougham, one of the best and most diligent critics of ancient oratory, himself tells us that he could not read Isaeos:—‘the total want of interest in the subject, and the minuteness of the topics, has always made a perusal of them so tedious as to prevent us from being duly sensible of the force and keenness with which they are said to abound.’ If, however, Brougham had considered Isaeos, not as merely a writer on a series of willcases, but as the oldest and most vivid witness for the working of inchoate testation in a primitive society, and, on the other hand, as the man who, alone, marks a critical phase in the growth of Attic prose, it is conceivable that Brougham should have thought Isaeos worthy of the most attentive perusal.

The present attempt to aid in giving Attic Oratory its due place in the history of Attic Prose was begun in the summer of 1870, and has since employed all the time that could be spared to it from the severe and almost incessant pressure of other occupations. In addition to the works of Dr Blass, I would name the exhaustive work of Arnold Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, as one which has been my constant help. M. Perrot's ‘L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire à Athènes: 1 Partie, Les Précurseurs de Démosthène,’ and Mr Forsyth's Hortensius, also claim my gratitude. Among particular aids, I must mention the Essay on Isokrates, by M. Havet, prefixed to M. Cartelier's translation of the περὶ ἀντιδόσεως,—an acknowledgement which is the more due since, by an inadvertence for which I would fain atone, the essay is ascribed at p. 45 of my second volume, not to its true author, but to the scholar whose memory he has so loyally served. The article of Weissenborn on Isaeos in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopaedia, the editions of Isaeos by Schömann and Scheibe, and the edition of the two Speeches On the Crown by MM. Simcox, must be added to the list. I am glad that my Introduction was not printed too soon to profit by some of Mr Watkiss Lloyd's remarks on Perikles. The authorities, general or particular, not specified above will be found in a list which is subjoined. If an obligation anywhere remains unacknowledged, I would beg my readers to believe that it is by an oversight which I should rejoice to have the opportunity of repairing.

Last, though not least, I have to thank my friend Mr Sandys for his help in revising some of the earlier sheets of the book for the press, as well as for several valuable suggestions.

It seems probable that the study of antiquity, especially of the Greek and Latin languages and literatures, so far from declining, is about to enter on a larger and a more truly vigorous life than it has had since the Revival of Letters. That study has become, in a new and fuller sense, scientific. The Comparative Method, in its application to Language, to Literature, to Mythology, to Political or Constitutional History, has given to the classics a general interest and importance far greater than they possessed in the days when the devotion which they attracted was most exclusive. For the present, indeed, during a time of transition, the very breadth of the view thus opened is apt to be attended by a disadvantage of its own. So long as the study given to ancient Greece or Rome was practically confined to the short periods during which the literature of either was most brilliant, this study was often narrow, perhaps, but it was usually searching and sympathetic. The great masters in each kind were known at close quarters. Their excellence was not something taken on credit as giving them their claim to a place in a rapid survey. It was apprehended and felt. Paradoxes as to then relative merits were, therefore, not so easily commended to educated opinion in the name of a revolt from academical prescription. I remember to have seen an ingenious travesty of ‘The Last Days of Pompeii,’ in which the sorcerer Arbaces had occasion to recite the praises of his countrymen, the Egyptians. ‘The Greeks,’ Arbaces sang, ‘are wonderfully clever; but we have invented the Greeks.’ Goethe said that Winckelmann had ‘found’ the antique; but it appears sometimes to be forgotten that this merit is essentially distinct from that intimated by the Egyptian. In the meantime, I am persuaded that anyone will be doing useful work who makes a contribution, however slight, to that close study of the best Greek literature which ought ever to be united with attention to the place of Greece in the universal history of the mind. In these things, as in greater still, the words are true, Securus iudicat orbis terrarum.

THE UNIVERSITY, GLASGOW, November, 1875.

Sources
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2. Latin Cicero. Opera omnia (with the incerti Rhet. ad Herennium) C. F. A. Nobbe, Leipzig, 1869. Cicero. Rhetorica (De Inventione, l. II.), with the Rhet. ad Her, F. Lindemann, Leipzig, 1828. Cicero. De Oratore, l. III. C. W. Piderit, Leipzig, 4th ed. 1873. Cicero. Brutus de claris oratoribus, C. W. Piderit, Leipzig, 2nd ed. 1875. Cicero. Partitiones Oratoriae, C. W. Piderit, Leipzig, 1867. Cicero. De Optimo Genere Oratorum, (with Orator,) O. Jahn, Berlin, 3rd ed. 1869. Gellius. Mart. Hertz (Teubner), 1853. Lucilius, Fragments of. In L. Müller's Saturarum Reliquiae, 1872.,/cell> Quintilian. E. Bonnell (Teubner), 1868; commentary—Spalding, Buttmann, Bonnell, and Zumpt; bks. I—VI. Leipzig, 1798—1834. Rhetorica ad Herennium. F. Lindemann (see above), Leipzig, 1828. De Oratoribus Dialogus. In Tacitus, ed. J. G. Orelli, 1846.

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Annals

Olympiads and Archons B.C. Literary events Political and military events 72. Diognetos 492 Fleet of Mardonios destroyed off Athos. 2. Hybrilides 491 Persian heralds sent by Dareios to demand earth and water from the Greek cities. 3. Phaenippos 490 Pindar Πυθ. 7 and (?) 12. Aeschylos fights at Marathon. Persians, under Artaphernes and Datis, invade Greece: Hippias lands with them at Marathon. Athenian victory. 4. Aristides 489 Expedition of Miltiades to Paros: his disgrace and death. 73. Anchises 488 Pheidias born? 2. 487 Simonides of Keos flourishes. 3. 486 Pindar Πυθ. 3. Death of Dareios: Xerxes king of Persia. 4. Philokrates 485 Gorgias, Protagoras and Tisias born about this time. Gelon becomes tyrant of Syracuse. 74. Leostratos 484 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 10 and 11. Epicharmos writes Comedy at Syracuse. Aeschylos begins to be eminent in Tragedy. Herodotos born. 2. Nikodemos 483 Aristeides ostracised. 3. 482 4. Themistokles 481 75. Kalliades 480 Antiphon born. Pindar Ἰσθμ. 7. Euripides born. (Aeschylos was now 45, and Sophokles 15.) Amnesty at Athens before Salamis I. 125. Second Persian invasion. Xerxes crosses Hellespont. Battles of Thermopylae, Artemision and Salamis. 2. Xanthippos 479 Athenians reject the offers of Mardonios: he occupies Athens. Battles of Plataea and Mykale. Athenian ἀρχή founded. Athens rebuilt and Peiraeus fortified: Walls of Themistokles. 3. Timosthenes 478 History of Herodotos ends at siege of Sestos (spring). Hieron succeeds Gelon as tyrant of Syracuse. Korax flourishes in his reign (cf. 466 B.C.). Pausanias recalled from Byzantium to Sparta. 4. Adeimantos 477 Formation of Delian Confederacy under headship of Athens: tribute assessed on members by Aristeides. Treason and death of Pausanias.—Kleisthenean constitution begins to be developed through the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος: Fourth Class made eligible for archonship: boards for internal administration multiplied (ἀγοράνομοι, ἀστύνομοι, &c.). 76. Phaedon 476 Phrynichos tragicus victor with Φοίνισσαι. Athenians take Eion, reconquer Lemnos, reduce Skyros and Karystos. 2. Dromoklei- 475 3. Akestorides 474 4. Menon 473 77. Chares 472 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 1 and 12. Death of Pythagoras age 99. Aeschylos Πέρσαι. Thrasydaeos, tyrant of Agrigentum, expelled: Empedokles opposes the restoration of the tyranny, I. cxx. 2. Praxiergos 471 Thucydides born. Themistokles ostracised. 3. Demotion 470 4. Apsephion 469 78. Theagenides 468 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 6. Sophokles gains his first tragic victory, age 28. Sokrates born. Death of Aristeides. 2. Lysistratos 467 Thrasybulos succeeds Hieron as tyrant of Syracuse. 3. Lysanias 466 Korax begins to teach Rhetoric at Syracuse: I. cxxi.—Pindar Πυθ. 4 and 5. Diagoras of Melos flor. Thrasybulos expelled from Syracuse: Gelonian dynasty overthrown and a democracy established. Naxos revolts from Athens and is subjugated. 4. Lysithcos 465 Athenian colonists destroyed by Thracians near Ennea Hodoi: II. 189. Thasos revolts from Athens: is reduced 463 B.C. Death of Xerxes: Artaxerxes I. (Μακρόχειρ) king (—425 B.C.). 79. Arclndemides 464 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 7 and 13. Helots rise against Spartans (—455 B.C.): quarrel between Athens and Sparta: alliance between Athens and Argos. 2. Tlepolemos 463 3. Konon 462 4. Evippos 461 Megara joins Athenian alliance: Long Walls of Megara built. 80. Phrasikleides 460 Parmenides visits Athens. Zenon of Elea (‘inventor of Dialectic’, Arist.) flor. Hippokrates the physician born. Demokritos born. Kephalos, father of Lysias, invited to settle at Athens by Perikles? I. 142. Revolt of Egypt from Persia (—455 B.C.). 2. Philokles 459 Lysias born, acc. to [Plut.] and Dionys. (cf. 444 B.C.) I. 143.—Thrasymachos of Chalkedon born? Reforms of Ephialtes II. 208. 3. Bion 458 Aeschylos Ὀρεστεία. Kimon ostracised? 4. Mnesitheides 457 Long Walls of Athens begun. Embitterment of the conservative party: murder of Ephialtes.—Athenians defeated at Tanagra by Lacedaemonians and allies.—Athenians defeat Boeotians at Oenophyta. Athenian empire at its greatest extent 81. Kallias 456 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 9. Death of Aeschylos age 69. Kimon recalled from exile. Long Walls of Athens completed. 2. Sosistratos 455 First tragedy, Πελιάδες, of Euripides, age 36. Destruction of Athenian armament sent to help Inaros II. 189. Persians reduce all Egypt except the fens held by Amyrtaeos.—Ithome surrenders to Sparta (cf. 464 B.C.): Tolmides, στρατηγός, settles expelled Helots at Naupaktos. —Athens conquers Aegina. 3. Ariston 454 Death of Alexander I. (φιλέλλην) of Macedon (498 B. C.—): accession of Perdikkas. 4. Lysikrates 453 82. Chaerepha- 452 Pindar Ὀλυμπ. 4 and 5. 2. Antidotos 451 Ion of Chios, tragic poet, begins to exhibit. 3. Euthydemos 450 Krates comicus and Bakchylides lyricus flor. Anaxagoras age 50 withdraws from Athens: he had taught Perikles and Euripides. Five Years'Truce between Athens and Sparta I. 130. Athens sends 60 ships to help Amyrtaeos in Egypt. 4. Pedieus 449 Siege of Citium in Cyprus by Kimon: cf. II. 189. His death. Athenian victory at the Cyprian Salamis. Alleged treaty (‘of Kalhas’) between Athens and Persia, II. 157 Alkibiades born? 83 Philiskos 448 Kratinos comicus flor. 2. Timarchides 447 Death of Themistokles.—Athenians under Tolmides defeated by Boeotians at Koroneia. Athemans evacuate Boeotia: their ἀρχή begins to break up. 3. Kallimachos 446 4. Lysimachides 445 Iktinos and Kallikrates, architects, flor. Euboea and Megara revolt from Athens. Lacedaemonians under Pleistoanax invade Attica. Thirty Years' Truce between Athens and Sparta: Andokides, grandfather of the orator, an envoy, I. 132. 84. Praxiteles 444 Date for birth of Lysias placed between this year and 436 by C. F. Hermann and Blass, I. 144 (cf. 459 B.C.). Pheidias age 44 has superintendence of the public art-works of Athens. Foundation of Thurii (I. 143), by Athenian colonists, on the site of Sybaris. 2. Lysanias 443 Death of Pindar age 79. Herodotus age 43 goes to Thurii: Lysias either now or later. Thucydides, son of Melesias, ostracised: aristocratic party broken up. 3. Diphilos 442 Euripides age 49 gains, for the first time, the first prize in tragedy. 4. Timokles 441 85. Myrochides 440 Andokides born, I. 71. Decree to put down Comedy (ψήφισμα τοῦ μὴ κωμωδεῖν). Sophokles Ἀντιγόνη (in the year of his στρατηγία). Revolt of Samos from Athens: Andokides avus and Sophokles command with Perikles against Samos, I. 72. Samos surrenders in 9th month. Appeal of Samians to Lacedaemonians: congress at Sparta: Corinthians insist on the principle of non-interference with an autonomous city. 2. Glaukines 439 3. Theodoros 438 Parthenon completed and dedicated: Pheidias age 50. — Euripides Ἄλκηστις.—Kalamis, sculptor, flor. 4. Euthymenes 437 Pheidias goes to Elis. Decree against Comedy repealed. 86. Lysimachos 436 Isokrates born. II. 2. The Zeus at Olympia completed by Pheidias. Propylaea of Athens begun. The people of Epidamnos apply to their metropolis Corcyra: help is refused, and they apply to Corinth. 2. Antilochides 435 Phrynichos comicus begins to write. Polygnotos, painter, flor. Corinthian army admitted into Epidamnos: sea-fight between Corinthians and Corcyraeans: Epidamnos capitulates to Corcyraeans. 3. Chares 434 Embassies to Athens from 4. Apseudes 433 Corcyra and from Corinth: Athens makes a defensive alliance with Corcyra: 10 Athenian ships sent to Corcyra under Lakedaemonios son of Kimon. 87. Pythodoros 432 Pheidias and Aspasia prosecuted ἀσεβείας: Pheidias dies in prison— Anaxagoras also persecuted: he withdraws to Lampsakos. Corcyraeans, supported by Athenians, defeated in a sea-fight by Corinthians (spring).— Athenians blockade Pydna and Potidaea.—Congress at Sparta (autumn): a large majority of the allies vote for war with Athens. 2. Euthydemos 431 Perikles speaks the ἐπιτά‐ φιος of those who had fallen in the first year of the war. Euripides Μήδεια. Xenophon born. Peloponnesian demands rejected by Athens.—Beginning of Peloponnesian War.—Theban attempt on Plataea.—First invasion of Attica under Archidamos.—Brasidas, now first heard of, rescues Methone from Athenians. 3. Apollodoros 430 Polykleitos, sculptor, flor. Year 2 of War.—Second invasion of Attica.—Plague at Athens.—Perikles unpopular: he is fined, but re-elected strategos. 4. Epameinon 429 Damon, musician, flor. II. 145. Plato born (May).—Death of Perikles (autumn). Eupolis writes Comedy. Year 3 of War.—Potidaea surrenders on conditions (cf. 332 B.C.)—Phormion, commanding Athenian fleet, gains two victories in Corinthian gulf. 88. Diotimos 428 Year 4 of War.—Lesbos, except Methymna, revolts: Athenians besiege Mytilene. —Third invasion of Attica, led by Kleomenes. 2. Eukleides 427 Gorgias visits Athens as chief envoy of Leontini, I. CXXV. Tisias accompanies him, acc. to Paus. Aristophanes begins to satirize the New Culture in his Δαιταλεῖς—a contrast between the old school and the new. Year 5 of War.mdash;Plataea destroyed by Sparta, II. 176.— Fourth invasion of Attica, led by Kleomenes.—Mytilene taken by Athenians, I. 56: massacre proposed by Kleon and averted by Diodotos.— Strife at Corcyra between oligarchs and demos (summer). Athens sends help to Leontini. 3. Euthynos 426 Aristophanes Βαβυλώνιοι— a plea for the allies against Kleon, &c. Year 6 of War.mdash;Athenians purity Delos and restore the Panionic festival, to be held there every 4 years. 4. Stratokles 425 Aristophanes Ἀχαρνεῖς. Zeuxis, painter, flor. Year 7 of War.mdash;Corcyraean demos, helped by Eurymedon and Athenians, storm Istone: massacre of oligarchs.—Fifth invasion of Attica led by Agis II. — Demosthenes occupies Pylos. Spartan hoplites blockaded in Sphakteria: Kleon takes the island, and brings Spartan prisoners to Athens. —Death of Artaxerxes I. (465 B.C.—See next year.) 89. Isarchos 424 Aristophanes Ἱππεῖς. Year 8 of War.mdash;Defeat of Athenians by Thebans at Delium.—Brasidas in Thrace: he gains Akanthos, Amphipolis, Stageiros, Torone.— Congress of Sicilian Greeks at Gela: Hermokrates denounces Atheman aggression. Accession of Dareios II. (Νόθος—405 B.C.) after a contest. 2. Ameinias 423 Thucydides, the historian, is banished, or withdraws from Athens, in consequence of his failure to save Amphipolis (January?). Returns to Athens in 403. Aristophanes Νεφέλαι (1st edit.). Year 9 of War.mdash;Brasidas in Thrace: Skione and Mende revolt from Athens.—Truce for a year. 3. Alkaeos 422 Aristophanes Σφῆκες. Year 10 of War.mdash;Torone recovered by Kleon. Battle of Amphipolis: Kleon and Brasidas killed.—Number of Athenian males above the age of 20 was at this time about 20,000: total civic population (excluding μέτοικοι and slaves) about 82,000: average attendance in Ekklesia, about 5000. 4. Aristion 421 Eupolis in his Κόλαλες brings in Protagoras as then hving at Athens Year 11 of War.mdash;Peace ‘of Nikias,’ for 50 years, nominally valid down to 414, but not accepted by Boeotians, Corinthians or Megarians. 90. Astyphilos 420 Isaeos born II. 262. Plato comicus flor. Year 12 of War.mdash;Separate treaty of Sparta with (1) Boeotians, (2) Aigives.—Alkibiades contrives to alienate the Argives from Sparta: defensive alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis and Mantineia. 2. Archias 419 Year 13 of War.mdash;Alkibiades στρατηγός: he makes a progress through Achaia.—Invasion of Epidauros by Argives. Year 14 of War.mdash;Spartans in- 3. Antiphon 418 vade Argos. Argives, with Alkibiades, attack Orchomenos: Spartans come to the defence of Tegea. Battle of Mantineia (cf. 362 B C.): Complete victory of Spartans over Argives and Athenians. Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand at Argos. 4. Euphemos 417 Antiphon or. 5 περὶ τοῦ Ἡρώδου φόνου, I. 59 Year 15 of War.mdash;Rising of Argive demos against oligarchs. —Athenian expedition to get back Amphipolis: Perdikkas of Macedon breaks faith, and the plan fails.—Ostracism of Hyperbolos, I. 134—the tenth, and last, recorded exercise of ostracism since its institution by Kleisthenes about 509 B.C. (Cf. I. 137.) 91. Arimnestos 416 Agathon tragicus flor. Year 16 of War.mdash;Athenians take Melos, II. 156. Victories of Alkibiades at Olympia? II. 227.—Embassy to Athens from Egesta, asking help against Selinus. Athenian envoys sent to Egesta. 2. Chabrias 415 Andokides banished, under the decree of Isotimides, I. 75. Fictitious date of [Andok.] or. 4 κατὰ Ἀλκιβιάδου, I. 134. Sokrates flor., age 53: Plato is now 14: Alkibiades circ. 34, Xenophon circ. 16.— Euripides Τρωάδες . Year 17 of War.mdash;Envoys return from Egesta: Sicilian Expedition voted.—Mutilation of the Hermae, just as fleet is going to sail for Sicily (May), I. 73—(Athenian ambitions in 415: II. 188.) — Alkibiades accused of profaning Mysteries.—Expedition sails for Sicily under Nikias, Lamachos and Alkibiades.—Excitement caused at Athens by disclosures of Diokleides and Andokides. Alkibiades condemned to death in his absence.—Nikias misses his chance of investing Syracuse. 3. Peisandros 414 Aristophanes Ὄρνιθες. Year 18 of War.—Second campaign in Sicily. Lamachos killed. Gylippos enters Syracuse. Nikias writes to Athens for help. 4. Kleokritos 413 Year 19 of War.mdash;Dekeleia in Attica fortified by Lacedaemonians, II. 188, who ravage Attica. Formal end to the truce of 421. Beginning of the second chapter of the War, called the Δεκελεικὸς or Ἰώνιος πόλεμος (—404 B.C.)— Third campaign in Sicily. Sea-fight at Syracuse: Athenian fleet destroyed. Death of Nikias and of Demosthenes. Death of Perdikkas, King of Macedon (454 B.C.—); accession of Archelaos (—399 B.C.). 92. Kallias 412 Antiphon or. 6 περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ? I. 63 —Lysias and his brother Polemarchos driven from Thurii, come to Athens.— Euripides Ἑλένη, Ἀνδρομέδα. Kallimachos, sculptor, flor. Year 20 of War.mdash;Revolt of Lesbos from Athens, I. 58. Revolt of Euboea, II. 263. Revolt of Chios, II. 160. Pedaritos commands there for Sparta, II. 198. Revolt of Miletos. Oropos seized by Boeotians, II. 179. Athenians lose a sea-fight off Knidos, II. 351.—Samian demos, true to Athens, rises against the oligarchs. Athenian fleet musters at Samos: Spartan Astyochos defeats Charmînos. Alkibiades takes refuge from Spartans with Tissaphernes: his overtures to the Athenian leaders. 2. Theopompos 411 First return of Andokides to Athens, I. 79. Antiphon dies, I. 13. Xenophon begins his Ἑλληνικά with the manœuvres at the Hellespont just after the battle of Kynossema: cf. 362 B.C. Aristophanes Λυσιστράτη, Θεσμοφοριάζουσαι . Year 21 of War.mdash;Government of the Four Hundred, I. 7: (March —June.)—Eratosthenes (Lys. or. 12) active at the Hellespont for the oligarchs: I. 266.—Athenian victory at Kynossema.—Evagoras begins to reign? II. 110. 3. Glaukippos 410 Second return of Andokides to Athens: or. 2. περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καθόδου, I. 109.—Dramatic date of Plato Φαῖδρος? II. 3.— History of Thucydides breaks off after the battle of Kyzikos. Year 22 of War.mdash;Thrasyllos commands on coast of Asia Minor, I. 297.—Second form of the Trierarchy brought in — συντριηραρχία: cf. 357, 340 B.C. — Athenians attack and recover Kyzikos: death of Spartan admiral Mindaros. — Kleophon δημαγωγός: Athens rejects Spartan offers of peace. 4. Diokles 409 Sophokles Φιλοκτήτης. Year 23 of War.mdash;Athenian campaign under Thrasyllos in Lydia. — Messenians in Pylos surrender to Sparta.— Megara recovers Nisaea. 93. Euktemon 408 Euripides Ὀρέστης. Aristophanes Πλοῦτος (1st edit.: cf. 388 B.C.). Year 24 of War.mdash;Alkibiades recovers Selymbria and Byzantium for Athens.—Troops under Thrasyllos defeated at Ephesos, I. 297. 2. Antigenes 407 Lysias or. 20 ὑπὲρ Πολυστράτου? I. 217. Year 25 of War.mdash;Alkibiades returns to Athens, is chosen στρατηγός and leads the procession to Eleusis.—Antiochos, the pilot of Alkibiades, defeated by Lysander off Notion, Alkibiades plunders Kyme. He is deposed from his στρατηγία: ten new Generals are chosen. 3. Kallias 406 Death of Euripides. Year 26 of War.mdash;Dionysios I. becomes tyrant of Syracuse, II. 171.—Kallikratidas (successor of Lysander) storms Methymna and blockades Konon in Mytilene. Complete victory of Athenians at Arginusae: death of Kallikratidas.—Theramenes accuses the Generals: six are put to death, Sokrates protesting. 4. Alexias 405 Death of Sophokles. Aristophanes Βάτραχοι. Dramatic date of Plato Γοργίας . Year 27 of War.mdash;Battle of Aegospotami (late autumn). The Areiopagostakes measures for public safety, II. 212. Konon escapes to Evagoras. Death of Dareios II. (424 B.C.—): Artaxerxes II. (Μνή‐ μων—359 B. C.) succeeds him. 94. Pythodorus 404 Polemarchos, brother of Lysias, put to death by the Thirty (May); Lysias escapes to Megara, I. 148: cf. 265.—Isokrates leaves Athens for Chios, II. 6. Theramenes brings the terms of peace from Sparta. Agoratos informs, I. 269. Athens surrenders to Lysander. Kritias and Eratosthenes are among the five ἔφοροι, and then among the XXX., I. 266. Tyranny of the Thirty begins (April). Thrasybulos advances from Phyle to Peiraeus. The Thirty deposed in 8th month (Dec.). Theramenes put to death in autumn, II. 6.— Death of Alkibiades, age about 45. 2. Eukleides 403 Proposal to give Lysias the citizenship defeated by Aichinos, I. 151. Lysias or. 12 κατὰ Ἐρατοσθέ‐ νους, I 261.—Lysias or, 34 περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πσλιτείαν, I. 211. Isokrates returns to Athens, II. 6 Isokrates or. 21 πρὸς Εὐθύνουν, II. 219. Thrasybulos and the exiles in the Peiraeus are at war with the Ten; but are in possession of Athens before the end of July —Democracy formally restored in September.—Law of Aristophon, II. 328 — Knights who had served under the Thirty are required to refund their κατάστασις, I. 246.—Expedition from Athens to Eleusis, to dislodge the Thirty, I. 252. 3. Mikon 402 Third and final return of Andokides to Athens. Lysias or. 21 δωροδοκίας ἀπολογία, I. 219. Lysias or. 24 ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου? I. 255. Isokrates or. 18 πρὸς Καλλίμαχον, II. 232. 4. Xenaenetos 401 Lysias or. 25 δήμου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία, I. 250. Sophokles Οἰδίπους ἐπὶ Κολωνῷ: brought out by Sophokles nepos. Expedition of Cyrus the younger, II. 161, 173. Battle of Kunaxa and death of Cyrus (autumn).—Retreat of the Greeks: they reach Armenia in the winter.— War between Lacedaemon and Elis. 95. Laches 400 Parrhasios, painter, flor. Campaign of Thimbron in Asia Minor, II. 161. The Greeks in their retreat reach Kotyora on the Euxine 8 months after battle of Kunaxa. 2. Aristokrates 399 Andokides or. 1 περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων, I. 114.—Death of Sokrates, I. 153.—Lysias or. 30 κατὰ Νικομάχου, I. 224.—[Lys.] or. 6 κατὰ Ἀνδοκίδου, I. 281.—Plato withdraws to Megara.—Lys. or. 13 κατὰ Ἀγοράτου, I. 269. Proceedings before the Areiopagos against men formerly of the XXX., I 296. Derkyllidas supersedes Thimbron in Asia Minor, II. 161.— Death of Archelaos of Macedon (413 B. C.—); his son Orestes succeeds, but is dispossessed (396 B. C.) by his guardian Aeropos. See 394. 3. Ithykles 398 Ktesias brought his Περσικά to this year. Second campaign of Derkyllidas in Asia Minor. 4. Suniades 397 Lysias or. 17 περὶ δημοσίων χρημάτων [better περὶ τῶν Ἐράτωνοσχρημάτων] I. 300 Isokrates or. 17 περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους, II. 228. Third campaign of Derkyllidas in Asia Minor: he is about to invade Karia when he meets the satraps and makes an armistice with Tissaphernes. 96. Phormion 396 Beginning of ὁ περὶ *)ρόδον πόλεμος between Persia and Sparta (—394 B. C.), II. 160. First campaign of Agesilaos in Asia Minor, II. 161. 2. Diophantos 395 Lysias or. 18 περὶ δημεύ‐ σεως τῶν τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ, I. 229. Plato age 34 returns to Athens. His Γοργίας written between this year and 389. Lysias or. 7 περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ? I. 289. Athenian expedition to relieve Haliartos, I. 247. Alkibiades the younger takes part, I. 257, and Lysander is killed.—Second campaign of Agesilaos. 3. Eubulides 394 [Lysias] or. 9 ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατιωτοῦ, I. 232. Isokrates or. 20 κατὰ Λοχί‐ του, II. 215.—(or. 393) or. 19 Ἀιγινητικός, II. 217 or. 17 Τραπεζιτικός, II. 222. Beginning of Corinthian War (—390 B. C.), II. 161. Naval campaigns of Konon (Lys. or. 19), I. 235.—Battle of Corinth. Agesilaos in Boeotia (autumn), I. 247. Battle of Knidos, II. 160. — Dionysios I. hard pressed by Carthaginians, II. 198. — Amyntas II of Macedon begins to reign, II. 158. 4. Demostratos 393 Lysias or. 3 κατὰ Σίμωνος, I. 277. Polykrates κατηγορία Σωκρατους, II. 94. (—391) Isaeos the pupil of Isokrates, II. 264. Long Walls of Athens restored by Konon, I. 83. Lechaeum, western port of Corinth, taken by Lacedaemomans, II. 352. 97. Philokles 392 Lysias or. 16 ὑπὲρ Μαντιθέου? I. 245. Isokrates begins to teach. First period of his School, 392—378 B. C.: II. 10.— Aristophanes Ἐκκλησιά‐ ζουσαι. 2. Nikoteles 391 (—390 B. C.) Isokrates or. 11 Βούσιρις, II. 93: or. 13 κατὰ σοφιστῶν, II. 127. Plenipotentiaries sent by Athens to treat for peace at Sparta, I. 83 (winter 391—390). 3. Demostiatos 390 Andokides or. 1 περὶ τῆς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνης (spring), I. 128.—Isokrates visits Gorgias in Thessaly, II. 5. Isaeos or. 5 περὶ τοῦ Δικαιογένους κλήρου, II. 348. Skopas, sculptor, and Theopompos, last poet of Old Comedy, flor. Thrasybulos the Steirian receives Amadokos I. and Seuthes into the alliance of Athens, II. 168: descends the coast of Asia Minor, II. 346. 4. Antipatros 389 Lysias or. 28 κατὰ Ἐργοκλέους, I. 221. Lysias or. 27 κατὰ Ἐπικράτους? I. 222. Lysias or. 29 κατὰ Φιλοκρά‐ τους, I 240. Aeschines born. Plato age 40 first visits Sicily. His Πολιτεία was begun before this year. Death of Thrasybulos the Steirian, I. 246. Atheman expedition to aid Evagoras, I. 236.—Conquests of Dionysios I. in Sicily and Magna Graecia, II. 163 (389—387 B. C.). 98. Pyrrhion 388 Lysias or. 33 Ὀλυμπιακός, I. 204. Aristophanes Πλοῦτος—second (the extant) edition, marking the transition to Middle Comedy; cf. 408 B. C. Polykrates eminent as a teacher of Rhetoric, II. 95. 388—387 B.C., Diotimos commands in Hellespont, I. 237. Dionysios I. of Syracuse sends an embassy to Olympia. I, 155. 2. Theodotos 387 Lysias or. 19 περὶτῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων, I. 235. Eight triremes under Thrasybulos the Kollytean taken by Antalkidas, near Abydos, I. 243.—Peace of Antalkidas, II. 151 3 Mystichides 386 Lysias or. 22 κατὰ τῶν σιτοπωλῶν? I. 227. Plato age 43 begins to teach in the Academy? Plataea rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold against Thebes, II 176. 4. Dexitheos 385 Mantinera destroyed by Lacedaemonians, II. 152.—Beginning of war between Evagoras and Artaxerxes II., II. 158. 99. Diotiephes 384 (—383 B.C.) Lys. or. 10 κατὰ Θεομνήστου, I. 293. Demosthenes born (Schä- fer). Aristotle born: Plato age 45. 2. Phanostratos 383 Olynthos besieged by Lacedaemonians, II. 150.—Beginning of Olynthian War (— 379), II. 158. Kotys becomes King of Thracian Odrysae. Iphikrates goes against him with Athenian force: then makes peace with him, II. 337. 3. Evandros 382 Lysias or. 26 κατὰ Ἐυάνδρου, I, 242. The Kadmeia seized by Lacedaemonians, II. 152 —Philip of Macedon, son of Amyntas II., born: cf. 359 B.C. 4. Demophilos 381 (—380 B. C.) Lysias frag. CXX. f. (Sauppe) ὑπὲρ Φερενίκου, I. 312. 100. Pytheas 380 Lysias (I 155). Phlius besieged by Lacedaemonians, II. 150. 2. Nikon 379 Gorgias and Aristophanes die about this time. End of Olynthian War, II. 158. 3. Nausinikos 378 (—376 B.C.) Isokrates companion and secretary of Timotheos, II. 10. These orators flourish;— Kallistratos, Leodamas, Thrasybulos and Kephalos of Kollytos, II. 372. Athens at the head of a new Naval Confederacy, II. 10.— Financial reform: establishment of the 20 συμμορίαι for payment of war-tax, II. 30. Θηβαικὸς πόλεμος (II. 331) begins (—371 B. C.). Invasions of Boeotia by Agesilaos and Kleombrotos, II. 176. 4. Kallias 377 (—371 B.C.) Isaeos or. 10 περὶ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου κλήρου, II. 333. Agesilaos invades Boeotia. — Thebes begins to reorganise the Boeotian Confederacy, II. 178. 101. Charisandros 376 —351, Second period of the school of Isokrates, II. 10. Death of Antisthenes, II. 103. End of war (385—) between Evagoias and Aitaxerxes II., II. 158. Kleombrotos invades Boeotia. 2. Hippodamos 375 Isaeos or. 8 περὶ τοῦ Κίρωνος κλήρου? II. 327. Araros (son of Aristophanes) and Eubulos, earliest poets of Middle Comedy. Timotheos sails round Peloponnesos: Corcyra and other cities of the Ionian Sea join the Atheman League. 3. Sokratides 374 Isokrates or. 2 πρὸς Νικοκλέα, II. 87. —370 B. C., Jason of Pherae tagos of Thessaly, II. 18. Death of Evagoras king of the Cyprian Salamis, II. 107. Congress at Sparta. Peace between Athens and Sparta, II. 178: Thebes excluded from it, ib. 181. 4. Asteios 373 Isokrates or. 14 Πλαταικός, II. 176. Plataea destroyed. Walls of Thespiae razed by Thebans, II. 177—9. At this time Oropos belonged to Athens, ib.: cf. 412 B. C.—Timotheos deposed from his στρατηγία and accused by Iphikrates and Kallistratos. — Iphikrates, Chabrias, Kallistratos chosen Generals. 102. Alkisthenes 372 Isokrates or. 1 πρὸς Δημόνικον? II. 84: or. 3 Νικοκλῆς ἢ Κύπριοι, II. 90. 2. Phrasikleides 371 Battle of Leuktra, July 6, II. 196. General Peace (excluding the Thebans) concluded at Sparta (‘Peace of Kallias’), June 16, II. 141.—Jason of Pherae enters Greece as mediator. 3. Dysniketos 370 Isokrates or. 10 Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον, II. 100. Jason assassinated, II. 18. First march of Epameinondas into Peloponnesos: invasion of Laconia: foundation of Megalopolis and of the new Messene, II. 194. 4. Lysistratos 369 Isaeos or. 9 περὶ τοῦ Ἀστυφίλου κλήρου, II. 330. Second march of Epameinondas into Peloponnesos. First expedition sent by Dionysios I. of Syracuse to help the Corinthians and Spartans: Athens also forms friendly relations with him.—Death of Amyntas II. of Macedon: accession of his eldest son Alexander II. (brother of Philip). 103. Nausigenes 368 Isokrates Epist. I Διονύσῳ, II. 238. Second expedition sent by Dionysios I. Pelopidas imprisoned by Alexander of Pherae: released by Epameinondas.—Philip (age 14) sent by Ptolemaeos as a hostage to Thebes: lives there till 365 B. C. — Alexander II. of Macedon put to death by usurper Ptolemaeos (—365 B. C.). 2. Polyzelos 367 Dionysios I. gains tragic prize with Λύτρα Ἕκτορος. Plato age 62 visits Sicily for second time. Aristotle age 17 comes to Athens, where he lives till Plato's death in 347. Death of Dionysios I. of Syracuse, II. 19. His son Dionysios II. succeeds him. Third march of Epameinondas into Peloponnesos.—Timotheos again in command of Athenian fleet. 3. Kephisodoros 366 Isokrates or. 6 Ἀρχίδαμος, II. 193. Demosthenes comes of age: his studies with Isaeos probably begin, II. 267. Sparta refuses to recognise Messene. Corinth, Epidauros and Phlius make peace for themselves with Thebes, II. 193. Oropos revolts from Athens and is occupied by the Thebans. 4. Chion 365 Isokrates or. 9 Ἐυαγόρας? II. 106. Kallistratos and Chabrias impeached for the Oropos affair by Leodamas, Philostratos Κολωνέυς, and (?) Hegesippos:—acquitted. Timotheos reduces Samos (where κληροῦχοι are established), Sestos and Krithote. —Perdikkas III. (second son of Amyntas II. and brother of Philip) King of Macedon (—359 B. C.). 104. Timokrates 364 (—363 B.C) Isaeos or. 6 περὶ τοῦ Φιλοκτήμονος κλήρου, II. 343. Timotheos succeeds to the command of Iphikrates in Thrace: takes Methone, Pidna, Potidaea, Torone. Expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly: his death. 2. Charikleides 363 Demosthenes or. 27 κατὰ Ἀφόβου ά, or. 28 κατὰ Ἀφόβου β/, II 301. Campaign of Timotheus against Kotys and Byzantines: his return to Athens. 3. Molon 362 Demosthenes or. 30 πρὸς Ὀνήτορα ά, or. 31 πρὸς Ὀνήτορα β/, II. 301. Plato's third visit to Sicily. Xenophon closes his Ἑλληνικά (411 B. C.—) at the battle of Mantineia. Fourth and last march of Epameinondas into Peloponnesos. Battle of Mantineia (July 3); death of Epameinondas. General peace, excluding Sparta.—Autokles Athenian commander at the Hellespont. 4. Nikophemos 361 Demosthenes or. 41 πρὸς Σπουδίαν, or. 55 πρὸς Καλλικλέα, II. 301. Deinarchos born. Archidamos III. succeeds his father Agesilaos as a king of Sparta, II. 19.—Kallistratos flies from Athens to Thasos: Thasians recolonise Datos, II. 185. Aristophon δημαγωγός. 105. Kallimedes 360 (—353 B. C.) Isaeos or. 1 περὶ τοῦ Κλεωνόμου κλήρου, II. 319. Hypereides κατ’ Αὐτοκλέους, II. 381. Praxiteles, sculptor, flor. War between Artaxerxes II. and his satrap Orontes: Athens supports the latter II. 185. 2. Eucharistos 359 Isaeos or. 11 περὶ τοῦ Ἁγνίου κλήρου, II. 354. Demosthenes trierarch. Isokrates Epist. VI τοῖς Ἰά‐ σονος παισίν, II. 241. Death of Aitaxerxes II. (Μνή‐ μων, 405 B. C.—) Accession of Artaxerxes III. ( Ὦχος—337 B. C.).—Perdikkas III. of Macedon killed in battle with Illyrians: contest for throne: accession of Philip (—336 B.C.). —Alexander of Pherae murdered by his wife Thebe's halfbrothers, Tisiphonos, Peitholaos and Lykophron, II. 241. Kotys, king of Thracian Odrysae, murdered: his son Kersobleptes prevails, in a contest for the succession, over Berisades and Amadokos II., II. 185. 3. Kephisodo- 358 4. Agathokles 357 Chios, Kos, Rhodes, Byzantium revolt from Athens. Social War begins (—355 B. C.), II. 183. Philip takes Amphipolis, II. 185. Treaty between Chares and Kersobleptes: Thracian Chersonese (except Kardia) ceded to Athens, ib. Third form of the Trierarchy brought in by the συμμορίαι of Periandros: cf. 410 B.C. 106. Elpines 356 Isaeos frag. XVI (Sauppe) ὐπὲρ Εὐμάθους, II. 367. Demosthenes or. 54 κατὰ Κόνωνος? II. 300. Isokrates Epist. IX Ἀρχιδάμῳ, II. 243. Alexis writes Comedy. Philip victor at Olympia: takes and destroys Potidaea: founds Philippi. Alexander the Great born. Chares deteats a Persian force, II. 206. 2. Kallistratos 355 Isokrates or. 8 περὶ τῆς εἰρή‐ νης (or συμμαχικὀς): or. 7 Ἁρεοπαγιτικός, II. 202. Demosthenes or. 22 κατὰ Ἀνδροτίωνος, II. 301. Aristotle may have taught Rhetoric as early as this year. Social War ends (midsummer), II. 183.—Phocian (or Sacred) War begins (— 346 B. C.).— Oligarchies set up at Corcyra, Chios, Mytilene, &c., II. 248. 3. Diotimos 354 Death of Xenophon? Isaeos or. 2 περὶ τοῦ Μενεκλέους κλήρου, II. 336. Dem. or. 14 περὶ τῶν συμμοριῶν, II. 301, 373, or. 20 πρὸς Λεπτίνην, II. 301. Eubulos becomes financial mimster of Athens (ταμιας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου), II. 27: cf. 338 B.C.—Timotheos brought to trial: dies at Chalkis.— Kallistratos returns to Athens (cf. 361 B. C.):—his death, II. 186.—The Generals Ipikrates, Menestheus and Timotheos arraigned by Aristophon and Chares. 4. Eudemos 353 Isokrates or. 15 περὶ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως, II. 134. Isaeos or. 7 περὶ τοῦ Ἀπολλοδώρου κλήρου, II. 324. Philip marches along the Thracian coasts, and takes Abdera and Maroneia.—Philip takes Methone: is defeated in Thessaly by Onomarchos. 107. Aristodemos 352 Demosthenes or. 16 ὑπὲρ Μεγαπολιτῶν, or. 24 κατὰ Τιμοκρατους, or. 23 κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους, or. 36 ὑπὲρ Φορμίωνος, II. 300. Theodektes tragicus flor. Theopompos, historian, flor. Philip re-enteis Thessaly: defeats Phocians under Onomarchos (who is killed), and advances to Thermopylae: finds it held by Athenians, and retires. He marches to Heraeon on Propontis: dictates peace to Kersobleptes, makes alliance with Kaidia, Perinthos and Byzantium,— He frees Pherae from the Tyranny, II. 241. 2. Thessalos 351 Demosthenes or. 4 κατὰ Φιλίππου ά, II. 301: or. 15 ὑπὲρ τῆς Ῥοδίων ἐλευθερίας. Death of Mausolos. Artemisia proposes a contest of oratory; Theopompos the historian gains the prize, II. 11. Idrieus, brother of Mausolos, succeeds Artemisia as dynast of Kaiia, II. 173.—Philip marches against the Molossian Arybbas. 3. Apollodoros 350 (—338.) Third period of the school of Isokiates, II. 10. Demosthenes or. 39 πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος, II. 300. Isokrates Epist. IX τοῖς Μυτιληναίων ἄρχουσιν, II. 248. Death of Isaeos? II. 269. Euboeans ally themselves with Athens. Phokion leads Athenians to support Plutarchos of Eretria: battle of Tamynae.—Apollodoros tried and condemned for proposing to apply the θεωρικὸν to the war. —First help sent by Athens to Olynthos. 4. Kallimachos 349 Demosthenes or. 26 κατὰ Μειδιου, or. 1 Ὀλυνθιακὸς ά, or. 2 Ὀλυνθιακὸς β/. Philip makes war on Olynthos and the Chalkidic towns. Alliance between Olynthians and Athens.—Second Athenian expedition, under Chares, to help them. 108. Theophilos 348 Demosthenes or. 3 Ὀλυνθιακὸς γ/. Philip besieges Olynthos—third Athenian expedition, under Chares, to help it—Philip takes Olynthos: destroys it and the 32 Chalkidic towns of its Confederacy. 2. Themistokles 347 [Dem.] or. 40 πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ προικός. Death of Plato age 82. Aristotle leaves Athens and goes to Hermeias of Atarneus. Philip renews war with Kersobleptes (cf. 352)—which he ends in 346 by dictating a peace. Athenian troops under Chares sent to Thrace.— Mytilene returns into alliance with Athens. 3. Archias 346 Isokrates or. 5 Φίλιππος (April), II. 167. Demosthenes or. 5 περὶ εἰ‐ ρήνης (August). Envoys (Philokrates, Aeschines, Demosthenes, &c.) sent by Athens to Philip. — Philip goes to Thracian War.—Antipater and Parmenion negociate with Athenian envoys, —Peace ‘of Philokrates’ ratified on part of Athens and allies (April).—Second Athenian embassy to await Philip at Pella: he returns and takes the envoys to Pherae: ratifies peace there (end of June) —Philip occupies Phocis: end of Phocian War. Philip becomes a member of Amphictyonic Council, and thereby a Greek Power. 4. Eubulos 345 Demosthenes or. 37 πρὸς Πανταίνετον, or. 38 πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον, II. 300. Aeschines or. 1 κατὰ Τιμάρχου. Isokrates Epist. VII. Τιμοθέῳ, II. 246. The Δηλιακός of Hypereides (cf. II. 385 n.) earther than 344: Sauppe II. 285 f. Philip marches against Illyrii, Dardani, Triballi.—Timoleon of Corinth goes against Dionysios II. of Syracuse. 109 Lykiskos 344 Demosthenes or 6 κατὰ Φιλίππου β/. Aristotle removes from Ataineus to Mytilene. Ephoros, historian, flor. Timoleon frees Sicily —Philip begins to meddle in Peloponnesos. Demosthenes goes thither to counteract him. Embassy, in remonstrance, from Philip, Argos and Messene to Athens. 2. Pythodotos 343 Demosthenes or. 19, and Aeschines or 2, περὶ τῆς παραπρεσβείας Antiphanes still writing Comedy. Philokrates is accused by Hypereides, goes into exile.— Aeschines is accused by Demosthenes of malversation in the embassy (346 B. C.), but is acquitted. 3. Sosigenes 342 Hegesippos ([Dem.] or. 7) περὶ Ἁλοννήσου. Isokrates Epist. II. Φιλίππῳ ά, II. 250: Epist. v. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, II. 252 Aristotle begins to teach Alexander. Menander born. Philip sets up tetrarchies in Thessaly. — His letter to Athens about Halonnesos.— Alliance between Euboean Chalkis and Athens—(*) nning of Philip's Third lnracian War (—339 B. C) cf. 352, 347 B. C. 4. Nikomachos 341 Demosthenes or 8 περὶ τῶν ἐν χερσοννήσῳ, or. 9 κατὰ Φιλίππου γ/. Aphareus tragicus flor. down to this time. Feud between Kardia and Attic kleruchi of Chersonese.— Philip supports Kardia Diopeithes, Athenian General, ravages Thracian seaboard. Letter of Philip to Athens about the Chersonese.—Philip approaches Perinthos.—Demosthenes envoy to Byzantium: its alliance with Athens. 110. Theophrastos 340 Isokrates Epist. IV. Ἀντιπάτρῳ, II. 253. Anaximenes Ῥητορικὴ [πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον]? Philip besieges Perinthos and Byzantium:—Athenians under Chares support Byzantines.—Philip's ultimatum: Athens, on proposal of Demosthenes, declares war.— Fourth form of the Trierarchy brought in by law of Demosthenes, equalising the burden on taxable capital: cf. 410, 357 B. C. 2 Lysimachides 339 Isokrates or. 12 Παναθηναικός, II. 113. Xenokiates begins to teach in the Academy. Aeschines and Meidias go as πυλαγόραι to Amphictyonic Council. Amphictyons make war on Lokrians of Amphissa.—Second Athenian force sent to help Byzantium. Philip raises the siege.—Amphictyons make Philip their General (Oct.). He returns to Greece, defeats mercenaries under Chares and Proxenos, and destroys Amphissa. 3. Chaerondas 338 Isokrates Epist. III. Φιλίππῳ β/, II. 235. Death of Isokrates, II. 31. (—326 B. C.) Lykurgos, the orator, is ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου, II. 375. Commissioners (including Demosthenes) appointed to restore fortifications of Athens: Demosthenes administers the θεωρικόν.—Immediately after destroying Amphissa, Philip hands over the Achaean Naupaktos to the Aetolians: then enters Phokis, and occupies Kytinion and Elateia (Feb.?). 4. Phrynichos 337 (Jan.?) At the annual winter Festival of the Dead in the outer Kerameikos, Demosthenes speaks the epitaph of those who fell at Chaeroneia. [Not extant: the Demosthenic or. 60 is spurious.] Battle of Chaeroneia: μεταγειτνίωνος ἑβδόμῃ (Aug. 2? Curt. v. 436 Eng. tr. n.). Peace ‘of Demades’ between Philip and Athens End of Athenian Naval Hegemony: Congress of Corinth: Hellenic League under Macedonian Hegemony: Philip Hellenic General against Persia. — Artaxerxes III. (Ὦχος) dies: Arses succeeds him. 111. Pythodemos 336 Ktesiphon proposes(March) that Demosthenes should be crowned at the Great Dionysia. Aeschines gives notice of an action παρανόμων against Ktesiphon. Deinarchos begins his activity as λογογράφος. Death of Arses: Dareios III. King of Persia (—330 B. C.). Parmenion and Attalos open the Persian War in Asia. Philip assassinated at Aegae (early in August). Alexander the Great becomes king of Macedon —He enters Greece: Thessaly, Amphictyons, Athens and Congress of Corinth acknowledge his hegemony. 2. Euaenetos 335 The surrender of Demosthenes. Lykurgos, &c. is demanded from Athens by Alexander:—Demades helps to arrange a peace. Parmenion repulsed in Asia by Memnon, who takes Ephesos. — Thebans rise against Macedon: Alexander takes and destroys Thebes (autumn). 3. Ktesikles 334 Aristotle settles at Athens and teaches in the Lykeron.—His Ῥητορική certainly later than 338 B.C. Alexander sets out for Persian War, and crosses Hellespont: wins battle of Granikos (May): reduces Aeolis and Ionia: takes Miletos and Halikarnassos: and advances to Gordion in Phrygia. 4. Nikokrates 333 Alexander routs Dareios III. at Issos (Oct.). 112. Niketes 332 Alexander besieges Tyre; takes it (July): takes Gaza: occupies Egypt: founds Alexandria: winters at Memphis. 2. Aristophanes 331 Lysippos, sculptor, flor. With his school began a decline of Sculpture, parallel to that of Oratory. Cf. II. 445. Kallisthenes of Stageiros, who went with Alexander to Asia, represents the decay of taste in oratorical prose. Alexander crosses Euphrates (July); routs Dareios at Arbela (Oct.); marches to Babylon, Susa and Persepolis. 3. Aristophon 330 (August?) Demosthenes or. 18 περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου, Aeschines or. 3 κατὰ Κτησιφῶντος, II. 398. — Aeschines leaves Athens. Lykurgos κατὰ Λεωκράτους, II. 376. Demades administers the θεωρικόν.—[Dem.] or. 17 περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν (by Hegesippos?). Hypereides ὑπὲρ Ἐυξενίππου? II. 387. Spartans, under Agis III., rise against Macedon: are defeated at Megalopolis by Antipater; and accept Macedonian hegemony: death of Agis III. —Alexander pursues Dareios, who is murdered by Bessos in Parthia.—enters Hyrcania, Drangiania, and Aracosia: founds Alexandria ad Caucasum (Kandahar?). 4. Kephisophon 329 Alexander enters Baktria and Sogdiana; takes Marakanda (Samarkand): crosses the Oxus and advances to Jaxartes: founds Alexandria Eschate (Khojend?).—Returns to winter-quarters in Baktria. 113. Euthykritos 328 Between 330 and 326 B.C. (Schäfer) there was a great dearth at Athens, during which Demosthenes administered the σιτωνία. Alexander subdues Sogdiana.— Slays Kleitos at Marakanda. —Harpalos sends supplies of corn to Athens, and receives the citizenship. 2. Hegemon 327 Alexander crosses the Indus and enters the Punjaub. 3. Chremes 326 End of financial administration of Lykurgos (338 B.C. —): Menesaechmos becomes ταμίας. Fictitious date of the speech περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας (i.e. 338—326 B.C.): not by Demades, Sauppe II. 312. Alexander defeats Porus. — Begins his river-voyage southwards through India. 4. Antikles 325 Alexander reaches mouth of Indus about July.—Sets out on march westward in Aug., and reaches capital of Gedrosia in Oct.—Nearchos sails for Persian Gulf in Oct.— Harpalos, the profligate treasurer of Alexander, crosses from Asia to Attica:—is warned from the Peiraeus, and goes to Taenaron. 114. Hegesias 324 Demarchos or. 1 κατὰ Δημοσθένους, or. 2 κατὰ Ἀριστογείτονος, or. 3 κατὰ Φιλοκλέους, II. 373. Hypereides κατὰ Δημοσθέ‐ νους.—Death of Lykurgos (before midsummer). Alexander celebrates the Dionysia at Susa. — Death of Hephaestion at Ekbatana.— Athens decrees divine honours to Alexander.—Demosthenes ἀρχιθέωρος at Olympia (July). — Areiopagos directs that Demosthenes, Philokles, Demades, &c. be prosecuted for taking bribes from Harpalos. —Demosthenes is fined and imprisoned:—escapes to Aegina. 2. Kephisodoros 323 Epikuros age 18 comes to Athens. Alexander holds court at Babylon and receives the embassies.—His death, June 8. Lamian War, promoted by Hypereides — Leosthenes of Athens defeats Antipater at Herakleia and besieges him in Lamia. 3. Philokles 322 Hypereides ἐπιτάφιος, II. 389. Death of Hypereides (Oct. 5). Death of Demosthenes (Oct. 12). Aristotle retires to Chalkis, and dies there (Oct.?). Theophrastos succeeds him in the Lykeron. Leosthenes killed before Lamia. Antiphilos succeeds to command of the Greeks and defeats Leonnatos. — Decisive victory of Macedonians at Krannon (Aug. 5).—Hellenic League breaks up. Athens submits to Antipater. On proposal of Demades, the Ekklesia pronounces Demosthenes, Hypereides, &c., traitors. 4. Archippos 321 New Comedy beginning.— Menander age 21 Ὀργή (his first play).—Philemon, Diphilos comici flor. Alexander's Empire divided among his Generals. Ptolemy founds a monarchy in Egypt (306) B. C. The descendants of Seleukos found a kingdom in Asia, which afterwards shrinks up into Syria. In Macedonia there is confusion till about 272 B.C.: then the house of Antigonos reigns till 168 B.C., when Rome abolishes the kingdom. 115. Neaechmos 320 2. Apollodoros 319 Death of Antipater. 3. Archippos Olympiads. 318 B.C. Death of Demades.—Demetrios Phalereus flor. Decline of Oratory begins. 116. 4. 314 Death of Aeschines. 120. 1. 300 Klertarchos of Soli, representative of the florid Asianism. 306—285. Ptolemy Soter. 122. 3. 290 Hegesias of Magnesia, the so-called founder of Asianism, flor. 127. 3. 270 Theokritos, Bion, Moschos flor. 285—247. Ptolemy Philadelphos. 129. 1. 264 Timaeos of Tauromenion (now age circ. 70, resident at Athens since about 310 B.C.) brought his History down to this year. He represents the epigrammatic Asianism. 280—251. First period of Achaean League. 247—222. Ptolemy Euergetes. 130. 1. 260 Kallimachos, the poet, librarian of Alexandria. 132. 3. 250 A period of almost total 205—181. Ptolemy Epiphanes. 157. 3. 150 darkness in the history of Greek Oratory. When light returns, Asianism is fully dominant, but a reaction to Attieism is just beginning. 197. Battle of Kynoskephalae. The Greek allies of Rome, though nominally free, are henceforth practically dependent. 145. 1. 200 Aristophanes librarian of Alexandria. 146. 3. 194 Apollonios Rhodios librarian of Alexandria. 156. 1. 156 Aristarchos librarian of Alexandria. 158. 3. 146 Polybios brought his History from 264 B. C. (where Timaeos left off) to this year. Corinth destroyed. The Achaean cities become formally subject to Rome. 145. Polybios legislates for the 165. 1. 120 Hierokles and Menekles repiesent the epigrammatic Asranism in its maturity. Achaean cities. 166. 3. 114 Hortensius born. 167. 3 110 Approximate date for Hermagoras of Temnos [usually put much too late —by Clinton, about 62 B C. See Cic. de Invent. I. 8, written about 84 B. C., which shows that Hermagoras was then long dead: Blass die Griech. Ber. von Alex. bis zu Aug., pp.84f.] —Hermagoras founds the Scholiastic Rhetoric, and thus prepares the way for Atticism. Apollonios ὁ μαλακός emnent as a teacher of Rhetoric at Rhodes. 168. 3. 106 Cicero born. 170. 1. 100 Established fame of the Rhodian eclectic school of Oratory,—Attic in basis, but with Asian elements Julius Caesar born. Greek Rhetoric is already thoroughly fashionable at Rome. 171. 2. 95 Apollonios, surnamed Molon (Cicero's master), eminent at Rhodes. 172. 1. 92 L. Plotius and others open schools at Rome for the teaching of Rhetoric, no longer in Greek, but in Latin. 173. 3. 86 Sulla takes Athens. 174. 1. 84 Cicero De Inventione? 3. 82 Caius Licinius Calvus born. 175. 1. 80 The Rhetorica ad Herennium (mcerti) not earlier than this year.—Aeschylos of Knidos and Aeschines of Miletos represent the florid Asianism. Cf. 120 B.C. 175. 2. 79 Cicero, age 27, at Athens. 177. 4. 69 Hortensius, the Roman representative of Asranism, is Consul. After this time he comes little forward as a speaker; and leaves the field to Cicero, the representative of the Rhodian eclecticism. 181. 2. 55 Cicero De Oratore. Calvus represents pure Atticism of the Lysian type. 182. 3. 50 Apollodoros of Pergamos and Theodoros of Gadara are rival masters of Scholastic Rhetoric. 183. 1. Death of Calvus. 2. 46 Cicero Brutus. Cicero Orator. 4. 44 Cicero De Optimo Genere Death of Caesar. Oratorum. 184 1. 43 Death of Cicero. 187. 3. 30 Didymos of Alexandria, grammarian and critic, flor. Octavianus (Augustus Caesar) begins to govern the Republic as Emperor. 188. 4. 25 Dionysios of Halikarnassos and Caecilius of Calacte, a Sicilian Greek, flourish at Rome as scholars and critics. Victory of Atticism over Asianism complete and nearly universal. 189. 4. 21 Athens deprived of its jurisdiction over Eretria and Aegina: Confederacy of the free Laconran cities formed by Augustus. 191. 3. A.D. 14 Death of Augustus. 192. 3. 18 Strabo (born 66 B.C.) published his γεωγραφικά about this year. 213. 2. 74 Tacitus Dialogus De Oratoribus. 69—79. Vespasian. 214. 4. 80 The βίοι τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων, wrongly ascribed to Plutarch, were perhaps compiled about this time, chiefly from Caecilius. 217. 2. 90 Plutarch flor. Quintilian flor. 81—96. Domitian. 98—117. Trajan. 230. 3. 143 Herodes Atticus, the master in Greek oratory of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, is made consul age 40, by Antoninus Prus. — Favorinus and Fronto flor. 117—138. Hadrian. His visits to Athens, 122—135. 138—161. Antoninus Pius. 234. 4. 160 Lucian, a Syrian of Samosata, writes the best Attic Greek since Hypereides. — Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticac.—Pausanias the geographer, Ptolemy the astionomei, Polyaenos (Στρατηγήματα), and Galen flor. 161—180. Marcus Aurelius. 237. 2. 170 Publius Aelius Aristeides, of Mysia, in his Παναθηναικός and ἱεροὶ λόγοι, imitates the Attic models of ἐπίδειξις. Hermogenes makes a complete digest of the Scholastic Rhetoric since Hermagoras of Temnos (110 B. C). It is contained in his περὶ στάσεων, περὶ ιδεῶν, περὶ εὑρέσεως, περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος, προγυμνάσματα (in Rhetores Graeci, II. Spengel). Hermog. was the chief authority on his subject till Aphthonios. 242. 2. 190 Athenaeos Δειπνοσοφισταί. Dio Cassius flor. — The ὀνομαστικόν of Julius Pollux drawn up about this time. 247. 2. 210 Teitullian flor. 249. 4. 220 Origen flor. 251. 1. 225 Sextus Empiricus πρὸς τοὺς μαθηματικοὺς ἀντιρρητικοί: a controversy with the professors of (1) grammar and history, (2) rhetoric, (3) geometry. (4) arithmetic, (5) astrology, (6) music. — Diogenes Laertios φιλόσοφοι βίοι. 253. 3. 235 Philostratos βίοι σοφιστῶν. Aelian flor. 264. 4. 280 Timaeos λέξεις Πλατωνικαί. 259. 4. 260 Longinus (Διονύσιος Κάσσιος Λογγῖνος) flor. His τέχνη ῥητορική is printed in Rhet. Graec., II. 298 f., ed. Spengel. [The treatise On the Sublime (περὶ ὕψους, ib. 245 f) may be his, and is at least of about this date. The ground of the doubt is that the oldest MS. has Διονυσίου (certainly not the Halikarnassian) ἢ Λογγίνου: another, ἀνωνύμου.] 284—305. Diocletian. 306. Flavius Valerius Constantinus (the Great) begins to reign. 273. 3. 315 Aphthonios προγυμνάσματα (in Rhet. Graec. II. Spengel). This book superseded Hermogenes in the schools. At the Revival of Letters it again became a text-book of Rhetoric, saec. XVI. and XVII. 323 — 337. Constantine makes Christianity the religion of the Empire, and builds Constantinople as its new capital. 282. 2. 350 Libanios of Antioch ὑποθέσεις εἰς τοὺς Δημοσθένους λόγους, βίος Δημοσθένους· μελέται: προγυμνασμάτων παραδείγματα, &c.—Gregory of Nazianzos: Athanasios flor. 361—363. Julian Emperor. 379—395. Theodosios the Great. 289. 4. 380 Aelius Theon, of Alexandria, προγυμνάσματα (in Rhet. Graec. II. Speng.). [The only clue to his date is that he certainly used both Hermog. and Aphthonios, though he does not name them; and probably wrote while the popularity of the latter was fresh. Cf. Walz, Rhet Grace. vol. v pp. 137 f.] Eunapios of Sardis, βίοι φιλοσόφων καὶ σοφιστῶν. 390—420. The Pagan religion prohibited, and (except in the rural districts) extinguished. 293. 2. 394 Olympic Games abolished under Theodosios I. 395 The Empire divided between the Caesar of the West and the Caesar of the East. 397 Ioannes, surnamed Χρυσόστομος, aichbishop of Constantinople. 480 Ioannes Stobaeos, Ἀνθολό‐ γιον Ἐκλογαί. 800 Charles, king of the Franks, crowned Emperor of Rome. 858 Photios raised to the patriarchate, Dec. 25, βιβλιοθήκη, λεξέων συναγωγή. 988 Cherson, the last of the Greek Commonwealths, submits to Wladimir of Russia. 1050 ? Byzantine Ἐτυμολογικὸν μέγα. 1100 ? Surdas λέξεις. Harpokration's Lexicon to the Ten Orators (λέξεις τῶν ί ῥητόρων) was used both by the compilers of the Etymologicum and by Suidas. Its author has been identified (1) with the Harpokration who taught Lucius Verus, about 150 A D.: (2) with the poet and teacher praised by Libanios, about 350 A. D.: (3) with the Harpokration of Mendes mentioned by Athenaeos —whom Schweighauser (ad XIV. 648 b) identifies with the friend of Julius Caesar.

Introduction
The Augustan Atticism.

IN the reign of Augustus, when Rome had become the intellectual no less than the political centre of the earth, a controversy was drawing to a close for which the legionaries cared less than their master, but which for at least fifty years had been of some practical interest for the Forum and the Senate, and which for nearly three centuries had divided the schools of Athens, of Pergamos, of Antioch, of Alexandria, of all places where men spoke and wrote a language which, though changed from the glory of its prime, was still the idiom of philosophy and of art. This controversy involved principles by which every artistic creation must be judged; but, as it then came forward, it referred to the standard of merit in prose literature, and, first of all, in oratory. Are the true models those Attic writers of the fifth and fourth centuries, from Thucydides to Demosthenes, whose most general characteristics are, the subordination of the form to the thought, and the avoidance of such faults as come from a misuse of ornament? Or have these been surpassed in brilliancy, in freshness of fancy, in effective force by those writers, belonging sometimes to the schools or cities of Asia Minor, sometimes to Athens itself or to Sicily, but collectively called ‘Asiatics,’ who flourished between Demosthenes and Cicero? This was the question of Atticism against Asianism. For a long time Asianism had been predominant. But, in the last century of the Republic, the contest had centred at Rome, at Rome it was fought out, and the voice that decided the strife of the schools was the same that commanded the nations. If the Roman genius for art had little in common with the Greek, if it was ill-fitted to apprehend the Greek subtleties, it had preeminently that sound instinct in large art-questions which goes with directness of character, with the faculty of creating and maintaining order and with reverence for the majesty of law. A ruling race may not always produce the greatest artists or the finest critics. But in a broad issue between a pure and a false taste its collective opinion is almost sure to be found on the right side. Rome pronounced for Atticism.

Caecilius and Dionysios.

Among the Greeks then living in the Imperial City were two men, united by friendship, by community of labours and by zeal for the Atticist revival; symbols, by birth-place, of influences which in the past had converged upon the Athens of Perikles from Sicily and the Ionian East,—Caecilius of Calacte and Dionysios of Halikarnassos, now met in that new capital of civilised mankind to which the arts, too, of Athens were passing. Both were scholars of manifold industry, in history, in archæology, in literary criticism, in technical rhetoric, and in a field which the catalogues of the libraries had left almost untouched—discrimination between the genuine and the spurious works of Attic writers. Both wrote upon the Attic orators, but with a difference of plan which is instructive.

The lost work of Caecilius was entitled Caecilius on the Attic Orators. περὶ χαρακτῆρος τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων, On the Style of the Ten Orators. These ten were Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, The decade. Isokrates, Isaeos, Lykurgos, Aeschines, Demosthenes, Deinarchos. Now, Caecilius, and his contemporary Didymos, the grammarian and critic of Alexandria, are the earliest writers who know this decade. Dionysios takes no notice whatever of the canon thus adopted by his friend. He seems never to have heard of the number ‘ten’ in connexion with the Attic orators. But from the first century A.D. onwards the decade is established. It is attested, for instance, by the Lives of the Ten Orators, wrongly ascribed to Plutarch, but probably composed about 80 A.D.; by Quintilian; by the neoplatonist Proklos, about 450 A.D.; and by Suidas, about 1100 A.D.— from whom it appears that, in his time, the grammarians had added a second list of ten to the first. The origin of the canon is unknown. It has been ascribed to Caecilius himself, mainly on the ground that it is not heard of before his time. It has been referred to Aristophanes the Byzantine, librarian at Alexandria about 200 B. C., or to his successor Aristarchos, about 156 B. C.,—by whom a canon of the poets, at least, was certainly framed. Another view is that it arose simply from the general tendency to reduce the number of distinguished names in any field to a definite number,—the tendency that gives the Seven Sages of Greece, the Seven Champions of Christendom, and the like. This last theory may safely be rejected. The decade includes at least three names which this kind of halo can never have surrounded—Andokides, Isaeos and Deinarchos. It excludes other orators who, though inferior as artists, would have had a stronger popular claim, such as Kallistratos of Aphidnae, the chief organiser of the Athenian Confederacy in 378, of whom Demosthenes said, when asked whether he or Kallistratos were the better speaker, ‘I, on paper—Kallistratos on the platform’,—his opponents, Leodamas of Acharnae, Aristophon of Azenia, Thrasybulos and Kephalos of Kollytos,—or that vigorous member of the anti-Macedonian party, Polyeuktos of Sphettos. Clearly, this canon was framed once for all by a critic or a school from whose decree contemporary opinion allowed no appeal, was adopted by successive generations, and ultimately secured the preservation of the writings which it contained, while others, not so privileged, were neglected, and at last suffered to perish. The decade was probably drawn up by Alexandrian grammarians in the course of the last two centuries before our era: but there is no warrant for connecting it with any particular nameOn the history of the decade, see Ruhnken, Historia Critica Oratorum Graecorum, who brings together the ancient authorities; Meier, Comment. Andoc. IV. 140; and the observations in Blass, Die Griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis auf Augustus (Berlin, 1865) p. 193. .Dionysios on the Attic Orators.

Dionysios, as has been said, altogether ignores the decade. If we supposed that Caecilius was its author, and that, when Dionysios wrote, Caecilius had not yet made his selection, the fact would be explained. But the double supposition involves the strongest improbability. Even if Caecilius had been the framer of the decade, it can hardly be doubted that at least the idea must have been known through him to his intimate friend Dionysios before the latter had completed the series of works which we possess, and that we should find some trace of it in those long lists of orators which Dionysios frequently gives. The truth probably is that Dionysios was perfectly aware of this arbitrary canon, but disregarded it, because it was not a help, but a hindrance, to the purpose with which he studied the Attic orators.

Nothing is more characteristic of Dionysios as a critic than his resolution not to accept tradition as such, but to bring it to the test of reason. This comes out strikingly, for instance, in his distrust of merely prescriptive or titular authenticity when he is going through the list of an ancient writer's works. Now, his object in handling the Attic orators was His object in handling them. not to complete a set of biographies or essays, but to establish a standard for Greek prose, applicable alike to oratory and to every other branch of composition. He considers the orators, accordingly, less as individual writers than as representatives of tendencies. He seeks to determine their mutual relations, and, with the aid of the results thus obtained, to trace a historical development. The orators whom he chose as, in this sense, representative were six in number —Lysias, Isokrates, Isaeos, Demosthenes, Hypereides, Aeschines. We have his treatises on Lysias, Isokrates, and Isaeos. We have also the first part of his treatise on Demosthenes—that part in which he discusses expression as managed by Demosthenes; the second part, in which he discussed the Demosthenic handling of subject-matter, has perished with his discourses on Hypereides and Aeschines. The treatise on Deinarchos, it need hardly be said, is bibliographical, and has nothing to do with the other series. His classification— the εὑοεταί and the τελειωταί . Dionysios considers his six orators as forming two classes. Between these classes the line is clearly drawn. Lysias, Isokrates, Isaeos are εὑρεταί, inventors,—differing indeed, in degree of originality, but alike in this, that each struck out a new line, each has a distinctive character of which the conception was his own. Demosthenes, Hypereides, Aeschines, are τελειωταί, perfecters,—men who, having regard to the historical growth of Attic prose, cannot be said to have revealed secrets of its capability, but who, using all that their predecessors had provided, wrought up the several elements in a richer synthesis or with a subtler finishDionys. De Deinarch. c. 1; cf. c. 5. .

Plan of this book.

The task which I have set before me is to consider the lives, the styles and the writings of Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isokrates and Isaeos, with a view to showing how Greek oratory was developed, and thereby how Greek prose was moulded, from the outset of its existence as an art down to the point at which the organic forces of Attic speech were matured, its leading tendencies determined, and its destinies committed, no longer to discoverers, but to those who should crown its perfection or initiate its decay. The men and the writings that mark this progress will need to be studied systematically and closely. It is hoped that much which is of historical, literary or social interest will be found by the way. But the great reward of the labour will be to get, if it may be, a more complete and accurate notion of the way in which Greek prose grew. It will not be enough, then, if we break off when the study of Isaeos has been finished. It will be necessary to look at the general characteristics of the mature political oratory built on those foundations at which Isaeos was the latest worker. It will be necessary to conceive distinctly how Isaeos and those before him were related to Lykurgos, Hypereides, Aeschines, Demosthenes. Nor must we stop here. The tendencies set in movement during the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. were not spent before they had passed into that life of the Empire which sent them on into the modern world. The inquiry which starts from the Athens of Perikles has no proper goal but in the Rome of Augustus.

The English word ‘orator’ compared with Latin and with Greek ῥήτωρ

At the outset, it is well to clear away a verbal hindrance to the comprehension of this subject in its right bearings. The English term ‘orator,’ when it is not used ironically, is reserved for one who, in relation to speaking, has genius of an order analogous to that which entitles a man to be seriously called a poet. The term ‘oratory,’ though the exigencies of the language lead to its often being used as a mere synonym for ‘set speaking,’ is yet always inconveniently coloured with the same suggestion either of irony or of superlative praise. The Roman term orator, ‘pleader,’ had this advantage over ours, that it related, not to a faculty, but to a professional or official attitude. It could therefore be applied to any one who stood in that attitude, whether effectively or otherwise. Thus the Romans could legitimately say ‘mediocris’ or ‘malus orator,’ whereas, in English, the corresponding phrases are either incorrect or sarcastic. Even the Romans, however, seem to have felt that their word was unsatisfactory, and to have confessed this sense by using ‘dicere,’ ‘ars dicendi,’ as much as possible. But the Greeks had a word which presented the man of eloquence, not, like the English word, as a man of genius, nor like the Roman word, as an official person, but simply as a speaker, ῥήτωρ. This designation was claimed by those Sicilian masters who taught men how to speak: at Athens it was given especially to the habitual speakers in the public assembly: in later times it was applied to students or theorists of Rhetoric. What, then, is the fact signified by this double phenomenon—that the Greeks had the word rhetor, Significance of the term ‘rhetor’. and that they did not apply it to everybody? It is this: that, in the Greek view, a man who speaks may, without necessarily having first-rate natural gifts for eloquence, or being invested with office, yet deserve to be distinguished from his fellows by the name of a speaker. It attests the conception that speaking is potentially an art, and that one who speaks may, in speaking, be an artist.

This is the fundamental conception on which rests, first, the relation between ancient oratory and ancient prose; secondly, the relation between ancient and modern oratory.

Relations between ancient Oratory and ancient Prose

The relation between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind. Here our unfortunate word ‘oratory,’ with its arbitrary and perplexing associations, is a standing impediment to clearness of view. The proposition will be more evident if it is stated thus:—In Greek and Roman antiquity, that prose which was written with a view to being spoken stood in the closest relation with that prose which was written with a view to being read. Hence the historical study of ancient oratory has an interest wider and deeper than that which belongs to the study of modern oratory. It is that study by which the practical politics of antiquity are brought into immediate connexion with ancient literature.

The affinities between ancient and modern oratory Relation between Ancient and Modern Oratory. have been more often assumed than examined. To discuss and illustrate them with any approach to completeness would be matter for a separate work. We must try, however, to apprehend the chief points. These shall be stated as concisely as possible, with such illustrations only as are indispensable for clearness.

Ancient Oratory a fine art.

Ancient oratory is a fine art, an art regarded by its cultivators, and by the public, as analogous to sculpture, to poetry, to painting, to music and to acting. This character is common to Greek and Roman oratory; but it originated with the Greeks, and was only acquired by the Romans. The evidence for this character may be I. Internal evidence. considered as internal and externalSome of the chief heads of the evidence are given by Brougham, Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients. . The internal 1 Finish of form. evidence is that which is afforded by the ancient orations themselves. First, we find in these, considered universally, a fastidious nicety of diction, of composition and of arrangement, which shows that the attention bestowed on their form, as distinguished from their matter, was both disciplined 2 Repetitions. and minute. Secondly, we find the orator occasionally repeating shorter or longer passages—not always striking passages—from some other speech of his own, with or without verbal amendments; or we find him borrowing such passages from another orator. Thus Isokrates, in his Panegyrikos, borrowed from the Olympiakos of Lysias, and from the so-called Lysian Epitaphios. Demosthenes, in the speech against Meidias, borrowed from speeches of Lysias, of Isaeos and of Lykurgos, in like cases of outrage. In many places Demosthenes borrowed from himself. This was done on the principle that τὸ καλῶς εἰπεῖν ἅπαξ περιγίγνεται, δὶς δὲ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται: A thing can be well said once, but cannot be well said twice Theon (who disputes the maxim) προγυμνάσματα c. 1 (Rhet. Graec. II. 62, ed. Spengel).. That is, if a thought, however trivial, has once been perfectly expressed, it has, by that expression, become a morsel of the world's wealth of beauty. The doctrine might sometimes justify an artist in repeating himself; as an excuse for appropriation, it omits to distinguish the nature of the individual's property in a sunset and in a gem; but, among Greeks, at least, it was probably not so much indolence as solicitude for the highest beauty, even in the least details, that prompted such occasional plagiarisms.

Thirdly, we find that the orators, in addressing Speakers criticise each other's style. juries or assemblies, criticise each other's style. Aeschines, in a trial on which all his fortunes depended, quotes certain harsh or unpleasant figures of speech which, as he alleges, Demosthenes had used. ‘How,’ he cries to the jurors, ‘how, men of iron, can you have supported them?’ And then, turning in triumph to his rival, ‘What are these, knave? ῥήματα ἢ θαύματα; metaphors or monsters?’ ( Aesch. In Ctes. §§ 166 f.) When a poet, a painter or a musician thus scrutinises a brother artist's work, the modern world is not surprised. But a modern advocate or statesman would not expect to make a favourable impression by exposing in detail the stylistic shortcomings of an opponent.

The external evidence is supplied by what we II. External evidence. know of the orators, of their hearers and of their critics. Already, before the art of Rhetoric had 1. Training of speakers. become an elaborate system, the orators were accustomed to prepare themselves for their task by laborious training, first in composition, then in delivery. They make no secret of this. They are not ashamed of it. On the contrary, they avow it and insist upon it. Demosthenes would never speak extemporarily when he could help it; he was unwilling to put his faculty at the mercy of fortune ἐπὶ τύχῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν, Plut. Demosth. c. 9 : who observes that this was certainly not from want of nerve, since, in the opinion of many contemporaries, Demosthenes showed more τόλμα and θἀρσος when he spoke without premeditation. His habitual reluctance to do so is, however, well attested. See Plut. l.c. c. 8, and the story in [Plut] Vitt. X. oratt., Dem. § 69. To the reproach, ὅτι ἀεὶ σκέπτοιτο, he answered:—αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν εἰ τηλικούτῳ δήμῳ συμβουλεύων αὐτοσχεδιάζοιμι. The compiler naïvely adds, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους λόγους εἶπεν αὐτοσχεδιάσας, εὖ πρὸς αὐτὸ πεφυκώς,—a fact perfectly consistent with laborious preparation for all grave occasions.. ‘Great is the labour of oratory,’ says Cicero, 2 Appreciation shown by hearers. ‘as is its field, its dignity and its reward.’ Nor were the audiences less exacting than the speakers were painstaking. The hearers were attentive, not merely to the general drift or to the total effect, but to the particular elegance. Isokrates speaks of ‘the antitheses, the symmetrical clauses and other figures which lend brilliancy to oratorical displays, compelling the listeners to give clamorous applause’ Isokr. Panath. (Or. XII.) § 2.). Sentences, not especially striking or important in relation to the ideas which they convey, are praised by the ancient critics for their artistic excellenceE.g. Cic. in Verr. Act. II. Lib. v. c. xxxiii, Stetit soleatus praetor populi Romani cum pallio purpureo tunicaque talari, muliercula nixus, in litore : praised by Quint. VIII. 3 § 64 for ἐνάργεια, artistic vividness: (not, as Brougham says in alluding to it, Dissert. on the Eloquence of the Ancients, p. 42, for ‘fine and dignified composition.’)— Cic. Orator, c. 63 § 214, speaking of the rhythmical effect of the dichoreus, ¯˘¯×, at the end of a sentence, quotes from the tribune Carbo, Patris dictum sapiens temeritas filii comprobavit: and adds,—‘The applause drawn from the meeting by this dichoreus was positively astonishing.’ . 3. Pamphlets in the oratorical form. Further, when an orator, or a master of oratorical prose, wished to publish what we should now call a pamphlet, the form which he chose for it, as most likely to be effective, was that, not of an essay, but of a speech purporting to be delivered in certain circumstances which he imagined. Such are the Archidamos, the Areopagitikos and the Symmachikos of Isokrates in the Deliberative form, and his speech On the Antidosis in the Forensic. Such again is the famous Second Philippic of Cicero. Then we know 4 Collections of commonplaces. that orators compiled, for their own use, collections of exordia or of commonplaces, to be used as occasion might serve. Such was that volumen prooemiorum of Cicero's which betrayed him into a mistake which he has chronicled. He had sent Atticus his treatise ‘De Gloria’ with the wrong exordium prefixed to it—one, namely, which he had already prefixed to the Third Book of the Academics. On discovering his mistake, he sends Atticus a new exordium, begging him to ‘cut out the other, and substitute this Cic. ad Att XVI. 6 § 4, quoted by Brougham, Dissert. p. 36. As to the ‘προοίμια of Demosthenes’ there noticed, it is now well known that they were not drawn up by Demosthenes. The scholastic compiler, whoever he was, took some of them from Demosthenes, some from other orators, and probably wrote some himself: Schafer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. App. p. 129..’ Lastly, the ancient critics habitually compare the 5. Ancient critics compare Oratory with Sculpture or Painting. pains needful to produce a good speech with the pains needful to produce a good statue or picture. When Plato wishes to describe the finished smoothness of Lysias, he borrows his image from the sculptor, and says ἀποτετόρνευται. Theon says:—‘Even as for him who would be a painter, it is unavailing to observe the works of Apelles and Protogenes and Antiphilos, unless he tries to paint with his own hand, so for him who would become a speaker there is no help in the speeches of the ancients, or in the copiousness of their thoughts, or in the purity of their diction, or in their harmonious composition, no, nor in lectures upon elegance, unless he disciplines himself by writing from day to dayTheon, προγυμνάσματα c. 1, (Rhet. Graec. I. p. 62 ed. Spengel.).’ Lucilius, from whom Cicero borrows the simile, compares the phrases, lexeis, each fitted with nicety to its setting in a finished sentence, with the pieces, tesserulae, laid in a mosaicLucilius ap. Cic. De Oratore III. § 171: Quam lepide lexeis compostae! ut tesserulae omnes arte pavimento atque emblemate vermiculato. The satirist was mocking T. Albucius, who wished himself to be thought ‘plane Graecus’ (Cic. De Fin. I. 1 § 8), and was alluding especially to the Isokratics. No one, certainly, could say of Lucilius what he said of Albucius.. But among the passages, and they are innumerable, which express this view there is one in Dionysios that can never be too attentively Dionysios περὶ συνθέσεως, c. 25. considered by those who wish to understand the real nature of ancient, and especially of Attic, oratory. He is explaining and defending—partly with a polemical purpose at which we shall have to glance by and by—that minute and incessant diligence which Demosthenes devoted to the perfecting of his orations. It is not strange, says the critic, ‘if a man who has won more glory for eloquence than any of those that were renowned before him, who is shaping works for all the future, who is offering himself to the scrutiny of all-testing Envy and Time, adopts no thought, no word, at random, but takes much care of both things, the arrangement of his ideas and the graciousness of his language: seeing, too, that the men of that day produced discourses which resembled no common scribblings, but rather were like to carved and chiselled forms,— I mean Isokrates and Plato, the Sophists. For Isokrates spent on the Panegyrikos, to take the lowest traditional estimate, ten years; and Plato ceased not to smooth the locks, and adjust the tresses, or vary the braids, of his comely creations, even till he was eighty years oldThe language here—τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ διαλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀναπλέκων—is not, perhaps, mere tautology. κτενίζων may be the general term; while βοστρυχίζων refers to the addition, and ἀναπλέκων to the retrenchment, of luxuriance.. All lovers of literature are familiar, I suppose, with the stories of Plato's industry, especially the story about the tablet which, they say, was found after his death, with the first words of the Republic —κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος—arranged in several different orders. What wonder, then, if Demosthenes also took pains to achieve euphony and harmony, and to avoid employing a single word, or a single thought, which he had not weighed? It seems to me far more natural that a man engaged in composing political discourses, imperishable memorials of his power, should neglect not even the smallest detail, than that the generation of painters and sculptors, who are darkly showing forth their manual tact and toil in a corruptible material, should exhaust the refinements of their art on the veins, on the feathers, on the down of the lip and the like niceties Dionys. περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων, c. 25..’ Repeating this passage, slightly altered, in the essay on Demosthenes, Dionysios adds that we might indeed marvel if, while sculptors and painters are thus conscientious, ‘the artist in civil eloquence (πολιτικὸς δημιουργός) neglected the smallest aids to speaking well—if indeed these be the smallest Dionys. De Demosth. c. 51. .’

This conception is originally Greek.

It has already been observed that this feeling about speaking is originally Greek; and it is worth while to consider how it arose. That artistic sense Its basis— the idealisation of man. which distinguished the Greeks above all races that the world has known was concentrated, in the happy pause of development to which we owe their supreme works, on the idealisation of man. Now, λόγος, speech, was recognised by the Greeks as the distinctive attribute of manAristotle uses this consideration to enforce the ‘defensive’ use of Rhetoric: — πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας, Rhet. I. 1 . On λόγος as the distinction of man, see a splendid passage in Isokrates, Antid. (Or. XV.) §§ 252—257.. It was necessary, therefore, that, at this stage, they should require in speech a clear-cut and typical beauty analogous to that of the idealised human form. This was the central and primary motive, relatively to which all others were subsidiary or accidental. Secondary motives. But, of these secondary motives, two at least (1) the oral tradition of poetry: demand a passing notice. First, the oral tradition of poetry and the habit of listening to poetical recitation furnished an analogy which was present to people's minds when they saw a man get up to make a set speech; they expected his words to have something like the coherence, something like the plastic outline, something even like the music of the verses which they were wont to hear flow from the lips of (2) The civil importance of speech his counterpart, the rhapsode. Secondly, in the Greek cities, and especially at Athens, public speaking had, by 450 B. C., become so enormously important, opened so much to ambition, constituted a safeguard so essential for security of property and person, that not only was there the most various inducement to cultivate it, but it was positively dangerous to neglect it. Further, since in a law-court (3) Competition. it was unavailing for the citizen that he could speak well unless the judges thought that he spoke better than his opponent, the art of persuasion was studied with a competitive zeal which wrought together with the whole bent of the Greek genius in securing attention to detail.

Characteristics of Modern Oratory

It will now be useful to look at some of the broad characteristics of modern oratory and of the modern feeling towards it; but only in so far as these will help our present purpose—namely, to elucidate the nature of ancient oratory. The first thing that strikes one is how completely modern life has redressed the complaint made by the earliest philosophical theorist of rhetoric. Aristotle opens his treatise with the Aristotle on the three instruments of Rhetorical Proof: observation that, whereas there are three instruments of rhetorical persuasion—the ethical, the pathetic and the logical—his predecessors have paid by far the most attention to the second, and have almost totally neglected the third, though this third is incomparably the most important,—indeed, the only one of the three which is truly scientific. The logical proof is the very body, σῶμα, of rhetorical persuasion,—everything else, appeal to feeling, attractive portrayal of character, and so forth, is, from the scientific point of view, only προσθήκη, appendage. This is essentially His estimate is that of the Modern World. the modern, especially the modern Teutonic, theory of oratory, and the modern practice is in harmony with it. The broadest characteristic of modern oratory, Modern Oratory puts the λογικὴ πίστις first. as compared with ancient, is the predominance of a sustained appeal to the understanding. Hume, with general truth, declares the attributes of Greek oratory to be ‘rapid harmony, exactly adjusted to the sense’, ‘vehement reasoning, without any appearance of art’, ‘disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved in a continual stream of argumentEssay XII., Of Eloquence. ’—a description, it must be observed, which should at all events be limited to the deliberative and forensic orators contemporary with Demosthenes. Brougham, however, states the case both more accurately and in terms of wider application, when he observes that in ancient oratory there are scarcely any long chains of elaborate reasoning; what was wanted to move, to rouse, and to please the hearers, was rather a copious stream of plain, intelligible observations upon their interests, appeals to their feelings, reminiscences from the history, especially the recent history, of their city, expositions of the evils to be apprehended from inaction or from impolicy, vindications of the orator's own conduct, demonstrations of the folly which disobeys, or of the malice which assails him Dissertation On the Eloquence of the Ancients, pp. 48, 58.. Aristotle himself, it may be observed, the very champion of the enthymeme, is the strongest witness to the truth of this. He impresses upon the student of Rhetoric that a speaker must ever remember that he is addressing the vulgar; he must not expect them to be capable of a far-reaching ratiocination, he must not string syllogism to syllogism, he must administer his logic temperately and discreetlySee (e.g.) Rhet. I. 2 §§ 12, 13, ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἁπλοῦς, κ.τ.λ. : II. 22 §§ 2 ff., III 17 § 6, etc.. Now, in contrast with this, long and elaborate chains of reasoning, or expositions of complicated facts, have been the very essence of the great efforts and triumphs of modern oratory; the imagery and the pathos heighten the effect, but would go only a very little way if the understandings of the hearers had not, in the first place, been convinced. We are here again reminded of the basis on which ancient oratory rested. The The modern speaker has no distinct acceptance as an artist. modern speaker comes before his audience with no a priori claim to be regarded as an artist whose display of his art may be commendable and interesting in itself. Cicero's speech for Archias, which is The ancients less strict about logical relevance. exquisitely composed, but of which not more than one-sixth is to the purpose, or his speech for Publius Sextus, in which the relevant part bears a yet smaller proportion to the whole, could not have been delivered in a British court of justiceBrougham, l.c., p. 46.. There is usually, however, an important difference, which will be noticed by and by, between the nature of Greek and that of Roman irrelevance. On the other hand, the modern exaction of consecutive and intelligible reasoning becomes, of course, less severe the more nearly the discourse approaches to the nature of a display. Still, this logical vigilance, with a comparative indifference to form, is, on the whole, the first great characteristic of modern oratory, and has, of course, become more pronounced since the system of reporting for the Press has been perfected, as it is Influence of neutral reporting. now, in many cases, far more important for the speaker to convince readers than to fascinate hearers. The characteristic which comes next in degree of significance for our present object is the habitual Modern feeling that a great speech must be extemporary presumption that the speech is extemporary. Even where there has been the most laborious preparation, even where the fact of such preparation is notorious, it is generally felt to be essential to impressiveness that the fact of verbal premeditation should be kept out of sight, and on the part of the hearers it is considered more courteous to ignore it. A certain ridicule attaches to a speech which, not having been delivered, is published,—the sense of something ludicrous arising partly from the feeling, ‘What an absurd disappointment’, but also from the feeling, ‘Here are the bursts which would have Sources of this feeling: 1 The failures of Premeditation. electrified the audience’. One thing which has helped to establish this feeling is the frequent failure of those who have attempted verbal premeditation; a failure probably due less often to defective memory or nerve than to neglect of a department in which the ancient orators were most diligent, and in which, moreover, they were greatly assisted by the plastic forms among which they lived, by the share of musical training which they ordinarily possessed, and by the draping of the himation or the toga—delivery, in respect both of voice and of action. When a premeditated speech is rendered lifeless or ludicrous by the manner in which it is pronounced, the modern mind at once recurs to its prejudice against Rhetoric—that is, against the Rhetoric of the later schools—and a contempt is generated for those who deign to labour beforehand on words that should come straight from the heart. There 2 The Hebraic basis of Christian education. is, however, a much deeper cause than this for the populai modern notion that the greatest oratory must be extemporary, and it is one which, for the modern world, is analogous to the origin of the Greek requirement that speech should be artistic. This cause is the Hebraic basis of education in modern Christendom, especially in those countries which have been most influenced by the Reformation. It becomes a prepossession that the true adviser, the true warner, in all the gravest situations, on all the most momentous subjects, is one to whom it will in that hour be given what he shall speak, and whose inspiration, when it is loftiest, must be communicated to him at the moment by a Power external to himself. The ancient world compared the orator with the poet. The modern world compares the orator with the prophet.

Modern approximations to the theory of Ancient Oratory.

It is true, indeed, that the ancient theory has often been partially applied in modern times, sometimes with great industry and with much success; but modern conditions place necessary limits to the application, and the great difference is this:—The ancients required the speech to be an artistic whole; the modern orator who composes, or verbally premeditates, trusts chiefly, as a rule, to particular passages and is less solicitous for a total symmetry. Debate, in our sense, is a modern institution; its Influence of Debate unforeseen exigencies claim a large margin in the most careful premeditation; and hence, in the principal field of oratory, an insurmountable barrier is at once placed to any real assimilation between the ancient and the modern modes. Just so much the more, if only for contrast, is it interesting to contemplate those modern orators who have approximated to the classical theory in such measure as their genius and their opportunities allowed. In an inquiry of the present scope, it might be presumptuous to select living illustrations of the Pulpit, the Senate, or the Bar. It would not, indeed, be needful to go far back; but it may be better, for our purpose, to seek examples where the natural partialities of a recent memory no longer refract the steady rays of Finished Rhetorical Prose: fame. In respect of finished rhetorical prose, which is not, either in the ancient or in the modern sense, great oratory, but which bears to it the same kind of relation that the Panegyrikos of Isokrates bears to the speech On the Crown, no one, perhaps, has Canning's Plymouth speech. excelled Canning. The well-known passage of his speech at Plymouth in 1823 will serve as an illustration:—

‘The resources created by peace are means of war. In cherishing those resources, we but accumulate those means. Our present repose is no more a proof of inability to act, than the state of inertness and inactivity in which I see those mighty masses that float in the waters above your town is a proof that they are devoid of strength and incapable of being fitted out for action. You well know, gentlemen, how soon one of those stupendous masses now reposing on their shadows in perfect stillness—how soon, upon any call of patriotism or of necessity, it would assume the likeness of an animated thing, instinct with life and motion—how soon would it ruffle, as it were, its swelling plumage—how quickly it would put forth all its beauty and its bravery, collect its scattered elements of strength, and awaken its dormant thunder. Such as is one of those magnificent machines when springing from inaction into a display of its might—such is England herself, while, apparently passive and motionless, she silently concentrates the power to be put forth on an adequate occasion.’

The ancient parallel for this is such a passage His analogue— Isokrates. as that in the Panegyrikos, describing the irresistible and awe-inspiring might in which the Panhellenic invasion will move through Asia — θεωρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ στρατείᾳ προσεοικώς (Isokr. Or. IV. § 182) . But a nearer Union of rhythmical finish with passion: resemblance to the classical union of rhythmical finish with living passion is afforded, in deliberative oratory, by Grattan, in forensic, by Erskine. Take the peroration of Grattan's speech in the Irish Grattan. Parliament on the Declaration of Irish Rights Speeches, Vol. I. pp. 52 f.:—

‘Do not suffer the arrogance of England to imagine a surviving hope in the fears of Ireland; do not send the people to their own resolves for liberty, passing by the tribunals of justice and the high court of Parliament; neither imagine that, by any formation of apology, you can palliate such a commission to your hearts, still less to your children, who will sting you with their curses in your graves, for having interposed between them and their Maker, robbing them of an immense occasion, and losing an opportunity which you did not create and never can restore.

‘Hereafter, when these things shall be history, your age of thraldom and poverty, your sudden resurrection, commercial redress, and miraculous armament, shall the historian stop at liberty, and observe—that here the principal men among us fell into mimic trances of gratitude; that they were awed by a weak ministry, and bribed by an empty treasury; and, when liberty was within their grasp, and the temple opened her folding doors, and the arms of the people clanged, and the zeal of the nation urged and encouraged them on,—that they fell down and were prostituted at the threshold.

‘I might, as a constituent, come to your bar and demand my liberty,—I do call upon you, by the laws of the land and their violation, by the instruction of eighteen counties, by the arms, inspiration, and providence of the present moment, tell us the rule by which we shall go—assert the law of Ireland—declare the liberty of the land.

‘I will not be answered by a public lie in the shape of an amendment; neither, speaking for the subject's freedom, am I to hear of faction. I wish for nothing but to breathe, in this our island, in common with my fellow-subjects, the air of liberty. I have no ambition, unless it be the ambition to break your chain and contemplate your glory. I never will be satisfied so long as the meanest cottager in Ireland has a link of the British chain clanking to his rags; he may be naked, he shall not be in iron; and I do see the time is at hand, the spirit is gone forth, the declaration is planted; and though great men should apostatize, yet the cause will live; and though the public speaker should die, yet the immortal fire shall outlast the organ which conveyed it, and the breath of liberty, like the word of the holy man, will not die with the prophet, but survive him.’ Erskine.

Erskine's defence of Stockdale, the publisher of a pamphlet in defence of Warren Hastings, containing certain reflections on the Managers which the House of Commons pronounced libellous, contains a passage of which the ingenuity, no less than the finished art, recalls the best efforts of ancient forensic oratory; though this ingenuity cannot be fully appreciated without the context. At first, Erskine studiously keeps his defence of Stockdale separate from his defence of Hastings; then he gradually suggests that Hastings is entitled to indulgence on account (1) of his instructions, (2) of his situation, (3) of English and European policy abroad, (4) of the depravity to which, universally, men are liable who have vast power over a subject race,—and the last topic is illustrated thus:—

‘Gentlemen, I think that I can observe that you are touched by this way of considering the subject; and I can account for it. I have not been considering it through the cold medium of books, but have been speaking of man and his nature, and of human dominion, from what I have seen of them myself among reluctant nations submitting to our authority. I know what they feel, and how such feelings can alone be repressed. I have heard them in my youth from a naked savage, in the indignant character of a prince surrounded by his subjects, addressing the governor of a British colony, holding a bundle of sticks in his hand as the notes of his unlettered eloquence; ‘Who is it,’ said the jealous ruler over the desert encroached upon by the restless foot of English adventure—‘who is it that causes this river to rise in the high mountains and to empty itself into the ocean? Who is it that causes to blow the loud winds of winter, and that calms them again in summer? Who is it that rears up the shade of those lofty forests, and blasts them with the quick lightning at his pleasure? The same Being who gave to you a country on the other side of the waters, and gave ours to us; and by this title we will defend it!’ said the warrior, throwing down his tomahawk on the ground, and raising the war-sound of his nation. These are the feelings of subjugated men all round the globe; and, depend upon it, nothing but fear will control where it is vain to look for affectionFrom a longer extract given by Brougham in his Essay on Erskine, reprinted from the Edinburgh Review in the volume of his ‘Rhetorical and Literary Dissertations and Addresses,’ p. 225..’

But no speaker, probably, of modern times has Burke. come nearer to the classical type than Burke; and this because his reasonings, his passion, his imagery, are sustained by a consummate and unfailing beauty of language. The passage in which he describes the descent of Hyder Ali upon the Carnatic is supposed to owe the suggestion of its great image, not to Demosthenes, but to Livy's picture of Fabius hovering over Hannibal; the whole passage is infinitely more Roman, more Verrine, if the phrase may be permitted, than Greek; but it is anything rather than diffuse:—

‘Having terminated his disputes with every enemy and every rival, who buried their mutual animosities in their common detestation against the creditors of the Nabob of Arcot, he drew from every quarter whatever a savage ferocity could add to his new rudiments in the arts of destruction; and compounding all the materials of fury, havoc, and desolation into one black cloud, he hung for a while on the declivity of the mountains. Whilst the authors of all these evils were idly and stupidly gazing on this menacing meteor, which darkened all their horizon, it suddenly burst, and poured down the whole of its contents upon the plains of the Carnatic. Then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell. All the horrors of war before known or heard of were mercy to that new havoc. A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants, flying from their flaming villages, in part were slaughtered; others, without regard to sex, to age, to the respect of rank, or sacredness of function, fathers torn from children, husbands from wives, enveloped in a whirlwind of cavalry, and amidst the goading spears of drivers and the trampling of pursuing horses, were swept into captivity in an unknown and hostile land. Those who were able to evade this tempest fled to the walled cities. But escaping from fire, sword and exile they fell into the jaws of famine. For months together these creatures of sufferance, whose very excess and luxury in their most plenteous days had fallen short of the allowance of our austerest fasts, silent, patient, resigned, without sedition or disturbance, almost without complaint, perished by a hundred a day in the streets of Madras or on the glacis of Tangore, and expired of famine in the granary of India.’

BroughamIn his Inaugural Discourse before the University of Glasgow. contrasts this passage with that in Brougham on Burke compared with Demosthenes. which Demosthenes says that a danger ‘went by like a cloud’, with that where he says, ‘If the Thebans had not joined us, all this trouble would have rushed like a mountain-torrent on the city’, and with that where he asks, ‘If the thunder-bolt which has fallen has overpowered, not us alone, but all the Greeks, what is to be done Dem. de Corona § 188 (νέφος), § 153 ( χειμάρρους), § 194 (σκηπτός).?’ Brougham contends that Burke has marred the sublimity of the ‘black cloud’ and ‘the whirlwind of cavalry’ by developing and amplifying both. This, surely, is to confound the plastic with the picturesque—a point which will presently claim our attention. Demosthenes is a sculptor, Burke a painter.

It might, however, have been anticipated that Modern Eloquence of the Pulpit. modern oratory would have most resembled the ancient in that branch where the conditions are most nearly similar. If Isokrates could have foreseen the splendid, the unique opportunities which in later ages would be enjoyed by the Christian preacher, what expectations would he not have formed, not merely of the heights that would be attained—past and living instances remind us that, in this respect, no estimate could well have been too sanguine—but of the average abundance in which compositions of merit would be produced! It will, of course, be recollected that no quality is here in question except that of an eloquence which, regarded as literary prose, has the finish which deserves to be called artistic. If the test, thus defined, be applied, it will be found to afford a striking confirmation of what has already been observed in regard to the effect upon oratory of that especially Protestant conception according to which the orator's function is prophetic. In the combination of argumentative power with lofty earnestness and with eloquence of the Hebraic typeChatham prescribed a study of Barrow as the best foundation of a good style in speaking, none have surpassed, or perhaps equalled, those divines whose discourses are among the chief glories of the English language. In respect, however, of complete artistic form, of classical finish, a nearer resemblance to the antique has been presented by the great preachers of Catholic FranceIn his Essay on ‘Pulpit Eloquence’ Brougham seems hardly to do justice to Bossuet—the more florid Isokrates of the group. Bonrdaloue, with his abundant resource, his temperate pathos and his frequent harshness, may perhaps be compared with Lykurgos: Massillon, Voltaire's favourite, with his severity, rapidity, and lofty fervour, was probably the most Demosthenic. .

Modern Oratory— its greatest triumphs won by sudden bursts.

The most memorable triumphs of modern oratory are connected with the tradition of thrills, of electrical shocks, given to the hearers at the moment by bursts which were extemporary, not necessarily as regards the thought, but necessarily as regards the form. It was for such bursts that the eloquence of the elder Pitt was famous; that of Mirabeau, and of Patrick Henry, owed its highest renown to the same cause. Sheil's retort, in the debate on the Irish Municipal Bill in 1837, to Lord Lyndhurst's description of the Irish (in a phrase borrowed from O'Connell), as ‘aliens in blood, language and religion’, was of this kindIt is quoted in the excellent article on ‘The British Parliament; its History and Eloquence’, Quarterly Review of April, 1872, No. cxxxii. p. 480.. Erskine, in his defence of Lord George Gordon, produced an astonishing effect by a protestation,—which would have been violent if it had not been solemn,—of personal belief in his client's innocence; a daring transgression of the advocate's province which was paralleled, with some momentary success, in a celebrated criminal case about twenty years ago. Now these sudden bursts, and the shock or the transport which they may cause, were forbidden to ancient oratory by the principal law of its being. In nothing is the contrast more striking than in this— that the greatest oratorical reputations of the ancient world were chiefly made, and those of the modern world have sometimes been endangered, by prepared works of art. Perikles and Hypereides were renowned for no efforts of their eloquence more than for their funeral orations. Fox's carefully composed speech in honour of the Duke of Bedford, Chatham's elaborate eulogy of Wolfe, were accounted among the least happy of their respective performances. There is, however, at least one instrument of Use of quotation. sudden effect which Greek oratory and British Parliamentary oratory once had in common, but which the latter has now almost abandoned—poetical quotation. A quotation may, of course, be highly effective even for those to whom it is new. But the genuine oratorical force of quotation depends on the hearers knowing the context, having previous associations with the passage, and thus feeling the whole felicity of the application as, at the instant, it is flashed upon the mind. In this respect, the opportunities of the Greek orator were perfect. His hearers were universally and thoroughly familiar with the great poets. When Aeschines applies the lines from Hesiod to Demosthenes, it is as if Digby, addressing Puritans, had attempted to sum up Strafford in a verse of Isaiah. In the days when all educated Englishmen knew a good deal of Virgil and Horace, and something of the best English poets, quotation was not merely a keen, but, in skilful hands, a really powerful weapon of parliamentary debate; and its almost total disuse, however unavoidable, is perhaps a more serious deduction than is generally perceived from the rather slender resources of modern English oratory for creating a glow. Pitt's speech on the Slave Trade concluded with the expression of this hope—that ‘Africa, though last of all the quarters of the globe, shall enjoy at length, in the evening of her days, those blessings which have descended so plentifully upon us in a much earlier period of the world’: the first beams of the rising sun were just entering the windows of the House, and he looked upward as he said— vos......primus ethnis oriens affianit anhelis? illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper.

Special characteristics of Greek oratory

Hitherto we have been seeking to bring into relief, against the modern conception, that character which is common to Greek and to Roman oratory. But Greek oratory, as compared with Roman, has a stamp of its own. It is separated from the Roman, not, indeed, by so wide an interval, yet by a line as firm as that which separates both from the modern.all Greek art hus the plastic character.

That character which, with special modifications, belongs to every artistic creation of the Greek mind, whether this be a statue, a temple, a poem, a speech, or an individual's conception of his own place in life, is usually, and rightly, called the plastic. When it is desired to describe the primary artistic aspect of Greek Tragedy, this is commonly and justly done by a comparison with Sculpture. But it is certain that Popular misconception of what is meant by ‘plastic’. comparatively few understand the real meaning of ‘plastic’, ‘sculpturesque’, in these relations; and that to a vast majority of even cultivated persons, the statement of this affinity conveys an altogether erroneous notion. The reason of this is that the place held in antiquity by Sculpture is now held jointly by Painting, Music and certain forms of Poetry; that the modern mind instinctively refers the sculptural to the standard of the picturesque; and that, consequently, while the positive and essential characteristics of Sculpture are lost sight of, its negative qualities, relatively to Painting, become most prominent. These are, the absence of colour and the exclusion of tumultuous or complex action. Hence to the popular modern conception of Sculpture there usually attaches the notion of coldness and of rigidity. When people are told that Greek Tragedy (for example) is sculpturesque, they form this idea of it—that it has grandeur, but that it is cold and rather stiff. Then, if they are convinced that somehow the Greeks really were a race with the very highest genius for art, they begin to feel a secret wish that this alleged analogy between Greek Tragedy and sculpture might turn out to be a mistake. Here is an opportunity. The ingenious step in and A result of this misconception. say, ‘It is a mistake. It is pedantry and sentiment. For our part, we have always felt that Sophokles was frigid, and that Euripides, with his pathetic humanity, his tender women, his heroes who are not ashamed to display their emotions, was the better artist; now, dismiss the prepossessions created by students who are in no sympathy with nature or men, look at the facts as they are, deign to take homely views, and say, Is it not so?’Conscquent danger to the whole study of the antique.

The question at issue here happens to be vital to the immediate subject of these pages, viz., the development, through Attic oratory, of Attic prose. It is, however, just as vital for every other department whatsoever in the study of ancient art, literature and thought, for it involves nothing less than our fundamental conception of the antique. Unless that conception is true, everything will be seen in a distorted light, and the best things that the ancient world has to teach will be neglected for the secondbest.Character of Greek thought in the best days of Greek art;

Let us take a moment of the period when, as a matter of fact, the creative activity of Greek art was abundant—say 440 B.C.—and consider what, at that moment, was the principal characteristic of Greek reflectionThe essay on Winckelmann, in Mr W. H. Pater's ‘Studies in the History of the Renaissance.’ is the most perfect interpretation of the Greek spirit in art that I know. If the restatement of some of its points should gain for it fresh students, such a separation of its teaching from its beauty may deserve to be forgiven.. This will be best understood by a comparison with two other characters of thought; that which has belonged, though in a multitude of special shapes, to the East, and that of mediæval Europe. Oriental thought, as interpreted by Oriental art, fails to define humanity or to give a clear-cut compare with the Oriental form to any material which the senses offer to it. Life is conceived only generally, as pervading men, animals and vegetables, but the distinctive attributes of human life, physical or spiritual, are not pondered or appreciated. The human form, the human soul, are not, to this Eastern thought, the objects of an absorbing and analysing contemplation. To European and with the Medieval. mediævalism, they are so; but the body is regarded as the prison and the shame of the soul; and mediæval art expresses the burning eagerness of the soul to escape from this prison to a higher communion. The three marks of mediæval art are individualism, desire and ecstasy; individualism, since the artist is struggling to interpret a personal intensity, and goes to grotesqueness in the effort; desire, since the perpetual longing of the Church on earth for her Master is the type of the artist's passion; ecstasy, since this passion demands the surrender of reason and has its climax in the adoration of a mystery revealedI have not at hand an article on (I think) Mr Rossetti's poems, which appeared some years ago in the Westminster Review, and in which these traits of mediævalism were very finely delineated.. Between the Oriental and the Mediæval art stands the Greek. Greek art defines humanity, the body and the soul of man. But it has not reached the mediæval point; it has not learned to feel that the body is the prison and the shame of the soul. Rather, it regards the soul as reflecting its own divinity upon the body. ‘What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!’ If Hamlet could have stopped there, he would have been a Greek; but he could not, he was sick with a modern distemper, abandonment to the brooding thought Greek reflection was at a happy pause: that sapped his willDowden, ‘Shakspere's Mind and Art,’ p. 47.. The Greek of the days when art was supreme could and did stop there; he was Narcissus, standing on the river bank, looking into the deep, clear waters where the mirror of his image shows the soul, too, through the eyes, Narcissus in love with the image that he beholds,—but Narcissus as yet master of himself,—as yet with a firm foot-hold upon the bank, not as yet possessed by the delirious impulse to plunge into the depths. Here, then, was the first condition for the possibility of a great art. Reflection had taken the right direction, had got far enough, but had not got too far; it was a pause. But, in order that this pause should be joyous, and that the mind should not, from weariness or disappointment, hasten forward, another thing was and the Greeks were beautiful necessary—that men and women should be beautiful. By some divine chance, the pause in reflection coincided with the physical perfection of a race; and the result was Greek art.

Why Greek art became plastic rather than picturesque.

Why, however, should this art have expressed itself in Sculpture rather than, for instance, in Painting? Art gives pleasure by form, by colour, by sound, or, as in poetry, by the reminiscence of all these combined with the delight of motion. But the mind has had a history; and the very degree in Series of the arts: which the resources of a particular art are limited or ample may give it a special affinity with an earlier or a later stage of the mind. Architecture corresponds Architecture: with the phase when man's thoughts about himself are still indistinct; the building may hint, but it cannot express, the artist's personality: Egyptian art has been called a Memnon waiting for the day. Painting, Music, Poetry; Painting, Music and Poetry are the modern and romantic arts, with a range of expression adequate to every subtlety and intricacy of self-analysis. Between this group and Architecture comes Sculpture, the art Sculpture. kindred with that phase in the mind's history when man has just attained to recognition of himself and is observing his own typical characteristics of form and spirit with wonder and with joy, but, as yet, without the impulse towards analysis. In all the greatest sculpture there breathes the unshamed and innocent surprise of a child just waked from sleep. But this of itself implies renouncement; the limits The limit of expression in Sculpture not irksome, but congenial, to the Greek. of possible expression in Sculpture are severe. If, then, the Greek was contemplating his own soul as well as his own body, why, it might be asked, had he recourse to a medium of interpretation for which the spiritual subtleties of painting and poetry are impossible? The answer is,—Because he was not observing the soul apart from the body, but as one with the body in a godlike union; and because, to him, any expression of spiritual subtleties was not a gain but a loss, if it was effected at the expense of that in which he was absorbed—the contemplation of man as man, in his totality, as the paragon of animals. Sculpture cannot express a complex or refined situation; but its very limitations on that side make it the clearest interpretation of a character or a type. The Greek's attention was fixed on the typical, unchanging, divine lineaments of man, as he stood forth under the blue heaven, his outlines clear against the sunlit sea; and, for the Greek's purpose, sculpture was the more fitting just because it The best soulpture is not cold nor vague. eliminates what is restless or accidental. But he did not mean sculpture to be cold or rigid; he did not mean it to be blank or vague; and assuredly he made it none of these things. The ‘Adorante’ lifting up his hands in praise for victory, the cousinship of Love with Death hinted in the Genius of Eternal Slumber,—let these works and such as these be witnesses.

Mistake of conceiving Greek Tragedy as the daughter of Sculpture

This character of Sculpture belongs also to Greek Tragedy. But this is not, as seems sometimes to be imagined, because the Greeks sought to make They are sister forms of one tendency, Tragedy like Sculpture. It is because that tendency of intellect and feeling, for which Sculpture happened to be a peculiarly apt expression, set its necessary stamp equally on every thing else that the Greek which we call ‘plastic’. mind created. In naming this stamp ‘plastic’ we borrow our term from the arts of modelling; but to conceive the form of Greek Tragedy as derived from Sculpture is like conceiving the Greek language to be derived from Sanskrit. It is true that, in reference Greek Tragedy has an alloy of trouble, to the history of Greek thought, Tragedy is a later manifestation than Sculpture; the perfect repose is already troubled, an element of conflict has entered, man is in the presence of Nemesis, and the δράσαντι παθεῖν, the law that sin shall entail suffering, is but is typical still. the theme. But the typical character is not lost; those unchanging attributes which, on the one hand, bring man near to the gods or, on the other, mark his brotherhood with the dust and the limits of his mortal destiny are presented in emphatic, untroubled lines; and, when Retributive Justice has done its work, that blitheness out of which the passions rose into a storm returns subdued to the graver and deeper calm that follows a transcendant contemplation. All honour to those sublime voices of Titanic pain or victory that roll, like dirges or paeans, along the spacious music of Aeschylos; all honour to Euripides also, for no one is capable of feeling that Sophokles is supreme who does not feel that Euripides is admirable. Euripides The true greatness of Euripides. is a great emotional dramatist; a master of the picturesque; the only Greek, except Aristophanes, who set foot in the charmed woodlands of fancy‘An admirer of Aeschylus or Sophocles might affirm that neither Aeschylus nor Sophocles chose to use their art for the display of thrilling splendour. However that may be, Euripides, alone of Greeks, with the exception of Aristophanes, entered the fairyland of dazzling fancy which Calderon and Shakspere and Fletcher trod.’ Symonds, The Greek Poets, p. 230. This seems to me exactly to define one of the most attractive poetical distinctions of Euripides. Compare the same writer's remarks on the lyrics of Aristophanes, p. 250.. That special claim, however, which has in recent times been made for Euripides, and on the strength of which he has by some been preferred to his predecessors, involves a fallacy which it is important to observe, since what is at issue is much more than our judgment on the relative merits of two poets, it is the principle of appreciation relatively to all the best Greek work in every kind. Euripides has been regarded as distinctively Fallacy involved in calling Euripides the most ‘human’ of the Greek Tragedians. the human. Now if by this were meant only that he is great in dramatising the accidents of life, in portraying the more obvious phenomena of character, in exciting compassion for such troubles, or sympathy with such joys, as come home to us all, in establishing between the poet and the spectator not merely a vivid intelligence but something like a personal friendship, then the epithet would be perfectly just. If, however—and this is the popular notion— Euripides is to be called the ‘human’ poet in contrast with, for instance, Sophokles; if it is meant that Sophokles is comparatively cold, pompous, stiff, while Euripides is in a warm, flexible, fruitful sympathy with humanity—then the epithet involves a confusion of ideas than which nothing could be more fatal. Sophokles is the most human, because he is the most Greek. Euripides is human, but Sophokles is more human; Sophokles is so in the only way in which a Greek could be so, by being more Greek. When the best Greek mind was truest to the law of its own nature, it looked at man and man's life in the manner of Sophokles—fixing its regard on the permanent, divine characteristics of the human type, and not suffering minor accidents or unrulinesses or griefs so to thrust themselves forward as to mar the symmetry of the larger view. True simplicity is not the avoidance, but the control, of detail. In Sophokles, as in great sculpture, a thousand fine touches go to that which, as the greatest living creator in fiction has proved, he can still help to teach—the delineation of Sophokles the most perfect type of the Greek intellect. the great primary emotions. Sophokles is the purest type of the Greek intellect at its best. Euripides is a very different thing, a highly gifted son of his day. Rhetorical Dialectic has broken into Tragedy, and the religious basis, the doctrine of Nemesis, has been abandoned in favour of such other interests as the poet can devise. Euripides was brilliantly fertile in plots. This is what Aristotle means by τραγικώτατος, alluding especially to sudden and pathetic reversals of situation; for, before Alexander's time, ‘tragic’ had already come near to ‘sensational’The gradual degradation of the words τραγωδεῖν, τραγῳδία, etc., is a painful hint of this. Perhaps the nadir has been reached when a contemporary of Aristotle's, a master, too, of all Attic refinements, can use τραγῳδίαι of the menaces with which a Macedonion queen intimidated Athens: Hypereides ὑπὲρ Ἐυξενίππου col. 37, τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῆς (i.e. Ὀλυμπιάδος) καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας ἀφῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα.. No woman in Greek Tragedy is either so human, or so true a woman, as the Antigone of SophoklesTo Sophokles, hardly less than to Plato, apply the words of Professor Jowett (Introduction to the Phaedros, 2nd edit. II. 102), ‘We do not immediately recognize that under the marble exterior of Greek literature was concealed a soul thrilling with spiritual emotion.’.

The plastic character as manifested in Greek oratory.

Since, as has been seen, Oratory was for the Greeks a fine art, it follows that Greek Oratory must have, after its own kind, that same typical character which belongs to Greek Sculpture and to Greek Tragedy. Wherein, then, does it manifest this character? We must here be on our guard against the great stumblingblock of such inquiries, the attempt to find the analogy in the particulars and not in the whole. It might be possible to take a speech of Demosthenes and to work out the details of a correspondence with a tragedy of Sophokles or a work of Pheidias; but such refinements have usually a perilous neighbourhood to fantasy, and, even when they are legitimate, are apt to be more curious than instructive. How truly and universally Greek Oratory bears the plastic stamp, can be seen only when it is regarded in its largest aspects. The A series of types is developed by a series of artists. first point to be observed is that, in Greek Oratory, we have a series of types developed by a series of artists, each of whom seeks to give to his own type the utmost clearness and distinction that he is capable of reaching. The same thing is true of Tragedy, but not in the same degree; for, in Tragedy, the element of consecrated convention was more persistent; and, besides, Oratory stood in such manifold and intimate relations with the practical life that the artist, in expressing his oratorical theory, could express his entire civic personality. Hence the men who moulded Attic Oratory, whether statesmen or not, are good examples of conscious obedience to that law of Greek nature which constrained every man to make himself a living work of art. ‘In its poets and orators’, says HegelAesthetik, Part III. Section 2, ch. 1, quoted by Pater, p. 192., ‘its historians and philosophers, Greece cannot be conceived from a central point unless one brings, as a key to the understanding of it, an insight into the ideal forms of sculpture, and regards the images of statesmen and philosophers as well as epic and dramatic heroes from the artistic point of view; for those who act, as well as those who create and think, have, in those beautiful days of Greece, this plastic character. They are great and free, and have grown up on the soil of their own individuality, creating themselves out of themselves, and moulding themselves to what they were and willed to be. The age of Perikles was rich in such characters: Perikles himself, Pheidias, Plato, above all Sophokles, Thucydides also, Xenophon and Sokrates, each in his own order, without the perfection of one being diminished by that of the others. They are ideal artists of themselves, cast each in one flawless mould—works of art which stand before us as an immortal presentment of the gods.’

The plastic character of Greek oratory,—thus seen, first of all, in the finished distinction of successive types, clearly modelled as the nature that wrought them,—is further seen in the individual oration. Take it whence we will, from the age of In the individual oration, Antiphon or of Demosthenes, from the forensic, from the deliberative or from the epideictic class, two great characteristics will be found. First, however little the main lines of the theme are unperplexed, of sustained reasoning there may be, however much the argument may be mingled with appeals, reminiscences or invectives, everything bears on the matter in hand. It is an exertion of art, but of art strictly pertinent to its scope. No Greek orator could have written such a speech as that of Cicero For Archias or For Publius Sextus. In a Greek speech the main lines of the subject are ever firm; they are never lost amid the flowers of a picturesque luxuriance. Secondly, wherever pity, terror, anger, and the unity is sealed by a final calm. or any passionate feeling is uttered or invited, this tumult is resolved in a final calm; and where such tumult has place in the peroration, it subsides before the last sentences of all. The ending of the speech On the Crown—which will be noticed hereafterVol. II. p 415.—is exceptional and unique. As a rule, the very end is calm; not so much because the speaker feels this to be necessary if he is to leave an impression of personal dignity, but rather because the sense of an ideal beauty in humanity and in human speech governs his effort as a whole, and makes him desire that, where this effort is most distinctly viewed as a whole —namely, at the close—it should have the serenity Attic perorations in Cicero and Erskine. of a completed harmony. Cicero has now and then an Attic peroration, as in the Second Philippic and the Pro Milone; more often he breaks off in a burst of eloquence—as in the First Catilinarian, the Pro Flacco and the Pro Cluentio. Erskine's concluding sentences in his defence of Lord George Gordon are Attic:—‘Such topics might be useful in the balance of a doubtful case; yet, even then, I should have trusted to the honest hearts of Englishmen to have felt them without excitation. At present the plain and rigid rules of justice are sufficient to entitle me to your verdictThis calmness of the Greek peroration is noticed by Brougham in his Dissertation (p. 25), but is more fully discussed in his essay on Demosthenes, pp. 184 f. He does not, however, penetrate to the true Greek feeling when he says, ‘The same chastened sense of beauty which forbade a statue to speak the language of the passions, required that both the whole oration and each highly impassioned portion of it, should close with a calmness approaching to indifference, and tameness.’ There comes in the popular modern notion of the sculpturesque..’

The personalities of ancient oratory.

This seems the fitting place to touch for a moment on a trait of ancient forensic oratory which has sometimes been noticed with rather exaggerated emphasis, and which, it might be objected, is strangely discordant with the character just described—the disposition of Greek as well as Roman orators to indulge in personalities of a nature which would be deemed highly indecorous in modern times. Their case is scarcely, perhaps, mended by the observation that the point of honour did not then exist. A more important circumstance to observe is that the language in question, however strong, is seldom redundant. It finds its place; but it does not overflow; nor does it destroy that self-mastery in the speaker on which the unity of his utterance depends. From the artistic point of view—and from this alone it is now being regarded—it is a distressing blemish; yet not, even here, of the order to which it is referred by those whose estimate of it is purely modern, since it is not permitted to disturb the symmetry or the repose of the whole. Unquestionably, the scale of life in the Greek republics, and the dialect of the aristocracy at Rome, often imparted to the mutual criticisms of their orators a parochial character which is comparatively rare in the public discussions of the present day. Apart from this accident, however, modern analogies are, unfortunately, not wantingSpecimens of the language addressed by Coke, then Attorney-General, to Raleigh, whose prosecution he was conducting, will be found in a note to Mr Forsyth's Hortensius, p. 45. The phrases are surpassed by nothing in Aeschines. Chatham's most effective retorts were personalities which might have satisfied Cicero. One or two of them will be found in the Quarterly Review, No. 132, p. 470. Those who desire further illustrations may read, or recall, the debates in the House of Commons of May 15 and June 8, 1846.. The speech against Ktesiphon and the speech against Piso certainly contain exceedingly strong phrases. Catullus, who used the ordinary language of society in his daySee H. A. J. Munro on Catullus' 29th Poem in the Journal of Philology, II. 1—34 (1869)., is less euphemistic than Byron. But scurrility is not the measure of vituperation. Ancient invective concentrated the former. Modern invective prefers to diffuse, without diluting, the latter.

Superiority of Greek to Roman oratory.

The superiority of Greek oratory to Roman, in the deliberative and forensic branches alike, has been recognised by the best critics as well as by the most Brougham on Cicero. competent practical judges. Brougham, who speaks with the authority of both characters, brings this out with great force and clearness. He says:— ‘In all his (Cicero's) orations that were spoken (for, singular as it may seem, the remark applies less to those which were only written, as all the Verrine, except the first, all the Philippics, except the first and ninth, and the Pro Milone), hardly two pages can be found which a modern assembly would bear. Some admirable arguments on evidence, and the credit of witnesses, might be urged to a jury; several passages, given by him on the merits of the case, and in defence against the charge, might be spoken in mitigation of punishment after a conviction or confession of guilt; but, whether we regard the political or forensic orations, the style, both in respect Cicero's orations utterly unfit for the modern Senate or Bar: whereas almost all the Greek orations could be adapted. of the reasoning and the ornaments, is wholly unfit for the more severe and less trifling nature of modern affairs in the senate or at the bar. Now, it is altogether otherwise with the Greek masters; changing a few phrases, which the difference of religion and of manners might render objectionable,—moderating, in some degree, the virulence of invective, especially against private character, to suit the chivalrous courtesy of modern hostility,—there is hardly one of the political or forensic orations of the Greeks that might not be delivered in similar circumstances before our senate or tribunals Inaugural Discourse, pp. 122f. Hume, again, observing that Cicero is ‘too florid and rhetorical,’ and that Greek oratory is ‘more chaste and austere,’ adds:—‘could it be copied, its success would be infalhble over a modern assembly.’ (Essay XII, Of Eloquence, p 60).’

The main reason of this decided advantage on the Reasons of this superiority: Greek oratory is always to the point: part of Greek practical oratory—and the epideictic oratory has a corresponding excellence relatively to that of the French Pulpit—is the business-like character already noticed. If everything is not logical, everything is at least relevant. Cicero, with all his ingenuity, brilliancy and wit, is so apt to wander into mere display, and this display is so openly artificial, that, as Brougham says, ‘nothing can be less adapted to the genius of modern elocution’. The style of modern debate comes far nearer to the Greek than to the Latin. But there are two other causes which should be remarked, one especially influential in Deliberative, the other in Forensic, oratory. The first is that, in the days of the political inspirations of Greek oratory are nobler: the great Roman eloquence, Rome had no political rival. Her discipline and her manners contributed with her civic security to exempt her citizens from sudden or violent emotion. What Claudian De sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti (404 A.D.) v. 150. afterwards happily called the vitae Romana quies already prevailed. If the paradox of Quintilian (X. 1 § 106) be true, that Demosthenes has plus curae, Cicero plus naturae, it is true in this sense alone, that Cicero is an inferior artist, and indulges more freely the taste of the natural man for ornament. But that Roman oratory should be on the whole more artificial than the Greek, and more limited in its range of subjects, was inevitable. Athens, the antagonist of Sparta or Thebes, Athens vigilant against Persia or threatened by Macedon, was a city in which the inspirations of eloquence were not only personal but national. and the forensic motive is more genuine. Secondly: the Roman patronus, who pleaded his client's cause gratuitously, rewarded by the fact that all the higher paths of ambition opened directly from the forum, had, doubtless, an incentive to eloquent declamation which his Attic brother, the professional logographos, did not possess. But he had not anything like the same inducement to handle his case scientifically. He was a political aspirant, not a man settled to a calling; and, from a forensic point of view, the element of unreality in his position had a strong tendency to vitiate his performance by making it, before all things, a display.

Early History of Greek Oratory.

The least gifted people, in the earliest stage of intellectual or political growth, will always or usually have the idea, however rude, of a natural Two conditions for the possibility of any such history. oratory. But oratory first begins to have a history, of which the development can be traced, when two conditions have been fulfilled. First, that oratory should be conceived, no longer subjectively, but objectively also, and from having been a mere faculty, should have become an art. Secondly, that an oration should have been written in accordance with the theory of that art. The history of Greek oratory begins with Gorgias. The history of Attic oratory, properly so called, begins with Antiphon.

The special attributes and endowments of the Greeks would lead us to expect, before the beginnings of an oratorical art, a singularly rich and various manifestation of natural eloquence, and also an early moment of origin for the art itself. Now, as a Late appearance of Greek oratory as an Art. matter of fact, the origin of the art was singularly late, relatively to the gifts and to the general artistic tendency of the race; but the causes of this delay were external and political. On the other hand, Extraordinary brilliancy of the pre theoretic Oratory. no documents of any early society can show an exuberance, a brilliancy, a diversified perfection of natural eloquence comparable to that which makes one of the chief glories of the Homeric poems. By ‘natural’ is meant, not necessarily unstudied, but unsystematic, or antecedent to a theory of Rhetoric. The man to whom the gods had given Homeric estimate of Eloquence. ἀγορητύς, the power of discourse,—that which, with beautiful strength, φυή, and good sense, φρένες, makes the Homeric triad of human excellences,— might cultivate it; but so long as this cultivation is empirical, not theoretic, the eloquence which it achieves is still natural. From Achilles to Thersites, the orators of the Iliad and the Odyssey are Homeric illustrations of Eloquence. individual. If Achilles alone is a Demosthenes, who had no defects to conquer and no mysteries to learn, Nestor is an Isokrates unaided or unembarrassed by his system, Telemachos an ingenuous youth who has no need of prompting by a Lysias, Odysseus a speaker in whom the logical terseness of Isaeos is joined to something like the unscrupulous smartness, though to nothing like the theatrical splendour, of Modern character of the great Homeric speeches: Aeschines. Nor does any oratory that the ancient world has left approach so nearly as the Homeric to the modern ideal. The reason of this is that the great orations of the Iliad are made in debate, and the greatest of all are replies,—as the answer of Achilles to the envoys in the First Book. Condensed statement, lucid argument, repartee, sarcasm, irony, overwhelming invective, profound and irresistible pathos,—all these resources are absolutely commanded by the orators of the Iliad, and all these must have belonged to him, or to those, by whom Their historical significance. the Iliad was created. As Mr Gladstone has said Studies on Homer, III. 107., ‘Paradise Lost’ does not represent the time of Charles the Second, nor the ‘Excursion’ the first decades of this century, but ‘as, when we find these speeches in Homer, we know that there must have been men who could speak them, so, from the existence of units who could speak them, we know that there must have been crowds who could feel them.’The Homeric eloquence is still aristocratic, not civil.

The Homeric ideal, to shine in eloquence as in action, to be at once ‘a speaker of words and a doer of deeds,’ ‘good in counsel, and mighty in war,’ had ample scope, as far as kings and nobles were concerned, in the council and the agora. But the eloquence of the commons does not appear to have been particularly encouraged by the chiefs, and the consummate individuality of an Achilles or an Odysseus was no real step towards the development of a popular oratory based upon a theory communicable to all. In the presence of these great debaters of the Iliad, the Homeric τις, when present at all, is essentially a layman, confined strictly to the critical function and uttering his criticisms, when they find utterance, in the fewest and plainest words. Democracy, with its principle of ἰσηγορία,— First conditions of civil eloquence — ἰσηγορία, the principle that every citizen has an equal right to speak his mind about the concerns of the city,— was necessary before a truly civil eloquence could be even possible. But, after Democracy had arisen, a further condition was needed,—the cultivation of and popular culture. the popular intelligence. What is so strikingly characteristic of Greek Democracy in the period The faculty of speech— its place in early Greek Democracy. before an artistic oratory is this,—that the power of public speaking now exists, indeed, as a political weapon, but, instead of being the great organ by which the people wield the commonwealth, is constantly used by designing individuals against the people. It is employed as a lever for changing the democracy into a tyranny. Such names as Aristagoras, Evagoras, Protagoras, Peisistratos, frequent especially in the Ionian colonies, indicate, not the growth of a popular oratory, but the ascendancy which exceptionally gifted speakers were able to acquire, especially in democracies, before oratory was yet an accomplishment studied according to a method.

The intellectual turning-point— first conception of a literary Prose.

The intellectual turning-point came when Poetry ceased to have a sway of which the exclusiveness rested on the presumption that no thought can be expressed artistically which is not expressed metrically. So soon as it had been apprehended that to forsake poetical form was not necessarily to renounce beauty of expression, an obstacle to clear reflection had been overcome. Mythology and cosmical speculation began to have a rival,—a curiosity withdrawn from the cloud-regions of the past or of the infinite to the things of practical life. And this life itself was growing more complex. The present, with its problems which must be solved under penalties, was becoming ever more importunate, and would no longer suffer men's thoughts to wander in mazes where they could find no end:— the riddling sphinx put dim things from our minds, and set us to the questions at our doors.

Political turning-point— opening of secure intercourse between the cities

The political turning-point came with the Persian Wars. Greek freedom was secured against the barbarian. A maritime career was opened to commerce. The Greek cities everywhere came into more and the new primacy of Athens active intercourse; and the centre of the Greek world was Athens. The Dorian States, Sparta and Argos, had never been favourable to the artistic treatment of language. This, like all art and science, was especially the province of the Ionians; and, for the future of oratory, it was of the highest importance that the central city of Hellas should be Ionian. But, though Athens perfected the art, and soon became almost its sole possessor, the first elements External influences which prepared Attic Oratory. were prepared elsewhere. The two principal forces which moulded Attic oratory came from the East and the West. One was the Practical Culture of Ionia; the other was the Rhetoric of Sicily.

External influences: The Practical culture of Ionia

The theories of the Ionian physicists had not been able to interest more than a few, still less had they been able to draw away the mass of the people from the old poetical faith; nor had the Ionian chroniclers made any but the rudest approaches to a written prose. But the national Wars of Liberation had quickened all the pulses of civic life. Freedom once secured, the new intellectual tendency took a definite shape. Men arose who, in contrast with the speculative philosophers, undertook to give a practical culture. This culture had representatives in every part of Greece. But, while in Sicily and Magna Graecia it was engrossed with Rhetoric, in Asiatic, and especially Ionian, Hellas it was more comprehensive. There, its essence was Dialectic, in connexion with a training sometimes encyclopaedic, sometimes directed especially to grammar or to literary criticism. These more comprehensive teachers were known by the general name of SophistsIt does not fall within my province to enter on the ‘Sophist’ controversy, to which, in this country, eminent scholars have lately given a new life. But I would invite the reader's attention to a note, on p. 130 of my second volume, as to the use of the word by Isokrates. And I would record my general agreement with the reasoned development of Grote's view by Mr H. Sidgwick, in the ‘Journal of Philology,’ Vol. IV. No. 8 (1872).For the details given here respecting particular Sophists or Rhetors, I have used chiefly:—(1) Cope's papers on the Sophists and the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, I. 145—188, II. 129—169, III. 34—80. (2) Westermann, Gesch. der Beredsamkeit, pp. 36—48: (3) Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit von Gorgias bis zu Lysias, pp. 1—78.. Those who, like the Sicilians, had a narrower scope were sometimes called Sophists, but were especially and properly called Rhetors.

Protagoras of Abdera, the earliest of the Sophists Protagoras. proper, was born about 485 B. C., and travelled throughout Greece, teaching, for about 40 years, from 455 to 415. The two things by which he is significant for artistic oratory are, his Dialectic, and the Commonplaces which he made his pupils commit to memory. His Dialectic is famous for its undertaking to make the weaker cause the stronger. One of the uses of Rhetoric, as Aristotle says, is to succour truth when truth is imperilled by the weakness of its champion; but this is not the place to inquire whether Protagoras intended, or how far he was bound to foresee, an immoral application. As a mental discipline, his Dialectic was important to oratory, not merely by its subtlety, but by its treatment of the rhetorical syllogism. The prepared topics which his pupils learned seem to mark a stage when public speaking in general was no longer purely extemporary, but when, on the other hand, the speech was not, as in Antiphon's time, wholly written. In regard to language, Protagoras insisted on ὀρθοέπεια—i.e. a correct accidence: but there is no proof that he sought to make a style; both the Ionic fragment in Plutarch Plut. παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον, c. 33 ( Moral p. 118), τῶν γὰρ υἱέων νεηνιῶν — ἀμηχανίην. and the myth in Plato ( Protag. pp. 320 D—328 C) are, for the prose of the time, simple, and they are free from the Gorgian figures.Prodikos

Prodikos of Keos—the junior by many years of Protagoras—was neither, like the latter, a dialectician nor a rhetor of the Siceliot type, but rather, like Hippias, the teacher of an encyclopaedic culture. There is no reason to think that he, any more than Protagoras or Hippias, concerned himself with the artistic oratory of Gorgias. Xenophon gives in the Memorabilia (II. i. §§ 21—33) Xen. calls it τὸ σύγγραμμα τὸ περὶ Ἡρακλέους. a paraphrase of the ‘Choice of Herakles’ as related by Prodikos in his fable called Ὧραι. When Philostratos Vit. Sophist. p. 16 (Kayser), καὶ τί ἂν χαρακτηρίζοιμεν τὴν τοῦ Προδίκου γλῶτταν, Ξενοφῶντος αὐτὴν ἱκανῶς ὑπογράφοντος; says that he need not describe the style of Prodikos because Xenophon has sketched it, he is refuted by Xenophon himself, who observes that the diction of Prodikos was more ambitious than that of his paraphrase Mem. II. i. § 34, οὕτω πως διώκει (διῴκει?) Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ’ Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παίδευσιν, ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν .. There are certainly confusions of synonyms which the Platonic Prodikos distinguishesAs Blass points out (l.c.), Xenophon ( Mem. II. i. § 24) makes Prodikos use τέρπεσθαι, ἥδεσθαι, ἐυφραίνεσθαι, indistinguishably: whereas Plato ( Prot. 337 C) makes Prodikos appropriate εὐφραίνεσθαι to intellectual, ἥδεσθαι to sensuous pleasure.; and the only safe inference appears to be that, however faithful Xenophon may have been to the matter of the fable, he is a witness of no authority for its form. The true point of contact between Prodikos and the early Rhetoric is his effort to discriminate words which express slight modifications of the same idea, and which, therefore, were not ordinarily distinguished by poets or in the idiom of daily life. However unscientific his effort may have been, it at least represented a scientific tendency, which soon set its mark on literature as well as on thought. Two men who are said to have been pupils of Prodikos— Euripides and Isokrates—show clear traces of it; but, for reasons which will appear further on, it is especially distinct in the earliest phase of artistic oratory—in Antiphon, and above all in Thucydides.

Hippias of Elis is of no immediate significance Hippias. for our subject. Neither Dialectic nor Rhetoric was included, or at least prominent, in the large circle of arts and sciences which he professed to teach. Economics, Ethics and Politics—‘the faculty of managing public affairs along with his own Plat. Hipp. Mai. 282 B, τὸ καὶ τὰ δημόσια πράττειν δύνασθαι μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων . Cf. Cope in Journ. Class. and Sacr. Phil. III. 63.’— formed his especial province. Like all the other Sophists, he touched, of course, the domain of grammar and prosody; his Τρωικὸς λόγος Plat l.c. p. 286 A., a dialogue between Nestor and Neoptolemos, made pretensions to elegance of style, but probably not of a poetical or Gorgian castPhilostratos, at least, says of Hippias that he wrote ‘powerfully and naturally,’ εἰς ὀλίγα καταφεύγων τῶν ἐκ ποιητικῆς ὀνόματα, Vit. Sophist. p. 15 (Kayser).; and, in Plato, Hippias assigns, not his oratory, but his political insight, as the ground of his selection as an ambassador by the EleansPlat. l.c. p. 281 (ad init.) He is a δικαστὴς καὶ ἄγγελος τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν πόλεων ἑκάστων λέγωνται..

Thrasymachos of Chalkedon stands in a far riper and more definite relation to Attic rhetorical prose, and will more properly be noticed in connexion with the progress from Antiphon to Lysias, when we come to look back on the development as a wholeSee Vol. II. ch. xxiii..Summary: influence of the Ionian Practical culture.

These, then, were the two things by which the Eastern or Ionian school of practical culture prepared the ground for Attic oratory: first and chiefly, popular Dialectic; secondly, in the phrase of Protagoras, orthoepy—attention to correctness in speaking or writing. In contrast with the Eastern Dialectic stands the Western Rhetoric. In contrast with the Ionian study of correct diction, ὀρθοέπεια, stands the Sicilian study of beautiful diction, εὐέπεια.

External influences: The Sicilian Rhetoric.

Deeper causes than a political crisis fitted Sicily to become the birthplace of Rhetoric. The first cause was the general character of the Sicilian Greeks. Thucydides remarks that the quick and adventurous Character of the Sicilian Greeks. Athenians, who were often benefited by Lacedaemonian slowness or caution, found most formidable adversaries in the Syracusans just because the Syracusans were so like themselves μάλιστα ὁμοιότροποι, Thuc. VIII. 96 .; and this resemblance, we have good reason to suppose, included the taste for lively controversy and the passion for lawsuits described by Aristophanes in the Wasps. ‘An acute people, with an inborn love of disputation’, is the description of the Sicilians which Cicero quotes from Aristotle ( Brut. xii. § 46.): ‘Sicilians are never so miserable’, he says in one of the Verrine speeches, ‘that they cannot make a happy joke Cic. In Verr. IV. 43 ad fin. Cf. Quint. VI. 3 § 41.’. The Political development of the Sicilian cities. population thus gifted had, further, gone through the same political phases as Athens; through aristocracy they had arrived at tyranny, and through tyranny at a democracy. The flourishing age of the Sicilian The Age of the Sicilian Tyrants. Tyrants—the early part of the fifth century B. C.— was illustrated by art and literature, by the lyric poetry which, native to Ionia, found its most splendid theme in the glory of these Dorian princes of the West, and by a home-growth of Comedy, the creation of Phormis and Epicharmos. It was in 466 The Democratic Revolution. that Thrasybulos, last of the Gelonian dynasty, was expelled and that a democracy was established at Syracuse. Somewhat later, a democracy arose at Character of Sicilian Democracy. Agrigentum also. Popular life was now as exuberant in Sicily as it was at Athens after the Persian Wars; but, with its mixture of races, it was less fortunately tempered; its vigour, instead of glowing with the sense of national welfare secured against aliens, had the feverish vehemence of a domestic reaction; and hence we should be prepared to find these younger democracies showing almost at once some features which do not appear in the elder Athenian democracy until the time of the Peloponnesian War. But it was neither by the turbulent rivalries of the popular assembly, nor by Circumstances under which Rhetoric became an Art. the natural growth of συκοφαντική or pettifogging, that the formulation of Rhetoric as an Art was immediately caused. The absolute princes of Sicily had done as they listed. They had banished, they Derangement of civil life by the Tyrants. had confiscated,—like Dionysios I. in later times, they had effaced towns and transferred populations,— they had turned all things upside-down. When they were driven out, and when governments arose based on the equality of citizens before the law, a Claims thence arising. crowd of aggrieved claimants presented themselves wherever that law had a seat. ‘Ten years ago’, this one would say, ‘Hieron banished me from Syracuse because I was too much a democrat, and gave my house on the Epipolae to Agathokles, who still lives among you; I ask the people to restore it to me.’ ‘When Gelon razed our city’, another would say, ‘and divided the lands among his friends, we were commanded to dwell at Selinus, where I have lived many years; my father's land was given to a favourite of the tyrant's, whose first cousin still holds it; I ask you to insist on this man making restitution.’ Claims of this kind would be innumerable. And, besides those which were founded in justice, a vast number of false claims would be encouraged by the general presumption that the rights of property had been universally deranged. If, twenty years after the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland, a government had arisen of such a nature as to make it worth people's while to dispute every possession taken under that settlement in the Ten Counties, the state of things which would have ensued would have borne some resemblance to that which prevailed throughout Sicily, but especially at Syracuse, in 466 B.C.Those who wish to test the accuracy of this illustration are referred to the History of the Cromwellian Settlement by Mr J. P. Prendergast. (Longmans, 1865)

Now, if we consider what would be, as a rule, General features of such claims. the characteristics of claims to property made under such conditions, we shall find that they throw a significant light on the little which is expressly recorded in regard to the first artists of Rhetoric. First, such claims would, as a rule, go several years back, and would often require for their elucidation that a complicated mass of details should be stated or arranged. Secondly, such claims would often lack documentary support; the tablets proving a purchase, a sale, or a contract, would, in many or most cases, have been lost or destroyed, and the claimant would have to rely chiefly on inferences from other facts which he could substantiate. Best aids for such claimants: If, then, we imagine a man conceiving the idea that these innumerable claimants want help, and that the occupation of helping them may be a way to notoriety or gain, in what particular forms is it probable that he would have tried to render 1. Skill in marshalling facts: this help? He would have seen, first, that people must be assisted to deal with an array of complex facts; they must be taught method. He would have seen, secondly, that they must be assisted to dispense with documentary or circumstantial 2 Skill in arguing probabilities. evidence; they must be given hints as to the best mode of arguing from general probabilities.

Empedokles.

Diogenes Laertios quotes a statement of Aristotle that Empedokles was the inventor of Rhetoric, as Zenon of DialecticDiog. VIII. 57, )Αριστοτέλης δ’ ἐν τῷ σοφιστῇ φησι πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικὴν εὑρεῖν, Ζήνωνα δὲ διαλεκτικήν. In his lost work περὶ ποιητῶν, Arist. (as quoted by Diog l.c.) said that Empedokles was δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν and μεταφορικός, as well as generally Ὁμηρικός. Twining notices (Vol. I. p. 249) the apparent discrepancy between this statement and that in the Poetics c. 1.—that Empedokles and Homer have οὐδὲν κοινὸν πλὴν τὸ μέτρον.. The more cautious phrase of Sextus EmpiricusVII. 6: Quint. III. 1 § 8. (also from Aristotle), which Quintilian translates, is that Empedokles broke ground ( κεκινηκέναι, aliqua movisse) in Rhetoric. Assuredly the poet and philosopher of Agrigentum created, at least, no rhetorical system. His oratory— which, after the fall of Thrasydaeos in 472, found political scope in resistance to a restoration of the tyranny—however brilliant, was practical only; and his analogy—so far as the wanderings of his later years and the union of care for studied expression with a doctrine give the semblance of such—is, at least, more with the Sophists of proper Greece than with the Sicilian Rhetors.

Korax.

The founder of Rhetoric as an Art was Korax of Syracuse. He had enjoyed some political consideration in the reign of Hieron (478—467 B.C.), and was probably several years older than Empedokles. The law-suits which followed the establishment of the democracy are said to have given him the idea of drawing up, and committing to writing, a system of rules for forensic speaking. This was his τέχνη or Art of Rhetoric—the earliest theoretical Greek book, not merely on Rhetoric, but in any branch of art. There is no mention of speeches composed by him either for himself or for others. Nor, except the story of his law-suit with Tisias, is there any evidence that he taught Rhetoric for pay. In regard to the contents of his ‘Art’ two facts Treatise of Korax on Rhetoric. are known which are of interest. They are precisely those which, as has been shown, we should have expected to find. First, he gave rules for arrangement—dividing the speech into five parts— Arrangement. proem, narrative, arguments (ἀγῶνες), subsidiary remarks (παρέκβασις) and perorationThe ἀγῶνες and παρέκβασις are thus explained in the Greek prolegomena to Hermogenes, Spengel, συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, p. 25.. Secondly, he The topic of εἰκος. illustrated the topic of general probability, bringing out its two-edged application: e.g. if a physically weak man is accused of an assault, he is to ask, ‘Is it probable that I should have attacked him?’; if a strong man is accused, he is to ask, ‘Is it probable that I should have committed an assault in a case where there was sure to be a presumption against me?’. Nothing could be more suggestive of the special circumstances in which the art of Rhetoric had its birth. The same topic of Probability holds its place in the Tetralogies of AntiphonSee below, pp. 47 ff.. But its original prominence was, in truth, a Sicilian accidentThis topic of εἰκός—the great weapon of the early Rhetoric— stands ninth among those topics of the fallacious enthymeme which Aristotle enumerates in Rhet. II 24—a chapter which, for his Rhetoric, is what the περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων is for the Topica. The fallacy arises from the omission to distinguish between abstract and particular probability. Arist. illustrates it by the verses of Agathon:—‘Perhaps one might call this very thing a probability,— that many improbable things will happen to men.’ ‘Of this topic’ says Aristotle (Rh. II. 24 § 9) ‘the Treatise of Korax is made up.’ Cf. Spengel, συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν pp. 30 f..

Tisias.

Tisias, the pupil of Korax, must have been born about 485 B.C. We hear that he was the master of Lysias at the colony of Thurii (founded in 443 B.C.), and of the young Isokrates at Athens—about 418 B.C.; Pausanias makes him accompany Gorgias to Athens in 427 B. C.; and speaks of him as having been banished from Syracuse (VI. 17 § 8). Whatever may be the worth of these details, the main facts about Tisias are clear. He led the wandering life of a Sophist. The ‘Rhetoric’ of Tisias The topic of εἰκός further developed. And in his Art of Rhetoric—the only work of his which antiquity possessed—he followed his master in further developing the topic of Probability ( Plat. Phaedr. 267 A, 273 A—C).

Those who bring a scientific spirit to the study of Attic oratory need not be cautioned against allowing what is ignoble, puerile, or even immoral in the earliest Greek Rhetoric to prejudice their estimate of the real services afterwards rendered both to language and to thought by the conception of expression as an art. Popular sentiment is universally against new subtleties. To gauge the morality of the early Rhetoric by the feeling of the people would be as unreasonable as to judge Sokrates on the testimony of the Clouds. The real meaning of Real meaning of the lawsuit story. the story about the lawsuit between Korax and Tisias lies in its illustration of the people's feeling. Korax, suing Tisias for a fee, argued that it must be paid whether he gained or lost his cause; if he gained, under the verdict; if he lost, because the success of his pupil proved the fee to have been earned; Tisias inverted the dilemma; and the judges dismissed them both with the comment, ‘bad crow, bad eggs.’ What this really expresses is not the character of the earliest Rhetoric, but its grotesque unpopularity.

Gorgias.

Gorgias is a man of whose powers and merits it is extremely difficult for us now to form a clear or impartial notion. This is not, however, because the portrait of him in Plato is so vivid. Nothing more distinguishes Plato from later satirists of like keenness than his manner of hinting the redeeming points of the person under dissection; and, whenever Gorgias comes in—whether in the dialogue that bears his name or elsewhere—it may be discerned (I venture to think) that Plato's purpose was to bring out an aspect of the man—that aspect which he considered most important—but that he allowed, and was writing for those who knew, that there was another side to the picture. This other side is suggested by the fact that Gorgias had at least some influence on a man of such intellectual power as Thucydides, on one so highly cultivated as the tragic poet Agathon, and on so shrewd a judge of practical ability as Jason of Pherae. The difficulty of now estimating Gorgias comes from this,—that he was an inventor whose originality it is hard for us to realise, but an artist whose faults are to us peculiarly glaring. Gorgias of Leontini was born about 485 B. C. Tradition made him the pupil of Empedokles; but their nearness in age makes this unlikely. That they knew each other is probable enough. Gorgias, like Protagoras, began with natural philosophy; and, after employing Eleatic methods to combat Eleatic conclusions, turned from a field of which he held himself to have The province of Gorgias, neither Dialectic nor Rhetoric, proved the barrenness. The practical culture to which he next addressed himself differed both from that of the Eastern Sophists and from that of the Sicilian Rhetors. It was founded neither upon but Oratory. Dialectic nor upon a systematic Rhetoric. Its basis was Oratory considered as a faculty to be developed empirically. Whether Gorgias left a written Art or not, is doubtful; it seems more probable that he did notOn this point see Blass, p. 53.; and his method of teaching—which reappears a century and a half later with the beginnings of AsianismSee Vol. II. ch. xxiv.—rested on the commission to memory of prepared passages. These passages were especially such as might serve to magnify the speaker's theme (αὔξησις) or to bring out the enormity of a wrong (δείνωσις). Beautiful and effective expression (λέξις) was the one great object. Gorgias seems to have given little or no heed to the treatment of subjectmatter,—to invention or management; or even to that special topic of Probability which was already engaging so much of the attention of Rhetoric. He was himself a man with a brilliant gift for language. His general conception was simple enough, but, for his own day and world, both bold and original. If the faculty of expression is cultivated to the right point, and is combined with a certain amount of general information, it will carry all before it. Just in the spirit in which Vivian Grey is described as saying to himself ‘knowledge is power’, Gorgias said to himself, ‘expression is power.’ He considered the gift in its relation to victory, and this victory not to be such narrow and painful success as was prepared by the pedantries of the rhetors, but dazzling and world-wide. Everything recorded of the man suggests his immense self-confidence, his capacity for sustained work, his exuberant vitality, and, above all, his power of doing what a new style would not have done without other gifts—setting the fashion to the ambitious among the rising generation, or even exciting a popular enthusiasm. In His first visit to Athens. 427 B. C. the Leontines sent an embassy to Athens, praying for help in their war with Syracuse. ‘At the head of the envoys,’ says DiodorosXII. 53, τῷ ξενίζοντι τῆς λέξεως ἐξέπληξε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὄντας εὐφυεῖς καὶ φιλολόγους, διαφέρουσιν ἀντιθέτοις καὶ ἰσοκώλοις καὶ παρίσοις καὶ ὁμοιοτελεύτοις καὶ ἑτέροις τοιούτοις. On these, see Vol. II. pp. 64 f., ‘was Gorgias the rhetor, a man who far surpassed all his contemporaries in oratorical force. He astonished the Athenians, with their quick minds and their το ξενίζον in his speaking, love of eloquence, by the foreign fashion (τῷ ξενίζοντι) of his language’—and by figures which the historian proceeds to enumerate. Now Gorgias appears to have always spoken and written in the Attic dialect—not in the ordinary Sicilian Doric, nor in the Ionic of LeontiniBlass, p. 52.. The τὸ ξενίζον of Diodoros is that ‘foreign’ air which Aristotle in his Rhetoric calls τὸ ξενικόν (e.g.) Arist. Rhet. III. 2 § 3, διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν· ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαύμαστον . So ib. § 8, τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἡ μεταφορά . And III. 7 § 11, τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς ., and which, for Athenians at least, was capable, when rightly used, of being a charm in oratory. There is no word which will exactly translate it, but it is nearly akin to what we mean by ‘distinction.’ That which was, to the Athenians, τὸ ξενίζον, or the element of distinction, its poetical character. in the Sicilian's speaking, was its poetical character; and this depended on two things—the use of poetical words, and the use of symmetry or assonance between clauses in such a way as to give a strongly marked prose-rhythm and to reproduce, as far as possible, the metres of verse. The only considerable fragment of Gorgias extant is that from the Funeral Oration—for the Palamedes and the Helen are now generally admitted to be later imitations. A few Specimen from his Epitaphios. sentences from this will give the best idea of his manner:—

μαρτυρίας δὲ τούτων τρόπαια ἐστήσαντο τῶν πολεμίων, Διὸς μὲν ἀγάλματα, τούτων δὲ ἀναθήματα, οὐκ ἄπειροι οὔτε ἐμφύτου Ἄρεος οὔτε νομίμων ἐρώτων οὔτε ἐνοπλίου ἔριδος οὔτε φιλοκάλου εἰρήνης, σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ δικαίῳ, ὅσιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς τοκέας τῇ θεραπείᾳ, δίκαιοι πρὸς τοὺς ἀστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ, εὐσεβεῖς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους τῇ πίστει. τοιγαροῦν αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντων ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν, ἀλλ’ ἀθάνατος ἐν οὐκ ἀσωμάτοις σώμασι ζῇ οὐ ζώντων Sauppe, Or. Att. II. 130..

It may be hard now to understand how such His great popularity at Athens— how it is to be understood. a style can have moved to transports of delight men who lived among the works of Pheidias and Iktinos, who knew the prose of Herodotos, and whose ears were familiar with Homer, with Aeschylos and with Sophokles. It is more difficult still, perhaps, to realize that the invention of this style was a proof of genius. Gorgias was the first man who definitely conceived how literary prose might be artistic. That he should instinctively compare it with the only other form of literature which was already artistic, namely poetry, was inevitable. Early prose necessarily begins by comparing itself with poetry. Gorgias was a man of glowing and eager power; he carried the assimilation to a length which seems incredibly tasteless now. But let it be remembered that the interval between Gorgias and Thucydides, in some passages of the historian's speeches, is not so very wide. And if the enthusiasm of the Ekklesia still seems incomprehensible, let it be remembered that they felt vividly the whole originality of the man, and did not at all see that his particular tendency was mistaken. It was only by and by, and after several compromises, that men found out the difference between τὸ ἔρρυθμον and τὸ εὔρυθμον, between verse and rhythmical prose; namely, that rhythm is the framework of the former but only the fluent outline of the latter. If a style is new and forcible, extravagances will not hinder it from being received with immense applause at its first appearance. Then it is imitated until its originality is forgotten and its defects brought into relief. In the maturity of his genius, Lord Macaulay pronounced the Essay on Milton to be ‘disfigured by much gaudy and ungraceful ornament.’ Gorgias was the founder of artistic prose; and his faults are the more excusable because they were extravagant. Granting the natural assumption that prose was to be a kind of poetry, then Gorgias was brilliantly logical; and, as the event proved, his excesses did good service by calling earlier attention to the fallacy in his theory.

Perikles

Allowing, however, all that has been advanced above, it might still seem strange that Gorgias should have had this reception from the Assembly which, within three years, had been listening to Perikles. But the true question is whether Was his oratory artistic in form? Perikles had aimed at giving to his eloquence the finish of a literary form. Suidas says that Perikles was the first who composed a forensic speech before delivering it; his predecessors had extemporisedSuidas s. v. Περικλῆς ; ῥήτωρ καὶ δημαγωγός, ὅστις πρῶτος γραπτὸν λόγον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ εἶπε, τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ σχεδιαζόντων.. Cicero says that Perikles and Alkibiades are the most ancient authors who have left authentic writings Cic. De Orat. II. § 93, antiquissimi fere sunt, quorum quidem scripta constent: where the ‘constent’ seems to imply that the question of authentieity had been examined. But in Brut. § 27 he says, more doubtfully, Ante Periclem, cuius scripta quaedam feruntur, littera nulla est quae quidem ornatum aliquem habeat .. Quintilian, however, thinks that the compositions extant under the name of Perikles are not worthy of his reputation, and that, as others had conjectured, they were spurious Quint. III 1 § 12, Equidem non reperio quicquam tanta eloquentiae fama dignum; ideoque minus miror esse qui nihil ab eo scriptum putent, haec autem quae feruntur ab aliis esse composita. . Plutarch says Statement of Plutarch. positively that Perikles has left nothing written (ἔγγραφον) except decrees Plut. Pericl. c. 8, ἔγγραφον μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπολέλοιπε πλὴν τῶν ψηφισμάτων· ἀπομνημονεύεται δὲ ὀλίγα παντάπασιν .. The antithesis meant by ἔγγραφον is with those sayings of Perikles which tradition had preserved; especially those bold similes from nature and life to which reference will be made in considering the style of AntiphonBelow, pp. 27 f.. The speeches Thucydidean Speeches of Perikles. in Thucydides doubtless give the general ideas of Perikles with essential fidelity; it is possible, further, that they may contain recorded sayings of his like those in Aristotle: but it is certain that they cannot be taken as giving the form of the statesman's oratory. Like the other speeches, they bear the stamp of a manner which was not so fully developed until after his death. Perikles as an orator is best Notices of his oratory. known to us from the brief but emphatic notices of the impression which he made. ‘This man,’ says Eupolis, ‘whenever he came forward, proved himself the greatest orator among men: like a good runner, he could give the other speakers ten feet start, and win.......Rapid you call him; but, besides his swiftness, a certain persuasion sat upon his lips —such was his spell: and, alone of the speakers, he ever left his sting in the hearers Α. κράτιστος οὗτος ἐγένετ’ ἀνθρώπων λέγειν ὁπὀτε παρέλθοι, χὥσπερ ἁγαθοὶ δρομῆς ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ᾕρει λέγων τοὺς ῥήτορας. Β. ταχὺν λέγεις μέν· πρὸς δέ γ’ αὐτοῦ τῷ τάχει πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν· οὕτως ἐκήλει· καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις Eupolis, Δῆμοι, Bothe Frag. Com. I. 162, where the ancient citations of this famous passage are brought together. See (e.g.) Quint. XII. 10, Cic. Brut. § 38..’ When Aristophanes is describing the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, ‘Perikles the Olympian,’ he says, ‘was thundering and lightening and putting Greece in a Its distinctive conditions. tumult.’ (Ar. Ach. 530.) Unique as an Athenian statesman, Perikles must have been in two respects unique also as an Athenian orator;—first, because he occupied such a position of personal ascendancy as no man before or after him attained; secondly, because his thoughts and his moral force won him such renown for eloquence as no one else ever got from Athenians without the further aid of artistic expression. His manner of speaking seems to have been tranquil, stately to a degree which Plutarch seems inclined to satirize (Plut. Per. c. 5.), but varied by occasional bursts having the character of lofty poetryCf. Mr Watkiss Lloyd's ‘Age of Perikles’ I. 159 (speaking of the sweetness of voice and facile swiftness which distinguished the elocution of Perikles):—‘The combination of power, rapidity, and faseination that is thus avouched, is probably not so much explamed by, as it explains, the tradition of his obligations to such varied instructors as Anaxagoras, Damon, and Aspasia ..To Plato, Perikles was still, though only by traditional reputation, the most accomplished of all orators’ ( Phaedr. p 269 E, πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικήν .)—As Mr Lloyd says, Plato seems inclined there to connect this excellence of Perikles with a study of psychology under Anaxagoras: though the Phaedo p. 97 B implies that Anaxagoras did not enter on such inquiries. Undoubtedly psychology is what Plato in the Phaedros is recommending, first of all, to Isokrates; see on this, Blass, Isokrates und Isaios, p. 29..

History of Athenian oratory begins with Antiphon

The earliest of those Athenian orators who have left writings is not the disciple of him who most represented the new art of oratory. Antiphon was chiefly formed, not by the new Oratory, but by the a disciple, not of Gorgias, but of the Sicilian Rhetoric. new Rhetoric, not by Gorgias but by Tisias. The influence of Gorgias meets us somewhat, of course, even in Antiphon, but far more decidedly in Thucydides, and then, chastened to a form of which its beginnings had little promise, in Isokrates. The Rhetoric and Popular Dialectic at Athens from 450 B.C. second half of the fifth century at Athens had already given a place in the popular life to the new culture. While Comedy set itself against that culture, Tragedy had been more compliant. No Tragedy. contrast could be more significant than that between the singular barrenness of the trial-scene in the Eumenides, or the measured controversies of the Ajax, and the truly forensic subtleties of the Orestes. Nor was the exercise only mimic. Already the public advocates (συνηγόροι) formed a class. The Forensic Advocacy. private advocate was forbidden to take money. Hence he usually begins by defining the personal interest which has led him to appear. In the next century, at least, the law was not strictly observedLykurgos thus speaks of the mercenary advocacy which in his time had become a tolerated practice, κατὰ Λεωκράτους § 138 (circ. 330 B C.):—‘I am astonished if you do not see that your extreme indignation is well deserved by men who, although they have no tie whatever either of kinship or of friendship with the accused persons, continually help in defending them for pay’ — μισθοῦ συναπολογουμένοις ἀεὶ τοῖς κρινομένοις. — But the real error both of Greeee and of Rome (until, at some time before Justinian, Trajan's renewal of the Lex Cincia was repealed), lay in their refusal to recognise Advocacy as a profession. See, on the theory, Forsyth, Hortensius, pp. 377 ff.; private advocacy was often paid; and it is not rash to suppose that this practice was as old as the frequency of litigation.

Athens the chief seat of Civil Oratory.

But while literary fashion or private need thus lent their aid, greater and older causes than these had prepared Athens to be the home of Civil Oratory. Political morality of the Greeks. The chief importance of Grecian history depends on this, that the Greeks are the first people from whom we can learn any lessons in the art of ruling men according to lawFreeman, ‘General ‘Sketch of European History,’ ch. II. § 3: and the essay on ‘The Athenian Democracy’ (Second Series, no. IV.).. While all the nations with which the Greeks came in contact were governed more or less despotically, the Greek cities alone were governed politically. No Persian or Egyptian had any conception of the principle that both sides of a public question should be fairly heard, that it should be decided by the opinion of the civic majority, and that the minority should be bound by this decision. Every Greek city, be it planted where it might, at the Pillars of Herakles or on the shores of the Inhospitable Sea, was perfectly familiar with this doctrine. Sometimes a tyrant forcibly suspended its operation, sometimes an oligarchy capriciously narrowed its scope, but it was known wherever the Greek tongue This morality most practical at Athens. was spoken. In democratic Athens, more than in any other Greek city, this doctrine was no speculative opinion, no occasional motive, but the present and perpetual spring of public action; nor did any goddess of the pantheon receive a tribute more fitting or more sincere than that which Athenians Relation of Athenian to Greek Oratory annually laid on the altar of Persuasion Isokr. Antid. (Or. XV.) § 249, τὴν μὲν γὰρ Πειθὼ μίαν τῶν θεῶν νομίζουσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶσι καθ’ ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν θυσίαν αὐτῇ ποιουμένην .. It has sometimes been said that Greek Oratory means Athenian Oratory. This is far from being true in the sense that all the considerable masters of oratorical prose were either natives of Attica or permanent residents at Athens. Gorgias of Leontini, Theodoros of Byzantium, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, Anaximenes of Lampsakos, Naukrates of Erythrae, Philiskos of Miletos, Ephoros of Cumae, Theopompos of Chios, Theodektes of Phaselis, and many more, might be adduced. But there is another sense in which the statement is true. Athens was the home, though Attica was not the birth-place, of all the very greatest men in this branch of art, of all the men whose works had wide and lasting acceptance as canons. Athens was, further, the educator of all those men, whether first-rate or not, who, after about 400 B. C., won a Panhellenic name for eloquence. The relation of Athenian to Greek oratory is accurately stated by Isokrates when, in 353 B. C., he is defending his theory of culture against supposed objections—objections which, as the very history of his school shows, had never really taken hold of the Athenian mind, but were restricted to a much narrower circle than his rather morbid sensibility imagined ( Isokr. Antid. (Or. XV.) §§ 295— 298). ‘You must not forget that our city is regarded as the established δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι διδάσκαλος: note the tense, — expressing a position thoroughly won and generally recognised. teacher of all who can speak or teach others to speak. And naturally so, since men see that our city offers the greatest prizes to those who possess this faculty, —provides the most numerous and most various schools for those who, having resolved to enter the real contests, desire a preparatory discipline,—and, further, affords to all men that experience which is the main secret of success in speaking. Besides, men hold that the general diffusion and the happy temperament of Attic speech, the Attic flexibility of intelligence and taste for letters, contribute not a little to literary culture; and hence they not unjustly deem that all masters of expression are disciples of Athens. See, then, lest it be folly indeed to cast a slur on this name which you have among the Greeks...; that unjust judgment will be nothing else than your open condemnation of yourselves. You will have done as the Lacedaemonians would do if they introduced a penalty for attention to military exercises, or the Thessalians, if they instituted proceedings at law against men who seek to make themselves good riders.’

Political aspect of Athenian Oratory.

Athenian oratory has two great aspects, the artistic and the political. The artistic aspect will necessarily be most prominent in the following pages, since their special object is to trace the development of Attic oratory in relation to the development of Attic prose. When, however, Attic oratory is considered, not relatively to Attic prose, but in itself, the artistic aspect is not more important than the political; and, if even the literary value of the Attic orations is to be fully understood, their political significance must not for a moment be left out of sight. This significance resides not merely in the matter or form of each discourse, but also in the Political training of the Greek citizen, training which had been received by the public to which it is addressed. We must ask ourselves, not merely, ‘Is this subject well treated?’ but also, ‘What manner of a multitude can it have been for which the speaker thought this treatment adapted?’ The common life of every Greek city, not suppressed by tyranny or too much warped by oligarchy, was a political education for the citizens. The reason is manifest from the very fact that the society was a city, and neither a village nor a nation. On the one hand there was the instinct which demanded the highest attainable organisation under laws. On the other, there was the inability to conceive parliament except as a primary assembly. At Athens this political education of the citizens and especially of the Athenian. was more thorough than elsewhere, because at Athens the tendency of a commonwealth to deposit all power in an assembly was worked out with most logical completenessFreeman, Historical Essays (Second Scries), pp. 128 f.. All the powers of the State, legislative, executive and judicial were concentrated in the absolute Demos: the law-courts were committees of the Ekklesia, as the archons or generals were its officers. The world has seen nothing like this. The Italian Republics of the middle age were Civic sentiment in the Greek and in the Italian Republics. fragments of the Roman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. It was from their prosperity as municipalities that they had derived their independence as States. They grew up among traditions of feudal privilege, represented here and there by a noble who could openly violate the order of the city within Athens and Florence. whose walls he livedIn the Essay on ‘Ancient Greece and Mediæval Italy’ (Historical Essays, Second Series), Mr Freeman has worked out the likeness and unlikeness which here are barely touched on.. A Florentine, like an Athenian, was a citizen with his share in the government of the city: Florence, like Athens, recognised the right of the assembled People to decide questions of State. But Florence, until its latest days, had nothing truly corresponding to the Ekklesia. The citizens were occasionally called together, but there was no popular Assembly with an organised and continual superintendence of all affairs. Nor was the civic sentiment so vivid or so direct for the Florentine as for the Athenían. The Florentíne acted in politics primarily as member of a commercial guildThe Florentine burgher was qualified for the franchise by belonging to one of the ineorporated arts: Symonds, ‘Renaissance in Italy. Age of the Despots,’ p. 128. On the mercantile character of the Italian republics as influencing the political, ib. 173 f. and only secondarily as a citizen. The Greek Republics far more than the Italian, Athens far more than Florence, afforded the proper atmosphere for such an oratory as alone, in strictness, can take the Civil Oratory defined. lofty name of Civil; that is, which is addressed by a citizen, educated both in ruling and in obeying, to the whole body of fellow-citizens who have had the Attic Oratory fulfils this definition. same twofold training as himself. The glory of Attic oratory, as such, consists not solely in its intrinsic excellence, but also in its revelation of the corporate political intelligence to which it appealed: for it spoke sometimes to an Assembly debating an issue of peace or war, sometimes to a law-court occupied with a private plaint, sometimes to Athenians mingled with strangers at a festival, but everywhere and always to the Athenian Demos, everywhere and always to a paramount People, taught by life itself to reason and to judge.

Antiphon: Life
Introduction

In describing the Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens, Thucydides lays stress upon the fact that the measures which had effected it owed their unity and their success to the control of a single mind. The figure of Peisandros is most conspicuous in the foreground. ‘But he who contrived the whole matter, and the means by which it was brought to pass, and who had given his mind to it longest, was Antiphon; a man second to no Athenian of his day in virtue; a proved master of device and of expression; who did not come forward in the assembly, nor, by choice, in any scene of debate, since he lay under the suspicion of the people through a repute for cleverness; but who was better able than any other individual to assist, when consulted, those who were fighting a cause in a law-court or in the assembly. In his own case, too—when the Four Hundred in their later reverses were being roughly used by the people, and he was accused of having aided in setting up this same government—he is known to have delivered the greatest defence made in the memory of my age by a man on trial for his life.’ (Thuc. VIII. 68.)

This passage gives in outline nearly all that is known of the life of Antiphon. Other sources supply details, and make it possible to work up the sketch into something like a picture; but they add nothing which enlarges its framework. The Revolution of the Four Hundred is still the one great scene presented to our view.

Birth of Antiphon.

Antiphon was born about the year 480 B. C. [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. γέγονε κατὰ τὰ Περσικὰ καὶ Γοργίαν τὸν σοφιστὴν, ὀλίγῳ νεώτερος αὐτοῦ. Gorgias can scarcely have been more than seventy in 411 B.C. Blass would place the birth of Gorgias ‘a few years’ below 496 (Att. Bereds. p. 45). Clinton suggests 485 (sub ann. 427)., being thus rather younger than Gorgias, and some eight or nine years older than the historian Thucydides. He was of the tribe of Aiantis and of the deme of RhamnusHe is often distinguished as the ‘Rhamnusian’ from namesakes. Of these there are especially three with whom his ancient biographers —the pseudo-Plutarch, Philostratos, Photios (cod. 259), and the anonymous author of the γένος Ἀντιφῶντος—frequently confuse him. I. The Antiphon who was put to death by the Thirty Tyrants, seven years after the orator's death: Xen. Hellen. III. 40. He had furnished two triremes at his own cost during the war: and of him Philostratos is probably thinking when he says of the orator, ἐστρατήγησε πλεῖστα, ἐνίκησε πλεῖστα, ἑξήκοντα τριήρεσι πεπληρωμέναις ηὔξησεν Ἀθηναίοις τὸ ναυτικόν. The speech of Lysias περὶ τῆς Ἀντιφῶντος θυγατρός (pseudo-Plut. Vitt. X. Oratt.) referred to his daughter. II. Antiphon the tragedian, put to death by Dionysios the elder, towards the end of his reign, i.e. about 370 B. C.: Arist. Rhet. II. 6. The anonymous biographer says of the orator, τραγῳδίας ἐποίει: and Philostratos describes him as put to death by Dionysios for criticising his tragedies. III. Antiphon the Sophist, introduced by Xenophon as disputing with Sokrates, Memor. I. 6. 1. Diogenes calls him τερατοσκόπος (soothsayer), Suidas, ὀνειροκριτής — by which title he is often referred to. Hermogenes expressly distinguishes him from the orator (περὶ ἰδεῶν, II. 497); but they are confused by the pseudo-Plut. and by Photios.; of a family which cannot have been altogether obscure, since it was made a reproach to him on his trial that his grandfather had been a partisan of the PeisistratidaeHarpokration s. v. στασιώτης.. The tradition that his father Sophilos was a sophist antedates by a generation the appearance of that class of teachersK. O. Múller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXXIII., Vol. II. p. 105, ed. Donaldson., and may have been suggested simply by the jingle of the wordsDonalds., note, ibid.. Antiphon himself, as the style of his composition indicates, must have felt the sophistic influence; but there is no evidence for his having been the pupil of any particular sophist. He is allowed by general consent to have been the first Antiphon the first λογογραφος. representative at Athens of a profession for which the new conditions of the time had just begun to make a place, — the first λογογράφος, or writer of speeches for money[Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. λόγους συνέγραψε πρῶτος ἐπὶ τοῦτο τραπεὶς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι. Diod. ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. I. 365, πρῶτον δικανικὸν λόγον ἐς ἔκδοσιν γραψάμενον.. With the recent growth of Rhetoric as a definite art, the inequality, for purposes of pleading or debating, between men who had and who had not mastered the newly-invented weapons of speech had become seriously felt. A rogue skilled in the latest subtleties of argument and graces of style was now more than ever formidable to the plain man whom he chose to drag before a court or to attack in the ekklesia: and those who had no leisure or taste to become rhetoricians now began to find it worth while to buy their rhetoric ready-made. Forensic speeches were, no doubt, those with which Antiphon most frequently supplied his clients. But HermogenesHermog. περὶ ἰδ. II. p. 415, λἑγεται εὑρετὴς καὶ ἀρχηγὸς γενέσθαι τοῦ τύπου τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. By πολιτικοὶ λόγοι, as distinguished from διαλεκτική, were meant both συμβουλευτικοί and δικανικοί: see Isokr. κατὰ σοφ. § 20. describes him as ‘the inventor and founder of the political style’,—a phrase including deliberative as well as forensic oratory: and this exactly agrees with the statement of Thucydides that Antiphon was practised in aiding, not only those who had lawsuits, but debaters in the ekklesia Thuc. VIII. 68, τοὺς ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ...δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν .. Besides being a speech-writer, he was also a teacher of rhetoric, and, as the allusion in the Menexenos Plat. Menex. p. 236 A . implies, the most fashionable master of Plato's time Antiphon and Thucydides. at Athens. The tradition that Thucydides was the pupil of Antiphon may have been suggested by the warmth and emphasis of the passage in which the orator is mentioned by the historian [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. Καικίλιος δὲ (Caecilius of Calacte, the Greek rhetorician of the time of Augustus) ἐν τῷ περὶ αὐτοῦ συντάγματι Θουκυδίδου τοῦ συγγραφέως (VIII. 68.) μ αθητὴν τεκμαίρεται γεγονἐναι, ἐξ ὧν ἐπαινεῖται παρ’ αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν. Ruhnken (Disp. de Ant.) says that some mss. have διδάσκαλον instead of μαθητήν here: Blass suggests καθηγητήν. Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδ. II. 497) refers to the tradition as one which ‘many’ receive; but rejects it for the inadequate reason that the style of Thucydides resembles that of Antiphon the Sophist (see note above) rather than that of Antiphon the orator. In Bishop Thirlwall's remarks (c. XXVIII. Vol. IV. p. 23 note, ed. 1855) I entirely concur. Ruhnken's ‘satis, ni fallor, demonstravimus Thucydidem ab Antiphonte esse eruditum,’ is surely not justified by his reasonings.; a passage which, in its sudden glow of a personal admiration, recalls two others in the History—the tribute to the genius of Themistokles, and the character of Perikles. In the tradition itself there is nothing improbable, but it wants the support of evidence. The special relation of master to pupil need not be assumed to account for a tone which congeniality of literary tasteSee below, ch. II. pp 23 ff., on the affinity between the styles of Antiphon and Thucydides., common sufferings at the hands of the democracy, or perhaps personal friendship, would sufficiently explain.

Antiphon's life to 411 B.C.

Nothing is directly known of Antiphon's political relations before the year 411 B. C.; but there are slight indications which agree well with his later hostility to the democracy. Harpokration has preserved the names of two speeches written by him, one for the people of Samothrace, on the subject of the tribute which they paid to Athens; another, on the same subject, for the people of Lindos in RhodesHarpokration quotes five times a speech of Antiphon περὶ τοῦ Σαμοθρᾴκων φόρου, spoken, as the fragments show, by their ambassador; and in ten places refers to another περὶ τοῦ Λινδίων φόρου.. The oppression of the subject-allies by the demagogues, who extorted from them large sums on any pretence or threat, was a commonplace of complaint with oligarchsSee, e.g., Ar. Vesp. 669 ff.. The employment of Antiphon, afterwards so staunch an oligarch, by aggrieved allies, preparing to represent their grievances at the imperial city, was perhaps more than an accident of professional routine. The hostility of Antiphon to AlkibiadesPlutarch ( Alk. c. 3) quotes Antiphon as the authority for a discreditable story about Alkibiades; and goes on to say that it must be received with caution, on account of Antiphon's avowed enmity towards him: ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἀντιφῶντος λοιδορίαις γέγραπται. These λοιδορίαι would seem to have formed a sort of polemical pamphlet. But Athenaeos, on the other hand, quotes a statement made by Antiphon, ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου λοιδορίας (Athen. XII 525 B). This would seem to have been a speech in a δίκη κακηγορίας (Dem. Konon. § 18), for which λοιδορία is used as a convertible term. cf. Ar. Vesp. 1207, εἷλον διώκων λοιδορίας . Sauppe thinks that the mistake is with Athenaeos, not with Plutarch. See Blass, Att. Bereds. p. 95., again, need not have had any political meaning; but it would have been especially natural in one who had shared the views, and who mourned the fate, of Nikias. At all events, the words of Thucydides give a vivid idea of the position held at Athens by Antiphon just before the Revolution of the Four Hundred. His abilities were acknowledged, but they were exerted only for others; he himself came forward neither in the assembly, nor—‘when he could help it Thuc. VIII. 68, οὐδ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδένα .’—in the law-courts; he lay under the suspicion of the people for ‘cleverness.’ The nature of the ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης) for which Antiphon was distrusted and disliked is sufficiently illustrated by his Tetralogies. It was the art of fighting a cause which could hardly be defended on any broad ground by raising in succession a number of more or less fine points. The indignant bewilderment expressed by the imaginary prosecutor in the Second Tetralogy Tetr. II. Γ ad init. on finding the common-sense view of the case turned upside-down represents what many a citizen of the old school must have felt when he encountered, in the ekklesia or the law-court, a client of the ingenious ‘speech-writer.’ Antiphon was a cautious, patient man. The comic poets could ridicule him for his poverty or his avarice[Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. κεκωμῴδηται δ’ εἰς φιλαργυρίαν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Πεισάνδρῳ.; they could say that the speeches which he sold for great sums were ‘framed to defeat justicePhilostratos p. 17, καθάπτεται ἡ κωμῳδία τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ὡς δεινοῦ τὰ δικανικὰ καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου ξυγκειμένους ἀποδιδομένου πολλῶν χρημάτων αὐτοῖς μάλιστα τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν.;’ but a carefully obscure life probably offered no hold to any more definite attack. Meanwhile he was quietly at work with the oligarchic clubs. According to Thucydides he was not merely the arch-plotter of the Revolution. He was the man who ‘had thought about it longest.’

The Revolution.

In the spring of 411 B. C. the opportunity for which Antiphon had been waiting at last came. Alkibiades, by promises of Persian aid, induced the oligarchs in the army at Samos to commence a movement for the overthrow of the Athenian democracy. Peisandros, as their representative, came to Athens, and, by insisting on the hopelessness of the war without such help as Alkibiades covenanted to bring, extorted from the ekklesia a vote for that change of constitution which the exile demanded. Having visited the various oligarchical clubs in the city and urged them to combine in favour of the project, Peisandros went back to confer with Alkibiades. When he presently returned to Athens,—with the knowledge that his hopes from Persia were idle, but that, on the other hand, the Revolution must go on,— he found a state of things very different from that which he had left. He had left the people just conscious that an oligarchy was proposed, and consenting, in sheer despair, to entertain the idea; but, at the same time, openly and strongly averse to it, and in a temper which showed that the real difficulties of the undertaking were to come. He now finds that, in the brief interval of his absence, every difficulty has already vanished. Not a trace of open opposition remains in the senate or in the ekklesia; not a murmur is heard in the conversation of the citizens (Thuc. VIII. 65, 66.). It is a fair inference from the words of Thucydides that the principal agent in producing this rapid and wonderful change had been AntiphonCf. Grote, ch. LXII; Curtius, Hist. Gr. Vol III p. 435 (Ward's transl.).. A brief consideration of the task which he had to do, and of the manner in which it was done, will supply the best criterion of his capacity. He had, first, to bring into united and disciplined action those oligarchical clubs to which Peisandros had appealed. These are described as ‘leagues with a view to lawsuits and to offices ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, Thuc. VIII. 54 .;’ that is, associations of which the members were pledged by oath to support, personally and with funds, any one of their body who brought, or defended, a civil action, or who sought one of the offices of the State. When, with the steady advance of democracy from the Persian wars onwards, the oligarchs found themselves more and more in a minority, such associations became their means of concentrating and economising their one great power—wealth. The tone of such clubs would always be, in a general way, antipopular. But they were unaccustomed to systematic action for great ends; and, in regard to those smaller ends which they ordinarily pursued, their interests would, from the nature of the case, frequently conflict. Antiphon need not have had much difficulty in proving to them that, on this occasion, they had a common interest. But to make them effective as well as unanimous; to restrain, without discouraging, the zeal of novices in a political campaign, and to make of these a compact and temperate force, loyally taking the word from the best men among them, and so executing the prescribed manœuvres that in a short time they were completely ascendant over an enormous and hostile, but ill-organised majority,—this, assuredly, was the achievement of no ordinary leader. The absence of overt, and the skilful use of secret, violence was the characteristic of the Revolution. Adverse speakers were not menaced, but they disappeared; until apparent unanimity, and real terror, had silenced every objection. Antiphon had seen clearly how the Athenian instinct of reverence for constitutional forms might be used against the constitution. His too, on the showing of Thucydides, must have been that clever invention, the imaginary body of Five Thousand to whom the franchise was to be left; a fiction which, to the end, did service to the oligarchs by giving them a vague prestige for strength.

The two parties in the Council.

The Council of the Four Hundred comprised two distinct elements, — those thorough oligarchs who had been the core of the conspiracy; and a number of other men, more or less indifferent to the ideas of oligarchy, who had accepted the Revolution because they believed that it alone could save Athens. Had the new Government been able to conciliate or to frighten the army at Samos, both sorts of men would have been satisfied, and the Council would have gone on working, for a time at least, as a seemingly harmonious whole. But the resolute hostility of the army, which at once made the case of the Four Hundred really hopeless, brought the discord to light forthwith. The Council was thenceforth divided into an Extreme and a Moderate party. Among the leaders of the Extreme party were Peisandros, Phrynichos, Aristarchos, Archeptolemos, Onomakles and Antiphon. The Moderates were led by Theramenes and Aristokrates. Two chief questions were in dispute between the parties. The Moderates wished to call into political life the nominal civic body of Five Thousand; the ultra-oligarchs objected that it was better, at such a crisis, to avoid all chance of a popular rising. The ultra-oligarchs were fortifying Eëtioneia, alleging the danger of an attack from Samos; the Moderates accused them of wishing to receive Peloponnesian troops.

The Extreme party was soon driven, in May 411 B. C., to the last resource of an embassy to Sparta. Phrynichos, Antiphon, Archeptolemos, Onomakles and eight others Thuc. VIII. 90, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Φρύνιχον καὶ ἄλλους δέκα . That Archeptolemos and Onomakles were on the embassy appears from [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. were sent ‘to make terms with the Lacedaemonians in any way that could at all be borne Thuc. ib. παντὶ τροπῳ ὅστις καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἀνεκτός ξυναλλαγῆναι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ..’ Thucydides does not say what the envoys offered at Sparta or what answer they got; but he states plainly the length which he conceives that their party was ready to go. ‘They wished, if possible, having their oligarchy, at the same time to rule the allies; if that could not be, to keep their ships, their walls, and their independence; or, if shut out even from this, at all events not to have their own lives taken first and foremost by the people on its restoration; sooner would they bring in the enemy and covenant to keep the city on any terms, without wall or ships, if only their persons should be safe.’ (Thuc. VIII. 91)

Fall of the Four Hundred.

This embassy brought the unpopularity of the Extreme party to a crisis. Immediately upon his return Phrynichos was assassinated. The revolt of the citizens employed in fortifying Eëtioneia quickly followed. The assembly in the Anakeion, broken up by the sudden appearance of the Peloponnesian fleet, met again on the Pnyx soon after the Peloponnesian victory at Oropos; and the Four Hundred, who had taken office in March, were deposed about the middle of June.

The leading ultra-oligarchs hastened to save themselves by flight. Peisandros, Alexikles and others went to Dekeleia; Aristarchos, taking with him a body of bowmen, contrived to betray Oenoe on the Athenian frontier into the hands of the Boeotians who were besieging it. But, of the twelve who had formed the embassy, and who now, before all others, were in peril, three remained at Athens—Antiphon, Archeptolemos and Onomakles. An information against these three men was laid before the ekklesia by the Generals. The eisangelia charged them with having gone on an embassy to Sparta for mischief to Athens, sailing, on their way thither, in an enemy's ship, and traversing the enemy's camp at Dekeleia. A psephism was passed by the ekklesia directing the arrest of the accused that they might be tried by a dikastery, and instructing the Thesmothetae to serve each of them, on the day following the issue of the decree, with a formal summons. On the day fixed by the summons the Thesmothetae were to bring the cases into court; and the Generals, assisted by such Synegori, not more than ten in number, as they might choose from the Council of the Five Hundred, were to prosecute for treason[Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. .

Trial and condemnation of Antiphon.

Onomakles seems to have escaped or died before the day. Archeptolemos and Antiphon were brought to trial. The scanty fragments of the speech made by Antiphon in his own defence reveal only one item of its contents. One of the prosecutors, Apolexis, having asserted that Antiphon's grandfather had been a partisan of the Peisistratidae, Antiphon replied that his grandfather had not been punished after the expulsion of the tyrants, and could scarcely, therefore, have been one of their ‘body-guardHarpokr. s.v. στασιώτης (Sauppe, Or. Att. II. p. 138.) Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως· περὶ τοίνυν ὧν Ἀπόληξις κατηγόρηκεν ὡς στασιώτης ἦν ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πάππος ὁ ἐμός· ἔοικε νῦν ὁ ῥήτωρ ἰδίως ἐπὶ τοῦ δορυφόρου κεχρῆσθαι τῷ ὀνόματι· ἐν γοῦν τοῖς ἑξῆς φησιν ὅτι· οὐκ ἂν τοὺς μὲν τυραννοῦντας ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ πρόγονοι κολάσαι, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους ἠδυνάτησαν.Curtius (Hist. Gr. Vol. III. p. 460, transl. Ward) infers from this fragment that Antiphon in his speech argued ‘that the Four Hundred had acted as one equally responsible body, and that, therefore, either all ought to be punished or all acquitted.’ He observes that ‘reference seems to be made to an unjustifiable separation of the parties involved: this is indicated by the distinction drawn between the τύραννοι and the δορυφόροι.’ It is very likely that Antiphon may have used this argument: but I do not see how it is to be inferred from the fragments of the speech περὶ τῆς μεταστάσεως that he used it. The distinction between the τύραννοι and the δορυφόροι is made, as a perusal of the fragment will show, solely in reference to the Peisistratidae. .’ The other special topics are unknown; but their range, at least, is shown by the title under which the speech was extant. It was inscribed περὶ μεταστάσεως, On the Change of Government. It dealt, then, not merely with the matter specified in the eisangelia—the embassy to Sparta—but with the whole question of the Revolution. It is described by Thucydides as the greatest defence made in the memory of that age by a man on trial for his life. The story in the Eudemian Ethics Eth. Eudem. III. 5, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἑνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα ., whether true or not, seems at any rate characteristic. Agathon, the tragic poet, praised the speech; and Antiphon—on whom sentence of death had passed—answered that a man who respects himself must care more what one good man thinks than what is thought by many nobodies.

The sentence ran thus:—

‘Found guilty of treason—Archeptolemos son of Hippodamos, of Agryle, being present: Antiphon son of Sophilos, of Rhamnus, being present. The award on these two men was—That they be delivered to the Eleven: that their property be confiscated and the goddess have the tithe: that their houses be razed and boundary-stones put on the sites, with the inscription, ‘the houses of Archeptolemos and Antiphon the traitors:’ that the two demarchs [of Agryle and Rhamnus] shall point out their houses. That it shall not be lawful to bury Archeptolemos and Antiphon at Athens or in any land of which the Athenians are masters. That Archeptolemos and Antiphon and their descendants, bastard or true-born, shall be infamous; and if a man adopt any one of the race of Archeptolemos or Antiphon, let the adopter be infamous. That this decree be written on a brazen column and put in the same place where the decrees about Phrynichos are set up[Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. .’

Character of Antiphon's political life.

The distinctive feature in the life of Antiphon is the suddenness of his appearance, at an advanced age, in the very front of Athenian politics. Unlike nearly all the men associated with him, he had neither made his mark in the public service nor come forward in the ekklesia; yet all at once he becomes the chief, though not the most conspicuous, organiser of an enterprise requiring in the highest degree trained political tact; does more than any other individual to set up a new government; and acts to the last as one of its foremost members. The reputation and the power which enabled him to take this part were mainly literary. Yet it would not probably be accurate to conceive Antiphon as a merely literary man who suddenly emerged and succeeded as a politician. It would have been a marvel, indeed, if any one had become a leader on the popular side in Athenian politics who had not already been prominent in the ekklesia. But the accomplishments most needed in a leader of the oligarchic party might be learned elsewhere than in the ekklesia. The member of a ἑταιρεία, though a stranger to the bema, might gain practice in the working of those secret and rapid combinations upon which his party had come to rely most in its unequal struggle with democracy. As fame and years by degrees brought Antiphon more and more weight in the internal management of the oligarchic clubs, he would acquire more and more insight into the tactics of which at last he proved himself a master‘By far the larger number of the members of the party belonged to the sophistically-trained younger generation...who greedily imbibed the political teaching communicated to them at the meetings of the party by Antiphon, the Nestor of his party, as it was the fashion to call him.’ (Curtius, Hist. Gr. III. p. 435, transl Ward)The only authority for this ‘fashion’ which I have been able to find is [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt.: πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ῥητορικὰς τέχνας ἐξήνεγκε, γενόμενος ἀγχίνους· διὸ καὶ Νέστωρ ἐπεκαλεῖτο. As this notice makes the name ‘Nestor’ refer simply to rhetorical skill, not to political sagacity, I have hesitated to follow Curtius in his picturesque application of it.. He need not, then, be taken as an example of instinct supplying the want of training: he had probably had precisely the training which could serve him best. The real significance of his late and sudden prominence lies in its suggestion of previous self-control. No desire of place, no consciousness of growing power, had tempted him to stir until in his old age he knew that the time had come and that all the threads were in his hand.

Character of his ability.

The ability which Antiphon brought to the service of his party is defined as the power ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν. It was the power of a subtle and quick mind backed by a thorough command of the new rhetoric. He was masterly in device and in utterance. Fertility of expedient, ingenuity in making points in debate, were the qualities which the oligarchs most needed; and it was in these that the strength of Antiphon lay. In promptness of invention where difficulties were to be met on the instant he probably bore some likeness to Themistokles; but there is no reason for crediting him with that largeness of view, or with any share of that wonderful foresight, which made Themistokles a statesman as well as a diplomatist.His ἀρετή.

Thucydides praises Antiphon not only for his ability but, with equal emphasis, for his ἀρετή, his virtue. The praise may be interpreted by what Thucydides himself says elsewhere about the moral results of the intense conflicts between oligarchy and democracy (Thuc. III. 82.). The ἀρετή, precious as rare, of a public man was to be a loyal partisan; to postpone personal selfishness to the selfishness of party; to be proof against bribes; and at the worst not to flinch, or at least not to desert. Thucydides means that of the men who brought about the Revolution Antiphon was perhaps the most disinterested and the most constant. He had taken previously no active part in public affairs, and was therefore less involved than such men as Peisandros and Phrynichos in personal relations: his life had been to some extent that of a student: he had never put himself forward for office: he seems, to judge from his writings, to have really believed and felt that old Attic religion which at least the older school of oligarchs professed to cherish: and thus altogether might be considered as the most unselfishly earnest member of his party, the man who cared most for its ideas. In this measure he was disinterested: he was also constant. When the Council fell, he could, no doubt, have escaped with Peisandros and the rest. Considering his long unpopularity, and the fact that he would be assumed to have been the chief spokesman of the odious embassy to Sparta, his condemnation was perhaps more certain than that of any other person. But he stood his ground: and for the last time put out all his strength in a great defence of the fallen Government.

The new power of Rhetoric.

In a general view of Antiphon's career there is one aspect which ought not to be missed—that aspect in which it bears striking evidence to the growing importance in Athenian public life of the newly-developed art of Rhetoric. Antiphon's first and strongest claim to eminence was his mastery over the weapons now indispensable in the ekklesia and the law-courts; it was this accomplishment, no less fashionable than useful, which recommended him to the young men of his party whom he had no other pretension to influence; it was this rhetorical δεινότης to which he owed his efficiency in the Revolution. In his person the practical branch of the new culture for the first time takes a distinct place among the qualifications for political rank. The Art of Words had its definite share in bringing in the Four Hundred: it was a curious nemesis when seven years later it was banished from Athens by the Thirty.

Antiphon: Style
Antiphon the most antique of the orators.

ANTIPHON stands first among the orators of the Attic canon; and he claims this place not merely because he was born a few years earlier than any one of the rest. A broad difference separates him from those who were nearly his contemporaries hardly less than from men of the next century, from Andokides and Lysias as well as from Demosthenes and Hypereides. He represents older ideas and an older conception of the manner in which these ideas are to find expression. His successors, taken collectively, are moderns; compared with them, he is ancient.

The beginnings of Greek Prose.

The outburst of intellectual life in Hellas during the fifth century before Christ had for one of its results the creation of Greek prose. Before that age no Greek had conceived artistic composition except in the form of poetry. The Ionians who had already recorded myths or stated philosophies in prose had either made no effort to rise above the ease of daily talk, or had clothed their meaning in a poetical diction of the most ambitious kind. As the mental horizon of Greece was widened, as subtler ideas and more various combinations began to ask for closer and more flexible expression, the desire grew for something more precise than poetry, firmer and more compact than the idiom of conversation. Two special causes aided this general tendency. The development of democratic life, making the faculty of speech before popular assemblies and popular lawcourts a necessity, hastened the formation of an oratorical prose. The Persian Wars, by changing Hellenic unity from a sentiment into a fact, and reminding men that there was a corporate life, higher and grander than that of the individual city, of which the story might be told, supplied a new motive to historical prose. Athens under Perikles became the focus of all the feelings which demanded this new utterance, and of all the capabilities which could make the utterance artistic. The Athenian mind, with its vigour, its sense of measure, its desire for clearness, was fitted to achieve the special excellences of proseSee Curtius, Hist. Gr. Vol. II. p. 517, transl. Ward., and moulded that Attic dialect in which the prose-writer at last found his most perfect instrument. But the process of maturing the new kind of composition was necessarily slow; for it required, as its first condition, little less than the creation of a new language, of an idiom neither poetical nor mean. Herodotos, at the middle point of the fifth century, shows the poetical element still preponderant. The close of that century may be taken as the end of the first great stage in the growth of a prose literature. If a line is drawn there, Lysias will be perhaps the first representative name below it: Antiphon and Thucydides will be among the last names above it.

Character of the early Prose.

The leading characteristic of the earlier prose is dignity. The newly created art has the continual consciousness of being an art. It is always on its guard against sliding into the levity of a conversational style. The composer feels above all things that his written language must be so chosen as to produce a greater effect than would be produced by an equivalent amount of extemporary speaking. Every word is to be pointed and pregnant; every phrase is to be the condensed expression of his thought in its ultimate shape, however difficult this may be to the reader or hearer who meets it in that shape for the first time; the movement of the whole is to be slow and majestic, impressing by its weight and grandeur, not charming by its life and flow. The prose-writer of this epoch instinctively compares himself with the poet. The poet is a craftsman, the possessor of a mystery revealed to the many only in the spell which it exerts over their fancies; just so, in the beginnings of a literary prose, its shaper likes to think that he belongs to a guild. He does not care to be simply right and clear: rather he desires to have the whole advantage which his skill gives him over ordinary men; he is eager to bring his thoughts down upon them with a splendid and irresistible force. In Greece this character, natural to immature prose, was intensified by a special cause —the influence of the Sophists. In so far as these teachers dealt with the form of language, they tended to confirm that view of the prose-writer in which he is a professional expert dazzling and overawing laymen. The Sophists of Hellas Proper dwelt especially on the minute proprieties of language, as Protagoras on correct grammatical forms ὀρθοέπεια, Plat. Phaedr. p. 267 C . and Prodikos on the accurate use of synonyms ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων, Plat. Euthyd. p. 277 E . On the work of Protagoras and Prodikos in these departments, see Mr Cope in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, vol. III. pp. 48—57.; the Sophists of Sicily taught its technical gracesSpengel, Συναγ. τεχνῶν, p. 63: ‘Omnino Graeci sophistae, et quos diximus, et alii minus noti, recte et dilucide eloqui studebant; et si uno vocabulo omnia comprehendamus, Graeci ὀρθοέπειαν, Siculi εὐέπειαν elaborabant.’. In this last respect the teaching of Gorgias was thoroughly reactionary, and was calculated to hinder the growth of a good prose just at the critical point. At the moment when prose was striving to disengage itself from the diction of poetry, Gorgias gave currency to the notion that poetical ornament of the most florid type was its true charm. When, indeed, he went further, and sought to imitate the rhythm as well as the phrase of poetry, this very extravagance had a useful result. Prose has a rhythm, though not of the kind at which Gorgias aimed; and the mere fact of the Greek ear becoming accustomed to look for a certain proportion between the parts of a sentence hastened the transition from the old running style to the periodic.

Dionysios on the ‘austere’ style.

Dionysios has described vividly the characteristics of that elder school of composition to which Antiphon belonged. He distinguishes three principal styles, the austere, the smooth and the middle αὐστηρά, γλαφυρά and κοινὴ (or μέση) ἁρμονία: Dionys. περὶ συνθ. ὀνομ. ec. 22, 23, 24. The three ἁρμονίαι, or styles of composition, distinguished by Dionysios, must not be confused with the three λέξεις, or styles of diction, which he distinguishes in his essay on Demosthenes, cc. 1—3. The ἁρμονίαι refer, of course, to the putting together of words; the λέξεις, to the choice of words. As to λέξεις, Dionysios recognises (1) an elaborate diction, which employs farfetched and unusual words, ἐξηλλαγμένη, περιττὴ λέξις, of which Thucydides is the great example: (2) a smooth and plain diction, λιτή, ἀφελὴς λέξις, best represented by Lysias: (3) a mixed diction, μικτὴ καὶ σύνθετος λέξις, of which the type is Isokrates. Of Antiphon and Isaeos, in respect to λέξις, he says merely that there was nothing ‘novel’ or ‘striking’ in their choice of words. ( Demosth. c. 8.) Probably he would have regarded them as intermediate in λέξις between Thucydides and Lysias, but as representing the compromise in a less mature and finished form than Isokrates.. He cites poets, historians and orators who are examples of each. Among orators Antiphon is his representative of the austere style, Isokrates of the smooth, Demosthenes of the middle. The austere style is thus describedDionys. περὶ συνθ. ὀνομ. c. 22.:

‘It wishes its separate words to be planted firmly and to have strong positions, so that each word may be seen conspicuously; it wishes its several clauses to be well divided from each other by sensible pauses. It is willing to admit frequently rough and direct clashings of sounds, meeting like the bases of stones in loose wall-work, which have not been squared or smoothed to fit each other, but which show a certain negligence and absence of forethought. It loves, as a rule, to prolong itself by large words of portly breadth. Compression by short syllables is a thing which it shuns when not absolutely driven to it.

‘As regards separate words, these are the objects of its pursuit and craving. In whole clauses it shows these tendencies no less strongly; especially it chooses the most dignified and majestic rhythms. It does not wish the clauses to be like each other in length of structure, or enslaved to a severe syntax, but noble, simple, free. It wishes them to bear the stamp of nature rather than that of art, and to stir feeling rather than to reflect character. It does not usually aim at composing periods as a compact framework for its thought; but, if it should ever drift undesignedly into the periodic style, it desires to set on this the mark of spontaneity and plainness. It does not employ, in order to round a sentence, supplementary words which do not help the sense; it does not care that the march of its phrase should have stage-glitter or an artificial smoothness; nor that the clauses should be separately adapted to the length of the speaker's breath. No indeed. Of all such industry it is innocent... It is fanciful in imagery, sparing of copulas, anything but florid; it is haughty, straightforward, disdainful of prettiness, with its antique air and its negligence for its beauty.’

It is important to remember that this description is applied to a certain kind of poetry as well as of prose, to Pindar and Aeschylos as well as to Thucydides and Antiphon; and that, taken in reference to prose alone, it needs modification. It is not true, for instance, of the older prose that it always shrank from the display of artificialism. Negligent it often was; but at other times it was consciously, ostentatiously artificial. Its general characteristics, however, are admirably given by Dionysios. It is dignified; it relies much on the weight of single words; it is bold but not florid; it aims at moving the hearer rather than at reflecting the character of the speaker. Antiphon, his representative orator, exemplifies these points clearly,—as will be seen better if he is compared from time to time with the critic's representative historian, Thucydides.

Antiphon's style—its dignity.

In the first place, then, Antiphon is preeminently dignified and noble. He is to his successors generally as Aeschylos to Euripides. The elder tragedy held its gods and heroes above the level of men by a colossal majesty of repose, by the passionless utterance of kingly thoughts; and the same feeling to which these things seemed divine conceived its ideal orator as one who controls a restless crowd by the royalty of his calm power, by a temperate and stately eloquence. The speaker who wins his hearers by blandishments, who surprises them by adroit turns, who hurries them away on a torrent of declamation, belonged to a generation for which gods also and heroes declaimed or quibbled on the stage. Plutarch has described, not without a tinge of sarcasm, the language and demeanour by which Perikles commanded the veneration of his age Plut. Per. c. 5.. ‘His thoughts were awe-inspiring σοβαρόν. The word is openly sarcastic, and is meant by Plutarch to describe a pompous tone which Perikles took from ‘his sublime speculations’ (μετεωρολογία) and ‘supramundane talk’ (μεταρσιολεσχία) with Anaxagoras., his language lofty, untainted by the ribaldry of the rascal crowd. His calm features, never breaking into laughter; his measured step; the ample robe which flowed around him and which nothing deranged; his moving eloquence; the tranquil modulation of his voice; these things, and such as these, had over all men a marvellous spell.’ The biographer goes on to relate how Perikles was once abused by a coarse fellow in the market-place, bore it in silence until he had finished his business there, and when his persecutor followed him home, merely desired a slave to take a lantern and see the man homeloc. cit.. It is not probable that the receiver of the escort felt all the severity of the moral defeat which he had sustained; and he is perhaps no bad representative of the Athenian democracy in its relations to the superb decorum εὐκοσμία. Aeschines says that Solon made regulations περὶ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων εὐκοσμίας. The oldest citizen was to speak first in the assembly—σωφρόνως ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα παρελθὼν ἄνευ θορὑβου καὶ ταραχῆς. (In Ctes. § 2.) Cf. Dem. de F. L. § 251: ‘He said that the sobriety (σωφροσύνη) of the popular speakers of that day is illustrated by the statue of Solon with his cloak drawn round him and his hand within the folds.’ of the old school. Much of this decorum survives in Antiphon, who, in a literary as in a political sense, clung to traditions which were fading. Yet even in him the influence of the age is seen. The Tetralogies, written for practice, and in which he had to please no one but himself, are the most stately of his compositions. The speech On the Murder of Herodes is less so, even in its elaborate proem; while part of the speech On the Choreutes, doubtless the latest of his extant works, shows a marked advance towards the freedom and vivacity of a newer style. It was in the hands of Antiphon that rhetoric first became thoroughly practical; and for this very reason, conservative as he was, he could not maintain a rigid conservatism. The public position which he had taken for his art could be held only by concessions to the public taste.

Reliance on single words.

Antiphon relies much on the full, intense significance of single words. This is, indeed, a cardinal point in the older prose. Its movement was slow; each word was dropped with deliberation; and now and then some important word, heavy with concentrated meaning, came down like a sledge-hammer. Take, for instance, the chapter in which Thucydides shows how party strife, like that in Corcyra, had the effect of confusing moral distinctions. Blow on blow the nicely-balanced terms beat out the contrasts, until the ear is weary as with the clangour of an anvil. ‘Reckless daring was esteemed loyal courage,—prudent delay, specious cowardice; temperance seemed a cloak for pusillanimity; comprehensive sagacity was called universal indifferenceThuc. III. 82. Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδ|εῶν I. cap. VI.) remarks that σεμνότης is a matter of ὀνόματα, phrases, not of ῥήματα, single words; and that the attempt to achieve σεμνότης by ῥήματα is a mistake. Thucydides, however, he says, is constantly doing this: καταφανῶς δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς στάσεως ἐκφράσει τῶν Κερκυραίων πεποίηκε ..’ ‘Remonstrance is for friends who err; accusation for enemies who have done wrongThuc. I. 69. Another good instance is II. 62, αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμαθίας εὐτυχοῦς καὶ δειλῷ τινὶ ἐγγίγνεται, καταφρόνησις δὲ ὃς ἂν καὶ γνώμῃ πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων προέχειν..’ In Antiphon's speech On the Murder of Herodes, the accused says (reminding the court that his case ought not to be decided until it has been heard before the Areiopagos):—‘Be now, therefore, surveyors of the cause, but then, judges of the evidence,—now surmisers, but then deciders, of the truth de caed. Herod. § 94 νῦν μὲν οὖν γνωρισταὶ γίνεσθε τῆς δίκης, τότε δὲ δικασταὶ τῶν μαρτύρων· νῦν μὲν δοξασταί, τότε δὲ κριταὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν..’ And in the Second Tetralogy:—‘Those who fail to do what they mean are agents of a mischance; those who hurt, or are hurt, voluntarily, are authors of suffering Tetral. II. B. § 6, οἵ τε γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὧν ἂν ἐπινοήσωσί τι δρᾶσαι, οὗτοι πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων εἰσίν· οἱ δὲ ἑκούσιόν τι δρῶντες ἢ πάσχοντες, οὗτοι τῶν παθημάτων αἴτιοι γίγνονται..’ Examples of this eagerness to press the exact meaning of words are frequent in Antiphon, though far less frequent than in Thucydides. It is evidently natural to that early phase of prose composition in which, newly conscious of itself as an art, it struggles to wring out of language a force strange to the ordinary idiom; and in Greece this tendency must have been further strengthened by the stress which Gorgias laid on antithesis, and Prodikos on the discriminating of terms nearly synonymous. Only so long as slow and measured declamation remained in fashion could the orator attempt thus to put a whole train of thought into a single weighty word. What the old school sought to effect by one powerful word, the later school did by the free, rapid, brilliant development of a thought in all its fulness and with all the variety of contrasts which it pressed upon the mind.

Antiphon is imaginative but not florid.

A further characteristic of the older style—that it is ‘fanciful in imagery, but by no means florid’— is exemplified in Antiphon. The meaning of the antithesis is sufficiently clear in reference to Aeschylos and Pindar, the poets chosen by Dionysios as his instances. In reference to prose also it means a choice of images like theirs, bold, rugged, grand; and a scorn, on the other hand, for small prettinesses, for showy colouring, for maudlin sentiment. The great representative in oratory of this special trait must have been Perikles. A few of his recorded expressions bear just this stamp of a vigorous and daring fancy;—his description of Aegina as the ‘eyesore’ of the Peiraeus Arist. Rhet. III. 10.; his saying that, in the slain youth of Athens, the year had lost its spring ib., and I. 7.; his declaration, over the bodies of those who fell at Samos, that they had become even as the gods; ‘for the gods themselves we see not, but infer their immortality from the honours paid to them and from the blessings which they bestowPlut. Per. c. 8..’ The same imaginative boldness is found in Antiphon, though but rarely, and under severe control. ‘Adversity herself is wronged by the accused,’ he makes a prosecutor exclaim, ‘when he puts her forward to screen a crime and to withdraw his own villainy from view Tetr. I. Γ. § 1..’ A father, threatened with the condemnation of his son, cries to the judges:—‘I shall be buried with my son—in the living tomb of my childlessness Tetr. II. B. § 10: cf. II. Γ. § 12..’ But in Antiphon, as in Thucydides, the haughty μεγαλόφρων—αὐθέκαστος: Dionys. περὶ συνθ. ὀνομ c. 22., careless freedom of the old style is shown oftener in the employment of new or unusual words or phrasesE.g. Tetr. I. Γ. § 10 τὰ ἴχνη τῆς ὑποψίας: Tetr. I. Δ. § 10 τὰ ἴχνη τοῦ φόνου: Tetr. II. B. § 2 ἀνατροπεὺς τοῦ οἴκου ἐγένετο: Tetr. IV. Γ. § 2 φιλοθύτης: Herod. § 78 χωροφιλεῖν (=φιλοχωρεῖν.). The orator could not, indeed, go so far as the historian, who is expressly censured on this score by his Greek criticDionysios speaks of τὸ κατάγλωσσον τῆς λέξεως καὶ ξένον in Thucydides (de Thuc. c. 53), and remarks (ib. 51) that it was not a general fashion of the time, but a characteristic distinctive of him.; but they have some expressions of the same character in commonThe Thucydidean style may be recognised, for instance, in Tetr. I. Γ. § 3, ἡ αἰσχύνη—ἀρκοῦσα ἦν σωφρονίσαι τὸ θυμούμενον τῆς γνώμης: Herod. § 73 κρεῖσσον δὲ χρὴ ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι τὸ ὑμέτερον δυνάμενον ἐμὲ δικαίως σώζειν ἢ τὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βουλόμενον ἀδίκως με ἀπολλύναι: ib. § 84 οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τοῖς ἔργοις τοὺς λόγους ἐλέγχουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ τοῖς λόγοις ζητοῦσι τὰ ἔργα ἄπιστα καθιστάναι .. While Antiphon is sparing of imagery, he is equally moderate in the use of the technical figures of rhetoric. These have been well distinguished as ‘figures of language’ (σχήματα λέξεως) and ‘figures of thought’ (σχήματα διανοίας)—the first class including various forms of assonance and of artificial symmetry between clauses; the second including irony, abrupt pauses, feigned perplexity, rhetorical question and so forth. Caecilius of Calacte, the author of this distinction, was a student of Antiphon, and observed that the ‘figures of thought’ are seldom or never used by himCaecilius ap. Phot. Cod. 259, p. 485, Bekker.. The figures of language all occur, but rarelySee Blass, Att. Bereds. pp 130—134.. Blass Att. Bereds. p. 134. and K. O. Müller Hist. Gk. Lit. c. XXXIII. § 5. agree in referring this marked difference between the older and later schools of oratory—the absence, in the former, of those lively figures so abundant in the latter—to an essential change which passed upon Greek character in the interval. It was only when fierce passion and dishonesty had become strong traits of a degenerate national character that vehemence and trickiness came into oratory. This seems a harsh and scarcely accurate judgment. It appears simpler to suppose that the conventional stateliness of the old eloquence altogether precluded such vivacity as marked the later; and that the mainspring of this new vivacity was merely the natural impulse, set free from the restraints of the older style, to give arguments their most spirited and effective form.

Pathos and Êthos in Antiphon.

Nothing in the criticism of Dionysios on the ‘austere’ style is more appreciative than his remark, that it aims rather at pathos than at êthos. That is, it addresses itself directly to the feelings; but does not care to give a subtle persuasiveness to its words by artistically adjusting them to the character and position of the person who is supposed to speak them. It is tragic; yet it is not dramatic. There has never, perhaps, been a greater master of stern and solemn pathos than Thucydides. The pleading of the Plataeans before their Theban judges, the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians, the whole history of the Sicilian Expedition and especially its terrible closing scene, have a wonderful power over the feelings; and this power is in a great degree due to a certain irony. The reader feels throughout the restrained emotion of the historian; he is conscious that the crisis described was an agonising one, and that he is hearing the least that could be said of it from one who felt, and could have said, far more. On the other hand, a characteristic colouring, in the literary sense, is scarcely attempted by Thucydides. No writer is more consummate in making personal or national character appear in the history of actions. And when his characters speak, they always speak from the general point of view which he conceived to be appropriate to them. But in the form and language of their speeches there is little discrimination. Athenians and Lacedaemonians, Perikles and Brasidas, Kleon and DiodotosThuc. III. 42. speak much in the same style; it is the ideas which they represent by which alone they are broadly distinguishedOne exception may possibly be noted. It seems as if the unique personality of Alkibiades were sometimes indicated by a characteristic insolence and vehemence of language: e.g. VI. 18. 3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμιεύεσθαι εἰς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἄρχειν: ib. § 4 ἵνα Πελοποννησίων στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα . The case is nearly the same with Antiphon. His extant works present no subject so great as those of Thucydides, and his pathos is necessarily inferior in degree to that of the historian; but it resembles it in its stern solemnity, and also in this, that it owes much of its impressiveness to its self-control. The secondEsp. §§ 1—4, 9. and fourthEsp. §§ 1—3. speeches of the First Tetralogy, and the second§§ 1—3, 10—12. and third§§ 3, 4. of the Second, furnish perhaps the best examples. In êthos, on the contrary, Antiphon is weak; and this, in a writer of speeches for persons of all ages and conditions, must be considered a defect. In the Herodes case the defendant is a young Mytilenean, who frequently pleads his inexperience of affairs and his want of practice as a speaker. The speech On the Choreutes is delivered by an Athenian citizen of mature age and eminent public services. But the two persons speak nearly in the same strain and with the same measure of self-confidence. Had Lysias been the composer, greater deference to the judges and a more decided avoidance of rhetoric would have distinguished the appeal of the young alien to an unfriendly court from the address of the statesman to his fellow citizens.

The style of Antiphon: how far periodic.

The place of Antiphon in the history of his art is further marked by the degree in which he had attained a periodic style. It is perhaps impossible to find English terms which shall give all the clearness of the Greek contrast between περιοδική and εἰρομένη λέξις λέξις εἰρομένη (Arist. Rhet. III. 9). Demetrios (ἑρμ. περὶ περιόδων § 12) calls it διηρῃμένη, ‘disjointed,’ διαλελυμένη ‘loose,’ διερριμμένη ‘sprawling’—in contrast to the close, compact system of the periodic style. It is also called by Dionysios de Demosth. c. 39, κομματική, ‘commatic,’ as consisting of short clauses (κόμματα) following each other without pause. Aristotle (l. c.) calls the periodic style κατεστραμμένη, ‘compact.’. The ‘running’ style, as εἰρομένη expresses, is that in which the ideas are merely strung together, like beads, in the order in which they naturally present themselves to the mind. Its characteristic is simple continuity. The characteristic of the ‘periodic’ style is that each sentence ‘comes round’ upon itself, so as to form a separate, symmetrical wholeCicero calls the period circuitum et quasi orbem verborum (Cic. Orat. III. 51. 198) .. The running style may be represented by a straight line which may be cut short at any point or prolonged to any point: the periodic style is a system of independent circles. The period may be formed either, so to say, in one piece, or of several members (κῶλα, membra), as a hoop may be made either of a single lath bent round, or of segments fitted together. It was a maxim of the later Greek rhetoric that, for the sake of simplicity and strength, a period should not consist of more than fourHermogenes περὶ εὑρες. II. p. 240, Spengel. of these members or segments; Roman rhetoric allowed a greater numberQuint. IX. 4. 124..

Aristotle Rhet. III. 9. takes as his example of the ‘running’ style the opening words of the History of Herodotos; and, speaking generally, it may be said that this was the style in which Herodotos and the earlier Ionian logographers wrote. But it ought to be remembered that neither Herodotos, nor any writer in a language which has passed beyond the rudest stage, exhibits the ‘running’ style in an ideal simplicity. In its purest and simplest form, the running style is incompatible with the very idea of a literatureBlass, Att. Bereds. p. 124: Die gewisse Periodik hat naturlich die griechische und jede Litatur von Anfang an gehabt: eine ganz reine λέξις εἰρομένη ist in der Wirklichkeit nie vorhanden. . Wherever a literature exists, it contains the germ, however immature, of the periodic style; which, if the literature is developed, is necessarily developed along with it. For every effort to grasp and limit an idea naturally finds expression more or less in the periodic manner, the very nature of a period being to comprehend and define. In Herodotos, the running style, so congenial to his direct narrative, is dominant; but when he pauses and braces himself to state some theory, some general result of his observations, he tends to become periodic just because he is striving to be preciseSee (for instance) the passage which Herodotos speculates on the causes of the overflowing of the Nile, II. 24, 25. It begins in a thoroughly periodic style:— εἰ δὲ δεῖ, | μεμψάμενον γνώμας τὰς προκειμένας, | αὐτὀν περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων ἀποδέξασθαι, | φράσω διότι μοι δοκέει πληθύεσθαι ὁ Νεῖλος τοῦ θέρεος.. From the time of Herodotos onward the periodic style is seen gradually more and more natured, according as men felt more and more the stimulus to find vigorous utterance for clear conceptions. Antiphon represents a moment at which this stimulus had become stronger than it had ever before been in the Greek world. His activity as a writer of speeches may be placed between the years 421 and 411 B.C.The speech On the Murder of Herodes must probably be placed between 421 and 416 B. C.; the speech On the Choreutes about 413.. The effects of the Peloponnesian war in sharpening political animosities had made themselves fully felt; that phase of Athenian democracy in which the contests of the ekklesia and of the lawcourts were keenest and most frequent had set in; the teaching of the Sophists had thrown a new light upon language considered as a weapon. Every man felt the desire, the urgent necessity, of being able in all cases to express his opinions with the most trenchant force; at any moment his life might depend upon it. The new intensity of the age is reflected in the speeches of Antiphon. Wherever the feeling rises highest, as in the appeals to the judges, he strives to use a language which shall ‘pack the thoughts closely and bring them out roundlyDionys. de Lys. c. 6 (in reference to Lysias) ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις,—a good description of the periodic style generally as opposed to the εἰρομένη..’ But it is striking to observe how far this periodic style still is from the ease of Lysias or the smooth completeness of Isokrates. The harshness of the old rugged writing refuses to blend with it harmoniously,—either taking it up with marked transitions, or suddenly breaking out in the midst of the most elaborate passages E. g., in the speech On Murder of Herodes, sections 1 show thoroughly artistic period § 20, again, is almost pure εἰρομέν in Tetral. II. Γ 7 (ἀξιῶν δὲ διὰ φανερὰν εἶναι τὴν ὑποψίαν...ἐπέθετο αὐτῷ) the κατεστραμμένη and εἰρομένη are combined.. It is everywhere plain that the desire to be compact is greater than the power. Antitheses and parallelismsE.g. Accus. Venen. § 5 τοῦ μὲν ἐκ προοβουλῆς ἀκουσίως ἀποθανόντος τῆς δὲ ἑκουσίως ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτεινάσης. are abundantly employed, giving a rigid and monotonous effect to the periods which they form. That more artistic period of which the several parts resemble the mutually-supporting stones of a vaulted roof περιφερὴς στέγη, Demetrios περὶ ἑρμ. § 12, where this comparison is made., and which leads the ear by a smooth curve to a happy finish, has not yet been found. An imperfect sense of rhythm, or a habit of composition to which rhythmical restraint is intolerable except for a very short space, is everywhere manifest. The vinegar and the oil refuse to mingle. Thucydides presents the same phenomenon, but with some curious differences. It may perhaps be said that, while Antiphon has more technical skill (incomplete as that skill is) in periodic writing, Thucydides has infinitely more of its spirit. He is always at high pressure, always nervous, intense. He struggles to bring a large, complex idea into a framework in which the whole can be seen at once. Aristotle says that a period must be of ‘a size to be taken in at a glance μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον: Rhet. III. 9.;’ and this is what Thucydides wishes the thought of each sentence to be, though he is sometimes clumsy in the mechanism of the sentence itself. Dionysios mentions among the excellences which Demosthenes borrowed from the historian, ‘his rapid movement, his terseness, his intensity, his sting τὰ τάχη—τὰς συστροφάς—τοὺς τόνους—τὸ πικρόν: Dionys. De Thuc. 53. He adds τὸ στρυφνόν (which seems to be a metaphor of the same kind as αὐστηρόν, and to mean ‘his biting flavour’); and τὴν ἐξεγείρουσαν τὰ πάθη δεινότητα.;’ excellences, he adds, which neither Antiphon nor Lysias nor Isokrates possessed. This intensity, due primarily to genius, next to the absorbing interest of a great subject, does, in truth, place Thucydides, with all his roughness, far nearer than Antiphon to the ideal of a compact and masterly prose. Technically speaking, Thucydides as well as Antiphon must be placed in the border-land between the old running style and finished periodic writing. But the essential merits of the latter, though in a rude shape, have already been reached by the native vigour of the historian; while to the orator a period is still something which must be constructed with painful effort, and on a model admitting of little variety.

Antiphon's treatment of subject-matter.

These seem to be the leading characteristics of Antiphon as regards form: it remains to consider his treatment of subject-matter. The arrangement of his speeches, so far as the extant specimens warrant a judgment, was usually simple. First a proem (προοίμιον) explanatory or appealing; next an introduction (technically προκατασκευή) dealing with the circumstances under which the case had been brought into court, and noticing any informalities of procedure: then a narrative of the facts ( διήγησις): the arguments and proofs (πίστεις), the strongest first, finally an epilogue or peroration (ἐπίλογος). The Tetralogies, being merely sketches for practice, have only proem, arguments and epilogue, not the ‘introduction’ or the narrative. The speech On the Murder of Herodes and the speech On the Choreutes (in the latter of which the epilogue seems to have been lost) are the best examples of Antiphon's method. It is noticeable that in neither of these are the facts of the particular case dealt with closely or searchingly; and consequently in both instances the narrative of the facts falls into the background. Narrative was the forte of Andokides and Lysias; it appears to have been the weak side of Antiphon, who was strongest in general argument. General presumptions,—those afforded, for instance, by the refusal of the prosecutors to give up their slaves for examination, or by the respective characters of prosecutor and prisoner and by their former relations—are most insisted upon. The First Tetralogy is a good example of Antiphon's ingenuity in dealing with abstract probabilities (εἰκότα); and the same preference for proofs external to the immediate circumstances of the case is traceable in all his extant work. The adroitness of the sophistical rhetoric shows itself, not merely in the variety of forms given to the same argument, but sometimes in sophistry of a more glaring kindSee e.g. the argument in a circle in Tetr. I. A. § 6..

The rhetorician of the school is further seen in the great number of commonplaces, evidently elaborated beforehand and without reference to any special occasion, which are brought in as opportunity offers. The same panegyric on the laws for homicide occurs, in the same words, both in the speech On the Choreutes and in that On the Murder of Herodes. In the last-named speech the reflections on the strength of a good conscience de Choreut. § 93., and the defendant's contention that he deserves pity, not punishment ib. § 73., are palpably commonplaces prepared for general use. Such patches, unless introduced with consummate skill, are doubly a blemish; they break the coherence of the argument and they destroy everything like fresh and uniform colouring; the speech becomes, as an old critic says, uneven ἀνώμαλον: Alkidamas Περὶ Σοφιστ. §§ 24, 25.. But the crudities inseparable from a new art do not affect Antiphon's claim to be considered, for his day, a great and powerful orator. In two things, says Thucydides, he was masterly,—in power of conception and in power of expressionThuc. VIII. 68: κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ γνοίη εἰπεῖν. Comp. [Plut.] Vitt. X Oratt. 8: ἔστι δὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγ ἀκριβὴς καὶ πιθανὸς καὶ δεινὸς π τὴν εὕρεσιν.. These were the two supreme qualifications for a speaker at a time when the mere faculty of lucid and continuous exposition was rare, and when the refinements of literary eloquence were as yet unknown. If the speaker could invent a sufficient number of telling points, and could put them clearly, this was everything. Antiphon, with his ingenuity in hypothesis and his stately rhetoric, fulfilled both requirements. Remembering the style of his oratory and his place in the history of the art, no one need be perplexed to reconcile the high praise of Thucydides with what is at first sight the startling judgment of Dionysios. That critic, speaking of the eloquence which aims at close reasoning and at victory in discussion, gives the foremost place in it to Lysias. He then mentions others who have practised it,—Antiphon among the rest. ‘Antiphon however,’ he says, ‘has nothing but his antique and stern dignity; a fighter of causes (ἀγωνιστής) he is not, either in debate or in lawsuitsDionys. de Isaeo c. 20: Ἀντιρῶν γε μὴν τὸ αὐστηρὸν ἔχει μόνον καὶ ἀρχαῖον, ἀγωνιστὴς δὲ λόγων οὔτε συμβουλευτικῶν οὔτε δικανικῶν ἐστί ..’ If, as Thucydides tells us, no one could help so well as Antiphon those who were fighting causes ( ἀγωνιζομένους)Thuc. VIII. 68. in the ekklesia or the lawcourts; if, on his own trial, he delivered a defence of unprecedented brilliancy; in what sense is Dionysios to be understood? The explanation lies probably in the notion which the critic attached to the word ‘agonist.’ He had before his mind the finished pleader or debater of a time when combative oratory considered as an art had reached its acme; when every discussion was a conflict in which the liveliest and supplest energy must be put forth in support of practised skill; when the successful speaker must grapple at close quarters with his adversary, and be in truth an ‘agonist,’ an athlete straining every nerve for victory. Already Kleon could describe the ‘agonistic’ eloquence which was becoming the fashion in the ekklesia as characterized by swift surprises, by rapid thrust and parryIt is remarkable how strongly this image of debate in the ekklesia as an ἀγών is brought out in Kleon's speech, Thuc. III. 37, 38: ἀγωνισταί —ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους—ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσται ἀγωνίσαιτ’ ἄν—ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων—αἴτιοι δ’ ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες—ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι. The characteristics of the ἀγωνιστής are τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονῆσαι—καινότης λόγου—ὀξέως λέγειν (ib.); already Strepsiades conceives the ‘agonist’ of the lawcourts as ‘bold, glib, audacious, headlong Ar. Nub. 445 θρασὺς, εὔγλωττος, τολμηρὸς, ἴτης ..’ This was not the character of Antiphon. He was a subtle reasoner, a master of expression, and furnished others with arguments and words; but he was not himself a man of the arena. He never descended into it when he could help; he had nothing of its spirit. He did not grapple with his adversary, but in the statelier manner of the old orators attacked him (as it were) from an opposite platform. Opposed in court to such a speaker as Isaeos, he would have had as little chance with the judges as Burke with one of those juries which Curran used to take by storm. Perhaps it was precisely because he was not in this sense an ‘agonist’ that he found his most congenial sphere in the calm and grave procedure of the Areiopagos.

Religious feeling of Antiphon.

Nor was it by the stamp of his eloquence alone that he was fitted to command the attention of that Court. In politics Antiphon was aristocratic; in religion, an upholder of those ancient ideas and conceptions, bound up with the primitive traditions of Attica, of which the Areiopagos was the embodiment and the guardian. For most minds of his day these ideas were losing their awful prestige,—fading, in the light of science, before newer beliefs, as obligarchy had yielded to democracy, as Kronos to the dynasty of Zeus. But, as Athene, speaking in the name of that dynasty, had reserved to the Eumenides a perpetual altar in her land (Aesch. Eum. 804), so Antiphon had embraced the new culture without parting from a belief in gods who visit national defilementSee, for instance, the close of the accuser's first speech in the First Tetralogy (I. A. § 10)...‘It is also harmful for you that this man, vile and polluted as he is, should enter the precincts of the gods to defile them, or should poison with his infection the guiltless persons whom he meets at the same table. From such causes spring plagues of barrenness (αἱ ἀφορίαι) and reverses in men's fortunes. You must therefore remember that vengeance is yours: you must impute to this man his own crimes: you must bring their penalty home to him, and purity back to Athens.’ Again, in Tetr. II. Γ. § 8, he speaks of θεία κηλίς. Compare the passage in which the Erinyes threaten Attica with λιχὴν ἄφυλλος, ἄτεκνος, Eum. 815 ; and Soph. O. T. 25, 101 ., in spirits who hear the curse of dying men οἱ ἀλιτήριοι (which Antiphon uses in the sense of ἀλάστορες: and so Andok. de Myst. § 131)—οἱ τῶν ἀποθανόντων προστρόπαιοι: Tetr. III. A. § 4. He uses ἐνθύμιος (Tetr. II. A. 2 &c), just as the older poets do, of a sin which lies heavy on the soul, bringing a presage of avenging Furies; and the poetical ποινή (Tetr. I. Δ. § 11), of atonement for blood. and avenge blood crying from the ground. In the recent history of his own city he had seen a great impiety followed by a tremendous disasterTimaeos, writing early in the 3rd century B.C., directly connected the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily with the mutilation of the Hermae—noticing that the Syracusan Hermokrates was a descendant of the god Hermes: Tim. frag. 103—4, referred to by Grote, vol. VII. p. 230.. The prominence which he always gives to the theological view of homicide means more than that this was the tone of the Court to which his speeches were most frequently addressed: it points to a real and earnest feeling in his own mind. There is no better instance of this feeling than the opening of the Third Tetralogy—a mere exercise, in which the elaborate simulation of a religious sentiment would have had no motive:—

‘The god, when it was his will to create mankind, begat the earliest of our race and gave us for nourishers the earth and sea, that we might not die, for want of needful sustenance, before the term of old age. Whoever, then, having been deemed worthy of these things by the god, lawlessly robs any one among us of life, is impious towards heaven and confounds the ordinances of men. The dead man, robbed of the god's gift, necessarily bequeaths, as that god's punishment, the anger of avenging spirits —anger which unjust judges or false witnesses, becoming partners in the impiety of the murderer, bring, as a self-sought defilement, into their own houses. We, the champions of the murdered, if for any collateral enmity we prosecute innocent persons, shall find, by our failure to vindicate the dead, dread avengers in the spirits which hear his curse; while, by putting the pure to a wrongful death, we become liable to the penalties of murder, and, in persuading you to violate the law, responsible for your sin also Tetr. III. A. §§ 2 f..’

Aeschylean tone in Antiphon.

The analogy of Antiphon to Aeschylos in regard to general style has once already been noticed; it forces itself upon the mind in a special aspect here, where the threat of judgment from the grave on blood is wrapt round with the very terror and darkness of the Eumenides. In another place, where Antiphon is speaking of the signs by which the gods point out the guilty, the Aeschylean tone is still more striking. No passage, perhaps, in Aeschylos is more expressive of the poet's deepest feeling about life than that in which Eteokles forebodes that the personal goodness of Amphiaraos will not deliver him:— Alas that doom which mingles in the world A just man with the scorners of the gods! ... Aye, for a pure man going on the sea With men fierce-blooded and their secret sin Dies in a moment with the loathed of heaven Aesch. Theb. 593 ff.

In the Herodes trial the defendant appeals to the silent witness which the gods have borne in his behalf:—‘You know doubtless that often ere now men red-handed or otherwise polluted have, by entering the same ship, destroyed with themselves those who were pure towards the gods; and that others, escaping death, have incurred the extremity of danger through such men. Many again, on standing beside the sacrifice, have been discovered to be impure and hinderers of the solemn rites. Now in all such cases an opposite fortune has been mine. First, all who have sailed with me have had excellent voyages: then, whenever I have assisted at a sacrifice it has in every instance been most favourable. These facts I claim as strong evidence touching the present charge and the falsity of the prosecutor's accusations De caed. Herod. §§ 82 ff..’

Coincidences of thought and tone such as these deserve notice just because they are general coincidences. There is no warrant for assuming a resemblance in any special features between the mind of Antiphon and the mind of Aeschylos: all the more that which the two minds have in common illustrates the broadest aspect of each. By pursuits and calling Antiphon belonged to a new Athenian democracy antagonistic to the old ideas and beliefs: by the bent of his intellect and of his sympathies he belonged, like Aeschylos, to the elder democracy. It is this which gives to his extant work a special interest over and above its strictly literary interest. All the other men whose writings remain to show the development of oratorical Attic prose have around them the atmosphere of eager debate or litigation; Antiphon, in language and in thought alike, stands apart from them as the representative of a graver public life. Theirs is the spirit of the ekklesia or the dikastery; his is the spirit of the Areiopagos.

Antiphon: Works
The Tetralogies.

SIXTY speeches ascribed to Antiphon were known The φονικοὶ λόγοι alone extant. in the reign of Augustus; but of these Caecilius pronounced twenty-five spurious [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. . Fifteen, including the twelve speeches of the Tetralogies, are now extant. All these relate to causes of homicide. The titles of lost speeches prove that Antiphon's activity was not confined to this province; but it was in this province that he excelled; and as the orations of Isaeos are now represented by one class only, the κληρικοί, so the orations of Antiphon are represented by one class only, the φονικοί.

The Tetralogies have this special interest, that they represent rhetoric in its transition from the technical to the practical stage, from the schools to the law-courts and the ekklesia. Antiphon stood between the sophists who preceded and the orators who followed him as the first Athenian who was at once a theorist of rhetoric and a master of practical eloquence. The Tetralogies hold a corresponding place between merely ornamental exercises and real orations. Each of them forms a set of four speeches, supposed to be spoken in a trial for homicide. The accuser states his charge, and the defendant replies; the accuser then speaks again, and the defendant follows with a second reply. The imaginary case is in each instance sketched as lightly as possible; details are dispensed with; only the essential framework for discussion is supplied. Hence, in these skeleton-speeches, the structure and anatomy of the argument stand forth in naked clearness, stripped of everything accidental, and showing in bold relief the organic lines of a rhetorical pleader's thought. It was the essence of the technical rhetoric that it taught a man to be equally ready to defend either side of a question. Here we have the same man— Antiphon himself—arguing both sides, with tolerably well-balanced force; and it must be allowed that much of the reasoning—especially in the Second Tetralogy—is, in the modern sense, sophistical. In reference, however, to this general characteristic one thing ought to be borne in mind. The Athenian law of homicide was precise, but it was not scientific. The distinctions which it drew between various degrees of guilt in various sets of circumstances depended rather on minute tradition than on clear principle. A captious or even frivolous style of argument was invited by a code which employed vague conceptions in the elaborate classification of accidental details. Thus far the Tetralogies bear the necessary mark of the age which produced them. But in all else they are distinguished as widely as possible from the essays of a merely artificial rhetoric; not less from the ‘displays’ of the elder sophists than from the ‘declamations’ of the Augustan age‘Antiphon is a sophist,’ (says Reiske (Orat. Att. VII. p. 849)— ‘nay, in a manner the father of that pedantic (umbratici), hairplitting, empty, affected kind of speaking with which the schools of the ancients were rife.’ The very phrase ‘scholae veterum’ shows the vagueness of this assertion. Precisely that which distinguished Antiphon from the earlier sophists was his practical bent. No man could be less fairly called ‘umbraticus.’. They are not only thoroughly real and practical, but they show Antiphon, in one sense, at his best. He argues in them with more than the subtlety of the speeches which he composed for others, for here he has no less an antagonist than himself: he speaks with more than the elevation of his ordinary style,—for in the privacy of the school he owed less concession to an altered public taste.

First Tetralogy.

The First Tetralogy supposes the following case. A citizen, coming home at night from a dinner-party, has been murdered. His slave, found mortally wounded on the same spot, deposes that he recognised one of the assassins. This was an old enemy of his master, against whom the latter was about to bring a lawsuit which might be ruinous. The accused denies the charge: the case comes before the court of the Areiopagos. The speeches of accuser and defendant comprise a number of separate arguments, each of which is carefully, though very briefly, stated, but which are not systematised or woven into a whole. An enumeration of the points raised on either side in this case will give a fair general idea of the scope of the Tetralogies generally. Analysis.

I. First Speech of Accuser.

1. §§ 1—3. (Proem.) The accused is so crafty that even an imperfect proof against him ought to be accepted: a proof complete in all its parts is hardly to be looked for.—It is not to be supposed that the accuser would have deliberately incurred the guilt of prosecuting an innocent person.

[Here a narrative of the facts would naturally follow; but as this is a mere practice-speech, it is left out, and the speaker comes at once to the proofs—first, those derived from argument on the circumstances themselves (the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις)—then, the testimony of the slave (which represents the ἄτεχνοι.)]

2. § 4. The deceased cannot have been murdered by robbers; for he was not plundered.

3. Nor in a drunken brawl; for the time and place are against it.

4. Nor by mistake for some one else; for, in that case the slave would not have been attacked too.

5. §§ 5—8. It was therefore a premeditated crime and this must have been prompted by a motive of reveng or fear.

6. Now the accused had both motives. He had lost much property in actions brought by the deceased, and was threatened with the loss of more. The murder was the only means by which he could evade the lawsuit hanging over him. [Here follows a curious argument in a circle.] And he must have felt that he was going to lose the lawsuit, or he would not have braved a trial for murder.

7. § 9. The slave identifies him.

8. §§ 9—11. (Epilogue.) If such proofs do not suffice no murderer can ever be brought to justice, and the State will be left to bear the wrath of the gods for an unexpiated pollution.

II. First Speech of the Defendant.

1. §§ 1—4. (Proem.) The accuser deserves the pity of the judge, for he is the most unlucky of men. In death, as in life, his enemy hurts him still. It is not enough if he can prove his own innocence; he is expected to point out the real culprit. The accuser credits him with craft. If he was so crafty, is it likely that he would have exposed himself to such obvious suspicion?

2. §§ 5—6. The deceased may have been murdered by robbers, who were scared off by people coming up before they had stripped him.

3. Or he may have been murdered because he had been witness of some crime.

4. Or by some other of his numerous enemies; who would have felt safe, knowing that the suspicion was sure to fall on the accused, his great enemy.

5. § 7. The testimony of the slave is untrustworthy, since, in the terror of the moment, he may have been mistaken; or he may have been ordered by his present masters to speak against the accused. Generally, the evidence of slaves is held untrustworthy; else they would not be racked.

6. § 8. Even if mere probabilities are to decide the case, it is more probable that the accused should have employed some one else to do the murder, than that the slave should, at such a time, have been accurate in his recognition.

7. § 9. The danger of losing money in the impending lawsuit could not have seemed more serious to the accused than the danger, which he runs in the present trial, of losing his life.

8. §§ 10—13. (Epilogue.) Though he be deemed the probable murderer, he ought not to be condemned unless he is proved to be the actual murderer.—It is his adversary who, by accusing the innocent, is really answerable for the consequences of a crime remaining unexpiated.—The whole life and character of the accused are in his favour, as much as those of the accuser are against him.—The judges must succour the ill fortune of a slandered man.

III. Second Speech of the Accuser.

1. § 1. (Proem.) The defendant has no right to speak of his ‘misfortune:’ it is his fault. The first speech for the prosecutor proved his guilt; this shall overthrow his defence.

2. § 2. Had the robbers been scared off by people coming up, these persons would have questioned the slave about the assassins, and given information which would have exculpated the accused.

3. Had the deceased been murdered because he had been witness of a crime, this crime itself would have been heard of.

4. § 3. His other enemies, being in less danger from him than the accused was, had so much less motive for the crime.

5. § 4. It is contended that the slave's testimony is untrustworthy because it was wrung from him by the rack. But, in such cases as these, the rack is not used at all. [Nothing is said about the hypothesis that the slave may have been suborned by his masters.]

6. § 5. The accused is not likely to have got the deed done by other hands, since he would have been suspected all the same, and could not have been so sure of the work being done thoroughly.

7. § 6. The lawsuit hanging over him—a certainty— would have seemed more formidable to him than the doubtful chance of a trial for murder.

8. §§ 7—8. (Notice of a few topics touched on by the defendant at the beginning and end of his speech.)—The fear of discovery is not likely to have deterred such a man from crime: whereas the prospect of losing his wealth—the instrument of his boasted services to the State—is very likely to have driven him to it.—When the certain murderer cannot be found, the presumptive must be punished.

9. §§ 9—11. (Epilogue.) The judges must not acquit the accused—condemned alike by probabilities and by proofs—and thereby bring bloodguiltiness on themselves. By punishing him, they can take the stain of murder off the State.

IV. Second Speech of the Defendant.

1. §§ 1—3. (Proem.) He is the victim of cruel malignity. Though bound only to clear himself, it is demanded of him that he shall account for the crime.

2. §§ 4—5. Suppose that robbers did the murder, but were scared, before they had taken their booty, by people coming up. Would these persons, as it is contended, have remained to make inquiries? Coming on a bloody corpse and a dying man at dead of night, would they not rather have fled in terror from the spot?

3. § 6. Suppose that the deceased was slain because he had been witness of a crime:—the fact of such crime not having been heard of, does not prove that it did not take place.

4. § 7. The slave, with death from his wounds close at hand, had nothing to fear if he bore false testimony.

5. § 8. But the accused can prove a distinct alibi. All his own slaves can testify that on the night in question— the night of the Diïpolia—he did not leave his own house.

[The assertion of the alibi has been reserved till this point, because now the prosecutor cannot reply.]

6. § 9. It is suggested that he may have committed the crime to protect his wealth. But desperate deeds, such as this, are not done by prosperous men. They are more natural to men who have nothing to lose.

7. § 10. Even if he were the presumptive murderer, he would not have been proved the actual: but, as it is, the probabilities also are for him. On all grounds, therefore, he must be acquitted, or there is no more safety for any accused man.

8. §§ 11—12. (Epilogue.) The judges are entreated not to condemn him wrongfully, and so leave the murder unatoned for, while they bring a new stain of bloodguiltiness on the State.

A tolerably full analysis of this First Tetralogy has been given, because it is curious as showing the general line of argument which a clever Athenian reasoner, accustomed to writing for the courts, thought most likely to succeed on either side of such a case. It will be seen that, though other kinds of evidence come into discussion, the contest turns largely on general probabilities (εἰκότα)—a province for which Antiphon had the relish of a trained rhetorician, and on which he enlarges in the speech On the Murder of HerodesSee esp. de caed. Herod. §§ 57—63.. As regards style, in this as in the other Tetralogies the language is noble throughout, rising, in parts of the speeches of the accused, to an austere pathosEsp. B. §§ 1—4: Δ §§ 1—3.; it is always concise without baldness, but somewhat over-stiff and antique. There is also too little of oratorical life; at which, however, in short speeches written for practice, the author perhaps did not aim.

Second Tetralogy.

The subject of the Second Tetralogy is the death of a boy accidentally struck by a javelin while watching a youth practising at the gymnasium. The boy's father accuses the youth—whose father defends him—of accidental homicide; and the case comes before the court of the Palladion. In order to understand the issues raised, it is necessary to keep in mind the Greek view of accidental homicide. This view was mainly a religious one. The death was a pollution. Some person, or thing, must be answerable for that pollution, and must be banished from the State, which would else remain defiledThis feeling about homicide comes out strongly in the custom of trying cases of φόνος in the open air: ἵνα τοῦτο μὲν οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ ἴωσιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὴ καθαροῖς τὰς χεῖρας, τοῦτο δὲ ὁ διώκων τὴν δίκην τοῦ φόνου ἵνα μὴ ὁμωρόφιος γένηται τῷ αὐθέντῃ. Cf. supra, p. 40, note 2; and Dem. Aristocr. §§ 65—79.. In a case like the supposed one, three hypotheses were possible:—that the cause of the impurity had been the thrower, the person struck, or the missile. Perikles and Protagoras spent a whole day in discussing a similar question. Epitimos, an athlete, had chanced to hit and kill a certain Pharsalian: did the guilt lie, they inquired, with Epitimos, with the man killed, or with the javelin Plut. Perikl. 36.? There was a special court—that held at the Prutaneion—for the trial of inanimate things which had caused death. Here, however, the question is only of living agents. The judges have nothing whatever to do with the question as to how far either was morally to blame. The question is simply which of them is to be considered as, in fact, the author or cause of the death.

The accused, in his first speech, assumes that the case Analysis. admits of no doubt; states it briefly; and concludes with an appeal to the judges (A. §§ 1—2). The father of the accused, after bespeaking patience for an apparently strange defence (B. §§ 1—2)—argues that the error, the ἁμαρτία, was all on the boy's side (§§ 3—5). The thrower was standing in his appointed place; the boy was not obliged to place himself where he did. The thrower knew what he was about; the boy did not—he chose the wrong moment for running across. He was struck; and so punished himself for his own fault (§§ 6—8).—The accuser answers in the tone of a plain man bewildered by the shamelessness of the defence, (Γ. §§ 1—4). It is absured, he says, to pretend that the boy killed himself with a weapon which he had not touched. On the showing of the defence itself, the blame is divided: if the boy ran, the youth threw: neither was passive (§§ 5— 10).—The youth's father answers that his meaning has been perverted (A. §§ 1—2): he did not mean, of course, that the boy pierced himself, but that he became the first cause of his own death (§§ 3—5). The youth did no more than the other throwers, who did not hit the boy only because he did not cross their aim (§§ 6—8). Involuntary homicide is, doubtless, punishable by law; but, in this instance, the involuntary slayer—the deceased himself—has been punished already. To condemn the accused would be only to incur a new pollution (§§ 9—10).

The striking point of the whole Tetralogy is the ingenuity with which the defender inverts the natural view of the case. The guilt of blood is, he says, with the deceased alone, who has taken satisfaction for it from himself. ‘Destroyed by his own errors, he was punished by himself in the same instant that he sinned.’ (Δ. § 8.)

Third Tetralogy.

Another peculiarity of the Athenian law of homicide is illustrated by the third and last Tetralogy. An elderly man had been beaten by a younger man so severely that in a few days he died. The young man is tried for murder before the Areiopagos.Analysis.

The accuser, in a short speech, appeals chiefly to the indignation of the judges, dwelling, in a striking passage on the sin of robbing a fellow-mortal of the god's gift (A. §§ 1—4).—The defendant argues in reply that, if the homicide is to be regarded as accidental, then it rests with the surgeon, under whose unskilful treatment the man died; but, if it is to be regarded as deliberate, then the murderer is the deceased himself, since he struck the first blow, which set the train of events in motion (B. §§ 3—5).— The accuser answers that the elder man is not likely to have first struck the younger (Γ. § 2); and that to blame the surgeon is idle; it would not be more absurd to inculpate the persons who called in his aid (§ 5).—[Here the second speech of the accused could naturally follow. But the accused has, in the meantime, taken advantage of the Athenian law by withdrawing into voluntary exile. The judges have no longer any power to punish him. A friend, however, who was a bystander of the quarrel, comes forward to defend the innocence of the accused.] The guilt, he maintains, lies with the old man; he, as can be proved, gave the first blow (Δ. §§ 2—5); he is at once the murdered and the murderer (§ 8).

The line thus taken by the defence is remarkable. It relies chiefly on the provocation alleged to have been given by the deceased. But it does not insist upon this provocation as mitigating the guilt of the accused. It insists upon it as transferring the whole guilt from the accused to the dead man. Athenian law recognised only two kinds of homicide; that which was purely accidental, and that which resulted from some deliberate act. In the latter case, whether there had been an intent to kill or not, some one must be a murderer. Thus, here, it would not have been enough for the defence to show that the accused had, without intent to kill, and under provocation, done a fatal injury. It is necessary to go on to argue that the deceased was guilty of his own murder.

The literary form of the Third Tetralogy deserves notice in two respects; for the solemnity and majesty of the language in the accuser's first address; and for the vivacity lent by rhetorical question and answer to part of the first speech of the defendantTetral. III. B. §§ 2, 3.—a vivacity which distinguishes it, as regards style, from everything else in these studies.

Speech On the Murder of Herodes.

Of extant speeches written by Antiphon for real causes, by far the most important is that On the Murder of Herodes. The facts of the case were as follows. Herodes, an Athenian citizen, had settled at Mytilene in 427 B.C. after the revolt and reduction of that town. He was one of the kleruchs among whom its territory was apportioned, but not otherwise wealthy§ 58.. Having occasion to make a voyage to Aenos on the coast of Thrace, to receive the ransom of some Thracian captives who were in his hands, he sailed from Mytilene with the accused,—a young man whose father, a citizen of Mytilene, lived chiefly at Aenos§ 78.. Herodes and his companion were driven by a storm to put in at Methymna on the north-west coast of Lesbos; and there, as the weather was wet, exchanged their open vessel for another which was decked. After they had been drinking on board together, Herodes went ashore at night, and was never seen again. The accused, after making every inquiry for him, went on to Aenos in the open vessel; while the decked vessel, into which they had moved at Methymna, returned to MytileneCompare § 28 with § 23.. On reaching the latter place again, the defendant was charged by the relatives of Herodes with having murdered him at the instigation of Lykînos, an AthenianSee § 61; and also § 62, ἀπεστέρει μὲν ἐμὲ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀπεστέρει δὲ αὑτὸν ἱερῶν, which implies, as Blass points out, that Lesbos was not the πατρίς of Lykînos, as it was of the defendant. living at Mytilene, who had been on bad terms with the deceased. They rested their charge principally on three grounds. First, that the sole companion of the missing man must naturally be considered accountable for his disappearance. Secondly, that a slave had confessed under torture to having assisted the defendant in the murder. Thirdly, that on board the vessel which returned from Methymna had been found a letter in which the defendant announced to Lykînos the accomplishment of the murder.

It was necessary that the trial should take place Mode of legal procedure. at Athens, whither all subject-allies were compelled to bring their criminal causes. The ordinary course would have been to have laid an indictment for murder (γραφὴ φόνου) before the Areiopagos. Instead, however, of doing this the relatives of Herodes laid an information against the accused as a ‘malefactor’ ἔνδειξις κακουργίας: cf. § 9 κακοῦργος ἐνδεδειγμένος. When the accused arrived in Athens, he was, on the strength of the ἔνδειξις, arrested by the Eleven: § 85 ἀπήχθην. Hence in § 9 he speaks of ταύτην τὴν ἀπαγωγήν. The terms ἔνδειξις κακουργίας and ἀπαγωγὴ κακουργιας do not denote two different processes, but two parts of the same process. Ἔνδειξις was the laying of information against a person not yet apprehended: ἀπαγωγή was the act of apprehending him.. He was accordingly to be tried by an ordinary dikastery under the presidency of the Eleven. ‘Malefactor,’ at Athens, ordinarily meant a thief, a housebreaker, a kidnapper, or criminal of the like class; but the term was, of course, applicable to murder, especially if accompanied by robbery. Instances of persons accused of murder being proceeded against, not by an indictment, but by an information, and being summarily arrested without previous inquiry, occur only a few years later than the probable date of this speechThe two murderers of Phrynichos in 411 were ‘seized and put in prison’ by his friends (ληφθέντων καὶ ἐς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἀποτεθέντων), —that is, were proceeded against by ἀπαγωγή: Lykurgos in Leokr. § 12. The procedure in the case of Agoratos (391 B.C.), again, was by an ἔνδειξις, not by a γραφὴ φόνου, and there was an ἀπαγωγή of the accused (Lys. in Agorat. § 85). Strictly speaking the ἔνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή were applicable only to those cases in which the accused was taken ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ: that is, in which no further proof of his guilt was required. Thus Pollux defines ἔνδειξις as ὁμολογουμένου ἀδικήματος μήνυσις, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δεομένου. Agoratos appears to have raised this very point: Lys. in Agor. § 85. But, since the procedure of the Areiopagos was so highly favourable to the accused, a prosecutor would generally prefer the procedure by ἔνδειξις if there was any decent pretence for it. And the condition of manifest guilt does not seem to have been rigorously insisted upon by the authorities. There was, probably, a feeling that the forms of the Areiopagos would be in a manner profaned by application to criminals of the vilest class.. When, therefore, the accused contends that the form of the procedure was unprecedented and illegal, this is probably to be understood as an exaggeration of the fact that it was unusual. In two ways it must have been distasteful to the prisoner; first, as an indignity; secondly, as a positive disadvantage. Trial before the Areiopagos left to the prisoner the option of withdrawing from the country before sentences; and imposed upon the accuser a peculiarly solemn oath De caed. Herod. § 12, δέον σε διομόσασθαι ὅρκον τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον, ἐξώλειαν αὐτῷ καὶ γέvει καὶ οἰκίᾳ τῇ σῇ ἐπαρώμενον.. In this case, moreover, the unusual (though not illegal) procedure was accompanied by unjust rigours. When the accused arrived in Athens, although he offered the three sureties required by law, his bail was refused; he was imprisoned. This treatment, of which he reasonably complains§ 17., may have been due in part to the unpopularity of Mytileneans at Athens, and to the fact that Herodes had been an Athenian citizen.Date of the speech.

The date of the speech must lie between the capture of Mytilene in 427§ 76. B. C. and the revolt of Lesbos in 412 B. C. The accused says that in 427 B.C. he was too young§ 75. to understand the events which were passing, and that he knows them only by hearsay. On the other hand, he can hardly have been less than twenty at the time of the trial. KirchnerKirchner De temporibus orationum Antiphont. pp. 2 ff., quoted by Blass, Attisch. Bereds. p. 166. and Blass are inclined to place the speech about 421 B. C.; it would perhaps be better to put it three or four years later, about 417 or 416 B. C. On the other hand, a slight indication—which seems to have escaped notice—appears to show that it was at least earlier than the spring of 415 B. C. The accused brings together several instances in which great crimes had never been explained§§ 67—70.. If the mutilation of the Hermae had then taken place, he could scarcely have failed to notice so striking an example.

The speech opens with a proem in which the defendant Analysis. pleads his youth and inexperience (§§ 1—7); and which is followed by a preliminary argument (προκατασκευή) on the informality of the procedure (§§ 8—18). The defendant then gives a narrative of the facts up to his arrival at Aenos (§§ 19—24); and shows that the probabilities, as depending upon the facts thus far stated, are against the story of the prosecutors (§§ 25—28). The second part of the narrative describes how the vessel into which Herodes and the defendant had moved at Methymna returned to Mytilene; how the slave was tortured, and under torture accused the defendant of murder (§§ 29—30).

The defendant now concentrates his force upon proving the testimony of the slave to be worthless (§§ 31—51). He next discusses the statement of the prosecutors that a letter, in which he announced the murder to Lykînos, had been found on board the returning vessel (§§ 52—56). He shows that he could have had no motive for the murder (§§ 57—63). He maintains that he cannot justly be required to suggest a solution of the mystery. It is enough if he establishes his own innocence. Many crimes have finally baffled investigation (§§ 64—73). He notices the reproaches brought against his father as having taken part in the revolt of Mytilene and having been generally disloyal to Athens (§§ 74—80).

Besides all the other proofs, the innocence of the prisoner is vindicated by the absence of signs of the divine anger. Voyages and sacrifices in which he has taken part have always been prosperous (§§ 81—84). In a concluding appeal the judges are reminded that, in any case, justice cannot be frustrated by his acquittal, since it will still be possible to bring him before the Areiopagos (§§ 85—95).Remarks.

In reviewing the whole speech as an argument, the first thing which strikes us is the notable contrast between the line of defence taken here and that traced for a case essentially similar in the modelspeeches of the First Tetralogy. There, the defendant employs all his ingenuity in suggesting explanations of the mysterious crime which shall make the hypothesis of his own guilt unnecessary. Here, the defendant pointedly refuses to do any thing of the kind. It is enough if he can show that he was not the murderer; it is not his business to show who was or might have been. On this broad, plain ground the defence takes a firm stand. The arguments are presented in a natural order, as they arise out of the facts narrated, and are drawn out at a length proportionate to their consequence,—by far the greatest stress being laid on the worthlessness of the slave's evidence; in discussing which, indeed, the speaker is not very consistentIn § 39 it is contended that the slave cannot have represented himself as taking part in the murder, but only as helping to dispose of the corpse. In § 54, on the contrary, it is assumed that the slave represented himself as the actual murderer. Lastly, in § 68, the view taken in § 39 is not only reasserted, but is ascribed to the adversaries as their own.. One apparent omission is curious. The prisoner incidentally says that he never left the vessel on the night when Herodes went on shore and disappeared§ 26 λέγουσι δὲ ὡς ἐν μὲν τῇ γῇ ἀπέθανεν ὁ ἀνήρ, κἀγὼ λίθον ἐπέβαλον αὐτῷ εἰς τὴν κεφαλήν, ὃς οὐκ ἐξέβην τὸ παράπαν ἐκ τοῦ πλοίου.; but he does not dwell upon, or attempt to prove, this allessential alibi. If the numerous commonplaces and general sentiments seem to us a source of weakness rather than strength, allowance must be made for the taste and fashion of the time; and every one must recognise the effectiveness of the appeal to divine signs in which the argument finds its rhetorical climax.

As a composition, the speech has great merits. The êthos, indeed, is not artistic; a style so dignified and so sententious is scarcely suitable to a speaker who is continually apologising for his youth and inexperience. Nor, except in the passage which touches on the ruin of Mytilene§ 79: ‘For all Mytileneans, the memory of their past error has been made indelible; they exchanged great prosperity for great misery; they beheld their country made desolate.’, is there even an attempt at pathos. But there is variety and versatility; the opening passage is artistically elaborate, the concluding, impressive in a higher way; while the purely argumentative part of the speech is not encumbered with any stiff dignity, but is clear, simple, and sufficiently animated. Altogether the style has less sustained elevation, but shows more flexibility, greater maturity and mastery, than that of the Tetralogies.

Speech On the Choreutes.

The speech On the Choreutes relates to the death of Diodotos, a boy who was in training as member of a chorus to be produced at the Thargelia, and who was poisoned by a draught given to him to improve his voiceThe object with which the draught was given is not stated in the speech itself: but the argument says εὐφωνίας χάριν ἔπιε φάρμακον καὶ πιὼν τέθνηκεν. Compare the passage in which Plutarch speaks of the pains taken to train the voices of the chorus (De glor. Athen. c. 6): οἱ δὲ χορηγοὶ τοῖς χορευταῖς ἐγχέλια καὶ θριδάκια καὶ σκελλίδας καὶ μυελὸν παρατιθέντες εὐώχουν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον φωνασκουμένους καὶ τρυφῶντας .. The accused is the choregus, an Athenian citizen, who discharged that office for his own and another tribe, and at whose house the chorus received their lessons. The accuser, Philokrates, brother of the deceased Diodotos, laid an information for poisoning before the Archon Basileus; and after some delay, the case came before the AreiopagosThat the Areiopagos was the court which tried the case appears certain (1) because that court alone had jurisdiction in γραφαὶ φαρμάκων: (2) because the special compliment to the court as ‘the most conscientious and upright in Greece’ (§ 51) points to the Areiopagos Some have supposed that this case came before court at the Palladion, because, in § 16, the accused is spoken of as βουλεύσας τὸν θάνατον, and, according to Harpokration, cases of βούλευσις were tried at the Palladion by the Ephetae. But the βούλευσις of Harpokration is a technical term,=ἐπιβούλευσις, and denotes the intent to kill in cases in which death had not actually followed. On the other hand, the accused here is said βουλεῦσαι τὸν θάνατον merely in the sense that it was by his order that the draught was given to the boy, though he did not hand the cup to him. No intent to murder was imputed to him: see § 19 οἱ κατήγοροι ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐκ προνοίας μηδ’ ἐκ παρασκουῆς γενέσθαι τὸν θάνατον.. It was not contended that the accused had intended to murder the boy, but only that he had ordered to be administered to him the draught which caused his death. According to Athenian law this was, however, a capital offence. The present speech is the second made by the defendant, and the last, therefore, of the trial. Its date may probably be placed soon after the Sicilian disasterIn §§ 12, 21, 55 the choregus speaks of having brought an action for embezzlement of public monies against Philînos and two other persons. Now Antiphon wrote a speech κατὰ Φιλίνου,—very probably, as Sauppe conjectures, against this same Philînos when prosecuted by the choregus: and from the speech κατὰ Φιλίνου are quoted the words, τούς τε θῆτας ἅπαντας ὁπλίτας ποιῆσαι. Sauppe thinks this points to a time just after the Sicilian disaster: ‘in illis enim rerum angustiis videntur A thenienses thetes ad arma vocasse.’ (Or. Att. vol. II. p. 144.) This is quite possible: but Sauppe's other argument that the fact of the choregus representing two tribes (§ 11) points to a contraction of public expenses in a time of distress, is not worth much, since we do not know that this may not have been the usual custom at the Thargelia. At any rate the decidedly modern character of the speech as compared with the De caed. Herodis warrants us in placing it some years after the latter, which (as has been said above) was probably spoken between 421 and 416 B. C..

In a long proem, the accused dwells on the advantage Analysis of a good conscience—on the excellence of the court of the Areiopagos—and on the weight of a judicial decision in such a case (§§ 1—6). He goes on to complain of the manner in which the adversaries have mixed up irrelevant charges with the true issue; he will address himself to the latter, and then refute the former (§§ 7—10). A narrative of the facts is then begun; but he breaks it off with the remark that it would be easy to expose the falsehoods contained in the adversary's second speech, and that he will now bring proofs (§§ 11—15). The testimony of witnesses is adduced and commented upon (§§ 16—19). The defendant goes on to contrast his own conduct in the matter with that of the accuser; dwells on the refusal of his challenge to an examination of slaves; and urges the strength in all points of his case (§§ 20—32). The evidence closed, he digresses into a full review of the adversaries' conduct from the first, in order to illustrate their malice and dishonesty. ‘What judges,’ he asks in conclusion, ‘would they not deceive, if they have dared to trifle with the awful oath under which they came before this court?’ (§§ 33—51.)Remarks.

It seems probable that the end of the speech has been lost. Standing last in the MSS. of Antiphon, it would thus be the more liable to mutilation; and in the concluding speech of a trial the orator would scarcely have broken the rule, which he observes in every other instance, of finishing with an appeal to the judges. The fact that a rhetorical promise made in the speechIn § 8 the speaker says that he will first deal with the matter at issue, and then meet certain other charges which the adversaries have brought against him, but which he feels sure that he can turn to their own discomfiture. The promise, however, is conditional—ἐὰν ὑμῖν ἡδομένοις ᾖ: and is, in effect, if not literally, fulfilled by the digression (§§ 33—51) in which he brings out the malicious character of their whole conduct towards him. is not literally fulfilled need not be insisted upon to strengthen this view.

In the speech On the Murder of Herodes, Antiphon had to rely mainly on his skill in argument; here, witnesses were available, the case against the accusers was strong, and little was needed but a judicious marshalling of proofs. This is ably managed; but, as a display of power, the speech is necessarily of inferior interest. The Mytilenean defendant in the Herodes case and the choregus here speak in the same general tone—with a certain directness and earnestness; but the common êthos is more strongly marked here, as the personality of the speaker comes more decidedly forward. In other points of style there is a striking contrast between the earlier and the later oration. The proem here is, indeed, as measured and as elaborate as any thing in the earlier work. But it stands alone; in the rest of the speech there is no stiffness. The language is that of ordinary life; the sentences are more flowing, if not always clear; the style is enlivened by question and exclamation, instead of being ornamented with antitheses and parallelisms; and already the beginning of a transition to the easier, more practical style of the later eloquence is well-marked.

Speech Against a Stepmother.

The short speech entitled ‘Against a Step-mother, on a Charge of Poisoning,’ treats of a case which, like the preceding, belonged to the jurisdiction of the Areiopagos. The speaker, a young man, is the son of the deceased. He charges his step-mother with having poisoned his father several years before§ 30., by the instrumentality of a woman who was her dupe. The deceased and a friend, Philoneos, the woman's lover, had been dining together; and she was persuaded to administer a philtre to both, in hope of recovering her lover's affection. Both the men died; and the woman—a slave—was put to death forthwith. The accuser now asks that the real criminal, —the true Klytaemnestra§ 7. of this tragedy,—shall suffer punishment.

After deprecating in a proem (§§ 1—4) the odium to Analysis. which his position exposes him, and commenting on the refusal of the adversaries to give up their slaves for examination (§§ 5—13), the speaker states the facts of the case. (§§ 14—20.) He goes on to contrast his own part as his father's avenger with that of his brother, the champion of the murderess (§§ 21—25); appeals for sympathy and retribution (§§ 26—27); denies that his brother's oath to the innocence of the accused can have any good ground, whereas his own oath to the justice of his cause is supported by his father's dying declaration (§§ 28—30); and concludes by saying that he has discharged his solemn duty, and that it now remains for the judges to do theirs. (§ 31.)Remarks.

Two questions have been raised in connexion with this speech; whether it was written merely for practice; and whether it was the work of Antiphon. I. It has been urged that stories of this kind were often chosen as subjects by the rhetoricians of the schools; that the designation of the accused as Klytaemnestra is melodramatic; that the name Philoneos (Φιλόνεως) seems fictitious; that the address to the Areiopagites as ὦ δικάζοντες in § 7 is strange; and that the speech stands in the mss. before the TetralogiesSpengel rejects the speech, but without assigning reasons (συν. τεχνῶν, p. 118). The special objections mentioned above were advanced by Maetzner, an editor of Antiphon, and are examined by Dr. P. G. Ottsen in a tract De rerum inventione ac dispositione quae est in Lysiae atque Antiphontis orationibus (Flensburg, 1847). If the speech was written as a mere exercise, then it certainly is not the work of Antiphon, who would have treated the subject as he treats the subjects of the Tetralogics—in outline merely, without needless details of name or place. But there is no good ground for assuming that the speech was not spoken in a real cause. The story has some melodramatic features, but contains nothing which might not have occurred in ordinary Greek life. With the designation of the accused as Klytaemnestra, compare Andok. de Myst. § 129, τίς ἂν εἴη οὗτος; Οἰδίπους ἢ Αἴγισθος; ἢ τί χρὴ αὐτὸν ὀνομόσαι; Isaeos mentions Διοκλέα τὸν Φλυέα, τὸν Ὀρέστην ἐπικαλούμενον: de Cirrh. hered. (Or. VIII.) § 3. Maetzner derived the name Φιλόνεως from φίλος and ναῦς, and thought it suspicious that such a name should be given to a resident in the Peiraeus. Ottsen accepts the etymology, but does not share the suspicion. Even if Φιλόνεως could be equivalent to Φιλόναυς (cf. λιπόναυς, μυριόναυς, &c.), the fact of a person so called living at a seaport would be about as strange as the fact of a person called Philip living at Ἄργος ἱππόβοτον. Lastly, as to the ὦ δικάζοντες in § 7, the great variety of forms used by Greek orators in addressing the judges would forbid us to pronounce this one inadmissible because it is unusual. But the genuineness of the words is not above suspicion. Blass, in his edition of Antiphon, brackets as spurious the words in § 7, πῶς οὖν περὶ τούτων, ὦ δικάζοντες—οὐκ εἴληφε. One good ms. omits them; and they seem like a scholium on what immediately precedes.. The last objection alone requires notice. The place of the speech in the mss. is, as Blass observes, due to the fact that it is the only accusatory speech; the Tetralogies comprise both accusation and defence; then come the defensive orations Attisch. Bereds. p. 180.. On the other hand the prominence of narrative and the entire absence of argument in this speech—in direct contrast to the Tetralogies, which are all argument and no narrative—and the unfitness of the subject for practising the ingenuity of an advocate, seem conclusive against the view that this was a mere exercise. II. The question of authenticity is more difficult. As regards matter, nothing can be weaker than the speech. There is no argument. An unsupported assertion that the accused had attempted the same crime before; the belief of the deceased that his wife was guilty; the refusal of the adversaries to give up their slaves; these are the only proofs. As regards style, there is much clumsy verbiagee. g. § 21 τῷ τεθνεῶτι ὑμᾶς κελεύω καὶ τῷ ἠδ ικημένῳ . . τιμωροὺς γενέσθαι...ἄξιος καὶ ἐλέου καὶ βοηθείας καὶ τιμωρίας παρ’ ὑμῶν τυχεῖν...§ 22 ἀθέμιτα καὶ ἀτέλεστα καὶ ἀνήκουστα...§ 23 δικασταὶ ἐγένεσθε καὶ ἐκλήθητε.. On the other hand, the narrative (§§ 14—20) shows real tragic power, especially in the contrast drawn between the unconsciousness of the miserable dupe and the craft of the instigator; throughout there is a pathos of the same kind as that of the Tetralogies, but higher; and lastly there is a strong resemblance to a particular passage in the speech On the ChoreutesCompare § 1 with de Choreuta § 27.. The conclusion to which Blass comes appears sensible Att. Bereds. p. 184.. Our knowledge of Antiphon's style is not so complete as to justify this rejection of the speech; but it must in any case be assigned to a period when both his argumentative skill and his power as a composer were still in a rude stage of their development.

Lost works.

Besides the extant compositions, twenty-four others, bearing the name of Antiphon, are known by their titles. Among these three deserve especial notice, because their titles have occasioned different inferences as to their contents, and because it is now tolerably certain that they belong, not to Antiphon Authorship of the treatises On Truth, On Concord, On Statesmanship. the orator, but to Antiphon the sophistSee p. 2, note 3.. These are the ‘speeches’ (or rather essays) On Truth, On Concord, On Statesmanship ἀληθείας λόγοι B:—περὶ ὁμονοίας:—πολιτικός. The fragments are given in Sauppe's Fragm. Oratt. Att. pp. 145 ff. printed in Baiter and Sauppe's Oratores Attici, and in the edition of Antiphon by Blass, pp. 124—143 (Teubner, 1871).. As regards the first of these, indeed, the testimony of HermogenesHermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν. II. c. 11. p. 414. There were two Antiphons, he says, ὧν εἷς μέν ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ, οὗπερ οἱ φονικοὶ φέρονται λόγοι καὶ δημηγορικοὶ καὶ ὅσοι τούτοις ὅμοιοι. ἕτερος δὲ ὁ καὶ τερατοσκόπος καὶ ὀνειροκρίτης λεγόμενος γενέσθαι, οὗπερ οἵ τε περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας λέγονται λόγοι καὶ ὁ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ οἱ δημηγορικοὶ καὶ ὁ πολιτικός. Spengel proposed to detach the words καὶ ὁ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ οἱ δημηγορικοὶ καὶ ὁ πολιτικός from the last clause, and to insert them in the first clause after φέρονται λόγοι, (omitting, of course, the καὶ δημηγ. which already stands there, and the τε in οἵ τε περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας). He would thus make Hermogenes ascribe the περὶ ὁμονοίας and the πολιτικός to Antiphon the orator, and the ἀληθείας λόγοι only to Antiphon the sophist. But this is an arbitrary and violent treatment of the text. Sauppe is no doubt right in thinking that its only corruption is the recurrence of οἱ δημηγορικοί in the second clause. The article had been accidentally left out where the word first occurs, and a corrector wrote οἱ δημηγορικοί at full length in the margin, whence it crept into the text a second time. that it was the work of the Sophist has scarcely been questioned. But the treatise On Concord has often been given to the orator on the assumption that it was a speech, enforcing the importance of harmony, which he delivered in some political crisis, perhaps at the moment when the Four Hundred were threatened with ruin by internal dissensionsIn reference to the meeting of the Four Hundred on the day after the mutiny of the hoplites in the Peiraeus (Thuc. VIII. 92, 93), Mr Grote says—‘It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord.’ (Hist. Gr. c. 62, vol. VIII. p. 94 n.) ‘In hoc autem libro,’ (says Blass, Antiphon p. 130) ‘sicut fragmenta docent, de moribus sophista disserebat deque vitae brevitate et aerumnis: rempublicam vero civiumque concordiam nusquam attigit.’. The treatise on Statesmanship, again, might, as far as the title witnesses, have been a practical exposition of oligarchical principles by the eloquent colleague of Peisandros. An examination of the fragments leads, however, to the almost certain conclusion that all these three works must be ascribed to the Sophist. The essay On Truth was a physical treatise, in which cosmic phenomena were explained mechanically in the fashion of the Ionic SchoolProtagoras called his Treatise of Natural Philosophy ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. The most suggestive fragment of the ἀληθείας λόγοι is no. 13 in Sauppe's list (fragm. Or. Graec. p. 149). Galen ap. Hippokr. epidem. I. 3. vol. 17, 1. p. 681 (Kühn) says:—οὕτω δὲ καὶ παρ’ Ἀντιφῶντι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τῆς Ἀληθείας ἔστιν εὑρεῖν γεγραμμένην τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ῥήσει· ὅταν οὖν γένωνται ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ὄμβροι τε καὶ πνεύματα ὑπενάντια ἀλλήλοις, τότε συστρέφεται τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ πυκνοῦται κατὰ πολλά, κ.τ. λ. . The essay On Concord was an ethical treatise, exhorting all men to live in harmony and friendship, instead of embittering their short lives by strifeSee, for instance, fragments 1 and 4 of the περὶ ὁμονοίας in Sauppe:—ἀναθέσθαι δὲ ὥσπερ πεττὸν τὸν βίον οὐκ ἔστιν...πολλοὶ δ’ ἔχοντες φίλους οὐ γιγνώσκουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἑταίρους ποιοῦνται θῶπας, πλούτου καὶ τύχης κόλακας.. The essay on Statesmanship was no party-pamphlet, but a discussion of the training required to produce a capable citizenFor instance, in fragment 2 of the πολιτικός we have a precept on the value of a character for steady business habits—μήτε φιλοπότην κληθῆναι καὶ δοκεῖν τὰ πράγματα καταμελεῖν ὑπ’ οἴνου ἡσσώμενον.. Besides the speeches known to the ancients, a work on the Art The Rhetoric. of Rhetoric ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι., and a collection of Proems and Epilogues προοίμια καὶ ἐπίλογοι., were current under Antiphon's name. The collectwn of Proems and Epilogues. Sauppe and SpengelSauppe, Fragm. Oratt. Gr. p. 145 believe the Tetralogies to be examples taken from the Rhetoric; the latter, however, is expressly condemned as spurious by PolluxPollux (VI. 143) quotes a word as used by Antiphon ἐν ταῖς ῥητορικαῖς τέχναις: but adds—δοκοῦσι δ’ οὐ γνήσιαι.. The collection of Proems and Epilogues may, as Blass Attisch. Bereds. p. 103, where he quotes (note 7) Cic. Brut. 47 for the statement of Aristotle—huic (Gorgiae) Antiphontem Rhamnusium similia quaedam habuisse conscripta: — where conscripta seems to mean a collection of communes loci stored up to be used as they might be wanted. suggests, have furnished the opening and concluding passages of the Speech On the Murder of Herodes, and the opening passage of that On the Choreutes. In the latter case the difference of style between the proem and all that follows it is certainly striking.

Andokides: Life
Birth of Andokides.

THE life of Andokides has, in one broad aspect, a striking analogy to the life of Antiphon. Each man stands forth for a moment a conspicuous actor in one great scene, while the rest of his history is but dimly known; and each, at that moment, appears as an oligarch exposed to the suspicion and dislike of the democracy. The Revolution of the Four Hundred is the decisive and final event in the life of Antiphon. The mutilation of the Hermae is the first, but hardly less decisive event, in the known life of Andokides; the event which, for thirteen years afterwards, absolutely determined his fortunes, and which throws its shadow over all that is known of their sequel.

Andokides was born probably about 440 B.C.According to [Lys.] in Andok. § 46, he was in 399 B.C. πλέον ἢ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονώς. He speaks of his ‘youthfulness’ in 415 B.C.: de Red. § 7. His father, Leogoras II., may have been born about 470: Andokides I. about 500: Leogoras I. about 540. The pseudo-Plutarch puts his birth in the archonship of Theagenides, Ol. 78. 1, 468 B.C.: probably on the assumption that the orator was the Andokides of Thuc. I. 51. The deme Kydathene, of which he was a member, was included in the Pandionian tribe. His family was traced by Hellanikos the genealogist through Odysseus up to the god Hermes[Plut.] Vit. Andok. γένους Εὐπατριδῶν, ὡς δὲ Ἑλλάνικος, καὶ ἀπὸ Ἑρμοῦ· καθήκει γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸν τὸ Κηρύκων γένος. The pseudo-Plutarch seems to have inferred from the fact that the descent of Andokides was traced from Hermes, that he belonged to the priestly family of the Κήρυκες, who represented their ancestor Κῆρυξ as the son of Hermes (Paus. I. 38. 3). But Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) tells us that Hellanikos traced Andokides up to Odysseus; the line from Hermes, then, was not through Kêryx, but through Autolykos, whose daughter Antikleia was mother of Odysseus., and had been known in Athenian history for at least three generations. Leogoras, his great grandfather, had fought against the Peisistratidae Andok. de Myst. § 106. In de Red. § 26 Valckenar and Sauppe read ὁ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατρὸς πάππος instead of ὁ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατρὸς πρόπαππος .. Andokides the elder, his grandfather, was one of ten envoys who negotiated the Thirty Years' Truce with Sparta in 445Andok. de Pace § 6.; and had commanded with Perikles at Samos in 440Schol. Aristid. III. 485, ap. Blass Att. Bereds. p. 270., and with Glaukon at Corcyra in 435Thuc. I. 51.. Leogoras, father of the orator, was, to judge from Aristophanes, famous chiefly for his dinners and his pheasants Ar. Vesp. 1269 : Nub. 109 τοὺς φασιανοὺς οὓς τρέφει Λεωγόρας . Athen. IX. p. 387 A κωμωδεῖται γὰρ ὁ Λεωγόρας ὡς γαστρίμαργος ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Περιαλγεῖ. Besides his son Andokides, Leogoras had a daughter who married Kallias a son of Telekles: de Myst. § 117: cf. §§ 42, 50. .

Affair of the Hermae.

The only glimpse of the life of Andokides before 415 B. C. is afforded by himself. He belonged to a set or club, of which one Euphiletos was a leading member De Myst. §§ 61—63. Euphiletos is there described as proposing the sacrilege at a convivial meeting of the club (εἰσηγἠσατο... πινόντων ἡμῶν § 61). Its members were intimate associates ( ἐπιτήδειοι § 63: cf. οἷς ἐχρῶ καὶ οἷς συνῆσθα § 49). There is nothing to show that this club of young men was anything so serious as a political ἑταιρεία., and with which his address ‘To His Associates’ (πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους), mentioned by Plutarch, has sometimes been connectedPlut. Them. c. 32. See ch. VI. ad fin.. It was in May, 415, when he was about twenty-five, when the Peiraeus was alive with preparations for the sailing of the fleet to Sicily, and all men were full of dreams of a new empire opening to the city, that Athens was astonished by a sacrilege, of which it is hard now to realise the precise effect upon the Athenian mind. When it appeared that the images of Hermes throughout the town—in the marketplace, before the doors of houses, before the temples—had been mutilated in the night, the sense of a horrible impiety was joined to a sense of helplessness against revolutionThuc. VI. 27 καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε γὰρ ἔκπλου οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι. Cf. Isokr. de Bigis § 6.; for to an Athenian it would occur instinctively that the motive of the mutilators had been not simply to insult, but to estrange, the tutelar gods of the city. This terror, while still fresh, was intensified by the rumoured travesties in private houses of the innermost sacrament of Greek religion, the Mysteries of Eleusis. In order to understand the position of Andokides, it is necessary to keep these two affairs distinct. There is nothing to shew that he was in any way concerned, as accomplice or as informer, with the profanation of the Mysteries. As a matter of course, the author of the speech against him asserts it[Lys.] in Andok. § 51 μιμούμενος τὰ ἱερὰ ἐπεδείκνυε τοῖς ἀμυήτοις, κ.τ.λ. ; but his own denial is emphatic and clearAndok. de Myst. § 29 περὶ μὲν τῶν μυστηρίων...ἀποδέδεικταί μοι ὡς οὔτε ἠσέβηκα οὔτε μεμήνυκα, κ.τ.λ. , and agrees with what is known from other sources. It was in the affair of the Hermae alone that he was implicated. The first important evidence in this matter was given by Teukros, a resident-alien, who had fled to Megara, and who was brought back to give information under a promise of impunity. This man denounced twelve persons as guilty in regard to the Mysteries, and eighteen as mutilators of the Hermae. Among the eighteen were Euphiletos and other members of the club to which Andokides belonged; of whom some were at once put to death, and others fled De Myst. § 35..

But there was a very general belief that the bottom of the matter had not been reached, and that the conspiracy had been far more widely spread; a belief which the commissioners of enquiry, especially Peisandros, seem to have encouraged. As usual in such cases, the demand for discoveries created the supply. Diokleides, the Titus Oates of this plot, came forward to state that the conspiracy included no less than three hundred persons. Fortytwo of these were denounced, among whom were Andokides, his father, his brother-in-law and ten other of his relatives. They were imprisoned at once; Diokleides was feasted as a public benefactor at the Prytaneion; and the whole town spent the night under arms, panic-stricken by the extent of the conspiracy,—not knowing whence, when, or in what strength they might be attacked by the enemies of gods and men De Myst. § 45.. Andokides has described the first night in prison. Wives, sisters, children, who had been allowed to come to their friends, joined in their tears and cries of despair. Then it was that Charmides, one of his cousins, besought him to tell all that he knew, and to save his father, his relations and all the innocent citizens who were threatened with an infamous death. Andokides yielded. He was brought before the Council, and stated that the story of Teukros was true. The eighteen who had died or fled were indeed guilty. But there were four more whom Teukros had left out, and whom Andokides now named. These four fled De Myst. § 68..

Decree of Isotimides.

The deposition of Andokides, confirming as it did the testimony of Teukros, and at the same time supplementing that testimony, was accepted, at least at the time, as the true and complete account. The affair of the Hermae was dropped, and attention was fixed once more upon the affair of the MysteriesThuc. VI. 61 ἐπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν ᾤοντο σαφὲς ἔχειν, πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ μυστικὰ ὧν ἐπαίτιος ἦν μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ξυνωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου (τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου) ἐδόκει πραχθῆναι.. At some time not much later, Leogoras, the father of Andokides, gained an action which he brought against the senator Speusippos, who had illegally committed for trial Leogoras and the other persons accused by the slave Lydos of having profaned the Mysteries in the house of his master Pherekles De Myst. § 17.. Andokides himself was less fortunate. He had given his information under a promise of personal indemnity guaranteed by a decree of the ekklesia. After his disclosures, however, a new decree, proposed by Isotimides, cancelled the former. It provided that those who had committed impiety and confessed it should be excluded from the marketplace and from the temples; a form of ‘disgrace’ (atimia) virtually equivalent to banishment. Andokides was considered as falling under this decree, and was accordingly driven to leave Athens.

This closes the first chapter of his life. Two questions directly arising out of it suggest themselves for consideration here.

The speech on the Mysteries.

First—Does the speech On the Mysteries give the story which he really told before the Council at Athens in 415? In that speech, he represents himself as having stated that the mutilation of the Hermae had been proposed by Euphiletos at a convivial meeting of their club; that he had strenuously opposed it; and that, while he was confined to his house by illness, Euphiletos had seized the opportunity of executing the scheme, telling the others that Andokides had become favourable to it. Now it is a suspicious fact that in the speech On his Return, spoken in 410—that is, eleven years before the speech On the Mysteries—Andokides distinctly pleads guilty to certain offences committed in 415, and excuses them by his youth, his folly, his madness at the time De Red. §§ 7, 25.. It is suspicious, also, that not merely the author of the speech against him[Lys.] in Andok. §§ 36, 51., but also Thucydides in terms which can hardly be explained awayThuc. VI. 60 καὶ ὁ μὲν αὐτός τε καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλων μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν. Bishop Thirlwall thinks that this need not mean more than that Andokides confessed privity to the fact (Hist. Gr. vol. III. Appendix III. p. 500). But the words would naturally mean that he confessed participation in the fact. And so Mr Grote understands them, vol. VII. p. 279., and Plutarch still more explicitlyPlut. Alk. 21 οὗτος ( Τίμαιος) ἀναπείθει τὸν Ἀνδοκίδην ἑαυτοῦ κατήγορον καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων γενέσθαι μὴ πολλῶν ... ὁ Ἀνδοκίδης ἐπείσθη καὶ γενόμενος μηνυτὴς καθ’ αὑτοῦ καὶ καθ’ ἑτέρων ἔσχε τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἄδειαν αὐτός· οὓς δ’ ὠνόμασε, κ.τ.λ. , represent him as having accused himself along with the rest. It can hardly be doubted that, in 415, he told the Council that the mutilation of the Hermae had been a mad freak committed by the club of young men to which he belonged, and by himself among the number. Probably he felt that it would be useless to make a reservation of his own innocence. No one would believe him; and at the same time it would seriously damage the plausibility of his alleged acquaintance with the plans of the conspirators. It is very likely, however, that he did make excuses for himself, such as that his active part in the affair had been small, or that he had been drawn into it against his will, or in a moment of excitement. At the distance of sixteen years such excuses might easily grow into a denial of his having been concerned at all.

It is a further question whether, supposing that the story which he told at the time inculpated himself, this story was true. Was he really guilty? It ought to be remembered that the eighth book of Thucydides was probably written before the speech On the Mysteries had been delivered, or the exiles of 415 had returned; and that, therefore, we have perhaps larger materials than Thucydides himself had for forming a judgment on an affair which (as he says) had never been cleared upThuc. VI. 60.. Great weight ought surely to be allowed to the circumstance that the Hermes before the house of Andokides was one of the very fewThe only one—μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν, according to Andokides himself, de Myst. § 62. But Plut. Alk. 21 says ἐν ὀλίγοις πάνυ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν μόνος σχεδὸν ἀκέραιος ἔμεινε: and Thuc. VI. 27 says only οἱ πλεῖστοι περιεκόπησαν. which had not been mutilated. The explanation of this given by Andokides himself in 399 is at least plausible. Euphiletos, he says, had told the other conspirators that Andokides had himself undertaken the mutilation of this particular image; and so it escaped, Andokides being ill and ignorant of the whole matter. Now if Euphiletos had a spite against Andokides for having condemned his proposal, he could not, in fact, have taken a more effectual revenge. The sparing of this Hermes was just the circumstance, which, in the event, turned suspicion most strongly upon Andokides. Had he been out himself that night and engaged in the sacrilege, he could scarcely have failed to think of a danger so evident, and would have taken care that his own house should not be marked out by its immunity. If the number of mutilators was as small as he states, the neglect of such a precaution is altogether inconceivable. The conjecture to which we should incline is that the Hermae were mutilated by the small club of young men to which Andokides belonged, but that, for some reason or other, he had no hand in it; that, however, when he gave his evidence at the time, he accused himself of having been actively concerned, thinking that otherwise the rest of his story would be disbelieved. It would follow that the version of the matter given in his speech On the Mysteries is, on the whole, true in itself, but is untrue as a representation of what he stated in 415.

Life of Andokides from 415 to 402.

The second chapter in the life of Andokides covers the years from 415 to 402. It is the history of his exile.

On leaving Athens in 415 he appears to have adopted a merchant's life. Archelaos, king of Macedonia, a friend of his family, gave him the right of cutting timber and exporting it Andok. de Red. § 11. Cf. Theophr. Char. XXIII., where the ἀλαζών boasts of having received, as a special honour from Antipatros, the ἐξαγωγὴ ξύλων ἀτελής.. In Cyprus, according to the author of the speech against him, he was imprisoned by the king of Citium on account of some treachery[Lys.] in Andok. § 26.; a story from which it would be unsafe to infer more than that Andokides had visited the island. When, after the Sicilian disaster, Samos became the headquarters of the Athenian fleet, he endeavoured to conciliate his countrymen there by supplies of corn and cargoes of oar-spars and of bronze, which his mercantile connexion enabled him to get for them at a cheap rate De Red. § 11.. In the spring of 411 he made His first return to Athens. his first attempt to re-establish himself at Athens. He was unaware, at the moment of his return, that the revolution of the Four Hundred had taken place. The hatred of the oligarchical clubs, incurred by his denunciation of his own associates, and the enmity of Peisandros, whose desire to keep up a panic had been thwarted by his reassuring disclosures, would have been enough to have prevented him from expecting any other reception than that which he actually experiencedHe says (de Red. § 13) κατέπλευσα ὡς ἐπαινεθησόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνθάδε: and he would hardly have expected the ‘praise’ of the Four Hundred for having ministered to the army at Samos. Earlier in the narrative, indeed, (§ 11) he says that he brought the supplies to Samos ‘when the Four Hundred had already seized the government;’ but this is a way of fixing the date. It does not follow that the tidings from Athens had then reached Samos.. He was instantly denounced to the Council by Peisandros for supplying oars to the hostile democracy at Samos, and was thrown into prison De Red. § 15.. Released by the downfall of the oligarchy, he again visited Cyprus,—where, according to his accuser he was once more imprisoned ‘for a misdeed’—this time by Evagoras king of Salamis[Lys.] in Andok. § 28.; but we may hesitate whether to recognise here the monotony of fate or of invention.

In Cyprus Andokides found a new opportunity to serve the interests of Athens. The loss of her power in the Propontis had cut off her corn-trade with the Euxine; and Andokides procured the despatch of corn-ships from Cyprus to the Peiraeus. His second return to Athens. It must have been in the spring or summer of 410, before the results of the victory at Kyzikos had removed all fear of famineFor a discussion of the date of the speech On his Return, see Chap. VI., that Andokides was again at Athens, and in a speech in the ekklesia pleaded for the removal of the disabilities under which the decree of Isotimides was held to have placed him. He expresses penitence for his errors in 415; and lays stress upon certain information which he had given to the Senate, as well as upon his services in procuring a supply of corn De Red. §§ 19 ff.. His application was rejected; and for the third time he went into exile. During the next eight years he is said to have visited Sicily, Italy, the Peloponnesus, Thessaly, the Hellespont, Ionia and Cyprus[Lys] in Andok § 6.. In Cyprus he had received, perhaps from Evagoras, a grant of landIn De Myst. § 4 he supposes his enemies saying of him—ἔστι πλεύσαντι εἰς Κύπρον, ὅθενπερ ἥκει, γῆ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ διδομένη καὶ δωρεὰ ὑπάρχουσα.; and the fortune which afterwards enabled him to discharge costly offices at Athens, although his patrimony had been wreckedib § 144., appears to show that he had been active and successful as a merchant.

Andokides readmitted to citizenship

The general amnesty of 403 at last gave him the opportunity which he had so long sought in vain. He returned to Athens from Cyprusib. § 4., probably about the beginning of 402The contest between the exiles at the Peiraeus and the town party was not finally concluded till Boedromion (Sept. — Oct.) 403 B. C. See Clinton, F. H. At the time when the amnesty was sworn, Andokides was absent from Athens: [Lys] in Andok. § 39. It seems safe, then, to conclude that he did not return to Athens before the early part of 402.; and for three years was not only unmolested, but was readmitted to the employments and honours of an active citizen. He was a choregus, and dedicated in the Street of Tripods the prize which he had won with a cyclic chorus [Plut.] Vit. Andok. ; he was gymnasiarch at the Hephaestia—head of sacred missions to the Isthmian and Olympian games—and steward of the sacred treasure De Myst. § 132.; he is heard of as speaking in the Senate and preferring accusations in the law-courts[Lys] in Andok § 33 παρασκευάζεται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν καὶ ἤδη δημηγορεῖ. Cf. ib. § 11, where mention is made of a γραφὴ ἀσεβείας brought by Andokides against one Archippos.. At length, in 399Three years after his return to Athens: de Myst. § 132. The date 399 is confirmed by another consideration. In de Myst. § 132 the offices which he had held are enumerated in apparently chronological order:—πρῶτον μὲν γυμνασίαρχον Ἡφαιστίοις, ἔπειτα ἀρχιθεωρὸν εἰς Ἰσθμὸν καὶ Ὀλυμπίαζε, εἶτα δὲ ταμίαν ἐν πόλει τῶν ἱερῶν χρήματων. Now the Olympic festival at which he was ἀρχιθεωρός must have been that of Ol. 95. 1, 400 B.C. After this architheoria he had been tamias; but clearly was so no longer at the time when the speech On the Mysteries was spoken., the zeal of his enemies—stimulated, perhaps, by his prosperity—appears to have revived. After one attempt which seems to have been abortive[Lys.] in Andok § 30 ἀφικόμενος εἰς τὴν πόλιν δὶς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ [ἐνιαυτῷ?] ἐνδέδεικται. Neither Andokides nor his accuser say anything about the result of the earlier ἔνδειξις: probably, then, it never came to a trial., he was brought to trial, in the autumn of 399, on a charge of impiety. He had attended the Greater Mysteries at Eleusis; and his enemies contended that he had thereby violated the decree of Isotimides, by which he was excluded from all temples. Before the Eleusinian festival was overThe great Eleusinia fell in the last half of Boedromion (end of Sept. and beginning of Oct.). The ἔνδειξις was laid ταῖς εἰκάσι, τοῖς μυστηρίοις τούτοις, de Myst. § 121., an information to this effect was laid before the Archon Basileus. The accusers were Kephisios, Epichares and Meletos, supported by Kallias and Agyrrhios. The fact that Andokides was supported in court by Anytos and Kephalos De Myst. § 150., two popular public men, as well as by advocates chosen by his tribe, shows that his assiduous services to the State, and perhaps the persevering malice of his adversaries, had at last produced their effect upon the general feeling towards him. He speaks like a man tolerably confident of a verdict; and he was acquitted.

Little is known of the life of Andokides after 399. From the speech On the Mysteries it appears that he was at that time unmarried and childless De Myst. § 148.. His uncle Epilykos had died leaving two daughters, whom Andokides and Leagros, as the nearest kinsmen, had claimed in marriage before the Archon. The girl claimed by Andokides had died before the claim was heard; the other was now claimed by Kallias, who had induced Leagros to retire in his favour, and Andokides, to defeat this intrigue, had entered a counter-claim; but in 399 the case was still undecided ib. §§ 117—123.. If Andokides died without legitimate issue, his family became extinct ib. § 146..

The first reappearance of Andokides in public life is marked by the speech On the Peace with Lacedaemon, which belongs to 390, the fourth year of the Corinthian WarFrom the speech itself it appears that (1) the Boeotians had been now four years at war, § 20: (2) Lechaeum had been taken by the Lacedaemonians, § 18: (3) The Lacedaemonians are spoken of as having been already thrice victorious—at Corinth, Coronea, and Lechaeum; and nothing is said of any check which they had received: §18. The destruction of the mora by Iphikrates—so tremendous a blow to the Spartan arms—can hardly, then, have taken place. Grote puts the victory of Iphikrates in 390: see his note, vol. ix. p. 455, which discusses Clinton's view that it occurred in 393.Krüger places the speech of Andokides in 393: Grote and Kirchner in 391; but the data above mentioned seem in favour of 390: which is the year for which Blass decides (Att. Bereds. pp. 282f.).. Athens, Boeotia, Corinth and Argos were at this time allied against Sparta. The success of Agesilaos in 391 had led the Athenians, probably in the winter of 391—90, to send plenipotentiaries, among whom was Andokides, to treat for peace at Sparta. According to the terms proposed by the Lacedaemonians, Athens was to retain her Long Walls—rebuilt three years before by Konon —and her fleet; she was also to recover Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros: and Boeotia was to be gratified by the withdrawal of the Spartan garrison from Orchomenos. The plenipotentiaries did not use their powers, but requested that the Athenian ekklesia might have forty days in which to consider these proposals; and returned, accompanied by Spartan envoys, to AthensXenophon and Diodoros say nothing about such an embassy from Sparta to Athens. But, according to the author of the Argument to the Speech, Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ἐλθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ Λακεδαιμονίας καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου. Philochoros, writing circ. 300—260 B.C., is a trustworthy witness for the fact of the embassy.. It was in the ensuing debate —early in the year 390—that the speech of Andokides was made.

This, his only recorded utterance on a public question, is temperate and sensible. He points out that it is idle to wait either for the prospect of crushing Sparta in war, or for the prospect of recovering by diplomacy all the possessions abroad which Athens had lost in 405; her ships and walls are now, as they always were, her true strength, and she ought to accept thankfully the secured possession of these. The soundness of this view was proved in the sequel. By the Peace of Antalkidas three years later Athens got only what she was offered in 390; and she got it, not by treaty on equal terms with a Hellenic power, but as part of the price paid by the Persian king for the disgraceful surrender of Asiatic Hellas. The advice of Andokides probably lost something of its effect through the suspicion of ‘laconism’ attaching to all statesmen of oligarchical antecedents; and, though he had long cast in his lot with the democracy, a certain odour of oligarchy must have clung to him still. At any rate his advice was not taken. The story that he was not only disobeyed, but banished[Plut.] Vit. Andok. πεμφθεὶς δὲ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης εἰς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ δόξας ἀδικεῖν ἔφυγε., probably represents merely the desire to add one disaster more to a history so full of repulses.

Character of Andokides.

A fair estimate of Andokides is made difficult by the fact that he was first brought into notice by a scandal, and that the memory of this scandal runs through nearly all that is known of his after-life. At the age of twenty-five he is banished for the Hermae affair; he is defeated, on the same ground, in two attempts to return; at the end of sixteen years he is brought to trial for impiety; and his acquittal is the last thing recorded about him. At that time he was only forty-one; already, since his return in 402, he had discharged public services; and now, formally acquitted of the charges which had so long hung over him, he might hope for a new career. His speech On the Peace shows that in 390 he was sufficiently trusted by his fellow-citizens to have been sent as a plenipotentiary to Sparta; and proves also, by its statesmanlike good sense, his fitness for such a trust. But, except in this speech, nothing is recorded of his later and probably brighter years. History knows him only under a cloud. It was, moreover, his misfortune that while the informations which he laid in 415 made him hateful to the oligarchs, his hereditary connexion with oligarchy exposed him to the continual suspicion of the democrats. One year he is imprisoned by the Four Hundred; the next he is repulsed by the ekklesia. It would be an easy inference that there must have been something palpably bad and false in the man to whom both parties were harsh, did not a closer view show that one party may have been influenced by spite and the other by prejudice. Many of those who believed that Andokides was concerned in the mutilation of the Hermae must have regarded him with sincere horror. But on the other hand it should be remembered that such horror is never so loudly expressed, and is never so useful to personal enmity, as at a time when a popular religion, still generally professed, is beginning to be widely disbelieved. Diagoras and Sokrates were accused of impiety with the more effect because the views ascribed to them resembled the real views of many who seemed orthodox. Besides those who hated Andokides as an informer, as an oligarch, or as an iconoclast, there were probably many who regarded him with that special kind of dislike which attaches to a person who drives the world into professing angry conviction on matters to which it is secretly indifferent. Viewed apart from the feelings which worked on his contemporaries, the facts of his life seem to warrant severe blame as little as they warrant high praise. His youthful associates were dissolute; through them he was involved, rightly or wrongly, in the suspicion of a great impiety; and this suspicion clung to him for years. But it was never proved; and when he was at last brought to trial, he was acquitted. As an exile he conferred on Athens services which, if not disinterested, were at all events valuable; after his return he discharged costly public services, and represented the State on an important mission.

To judge from his extant works he had not genius, but he was energetic and able. Hard and various experiences had sharpened his shrewdness; he had a quick insight into character, and especially the triumphant skill of a consciously unpopular man in exposing malignant motives. There was no nobleness in his nature, except such as is bred by selfreliance under long adversity; but he had practical good sense, which his merchant's life in exile must have trained and strengthened. If the counsel which he gives to Athens in his speech On the Peace with Lacedaemon may be taken as a sample of his statesmanship, he was an adviser of the kind rarest in the ekklesia; not only clearsighted in the interests of the city, but bold enough to recommend to Athenians a safe rather than a brilliant course.

Andokides: Style
Andokides not an artist

ANDOKIDES differs in one important respect from all the other Attic orators of the canon. He is not an artist. Each of the rest represents some theory, more or less definite, of eloquence as an art; and is distinguished, not merely by a faculty, but by certain technical merits, the result of labour directed to certain points in accordance with that theory. Among these experts Andokides is an amateur. In the course of an eventful life he spoke with ability and success on some occasions of great moment and great difficulty. But he brought to these efforts the minimum of rhetorical training. He relied almost wholly on his native wit and on a rough, but shrewd, knowledge of men.

This accounts for the comparatively slight attention paid to Andokides by the ancient rhetoricians and critics. Dionysios mentions him only twice; once, where he remarks that Thucydides used a peculiar dialect, which is not employed by ‘Andokides, Antiphon, or Lysias Dionys. de Thuc. c. 51.;’ again, where he says that Lysias is the standard for contemporary Attic, ‘as may be judged from the speeches of Andokides, Kritias and many others de Lys. c. 2..’ Both these notices recognise Andokides as an authority for the idiom of his own day; and it is evident that he had a philological interest for the critic. On the other hand it is clear that Dionysios discovered in him no striking power; for Andokides does not occur in his long list of men foremost in the various departments of oratory de Isaeo cc. 19 ff.. Quintilian names him only in one slighting allusion. Who, he asks, is to be our model of Attic eloquence? ‘Let it be Lysias; for his is the style in which the lovers of ‘Atticism’ delight. At this rate we shall not be sent back all the way to Andokides and KokkosQuint. XII. 10. § 21. Nam quis erit hic Atticus? Sit Lysias; hunc enim amplectuntur amatores istius nominis modum. Non igitur iam usque ad Coccum et Andocidem remittemur..’ It has been thought that Quintilian refers to the Kokkos mentioned by Suidas as a pupil of Isokrates; but, however this may be, the context is enough to show that he means to mark, not the antiquity, but the inferiority (in his view) of the two men. When Herodes Atticus was told by his Greek admirers that he deserved to be numbered with the Attic Ten, he turned off the compliment, with an adroitness which his biographer commends, by saying—‘At all events I am better than AndokidesPhilostratos, Vit. Her. Att. II. 1. § 14, p. 564 ed. Kayser. βοώσης δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ καλούσης αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν δέκα, οὐχ ἡττήθη τοῦ ἐπαἱνου, μεγάλου δοκοῦντος, ἀλλ’ ἀστειότατα πρὸς τοὺς ἐπαινέσαντας, Ἀνδοκίδου μὲν, ἔφη, βελτίων εἰμί..’ More definite censure is expressed in the compact criticism of Hermogenes:—

‘Andokides aims at being a political orator, but does not quite achieve it. His figures want clear articulation; his arrangement is not lucid; he constantly tacks on clause to clause, or amplifies in an irregular fashion, using parentheses to the loss of a distinct order. On these accounts he has seemed to some a frivolous and generally obscure speaker. Of finish and ornament his share is small; he is equally deficient in fiery earnestness. Again, he has little, or rather very little, of that oratorical power which is shown in method; general oratorical power he has almost noneHermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν B. c. XI. (vol. II. p. 416 Spengel Rhet. Gr.):— ὁ δὲ Ἀνδοκίδης πολιτικὸς μὲν εἶναι προαιρεῖται, οὐ μὴν πάνυ γε ἐπιτυγχάνει τούτου· ἀδιάρθρωτος γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ἀδιευκρίνητος καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπισυνάπτει τε καὶ περιβάλλει ἀτάκτως διὰ τὸ ταῖς ἐπεμβολαῖς χωρὶς εὐκρινείας χρῆσθαι, ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι φλύαρος καὶ ἄλλως ἀσαφὴς εἶναι· ἐπιμελείας δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ κόσμου πάνυ βραχὺ μέτεστι, γοργότητός τε ὡσαύτως. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς κατὰ μέθοδον δεινότητος ὀλίγον ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα ὀλίγον ἔχει, τῆς δ’ ἄλλης σχεδὸν οὐδ’ ὅλως. .’

The phrase ‘political oratory’ as used by Hermogenes has two senses, a larger and a narrower. In the larger sense it denotes all public speaking as opposed to scholastic declamation, and comprises the deliberative, the forensic, the panegyric styles. In the narrower sense it denotes practical oratory, deliberative or forensic, as opposed not only to scholastic declamation but also to that species of panegyric speaking in which no definite political question is discussedFor the larger sense, see περὶ ἰδεῶν B. c. X. περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου: in which chapter he says, τούτου δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ὁ μέν ἐστι συμβουλευτικὸς ὁ δὲ δικανικὸς ὁ δὲ πανηγυρικός. For the narrower sense, see c. XI. περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς πολιτικοῦ λόγου: and c. XII. περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς πανηγυρικοῦ. It is in the narrower sense—that is, as including deliberative and forensic speaking only, and excluding all epideiktic speaking, on whatever subject—that πολιτικὸς λόγος is generally used: see e.g. the Πητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, c. I. (Spengel), δύο γένη τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσὶ λόγων, τὸ μὲν δημηγορικὸν τὸ δὲ δικανικόν. Cf. Isok. κατὰ σοφ. § 19.. Here, the narrower sense is intended. When Hermogenes says that Andokides does not succeed in being a ‘political’ speaker, he means that Andokides does not exhibit—for instance, in the speech On his Return and in the speech On the Peace—the characteristic excellences of deliberative speaking; nor—for instance in the speech On the Mysteries—the characteristic excellences of forensic speaking. What Hermogenes took these excellences to be, he explains at length in another place; the chief of them are these three;—clearness; the stamp of truth; fiery earnestnessSee περὶ ἰδ. B. c. X. passim: esp. ad init. φημὶ τοίνυν δεῖν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγῳ πλεονάζειν μὲν ἀεὶ τόν τε τὴν σαφήνειαν ποιοῦντα τύπον καὶ τὸν ἠθικόν τε καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ μετὰ τούτους τὸν γοργόν ..

The first and general remark of Hermogenes upon Andokides implies, then, that he is wanting in these qualities. The special remarks which follow develop it. They refer partly to his arrangement of subject-matter, partly to his style of diction. He is said to have little ‘power’ (or ‘cleverness’) ‘of method’; that is, little tact in seeing where, and how, each topic should be brought inThe distinction drawn by Hermogenes in his criticism upon Andokides between ἡ κατὰ μέθοδον δεινότης and what he calls ἡ ἄλλη δεινότης is explained by his own writings. His treatise Περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος discusses the proper occasion (καιρὸς ἴδιος c. I.) for using the various figures and arts of rhetoric. It is a treatise upon Rhetorical Tact. By ἡ ἄλλη δεινότης he means simply what he speaks of in περὶ ἰδ. B. c. XI., περὶ δεινότητος:—oratorical power in the largest and most general sense, including all particular excellences whatsoever.; he ‘amplifies περιβάλλει. Hermogenes uses the terms περιβολή, περιβάλλξιν in a special technical sense, for which it is difficult to find any precise English equivalent. ‘Amplification’ perhaps comes nearest. There are two sorts of περιβολή: (1) κατ’ ἔννοιαν—when some special statement is prefaced by a general statement: e.g. πονηρὸν ὁ συκαφάντης ἀεί· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ φύσει κίναδος τἀνθρώπιόν ἐστι: (2) κατὰ λέξιν, when a fact is related with all its attendant circumstances: e.g. ὑπεσχόμην χορηγήσειν· πότε; τρίτον ἔτος τουτί· ποῦ; ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. διὰ τί; οὐ καθεστηκότος χορηγοῦ, κ.τ.λ. See Herm. περὶ ἰδ. A. c. XI.’ unnecessarily, by detailing circumstances unnecessary for his point; he obscures the order of his ideas by frequent parentheses, or by adding, as an afterthought, something which ought to have come earlier. As regards diction, in the first place his ‘figures’ are said to be ‘wanting in clear articulation’ (ἀδιάρθρωτα). Hermogenes elsewhereHermog. περὶ εὑρέσεων Δ.— Ch. I. is περὶ λόγου σχημάτων in genera: cc. II.—XIV. discuss the several σχήματα. enumerates thirteen ‘figures’ of rhetoric, which are either certain fixed modes of framing sentences, such as the antithesis and the period; or (in the phrase of Caecilius) ‘figures of thought,’ such as irony and dilemmaSee supra, p. 29.. Hermogenes means that Andokides does not use ‘figures’ of either sort with precision; he does not work them out to an incisive distinctness; he leaves them ‘inarticulate’—still in the rough, and with their outlines dull. Again Andokides has little ‘finish’ (ἐπιμέλεια)—a term by which his critic means refinement and smoothness in compositionSee the chapter περὶ ἐπιμελείας καὶ κάλλους, Hermog. περὶ ἰδ. A. c. XII, where he opposes κάλλος τι καὶ εὐρυθμία to τὸ ἀμελὲς καὶ ἄρρυθμον: and observes, πλεῖον δέ τι τῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τοῦ κάλλους ἔχουσιν αἱ μικραὶ τῶν λέξεων καὶ δἰ ὀλίγων συγκείμεναι συλλαβῶν· οἷον, περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἀκούειν ὑμᾶς ἐμοῦ δεῖ (from Dem. de Coron. § 2). So the use of short, simple words may be a mark of ἐπιμέλεια—showing how the notion of refinement comes into it.. Lastly, Andokides is said to be wanting in ‘fiery earnestness.’ The word γοργότης, which we have attempted thus to paraphrase, plays a very important point in the rhetorical terminology of Hermogenes: it describes one of the three cardinal excellences of ‘political’ oratory περὶ ἰδ. B. c. X. ad init.. Perhaps no simple English equivalent can be found for it. But Hermogenes has explained clearly what he means by it. He means earnest feeling, especially indignation, uttered in terse, intense, sometimes abrupt language. It is to a strong and noble emotion what ‘keenness’ (ὀξύτης) and ‘tartness’ (δριμύτης) are to a lower kind of eagerness. The lofty invectives of Demosthenes against Philip supply Hermogenes with his best examples of itSee the chapter περὶ γοργότητος (περὶ ἰδ. B. c. I.). He there says that γοργότης is the opposite of slackness and languor (τὸ ἀνειμένον καὶ ὕπτιον):—that it usually expresses itself in the trenchant style (διὰ τοῦ τμητικοῦ γίνεταιτύπου). He cites as examples of γοργότης the opening of the Third Philippic: also de Coron. § 10, ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ πρῶτος: κ.τ.λ., and several other passages from the same speech; de falsa Legat. § 24, τί γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενοι κ.τ.λ. .

We have now seen the worst that can be said of Andokides from the point of view of the technical Rhetoric; and it must be allowed that, from that point of view, the condemnation is tolerably complete. Now the canon of the Ten Attic Orators was probably drawn up at the time when scholastic rhetoric was most flourishing, and when, therefore, the standard of criticism used by Hermogenes and Herodes was the common one. It may seem surprising, then, that Andokides was numbered in the decad at all. Kritias, his contemporary, whom so many ancient writers praise highly, might be supposed to have had stronger claims; and the fact that the memory of Kritias as a statesman was hateful, is not enough in itself to explain his exclusion from a literary groupK. O. Müller says (Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XXXIII. Vol. II. p. 115 n., ed. Donaldson) ‘It is surprising that Kritias was not rather enrolled among the Ten; but perhaps his having been one of the Thirty stood in his way.’. Probably one reason, at least, for the preference given to Andokides was the great interest of the subjects upon which he spoke. The speech on the Mysteries, supplying, as it does, the picturesque details of a memorable event, had an intrinsic value quite apart from its merits as a composition. The speech On the Peace with Lacedaemon, again, gives a clear picture of a crisis in the Corinthian War; and is an illustration, almost unique in its way, of Athenian history at the time just after the rebuilding of the walls by Konon, when, for the first time since Aegospotami, Athenian visions of empire were beginning to revive. As Lykurgos seems to have owed his place among the Ten chiefly to his prominence as a patriot, so Andokides may have been recommended partly by his worth as an indirect historian. Again, Dionysios, as we have seen, recognised at least the philological value of Andokides. It is further possible that even rhetoricians of the schools may have found him interesting as an example of merely natural eloquence coming between two opposite styles of art; between the formal grandeur of Antiphon and the studied ease of Lysias.

General tendency of ancient criticism upon oratory: unjust to Andokides.

It is a result of the precision with which the art of rhetoric was systematized in the Greek and Roman schools that much of the ancient criticism upon oratory is tainted by a radical vice. The ancient critics too often confound literary merit with oratorical merit. They judge too much from the standpoint of the reader, and too little from the standpoint of the hearer. They analyse special features of language and of method; they determine with nicety the rank of each man as a composer; but they too often forget that, for the just estimation of his rank as a speaker, the first thing necessary is an effort of imaginative sympathy. We must not merely analyse his style; we must try to realise the effect which some one of his speeches, as a whole, would have made on a given audience in given circumstances. As nearly all the great orators of antiquity had been trained in the rudiments of the technical rhetoric, the judgment upon their relative merits is not, as a rule, much disturbed by this tendency in their critics. It may often, indeed, be felt that the judgment, however fair in itself, is based too much upon literary grounds. But, in most cases, so far as we can judge, no great injustice is done. Criticism of this kind may, however, happen to be unjust; and it has certainly been unjust in the case of Andokides. Others far excel him in finish of style, in clearness of arrangement, in force and in fire; but no one can read the speech On the Mysteries (for instance) without feeling that Andokides was a real orator. The striking thing in that speech is a certain undefinable tone which assures even the modern reader that Andokides was saying the right things to the judges, and knew himself to be saying the right things. He is, in places, obscure or diffuse; he sometimes wanders from the issue, once or twice into trivial gossip; but throughout there is this glow of a conscious sympathy with his hearers. He may not absolutely satisfy the critics; but he was persuading, and he felt with triumph that he was persuading, the judges.

Four epithets given to the style of Andokides by the author of the Plutarchic Life.

It is somewhat difficult to analyse the style of a speaker whose real strength lay in a natural vigour directed by a rough tact; and who, in comparison with other Greek orators, cared little for literary form. An attempt at such an analysis may, however, start from the four epithets given to Andokides in the Plutarchic Life[Plut.] vit. Andok. § 15, ἔστι δὲ ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀκατάσκευος ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀφελής τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος.. He is there said to be ‘simple’ (ἁπλοῦς); ‘inartificial in arrangement’ (ἀκατάσκευος); ‘plain’ (ἀφελής); and ‘sparing of figures’ (ἀσχημάτιστος). The first two epithets apparently refer to the order in which his thoughts are marshalled; the last two, to the manner in which they are expressed. We will first speak of the latter, and then come back to the former.The diction of Andokides is ‘plain’ (ἀφελής).

The sense in which the diction of Andokides is ‘plain’ will be best understood by a comparison with Antiphon and Lysias. Antiphon consciously strives to rise above the language of daily life; he seeks to impress by a display of art. Lysias carefully confines himself to the language of daily life; he seeks to persuade by the use of hidden art. Andokides usually employs the language of daily life; he is free, or almost free, from the archaisms of Antiphon, and writes in the new-Attic dialect, the dialect of Lysias and his successorsAs exceptions may be noted the frequent use of the formula τοῦτο μέν.. τοῦτο δέ (e. g. de Myst. § 103: de Red. § 16: de Pace § 40): and of the dative οἱ—avoided, as a rule, by the other orators: eg. de Myst. §§ 15, 38, 40, 41, 42, etc.. On the other hand, he does not confine himself to a rigid simplicity. In his warmer or more vigorous passages, especially of invective or of intreaty, he often employs phrases or expressions borrowed from the idiom of Tragedy E.g. De Myst. § 29, οἱ λόγοι τῶν κατηγόρων ταῦτα τὰ δεινὰ καὶ φρικώδη ἀνωρθίαζον: (cf. Aesch. Choeph. 271, ἐξορθιάζων πολλά .) Ib. § 67, πίστιν τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀπιστοτάτην. Ib. § 68, ὁρῶσι τοῦ ὴλίου τὸ φῶς—a phrase which, however, occurs also in the fragment of the speech of Lykurgos against Lysikles. Ib. § 99, ὦ συκοφάντα καὶ ἐπίτριπτον κίναδος: (cf. Soph. Ai. 104, τοὐπίτριπτον κίναδος .) Ib. § 146 (γένος ) οἴχεται πᾶν πρόρριζον: (cf. Soph. El. 765 πρόρριζον...ἔφθαρται γένος .) De Pace, § 34, εἰρήνης πέρι: cf. Arist. Poet. c. 22, where the collocation Ἀχίλλεως πέρι instead of περὶ Ἀχίλλεως is specially instanced as a violation of the idiom ( διάλεκτος) of ordinary life. Add to these examples the use of the poetical φρενῶν in De Red. § 7, τοιαύτην συμφορὰν τῶν φρενῶν: which, however, occurs also in the peroration of Demosth. de Corona, § 324, τούτοις βελτίω τινὰ νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε. Both instances, perhaps, come under the principle of Aristotle ( Rhet. III. 7. § 11) that unusual or poetical words μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς. The writer of the speech κατ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου has imitated the tragic vein which appears in the genuine speeches of Andokides: § 22, παρανομώτερος Αἰγίσθου γέγονεν. Cf. § 23.. These, being of too decidedly poetical a colour, have a tawdry effect; yet it is evident that they have come straight from the memory to the lips; they are quite unlike prepared fine things; and they remind us, in fact, how really natural a speaker was Andokides,—neither aiming, as a rule, at ornament, nor avoiding it on principle when it came to him. The ‘plainness’ of Lysias is an even, subtle, concise plainness, so scrupulous to imitate nature that nature is never suffered to break out; the ‘plainness’ of Andokides is that of a man who, with little rhetorical or literary culture, followed chiefly his own instinct in speaking. Lysias had at his command all the resources of technical rhetoric, but so used them towards producing a sober, uniform effect that his art is scarcely felt at any particular point; it is felt only in the impression made by the whole. Andokides had few of such resources. As his and sparing of figures (ἀσχημάτιστος.) biographer says, he is ‘sparing of figures.’ Here the distinction already noticed between ‘figures of language’ and ‘figures of thought’ must be kept in mind. Andokides uses scarcely at all the ‘figures of language’: that is, he seldom employs antitheses —aims at parallelism between the forms of two sentences—or studies the niceties of assonanceIn technical language, he seldom attempts, (1) ἀντίθεσις, the opposition of words, or of ideas, or of both, in the two corresponding clauses of a sentence: (2) παρίσωσις, a general correspondencc between the forms of two sentences or clauses: (3) παρομοίωσις, correspondence of sound between words in the same sentence. See on these, Mr Sandys's ed. of Isokr. Ad Demonicum, and Panegyricus, p xiv. One special form of παρομοίωσις, viz. ὁμοιοτέλευτον, occurs e.g. in Andok. De Pace, § 2, διά τε τὴν ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἕργου διά τε τὴν ἐκείνων ἀπιστίαν: another special form, viz. παρήχησις, e.g. in De Red. § 24, εἰ γὰρ ὅσα οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῇ γνώμῃ ἁμαρτάνουσι, τὸ σῶμα αὐτῶν μὴ αἴτιόν ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.: where there is a general resemblance of sound between γνώμη and σῶμα. But such artifices, so common in the other orators, are rare and exceptional in Andokides.. His neglect of such refinements—which, in his day, constituted the essence of oratorical art, and which must have been more or less cultivated by nearly all public speakers—has one noticeable effect on his composition. There is no necessary connection between an antithetical and a periodic style. But, in the time of Andokides, almost the only period in use was that which is formed by the antithesis or parallelism of clauses. Hence, since he rarely uses antitheses or parallelisms, Andokides composes far less in a periodic style than Thucydides or Antiphon or even Lysias. His sentences, in the absence of that framework, are constantly sprawling to a clumsy length; they are confused by parentheses, or deformed by supplementary clauses, till the main thread of the sense is often almost lostSee e g. De Myst. § 57: εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον ἑλέσθαι, ἢ καλῶς ἀπολέσθαι ἢ αἰσχρῶς σωθῆναι, ἔχοι ἄν τις εἰπεῖν κακίαν εἶναι τὰ γενόμενα· | καίτοι πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ τοῦτοεἵλοντο, τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν· | ὅπου δὲ τούτων τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ἦν, | σιωπήσαντι μὲν αὐτῷ τε αἴσχιστα ἀπολέσθαι μηδὲν ἀσεβήσαντι, ἔτι δὲ τὸν πατέρα περιιδεῖν ἀπολόμενον καὶ τὸν κηδεστὴν καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ ἀνεψιοὺς τοσούτους, οὓς οὐδεὶς ἀπώλλυεν ἢ ἐγὼ μὴ εἰπὼν ὡς ἕτεροι ἥμαρτον· | Διοκλείδης μὲν γὰρ ψευσάμενος ἔδησεν αὐτούς, σωτηρία δὲ αὐτῶν ἄλλη οὐδεμία ἦν ἢ πυθέσθαι Ἀθηναίους πάντα τὰ πραχθέντα· | φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγιγνόμην ἐγὼ μὴ εἰπὼν ὑμῖν ἃ ἥκουσα.Here the parenthesis, καίτοι πολλοί...τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν, first of all disturbs the original plan of the antithesis; this plan is resumed by the words ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ἦν: but then the speaker goes off into a new antithesis, σιωπήσαντι μέν, κ.τ.λ., which is never completed; for the clause οὓς οὐδεὶς ἀπώλλυεν ἢ ἐγώ, κ.τ.λ. leads to a new parenthesis in explanation, Διοκλείδης μὲν γάρ...τὰ πραχθέντα: and the final clause, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγιγνόμην, κ.τ.λ., is a conclusion drawn from this parenthesis, not the proper completion of that second member of the original antithesis which the words ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἐναντιώτατον ἦν commenced.This is a strong example; but it is typical of the perplexity in which many passages of Andokides are involved through the same cause— imperfect or careless structure of antithesis.. But while he thus dispenses with the ornamental ‘figures of language,’ Andokides uses largely those so-called ‘figures of thought’ which give life to a speech;—irony—indignant question, and the likeAmong the minor σχήματα διανοίας used by Andokides, asyndeton is one of the most frequent. It often adds life and vigour to his style: see e.g. De Myst. § 16:—τρίτη μήνυσις ἐγένετο. ἡ γυνὴ Ἀλκμαιονίδου, γενομένη δὲ καὶ Δάμωνος—Ἀγαρίστη ὄνομα αὐτῇ—αὕτη ἐμήνυσεν, κ.τ.λ.: cf. §§ 33, 115, 127. He also uses the figure called ἀναφορά—i.e. the emphatic repetition of a word at the beginning of successive clauses: and ὑποφορά—the ‘suggestion’ of some argument or objection which is then refuted. In De Myst. § 148, ἀναφορά and ὑποφορά occur together:—τίνα γὰρ καὶ ἀναβιβάσομαι δεησόμενον ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ; τὸν πατέρα; ἀλλὰ τέθνηκεν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀδελφούς; ἀλλ’ οὐκ εἰσίν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς παῖδας; ἀλλ’ οὔπω γεγένηνται. ὑμεῖς τοίνυν καὶ ἀντὶ πατρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἀντὶ παίδων γένεσθε· εἰς ὑμᾶς καταφεύγω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ καὶ ἱκετεύω· ὑμεῖς με παρ’ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν αἰτησάμενοι σώσατε.. This animation is indeed one of the points which most distinguish his style from the ordinary style of Antiphon, and which best mark his relative modernism.The method of Andokides is simple (ἀπλοῦς) and inartificial (ἀκατάσκευος.)

As Andokides is ‘plain’ in diction and avoids ornamental figures, so he is also ‘simple’ in treatment of subject-matter, and avoids an artificial arrangementAs he is ἀφελής and ἀσχημάτιστος, so he is also ἁπλοῦς and ἀκατάσκευος. The word ἀκατάσκευος is, indeed, often closely synonymous with ἀφελής and ἁπλοῦς: e.g. Dionys. Isae. c. 7, ἀκατάσκευον φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ ὡς ἂν ἰδιώτης τις εἰπεῖν δύναιτο τὸ εἰρημένον: cf. Ernesti Lex. Tech. Gr. Rhet. s.v., who quotes from Menander διαιρ. ἐπιδ. p. 624, εἶδος ἀπαγγελίας ἁπλοῦν ἀφελὲς καὶ ἀκατάσκευον. But in one or two places the usage of Dionysios seems to confirm the view that the author of the Plutarchic Life of Andokides meant ἁπλοῦς and ἀκατάσκευος to refer mainly to arrangement of subject-matter, as the other two epithets refer mainly to diction. Contrasting the method of Lysias with the method of Isaeos, Dionysios says (Isae. c. 3): παρὰ Λυσίᾳ μὲν οὐ πολλὴν τὴν ἐπιτέχνησιν οὔτ’ ἐν μερισμοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτ’ ἐν τῇ τάξει τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων οὔτ’ ἐν ταῖς ἐξεργασίαις αὐτῶν (τις ) ὄψεται· ἁπλοῦς γὰρ ὁ ἀνήρ. Again, he says (ib.) that Isaeos ‘in proportion as he falls short of the other's grace, excels him in cleverness of artificial arrangement’— ὅσον ἀπολείπεται τῆς χάριτος ἐκείνης, τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχη τῇ δεινότητι τῆς κατασκευῆς. In the essay of Dionysios on Thucydides, again, (c. 27) τὸ φορτικὸν τῆς λέξεως καὶ σκολιὸν καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητον are opposed to τὸ ἀγενὲς καὶ χαμαιπετὲς καὶ ἀκατάσκευον.. His two speeches before the ekklesia— that On his Return and that On the Peace—shew, indeed, no distinct or systematic partition. In his speech On the Mysteries he follows, with one difference, the arrangement usually observed by Antiphon and more strictly by Lysias. There is a proem, followed by a short prothesis or general statement of the case; then narrative and argument; lastly epilogueProem, §§ 1—7: prothesis, §§ 8—10: narrative and argument, §§ 11—139: epilogue, §§ 140—150.. But the narrative as a whole is not kept distinct from the argument as a whole. Each section of the narrative is followed by the corresponding section of the argument. Dionysios notices such interfusion as a special mark of art in IsaeosDionys. Isae. § 14: τοτὲ δὲ μερίσας αὐτὰς (τὰς διηγήσεις) εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια, καὶ παρ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὰς πίστεις παρατιθείς, ἐκμηκύνει τε μᾶλλον καὶ ἐκβαίνει τὸ τῆς διηγήσεως σχῆμα, τῷ συμφέροντι χρώμενος: ‘sometimes he divides his statement under heads; and, presenting the proofs under the several heads, adds somewhat to the length of the narrative, while he departs, as may be expedient, from its strict form.’. In Andokides it is rather a mark of artlessness. He had a long story to tell, and was unable, or did not try, to tell it concisely. The very length of his narrative compelled him to break it up into pieces and to comment upon each piece separately. He has not effected this without some loss of clearness, and one division of the speech is thoroughly confused§§ 92—150.. But it should be remembered that a defective ordering of topics, though a grave fault, was less serious for Andokides than it would have been for a speaker in a different style. The main object of Andokides was to be in sympathy with his audience—amusing them with stories, however irrelevant—putting all his arguments in the most vivid shape—and using abundant illustration. Lucid arrangement, though always important, was not of firstrate importance for him. His speeches were meant to carry hearers along with them, rather than to be read and analysed at leisure.

Andokides has little skill in the commonplaces of rhetorical argument.

But it is not merely in special features of diction or of arrangement that Andokides is seen to be no technical rhetorician. A disciple of the sophistical rhetoric learned to deal copiously and skilfully with those commonplaces of argument which would be available in almost any case. His education taught him to prefer general argument to argument from particular circumstances, unless these were especially easy to manipulate. We see this in Antiphon's First Tetralogy: it is a model exercise in making the utmost of abstract probabilities as inferred from facts which are very slightly sketched. In the speech On the Murder of Herodes the statement of the facts is hurried over, and there is no attempt at a close and searching analysis of them. But for a speaker unskilled in rhetorical commonplace the particulars of any given subject would be everything. Picturesque narration, shrewd inference from small circumstances, lively illustration of character would naturally be his chief resources. And so it is with Andokides. His strength is in narrative, as the strength of Antiphon is in argument. Andokides relies on his case, Antiphon on his science; it is only Lysias who hits the masterly mean, who makes his science the close interpreter of his case, who can both recount and analyse. But, although the narrative element in Andokides exceeds the just proportion always observed by Lysias, it is, from a Strength of Andokides in narrative. literary point of view, a great charm. The speech On the Mysteries is full of good bits of description, lively without set effort to be graphic. For instance, the scene in the prison, when Andokides was persuaded to denounce the real mutilators of the Hermae:—

‘When we had all been imprisoned in the same place; when night had come, and the gaol had been closed; there came, to one his mother, his sister to another, to another his wife and children; and there arose a piteous sound of weeping and lamentation for the troubles of the hour. Then Charmides (he was my cousin, of my own age, and had been brought up with me in our house from childhood) said to me:—‘Andokides, you see how serious our present dangers are; and though hitherto I have always shrunk from saying anything to annoy you, I am forced by our present misfortune to speak now. All your intimates and companions except us your relations have either been put to death on the charges which threaten us with destruction, or have taken to flight and pronounced themselves guilty. If you have heard anything about this affair which has occurred, speak it out, and save our lives—save yourself in the first place, then your father, whom you ought to love very dearly, then your brother-inlaw, the husband of your only sister,—your other kinsmen, too, and near friends, so many of them; and me also, who have never given you any annoyance in all my life, but am most zealous for you and for your interests, whenever anything is to be done.’ When Charmides said this, judges, and when the others besought and entreated me severally, I thought to myself,—‘most miserable and unfortunate of men, am I to see my own kinsfolk perish undeservedly—to see their lives sacrificed and their property confiscated, and in addition to this their names written up on tablets as sinners against the gods,—men who are wholly innocent of the matter,— am I to see moreover three hundred Athenians doomed to undeserved destruction and the State involved in the most serious calamities, and men nourishing suspicion against each other,—or shall I tell the Athenians just what I heard from Euphiletos himself, the real culprit De Myst. §§ 48—51. Compare, as another graphic passage, the account in §§ 38—40 of the story told by Diokleides—how he had seen by moonlight the conspirators meeting in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysos.?’

Another passage in the same speech illustrates the skill of Andokides in dramatising his narrative. He delighted to bring in persons speaking. Epichares, one of his accusers in this case, had been an agent of the Thirty Tyrants. He turns upon him.

‘Speak, slanderer, accursed knave—is this law valid or not valid? Invalid, I imagine, only for this reason,—that the operation of the laws must be dated from the archonship of Eukleides. So you live, and walk about this city, as you little deserve to do; you who, under the democracy, lived by pettifogging, and under the oligarchy—lest you should be forced to give back all the profits of that trade—became the instrument of the Thirty.

‘The truth is, judges, that as I sat here, while he accused me, and as I looked at him, I fancied myself nothing else than a prisoner at the bar of the Thirty. Had this trial been in their time, who would have been accusing me? Was not this man ready to accuse, if I had not given him money? He has done it now. And who but Charikles would have been cross-examining me? ‘Tell me, Andokides, did you go to Dekeleia, and enforce the hostile garrison on your country's soil?’—‘Not I.’—‘How then? You ravaged the territory, and plundered your fellow-citizens by land or sea?’—‘Certainly not.’ —‘And you did not serve in the enemy's fleet, or help to level the Long Walls, or to abolish the democracy?’—‘None of these things have I done.’— ‘None? Do you think, then, that you will enjoy impunity, or escape the death suffered by many others?’

‘Can you suppose, judges, that my fate, as your champion, would have been other than this, if I had References of Andokides to the early history of Attica. been caught by the Tyrants? I should have been destroyed by them, as they destroyed many others, for having done no wrong to Athens De Myst. §§ 99—102..’

The love of Andokides for narrative, wherever it can be introduced, is strikingly seen in his mode of handling his legal argument in the speech On the Mysteries. Instead of simply citing and interpreting the enactments upon which he relies, he reviews in order the events which led to the enactments being made De Myst. §§ 70—91.. The same tendency appears in his habit of drawing illustrations from the early history of Attica. These references are in many points loose and confusedRemarks on the historical references in De Myst. §§ 106—108 and in De Pace §§ 3—7 will be found in ch. VI., in connexion with these speeches respectively.. Andokides, however, is hardly a worse offender in this respect than (for instance) AeschinesSee, e.g. Aeschin. De Falsa Legat. § 172, where Miltiades is spoken of as alive after Salamis: and ib. § 174, where the 1000 talents set apart in 431 B.C. against special need (Thuc. II. 24) are represented as the total sum then in the Athenian treasury.; and has more excuse. In the time of Andokides written history was a comparatively new invention, and most men knew the events even of their grandfathers' days only from hearsay. Nor does the apparent inaccuracy of Andokides in regard to earlier history affect his authority as a witness for events with which he was contemporary. The value of his testimony for the years 415—390 is unquestioned.

Love of Andokides for gossip.

Andokides sometimes shows his taste for narrative in a special form which deserves notice. He is a master of shrewd and telling gossip. He diverges from the main thread of his argument into anecdotes which will amuse his hearers, and either directly damage the adversary, or at least strike some chord favourable to himself. A part of the speech On the Mysteries is, in fact, made up of such stories (§§ 110—136.) Speaking, for instance, of the son of his accuser Kallias, he reminds the judges that there was once a certain Hipponikos at Athens whose house was haunted by an avenging spirit—so said the children and the women: and the saying came true, for the man's son proved a very demon to him. Well, the house of Kallias is haunted by a fiend of the same kind (§§ 130—131). In this trait Andokides resembles one, and one only, of the other Greek orators: it is precisely the impudent, unscrupulous cleverness of Aeschines. There is the same shrewd perception of what will raise a laugh or a sneer; the same adroitness, unchecked by self-respect, in making a point of this kind whenever the opportunity offers; the same command of coarse but telling abuse; the same ability and resolution to follow the workings, and profit by the prejudices, of low minds. Akin to this taste for Proneness of Andokides to low comedy. gossip is a certain proneness to sink into low comedy. There is a fragment of Andokides, describing the influx of country-people into Athens in 431 B. C., which will illustrate this. It has exactly the tone of the Acharnians:—

‘Never again may we see the colliers coming in from the hills to the town—the sheep and oxen and the waggons—the poor women and old men— the labourers arming themselves! Never more may we eat wild greens and chervil μὴ γὰρ ἴδοιμέν ποτε πάλιν ἐκ τῶν ὀρέων τοὺς ἀνθρακευτὰς ἥκοντας καὶ πρόβατα καὶ βοῦς καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, καὶ γύναια καὶ πρεσβυτέρους ἄνδρας καὶ ἐργάτας ἐξοπλιζομένους· μηδὲ ἄγρια λάχανα καὶ σκάνδικας ἔτι φάγοιμεν. Quoted by Suidas, p. 3327 B, from a scholium on Ar. Acharn. 477: Sauppe, Fragm. Oratt. Gr. p. 166: Blass, Andoc. (Teubner) p. 97.!’

Summary.

In passing judgment upon Andokides, it must be allowed that he possesses neither literary merit nor properly oratorical merit which can entitle him to rank with the greatest masters of Greek rhetorical prose. His language has neither splendour nor a refined simplicity; he is not remarkably acute in argument; and, compared with his contemporaries, he is singularly without precision in the arrangement of his ideas. His extant works present no passage conceived in the highest strain of eloquence; he never rises to an impassioned earnestness. On the other hand, his naturalness, though not charming, is genuine; he has no mannerisms or affectations; and his speeches have a certain impetus, a certain confident vigour, which assure readers that they must have been still more effective for hearers. The chief value of Andokides is historical. But he has also real literary value of a certain kind: he excels in graphic description. A few of those pictures into which he has put all the force of a quick mind— the picture of Athens panicstricken by the sacrilege De Myst. §§ 43—45.—the scene of miserable perplexity in the prison De Myst. §§ 48—51.—the patriotic citizen arraigned before the Thirty Tyrants Ib. §§ 70—91.—have a vividness which no artist could easily surpass, combined with a freshness which a better artist might possibly have lostSluiter's judgment (Lectiones Andocideae, p. 3) does not show much discrimination—‘At equidem, quanquam Andocidiorationem non tribuam ratione et arte excultam et politam; subtilitatem tamen, impetum atque gravitatem illius sum admiratus. Arte Lysiae cedit, nervos plures habet et lacertos: vehemens imprimis in reprehendendo, in defendendo se gravis, ad misericordiam erga se movendam odiumque in adversarios excitandum plane compositus, in proponendis diiudicandisque argumentis subtilis et acutus, dictione purus et elegans, plenus Attici saporis: ut iure a Grammaticis in numerum sitrelatus et inter decem collocatus principes.’.

Andokides: Works
Speech ‘On his Return.’

Four speeches ascribed to Andokides are extant, bearing the titles ‘On the Mysteries:’ ‘On his Return:’ ‘On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians:’ ‘Against Alkibiades.’ The speech On the Mysteries, as the chief extant work of its author, stands first in the manuscripts and the editions. But the second oration relates to an earlier passage in the life of Andokides, and may conveniently be considered first.

The speech of Andokides ‘On his Return’ affords no further internal evidence of its own date than that it was spoken later than 411 and earlier than 405 B. C.Later than 411—as being a considerable time after the fall of the Four Hundred in June, 411, §§ 13—16, &c.: and obviously earlier than Aegospotami—since (e.g.) the Peiraeus is open to corn-ships, § 21.—The notice in [ Lys.] in Andok. § 29 gives no help towards fixing the date. Blass places it in 409 Attisch. Bereds. p. 278.. But a circumstance which he has not noticed seems to us to make it almost certain that the speech cannot have been delivered later than the summer of 410. Andokides lays stress upon the service which he has rendered to Athens by securing a supply of corn from Cyprus. There had been a disappointment about this supply; but he states that he has overcome the difficulty,— that fourteen corn ships will be in the Peiraeus almost immediately, and that others are to follow§§ 20—21.. Now the event which had made this supply a matter of anxiety to Athens was the stoppage of the usual importations from the south coast of the Euxine. In 411 she had lost the command of the Bosphorus by the revolt of Chalkedon, and the command of the Hellespont by the revolt of AbydosSee Grote, VIII pp 171 ff.. But, in 410, the battle of Kyzikos was followed by the reestablishment of Athenian power in the Propontis and in its adjacent straits. The corn-trade of the Euxine once more flowed towards Athens; and, in the autumn of 410, Agis, from his station at Dekeleia, saw with despair the multitude of corn-ships which were running into the Peiraeus Xen. Hellen. I. i. 35, Ἆγις δὲ ἐκ τῆς Δεκελείας ἰδὼν πλοἶδ πολλὰ σιτοῦ εἰς Πειραιᾶ καταθέοντα οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἔφη εἶναι τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον Ἀθηναίους εἴργειν τῆς γῆς, εἰ μή τις σχήσοι καὶ ὅθεν ὁ κατὰ θάλατταν σῖτος φοῖτᾷ .. The benefit, therefore, for which Andokides claims so much credit; would have been no great benefit, had it been conferred later than the middle of the year 410. The Four Hundred were deposed about the middle of June, 411; and it would have been natural that Andokides should have endeavoured to return at least in the course of the following year.

As a speech on a private matter before the public assembly, this oration belongs to the same class as that which Demosthenes is said to have written for Diphilos in support of his claim to be rewarded by the StateThat is to say, it is a δημηγορία, but not properly a deliberative speech; not a true συμβουλευτικὸς λόγος. Dionysios mentions (De Deinarcho, c. 11) a δημηγορικὸς λόγος written for Diphilos, in which the latter urged before the ekklesia his own claim to certain public honours (δωρεαί). Dionysios thinks that this must have been written by Demosthenes, not by Deinarchos. Cf. Sauppe, Fragm. Oratt. Gr. p. 251.. Andokides is charged, in the speech of the pseudo-Lysias, with having gained admittance to the ekklesia by bribing its presidents [Lys.] in Andok. § 29, καταπλεύσας δὲ ἐκεῖθεν δεῦρο εἰς δημοκρατίαν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν τοῖς μὲν πρυτάνεσιν ἔδωκε χρήματα ἵνα αὐτὸν προσαγάγοιεν ἐνθάδε, ὑμεῖς δ’ αὐτὸν ἐξηλάσατε ἐκ τῆς πόλεως .. It is unnecessary to believe this story. But the emphasis which he himself lays on the valuable information which he had previously given to the SenateAndok. De Red. § 19, ἐμοὶ τοίνυν τὰ μὲν ἤδη πεπραγμένα σχεδόν τι ἅπαντες ἂν εἰδείητε, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντά τε καὶ ἤδη πραττόμενα ἄνδρες ὑμῶν πεντακόσιοι ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ ἴσασιν, ἡ βουλή. The words ἄνδρες πεντακόσιοι deserve notice as a clever rhetorical touch: they imply a congratulation on the recent abolition of the Senate of Four Hundred. suggests that, without some such recommendation, he would have found it difficult to obtain a hearing from the people.

The object of the speech is to procure the removal of certain disabilities under which he was alleged to lie. His disclosures in 415 were made under a guarantee of immunity from all consequences. But the decree of Isotimides, passed soon afterwards, excluded from the marketplace and from temples all ‘who had committed impiety and who had confessed it;’ and his enemies maintained that this decree applied to him.

In the proem he points out the malice or stupidity of Analysis. the men who persist in rejecting the good offices which he is anxious to render to Athens; and refers to the importance of the communications which he has made in confidence to the Senate. (§§ 1—4.) His so-called crimes—committed in ‘youth’ and ‘folly’—are, he contends, his misfortunes. For the disclosures which he was driven to make five years before he deserves pity—nay, gratitude—rather than hatred (§§ 5—9).

He then speaks of his life in exile; of his services to the army at Samos in 411; of his return to Athens in the time of the Four Hundred; and of his imprisonment at the instance of Peisandros, who denounced him as the friend of the democracy (§§ 10—16). Statesmen and generals serve the State at the State's expense; he has served it at his own charge. Nor has the end of these services been yet seen. The people will be soon in possession of the secrets which he has imparted to the Senate; and will soon see supplies of corn, procured by his intercession, enter the Peiraeus. (§§ 17—21.) In return for so much, he asks but one small boon—the observance of the promise of impunity under which he originally laid his information, but which was afterwards withdrawn through the influence of his enemies. (§§ 22—23.)

The peroration opens with a singular argument. When a man makes a mistake, it is not his body's fault: the blame rests with his mind. But he, since he made his mistake, has got a new mind. All that remains, therefore, of the old Andokides is his unoffending body. (§ 24.) As he was condemned on account of his former deeds, he ought now to be welcomed for his recent deeds. His family has ever been patriotic; his great-grandfather fought against the Peisistratidae; he, too, is a friend of the people. The people, he well knows, are not to blame for the breach of faith with him; they were persuaded to it by the same advisers who persuaded them to tolerate an oligarchy. They have repented of the oligarchy; let them repent also of the unjust sentence. (§§ 25—28.)Remarks.

There is a striking contrast between this defence before the ekklesia and that which Andokides made on the same charges, some eleven years later, before a law-court. There he flatly denies that he is in any degree guilty; he turns upon his adversaries with invective and ridicule; he carries the whole matter with a high hand, speaking in a thoroughly confident tone, and giving free play to his lively powers of narration. Here it is quite otherwise. He speaks with humility and remorse of the ‘folly’—the ‘madness’ of his youth; he complains feelingly of the persecution which he has suffered; he implores, in return for constant devotion to the interests of Athens, just one favour—a little favour, which will give his countrymen no trouble, but which will be to him a great joy. In 399 he is defiant; in 410 he is almost abject. In 410 the traces of guilt to which his enemies pointed were still fresh. Before his next speech was spoken, they had been dimmed, not by lapse of time only, but by that great wave of trouble which swept over Athens in 405, and which left all older memories faint in comparison with the memory of the Thirty Tyrants. Andokides the wealthy choregus, the president of the sacred mission, the steward of the sacred treasure, supported on his trial by popular politicians and by advocates chosen from his tribe, was a different person from the anxious suitor who, in the speech On his Return, implored, but could not obtain tolerance.

In the style of the speech there is little to remark except that its difference from that of the speech On the Mysteries exactly corresponds with the difference of tone. There the orator is diffuse, careless, lively; here he is more compact—for he dared not treat a hostile assembly to long stories— more artificial—and decidedly more dull. Once only does the dramatic force of his natural style flash out—where he describes his appearance before the Council of the Four Hundred. ‘Some of the Four Hundred learned that I had arrived; sought me at once; seized me; and brought me before the Council. In an instant Peisandros was at my side:—‘Senators, I impeach this man for bringing corn and oar-spars to the enemy’’ (§ 14.)

Speech On the Mysteries.

The events with which the speech On the Mysteries is connected have been related in the life of Andokides. After his return to Athens, (probably early in 402 B. C.,) under favour of the general amnesty which followed the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants, he had spent three years in the discharge of various public offices. At length, in 399 B. C., his enemies renewed their attack. During the festival of the Great Mysteries, which Andokides attended, in the autumn of that year, Kephisios laid an information against him before the Archon Basileus.

Mode of legal procedure.

Some obscurity hangs over the form of the accusation; we will give the account of it which appears most probable. When, in 415 B. C., Andokides made his disclosures, he did so on the guarantee of impunity (ἄδεια) which a special decree of the ekklesia had given to all who should inform. Subsequently, however, Isotimides proposed and carried a decree that all who had committed impiety and had confessed it should be excluded from the marketplace and from the temples. The enemies of Andokides maintained that he came under this decree. This was the immediate cause of his quitting Athens in 415. In 409 he was unsuccessful in applying to have the sentence of disfranchisement cancelled. On his return in 402, however, nothing had been said at first about his disabilities.

His accusers now contended that he had broken the decree of Isotimides by attending the Mysteries and entering the Eleusinian Temple. To attend the festival or enter the temple unlawfully would, of course, be an impiety. The information which they laid against him charged him, therefore, on this ground, with impiety. It was an ἔνδειξις ἀσεβείας. But, in order to prove it, it was necessary to show that he came under the decree of Isotimides. It was necessary to show that he had committed impiety, as well as given information, in 415 B. C.

His defence is therefore directed to showing, in the first place, that he had not committed impiety at that time either by profaning the Mysteries or by mutilating the Hermae. The speech takes its ordinary title from the fact that the Mysteries form one of its prominent topics. But a more general title would have better described the range of its contents. It might have been more fitly called a Defence on a Charge of Impiety.

This view of the matter explains some difficulties. Andokides says (de Myst. § 71), ‘Kephisios has informed against me according to the existing law, but bases his accusation on the decree of Isotimides.’ That is, Kephisios laid against Andokides an ordinary ἔνδειξις ἀσεβείας. But the charge of ἀσέβεια rested on the assumption that he had broken the decree of Isotimides. He was not directly charged either with profaning the Mysteries or with mutilating the Hermae; his guilt in one or both of these matters was assumed. He proceeds to prove that this assumption is groundless; and that, therefore, the decree does not apply to himBlass says: ‘Kephisios, der als Hauptkläger auch die Hauptrede hielt, hatte nach Andokides seine Anklage gegründet auf das Psephisma des Isotimides.’ (Att. Bereds. p. 300) This statement, though substantially true, is not calculated to convey a clear idea of the form in which the accusation was preferred. Andokides was not simply accused of usurping certain rights which the decree of Isotimides had taken from him. That would have been an ἔνδειξις ἀτιμίας. He was accused specifically of impiety—the result of usurping such rights: it was an ἔνδειξις ἀσεβείας. Thus alone can we understand why the cause was brought into court by the Archon Basileus; and why death was the penalty. (Cf. de Myst. § 146: [Lys.] in Andok. § 55.).

The charge, like all connected with religion, was brought into court by the Archon Basileus. Since details connected with the Mysteries might be put in evidence, the judges were chosen exclusively from the initiated of the higher grade§ 29 οἱ μεμυημένοι: § 31 μεμύησθε καὶ ἑωράκατε τοῖν θεοῖν τὰ ἱερά.. Kephisios, the chief accuser§ 71., was assisted by Melêtos, who had been implicated in the murder of Leon under the Thirty§ 94., and by Epichares, who had been a member of their government§ 95.. On the same side were Kallias§§ 110—131. and Agyrrhios§§ 132—136., each of whom had a private quarrel with the accused. Andokides was supported by Anytos and Kephalos, both politicians of mark, and both popular for the part which they had taken in the restoration of the democracy§ 150. For Anytos, see Xen. Hellen. II. 3 §§ 42, 44: for Kephalos, Demosth. de Cor. § 219.. Advocates chosen for him by his tribesmen were also in court. It is remarkable if, as there is reason to believe, two men engaged on different sides in this trial were, in the same year, united in preferring a more famous charge of impiety. Anytos undoubtedly, MeletosMeletos is mentioned in §§ 12 f., 35, 63, 94. He was a partisan of the Thirty (§ 94), and is clearly identical with the Meletos who went to Sparta as one of the envoys of the Town Party in 403 to discuss the terms of peace between the Town and the Peiraeus ( Xen. Hellen. II. 4. § 36). All this agrees with what is known about the age of the Meletos who accused Sokrates. See the article by Mr Philip Smith in the Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography. probably, was the accuser of Sokrates.

The speech On the Mysteries falls into three main divisions. In the first, Andokides shows his innocence in regard to the events of 415 B. C. In the second he shows that, in any case, the decree of Isotimides is now obsolete. In the third he deals with a number of minor topics.

I. §§ 1—69.

1. (Proem.) §§ 1—7. Andokides dwells on the rancour of his enemies; insists on the fact of his having remained to stand his trial—instead of withdrawing to his property in Cyprus—as a proof of a good conscience; and appeals to the judgesParts of this proem, viz. § 1 to the words πολλοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, and §§ 6, 7 αἰτοῦμαι οὖν— ἀκούσητε ἀπολογουμένου occur, slightly varied, in Lysias de bonis Aristophanis §§ 2—5. Spengel and Blass believe that both Andokides and Lysias used a proem written by some third person; Andokides interpolating in it some matter of his own. It is true that the transition from § 5 to § 6 in the speech of Andokides is harsh, as if a patch had been made; but the transition from § 3 to § 4 is hardly less harsh, as Blass himself observes; indeed he suggests that a second borrowed proem may have been used there; but this is improbable. I should prefer to suppose that the whole proem is the work of Andokides himself, and that Lysias (whose speech belongs to 387 B. C.) abridged it..

2. §§ 8—10. He is perplexed as to what topic of his defence he shall first approach. After a fresh appeal to the judges he resolves to begin with the facts relating to the Mysteries.

3. §§ 11—33. The Mysteries Case. He neither profaned them himself, nor informed against others as having profaned them. Four persons, on four distinct occasions, did, in fact, so inform: viz.:—(i) Pythonikos, who produced the slave Andromachos, § 11: (ii) Teukros, § 15: (iii) Agariste, § 16: (iv) Lydos, § 17. Lydos implicated Leogoras the father of Andokides. Leogoras, however, not only cleared himself, but got a verdict in an action which he brought against the senator Speusippos, §§ 17, 18. (This occasions a parenthesis, in which Andokides defends himself against the imputation of having denounced his father and relations: §§ 19—24.) The largest reward for information (μήνυτρα) was adjudged to Andromachos; the second, to Teukros: §§ 27, 28. Andokides calls upon the judges to recognise his innocence as regards the Mysteries: §§ 29—33.

4. §§ 34—69. The Hermae Case. In this matter the chief informants were (i) Teukros: §§ 34—35: (ii) Diokleides, whose allegations caused a general panic: §§ 36—46: (iii) Andokides himself. The circumstances, motives and results of his disclosure are stated at length: §§ 47—69.

II. §§ 70—91.

It is argued that the decree of Isotimides is now void, because it has been cancelled by subsequent decrees, laws and oaths, §§ 70—72. These are next enumerated, as follows.

1. §§ 73—79. During the siege of Athens by the Lacedaemonians in 405 B. C. the decree of Patrokleides was passed, reinstating all the disfranchised.

2. § 80. After the truce with Sparta in 404, when the Thirty Tyrants were established, all exiles received free permission to return.

3. § 81. After the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 a general amnesty was proclaimed.

4. §§ 82—89. At the same time, in accordance with the decree of Tisamenos, a revision of the laws was ordered. This revision having been completed, four new general laws (νόμοι) were passed:—viz. (i) That no ‘unwritten’ law should have force: (ii) That no decree (ψήφισμα) of ekklesia or senate should overrule a law (νόμος): (iii) That no law should be made against an individual (ἐπ’ ἀνδρί, § 87): (iv) That decisions of judges or arbiters, pronounced under the former democracy, should remain valid; but that, in future, all decisions should be based on the code as revised in the archonship of Eukleides in 403 B. C. [This is expressed by the phrase χρῆσθαι νόμοις ἀπ’ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος, § 87.]

5. §§ 90, 91. Returning to the subject of § 81, Andokides recalls the terms of the oath of amnesty taken in 403 B. C. He then quotes the official oath of Senators and the official oath of Judges.

III. §§ 92—150 (end).

1. §§ 92—105. He shows that, if the amnesty is to be violated in his case, it may be violated to the cost of others also. The accusers, Kephisios, Meletus and Epichares, as well as others, would, in various ways, be liable to punishment.

2. §§ 106—109. He illustrates the good effect of general amnesties by two examples from the history of Athens: (i) the moderation shown after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae: (ii) an amnesty in the time of the Persian Wars.

3. §§ 110—136. He answers a charge made against him by Kallias. Kallias asserted that Andokides, terrified by the accusation hanging over him, had laid a suppliant's bough (ἱκετηρία) on the altar in the temple at Eleusis during the festival of the Great Mysteries. To take sanctuary, or to place a symbol of supplication, in that temple at that season, was a capital offence (as implying the approach of guilt to the temple at a holy season). Andokides explains the motive of this false charge. Kallias was seeking for his son an heiress whose hand was claimed by Andokides (§§ 110—123). This leads to a digression about a scandal connected with the birth of this son (§§ 124—131). He then attacks the abettors of Kallias in this slander—especially Agyrrhios, a fraudulent tax-farmer who had a grudge against Andokides (§§ 132—136).

4. §§ 137—139. He ridicules the assertion made by the accuser, that the gods must have preserved so great a traveller from the dangers of the sea because they reserved him for the hemlock.

5. §§ 140—150. Peroration, on three topics chiefly:— (i) the credit which Athens has gained by her policy of amnesties—credit which the judges are bound to sustain: (ii) the public services of the ancestors of Andokides: (iii) his own opportunities for usefulness to the State hereafter, if he is acquitted.

Andokides was acquitted. Before speaking of the method and style of his speech, it is due to its great historical interest to notice some of the disputed statements of fact which it contains.

Historical matter in the Speech.

1. Does the speech represent that account of his own conduct which Andokides gave in 415 when he made his disclosures before the Council of Four Hundred? Next—had he, as a matter of fact, taken part in the mutilation of the Hermae? These two questions have been shortly discussed in Chapter IV.p. 76. Some reasons are there suggested for believing (1) that, in 415, Andokides had criminated himself as well as others: (2) that he was, in fact, innocent.

2. In § 11 Pythonikos, who brought forward the evidence of the slave Andromachos, is named as the first denouncer of Alkibiades. ‘Some residentaliens and slaves in attendance on their masters’ (ἀκολούθων) are said by Thucydides (VI. 28) to have been the first accusers; and Plutarch adds that these were brought forward by Androkles. Androkles is mentioned by Andokides only in § 27, as claiming the reward (μήνυτρα) from the Senate. In order to reconcile Andokides with Thucydides, it must be supposed either (1) that the ‘resident-aliens and slaves’ of Thucydides (VI. 28) were the witnesses of Pythonikos, and not, as Plutarch states ( Alkib. 19), of Androkles: or (2) that they were the witnesses, some of Pythonikos, some of Androkles; and that those brought forward by Androkles did not criminate Alkibiades, although Androkles afterwards found witnesses who did so. The former supposition, which makes Plutarch inaccurate, seems the most likely.

3. In § 13 it is stated that, on Pythonikos making his accusations, Polystratos was at once arrested and executed, and that the other accused persons fled. It is certain, as Grote Hist. Gr. III. p. 243. observes, that Alkibiades was accused, but neither fled nor was brought to trial; and it would seem more probable, therefore, that the charge was dropped, for the time, in reference to the others also. On this point, however, it does not seem necessary to assume inaccuracy in Andokides. The position of Alkibiades, as a commander of the expedition on which the hopes of the people were set and which was about to sail, was wholly exceptional. The evidence against him may also have been of a different nature.

4. In § 13 there is an oversight. Among those denounced by Pythonikos was Panaetios. And it is said that all persons so denounced—except Polystratos, who was put to death—fled. But in § 68 Panaetios appears as leaving Athens in consequence of the later denunciation of Andokides. As the list in § 13 contains ten names in all, the speaker might easily have made a mistake about one of the number. Or the evidence against Panaetios—who is named last of the ten—may have been so weak that he was acquitted upon this first charge.

5. In § 34 it is said that some of the persons accused by Teukros were put to death. To this Mr Grote Hist. Gr. VII. p. 268. opposes the fact that Thucydides (VI. 60) names as having suffered death only some of those who were denounced by Andokides. It seems unsafe, however, to conclude that the orator has made a wrong statement. The language of Thuc. VI. 53, ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, hardly warrants the inference that imprisonment was the utmost rigour used in other cases. The statement of Andokides in § 34 is incidentally confirmed by the words which he ascribes to Charmides in § 49.

6. In § 38 Andokides quotes, without comment, the statement of Diokleides that he had seen the faces of some of the conspirators by the light of a full moon. Now Plutarch says that one of the informers (he does not give the name), being asked how he had recognised the faces of the mutilators, answered, ‘by the light of the moon;’ and was thus convicted of falsehood, it having been new moon on the night in questionPlut. Alk. c. 20 εἷς δ’ αὐτῶν ἐρωτώμενος ὅπως τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν ἑρμοκοπιδῶν γνωρίσειε, καὶ ἀποκρινάμενος ὅτι πρὸς τὴν σελήνην, ἐσφάλη τοῦ παντός, ἕνης καὶ νέας οὔσης ὅτε ταῦτ’ ἐδρᾶτο .. Diodoros (XIII. 2) tells the same story, without mentioning any name; but his account does not apply to Diokleides. Mr Grote is unquestionably right in treating the new-moon story as a later fiction Hist. Gr. VII. p. 271.. Andokides would not have failed to notice so fatal a slip on the part of Diokleides; nor is it likely that the informer would have made it.

7. In § 17 the action brought by Leogoras against Speusippos is mentioned directly after the evidence of Lydos. But it should be observed that it is mentioned parenthetically; and that the indefinite κἄπειτα does not fix its date at all. Leogoras was in the prison with his son (§ 50); and the action was doubtless not brought until after the disclosures of Andokides.

8. In § 45 the panic, during which the citizens kept watch under arms through the night, is placed in immediate connection with the informations of Diokleides, who caused this panic by representing the plot as widely spread. It is said, also, that the Boeotians took advantage of the alarm at Athens to march to the frontier. Now Thucydides (VI. 60) states that, during one night an armed body of citizens garrisoned the Theseion; but he puts this after the disclosures of Andokides, and connects it with the appearance of a Spartan force at the isthmus. Bishop Thirlwall justly remarks that, unless there were two or more occasions on which the citizens kept armed watch, Andokides, who goes into minute detail, is more likely than Thucydides to be right about the time of it Hist. Gr. III. p. 499 (appendix III. to ch. xxv.) .

9. In § 106 the expulsion from Athens of the tyrants—that is, Hippias and his adherents—is described as following upon a battle fought ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ, which seems to mean ‘at the Pallenion,’ the temple of Athene Pallenis at Pallene, about 10 miles E.N.E. of AthensProfessor Rawlinson, in the Journal of Philology, Vol. I. No. 2, p. 25, questions whether the Παλλήνιον of Andokides means the temple of.Athene at Pallene. The proper name of that temple was, he thinks, ‘the Pallenis.’ It appears to me as I have endeavoured to show (Journ. Philol. Vol. II. No. 3, p. 48) that Παλληνίς is always the epithet of the goddess, not the name of the temple. I believe Παλλήνιον to be identical with what Herodotos (I. 62) calls Παλληνίδος Ἀθηναίης ἱρόν .. Now it was near this temple that Peisistratos, on his third return, won the victory which led to the final establishment of his tyranny, probably in 545 B. C.This is the date fixed on by Curtius (Hist. Gr. Vol. I. p 359 tr. Ward). Clinton (F. H. II. p. 202) thinks 537 more probable. But no battle at the same spot, or anywhere near it, is mentioned by any other authority in connexion with the expulsion of of the Peisistratidae. According to Herodotos, the Lacedaemonians sent, in 510, an expedition under Kleomenes. Kleomenes, on entering Attica from the isthmus, met and routed the Thessalian cavalry of Hippias; advanced to Athens; and besieged the Peisistratidae, who presently capitulatedHer. v. 64.. Herodotos and Andokides can be reconciled only by supposing that the account of Herodotos is incompleteProfessor Rawlinson thinks that there was a second battle, (after that won by Kleomenes on entering Attica), in which the Alkmaeonidae and the other exiles fought on the Spartan side; and this battle, he suggests, may have been fought near Pallene (Journ. Phil. I. 2. pp. 25 ff.).. It seems more probable, however, that Andokides has confused the scene of a battle won by Peisistratos with the scene of a battle lost by the PeisistratidaeThe view that the battle described by Andokides as fought ἐπὶ Παλληνίῳ is identical with that mentioned in Herod. v. 64 is held by Sluiter, Lect. Andoc. p. 6: Wordsworth, Athens and Attica, p. 198 note: Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. II. p. 80 note: Grote, Hist. Gr. IV. p. 165 note..

10. In § 107 it is said that when, later, the Persian king made an expedition against Greece, the Athenians recalled those who had been banished, and reinstated those who had been disfranchised, when the tyrants were expelled. No such amnesty is recorded in connection with the first Persian invasion in 490; but Plutarch mentions such a measure as having been passed shortly before the battle of Salamis in 480 Plut. Them. c. 11.. Now the Persian invasion in 490 was undertaken for the purpose of restoring Hippias; and the invasion in 480 was undertaken partly at the instance of his family. Men (or their descendants) who had been banished or disfranchised in 510 would certainly not have been restored to Athenian citizenship in 490 or 480. Andokides seems, then, to have remembered vaguely that an act of amnesty was passed at Athens on some occasion during the Persian wars; to have placed this act in 490 instead of 480; and to have represented it as passed in favour of the very persons who would probably have been excluded from it.

11. In § 107 it is said of the Athenians;— ‘They resolved to meet the barbarians at Marathon... They fought and conquered; they freed Greece and saved their country. And having done so great a deed, they thought it not meet to bear malice against any one for the past. Therefore, although through these things they entered upon their city desolate, their temples in ashes, their walls and houses in ruins, yet by concord they achieved the empire of Greece,’ &c. From this passage ValckenärSee Valckenär's note, quoted and endorsed by Sluiter, Lect. Andoc. p. 48, and by Grote, IV. p. 165 n.:—‘Confundere videtur Andokides diversissima: Persica sub Miltiade et Dario et victoriam Marathoniam, quaeque evenere sub Themistocle, Xerxis gesta. Hic urbem incendio delevit, non ille. Nihil magis est manifestum quam diversa ab oratore confundi.’, Sluiter and Grote infer that Andokides has transferred the burning of Athens by Xerxes in 480 to the first invasion in 490. This is hardly a necessary inference. Andokides is speaking of the struggle with Persia—extending from 490 to 479—as a whole. He names Marathon: he does not name Salamis or Plataea. He merely says that, after the Athenians had ‘freed Greece,’ they came back to find their city in ruinsSee the Journal of Philology, Vol. I. No. 1, p. 165, for a discussion of this passage..

Arrangement and Style of the Speech.

It is impossible to read the speech On the Mysteries without feeling that, as a whole, it is powerful, in spite of some evident defects. The arrangement is best in what we have called the first division (§§ 1—69), which deals with two distinct groups of facts, those relating to the Mysteries case and those relating to the Hermae case. These facts are stated in an order which is, on the whole, clear and natural, though not free from the parentheses of which Andokides was so fond, and of which sections 19—24 form an example. Less praise is due to the second part of the speech (§§ 70—91), devoted to the various enactments which had made the decree of Isotimides obsolete. It is at once full and obscure, giving needless, and withholding necessary, details. The third part (§§ 92—end) is a mere string of topics, unconnected with each other, and but slightly connected with the case. This confused appendix to the real defence is, however, significant. It shows the anxiety of Andokides to make the judges understand the rancorous personal feeling of his enemies; an anxiety natural in a man who for sixteen years had been pursued by unproved accusations. The passages about Kallias and Agyrrhios probably had a stronger effect upon the court than any conventional appeal to compassion would have produced.

As regards style, the language of the speech is thoroughly unaffected and easy, plain without studied avoidance of ornament, and rising at the right places—as when he speaks of the old victories of freedom (§§ 106—109), and in the peroration (§§ 140 —150). But the great merit of the composition is its picturesqueness, its variety and life. The scene in the prison (§§ 48—53) and the description of the panic at Athens (§§ 43—45) are perhaps the best passages in this respect. If Andokides had not many rhetorical accomplishments, he certainly had perception of character, and the knack of describing it. Diokleides bargaining with Euphemos (§ 40)—Charmides exhorting Andokides to save the prisoners (§§ 49, 50)—Peisandros urging that Mantitheos and Aphepsion should be put on the rack (§ 43)—are well given in a few vivid touches.

Speech On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians.

The speech On the Peace with the Lacedaemonians belongs, as has been noticed in a former chapterCh. IV. p. 83., to the year 390. Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos had then been four years at war with Sparta. Andokides had just returned from an embassy to Sparta with a view to peace. The terms proposed by the Lacedaemonians were, as regarded Athens, permission to retain her walls and ships, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. The orator, speaking in debate in the ekklesia, urges that these terms should be accepted. Analysis.

The opponents of peace contend that peace with Lacedaemon is fraught with danger to the democracy (§§ 1—2). He meets this objection by instancing a number of cases in which peace with Sparta, so far from injuring the Athenian democracy, was productive of the greatest advantage to it. He cites (1) a peace with Sparta negotiated by Miltiades during a war in Eubœa: §§ 3—5. (2) The Thirty Years' Truce, 445 B. C. §§ 6—7. (3) The Peace of Nikias, 421 B. C.: §§ 8, 9.—The compulsory truce with Sparta in 404, followed by the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants, was not, properly speaking, a peace at all; and is therefore no exception to the rule that peace with Sparta has always been found salutary (§§ 10—12).

There is no good reason for continuing the war. The claims of Athens have now been recognised; the Boeotians desire peace; the hope of finally crushing Sparta is idle (§§ 13—16). Athens is the power which gains most by the peace now proposed (§§ 17—23). If Boeotia makes peace, Athens will be left with one weak ally, Corinth, and another who is a positive encumbrance—selfish Argos (§§ 24—27). Athens must not, here, prefer weak friends, as formerly she preferred Amorges to Xerxes II.; Egesta to Syracuse; Argos to Sparta (§§ 28—32). The speaker goes on to notice a variety of objections to the peace. Some say that walls and ships are not money, and wish to recover their property abroad [τὰ σφέτερ’ αὐτῶν τῆς ὑπερορίας, § 36] which was lost when the Athenian empire fell. But such men ought to remember that walls and ships were just the means by which the empire was won in the first instance (§§ 33—39).

In a peroration the assembly is reminded that the decision rests wholly with it; Argive and Corinthian envoys have come urging war; Spartan envoys, offering peace. The true plenipotentiaries are not the ambassadors, but those who vote in the ekklesia (§§ 40, 41 πρεσβευτὰς οὖν πάντας ὑμᾶς ἡμεῖς οἱ πρέσβεις ποιοῦμεν.).

Question of authenticity.

According to the author of the Argument, the speech On the Peace was judged spurious by DionysiosAuct. Argum. ad fin. ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος νόθον εἶναι λέγει τὸν λόγον., and Harpokration also doubted its authenticityHe quotes it thrice, but always with the addition εἰ γνήσιος.. Among modern critics, Taylor Lectiones Lysiacae, c. VI. (Vol. II. p. 260, ed. Reiske.) and Markland Ad Aeschin. De Falsa Legat. p. 302. are the chief who have taken the same view; but they have a majority of opinions against themSluiter, Lect. Andoc. c. x. p. 205, and Valckenär quoted there: Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Graec. (Opusc. Vol. I. p, 325); Wesseler ad Diod. Sic. XII. c. 8; and Blass, Att. Bereds. p. 322, are among the defenders of the speech as authentic.. Probably the suspicions of Dionysios, like those of Taylor, arose mainly from the difficulties of the historical passage (§§ 3—6); and from the fact that this passage is found, slightly modified, in the speech of Aeschines On the Embassy.

Historical Difficulties.It is said in §§ 3—5 that, when the Athenians ‘had the war in Euboea’—being then masters of Megara, Troezen and Pegae—Miltiades, son of Kimon, who had been ostracised, was recalled, and was sent to treat for peace at Sparta. A peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty yearsTaylor, correcting Andokides from Aeschin. De Fals. Legat. § 172, reads πεντήκοντα for πέντε: and so Blass.; and was observed on both sides for thirteen years. During this peace the Peiraeus was fortified (478 B. C.), and the Northern Long Wall was built (457 B. C.). Now (1) the only recorded war of Athens in which Euboea was concerned, during the life of Miltiades, was in 507, when the Chalkidians were defeated and their territory given to the first kleruchs. (2) Megara, Troezen and Pegae were not included in the Athenian alliance until long after 478 B. C. (3) Miltiades was never ostracised; having been sent to the Chersonese before the invention of ostracism by Kleisthenes. (4) No such peace as that spoken of is known; though in 491, an Athenian embassy went to Sparta with a different object—to denounce the medism of the AeginetansHer. VI. 49.. Most critics have assumed that Andokides refers to the Five Years' Truce between Athens and Sparta, concluded in 450 B. C., mainly through the influence of Kimon, son of Miltiades; and that he names the father instead of the sonThis view, briefly stated by Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideae, c. x. p. 135, is discussed and approved by Clinton, Fasti Hellen. Vol. II. Append. c. 8. p. 257; and adopted by Grote, v. p. 453, note 3. For the Five Years' Truce Clinton gives the date 450, which I take: Grote, 452: Curtius (Hist. Gr. II. p. 402 tr. Ward) 451—450.. But all agree that the passage as it stands is full of inaccuracies, and can be reconciled with history only by conjectural emendationCf. Curtius, Hist. Gr. Vol. II. p. 412 (tr. Ward): Grote, v. pp. 455—464. .

Again, in § 6 it is said that Athens having been plunged into war by the Aeginetans, and having done and suffered much evil, at last concluded the Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta (445 B. C.). The impression conveyed by this statement is wrong. The war between Athens and Aegina began about 458, and ended in 455 with the reduction of Aegina. In 450 Athens and Sparta made a truce for five years. A new train of events began with the revolution in Boeotia in 447, followed by the revolt of Megara and Euboea; and it was this which led up to the peace of 445 B. C.

These inaccuracies are in regard only to the earlier history of Athens: and the undoubtedly genuine speech On the Mysteries contains allusions which are no less inaccurate. In regard to contemporary events the speaker makes no statement which can be shown to be incorrect: and on one point—the position of Argos at the time—he is incidentally confirmed in a striking manner by XenophonThe speech On the Peace speaks of the Argives as having ‘made a peace on their ownaccount’ which protected their territory: § 27 αὐτοὶ δ’ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην ποιήσαντες τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Now Xenophon tells us that in 392 the Corinthian government had formed a close alliance with Argos. The boundary-stones between the territories were taken up; an Argive garrison held the citadel of Corinth; and the very name of Corinth was changed to Argos ( Hellen. IV. 4—6). In 391 Agesilaos had ravaged the Argive territory before taking Lechaeum ( Hell. IV. 4—19). The next year, 399, Ol. 97. 3, was the year of the Isthmia. The Argives assumed the presidency of the festival, and offered the sacrifice to Poseidon, on the ground that ‘Argos was Corinth’ — ὡς Ἄργους τῆς Κορίνθου ὄντος (Hell. IV. 5. 1) . Consequently they claimed the privilege of the Sacred Month (ἱερομηνία) for Argolis. And so, precisely in the year 390, to which we saw that the speech On the Peace belongs, it was true that the Argive territory enjoyed a special immunity. This had not been the case in 391; nor was it any longer the case in 388 (the next Isthmian year), when Agesipolis asked Zeus at Olympia and Apollo at Delphi whether he was bound to respect this fictitious extension of the ἱερομηνία—was absolved by the gods from respecting it—and ravaged Argolis ( H. IV. 7. 2).. A forger would have studied the early history with more care, and would not have known Passage common to Andokides and Aeschines. the details of the particular situation so well. But how does it happen that the whole historical passage (§§ 3—12) reappears, with modifications, in the speech of Aeschines On the EmbassyAeschin. De Fals. Legat. § 172, συνταραχθέντες δέ... to § 176, ἠναγκασμένοι. The topics are the same as those of Andok. De Pace, §§ 3—12: the language is coincident in several points, yet, on the whole, much altered.? Either Aeschines copied this speech, or a later writer copied the speech of Aeschines. There can be little doubt that the former was the case. Andokides, grandfather of the orator, is mentioned in the speech On the Peace§ 6 ᾑρέθησαν δέκα ἄνδρες ἐξ Ἀθηναίων ἁπάντων πρέσβεις ἐς Λακεδαίμονα αὐτοκράτορες, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἀνδοκίδης ὁ πάππος ὁ ἡμέτερος. as a member of the embassy to Sparta in 445 B. C. In the speech of AeschinesAesch. De Fals. Legat. § 174, Ανδοκίδην ἐκπέμψαντες καὶ τοὺς συμπρέσβεις. he is named as chief of that embassy. This Andokides—an obscure member, if he was a member, of the embassy which, according to DiodorosXII. 7., was led by Kallias and Chares —would not have been named at all except by his own grandson. Again, there are traces in Aeschines of condensation—not always intelligent —from the speech On the Peace. Thus the latter Andok. De Pace, § 7 πρῶτον μέν...ἀνηνέγκαμεν χίλια τάλαντα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ νόμῳ κατεκλείσαμεν ἐξαίρετα εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ· τοῦτο δὲ τριήρεις ἄλλας ἑκατόν, κ.τ.λ. says (referring to the years before the Peloponnesian war)—‘we laid up 1000 talents in the acropolis, and set them apart by law for the use of the people at special need’: Aeschines, leaving out the qualifying clause, makes it appear that the sum of 1000 talents was the total sum laid up in the Athenian treasuryAeschin. De Fals. Legat. § 174 χίλια μὲν γὰρ τάλαντα ἀνηνέγκαμεν νομίσματος εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ἑκατὸν δὲ τριήρεις ἑτέρας, κ.τ.λ. during the years of peace.

The treatment of the subject certainly affords no Remarks on the Speech. argument against the authenticity of the speech. Andokides gave little care to arrangement, and here there is no apparent attempt to treat the question methodically. On the other hand, the remarks about Corinth and Argos§§ 24—27., and the answer to those who demanded the restoration of lands abroad§§ 36—39., are both acute and sensible. In this, as in his other speech before the ekklesia, the descriptive talent of Andokides had little scope; but, as in the speech On the Mysteries, the style is spirited and vigorous.

Speech against Alkibiades.

The speech against Alkibiades is certainly spurious. It discusses the question whether the speaker, or Nikias or Alkibiades is to be ostracised. The situation resembles one which is mentioned by Plutarch. Alkibiades, Nikias and Phaeax were rivals for power, and it had become plain that one of the three would incur ostracismPlut. Alk. c. 13. In Aristid. c. 7 and in Nik. c. 11 Plutarch names only Alkibiades and Nikias as the rivals; adding, in Nik. c. 11, that Theophrastos substitutes Phaeax for Nikias.. They therefore made common cause against Hyperbolos, who was ostracised, probably in 417 B. C.The Schol. on Ar. Vesp. 1007 quotes Theopompos for the statement ἐξωστράκισαν τὸν Ὑπέρβολον ἓξ ἔτη. ὁ δὲ καταπλεύσας εἰς Σάμον ...ἀπέθανε. The death of Hyperbolos is fixed by Thuc. VIII. 73 to 411 B. C. Blass, with Cobet and others, thinks that the ‘six years’ of Theopompos represent simply the number of years which intervened between the banishment of Hyperbolos and his death. This brings the ostracism to 417 B C.

The supposed date of this speech is fixed by a reference in § 22 to the capture of Melos. Melos was taken in the winter of 416—415 B. C. Nikias left Athens, never to return, in the spring of 415. Therefore the speech could have been spoken only in the early part of 415 B. C.Analysis.

The orator, after stating the point at issue, and censuring the institution of ostracism (§§ 1—6), enters upon an elaborate invective against Alkibiades (§§ 10—40). The latter is attacked for having doubled the tribute of the allies (§§ 10—12); for having ill-used his wife (§§ 13—15); for contempt of the law (§§ 16—19); for beating a choregus (§§ 20, 21); for insolence after his Olympian victory (§§ 24—33). He is then contrasted with the speaker (§§ 34—40), who concludes with a notice of his own public services (§§ 41, 42).

The Speech not by Andokides.

The speech is twice cited without suspicion by Harpokration: it is also named as genuine by PhotiosPhot. Cod. 261.. The biographer of Andokides does not mention it; but, in its place, mentions a Defence in reply to Phaeax[Plut.] Vit. Andoc. ἀπολογία πρὸς Φαίακα .. There are traces of its ascription in antiquity both to LysiasAthenaeos (IX. p. 408 c.) quotes some words from § 29 of the speech, as from Λυσίας κατ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου. and to AeschinesThis may be surmised from Diogenes Lacrtios, II. 63, who says, speaking of Aeschines the Sokratic, ἦν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἱκανῶς γεγυμνασμένος. ὡς δῆλον ἔκ τε τῆς ἀπολογίας [τοῦ πατρός—Blass ὑπὲρ] Φαίακος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ Δίωνος .. But an examination of the speech will show that it cannot have been spoken by Andokides, or written by him for the use of another; that it was probably not written by any one who lived at the time of which it treats; and that there is good reason for believing it to be the work of a late sophist.

That Andokides spoke this speech is inconceivable. The speaker says (§ 8) that he has been four times tried; and (§ 41) that he has been ambassador to Molossia, Thesprotia, Italy and Sicily. But elsewhere, excusing himself for acts committed in the very year in which this speech is supposed to have been delivered—in 415—Andokides pleads that he was young and foolish at the time De Reditu, § 7.. Moreover, no writer mentions Andokides as having been in danger of ostracism at the same time as Nikias and Alkibiades.

Nor is it credible that Andokides wrote the speech for another person—Phaeax, for instance, as ValckenärSee Valckenär's dissertation, given at the end of Chap. I. of Sluiter's Lect. Andoc. suggests. The style is strongly against this. It is far more artificial than anything by Andokides which we possess; it approaches, indeed, more nearly to the style of Isokrates. The formal antitheses in the proem (§§ 1—2) are a striking example of this characterCompare also § 21 ἀλλ’ ὑμεῖς ἐν μὲν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τοιαῦτα θεωροῦντες δεινὰ νομίζετε, γιγνόμενα δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει ὁρῶντες οὐδὲν φροντίζετε, with Isokr. Panegyr. § 168 ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς συμφοραῖς ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν συγκειμέναις δακρύειν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀληθινὰ δὲ πάθη πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐφορῶντες τοσούτου δέουσιν ἐλεεῖν, κ.τ.λ. .

Was Phaeax the author?

Taylor Lect. Lysiac. c. VI. and others have ascribed the speech to Phaeax himself. Plutarch names Phaeax, Alkibiades and Nikias as the three men over whom ostracism was hanging at the same time; and quotes from a speech against Alkibiades, with which the name of Phaeax is connected, a story which appears (in a different form) in our speechPlut. Alk. c. 13 φέρεται δὲ καὶ λόγος τις κατ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ Φαίακος γεγραμμένος ἐν ᾧ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων γέγραπται καὶ ὅτι τῆς πόλεως πολλὰ πομπεῖα χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ κεκτημένης Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐχρῆτο πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἰδίοις πρὸς τὴν καθ’ ἡμέραν δίαιταν. For καὶ Φαίακος Taylor (l. c.) and Vater (Rerum Andocidearum cap. IV.) propose ὑπὸ Φαίακος: Blass (Att. Bereds. 330) ὑπὲρ Φαίακος. Blass thinks that, whoever the author of the speech was, the person meant to be defended was Phaeax; and that the ἀπολογία πρὸς Φαίακα in [Plut.] Vit. Andoc. may have come from an original ἀπολογία Φαίακι, i. e. ὑπὲρ Φαίακος.The story of the sacred vessels can hardly have been taken by Plutarch only from § 29 of the speech, where it runs:—τὰ πομπεῖα παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιθεωρῶν αἰτησάμενος ὡς εἰς τἀπινίκια τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς θυσίας χρησόμενος ἐξηπάτησε καὶ ἀποδοῦναι οὐκ ἤθελε.. Then it is known from Thucydides that Phaeax went on an embassy at least to Sicily and ItalyThuc. v. 4.. Valckenär's and Ruhnken'sRuhnken, Historia Crit. Oratt. Graec. (Opusc. I. p. 326). Ruhnken, as Sluiter points out, borrows largely from Valekenär's dissertation (see above), which had appeared 12 years before. arguments against Taylor are inconclusive. If the speech was really written at the time of which it treats, it cannot be disproved, any more than it can be proved, that Phaeax was the author.

The Speech probably by a late sophist.

But an overwhelming amount of evidence tends to show that the speech is the work of a later sophist. First stand two general reasons; the supposed occasion of the speech, and the style of its composition.

As far as the nature of ostracism is known to us, Ostracism misconceived. the whole speech involves a thorough misconception of it: it assumes a situation which could never have existed. Once every year the ekklesia was formally asked by its presidents whether, in that year, an ostracism should be held. If it voted affirmatively, a day was fixed. The market-place was railed in for voting, every citizen might write any name he pleased on the shell which he dropped into the urn; and if against any one name there were six thousand votes, the person so indicated was banished for ten— in later times, for five—years. The characteristic feature of the whole proceeding was the absence of everything like an open contest between definite rivals. The very object of ostracism was to get rid of a dangerous man in the quietest and least invidious way. No names were mentioned; far less was discussion dreamed of. The idea of a man rising in the ekklesia or other public gathering, and stating that he was one of three persons who were in danger of ostracism; then inveighing at great length and with extraordinary bitterness against one of the other two; and concluding with a vindication of his own consequence—would have probably seemed to Athenians of the days of ostracism incredibly indecent and absurd. In the first place, they would have been offended by his open assumption—whether true or not—that he was one of the citizens who had rendered the resort to ostracism necessary; secondly, they would have resented his attempt to prejudice the ballot; and if, in the end, he had escaped, his escape would probably have been due to their conviction that, as the poet Plato said of Hyperbolos, ‘it was not for such fellows that shells were invented Ap. Plut. Alk. c. 13 οὐ γὰρ τοιούτων εἵνεκ’ ὄστραχ’ εὑρέθη ..’ But the speaker against Alkibiades does not only himself speak thus; he asserts that Alkibiades is about to address the house next, and to endeavour to move it by his tears§ 39. Grote (IV. p. 202, note) remarks on the erroneous conception of ostracism involved in the speaker complaining that he is going to be ostracised without any secret voting—as if by a show of hands. But in § 2 the οὔτε before διαψηφισαμένων κρύβδην is now omitted by Schleiermacher and Blass..Style.

If the nature of the situation supposed were not enough, the style of the composition would in itself be almost decisive. The speaker begins with a formal statement of the matter in hand, evidently meant for a reader; and then goes on to string together all the tritest stories about Alkibiades. This —the body of the speech—has the unmistakable air of a compilation.

Particular errors.

The arguments from the supposed occasion and from the style are confirmed by the evidence of particular misstatements. In §§ 22, 23 Alkibiades is said to have had a child by a Melian woman who came into his power after the capture of Melos; but the speech, as has been shown, can refer only to the spring of 415: and Melos was taken only in the winter of 416—415. In § 33 Kimon is said to have been banished because he had married his own sister. In § 13 the commander at Delium—a battle fought but nine years before the supposed date of the speech —is called Hipponikos instead of Hippokrates. The two last blunders would have been impossible for an Athenian of that age. On the whole there can be little doubt that in this speech we must recognize the work of a late rhetorician who saw, in the juxtaposition of Alkibiades, Nikias and Andokides, a dramatic subject; who had only an indistinct notion of how ostracism was managed in olden times; and who believed himself sufficiently prepared for his task when he had read in Plutarch all the scandalous stories relating to Alkibiades.

Lost Works.

Beside the extant speeches of Andokides, the titles of four others have been preserved. (1) Plutarch quotes an address ‘To the Associates,’ or members Address to the Associates. of the oligarchical clubs, as authority for a statement that the remains of Themistokles had been dishonoured at Athens; but adds that the statement was made by Andokides merely for the purpose of exasperating the oligarchs against the peoplePlut. Themist. c. 32.. Ruhnken Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. (Opusc. I. p. 326)., with whom Sauppe Or. Att. II. p. 165. agrees, thought that this Address was a letter written by Andokides, then in exile, to the fellow-conspirators of Peisandros in 411. But the breach of Andokides with the oligarchical party, after his informations in 415, was decisive and final; when he returned to Athens in 411 he was at once denounced by Peisandros and imprisoned. It seems better, then, with Kirchhoff Andocidea, Hermes I. pp. 1— 20. and Blass Att. Bereds. p. 286; and Andoc. (Teubner) p. 96., to refer this Address to an earlier time than 415: perhaps to the years 420—418, a period of keen struggle between the oligarchical and popular Deliberative Speech. parties at AthensCf. Plut. Alk. c. 13.. (2) The ‘Deliberative Speech’ quoted by the lexicographersAntiatticista, Bekker Anecd. vol. I. p. 94, v. 25. Photios, p. 288, 23. is identified by Kirchhoff with the last-mentioned. Its title seems, however, to show plainly that it was of a different kind, and was either spoken, or supposed to be spoken, in Speech On the Information. debate in the ekklesia. (3) Harpokration once quotes a ‘Speech On the Information’ (περὶ τῆς ἐνδείξεως) for the word ζητητής, which occurs twice in the speech On the Mysteries§§ 36, 40.. Hence the two speeches have sometimes been identified. But the pseudo-Plutarch expressly distinguishes them[Plut.] Vit. Andoc. mentions first the speeches On the Mysteries and On his Return; and then adds, σώζεται δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐνδείξεως λόγος καὶ ἀπολογία πρὸς Φαίακα καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης .. And the author of the speech against Andokides states that two informations had been laid against him in the same year[Lys.] in Andoc. § 30.. It is true that there is no proof of the earlier information having resulted in a trial; and that the title of the lost speech, if really distinct from the De Mysteriis, was ill-chosen. But it is difficult to suppose that the biographer could have made such a blunder as to quote the same speech by two different titles in the same sentence. On the whole, Sauppe's O. A. II. p. 165. view, that the speech On the Mysteries and the speech On the Information were distinct, appears most probable. If the lost speech referred, like the De Mysteriis, to the Hermae case, it must have contained the word which Harpokration quotes; and it would have been natural for him to quote it from the earlier of the two compositions in which it occurred. (4) The ‘Reply to Phaeax’ is Reply to Phaeax. known only from the pseudo-Plutarch, who does not name the speech ‘Against Alkibiades’[Plut.] Vit. Andoc. l. c.. It has been shown that the latter is probably the work of a late sophist; and it is likely that Phaeax, rather than Andokides, was intended to be the speaker. If, then, it could be assumed that ‘Reply to Phaeax’ is an inaccurate quotation of the title, which ought to have been cited as ‘Reply for Phaeax,’ there is no difficulty in supposing the identity of this work with the extant speech Against Alkibiades.

Besides the names of these four speeches, two Doubtful fragments. fragments of unknown context have been preservedSauppe, O. A. II. p. 166: Blass Andoc. (Tcubner) p. 97.. One of them expresses the hope that Athens may not ‘again’ see the country people thronging in to seek shelter within the walls. This seems to refer to the invasion by Archidamos in 431. If this be so, the speech to which the fragment belonged was probably older than 413, when Agis occupied Dekeleia, and when the scenes of 431 must have been to some extent repeated. Such a passage might have found place either in the address To the Associates or in the Deliberative SpeechSauppe refers the fragment to the πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους. So, also, does Kirchhoff, identifying the πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους with the συμβουλευτικός. If these, however, were distinct, the fragment may belong just as well to the συμβουλευτικός.. The other fragment speaks of Hyperbolos as then at Athens; and is therefore older, at least, than 417On the date of the ostracism of Hyperbolos, see above, p. 134, note 1. .

Lysias: Life
Lysias a non-citizen born in Athens, perhaps 459 B.C.

Lysias, though he passed most of his years at Athens, did not possess the citizenship, and, except in the impeachment of Eratosthenes, appears to have had no personal contact with the affairs of the city. Yet, as in literary style he is the representative of Atticism, so in his fortunes he is closely associated with the Athenian democracy. He suffered with it in its two greatest calamities—the overthrow in Sicily and the tyranny of the Thirty; he took part in its restoration; and afterwards, in his speeches for the law-courts, he became perhaps the best, because the soberest, exponent of its spirit—the most graceful and most versatile interpreter of ordinary Athenian life.

Kephalos, the father of Lysias, was a Syracusan, who settled at Athens as a resident alien on the invitation of Perikles (Lys. in Eratosth. § 4). Such an invitation would scarcely have carried much weight before Perikles had begun to be a leading citizen,—i.e. before about 460 B. C.; and the story which represented Kephalos as having been driven from Syracuse when the democracy was overthrown by Gelon (485 B. C.) is therefore not very probable[Plut.] Vit. Lys. ὡς δέ τινες, ἐκπεσόντα τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἡνίκα ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἐτυραννοῦντο..

Lysias was born at Athens after his father had come to live there. The year of his birth cannot be determined. Dionysios assumes the same year as the pseudo-Plutarch—Ol. 80. 2., 459 B. C.; but admits, what the latter does not, that it is a mere assumptionDionys. Lys. c. 1 says that in the archonship of Kallias (412 B.C.) Lysias was forty-seven, as one might conjecture — ὡς ἄν τις εἰκάσειεν. Again in c. 12 he supposes that Lysias may have died in 379 at the age of 80. The pseudo-Plutarch Vit. Lys. says boldly:—γενόμενος Ἀθήνησιν ἐπὶ Φιλοκλέους ἄρχοντος τοῦ μετὰ Φρασικλῆ, κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον ἔτος τῆς ὀγδοηκοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος.. And the ground upon which the assumption rested is evident. Lysias was known to have gone to Thurii when he was fifteen. Thurii was founded Ol. 84. 1., 444 B. C.: it was inferred, then, that Lysias was born in 459 B. C. But there is nothing to prove that Lysias went to Thurii in the year of its foundation. The date 459 B. C. must be regarded, therefore, as a mere guess. It is the guess, however, which had the approval of the ancients; and it is confirmed by this circumstance—that Lysias was reported to have died at about eightyDionys. Lys. c. 12: [Plut.] Vit. Lys. , and that, in fact, his genuine works, so far as they are extant, cease at about 380 B. C.The speech Against Evandros (382 B.C.), and that For Pherenikos, of which a fragment remains, (381 or 380 B.C.)—are his latest known works. The two lost speeches For Iphikrates (Sauppe, Frag. XVIII. and LXV, Att. Or. II. pp. 178, 190) belonged respectively to the years 371 and 354; but the judgment of Dionysios in rejecting them (Lys. c. 12) has been generally confirmed by modern writers. In the absence of certainty, then, it seems probable that the date 459 is not far wrong.

This is not, however, the prevalent modern view. Lysias was said to have gone to Italy after his father's death τοῦ πατρὸς ἤδη τετελευτηκότος: pseudo-Plut. Vit. Lys. ; and this fact is the criterion for the date of his birth on which C. F. Hermann Gesammelte Abhandlungen, p. 15. and Baur Uebersetzung d. Reden d. Lys. pp. 5 ff.—Blass, Attisch. Bereds. p. 333. rely, as the ancient writers relied on the foundation-year of Thurii. Kephalos is introduced in Plato's Republic, of which the scene is laid (C. F. Hermann thinks) in 430 B. C. Lysias, then, it is agreed, cannot have gone to Thurii before 429, or have been born before 444. Blass justly objects to a dialogue of Plato being used as an authority for a date of this kind; but he himself arrives at the same conclusion on another ground— viz. because Kephalos cannot have come to Athens earlier than 460, and had lived there (as his son says, Lys. in Eratosth. § 4) thirty years. Again, Lysias was certainly older than IsokratesA dialogue of Plato can seldom be safely cited to prove that one of the persons of the imaginary conversation was, or was not, alive at a given time long before. But when, in such a dialogue, one of two persons contemporary with Plato is represented as very decidedly older than the other, it must be assumed that this was the case. To infer from the Republic that Kephalos was alive in 430 B.C. would be rash. But it is perfectly safe to infer from the Phaedros (p. 278 E, &c.) that Lysias was an orator of matured powers when Isokrates was a boy., who was born in 436. The birth of Lysias must therefore be put (Blass thinks) between 444 and 436.

This view depends altogether on the statement that Lysias remained at Athens till his father's death—a statement vouched for only by the Plutarchic biographer, who is surely untrustworthy on such a point. Further, it assumes both the date and the literal biographical accuracy of the Republic; or else—what is at least doubtful—that Kephalos could not have come to Athens before 460. Lastly, it makes it difficult to accept the well-accredited account of Lysias having reached, or passed, the age of eighty; since all traces of his industry, hitherto constant, cease when, at this rate, he would have been no more than sixty-sixBlass distinctly admits this:— ‘Starb also Lysias bald nach diesem Jahre, so sind freilieh jene Angaben über das Alter, welches er erreichte, vollig aufzugeben.’ Att. Bereds. p. 336.. The question must be left uncertain. But the modern hypothesis that Lysias was born between 444 and 436 B. C. does not seem, at least, more probable than the ancient hypothesis that he was born about 459Stallbaum, in his Lysiaca ad illustrandas Phaedri Platonici origines (Leipzig, 1851) pp. 6 f, takes the following dates: Birth of Lysias, 459: Foundation of Thurii, 446: Kephalos comes to Athens, 444: Lysias goes to Thurii, 443: Death of Lysias, 378..

Besides Lysias, Kephalos had two other sons, Polemarchos and EuthydêmosPlato (Rep. p. 328 B) mentions Lysias and Euthydêmos as the brothers of Polemarehos. Dionysios (Lys. 1) speaks of two brothers of Lysias. But the pseudo-Plutarch gives him three — Polemarchos, Eudidos (Euthydêmos), and Brachyllos. Blass seems right in concluding from Demosth. Neaer. § 22 that Brachyllos was not brother, but brother-in-law, of Lysias. It is there said that Lysias married the daughter of Brachyllos, his own nieee (ἀδελφιδῆ.) Hence, probably, the mistake of the so-called Plutarch.—Polemarchos being the eldest of the three; and a daughter, afterwards married to Brachyllos. The hospitable disposition of Kephalos is marked in the opening of the Republic, of which the scene is laid at the house of his eldest son. He complains that Sokrates does not come often now to see them at the Peiraeus, and begs that in future he will come to them without ceremony, as to intimate friendsPlat. Rep. p. 328 D.. It is easy to believe that, in the lifetime of Perikles, the house of the wealthy Sicilian whom his friendship had brought to Athens was an intellectual centre, the scene of many such gatherings as Plato imagined at the house of Polemarchos; and that Lysias really grew up, as Dionysios says, in the society of the most distinguished AtheniansDionys. Lys. 1: συνεπαιδεύθη τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις Ἀθηναίων. The pseudo-Plut. repeats the words: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον συνεπαιδεύετο τοῖς ἐπιφ. Ἀθην..

Lysias at Thurii.

At the age of fifteenDionys. Lys. 1.—his father, according to one account, being dead[Plut.] Vit. Lys. —Lysias went to Thurii, accompanied certainly by his eldest brother Polemarchos; perhaps also by EuthydêmosDionysios (l. c.) says σὺν ἀδελφοῖς δυσί: the pseudo-Plut. mentions Polemarchos only.. At Thurii, where he passed his youth and early manhood, he is said to have studied rhetoric under TisiasThe pseudo-Plut. says παιδευόμενος παρὰ Τισίᾳ καὶ Νικίᾳ τοῖς Συρακουσίοις. Blass thinks that the name of the unknown Nikias arose out of Τισίᾳ by a dittography. of Syracuse, himself the pupil of Korax, reputed founder of the art. If, as is likely, Tisias was born about 485 B. C. and did not go to Athens till about 418, there is nothing impossible in this account. At any rate it is probable that Lysias had lessons from some teacher of the Sicilian school, a school the trammels of which his maturer genius so thoroughly shook off. The overthrow of the Athenian arms in Sicily brought into power an anti-Athenian faction at Thurii. Lysias and his brother, with three hundred persons accused of ‘Atticising Ἀττικισμὸν ἐγκληθεῖσι, Dionys. Lys. 1.,’ were driven out, and fled to Athens in 412 B. C.Dionysios and the pseudoPlut. both mark the date by the archonship of Kallias.. A tradition, idle, indeed, but picturesque, connected the Athenian disaster in Sicily with the last days of Lysias in southern Italy. To him was ascribed a speech, possessed by the ancients, in which the captive general Nikias implored the mercy of his Sicilian conquerorsSee the short fragment of this speech ὑπὲρ Νικίου in Sauppe O. A. II. p. 199. Dionysios unliesitatingly rejeeted it, and the few remaining words suffiee in themselves to betray a vulgar rhetorician:—κλαίω τὸν ἀμάχητον καὶ ἀναυμάχητον ὄλεθρον, κ.τ.λ. But it must have been at least as old as the latter part of the fourth century B C, since Theophrastos quoted it (Dionys. Lys. 14)..

His life at Athens from 412 to 405 B C.

The next seven years at Athens—from 412 to 405—seem to have been years of peace and prosperity for the brothers. They were the owners of three houses, one in the town, in which Polemarchos livedThis follows from Lys. In Eratosth. § 16.; another in the Peiraeus, occupied by Lysias; and, adjoining the latter, a shield-manufactory, employing a hundred and twenty slaves. Informers— who were especially dangerous to rich foreigners— did not vex them In Eratosth. § 4.; they had many friends; and, in the liberal discharge of public services, were patterns to all resident-aliensCf. In Eratosth. § 20, where Lysias speaks of himself and his brother as πάσας τὰς χορηγίας χορηγήσαντας—and, in contrast with the Thirty, οὐχὁμοίωσμετοικοῦντας ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ἐπολιτεύοντο.. The possession of house propertyBoeckh, Publ. Econ. Bk. I. c. 24. A resident-alien could under no circumstances be an owner of land; and only an isoteles could be owner of a house. shows that they belonged—as their father Kephalos had doubtless belonged—to that privileged class of resident-aliens who paid no special tax as such, and who, as being on a par in respect of taxes with citizens, were called isoteleis. If Lysias continued his rhetorical studies during this quiet time, he probably had not yet begun to write speeches for the law-courts. A rich man, as he then was, had no motive for taking to a despised drudgery; and the only extant speech ascribed to him which refers to a date earlier than 403—that for Polystratos—is probably spurious. Cicero Cic. Brut. c. 48: nam Lysiam primo profiteri solitum artem dicendi, deinde, quod Theodorus esset in arte subtilior, in orationibus ieiunior, orationes eum scribere aliis coepisse, artem removisse ., quoting Aristotle, says that Lysias once kept a rhetorical school, but gave it up because Theodôros surpassed him in technical subtlety. If this story is worth anything, there is perhaps one reason for referring it to the years 412—405; it certainly imputes to Lysias the impatience of a wealthy amateur. At any rate the ornamental pieces enumerated in the lists of his works—the encomia, the letters, the show-speeches—may have belonged in part to this period of his life. After 403 he wrote for the lawcourts as a profession, and wrote with an industry which can have left little time for the rhetoric of display.

The Anarchy.

Soon after the Thirty had taken power in the spring of 404, two of them, Theognis and Peison, proposed that measures should be adopted against the resident-aliens; nominally, because that class was disaffected—really, because it was rich. Ten resident-aliens were chosen out for attack, two poor men being included for the sake of appearances. Lysias and Polemarchos were on the list. When Theognis and Peison, with their attendants, came to the house of Lysias in the Peiraeus, they found him entertaining a party of friends. The guests were driven off, and their host was left in the charge of Peison, while Theognis and his companions went to the shield-manufactory close by to take an inventory of the slaves. Lysias, left alone with Peison, asked if he would take a sum of money to save him. ‘Yes,’ said Peison, ‘if it is a large sum.’ They agreed on a talent; and Lysias went to bring it from the room where he kept his money-box. Peison, catching sight of the box, called up two servants, and told them to take its whole contents. Thus robbed of more than thrice the amount bargained for, Lysias begged to be left at least enough to take him out of the country. Peison replied that he might consider himself lucky if he got off with his life. They were then going to leave the house, when they met at the door two other emissaries of the Thirty. Finding that Peison was now going to the house of Polemarchos in the town, these men relieved him of Lysias, whom they took to the house of one Damnippos. Theognis was there already with some other prisoners. As Lysias knew Damnippos, he took him aside, and asked him to assist his escape. Damnippos thought that it would be best to speak directly to Theognis, who, he was sure, would do anything for money. While Theognis and Damnippos were talking in the front-hall, Lysias slipped through the door, which chanced to be open, leading from the first court of the house to the second In Eratosth. § 16, τριῶν δὲ θυρῶν οὐσῶν ἃς ἔδει με διελθεῖν ἅπασαι ἀνεῳγμέναι ἔτυχον. The first of these must have been the μέταυλος θύρα, leading from the outer to the inner αὐλή.. He had still two doors to pass through— luckily they were both unlocked. He escaped to the house of Archeneôs, the master of a merchantship, close by, and sent him up to Athens to learn what had become of Polemarchos. Archeneôs came back with the news that Polemarchos had been met in the street by Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, and taken straight to prison. The same night Lysias took boat to Megara.

Polemarchos received the usual message of the Thirty τὸ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων εἰθισμένον παράγγελμα, πίνειν κώνειον: In Eratosth. § 17.—to drink the hemlock. Although the property of which the brothers had been despoiled was so valuable—including almost the whole stock of the shield-manufactory, gold and silver plate, furniture, and a large sum of money—the decencies of burial were refused to Polemarchos. He was laid out in the prison on a common stretcher,—one friend gave a cloth to throw over the body, another a cushion for the head, and so forth. A pair of gold earrings were taken from the ears of his widow In Eratosth. § 19. For the whole account of the arrest, see that speech, §§ 6—20..

Lysias aids the Exiles.

During the ten or twelve months of the exile— from the spring of 404 to the spring of 403—Lysias seems to have been active in the democratic cause. According to his biographer [Plut.] Vit. Lys. The facts mentioned there may have been taken from the speech of Lysias on the motion of Archînos (ib. § 11), and also from that περὶ τῶν ἰδίων εὐεργεσιῶν, (quoted by Harpokration s. vv. Κεῖοι, Φηγαιεῦσι, μεταπύργιον,) if indeed this was distinct from the former.—whose facts were probably taken from Lysias himself—he presented the army of the patriots with two hundred shields, and with a sum of two thousand drachmas; gained for it, with the help of one Hermon Ἑρμᾶνι in the Vit. Lys. § 7 ought probably to be Ἕρμωνι, as Blass assumes, Att. Bereds. p. 340., upwards of three hundred recruits; and induced his friend Thrasydaeos of Elis[Plut.] Vit. Lys. Cf. Xen. Hellen. III. 2. 27 . to contribute no less than two talents. Immediately upon the return from the Peiraeus to the city in the spring of 403, Thrasybulos proposed that the citizenship should be conferred upon Lysias; and the proposal was carried in the ekklesia. In one respect, however, it was informal. No measure could, in strictness, come before the popular assembly which was not introduced by a preliminary resolution (probouleuma) of the Senate. But at the moment when this decree was passed, the Senate had not yet been reconstituted after the anarchyThis appears from the statement of the pseudo-Plut. Vit. Lys. § 8, that the proposal was made μετὰ τὴν κάθοδον ἐπ’ ἀναρχίας τῆς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου, that is, immediately after the return in the spring of the year 403. Later in the same year Eukleides became archon; and with the revival of the constitutional forms which commenced in his archonship the ἀναρχία was held to have ended; and the probouleuma had therefore been wanting. On this ground Archînos, a colleague of Thrasybulos, arraigned the decree (under the Graphê Paranomôn) as unconstitutional, and it was annulled[Plut.] Vit. Lys. ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἐκύρωσε τὴν δωρεάν, ἀπενεγκαμένου δὲ Ἀρχίνου γραφὴν παρανόμων διὰ τὸ ἀπροβούλευτον εἰσαχθῆναι ἑάλω τὸ ψήφισμα.. The whole story has been doubtedAs by Scheibe (Blass, p 340), who thinks that the biographer assumed it from the vague allusion in Aeschin in Ctes § 195: Ἀρχῖνος γὰρ ὁ ἐκ Κοίλης ἐγράψατο παρανόμων Θρασύβουλον τὸν Στειριέα γράψαντά τι παρὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἕνα τῶν συγκατελθόντων αὐτῷ ἀπὸ Φύλης, καὶ εἷλε. This says only, τι.; but it is difficult to reject it when the Plutarchic biographer expressly refers to the speech made by Lysias in connection with the protest of Archînos ἔστι δ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ψηφίσματος (λόγος) ὃ ἐγράψατο Ἀρχῖνος, τὴν πολίτειαν αὐτοῦ περιελών: Vit. Lys. § 11.. Whether this speech was or was not identical with that of Lysias On his own ServicesSee p. 151, note 1. cannot be decided; but the latter must at least have been made upon this occasion.

The professional life of Lysias.

Stripped of a great part of his fortune by the Thirty Tyrants, and further straitened, probably, by his generosity to the exiles, Lysias seems now to have settled down to hard work at Athens. His activity as a writer of speeches for the law-courts falls—as far as we know—between the years 403 and 380 B. C. That it must have been great and constant is shown by the fact that Dionysios speaks of him as having written ‘not fewer than two hundred forensic speeches De Lys. c. 17..’ No other of the Attic orators was credited with so many as a hundred compositions of all kindsEven including doubtful speeches, as Blass observes, Att. Bereds. p. 344.. First in time and first, too, in importance among the extant orations of Lysias is that Against Eratosthenes, in whom he The impeachment of Eratosthenes. saw not only one of the Thirty Tyrants but the murderer of his brother Polemarchos. It was probably in 403 that Eratosthenes was impeached. The speech of Lysias, memorable as a display of eloquence, valuable, too, as a sufferer's picture of a dreadful time, has this further interest, that it is the only forensic speech known to have been spoken by Lysias himself, and that it marks his only personal contact with the politics of Athens.

Lysias had probably been a professional speech-writer Lysias and Sokrates. for about four years when Sokrates was brought to trial in 399. According to the popular account, Lysias wrote a defence for Sokrates to speak in court, but Sokrates declined to use itDiog. Laert. II. 40: [Plut.] Vit. Lys: Cic. de Orat. I. 54 § 231: Quint. II. 15 § 30, XI. 1 § 9: Valer. Max. VI. 4. 2: Stob. Flor. VII. 56.. In the story itself there is nothing improbable; Kephalos and his son Lysias had been the intimate friends of Sokrates. But it may be suspected that the story arose from a confusion. At some time later than 392 B. C. the sophist Polykrates published an epideictic Accusation of SokratesThe κατηγορία Σωκράτους of Polykrates is mcntioned by Suidas s. v. Πολυκράτης: Isokr. Bus. §§ 3, 5, and auctor | Argum.: Aelian V. H. XI. 10: Quint. II. 17, ef. III. 1: Diog. Laert. II. 38. Diogenes notices, from Favorinus, that Polykrates had referred to the rebuilding of the walls by Konon: therefore, as Bentley first pointed out (de Epist. Socr. § 6, p. 51), the speech cannot have been written before 392 B.C., and, in reply to it, Lysias wrote a speech In Defence of SokratesSchol. ad Aristid. p. 113. 16 (vol. III. p. 480 Dind.), οἶδε τὸν Σωκράτην πρὸς τοὺς νέους ἀεὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα θαυμάζοντα...ὡς Πολυκράτης ἐν τῷ κατ’ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ φησὶ καὶ Λυσίας ἐν τῷ πρὸς Πολυκράτην ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. The title of the speech probably was Ὑπὲρ Σωκράτους πρὸς Πολυκράτην.. This was extant in antiquity; and some one who had heard of it, but who knew nothing of the circumstances under which it was written, probably invented the story that it had been offered to, and declined by, the philosopher. The self-denial of Sokrates would be complete when, after rejecting the aid of money, he had rejected the aid of the best contemporary rhetoricDr L. Hölscher (Quaestiunculae Lysiacae, Herford, 1857, pp. 4 ff.) defends the ordinary account, believing that Lysias really composed a defence which Sokrates declined to use. He thinks that the ἀπολογία Σωκράτους mentioned among the works of Lysias by Phot. Cod. 262, Antiatt. in Bekker Anecd. p. 115. 8, Schol. ad Plat. Gorg. p. 331 B, and [Plut.] Vit. Lys, was distinct from the speech ὑπὲρ Σωκράτους written in reply to Polykrates, and cited by the scholiast on Aristides. He remarks that in the Plutarchic life the Apologia is described as ἐστοχασμένη τῶν δικαστῶν—which is meant, he thinks, to mark that it was more practical, more forcnsic, than Plato's Apologia Socratis. He observes also that the scholiast on the Gorgias (l. c.) notices the speech of Lysias as having contained matter about Anytos and Melêtos. But neither of these references affords any good ground for assuming that there was an Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους by Lysias distinct from his reply to Polykrates. The latter had been read by the scholiast on Aristides. Sauppe shows that the supposed Apologia was at all events not extant in antiquity (O. A. II. p. 203)..Lysias at Olympia.

Lysias is named in the ordinary text of his own speech On the Property of Aristophanes as taking part in an embassy to Dionysios the elder of Syracuse, an embassy of which the date cannot be put below 389 B. C. But there can be little doubt as to the correctness of the emendation which removes his name from that passageLys. de bonis Aristoph. § 19, βουλομένου Κόνωνος πέμπειν τινὰ εἰς Σικελίαν [Ἀριστοφάνης] ᾤχετο ὑποστὰς μετὰ Εὐνόμου καὶ Λυσίου, φίλου ὄντος καὶ ξένου, τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ πεποιηκότος, κ.τ.λ. Sauppe substitutes Διονυσίου for the words καὶ Λυσίου. Obviously the words φίλου ὄντος καὶ ξένου require to be defined by the mention of the person whose friend he was. Kayser proposed to insert Διονυσίῳ between Λυσίου and φίλου. Sauppe's remedy is, as Blass says, simpler and better.. There is better reason for believing another story in which the name of Lysias is associated with that of the elder Dionysios. We have good authorityDionys. Lys. c. 29: Diod. XIV. 109. for the statement that the Olympiakos, of which a large fragment remains, was spoken by Lysias in person at the Olympic festival of 388 B.C., to which Dionysios had sent a splendid embassy. In that speech Lysias pointed out that two great enemies—the despot of Syracuse in the west, the king of Persia in the east— threatened Greece; and urged union among Greeks with all the eagerness and with more than the sagacity of Isokrates.

Chronological limit of his known work.

As has already been noticed, the indisputably genuine works of Lysias, so far as they are known, cease about 380 B.C. The latest, the speech for Pherenikos of which a fragment remains, belongs to 381 or 380. Of the two speeches for Iphikrates, also represented by fragments only, one belonged to 371, the other to 354See Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 178, 190.; but Dionysios pronounced both spurious, partly on the external ground that Lysias could not then have been living; partly— which, for us, is the important point—on the internal evidence of styleDionys. Lys. c. 12.. It seems probable that Lysias died in, or soon after, 380 B.C., at the age of about eighty[Plut.] Vit. Lys. ἐτελεύτησεν ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη βιούς, ἢ ὥς τινες ἓξ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα, ἢ ὥς τινες ὑπὲρ ὀγδοήκοντα, ἰδὼν Δημοσθένην μειράκιον ὄντα [Schafer places the birth of Demosthenes in 384]. Dionys. Lys. c. 12 εἰ γὰρ ὀγδοήκοντα ἔτη γενόμενον θήσει τις τελευτῆσαι Λυσίαν, κ.τ.λ. .

Character of Lysias.

The character, as well as the capacity, of Lysias must be judged from the indirect evidence of his own writings. Circumstances kept him out of political life, in which his versatility and shrewdness would probably have held and improved the position which great powers of speech must soon have won. The part which he took during the troubles under the Thirty proved him a generous friend to Athens, as the Olympiakos shows him to have been a wise citizenThe expression is his own: he claims to give counsel as a good citizen (Olymp. § 3)—with the thought in his mind, perhaps, that if he was still but a μέτοικος of Athens he was at least a πολίτης of Hellas. of Greece; but his destiny was not that of a man of action. It is not likely that he regretted this much, though he must have felt his exclusion from the Athenian franchise as the refusal of a reward to which he had claims. His real strength—as far as can be judged now—lay in his singular literary tact. A fine perception of character in all sorts of men, and a faculty for dramatising it, aided by a sense of humour always under control; a certain pervading gracefulness and flexibility of mind; rhetorical skill, masterly in a sense hardly dreamed of at that day, since it could conceal itself—these were his most distinctive qualities and powers. His liberal discharge of public services, and his generosity to the exiles in 404, accord with the disposition which is suggested by the fragments of his letters. He was a man of warm nature, impulsive, hospitable, attached to his friends; fond of pleasure, and freely indulging in it; but, like Sophokles at the Chian supper-party described by IonAthenaeos XIII. pp. 603 E—604 D., carrying into social life the same intellectual quality which marks his best work—the grace and the temperate brightness of a thoroughly Athenian mind.

Lysias: Style
Lysias a literary artist

An appreciation of Lysias is, in one sense, easy for modern criticism. He was a literary artist, and his work bears the stamp of consummate literary skill. The reader may fail to realise the circumstances under which a particular speech was delivered, the force with which it appeals to emotion or to reason, the degree in which it was likely to prove persuasive or convincing. But he cannot fail to be aware that he is reading admirable prose. The merit of Lysias as a writer is secure of recognition. It is his oratorical power which runs some danger of being too lightly valued, unless attention is paid to the conditions under which it was exerted. The speech Against Eratosthenes, indeed, in which he expresses the passionate feeling of his own mind, would alone suffice to prove him in the modern sense eloquent. But a large majority of his other speeches are so comparatively tame, so poor in the qualities of the higher eloquence, that his oratorical reputation, to be understood, needs to be closely interpreted by the scope of his oratory.

Although on a few occasions he himself came forward as a speaker, the business of his life was to write for others. All sorts of men were among his clients; all kinds of causes in turn occupied him. Now he lent his services to the impeachment of an official charged with defrauding the Athenian treasury, or to the prosecution of some adherent of the Thirty, accused of having slandered away the lives of Athenian citizens; now he supplied the words in which a pauper begged that his obol a day from the State might not be stopped, or helped one of the parties to a drunken brawl to demand satisfaction for a black eye. The elderly citizen who appeals against the calumny of an informer to his past services as trierarch or choregus; the young man checked on the threshold of public life by some enemy's protest at his dokimasia for his first office,—in turn borrow their eloquence from Lysias. If he had been content to adopt the standard which he found existing in his profession, he would have written in nearly the same style for all these various ages and conditions. He would have treated all these different cases upon a uniform technical system, merely seeking, in every case alike, to obtain the most powerful effect and the highest degree of ornament by applying certain fixed rules. Lysias was a discoverer when he perceived that a purveyor of words for others, if he would serve his customers in the best way, must give the words the air of being their own. He saw that the monotonous intensity of the fashionable rhetoric—often ludicrously unsuited to the mouth into which it was put—was fatal to real impressiveness; and, instead of lending to all speakers the same false brilliancy, he determined to give to each the vigour of nature. It was the desire of treating appropriately every case entrusted to him, and of making each client speak as an intelligent person, without professional aid, might be expected to speak in certain circumstances, which chiefly determined the style of Lysias.

Lysias the representative of the Plain Style.

This style, imitated by many, but marked in Lysias by an original excellence, made him for antiquity the representative of a class of orators. It was in the latter part of the fourth century B. C. that Greek critics began regularly to distinguish three styles of rhetorical composition, the grand, the plain and the middle. The grand style aims constantly at rising above the common idiom; it seeks ornament of every kind, and rejects nothing as too artificial if it is striking. The plain style may, like the first, employ the utmost efforts of art, but the art is concealed; and, instead of avoiding, it imitates the language of ordinary life. The ‘middle’ style explains itself by its name. Theophrastos appears to have been the first writer on Rhetoric who attempted such a classification; there is, at least, no hint of it in Aristotle or in the Rhetorica ad AlexandrumDionysios, speaking of the third or middle style, declares himself unable to decide whether it was first used by Thrasymachos of Chalkêdon, ‘as Theophrastos thinks,’ or by some one else: De Demosth. c. 3. From this, Francken infers with great probability that the distinction between the three styles was first made by Theophrastos in his lost work περὶ λέξεως (Commentationes Lysiacae, p. 9).. Vague as the classification necessarily is, it was frequently modified according to the taste of individual teachers. The two extremes—the grand and the plain styles—were recognised by all; but some discerned twoThus Demetrios (περὶ ἑρμην. c. 36, Walz, Rh. Graec. vol. IX. p. 21) distinguishes four types or χαρακτῆρες—the plain (ἰσχνός), the grand (μεγαλοπρεπής), the polished (γλαφυρός), and the forcible (δεινός)—meaning by the last a terse, vigorous style, suited to controversy in court or council., some threeSyrianos, in his commentary on the περὶ ἰδεῶν of Hermogenes (Walz, Rh. Graec. vol. VII. p. 93), says that Hipparchos (a rhetorician who wrote a treatise περὶ τρόπων, ib. VI. p. 337) recognised five styles—the plain (ἰσχνός), the copious (ἁδρός—another name for the μεγαλοπρεπής), the middle (μέσος), the graphic (γραφικός), and the florid (ἀνθηρός). shades between them; while others thought it needless to distinguish anything intermediateDemetrios says that his γλαφυρὸς χαρακτήρ was considered by some as a branch of the ἰσχνός, and his δεινὸς χαρακτήρ as the branch of the μεγαλοπρεπής: περὶ ἑρμ. c. 36, Walz, IX. 21.. On the whole, however, the tripartite division kept its ground down to Roman times. It was adopted, with variations of detail, by Cicero Cic. Orator c. 6 § 20, grandiloqui—tenues, acuti—medius et quasi temperatus. , DionysiosDionysios describes the grand style as ἐξηλλαγμένη, περιττή, ἐγκατάσκευος (De Demosth. 1), or ὑψηλὴ λέξις (ib. 34): the plain, as λιτή, ἀφελής (ib. 2), or ἰσχνή, ἀπέριττος (ib. 34): the middle as μέση (ib. 34) or μικτή (ib. 3). and QuintilianQuint. XII. c. 10 § 58. Unum subtile (genus), quod ἰσχνόν vocant, alterum grande atque robustum, quod ἁδρόν dicunt, constituunt; tertium alii medium ex duobus, alii floridum (namque id ἀνθηρόν appellant) addiderunt. . The characteristics of the ‘plain’ style General characteristics of the Plain Style. —with which we are most concerned at present—are only sketched by DionysiosDionys. De Demosth. c. 2, ἡ ἑτέρα λέξις, ἡ λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, καὶ δοκοῦσα κατασκευήν τε καὶ ἰσχὺν τὴν πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὁμοιότητα—a vague description, which tells us only that this style is based upon ἰδιώτης λόγος—the language of ordinary life.; but they are more precisely given by Cicero. There is a difference, indeed, between the points of view of the two critics. Dionysios treats the three styles historically; Cicero treats them theoretically. The ‘middle’ style of Cicero differs, therefore, from the ‘middle’ style of Dionysios in being an ideal. But Cicero's description of the ‘plain’ style, at least, would probably have been accepted in the main by Dionysios; and it is clear that for Cicero, as for Dionysios, Lysias was the canon of that style. According to Cicero, the chief marks of the ‘genus tenue’ are these:—1. In regard to composition—a free structure of clauses and sentences, not straining after a rhythmical period Cic. Orator § 77, Primum igitur eum tanquam e vinculis numerorum eximamus......Solutum quiddam sit, nec vagum tamen. . 2. In regard to diction—(a) purity ib. § 79 sermo erit purus et Latinus. , (b) clearness ib. dilucide planeque dicetur. , (c) propriety ib. quid deceat circumspiciatur. . 3. Abstemious use of rhetorical figures ib § 80 verecundus erit usus oratoriae quasi supellectilis. supellex est enim quodammodo nostra quae est in ornamentis, alia rerum, alia verborum. .

Originality of Lysias.

With certain exceptions, which will be noticed in their place, Lysias has these characteristics, and is the best representative of the plain style, whether viewed historically or in the abstract. That style gradually came to be used by almost all writers for the ekklesia or the law-courts; but it was Lysias, says Dionysios, who ‘perfected’ it, and ‘brought it to the summit of the excellence proper to itDionys. De Demosth. c. 2, ἐτελείωσε δ’ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰς ἀκρὸν ἤγαγε τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς Λυσίας ὁ Κεφάλου..’ In order that the originality of Lysias may not be underrated, attention must be given to the precise meaning of this statement. It appears to speak of him merely as having succeeded better than others in a style used by nearly all writers of speeches for the law-courts. But what was, in fact, common to him and them was this only—the avoidance of decidedly poetical ornament and the employment of sober prose. This is all that the ‘plain’ style, as opposed to the ‘elaborate,’ necessarily means. That which he had, and which no other had in the same degree, was the art of so writing this prose that it should be in character with the person who spoke it. Their style was monotonously plain; his was plain too, but it was more, it was variously natural. Dionysios shows elsewhere that he appreciated to the full the originality of Lysias; but he has hardly brought it out with sufficient clearness in the passage which has just been noticed. Lysias may, in a general sense, be regarded as the perfecter of a style already practised by many others; but it is closer to the truth to call him the founder of a new one, and of one in which he was never rivalledThe question, ‘How far is Lysias the true repres entative of the genus tenue?’ has been exhaustively discussed by Dr F. Berbig, in an essay ‘Ueber das genus dicendi tenue des Redners Lysias’ (Gymnasium-program, Cüstrin, 1871: reviewed in the Philologischer Anzeiger III. 5. p. 252). The essay will be referred to below. Its general conclusion is that ‘In all his writings Lysias must be pronounced, by any judgment not absolutely rigorous, an excellent model of the plain style;’ though both his composition and his language depart from it in certain points..

It does not, perhaps, strike the modern mind as very remarkable that a man whose business was to write speeches for other people should have conceived the idea of making the speech appropriate to the person. In order to understand why this conception was, at the time, a proof of genius, it is necessary to remember how rhetoric was then viewed. Prose composition in its infancy was a craft, a close profession, just as much as poetry. Beside the sacred band of ‘wise’ poets stood the small group of experts skilled to fashion artistic prose. When a man wished for help in a law-suit he applied, as a matter of course, if he could afford it, to one of these; and it was equally a matter of course that the speech supplied to him should bear the same stamp as others turned out by the same machine. There was no pretence of its being the work of the speaker, and no expectation, therefore, that it should reflect his nature; a certain rhetorical colour, certain recognized forms of argument and appeal, were alone looked for. The idea of writing for a client so that he should have in court the whole advantage of professional aid, and, in addition to this, the advantage of appearing to have dispensed with it, was not only novel but daring. This is what Lysias first undertook to do, and did admirably.

Had his style been florid before it became plain?

His dramatic purpose—if it may be so called— decided the special characteristics of his style. But, even without this purpose, an instinctive dislike of exaggeration would of itself have given his style some general characteristics, sufficient to distinguish it from that of any of his contemporaries. On this account we must dissent from a view advanced by K. O. Müller in his History of Greek LiteratureVol. II. p. 143 (transl. Donaldson). . Lysias had, he thinks, two distinct styles at two different periods of his life; the earlier, ‘forced and artificial;’ the later, plain. Müller recognises the former in the speech in the Phaedros, and in the Epitaphios. The turning-point was, he conceives, the impeachment of Eratosthenes, when ‘a real feeling of pain and anger’ in the mind of Lysias gave ‘a more lively and natural flow both to his spirits and to his speech.’ ‘This occasion’—Müller adds— ‘convinced Lysias what style of oratory was both the most suited to his own character and also least likely to fail in producing an effect upon the judges.’ Ingenious as the theory is, we have no belief in the fact of any such abrupt transition as it supposes. That temperate mastery with which Lysias cultivated the ‘plain’ style is doubly a marvel if it was only a sudden practical experience which weaned him from his first love for a forced and artificial rhetoric. Converts are not proverbial for discretion; and the exquisite judgment shown by Lysias after his supposed reformation ought to have prevented its necessity. Like all his contemporaries he must, unquestionably, have had his earliest training in the florid Sicilian school; but there is nothing to show that its precepts ever took a strong hold upon him; and there is overwhelming reason to believe that a genius of the bent of his must very early have thrown off such pedantic trammels. It is true that the speech in the Phaedros —assuming its genuineness—is more stiffly composed than any of his presumably later writings: but, on the other hand, it is, as Müller allows, entirely free from the ornaments of Gorgias. As for the Epitaphios, its spuriousness is now a generally recognised factSee below..

Special characteristics of his style.

Plainness and an easy versatility are, then, the general characteristics of Lysias. We propose now to consider in detail his special characteristics; speaking first of his style in the narrower sense, his composition and diction; next of his method of handling subject-matter.

His Composition.

Cicero, as we have seen, counts among the marks of the ‘plain’ style a free structure of sentences and clauses, not straining after a rhythmical period ( Orator § 77, quoted above). Dionysios, speaking of êthopoiïa in Lysias, says that he composes ‘quite simply and plainly, aware that êthos is best expressed, not in rhythmical periods, but in the lax (or easy) style’ (ἐν τῇ διαλελυμένῃ λέξει)Dionys. De Lys. c. 8.. In another place, however, he praises Lysias for a vigour, essential in contests, ‘which packs thoughts closely and brings them out roundly’ (στρογγύλως) ib. c. 6.—that is, in terse periods. Both remarks are just. Nothing more strikingly distinguishes Lysias from his predecessors and from nearly all his successors than the degree in which the structure of his sentences varies according to his subject. His speeches may in this respect be classified under three heads. First, those which are of a distinctly public character; in which the composition is thoroughly rhythmical, and which abound with artistic periods, single or combinedIn this class, Berbig (in the essay mentioned above ‘Ueber das genus dicendi tenue des Redners Lysias,’ p. 8) places these speeches: 1. Or. XXVII. (κατὰ Ἐπικράτους): 2. Or. XXVIII. (κατὰ Ἐργοκλέους): 3. Or. XXIX. (κατὰ Φιλοκράτους): 4. Or. XXXIII. ( Ὀλυμπιακός): 5. Or. XXXIV. (περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.). Secondly, those speeches which, from the nature of their subjects, blend the private with the public character; which show not only fewer combinations or groups of periods, but a less careful formation of single periodse.g. 1. Or. XII. (κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους): 2. Or. XIII. (κατὰ Ἀγοράτου): 3. Or. XVI. (κατὰ Φίλωνος): 4. Or. XIX. (περὶ τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων .). Thirdly, the essentially private speeches; which differ from the second class, not in the mould of such periods as occur, but in the larger mixture with these of sentences or clauses not periodicIn this third class two grades may be distinguished, according to the importance of the subject and the use, greater or less accordingly, of a periodic style. I. 1. Or. I. (περὶ τοῦ Ἐρατοσθένους φόνου): 2. Or. III. (κατὰ Σίμωνος): 3. Or. IV. (περὶ τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας): 4. Or. VII. (περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ). II. 1. Or. XVII. (περὶ δημοσίων χρημάτων): 2. Or. XXIII. (κατὰ Παγκλέωνος): 3. Or. XXXII. (κατὰ Διογείτονος ).. Further, in each of these three classes, a greater freedom of composition distinguishes the narrative from the argument. The narrative parts of the properly public speeches are usually thrown into what may be called the historical as opposed to the oratorical period; that is, the sentences are more loosely knit and are drawn out to a greater length. According as the speech has more of a private character, these freer periods are more and more relaxed into a simple series (λέξις εἰρομένη) of longer or shorter clauses. Yet, while there are so many shades in the composition of Lysias, the colour of the whole is individual. Isokrates develops period out of period in long, luxuriant sequence; Demosthenes intersperses the most finished and most vigorous periods with less formally built sentences which relieve them; Lysias binds his periods, by twos or threes at the most, into groups always moderate in size but often monotonous in form; excelling Isokrates in compactness, but yielding to Demosthenes in lifeCf. Dionys. De Lys. c. 6 (speaking of the terse periodic style)—ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις, Dionysios says, ταύτην ὀλίγοι μὲν ἐμιμήσαντο, Δημοσθένης δὲ καὶ ὑπερεβάλετο· πλὴν οὐχ οὕτως εὐτολῶς οὐδὲ ἀφελῶς ὥσπερ Λυσίας, χρησάμενος αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ περιέργως καὶ πικρῶς. .

His Diction—its purity.

The diction of Lysias is distinguished in the first place by its purity. This is a quality upon which no modern could have pronounced authoritatively, but for which the ancient Greek critic vouches. In the Augustan age the reaction from florid Asianism to Atticism had set in strongly, and especial attention was paid by Greek grammarians to the marks of a pure Attic style. Dionysios may be taken as a competent judge. He pronounces Lysias to be ‘perfectly pure in expression, the best canon of Attic speech,— not of the old used by Plato and Thucydides,’ but of that which was in vogue in his own timeDionys. De Lys. c. 2.. This may be seen, he adds, by a comparison with the writings of Andokides, Kritias and many others. Two ideas are included under the ‘purity’ praised here; abstinence from words either obsolete (γλῶσσαι) or novel, or too decidedly poetical; and abstinence from constructions foreign to the idiom of the day— an excellence defined elsewhere as ‘accuracy of dialect ib. c. 13, where the ‘purity’ spoken of in c, 2 is defined as consisting of two elements—τὸ καθαρὸν τῶν ὁνομάτων and ἡ ἀκρίβεια τῆς διαλέκτου..’ Lysias is not rigidly pure in these respects. The only instance of an old-fashioned syntax, indeed, which has been noticed in him, is the occasional use of τε as a copulaThis use occurs seven times in all: Or. I. § 17: XIII. §§ 1, 82 : XXXI. §§ 1, 5 : XXXII. §§ 1, 22. Berbig, p. 13.; nor does he use such pedantic words as were meant by ‘glossae;’ but rare or poetical words and phrases occur in many placese.g. Or. XXXIII. § 3 μικρολογησόμενος: § 7 οἰκοῦντες ἀπόρθητοι καὶ ἀτείχιστοι καὶ ἀστασίαστοι καὶ ἀήττητοι: Or. IV. § 8 παρωξυμμένος ὀξύχειρ λίαν καὶ πάροινός ἐστιν: § 9 ἐς του—το βαρυδαιμονίας ἥκει: § 20 ἀνήκεστος συμφορά: Or. XVIII. § 49, ἀρχαιόπλουτος: Or. XIII § 45 ἀκλεής— γηροτροφεῖν: Or. XXVI. § 4 ἀείμνηστος: Or. XXX. § 35 μισοπονηρεῖν: Or. XXIV. § 3 δυστυχήματα ἰᾶσθαι: Or. XXXIII. § 7 ἀθάνατος ἐλευθερία.. The praise of purity must be taken in a general and relative sense. Of those who came after Lysias, Isokrates most nearly approached him in this qualityDionys. De Lys. c. 2 Ἰσοκράτης—καθαρώτατος δὴ τῶν ἄλλων μετά γε Λυσίαν.; but Isaeos is also commended for itDionys. De Isaeo. c. 3. .

Simplicity.

Next, in contrast with the Sicilian school of rhetoric, Lysias is characterised by a general avoidance of ornamental figures. Such figures as occur are mostly of the kind which men use in daily life without rhetorical consciousness,—hyperbole, metaphor, prosopopoiïa and the likeAs an instance of a common prosopopoiïa see e.g. Or. XXI. § 8 οὔτω παρεσκευασμένην τριήρη πόσα οἴεσθε...τοὺς πολεμίους εἴργασθαι κακά; Other common figures which occur in Lysias are synekdoche, e.g. Or. XXXIII. § 9 τὰς ἐλπίδας τῆς σωτηρίας: antonomasia, Or. § 15 ὁ σεμνὸς Στειριεύς: metonymia, Or. XII. § 60 τὰς πόλεις ἐπάγοντες: epanaphora, Or. XXX. § 3 πολλὰ μέν... πολλὰ δέ: synathroismos, Or. XXXIII. § 3 καί...καί...καί...καί: periphrasis, Or. XVIII. § 3 τρόπαιον ἱστάναι, &c.. As a rule, he expresses his meaning by ordinary words employed in their normal senseDionys. De Lys. c. 3 (ἀρετὴ ) ἡ διὰ τῶν κυρίων τε καὶ κοινῶν καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κειμένων ὀνομάτων ἐκφέρουσα τὰ νοούμενα.. His panegyrical speeches and his letters are said to have presented a few exceptions to this rule; but all his business-works, as Dionysios calls them—his speeches for the ekklesia and for the law-courts—are stamped with this simplicity. He seems, as his critic says, to speak like the ordinary man, while he is in fact the most consummate of artists ib. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἰδιώταις διαλέγεσθαι δοκῶν πλεῖστον ὅσον ἰδιώτου διαφέρει .,—a prose poet who knows how to give an unobtrusive distinction to common language, and to bring out of it a quiet and peculiar music ib. κράτιστος ποιητὴς λόγων λελυμένης ἐκ μέτρου λέξεως, ἰδίαν τινὰ λόγων εὑρηκὼς ἁρμονίαν, ᾗ τὰ ὀνόματα κοσμεῖ τε καὶ ἡδύνει, μηδὲν ἔχοντα ὀγκῶδες μηδὲ φορτικόν.. Isokrates had the same command of familiar words, but he was not content to seek effect by artistic harmonies of these. His ambition was to be ornate; and hence one of the differences remarked by Dionysios: Isokrates is sometimes vulgar Dionys. De Isocr. c. 3 σχηματίζει φορτικῶς.; Lysias never is. There is one kind of ornament, however, which Lysias uses largely, and in respect to which he deserts the character of the plain style. He delights in the artistic parallelism (or opposition) of clauses. This may be effected: (1) by simple correspondence of clauses in length (isokôlon); (2) by correspondence of word with word in meaning (antitheton proper); (3) by correspondence of word with word in sound (paromoion)Isokôla and homoioteleuta constantly occur together. see esp. Or. XII. (§§ 1, 4, 6, 19, 26, 32, 39, &c.) and Or. XXXIII. passim. A speeial form of the paromoion, viz. paronomasia, is frequent in Lysias: e.g. Or. XXXI. § 11 γνώμῃ—συγγνώμης: § 24 τιμωρηθήσεται—τετιμήσεται: Or. XXX. § 29 τὰ πάτρια— κατὰ πατέρα.. Examples are very numerous both in the public and in the private speeches. This love of antithesis—shown on a larger scale in the terse periodic composition—is the one thing which sometimes blemishes the êthos in Lysias.

Clearness and conciseness.

Closely connected with this simplicity is his clearness. Lysias is clear in a twofold sense; in thought, and in expression. Figurative language is often a source of confusion of thought; and the habitual avoidance of figures by Lysias is one reason why he not only speaks but thinks clearly. In regard to this clearness of expression Dionysios has an excellent remark. This quality might, he observes, result merely from ‘deficiency of power,’ i.e. poverty of language and of fancy which constrained the speaker to be simple. In the case of Lysias it does, in fact, result from wealth of the right words De Lys. c. 4 καὶ εἰ μὲν δἰ ἀσθένειαν δυνάμεως ἐγίγνετο τὸ σαφὲς οὐκ ἄξιον ἦν αὐτὸ ἀγαπᾶν· νῦν δὲ ὁ πλοῦτος τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων ἐκ πολλῆς αὐτῷ περιουσίας ἀποδείκνυται ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν.. He uses only plain words; but he has enough of these to express with propriety the most complex idea. The combination of clearness with conciseness is Conciseness. achieved by Lysias because he has his language thoroughly under command; his words are the disciplined servants of his thoughts ib. c. 4 οὐ τοῖς ὀνόμασι δουλεύει τὰ πράγματα παρ’ αὐτῷ, τοῖς δὲ πράγμασιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ ὀνόματα.. Isokrates is clear; but he is not also concise. In the union of these two excellences, IsaeosIt is remarkable that Dionysios expressly denies to Demosthenes the invariable clearness of Lysias, De Lys. c. 4 τῆς μὲν Θουκυδίδου λέξεως καὶ Δημοσθένους, οἳ δεινότατοι τὰ πράγματα ἐξειπεῖν ἐγένοντο, πολλὰ δυσείκαστά ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσαφῆ. perhaps stands next to Lysias. There are, indeed, exceptions to the conciseness of Lysias, as there are exceptions to the purity and the plainness of his diction. Instances occur in which terms nearly synonymous are accumulated, either for the sake of emphasis or merely for the sake of symmetry For emphasis (e.g.) in Or. XIII. § 63 οἱ δ’ αὐτῶν περιγενόμενοι καὶ σωθέντες, οὓς οὗτος μὲν ἀπέκτεινεν ὠμῶς καὶ θάνατος αὐτῶν κατεγνώσθη, ἡ δὲ τύχη καὶ ὁ δαίμων περιεποίησε . . . τιμῶνται ὑφ’ ὑμῶν. For symmetry (e.g.) in Or. XXVIII. § 3 καὶ γὰρ δὴ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη εἰ νῦν μὲν οὕτως αὐτοὶ πιεζόμενοι ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς συγγνώμην τοῖς κλέπτουσι καὶ τοῖς δωροδοκοῦσιν ἔχοιτε, ἐν δὲ τῷ τέως χρόνῳ καὶ τῶν οἴκων τῶν ὑμετέρων μεγάλων ὄντων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων προσόδων μεγάλων οὐσῶν, θανάτῳ ἐκολάζετε τοὺς τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμοῦντας: where, as Blass observes, the words μεγάλων οὐσῶν are superfluous, and the phrase τοὺς τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιθυμοῦντας where τοὺς τοιούτους would have sufficed, is meant to balance τοῖς κλέπτουσι καὶ τοῖς δωροδοκοῦσιν.Another strong instance of redundancy of the former kind—the emphatic—is Or. XXI. § 24 οὐδεπώποτ’ ἠλέησα οὐδ’ ἐδάκρυσα οὐδ’ ἐμνήσθην γυναικὸς οὐδὲ παίδων τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ, οὐδ’ ἡγούμην δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ τελευτήσας ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ὀρφανοὺς καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπεστερημένους αὐτοὺς καταλείψω. Favorinus, according to Gellius (II. V.), used to say:—‘If you remove a single word from a passage of Plato, or alter it, however suitably to the sense, you will still have taken away something from the elegance; if you do so in Lysias, you will have taken away something from the sense.’ This praise, as we have seen, needs modification.; but such instances are not frequent.

Vividness.

Vividness, ἐνάργεια—‘the power of bringing under the senses what is narratedDionys. De Lys. c. 7 δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα.’—is an attribute of the style of Lysias. The dullest hearer cannot fail to have before his eyes the scene described, and to fancy himself actually in presence of the persons introduced as speaking. Lysias derives this graphic force from two things;—judicious use of detail, and perception of character. A good example of it is his description, in the speech Against Eratosthenes, of his own arrest by Theognis and Peison In Eratosth. §§ 8—17.. Dionysios ascribes vividness, as well as clearness, to Isokrates also De Isocr. c. 2.; but there is perhaps only one passage in the extant work of Isokrates which strictly justifies this praiseThe passage in the Aeginêtikos in which the speaker describes his care of Thrasylochos: §§ 24—27.. A description may be brilliant without being in the least degree graphic. The former quality depends chiefly on the glow of the describer's imagination; the latter depends on his truthfulness and skill in grouping around the main incident its lesser circumstances. A lifelike picture demands the union of fine colouring and correct drawing. Isokrates was a brilliant colourist; but he was seldom, like Lysias, an accurate draughtsman.

Êthopoiïa.

From this trait we pass naturally to another which has just been mentioned as one of its sources— the faculty of seizing and portraying character. Of all the gifts of Lysias this is the most distinctive, and is the one which had greatest influence upon his style. It is a talent which does not admit of definition or analysis; it can be understood only by studying its results. It is shown, as Dionysios says, in three things—thought, diction, and composition De Lys. c. 8 τριῶν τε ὄντων ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην συμβέβηκεν εἶναι, διανοίας τε καὶ λέξεως καὶ τρίτης τῆς συνθέσεως, ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνομαι κατορθοῦν.; that is, the ideas, the words, and the style in which the words are put together, always suit the person to whom they are ascribedFrancken (Commentationes Lysiacae, pp. 5—7) thinks it doubtful whether by the ἠθοποιΐα of Lysias Dionysios meant the appropriate delineation of each several character, or the attribution to all characters alike of a certain attractive simplicity. Francken inclines to the latter view. He refers to cases in which, as he thinks, Lysias has failed, or has not tried, to mark individual character, or in which the general stamp of simplicity is exaggerated. The appreciation of êthos depends much upon taste; it scarcely admits of argument. But it is clear to me what Dionysios, at least, meant by the ἠθοποιϊα of Lysias. He meant the appropriate delineation of each several character. Surely he says so very plainly: De Lys. c. 8 οὐ γὰρ διανοουμένους μόνον ὑποτίθεται χρηστὰ καὶ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ μέτρια τοὺς λέγοντας, ὥστε εἰκόνας εἶναι δοκεῖν τῶν ἠθῶν τοὺς λόγους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἀποδίδωσι τοῖς ἤθεσιν οἰκείαν. Cf. K. O. Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. II. p. 143 (tr. Donaldson):—‘Lysias distinguished, with the accuracy of a dramatist, between the different characters into whose mouths he put his speeches, and made everyone, the young and the old, the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated, speak according to his quality and condition: this is what the ancient critics praise under the name of his Êthopoiia. The prevalent tone, however, was that of the average man.’. There is hardly one of the extant speeches of Lysias upon which this peculiar power has not left its mark. Many of them, otherwise poor in interest, have a permanent artistic value as describing, with a few quiet touches, this or that type of man. For instance, the Defence which is the subject of the Twenty-first Oration is interesting solely because it embodies to the life that proud consciousness of merit with which a citizen who had deserved well of the State might confront a calumny. In the speech on the Sacred Olive, if the nameless accused is not a person for us, he is at least a character—the man who shrinks from public prominence of any kind, but who at the same time has a shy pride in discharging splendidly all his public duties De sacra Olea §§ 1—3, 30.. The injured husband, again, who has taken upon Eratosthenes the extreme vengeance sanctioned by the law, is the subject of an indirect portrait, in which homeliness is combined with the moral dignity of a citizen standing upon his rights ( De caed. Eratosth. (Or. I.) §§ 5 ff., 47—50). The steady Athenian householder of the old type, and the adventurous patriot of the new, are sketched in the speech On the Property of Aristophanes De Aristoph. bonis §§ 18— 23, 55—64.. The accuser of Diogeiton, unwilling to prosecute a relative, but resolved to have a shameful wrong redressed;—Diogeiton's mother, pleading with him for her sons;—are pictures all the more effective because they have been produced without apparent effort In Diogeit. §§ 1—3, 12—17.. But of all such delineations—and, as Dionysios says, no character in Lysias is inartistically drawn or lifeless De Lys. c. 8 ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲ εὑρεῖν δύναμαι παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι τούτῳ πρόσωπον οὔτε ἀνηθοποίητον οὔτε ἄψυχον.—perhaps the cleverest and certainly the most attractive is that of Mantitheos, the brilliant young Athenian who is vindicating his past life before the Senate. Nowhere is the ethical art of Lysias more ably shown than in the ingenuous words of apology with which, as by an afterthought, Mantitheos concludes his frank and highspirited defence:—

‘I have understood, Senators, that some people are annoyed with me for this too—that I presumed, though rather young, to speak in the Assembly. It was about my own affairs that I was first compelled to speak in public; after that, however, I do suspect myself of having been more ambitiously inclined than I need have been,—partly through thinking of my family, who have never ceased to be statesmen,— partly because I saw that you (to tell the truth) respect none but such men; so that, seeing this to be your opinion, who would not be invited to act and speak in behalf of the State? And besides— why should you be vexed with such men? The judgment upon them rests with none but yourselves Pro Mantith. §§ 20, 21..’

The ‘propriety’ and ‘charm’ of Lysias.

The ‘propriety’ which has always been praised in Lysias depends mainly on this discernment of what suits the character of each speaker; but it includes more—it has respect also to the hearers and to the subject, and generally to all the circumstances of the case. The judge, the ekklesiast, the listener in the crowd at a festival are not addressed in the same vein; different excellences of style characterise the opening, the narrative, the argument, the final appealThe distinction between Êthopoiia and the Propriety praised in Lysias will appear from a careful reading of Dionys. De Lys. cc. 8, 9. Êthopoiïa is the adaptation of the speech to the intrinsic character of the speaker. Propriety is the adaptation of the speech to the circumstances;—on the one hand, to the age, quality, occupation, &c. of the speaker; on the other hand, to the cause and to the audience..His ‘charm.’

It remains to say a few words on the peculiar and crowning excellence of Lysias in the province of expression,—his famous but inexplicable ‘charm.’ It is noticeable that while his Roman critics merely praise his elegance and polish, regarding it as a simple result of his art Cic. Brut. § 35 egregie subtilis scriptor atque elegans : ib. § 285, ieiunitas polita, urbana, elegans . Quint. X. 1. 78 subtilis atque elegans: IX. 4. 17 gratia quae in eo maxima est simplicis atque inaffectati coloris. It must be allowed to Cicero that he felt the plainness of Lysias to have a charm of its own. But he did not, like Dionysios, feel this charm to be something independent of the plainness, which could be used as a distinct test of genuine work. See Orator § 78, nam ut mulieres esse dicuntur nonnullae inornatae, quas id ipsum deceat, sic haec subtilis oratio atque incompta delectat. fit enim quiddam in utroque, quo sit venustius, sed non ut appareat. , the finer sense of his Greek critic apprehends a certain nameless grace or charm, which cannot be directly traced to art,—which cannot be analysed or accounted for: it is something peculiar to him, of which all that can be said is that it is there. What, asks Dionysios, is the freshness of a beautiful face? What is fine harmony in the movements and windings of music? What is rhythm in the measurement of times? As these things baffle definition, so does the charm of Lysias. It cannot be taken to pieces by reasoning; it must be seized by a cultivated instinct Dionys. De Lys. c. 11. Note the words—τίς ἡ παρ’ αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστι, βουλομένοις μαθεῖν ὑποθείμην ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν χρόνῳ μακρῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ, καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάθει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκει—ν αἴσθησιν—‘and to train their critical sense by a feeling as instinctive as itself.’. It is the final criterion of his genuine work. ‘When I am puzzled about one of the speeches ascribed to him, and when it is hard for me to find the truth by other marks, I have recourse to this excellence, as to the last piece on the board. Then, if the Graces of Speech seem to me to make the writing fair, I count it to be of the soul of Lysias; and I care not to look further into it. But if the stamp of the language has no winningness, no loveliness, I am chagrined, and suspect that after all the speech is not by Lysias; and I do no more violence to my instinct, even though in all else the speech seems to me clever and well-finished; believing that to write well, in special styles other than this, is given to many men; but that to write winningly, gracefully, with loveliness, is the gift of Lysias.’ Ib.

A modern reader would be sanguine if he hoped to analyse the distinctive charm of Lysias more closely than Dionysios found himself able to do. He may be content if study by degrees gives him a dim apprehension of something which he believes that he could use, as Dionysios used the qualities detected by his ‘instinct,’ in deciding between the genuine and the false. Evidently the same cause which in great measure disqualifies a modern for estimating the ‘purity’ of the language of Lysias also disqualifies him for estimating its charm. This charm may be supposed to have consisted partly in a certain felicity of expression,—Lysias having a knack of using the word which, for some undefinable reason, was felt to be curiously right; partly in a certain essential urbanity, the reflection of a nature at once genial and refined. The first quality is evidently beyond the sure appreciation of a modern ear: the second less so, yet scarcely to be estimated with nicety, since here too shades of expression are concerned. At best a student of Lysias may hope to attain a tolerably true perception of what he could not have written: but hardly the faculty of rejoicing that he wrote just as he did.

His treatment of subject, matter.

Having now noticed the leading characteristics of Lysias in regard to form of language, we will consider some of his characteristics in the other great department of his art—the treatment of the subject-matter. In this the ancient critics distinguished two chief elements, Invention and Arrangement εὕρεσις—τάξις: Dionys. De Lys. c. 15..

By ‘invention’ was meant the faculty of discovering Invention. the arguments available in any given circumstances; the art, in short, of making the most of a case. Sokrates, criticising the speech in the Phaedros, is made to express contempt for the inventive power of LysiasPlat. Phaedr. pp. 234 E—236 A.. Arguments, however, which would not pass with a dialectician, might do very well for a jury. If Plato found Lysias barren of logical resource, Dionysios emphatically praises his fertile cleverness in discovering every weapon of controversy which the facts of a case could yield to the most penetrating searchDionys. Lys. c. 13.. The latter part of the speech against Agoratos may be taken as a good example of this exhaustive ingenuity In Agorat. §§ 49—90.. It is a fault, indeed, that there the speaker attempts to make too many small points in succession; and one, at least, of these is a curious instance of overdone subtlety ib. §§ 70—90, in which it is argued that the amnesty of 403 does not hold good as between two members of the same political party..

In regard to arrangement, Lysias is distinguished Arrangement. from all other Greek orators by a uniform simplicity. His speeches consist usually of four parts, which follow each other in a regular order: proem, narrative, proof, epilogue ἔστι δὲ τὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως στοιχεῖα τέσσαρα, προοίμιον, διήγησις, πίστεις, ἐπίλογος: Dionys. Art. Rhet. X. c. 12. Aristotle's enumeration is προοίμιον, πρόθεσις, πίστις, ἐπίλογος : Rhet. III. 13.. In some cases, the nature of the subject renders a narrative, in the proper sense, unnecessary; in others, the narrative is at the same time the proof; in a few, the proem is almost or entirely dispensed with. But in no case is there anything more elaborate than this fourfold partition, —and in no case is the sequence of the parts altered. This simple arrangement, contrasting with the manifold subdivisions which Plato notices as used by the rhetoricians of his day Phaedr. pp. 266 E, 267 E. Cf. Arist. Rhet. IV. 13., is usually said to have been first made by IsokratesDionys. Lys. 16: Sauppe, O.A. II. 224: Cope, Introd. to Arist. Rhetoric, p. 332.. This may be true in the sense that it was he who first stated it theoretically. In practice, however, it had already been employed by Lysias; and more strictly than by Isokrates himselfWestermann (Griesch. Bereds. p. 75) seems to recognise Lysias as the inventor of the fourfold partition.. The difference between their systems, according to Dionysios, is precisely this;—Lysias uses always the same simple framework, never interpolating, subdividing or definingDionys. De Lys. c. 15.; Isokrates knows how to break the uniformity by transpositions of his own devising, or by novel episodesId. De Isocr. c. 4, τὸ διαλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν ὁμοειδίαν ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς καὶ ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις.. The same difference, in a stronger form, separates Lysias here from his imitator in much else, Isaeos. Every kind of artifice is used by Isaeos in shifting, subdividing, recombining the four rudimentary elements of the speech according to the special conditions of the caseId. De Isae. c. 14.. It was this versatile tact in disposing his forces—this generalship τοὺς δὲ δικαστὰς καταστρατηγεῖ , De Isae 3., as Dionysios in one place calls it—which chiefly procured for Isaeos the reputation of unequalled adroitness in fighting a bad causeHis reputation in this respect was of a somewhat sinister kind:— ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξα παρὰ τοῖς τότε γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης, ὡς δεινὸς ἀνὴρ τεχνιτεῦσαι λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρότερα. Dionys. De Isae. 4.. Lysias had consummate literary skill and much acuteness; but his weapons were better than his plan of campaign; he was not a subtle tactician. ‘In arranging what he has invented he is commonplace, frank, guileless;’ ἔστιν ἀπέριττός τις καὶ ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀπόνηρος οἰκονομῆσαι τὰ εὑρεθέντα: Dionys. De Lys. c. 15. while Isaeos ‘plays all manner of ruses upon his adversary,’ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον διαπονηρεύεται , De Isae. c. 3. Lysias ‘uses no sort of knavery.’ οὔτε γὰρ προκατασκευαῖς [κ.τ.λ.], ...οὔτε ταῖς ἄλλαις τοιαύταις πανουργίαις εὑρίσκεται χρώμενος . De Lys. c. 15. Invention and selection are admirable in him: arrangement is best studied in his successors Ib. .

Parts of the oration

If we turn from his general plan to his execution of its several parts, Lysias will be found to shew very different degrees of merit in proem, narrative, proof and epilogue.

Proem

His proem, or opening, is always excellent, always gracefully and accurately appropriate to the matter in hand. This inexhaustible fertility of resource calls forth the special commendation of Dionysios. ‘The power shown in his proems will appear especially marvellous if it is considered that, though he wrote not fewer than 200 forensic speeches, there is not one in which he is found to have used a preface which is not plausible, or which is not closely connected with the case. Indeed, he has not twice hit upon the same syllogisms, or twice drifted into the same thoughts. Yet even those who have written little are found to have had this mischance,—that, I mean, of repeating commonplaces; to say nothing of the fact that nearly all of them borrow the prefatory remarks of others, and think no shame of doing so.’ Dionys. De Lys. c. 17. The opening of the speech against Diogeiton may be cited as an example of a difficult case introduced with singular delicacy and tact.

Narrative.

The same kind of cleverness which never fails to make a good beginning finds a more important scope in the next stage of the speech. In narrative Lysias is masterly. His statements of facts are distinguished by conciseness, clearness and charm, and by a power of producing conviction without apparent effort to convinceHis narratives τὴν πίστιν ἅμα λεληθότως συνεπιφέρουσιν , id. De Lys. c. 18.. If these qualities mark almost equally some of the narratives in the private orations of DemosthenesAfter comparing an extract from the lost speech of Lysias Against Tisis with an extract from the speech of Demosthenes Against Konon, Dionysios asks—ταῦτα οὐ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκριβῆ καὶ σαφῆ καὶ διὰ τῶν κυρίων καὶ κοινῶν ὀνομάτων κατεσκενασμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ Αυσίου; and goes on to notice other excellences which both have alike. De Demosth. c. 13., it is yet Lysias and not Demosthenes to whom Dionysios points as the canon of excellence in this kind ορον τε καὶ κανόνα τῆς ἰδέας ταύτης αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνομαι: De Lys. c. 18.. He goes so far as to say that he believes the rules for narrative given in the current rhetorical treatises to have been derived from study of models supplied by Lysias.

Proof.

In the third province—that of proof—this supremacy is not maintained. Rhetorical proofs are of three kinds: (1) direct logical proofs which appeal to the reason; and indirect moral proofs which appeal (2) to the moral sense, and (3) to the feelings.

In the first sort Lysias is strong both by acuteness in discovering, and by judgment in selecting, arguments. In the second he is effective also; and succeeds, even when he has few facts to go upon, in making characters seem attractive or the reverse by incidental touches. In the third he is comparatively weak; he cannot heighten the force of a plea, represent a wrong, or invoke compassionIn the technical language of Dionysios, Lysias understands οὔτε αὐξήσεις οὔτε δεινώσεις οὔτε οἴκτους : De Lys. c. 19., with sufficient spirit and intensity.

Epilogue.

Hence in the fourth and last department, the epilogue, he shows, indeed, the neatness which suits recapitulation, but not the power which ought to elevate an appeal. The nature of his progress through a speech is well described by an image which his Greek critic employs αὕτη μέντοι (ἡ χάρις), καθάπερ νότιός τις αὖρα, μέχρι προοιμίου καὶ διηγήσεως αὐτὸν ἄγει· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τοὺς ἀποδεικτικοὺς ἔλθῃ λόγους, ἀμυδρά τις γίγνεται καὶ ἀσθενής· ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς παθητικοῖς εἰς τέλος ἀποσβέννυται: Dionys. De Demosth. c. 13.. Like a soft southern breeze, his facile inspiration wafts him smoothly through the first and second stages of his voyage; at the third it droops; in the last it dies.

General qualities resulting from character

The manner in which Lysias handles his subject-matter has now been spoken of so far as concerns its technical aspect. But, besides these characteristics of the artist which may be discovered in particular parts, there are certain general qualities, resulting from the character of the man, which colour the whole; and a word must now be said of these.

The tact of Lysias.

Foremost among such qualities is tact. One of its special manifestations is quick sympathy with the character of the speaker; another is perception of the style in which a certain subject should be treated or a certain class of hearers addressed. Both these have already been noticed. But, above and beyond these, there is a certain sureness in the whole conduct of a case, a certain remoteness from liability to blunder, which is the most general indication of the tact of Lysias. Among his genuine extant speeches there is only one which perhaps in some degree offers an exception to the rule;—the speech against EvandrosSee the remarks below upon this speech.. In the case of the speech against Andokides, the conspicuous absence of a fine discretion is one of the most conclusive proofs that Lysias was not the authorThe internal evidence against the authenticity of the speech Against Andokides is discussed below.. In relation to treatment, this tact is precisely what the ‘charm’ praised by Dionysios is in relation to language; it is that quality, the presence or absence of which is the best general criterion of what Lysias did or did not write.

His humour.

A quality which the last almost implies is humour; and this Lysias certainly had. The description of an incorrigible borrower, in the fragment of the lost speech against the Sokratic Aeschines, shows this humour tending to broad farceFragment 1 in Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 172. The passage especially meant here begins at ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὐκ εἰς ἐμὲ μόνον τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, and goes down to ἢ τούτῳ συμβάλλειν:—‘But indeed, judges, I am not the only person to whom he behaves in this way; he is the same to every one else who has had to do with him. Have not the neighbouring shopkeepers, from whom he gets on credit goods for which he never pays, shut up their shops and gone to law with him? Are not his neighbours so cruelly used by him that they have left their houses and are trying to take others at a distance? Whenever he has collected club-subscriptions, he fails to hand over the payments of the other members, and they are wrecked on this little tradesman like chariots at the turning-post of the course. Such a crowd goes at daybreak to his house to demand the sums due to them, that passers-by fancy the people have come to attend a funeral. As for the inhabitants of the Peiraeus they are in such a mind that they think it much safer to sail to the Adriatic than to encounter this man.’, and illustrates what Demetrius means by the ‘somewhat comic graces’Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 128 (Walz, Rhet. Gr. IX. 58): τῶν δὲ χαρίτων αἱ μέν εἰσι μείζονες καὶ σεμνότεραι, αἱ δὲ εὐτελεῖς μᾶλλον καὶ κωμικώτεραι, οἷον αἱ Ἀριστοτέλους χάριτες καὶ Σώφρονος καὶ Αυσίου. of Lysias. But, as a rule, it is seen only in sudden touches, which amuse chiefly because they surprise; as in the speech for Mantitheos, and most of all in that for the Invalide. g. In Mantith. (Or. XVI.) § 15: Pro Inval. (Or. XXIV.) § 9. Cf. De sacra Olea (Or. VII.) § 1, 14..

Sarcasm.

Really powerful sarcasm must come from earnest feeling; and Lysias, though intellectual acuteness gave him command of irony, was weak in sarcasm for the same reason that he was not great in pathos. There is, properly speaking, only one extant speech—that against Nikomachos—in which sarcasm is a principal weaponSee esp. In Nikom. (Or. XXX.) §§ 11, 27.. Here he is moderately successful, but not in the best way; for, just as in his attack upon Aeschines, vehemence, tending to coarseness, takes the place of moral indignation.

Defects of Lysias as an orator.

The language, the method, the genius of Lysias have now been considered in reference to their chief positive characteristics. But no attempt to estimate what Lysias was would be true or complete if it failed to point out what he was not. However high the rank which he may claim as a literary artist, he cannot, as an orator, take the highest. The defects which exclude him from it are chiefly two; and these are to a certain extent the defects of his qualities. As he excelled in analysis of character and in elegance, so he was, as a rule, deficient in pathos and in fire.The limits of pathos in Lysias.

It would be untrue to say that Lysias never appeals to the feelings with effect, and unfair to assume that he lacked the power of appealing to them with force. But the bent of his mind was critical; his artistic instinct shrank from exaggeration of every sort; and, instead of giving fervent expression to his own sense of what was pitiable or terrible in any set of circumstances, it was his manner merely to draw a suggestive picture of the circumstances themselves. This self-restraint will be best understood by comparing a passage of Lysias with a similar passage of Andokides. The speech On the Mysteries describes the scene in the prison when mothers, sisters, wives came to visit the victims of the informer DiokleidesAndok. De Myst. §§ 48—51.. A like scene is described in the speech Against Agoratos, when the persons whom he had denounced took farewell in prison of their kinswomenLys. In Agorat. §§ 39—42.. But the two orators take different means of producing a tragic effect. ‘There were cries and lamentations,’ says Andokides, ‘weeping and wailing for the miseries of the hour.’ De Myst. § 48. Lysias simply remarks that the wife who came to see her husband had already put on mourning In Agorat. § 40.. For hearers of a certain class the pathos of facts is more eloquent than an express appeal; but the speaker who is content to rely upon it renounces the hope of being found pathetic by the multitude. It was only now and then that, without going beyond the limits which his own taste imposed, Lysias could expect to stir general sympathy. In the defence which he wrote for the nephews of Nikias, the last survivors of a house made desolate by violent deaths and now threatened with spoliation, he found such an opportunity. He used it well, because, though declamation would have been easy, he abstained from everything rhetorical and hollow. The few words in which the defendant speaks of his claim to the protection of the court are plain and dignified:—

‘Judges, I have no one to put up to plead for us; for of our kinsmen some have died in war, after showing themselves brave men, in the effort to make Athens great; some, in the cause of the democracy and of your freedom, have died by the hemlock of the Thirty; and so the merits of our kinsmen, and the misfortunes of the State, have become the causes of our friendlessness. It befits you to think of these things and to help us with good will, considering that under a democracy those deserve to be welltreated at your hands who, under an oligarchy, had their share of the troubles.’ De bonis Niciae fratris (Or. XVIII.) §§ 24, 25.

The eloquence of Lysias rarely passionate.

After inquiring how far Lysias fails in pathos, it remains to speak of the other principal defect noticed above. How far, and in what sense, does he want fire? By ‘fire’ is meant here the passion of a speaker stirred with great ideas. Dionysios says (in effect) that, besides pathos, Lysias wants two other things, grandeur and spiritDionysios says that the style of Lysias is not ὑψηλή and μεγαλοπρεπής: nor θυμοῦ καὶ πνεύματος μεστή: De Lys. c. 13.. He has not—we are told— the intensity or the force τόνος—ἰσχύς: Dionys. Demosth. 13. of Demosthenes; he touches, but does not pierce, the heartHe wants τὸ πικρόν: id. Lys. 13.; he charms, but fails to astonish or to appalHis style being neither θαυμαστή nor καταπληκτική: ib.. This is true; but it should be remembered that in a great majority of the causes with which he had to deal the attempt at sublimity would have been ridiculous. It may be granted that, had Lysias been called upon to plead for Olynthos or to denounce Philip, he would not have approached even distantly the lofty vehemence of Demosthenes. The absence of passion cannot properly be regarded as a defect in his extant speeches; but they at least suggest that under no circumstances could he have excelled in passionate eloquence. They indicate a power which sufficed to elaborate them, rather than a power which gave them their special qualities out of an affluence of resource. Two speeches, however, must be named, one of which shows (in what remains of it) the inspiration of a great idea, the other, the inspiration of an ardent feeling. These are the Olympiakos and the speech Against Eratosthenes. If in each of these Lysias has shown himself worthy of his subject, the inference in his favour should be strengthened by the fact that, so far as we know, these are the noblest subjects which he treated.

In the Olympiakos he is enforcing the necessity of union among Greeks and calling upon Sparta to take the lead:—

‘It befits us, then, to desist from war among ourselves and to cleave, with a single purpose, to the public weal, ashamed for the past and apprehensive for the future; it befits us to imitate our forefathers, who, when the barbarians coveted the land of others, inflicted upon them the loss of their own; and who, after driving out the tyrants, established liberty for all men alike. But I wonder most of all at the Lacedaemonians, and at the policy which can induce them to view passively the conflagration of Greece. They are the leaders of the Greeks, as they deserve to be, both for their inborn gallantry and for their warlike science; they alone dwell exempt from ravage, though unsheltered by walls; unvexed by faction; strangers to defeat; with usages which never vary; thus warranting the hope that the freedom which they have achieved is immortal, and that, having proved themselves in past perils the deliverers of Greece, they are now thoughtful for her future.’ Olympiakos (Or. XXXIII.) §§ 6, 7.

In the speech Against Eratosthenes, he concludes the impeachment with an appeal to the two parties who had alike suffered from the Thirty Tyrants;— the Townsmen, or those who had remained at Athens under the oligarchy; and the democratic exiles who had held the Peiraeus:—

‘I wish, before I go down, to recall a few things to the recollection of both parties, the party of the Town and the party of the Peiraeus; in order that, in passing sentence, you may have before you as warnings the calamities which have come upon you through these men.

‘And you, first, of the Town—reflect that under their iron rule you were forced to wage with brothers, with sons, with citizens a war of such a sort that, having been vanquished, you are the equals of the conquerors, whereas, had you conquered, you would have been the slaves of the Tyrants. They would have gained wealth for their own houses from the administration; you have impoverished yours in the war with one another; for they did not deign that you should thrive along with them, though they forced you to become odious in their company; such being their consummate arrogance that, instead of seeking to win your loyalty by giving you partnership in their prizes, they fancied themselves friendly if they allowed you a share of their dishonours. Now, therefore, that you are in security, take vengeance to the utmost of your power both for yourselves and for the men of the Peiraeus; reflecting that these men, villains that they are, were your masters, but that now good men are your fellow-citizens,—your fellow-soldiers against the enemy, your fellow-counsellors in the interest of the State; remembering, too, those allies whom these men posted on the acropolis as sentinels over their despotism and your servitude. To you—though much more might be said—I say thus much only.

‘But you of the Peiraeus—think, in the first place, of your arms—think how, after fighting many a battle on foreign soil, you were stripped of those arms, not by the enemy, but by these men in time of peace; think, next, how you were warned by public criers from the city bequeathed to you by your fathers, and how your surrender was demanded of the cities in which you were exiles. Resent these things as you resented them in banishment; and recollect, at the same time, the other evils that you have suffered at their hands;—how some were snatched out of the marketplace or from temples and put to a violent death; how others were torn from children, parents, or wife, and forced to become their own murderers, nor allowed the common decencies of burial, by men who believed their own empire to be surer than the vengeance from on high.

‘And you, the remnant who escaped death, after perils in many places, after wanderings to many cities and expulsion from all, beggared of the necessaries of life, parted from children, left in a fatherland which was hostile or in the land of strangers, came through many obstacles to the Peiraeus. Dangers many and great confronted you; but you proved yourselves brave men; you freed some, you restored others to their country.

‘Had you been unfortunate and missed those aims, you yourselves would now be exiles, in fear of suffering what you suffered before. Owing to the character of these men, neither temples nor altars, which even in the sight of evil-doers have a protecting virtue, would have availed you against wrong;— while those of your children who are here would have been enduring the outrages of these men, and those who are in a foreign land, in the absence of all succour, would, for the smallest debt, have been enslaved.

‘I do not wish, however, to speak of what might have been, seeing that what these men have done is beyond my power to tell; and indeed it is a task not for one accuser, or for two, but for a host.

‘Yet is my indignation perfect for the temples which these men bartered away or defiled by entering them; for the city which they humbled; for the arsenals which they dismantled; for the dead, whom you, since you could not rescue them alive, must vindicate in their death. And I think that they are listening to us, and will be aware of you when you give your verdict, deeming that such as absolve these men have passed sentence upon them, and that such as exact retribution from these have taken vengeance in their names.

‘I will cease accusing. You have heard—seen— suffered: you have them: judge.’ In Eratosth. §§ 92—100.

Place of Lysias in the history of Rhetoric.

On reviewing the general position of Lysias among the Attic orators, it will be seen to result mainly from his discovery, made at a time when Rhetoric had not yet outlived the crudest taste for finery, that the most complete art is that which hides itself. Aided not only by a delicate mastery of language but by a peculiar gift for reading and expressing character, he created a style of which the chief mark was various naturalness. It was long before the art of speaking reached, in general practice, that sober maturity which his precocious tact had given to it in a limited field; it was long before his successors freed themselves to any great extent— few wholly freed themselves—from the well-worn allurements which he had decisively rejected when they were freshest. But at least no one of those who came after dared to neglect the lesson taught by Lysias; the attempt to be natural, however artificially or rarely, was henceforward a new element in the task which professors of eloquence conceived to be set before them. Lysias remains, for all aftertimes, the master of the plain style.

This supremacy in a definite province is allowed The ancient critics upon Lysias. to him by the general voice of antiquity through the centuries in which its culture was finest; the praise becoming, however, less discriminating as the instinct which directed it became less sure.

Plato's satirePlat. Phaedr. p. 264 B: οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρημένον ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεῖν δεύτερον τεθῆναι; It is on this ground—the unphilosophic character of Lysias—that Plato gives such a decided preference to Isokrates. Compare the remark of Dionysios that Isaeos differs from Lysias in this among other things—τῷ μὴ κατ’ ἐνθύμημά τι λέγειν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἐπιχείρημα (De Is. 16). That is, Isaeos frequently makes an attempt (ἐπιχείρημα) at strict logical proof; whereas Lysias rarely goes beyond the rhetorical syllogism (ἐνθύμημα). upon Lysias—for not having seen that the writing of love-letters is a branch of Dialectic—is joined to a notice of the clearness, compactness, finished polish of his language Phaedr. p. 234 E: τί δέ; καὶ ταύτῃ δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνευται;; and it would perhaps be unfair to Plato to assume that in the one place where he seems at all just to Lysias he meant to be altogether ironical. Isaeos was a careful student of LysiasDionys. De Is. 2: [Plut.] vit. Isae.. If AristotleIn the extant works of Aristotle there occur but two quotations from authentic speeches of Lysias: (1) In Rhet. III. ad fin. εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε. cited as an example of effective asyndeton. This is probably an inaccurate citation of the ἀκηκόατε, ἑωράκατε, πεπόνθατε, ἔχετε, δικάζετε with which the speech Against Eratosthenes closes. (2) In Rhet. II. c. 23 § 18 there is a quotation from § 11 of the speech of Lysias περὶ τῆς πολιτείας (Or. XXXIV.): εἰ φεύγοντες μὲν ἐμαχόμεθα ὅπως κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα.The citation in Rhet. III. c. 10 § 7 (διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ— συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας) from § 60 of the ἐπιτάφιος ascribed to Lysias (Or. II.) cannot be reckoned, since that speech is unquestionably spurious. Blass remarks that the words quoted by Demetrios (περὶ ἑρμ. § 28) from a lost work of Aristotle περὶ δικαιοσύνης resemble what we read in § 39 of the speech Against Eratosthenes. (Att. Bereds. p. 377, note 3.) seldom quoted him, if TheophrastosDionysios expresses indignant astonishment at the assertion of Theophrastos (ἐν τοῖς περὶ λέξεως) that Lysias had a taste for vulgar redundancy of ornament (φορτικῶν καὶ περιέργων αὐτὸν οἴεται ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι λόγων). Moderns may share this surprise, when they find that Theophrastos referred in support of his opinion to a speech said to have been composed by Lysias for the captive general Nikias. The few words quoted by Theophrastos suffice to indicate the work of a third-rate rhetorician: see above, p.147. Cf. Sauppe's remarks on the fragment, O.A. II. p. 199. appears to have missed and DemetricsIn a passage of the περὶ ἑρμηνείας (§ 128) already noticed, the epithets which Demetrios gives to the ‘graces’ of Lysias are εὐτελεῖς —κωμικώτεραι. It is significant that Demetrios should have mistaken ἀφέλεια for εὐτέλεια, plainness for paltriness. He lived at the time when Greek eloquence, in the first stage of its decline, was beginning to affect the tawdry ornament of the Rhodian school. (See Westerm. Griesch. Bereds. p. 165.) to have underrated his peculiar merits, one of the first orators of their generation, DeinarchosDionysios names certain speeches of Deinarchos as bearing especially the Αυσιακὸς χαρακτήρ. Hypereides and (of course) Demosthenes were the two other masters by whom Deinarchos was chiefly influenced. (Dionys. De Dein. c. 5.)Among the less eminent imitators of Lysias who belonged nearly to the age of Deinarchos, Cicero names Charisios and Hegesias of Magnesia ( Brut. § 286: Orator § 226)., often took him for a model. When the taste for Attic simplicity, lost during two centuries in the schools of Asia, revived at Rome, Lysias was recognised as its truest representative. Though most of his Roman imitators appear to have become feeble in seeking to be plain, one of them, Licinius Calvus, is allowed at least the praise of elegance Cic. Brutus § 283 Accuratius quoddam dicendi et exquisitius afferebat genus. He treated this style scienter eleganterque, though with a certain self-conscious and overwrought care which deprived it of freshness and force.. Cicero's criticism of Lysias is not close; it does not analyse with any exactness the special qualities of his style; but the general appreciation which it shows is just. For Cicero, Lysias is the model, not of a plain style merely, but of Attic refinement De Oratore III. 7 § 28 Suavitatem Isocrates, subtilitatem Lysias, acumen Hyperides, sonitum Aeschines, vim Demosthenes habuit. Compare Orator § 29 intelligamus hoc esse Atticum in Lysia, non quod tenuis sit atque inornatus, sed quod nihil habeat insolens aut ineptum. ; he has also the highest degree of vigour Brutus § 64 Quanquam in Lysia saepe sunt etiam lacerti, ita sic ut fieri nihil possit valentius. ; and though grandeur was seldom possible in the treatment of such subjects as he chose, some passages of his speeches have elevation De opt. gen Oratorum § 9 Est enim (Lysias) multis locis grandior; sed quia et privatas ille plerasque et eas ipsas aliis et parvarum rerum caussulas scripsit, videtur esse ieiunior, quom se ipse consulto ad minutarum genera caussarum limaverit. . Yet, while Demosthenes could use the simplicity of Lysias, it is doubtful (Cicero thinks) whether Lysias could ever have risen to the height of Demosthenes ib. § 10 Ita fit ut Demosthenes certe possit summisse dicere, elate Lysias fortasse non possit. ; Lysias is ‘almost’ a second Demosthenes Orator § 226, Lysiam—alterum paene Demosthenem. , or, what is the same thing, ‘almost’ a perfect orator Brutus § 35 Quem iam prope audeas oratorem perfectum dicere; nam plane quidem perfectum, et cui nihil admodum desit, Demosthenem facile dixeris. ; but his mastery is limited to a province. The Augustan age produced by far the best and fullest of known ancient criticisms upon Lysias, that of DionysiosBesides the special essay on Lysias, and the short notice in the κρίσις ἀρχαίων v. 1, there is much criticism upon him in the essays upon Isokrates, Isaeos, Demosthenes and Deinarchos. It is necessary to study these in connexion with the essay on Lysias; they explain, or limit, many statements found there.. The verdict of Caecilius has perished with his work on the Ten Orators; but the remark preserved from it, that Lysias was abler in the invention than in the arrangement of argumentsThe criticism is cited, and contested, by Photios, p. 489 B, quoted below., shows discernment. This quality marks in a less degree the judgments of subsequent writers. QuintilianQuint. IX. 4. 16: X. 1. 78 (Lysias)...quo nihil, si oratori satis est docere, quaeras perfectius. only commends Lysias in general terms for plain elegance of language and mastery of clear exposition; HermogenesIn the περὶ ἰδεῶν II. c. 41 Hermogenes ranks Lysias, with Isaeos and Hypereides, next to Demosthenes in mastery of the πολιτικὸς λόγος. In his chapter περὶ δεινότητος (περὶ ἰδ. II. 9) he says that there are three kinds of δεινότης, —that which is and seems, that which seems and is not, and that which is but does not seem. The last, or hidden, δεινότης is, he thinks, most perfectly exemplified in Lysias. especially praises, not his winningness, but his hidden force, classing him, with Isaeos and Hypereides, next to Demosthenes in political eloquence. PhotiosPhotios cod. 262: ἔστι δὲ ὁ Αυσίας δεινὸς μὲν παθήνασθαι, ἐπιτήδειος δὲ τοὺς πρὸς αὔξησιν διαθεῖναι λόγους.—Id. p. 489 B. 13: Καικίλιος δὲ ἁμαρτάνει εὑρετικὸν μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα εἴπερ ἄλλον τινὰ συνομολογῶν, οἰκονομῆσαι δὲ τὰ εὑρεθέντα οὐχ οὕτως ἱκανόν· καὶ γὰρ κἀν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῦ λόγου οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται καταδεέστερος—injudicious praise indeed. goes wide of the mark; he praises Lysias for those things in which he was relatively weak, pathos and sublime intensity; and disputes the just observation of Caecilius that Lysias excelled in invention rather than in arrangement.

Lysias and his Successors.

A few words will be enough to mark the broad differences between Lysias and those three of his successors who may best be compared with him,— Isaeos, Isokrates and Demosthenes. Isokrates, like Lysias, has purity of diction and accuracy of idiom; command of plain language (though he is seldom content with it); power of describing, though not of dramatizing, character; propriety and persuasiveness. But while Lysias hides his art in order to be more winning, Isokrates aims openly at the highest artificial ornament, and escapes being frivolous or frigid only by the greatness of most of his subjects and the earnestness with which he treats them. Isaeos, a direct student of Lysias, resembles him most in his diction, which is not only, like that of Isokrates, clear and pure, but concise also; further, he strives, like his master, to conceal his art, but never quite succeeds in this. The excellence of Demosthenes comprises that of Lysias, since, while the latter is natural by art, the former is so by the necessary sincerity of genius; but Demosthenes is not, like Lysias, plain; nor has he the same delicate charm; grandeur and irresistible power take its place. Services of Lysias to the prose idiom.

Lastly—it should be remembered that it is not only as an orator but also, and even more, as a writer that Lysias is important; that, great as were his services to the theory and practice of eloquence, he did greater service still to the Greek language. He brought the everyday idiom into a closer relation than it had ever before had with the literary idiom, and set the first example of perfect elegance joined to plainness; deserving the praise that, as in fineness of ethical portraiture he is the Sophokles, in delicate control of thoroughly idiomatic speech he is the Euripides of Attic prose.

Lysias: Epideictic and deliberative speeches
Extant and lost works

The Plutarchic biographer of Lysias says:—‘425 compositions pass under his name; of which 233 are pronounced genuine by Dionysios and Caecilius’.[Plut.] Vit. Lys. φέρονται δ’ αὐτοῦ λόγοι τετρακόσιοι εἴκοσι πέντε· τούτων γνησίους φασὶν οἱ περὶ Διονύσιον καὶ Καικίλιον εἶναι διακοσίους τριάκοντα. Photios, in his transcript of the passage (cod. 262), has διακοσίους τριάκοντα τρεῖς: and probably τρεῖς is to be replaced in [Plut.]. The general term λόγοι is to be understood as including Letters: Cf. Dionys. de Lys. 1, γράψας λόγους εἰς δικαστήρια...πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ..ἐπιστολικούς. — Suidas (s. v. Λυσίας) says λόγοι δ’ αὐτοῦ λέγονται εἶναι γνήσιοι ὑπὲρ τοὺς τ/ (300)— perhaps a mere slip for ς/ (200). The precise number 233 was probably given by Dionysios or Caecilius, not by both; but it may be taken as representing roughly the proportion of genuine to spurious allowed by the Augustan Atticists. It is not difficult to understand how the list of works attributed to Lysias had become so large and so inaccurate. His fertility was known to have been great; his style was distinguished less by any salient features than by marks needing for their recognition a finer sense, especially an instinct for the niceties of Attic idiom; and it was not until the Attic revival under Augustus that such an instinct, dead during two centuries, was brought back to an artificial life. Meanwhile the grammarians of Pergamos and Alexandria, presuming on the reputation of Lysias for industry, had probably been lavish in ascribing to him such anonymous forensic speeches as bore the general stamp of the ‘plain’ style.Proportion of Extant to Lost Works.

Thirty-four speeches, entire, or represented by large fragments, are extant under the name of Lysias. A hundred and twenty-seven lost speeches are known from smaller fragments or by their titles. Three letters, cited by grammarians, are identified by the names of the persons to whom they were addressed. If to this list is added the disputed Erôtikos in Plato's Phaedros, 165 of the 425 compositions mentioned in the Plutarchic Life have been accounted for; 260 remain unknownFor the titles and fragments of the 127 lost speeches, and of the letters, see Sauppe Or. Att. II. pp. 170—210. Blass reckons 170 (instead of 165) compositions known by name: Att. Bereds. pp. 348—365..Condition of the Extant Speeches.

Of the 34 speeches now usually reckoned as extant, three are mere fragments, though large fragments, preserved by Dionysios alone, and printed with the rest only in the more recent editions of Lysias. These are nos. XXXII. (Against Diogeiton); XXXIII. (Olympiakos); XXXIV. (Defence of the Constitution). Of the other 31 speeches eight are more or less mutilated. In the first place an entire quaternion (eight pages), and three pages of another, are wanting in the Palatine MS. The lost quaternion contained the end of Or. XXV. (Defence on a Charge of abolishing the Commonwealth), the speech Against Nikides, and the beginning of Or. XXVI. (Against Evandros). The imperfect quaternion contained on its first two pages the end of Or. v. (For Kallias), and the beginning of Or. VI. (For Andokides); on its last page, a passage in Or. VI. corresponding to the lacuna in § 49 after ἀνταποδούς. In the next place the archetype of the Palatine MS. itself was defective. The gaps are at the beginning of Or. IV. (On Wounding with Intent); at the end of Or. XVII. (On the Property of Eraton); at the beginning of Or. XVIII. (On the Property of Eukrates); and at the beginning of Or. XXI. (On a Charge of taking Bribes.) Thus of the 34 speeches only 23 are entireThese facts are taken partly from Baiter and Sauppe's edition of the text of Lysias, and the critical notes thereto; partly from the references of Blass to Sauppe's Epistola Critica (Att. Bereds. pp. 368—371)..

Leaving aside the three speeches known only Arrangement in the MSS. from Dionysios, the other 31, as arranged in the MSS., form three divisions. The first division consists of the solitary epideictic speech, No. II. (the Epitaphios)—interpolated, as it were, by accident, and (considering its almost certain spuriousness) possibly at a late time. The second division consists of Orations I. and III. to XI. inclusive,—all forensic, except VIII., and arranged with an attempt at classification of subjects. Oration I. refers to a case of murder; III. and IV. to cases of wounding with murderous intent; V. VI. VII. deal with cases of impiety; VIII.—XI. (inclusive) concern, directly or indirectly, cases of libel (κακηγορία);—No. VIII., though not forensic, being numbered with these for convenience. In the third division, consisting of Orations XII.—XXXI. inclusive, no such system of arrangement can be discovered; but the twenty speeches have this in common, that all relate to causes either formally or virtually public. Oration XVII. (On Eraton's Property—in the MSS. περὶ δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων), though not formally public, is so virtually, as concerning a confiscation to the treasury; the case dealt with by Or. XXIII. (Against Pankleon), though private in form, is so far akin to a public cause that it turns upon a disputed claim to Athenian citizenship.

It seems probable that each of these two divisions—Or. I. with III. to XI., and Or. XII. to XXXI.— is a fragment of a manuscript edition which originally comprised all the speeches of Lysias; but whether both fragments belong to the same edition can hardly be decidedIf both fragments belong to the same edition, then this edition would seem to have contained (1) the public speeches, classed together as such, but not arranged according to subjects, with the great speeches Against Eratosthenes and Against Agoratos (XII. XIII.) at their head: (2) the private speeches—whether technically private, or only virtually so, as concerning the individual more than the State—arranged according to subjects. But then it is difficult to explain why Orat. VI., Against Andokides—essentially a δημόσιος λόγος—should appear among the latter..

The extant speeches of Lysias may be considered under the heads of Epideictic, Deliberative and Forensic. After these, it will remain to speak of the Miscellaneous Writings ascribed to him, represented by the Address to his Companions (Or. VIII.) and the Platonic Erôtikos. Lastly the Fragments of speeches and letters will claim notice.

Epideictic Speeches.
Oratory at the Panhellenic festivals.

Of the Epideictic speeches of Lysias at least one genuine specimen remains—the fragment of an oration delivered at the Olympic festival. The fashion of addressing a set harangue to the Panhellenic concourse at the great national meetings had been set by the earliest sophists. Hippias ‘used to charm Greece at Olympia with ornate and elaborate speeches.’ ἔθελγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ λόγοις ποικίλοις καὶ πεφροντισμένοις εὖ, Philostr. Vit. Sophist I. 11. The Olympic oration of Gorgias was renowned; and at Delphi his golden statue stood in the temple where, during the panegyris, he had ‘thundered his Pythian speech from the altar.’ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πυθικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ Βωμοῦ ἤχησεν, ib. I. 9. If only as displays of rhetorical art, such harangues were in harmony with the character of the great Panhellenic meetings, the central idea of which was open competition in every sort of excellence, physical and mental. But the speaker at such a time would have certain practical themes suggested to him by the occasion itself, and would enjoy a rare opportunity of treating them with practical effect. He could interpret and apply to passing events the thought, necessarily present to every mind in such an assemblage, of a common Hellenic brotherhood. Gorgias had not failed to strike this chord. ‘His speech at Olympia dealt with the largest of political questions. Seeing Greece torn by faction, he became a counsellor of concord, seeking to turn the Greeks against the barbarians, and advising them to take for the prizes of their arms not each others' cities but the land of the barbarians.’Philostr. l.c. Hellenic nationality as a tie no less real than local citizenship, the Hellenic cause as paramount to all individual interests, must, in one form or another, have always been the foremost topic of speakers at the Panhellenic festivals.

The Olympiakos.

This topic had a special significance at the moment when the Olympiakos of Lysias was spokenXIV. 107, 109. Grote (X. 103, note) rejects the statement of Diodôros, and assumes 384 B. C.—the next festival—as the date; but on grounds which do not appear conclusive. The oration distinctly speaks of as war a going on at the time: ὥστε ἄξιον τὸν μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πόλεμον καταθέσθαι, § 6: and in 384 the Corinthian war had been over for three years.. It was spoken, according to Diodôros, in the first year of the 98th Olympiad, 388 B. C.—the year before the Peace of Antalkidas, by which the Corinthian War was brought to a close. Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth had in 388 been seven years at war with Sparta. During this time two powers, both dangerous to the freedom of Greece, had been rapidly growing. In the east the naval strength of Persia had become greater than it had been for a century. In the west Dionysios, tyrant, since 405, of Syracuse, had reduced Naxos, Katana and Leontini; had twice defeated Carthage; and was threatening the Greek towns of Italy.

The Embassy from Dionysios.A magnificent embassy from the court of Dionysios, with his brother Thearides at its head, appeared at the Olympic festival of 388. Tents embroidered with gold were pitched in the sacred enclosure; a number of splendid chariots were entered in the name of Dionysios for the four-horse chariot-race; while rhapsodists, whose skill in recitation attracted crowds, repeated poems composed by their royal masterDiod. XIV. 109.. While eye and ear were thus allured by the glories of the Syracusan tyrant, Lysias lifted up his voice to remind the assembled Greeks that in Dionysios they must recognise one of the two great enemies of Greece. Let them not admit to their sacred festival the representatives of an impious despotism. Let them remember that their duty is to overthrow that tyranny and to set Sicily free; and let the war be begun forthwith by an attack upon those glittering tents Dionys. Lys. c. 29..

Only the first part of the speech has been preserved; but, to judge from the scale on which the topics are treated and from the point in the argument which the extract reaches, the whole cannot have been much longer.

After praising Herakles for having founded the Olympic Analysis. festival in order to promote goodwill among all Hellenes (§§ 1, 2), the speaker says that he is not going to trifle with words like a mere sophist, but to offer serious counsel upon the dangers of Greece. Part of the Greek world is already subject to barbarians, part to tyrants. Artaxerxes is rich in ships and money; so is Dionysios. Greeks must lay aside civil strife, and unite like their fathers against their common foes. (§§ 3—6.) The Lacedaemonians are the acknowledged leaders of Greece, unconquered abroad, untroubled by faction at home. Why do they not bestir themselves? (§ 7) Instant action is needful. Greece must not wait until the enemy in the east and the enemy in the west close in upon her together. (§§ 8, 9.)

The Olympiakos compared with the Panegyrikos.

Here the extract ends—probably at the point Remarks. where Lysias addressed himself more particularly to the state of Sicily, before concluding with an invective against the envoys of Dionysios. It is natural to compare with this fragment the great speech in which eight years later the same subject was treated,—the Panegyrikos of Isokrates. In each case a Panhellenic audience is reminded of the political unity of Hellas and is urged to common action against the barbarian; in each case there is an appeal to the most powerful of the Greeks to become organisers and leaders of the rest; in each case the speaker claims to be a more practical adviser than his predecessors. This last claim would not be easy to decide. It would be hard to say which was the more hopeful scheme; in 388, that Sparta should persuade the other Greek cities to lay aside all jealousies and unite for the common defence under her leadership; or in 380, that Sparta and Athens should jointly achieve that task, and act as harmonious colleagues in such a leadership. As regards form, the vigorous plainness which stamps the fragment of the Olympiakos is perhaps in better keeping with counsel given at a grave national crisis than is the artistic finish of the Panegyrikos. Dionysios says that in the epideictic style Lysias is ‘somewhat languid,’ and wants that power of ‘rousing the hearer’ which Isokrates, like Demosthenes, possessedDionys. de Lys. c. 28, ἐν μέν δη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις μαλακώτερος.. οὐ διεγείρει δὲ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης η Δημοσθένης.. It is not certainly in this fragment that we find the justification of the criticism.

The Epitaphios.

The Funeral Oration ascribed to Lysias purports to have been spoken, in the course of the Corinthian War, over Athenians who had been sent to the support of Corinth. The precise date cannot be determined. In § 59 there is an allusion to the battle of Knidos in 394, and to the visit of the Persian fleet to Greece in 393; and in § 63 there is an allusion to the rebuilding of the walls of Athens in the latter year. If it were supposed that the speech was retouched after delivery, it might have been spoken over those who fell in the battle of Corinth in 394. Otherwise the fight in the Long Walls of Corinth in 392, or that in 391 when Agesilaos took Lechaeum, might be assumed as the occasion. To any one of these three hypotheses there is, indeed, the objection that the speaker seems to refer to the battle in question as one in which the deceased were on the winning side (§ 70).

The oration opens by contrasting the greatness of the Analysis. theme with the shortness of the time allowed to the speaker for preparation (§§ 1—3). It goes on, in the usual fashion of such discourses, to commemorate the exploits of Athens from the earliest times. It relates the war in which Theseus repelled the Amazons; the part taken by Athenians in obtaining burial for the Argives who fell before Thebes in the war of the Seven; the brave refusal of Athens to give up the children of Herakles to Eurystheus (§§ 4—16). Then a brief digression on the character of the Athenians as autochthones, and on the early growth of democracy (§§ 17—19). The Persian wars—the siege of Aegina in 458—and the expulsion of the Thirty Tyrants are successively noticed, with remarks on the contrast between the Athenian and the Spartan empire. (§§ 20—66.) Then comes a curiously short tribute to the departed (§§ 67—70), and a most gloomy address to their surviving relatives (§§ 71—76); followed by the usual commonplace about the immortal honours of the dead (§§ 77—81).

Character and authorship of the Epitaphios.

Two questions have to be considered in regard to the Epitaphios; whether it was written for a real occasion or merely as an exercise; and whether it is or is not the work of LysiasThe case for, and the case against, the authenticity of the Epitaphios are well argued in two essays—(1) Lysias Epitaphios als echt erwiesen, by Dr Le Beau, Stuttgart, 1863; (2) De Epitaphio Lysiae Oratori falso tributo, by H. Eckert, Berlin [1865?] Le Beau's able essay is clear and admirably thorough, but defends a hopeless cause: Eckert's is a full re-statement, in reply to Le Beau, of the arguments against the genuineness..

If it was written for a real occasion, then it can hardly be his work; for Lysias, not being an Athenian citizen, could not have spoken it himself; and it is unlikely that he should have composed it for another, since the citizen chosen by the Senate to pronounce a funeral harangue was usually an orator of reputeCf. Thuc. II. 34, ἀνὴρ ᾑρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκῃ. A third hypothesis has been advanced by Le Beau (pp. 37 ff.)— that the oration was written by Lysias to be spoken by the Archon Polemarch at one of the annual commemorations of citizens who had died during the past year; but Eckert maintains that such annual commemorations were not instituted before the time of Alexander (pp. 6 ff.).. But two things are in favour of the view that the Epitaphios was a mere rhetorical exercise; first, the character of the references to supposed contemporary events,—references particular enough to have been inserted by a composer anxious for the appearance of reality, yet not exactly corresponding with any known situation; secondly, the neglect of topics which a mere exercise could afford to ignore, but which in a real oration would, according to all fitness and all usage, be prominent—the topics of practical advice and of consolation. This Epitaphios says little enough about the dead; it scarcely attempts to exhort or to comfort the living. If, then, we may assume what the general character of the speech indicates—that it was composed merely as a rhetorical essay—the next question is—Was Lysias the author? The external evidence is inconclusive. Harpokration and TheonTheon, προγυμνάσματα p. 164 (Spengel, Rhet. Gr. II. p. 68) ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ Ἰσοκράτους μὲν τὰ ἐγκώμια, Πλάτωνος δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ὑπερείδου καὶ Λυσίου τοὺς ἐπιταφίους. ascribe it without suspicion to Lysias. Aristotle quotes from ‘the Epitaphios’ a passage which is found in our speech, but does not name Lysias, though in the same chapter he cites Perikles, Isokrates and others by name. Nothing, however, can fairly be inferred from this except that in Aristotle's time the speech was celebrated Arist. Rhet. III. 10 καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῷ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, κ.τ.λ. The passage occurs in nearly the same words in § 60 of our Epitaphios.. Dionysios nowhere mentions an Epitaphios by Lysias; and his silence is suspicious. Turning from the external to the internal evidence, we find that this is overwhelmingly against the authorship of Lysias. All his leading characteristics—simplicity, grace, clearness, the sense of symmetry—are conspicuous by their absence. The structure of the whole is clumsy; the special topics are ill-arranged, and receive a treatment sometimes meagre, sometimes extravagantly diffuse; the language is affected, turgid and in many places obscure to a degree which makes it inconceivable that this oration and the fragment of the Olympiakos can be the work of the same manEckert, in the essay referred to above, examines at length (pp. 19—48) the arrangement (τάξις), ‘invention’ (εὕρεσις), and diction (λέξις) of the speech, and shows how thoroughly each is foreign to the manner of Lysias. It has not been judged necessary here to follow his analysis into details. The broad impression left upon the mind by the speech as a whole will be enough for most readers. As Dobree said—‘Lysias in genere epideictico quantumvis plenus et diffluens; nugax, salebrosus, indigestus nunquam esse potuit.’ ( Advers. I. p. 15.). There are several resemblances of expression between this Epitaphios and the Panegyrikos of Isokrates, and these have often been explained by supposing Isokrates to have borrowed from Lysias. But let any careful reader note how thoroughly the more rhetorical parts of the Epitaphios bear the stamp of a cento, and he will prefer to suppose that some very inferior writer has borrowed from IsokratesCf. Panegyr. § 72, with Epitaph. § 9 Pan. § 88 with E. § 29: Pan. § 115 with E. § 59; &c. ‘Illic’ (i.e. in the Panegyrikos), says Dobree, ‘summum oratorem videas, hic nugacem compilatorem.’. No weight can be allowed to the argument that Plato in the Menexenos (386 B. C.?) had this particular Epitaphios in view. The Menexenos goes, indeed, over very nearly the same range of subjects; but these subjects were the commonplaces of commemorative oratory, and the coincidence is no warrant for assuming a direct imitation. If it may be taken for granted that Aristotle's citation in the Rhetoric is from our Epitaphios, the composition of the speech, whoever was the author, may be placed between 380 and 340 B. C.Aristotle's Rhetoric having been written probably during his second residence at Athens, 335— 323 B. C.: see Grote's Aristotle, I. 34.. In any case, considering the general character of the Greek‘Sermone utitur sat bene Graeco atque Attico, et in universum spectanti non videtur in sermonis puritatem et verborum delectum admodum peccasse’ (Dobree Adv. p. 14). Cf. Eckert, p. 52., it can scarcely be put much below the first half of the second century B. C.

Deliberative Speech.
Or. XXXIV., a Plea for the Constitution.

The speeches of Lysias for the ekklesia have had the same fate as his epideictic speeches. These, too, are represented by one fragment alone—that which now stands last in the collection as Oration XXXIV. Like the fragment of the Olympiakos, it is given by Dionysios as a specimen of a class. The title which it usually bears describes it as a Plea against abolishing the ancient Constitution of Athens. When, after the fall of the Thirty, the democracy was restored in 403, it was the aim of Sparta to restrict it. One Phormisios proposed in the ekklesia that only landowners should have the franchise, a measure which, according to Dionysios, would have excluded about five thousand citizens. The speech from which he gives an extract was made against this motion during a debate in the ekklesia. It appears to have been written by Lysias for some wealthy citizen who was not personally affected by the proposal, and may probably be regarded as the earliest of the orator's works now known.

A censure on the proposers and supporters of the motion Analysis. is followed by a statement of the speaker's political faith. Nothing but a full democracy, he says, can save the country. When Athens was imperial, did she limit the franchise? On the contrary, she gave one of the special privileges of citizenship to the Euboeans. Then, to take the landowners' point of view, it is not they who have ever profited by oligarchies. In fact it is just on their property that the advocates of this, as of former oligarchies, have designs. (§§ 1—5.)

If it is said that Athens can be safe only by obeying Sparta, it should be remembered how desperate are the terms which Sparta would like to impose. Surely it is better to die fighting for one's rights than to pass sentence of death upon oneself. But there is a danger for Sparta also, which will to a certain extent restrain her. She leaves Argos and Mantineia at peace, because she knows that nothing can be gained, and that much would be risked, by driving them to extremities: she will feel the same in regard to Athens. This was the policy of Athens herself when she was greatest. (§§ 6—9.) It would be strange if the democrats who fought bravely in exile should lose heart now that they are restored; if the sons of men who saved Hellas should shrink from delivering Athens. (§§ 10, 11.)

Dionysios remarks on this speech that there is nothing to prove that it was actually delivered on the occasion supposed, but that ‘at all events it is in a style suitable for debate.’ De Lys. c. 32 εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐρρήθη τότε, ἄδηλον· σύγκειταί γοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἀγῶνα ἐπιτηδείως . For that very reason, the smooth finish of the extract from the Olympiakos is not to be looked for here; a rougher vigour takes its place. Regarded historically, it has one point of interest—the analogy suggested between Sparta's contemptuous forbearance towards Argos and Mantineia and her probable attitude towards Athens. Nothing could show more strikingly the prostrate condition in which Athens was left by the Thirty Tyrants than that a speaker in the ekklesia should have ventured to use such an illustration.

Lysias: Forensic Speeches in Public Causes
Principle of distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ law-speeches.

In classifying forensic speeches the first thing to be done is to fix the principle of distinction between the public and the private. One method is to consider solely the form of procedure, and to distinguish ‘public’ and ‘private’ as they were technically distinguished by Greek law. Another method is to consider rather the substance than the form of each cause, and to arrange the causes according as their practical interest was more directly for the State or for the individual. Blass adopts the latter planBlass's classification is as follows:—I. Public Causes: Against Epikrates [Or. XXVII]: Against Ergokles [XXVIII]: Against Philokrates [XXIX]: Against Nikomachos [XXX]: Against the Corndealers [XXII]: Against Evandros [XXVI]: Against Philon [XXXI]. Against Alkibiades [XIV, XV]: Defence on Charge of Taking Bribes [XXI]: For Polystratos [XX]: Defence on a Charge of seeking to abolish the Democracy [XXV]: For Mantitheos [XVI]: On the Property of the Brother of Nikias [XVIII]. On the Property of Aristophanes [XIX].II. Private Causes in which the person of the accused, or the consequences of the offence in question, had a specially high importance for the Commonweal (Att. Bereds. p. 539). Against Eratosthenes [XII]: Against Agoratos[XIII]: Against Andokides [VI] III. Properly Private Causes. On the Murder of Eratosthenes [I]: Against Simon [III]. On Wounding with Intent [IV]: For Kallias [V]: On the Sacred Olive [VII]: For the Soldier [IX]: Against Theomnêstos [X, XI]: Against Diogeiton [XXXII]: On the Property of Eraton [XVII]: Against Pankleon [XXIII].IV. Bagatelle Speeches. For the Invalid [XXIV]: To his Companions [VIII].—Att. Bereds. pp. 445—660.. The speech On the Murder of Eratosthenes [Or. I.], for instance, is referred by Blass to the private class, since the cause, though formally public (as being a γραφὴ φόνου), was of no properly political interest. The obvious objection to such a mode of classification is its uncertainty. The definite technical distinction once abandoned, it becomes hard to say what is or is not a ‘public’ cause. Thus the speeches Against Eratosthenes [Or. XII.] and Against Agoratos [Or. XIII.] are placed by Blass in a rank by themselves, intermediate between the properly public and the properly private, because in each case, though an individual is mainly concerned, the issue is of high moment to the State. Such differences have a real literary importance, and have already been recognised (p. 166) as corresponding to different shades of style. But they appear too indefinite to form a good basis for scientific classification. The necessity of drawing a doubtful or arbitrary line is avoided by taking the classification supplied by Greek law itself. Classified as public and private (δημόσιοι and ἰδιωτικοί) in the Greek sense, the speeches of Lysias will stand thus:— A. Speeches in public causes. I. Causes relating to Offences directly against the State (γραφαὶ δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων); such as treason, malversation in office, embezzlement of public moneys. 1. For Polystratos [Or. XX.]. 2. Defence on a Charge of Taking Bribes [Or. XXI.]. 3. Against Ergokles [Or. XXVIII.]. 4. Against Epikrates [Or. XXVII.]. 5. Against Nikomachos [Or. XXX.]. 6. Against the Corndealers [Or. XXII.]. II. Cause relating to Unconstitutional Procedure (γραφὴ παρανόμων). On the Property of the Brother of Nikias [Or. XVIII.]. III. Causes relating to Claims for Money withheld from the State (ἀπογραφαί.) 1. For the Soldier [Or. IX.]. 2. On the Property of Aristophanes [Or. XIX.]. 3. Against Philokrates [Or. XXIX.]. IV. Causes relating to a Scrutiny ( δοκιμασία), especially the Scrutiny by the Senate of Officials designate. 1. Against Evandros [Or. XXVI.]. 2. For Mantitheos [Or. XVI.]. 3. Against Philon [Or. XXXI.]. 4. Defence on a Charge of seeking to abolish the Democracy [Or. XXV.]. 5. For the Invalid [Or. XXIV.]. V. Causes relating to Military Offences (γραφαί λειποταξίου, ἀστρατείας, κ. τ. λ. ). 1. Against Alkibiades, I. [Or. XIV.]. 2. Against Alkibiades, II. [Or. XV.]. VI. Causes relating to Murder or Intent to murder (γραφαὶ φόνου, τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας ). 1. Against Eratosthenes [Or. XII.]. 2. Against Agoratos [Or. XIII.]. 3. On the Murder of Eratosthenes [Or. I.]. 4. Against Simon [Or. III.]. 5. On Wounding with Intent [Or. IV.]. VII. Causes relating to Impiety (γραφαὶ ἀσεβείας). 1. Against Andokides [Or. VI.]. 2. For Kallias [Or. V.]. 3. On the Sacred Olive [VII.]. B. Speeches in private causes. I. Action for libel (δίκη κακηγορίας). Against TheomnêstosThe MSS. give κατὰ Θεομνήστου A. as Or. X. and κατὰ Θεομνήστου B. as Or. XI. But the so-called Second Speech is a mere epitome of the first: see below. [Or. X.]. II. Action by a Ward against a Guardian (δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς). Against Diogeiton [Or. XXXII.]. III. Trial of a Claim to Property ( διαδικασία). On the Property of EratonEntitled in the MSS. περὶ δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων . [Or. XVII.]. IV. Answer to a Special Plea (πρὸς παραγραφήν). Against Pankleon [Or. XXIII.].

I. Causes relating to offences directly against the state (γραφαὶ δημοσίων ἀδικημάτων).
I. 1. For Polystratos, Or. XX

1. For Polystratos. [Or. XX.]—Harpokration describes this as a ‘Defence for Polystratos on a charge of seeking to abolish the Democracy.’S.V. Πολύστρατος—ὑπὲρ Π. δήμου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία. But from the speech itself the precise nature of the charge cannot be gathered. All that can be safely inferred is that the offence alleged was of a political nature, and was connected with the oligarchical revolution of 411 B. C. Polystratos had held several offices under the oligarchy (§ 5), and had been elected to a vacancy in the Council of the Four Hundred just eight days before the defeat of the Athenian fleet by the Spartans at Eretria, immediately after which the government fell (§ 14). His most important employment had been that of enrolling the 5000 persons to whom the Council conceded the franchise; and he takes credit for having placed, in his capacity of registrar, 9000 instead of 5000 on the roll. It was only in their last peril that the Oligarchy took steps for giving a real existence to the nominal body of 5000; and this agrees with the account of Polystratos, who dates his registrarship from his entry into the Council only eight days before its overthrow (§ 14). When the democracy was re-established, Polystratos was prosecuted and heavily fined; probably on the ground of malversation in some office which he had held under the Oligarchy.

In the present case malversation in his registrarship Probable nature of the charge. may have been the special charge against him. The penalty threatened was pecuniary; but he says that, as he has no money with which to meet it, the result for him, if condemned, will be disfranchisement as a state-debtor.Date.

The date must lie between 411 and 405. The war in the Hellespont is noticed (§ 29); but there is no reference to Arginusae or subsequent events; and the early part of 407 is therefore the latest date which appears probable.

Polystratos, who was a man past sixty (§ 10), is represented by the eldest of his three sons (§ 24).Analysis.

The first part of the speech sets forth that Polystratos was one of the least prominent and least culpable of the oligarchs; that he had already suffered severely, and is now accused maliciously; and that the general tenor of his past life proves his patriotism (§§ 1—23). The speaker then relates his own services in Sicily after the disaster of 413, and reads a patriotic letter written to him by his father at that time. He recounts also the services of his brothers, the second and third sons of Polystratos; of whom the former had been active at the Hellespont, and the latter at home (§§ 24—29). In return for all that the father and his three sons have done for the city, they ask only to be spared a verdict which would rob them of citizenship (§§ 30—36).The speech probably spurious.

The only ancient notice of this speech is by Harpokration, who once refers to it; then, indeed, without suspicionS. V. Πολύστρατος .. But the general opinion of recent criticsAs of Baiter, Sauppe and Blass. It is curious to find—in an essay published at Munich in 1830, Dissertatio de locis quibusdam Lysiae arte critica persanandis, by J. Franz—numerous minute emendations proposed in the text of this speech (pp.7—10), all depending on close observation of the language of Lysias; while the general character of the whole composition—so unlike that of its reputed author's work—entirely escapes criticism. pronounces it spurious. In one respect alone it has at first sight a resemblance to the style of Lysias. It is thoroughly natural. Yet the naturalness is not that of Lysias. It is the absence, not the concealment, of art; the simplicity, not of a master, but of a composer wholly untrained. A want of logical method renders the statements in the first part (§§ 1—23) confused, and the language throughout clumsy, sometimes obscure. Instead of the compact sentences of Lysias there are long strings of clauses loosely joined;—see especially § 14. Were the speech genuine, it would be the only known forensic speech of Lysias earlier than the fall of the Thirty Tyrants. But it seems hardly doubtful that it must be rejected.

I. 2. Defence on a Charge of Taking Bribes, Or. XXI

2. Defence on a Charge of Taking Bribes. [Or. XXI.]—The first part of this speech, in which the accused met the specific charges against him, has been lost; the part which remains contains only his appeal to his previous character generally. The precise nature of the charge is therefore doubtful. In § 21 the speaker asks that he may not be adjudged guilty of taking bribes; hence the title given to the fragment. The accused had probably held some office, and was charged, when he gave account of it, with corrupt practices.

A clue to the date is given by the fact that the Date. speaker became of full age (i.e. eighteen) in the archonship of Theopompos (§ 1), 411 B. C.; and had performed leiturgies yearly to the archonship of Eukleides (§ 4), 403 B. C. No reason appears why his public services should have ceased abruptly in that year. On the other hand, if he had performed leiturgies later than 403 B.C., he would probably have mentioned them. The year of the speech may therefore be conjectured to be 402, and the age of the speaker 26Blass, Att. Ber. p. 496.. Analysis.

Having already answered the accusers in detail, he goes on, in the extant fragment, to enumerate his public services. As choregus and trierarch he has spent upwards of ten talents in eight years—more than four times the amount which would have satisfied legal requirements (§§ 1—5). His trireme, when he was trierarch, was so good that Alkibiades, as admiral, had done him the unwelcome honour of sailing in it (§ 7); and it was one of the twelve which made good their escape from Aegospotami (§ 10).

He might fairly claim some substantial recognition of these costly services; but he asks only not to be deprived of his own property (§§ 11—19). In conclusion he reminds the judges that one who had risked his life and whole fortune for the State was not likely to have taken bribes to defraud it (§§ 21, 22). Beggary had often enough hung over his wife and children when he was fighting for Athens; it would be hard if it should at last actually befall them by the sentence of an Athenian court (§§ 24—52).The êthos.

Lysias shows here strikingly his power of adapting language to character; the êthos is the merit of the speech. It expresses the strong, honest feeling of a man who has made sacrifices for his country, who is conscious of his desert, and who claims, rather than begs, acquittal. ‘I think, judges, that it would be much fairer for you to be indicted by the revenueofficers for keeping my property, than for me to be now in peril on a charge of keeping the property of the Treasury...I am not proud of what is left to me, but of what I have spent upon you. My fortune came to me from others—the credit for its use is my own.’ (§§ 16, 17.)

I 3 Against Ergokles, Or. XXVIII

3. Against Ergokles. [Or. XXVIII.]—In 390 B.C. a fleet of forty triremes was sent to the coast of Asia Minor under the command of Thrasybulos. After many successes in the Hellespont and a victory over the Lacedaemonians at Lesbos, Thrasybulos was slain at Aspendos in Pamphylia by a party of natives who surprised his camp by night (Xen. Hellen. IV. viii. 25—30). Meanwhile anger had been excited at Athens by reports that the commanders of the expedition had embezzled moneys levied on the towns in Asia, and had been treacherous to the cause of the city. A decree was passed demanding an account of all funds so raised, and recalling the commanders. Thrasybulos died before he could obey the summons; his colleagues, of whom Ergokles was one, were Date. brought to trial in 389 B.C. The procedure was apparently by impeachment. Ergokles was condemned to death and his property was confiscatedSee § 2 of the speech Against Philokrates, who was accused of having in his hands part of the confiscated property of Ergokles. .

The short speech of Lysias was spoken by one of the Public Prosecutors; who, as others had already gone fully into the charges, does little more than recapitulate them.

Ergokles is charged with having betrayed Greek towns Analysis. in Asia, with having injured citizens and friends of Athens, and with having enriched himself at the public cost. All this time the fleet was allowed to go to ruin, with the connivance of Thrasybulos—who would never have been given the command, had it been foreseen that only his ‘flatterers’ (§ 4) were to benefit by it (§§ 1—7). Thrasybulos had done well to die; the partners of his guilt are now seeking to buy their lives by wholesale bribery; but this must not be suffered (§§ 8—11). Ergokles pleads his patriotism at the restoration of the democracy; but he has since shown himself worse than the Tyrants (§§ 12—14). His condemnation and that of his associates is necessary as an example to Greece, and is due to the cities, such as HalikarnassosXenophon does not name Halikarnassos: but he describes Thrasybulos, after his victory at Lesbos, as levying money for his troops from some towns on the Greek coast: — ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰς μὲν προσηγάγετο τῶν πόλεων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν οὐ προσχωρουσῶνλ εηλατῶν χρήματα τοῖς στρατιώταις ἔσπευσεν εἰς τὴν *(πόδον ἀφικέσθαι. ὅπως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐκεῖ ὡς ἐρρωμενέστατον τὸ στράτευμα ποιήσαιτο, ἐξ ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἠργυρολόγει, κ.τ.λ. (H. IV. viii. 30) ., which they betrayed (§§ 15—17).

Decision and vigorous brevity are the chief characteristics of this speech, as of that Against Epikrates (XXVII.) and that Against Philokrates (XXIX.); both of which, like this, were spoken by Public Prosecutors. An address by an official afforded less scope for artistic individual colouring than a speech which had to be fitted to the character and circumstances of a private speaker.

I 4. Against Epikrates, Or. XXVII

4. Against Epikrates. [Or. XXVII.]—The title, ‘Against Epikrates and his Fellow-Envoys,’ which one TheodôrosThe MSS. having ΚΑΤΑ ΕΙΙΙΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΣΥΜΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ ΩΣ ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ. affixed to this speech, is clearly wrong. In the first place each of the ‘FellowEnvoys’ would have been the subject of a separate accusation; in the next place, there is absolutely no reference to an embassy except in the opening words κατηγόρηται μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἐπικράτους ἱκανὰ καὶ τῶν συμπρεσβευτῶν· ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δὲ χρή, κ.τ.λ. The words καὶ τῶν συμπρεσβευτῶν are probably spurious., which have probably been interpolated to match the title. The grammarian, it can hardly be doubted, was thinking of the Epikrates mentioned by Demosthenes as having been condemned, with his colleagues in an embassy, by a decree of the people De Falsa Legat. § 277: Blass, p. 445.. Whether this Epikrates is the same person or not, cannot be decided. But, in the present case, the charge against him is of having embezzled public moneys while he held the office of comptroller of the treasury (§ 3). The charge must have been made either at his audit (εὐθῦναι) or by a special impeachment (εἰσαγγελία.) The only clue to the date is the fact that a war had now lasted some time (§ 10). The latter part of the Date. Corinthian War—about the year 389—is probably indicated.

Like the speech against Ergokles, this was preceded by others for the prosecution, and gives therefore only a general view of the case.

Corrupt officers of the treasury, like Ergokles, often tell Analysis. the judges, in asking for a verdict against some one whom they have wrongfully accused, that if it is not given, the city will soon lack funds to pay its public servants. And now this lack of funds is caused by the corrupt officials themselves. The State must punish heavily those guardians of the revenue who so often procure the confiscation of private property while they enrich themselves out of the property of the public (§§ 1—7). If such men were condemned without the forms of a trial, it would be no breach of justice; their guilt is notorious. This is war-time; yet these men can not only pay heavy taxes, but at the same time live in the best houses—men who, in quieter times, had not bread to eat (§§ 8—10). No appeal to mercy should be admitted from such a quarter. The courts have lately been too lenient. Epikrates and his like must be made to suffer loss, since they are insensible to shame (§§ 11—16).

I. 5. Against Nikomachos, Or. XXX

5. Against Nikomachos. [Or. XXX.].—Soon after the fall of the First Oligarchy in 411 B.C., a decree of the ekklesia (probably in 410) appointed a board of special Commissioners (NomothetaeNikomachos is called in §§ 2 and 27 νομοθέτης. This was probably the ordmary official designation of the special Commissioners both in 411 and 403: the title ἀναγραφεὺς τῶν νόμων, ‘Recorder’ of the laws, also applied to Nikomachos in § 2, being sometimes used, perhaps, to distinguish the special from the ordinary Nomothetae — Rauchenstein notices in Demosth. Olynth. III. § 10 another trace of the occasional appointment of special Nomothetae: see his Introduction to this speech, Ausgewahlte Reden des Lysias, p. 130, n.) for the revision of the laws; especially for the recension of those old laws of Solon, written on the sides of the wooden prisms called Kurbeis or Axones, which now needed to be freed from corruptions and interpolations. NikomachosIn § 11, as once in a quotation by Harpokration (s. v. ἐπιβολή), Nikomachos is called Nikomachides:—πείθουσι Νικομαχίδην νόμον ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς χρὴ καὶ τὴν βουλὴν συνδικάζειν. Rauchenstein (ad loc.) thinks that is merely an instance of the patronymic used convertibly with the simple name, as Eubulides for Eubulos in Or. XIX. § 29; cf. Androkleides for Androkles in Isae. Or. VI. 46. Blass, with more likelihood, suspects a mere blunder. Is it possible that in § 11 we ought to insert τοῦτον after πείθουσι, and understand:—‘they persuade the defendant to enuntiate a law of which he was himself the parent’ (Νικομαχίδην νόμον) —a law invented by Nikomachos for the occasion? This would be quite in keeping with the sarcastic tone of the speech. was a member of the Commission. Four months were assigned for the work§ 2 προσταχθὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ τεσσάρων μηνῶν ἀναγράψαι...ἑξέτη τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐποιήσατο.; but Nikomachos contrived to extend his share of it over six years—i.e. until the overthrow of the democracy in 404—without rendering an account.

After the fall of the Second Oligarchy in 403, a second Revising Commission was appointed by the Senate. These special Nomothetae were to report within one month to the Senate and the 500 ordinary Nomothetae selected by the demesThe psephisma of 403 for the revision of the laws is given in full by Andokides in the speech On the Mysteries, § 83.. Nikomachos was again employed; his special duty on this occasion being to revise the laws which concerned the public sacrificesSee § 25, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναγραφεὺς γενόμενος εἰς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ἡμάρτηκεν. Here τῶν ὁσίων refers to the first Commission of 410 B. C., when the laws entrusted to the revision of Nikomachos were only secular; τῶν ἱερῶν to the second Commission of 403 B. C., when the laws which came under his revision were those relating to public worship.. Again he failed to discharge his task within the prescribed term. At the date of this speech he had held office for four years. The speech probably belongs, therefore, to 399 B. C. Nikomachos is accused before the Board of Auditors (the ten Logistae) of having failed to render an account of his office (ἀλογίου δίκη)The description in the MSS. heading of the speech—εὐθυνῶν κατηγορία—is inaccurate, as Rauchenstein points out (Introd. p. 131). This would mean that Nikomachos had rendered an account, and that, when he rendered it, an accusation was brought against him by some citizen; which would then have been heard by the εὔθυνοι. The charge against Nikomachos was that he had never rendered any account to the Logistae. The points of law connected with this speech are discussed in an essay entitled Diatribe in Lysae orationem in Nikomachum, by F. V. Weijers, Leyden, 1839..

The speaker is one of several accusers (§ 34), probably not the principal; the penalty demanded is death (§§ 23, 27.)Analysis.

The first part of the speech sets forth the antecedents of Nikomachos. His father was a public slave; he himself, after late enrolment in a phratria, became an under-scribe to a magistrate. His present offence was not the first of the kind which he had committed. After the First Oligarchy, as after the Second, commissioners for the revision of the laws were appointed. Nikomachos had been one of these also; and had retained the appointment for six years (§ 2)— (that is, till 404 B.C.)—(§§ 1—6).

He will perhaps try to cast upon his accuser the suspicion of oligarchical sympathies. It ought not to be forgotten that it was he himself who, by a forged law, enabled the oligarchs to destroy KleophonKleophon, ὁ λυροποιός, the demagogue: Ar. Ran. 677: Arist. Rhet. I. 15, etc. Cf. Lys. de bonis Aristoph. (Or. XIX) § 48: Κλεοφῶντα πάντες ἴστε ὅτι πολλὰ ἔτη διεχείρισε τὰ τῆς πόλεως πάντα . in 405. His sufferings under the Thirty were involuntary, and cannot be set against an action which was deliberate (§§ 7—16). The speaker will be taunted by Nikomachos with impiety because he complained in the ekklesia of the number of public sacrifices which this self-authorised legislator had ordered. But the truth is that, by ordering a number of new sacrifices, Nikomachos has caused those prescribed by the laws of Solon (τὰ ἐκ τῶν κύρβεων, § 17) to be neglected; and has in two years spent twelve talents more than was necessary (§ 21). Hence the city, from want of funds, has been driven to confiscations (§ 22). Nikomachos ought to suffer the extreme penalty, as a warning to the corrupt officials who, confident in their powers of speech, are reckless of public or private misery (§§ 17—25).

Neither service in war, nor liberality at home, nor the merit of ancestors, nor the hope of his own gratitude, can be pleaded as a reason for acquitting him. The people themselves might well be denounced for entrusting to such as he the powers once held by a Solon, a Themistokles, a Perikles (§ 28). Nikomachos has sought in vain to bribe his accusers; let his judges do their duty as firmly (§§ 26—35).

Unsparing and rather coarse sarcasm is the strength of this attach. Throughout, Nikomachos is treated, not as the recorder of laws, but as the son of the public slave, as the ex-under-scribe. ‘Are we to acquit him for his ancestors?’ asks the accuser. ‘Nay, for his own sake he deserves death; and for theirs—the slave-market’ (§ 27).

I. 6. Against the Corndealers, Or. XXII

6. Against the Corndealers. [Or. XXII.].—The Guild of Corndealers (σιτοπῶλαι) was composed of aliens (§ 5) resident in the Peiraeus, who bought corn as it came into port and sold it in small quantities to the citizens. The trade was a good one, and was watched with jealousy both by citizens and by wholesale importers (ἔμποροι, § 27). Stringent laws, administered by a board of Corn-Inspectors (σιτοφύλακες, § 8), were framed to limit the gains of the retaildealers. One of these laws forbade them to charge more than one obol a bushel over cost-price (§ 8); another, in order to check monopoly, provided that no one should buy more than 50 phormoi (about 50 bushels) of corn at one time (§ 6).

It is this second law which is here alleged to have been broken by the guild or by some of its members. The case is tried before an ordinary court under the presidency of the Thesmothetae: the penalty is death.

The date of the speech cannot be fixed. All that Date. can be said is that it was certainly later than the beginning of the Corinthian War in 394 B. C.; possibly later than the Peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C.See § 14, which speaks of the rumours spread by the Corndealers in order to raise the price of corn:—ἢ τὰς ναῦς διεφθάρθαι τὰς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ ἢ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκπλεούσας συνειλῆφθαι ἢ τὰ ἐμπόρια κεκλεῖσθαι ἢ τὰς σπονδας μέλλειν ἀπορρηθήσεσθαι. ‘The ships in the Euxine’ are theships which brought corn to Athens from those regions: cf. Xen. H. I. 35. The σπονδαί possibly refer to the Peace of Antalkidas or to negociations which preceded it. Analysis.

The speaker begins by deprecating the notion that the charge preferred by him is vexatious or spiteful. On the contrary, he says, he was at the beginning of the business suspected of unduly favouring the Guild. An impeachment was first laid before the Senate, who were inclined to deliver the Corndealers then and there to the Eleven. It was he who then counselled moderation and the observance of the usual legal course. Accordingly the case was heard before the Senate (which was itself the preliminary court in cases of impeachment). No one came forward as accuser; and the speaker then made the accusation himself. The case was sent by the Senate for trial by an ordinary court (§§ 1—4).

One of the Corndealers is then questioned, and admits having bought more than fifty bushels at once, but says that he did so by the recommendation of the Corn-Inspectors. The speaker shows, first, that this is no defence; next, that the statement is false (§§ 5—10). The dealers plead that their object in buying large quantities was to be able to sell cheap; but their claim to public spirit can be refuted (§§ 11—16). They have acknowledged their combination against the wholesale importers. Their death is the satisfaction due to these and to the officials who have so often been punished for inability to check such frauds (§§ 17—22).

Compact and clear, without any attempt at ornament, this short speech is at least good of its kind,—a specimen of the strictly business-like style of Lysias.

II. Indictment for proposing an unconstitutional measure (γραφὴ παρανόμων).
II. 1 On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nikias, Or. XVIII

On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nikias. [Or. XVIII.]—Eukrates, brother of the General Nikias, was put to death by the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B. C. Several years afterwards a certain PoliochosThere is some doubt about the name. The MSS. have Πολίαχος or Πόλισχος. Galen, in his citation (XVIII. 2. 657 Kuhn), Πολιοῦχος. Taylor has been followed by Sauppe and other recent editors in reading Πολίοχος, a proper name recognised by Harpokration. proposed and carried in the ekklesia a decree for confiscating the estate left by Eukrates. In this speech the elder of the two sons of Eukrates pleads against the execution of the decree.

The legal form of the cause is doubtful. Two Form of the cause. views are possible. (1) The sons of Eukrates may have indicated Poliochos under the Graphê Paranomôn for proposing an unconstitutional measure. In this case the speech is an Accusation. (2) Poliochos may have indicted the sons of Eukrates for withholding property due to the State under the decree; the action being in form an apographê, or claim for moneys withheld from the Treasury. In this case the speech is a DefenceFrancken (Commentationes Lysiacae, pp. 124 ff.) thinks that Hamaker has proved beyond all doubt that the cause is an ἀπογραφή, not a γραφὴ παρανόμων. But the arguments brought are unavailing without a satisfactory emendation of the words in § 14—to be noticed presently..

One point is in favour of the latter view. The speaker appeals in his peroration, first, to the judges generally, then to the Syndici (§ 26). Now these fiscal officers would have had the presidency of the court in a cause affecting the treasury. But it is not clear why they should have had jurisdiction in a trial under the Graphê Paranomôn.

On the other hand, a passage in § 14 supports the first view. ‘All men will know’ [i. e. if Poliochos gains the cause] ‘that on the former occasion you finedScheibe's emendation of ἐζημιώσατε for ἐζημίωσε seems certain. in 1000 drachmas the man who wished to confiscate our land, whereas on this occasion he has carried his proposal; and that, therefore, in these two cases Athenian judges gave two opposite verdicts, the same man being on his trial for a breach of the Constitution.’

The last words—παρανόμων φεύγοντος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός—may possibly be corruptFrancken (Comm. Lys. p. 126) suggests that Lysias may have written something like παρανόμων φυγόντος τότε τοῦ ἀνδρός [not τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός, as Blass quotes it, Att. Bereds. p. 524], νῦν δὲ νικήσαντος. But this is too violent a change: and besides, as Blass says, one would require τότε μὲν παρανόμων φυγόντος, νῦν δὲ νικήσαντος.. But if they are right, then they prove that this trial, like the former, was a Graphê Paranomôn against Poliochos. And this is confirmed by the fact that ‘Against Poliochos’ is the title under which the speech is cited by GalenVol. XVIII. 2. 657 (Kühn), ap. Sauppe Or. Att. p. 112 and Blass Att. Bereds. p. 522. It seems very probable that κατὰ Πολιόχου is the right title.. On the whole, the probabilities appear to lean to this side. But the evidence does not suffice to decide the question.Date.

The date may be inferred from two circumstances. (1) The speaker and his brothers were children in 404 (§ 10), but are now adults, holding the office of trierarchs (§ 21). (2) On the other hand, Athens and Sparta are at peace (§ 15). The Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.), therefore, either has not begun or is over. And as the son of Nikêratos (§ 10), the first cousin of the speaker, is not mentioned as having yet taken any part in public affairs, the earlier date is more likely—396 or 395 B. C., approximately.

The following stemma shows the relationship of the persons with whom the speech is concerned:—

Stemma of the family of Nikias Nikêratos Diognêtos returned from exile in 403, but is now dead, § 9 Eukrates died 404 (§ 5 of speech) Nikias the General, died 413 Diomnêstos § 21 Eldest son, the speaker Second son, § 21 Nikêratos Xenoph. Sympos. 1.2, etc. Nikias § 10

The speaker begins by dwelling on the public services Analysis. of his uncles Nikias and Diognêtos and his father Eukrates (§§ 1—12). He next argues that a confiscation is never in any true sense a gain to the State. First, it endangers the most precious of all the city's treasures—concord among citizens. In the next place, property thus confiscated is always sold below its true value, and part even of the sum which it fetches is made away with by the proposer of the measure. Left in the hands of patriotic owners—like the speaker, his brother, and his cousin, who, all three, are trierarchs—it is far more profitable to the State (§§ 13—23).

They can produce no relatives to weep and pray for them; they are the last of their house; they can only appeal to the judges to protect the kinsmen of those who suffered for the democracy. Let the judges remember the time when, in exile and poverty, they prayed to the gods for a day when they might be able to show their gratitude to the children of their champions. This gratitude is claimed now. The danger which threatens the accused is nothing less than utter ruin (§§ 24—27).

This fragment is interesting as giving a sequel, in the history of his family, to the personal fortunes Distinctive quality of the Speech. of Nikias; it is interesting, too, as being distinguished by a quality somewhat rare in the works of Lysias. Few of his speeches have so much pathos. The address is emphatically an appeal to pity; and excites it less by direct appeals than by its simplicity and a tone of manly self-restraint. One passage is especially striking—the description of Diognêtos bringing the orphan children of his brothers to Pausanias, and imploring the Spartan king to remember all that their fathers had suffered (§ 10).

III. Claims for moneys withheld from the state.
III. 1. For the Soldier, Or. IX

1. For the Soldier. [Or. IX.]—The accused, Polyaenos, is prosecuted under a writ ( ἀπογραφή, §§ 3, 21) for the recovery of a fine alleged to be due from him to the Treasury. He states that, two years before, he had returned to Athens from a campaign, but had not been two months at home before he was again placed upon the list for active service. Hereupon he appealed to the General of his tribe (τῷ στρατηγῷ, § 4); but obtained no redress. He spoke indignantly on the subject in conversation at one of the banker's tables in the marketplace; and, this having been reported to the authorities, he was fined under the law against reviling magistrates. The Generals did not, however, take any steps to levy the fine; but at the expiration of their year of office, left a note of it with the Stewards of the Treasury (τοῖς ταμίαις, § 6). These, after inquiry, were satisfied that the fine had been inflicted maliciously (§ 7), and cancelled it. The accusers, ignoring this decision, now prosecute the soldier, at an interval of more than a year, as a state-debtor. In case of conviction the penalty would be the payment of twice the original fine; but not the loss of civic rights. (§ 21.) From § 4 the speech may be referred to the time of the Corinthian War, 394— 387 B. C.

After complaining that his adversaries have wandered Analysis. from the special issue into general attaks upon his character the speaker sketches the facts of the case (§§ 1—7). He then argues, first, that the fine was originally illegal, since the offence contemplated by the law was that of speaking against a magistrate in court (ἐν συνεδρίῳ, § 6), which he had not done; secondly, that in any case the reversal of the sentence by the stewards had absolved him (§§ 8—12).

The malice of his enemies had been provoked, he says, by the favour which he had formerly enjoyed with Sôstratos, an influential citizen. They are resolved to ruin him. The matter at issue is nominally a fine, but really his citizenship; for, if the court also takes part against him, he will be driven to fly from a city in which justice is not to be had (§§ 13—22).

Harpokration doubted the authenticity of this Question of genuineness. speechs. v. δικαίωσις·—Λυσίας ἐν τῷ περὶ στρατιώτου, εἰ γνήσιος.; some recent critics have decisively rejected itEspecially Francken, Commentationes Lysiacae pp. 64 f.: Blass, Att. Bereds. pp. 606 f.. There are several traces of mutilation in the extant version. Thus the direct question with which the speech opens is oddly abrupt; in § 5 a conversation is referred to (τὰ προειρημένα) as if it had been given in terms; and in § 9 the speaker alludes to witnesses whom he has called, but of whom there is no other trace. It would be easier to vindicate the authorship of Lysias if the speech, as it stands, could be assumed to be a mere extract or epitome, like the so-called Second Speech Against Theomnêstos. But the epitomic character, distinct there, is absent here; there, proem and epilogue have been compressed; here their redundancies of expression are left untouched.

Francken thinks that the language is in some points doubtful Attice.g. ἐντός for ἔνδον in § 10— already noticed by Dobree; δικαίωσις for δικαίωμα (‘plea’ or ‘argument’) in § 8, noticed by Harpokr.; τὸ πέρας in the sense of ‘at last’ in § 17.; and that the law is questionableHe infers from Dem. Meid. § 33 that the penalty for reviling a magistrate in court, as for striking τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐστεφανωμένον, would have been, not a fine, but atimia; and he thinks it strange that the ταμίαι, inferior magistrates, should summon their superiors, the strategi, before them (§ 7). We do not know enough to decide such points: and nothing can be safely argued from them.. He argues further that, if the text is right in § 6, ‘Ktesikles the archon,’ there mentioned, must be the archon of Ol. CXI. 3, 334 B. C.; and notices that, in that year, an armament was prepared, but not despatched, by AthensSee Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, vol. III. p. 162.—which agrees with the fact that Polyaenos, when enrolled the second time, was not called upon to serve. These arguments seem to point to different conclusions. If the diction and the law are not classically Attic, then the speech is a late work, probably a rhetorical exercise. If Ktesikles is the Ktesikles of 334, then the speech was probably written for a real cause of about that dateBlass assumes (Att. Bereds. p. 607) that Ktesikles was one of the strategi, and this is certainly easier. But, in that case, the words τοῦ ἄρχοντος must be a gloss; added by a commentator who associated the name only with the archon of 334. A strategus could not have been called ἄρχων . .

Far stronger than these special objections is The general style proves the Speech spurious. the general objection arising from the style. This, indeed, appears conclusive. The passage in §§ 15— 18, where the speaker attacks his adversaries, could hardly have come from Lysias. It is overwrought in tone, overloaded with antitheses, and too epideictic for its place. The whole defence is meagre, yet not concise—a reversal of the manner of Lysias. It was probably written by a bad imitator of his style; but for a real cause rather than as an exerciseI cannot see that, as Blass thinks, a sophistic exercise is indicated by the accumulation of unknown proper names in § 5;— by the fact of the ‘influential’ Sôstratos (§ 13) being lost to fame;—by the absence of clearness in the statement of the case;—or by the uncertainty of the date. The subject would surely have been a poor one for a declamation. .

III. 2. On the Property of Aristophanes, Or. XIX

2. On the Property of Aristophanes. [Or. XIX.]—Nikophêmos, father of Aristophanes, was the friend of Konon, and his comrade in the naval campaigns of 394—390 B. C. When Konon visited the Persian Court in 394, he left Nikophêmos and Hierônymos in joint command of the Persian fleetDiod. XIV. 81: Νικόδημος, in that passage, being a mere clerical error for Νικόφημος.; and when he took Kythêra in 393 Nikophêmos was appointed harmost (Xen. Hellen. IV. viii. 8). While Konon and Nikophêmos had their home at Cyprus (§ 36), their sons, Timotheos and Aristophanes, lived at Athens; the latter poor, until the battle of Knidos in 394 and the campaigns of the following years brought some wealth to his father and himself (§ 28). On two important occasions Aristophanes was engaged in the service of the State. He went on an embassy to Sicily (in what year is doubtful) with proposals from Evagoras, king of Cyprus, to Dionysios; and succeeded in dissuading the latter from affording his promised aid to Sparta (§§ 19, 20). Again in 389 B. C. he sailed with an Athenian expedition to the aid of Evagoras (§§ 21— 23). From this expedition he never returned. He and his father Nikophêmos were suddenly put to death at Cyprus without trial (§ 7); doubtless on a suspicion of treachery or of embezzlement similar to that which raised a storm of indignation against Thrasybulos and his colleagues in 390 B. C.Origin of the Action.

After the death of Aristophanes, one Aeschines proposed the confiscation of his property. The proposal, like that of Poliochos in the case of the property of Eukrates, was resisted on the ground of illegality, and a speech was written by Lysias against itHarpokration s. v. Χύτροι·— Λυσίας ἐν τῷ κατ’ Αἰσχίνου περὶ τῆς δημεύσεως τῶν’ Αριστοφάνους χρημάτων: Sauppe O. A. II. p. 173. In his Onomasticum Fragmentorum Sauppe seems to identify this Aeschines with the Sokratic, against whom Lysias wrote on another occasion. That the proposal of Aeschines was met with a γραφὴ παρανόμων is indicated in § 8 of Or. XIX.. It was, however, carried into effect, and so stringently that not even the debts left by Aristophanes were discharged, nor was the dowry of his widow repaid to her family (§ 32). But the amount of property which was found disappointed the general belief in the wealth of Nikophêmos (§§ 11, 53). It was thought that something must have been withheld; and suspicion fell upon the father-in-law of Aristophanes. A writ was therefore issued against him for the recovery of moneys due to the treasury (§ 11). Before the trial came on, he died, at the age of more than seventy (§ 60); and his only son, a man of thirty (§ 55), was left to defend the action. The Fiscal Board of Syndici were the presidents of the court.

The date is indicated by § 50. It is there Date. said that Diotimos had lately (ἔναγχος) been accused of having forty talents unaccounted for in his possession; but had, on returning to Athens, disproved the charge. Diotimos had held a command in the Hellespont in 388 and 387 Xen. H. v. 1. 25 . B. C.; 387 is therefore probably the year of the speech.

The defence is approached with timidity, as if under Analysis. the consciousness that a strong prejudice has to be met. The speaker represents the gravity of the task which has devolved upon him; his father's good fame, his own, and all his fortunes are at stake. He sets forth the restless malice of his accusers, and reminds the court that experience has proved how little such accusations are to be trustedOn the almost verbal coincidence between §§ 2—5 of this proem and §§ 1, 6, 7 of Andok. De Mysteriis, see above, p. 117.. The cruel fate of Nikophêmos and Aristophanes;—the destitution of his brother-in-law's children, and the persecutions to which his own family have been exposed in addition to the burden thus thrown upon them;—the current delusions, lastly, about the wealth of Nikophêmos, delusions so dangerous in the present impoverished state of the Treasury—all these are urged as claims to the sympathetic attention of the court. (§§ 1—11.)

The next division of the speech is devoted to showing that Aristophanes was not originally a rich man, and was at all times lavish. He was not chosen by the speaker's father as a son-in-law on account of his wealth: indeed, his last act before sailing for Cyprus was to come to their house and borrow seven minae; and it could be proved that shortly afterwards he was in want of a very small sum of ready money. Then follows a formal inventory of the property left by the deceased (§§ 12—27).

But why, it may be asked, was this property so small? Aristophanes had scarcely any fortune until four years before his death; and within these four years he was twice choregus, besides buying a house and lands. The defendant had taken precautions for the due transference to the Government of every article left in the house of Aristophanes: a watch had even been set to see that the doors were not torn off, as sometimes happened to confiscated houses. He is ready to take the most solemn oath before the Syndici that nothing remains in his hands; nay, that his sisters' dowry and the debt of seven minae still remain unpaid. Supposing that the property of Timotheos, son of Konon, were confiscated and only four talents realized, would his relatives be thought to deserve ruin? Yet the father of Timotheos was at least ten times as rich as the father of Aristophanes (§§ 28—41). There are many instances in which the popular estimate of a man's fortune has been proved, at his death or on inquiry during his lifetime, to have been enormously exaggerated. The recent case of Diotimos (§ 50) and the case of the great Alkibiades (§ 52) are among those in point. (§§ 42—54.)

The good character borne by himself and by his father ought to be remembered. If their property were confiscated now, the State would not get two talents. At this moment he is a trierarch: his father spent his fortune on the State and for its honour; he kept good horses, had athletes in his pay, and won victories at the Isthmos and at Nemea (§ 63). On all these grounds the defendant claims the protection of the court against a malignant attach (§§ 55—64).

This very clever speech gives a formidable idea Light thrown by the speech on a danger of public service abroad. of the dangers to which an Athenian of the time was exposed if he or any member of his family was supposed to have made a fortune on foreign service. The city was poorSee especially § 11, χαλεπὸν μὲν οὖν ἀπολογεῖσθαι πρὸς σπάνιν ἀργυρίου ἣ νῦν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει. Compare Or. XXX (Against Nikomachos) § 22, and the case of Eraton (Or. XVII): Francken, Comment. Lysiacae, p. 130.; it was full of informers, ready to prefer any accusation on the chance of sharing the spoil; and by a vague charge of treachery or embezzlement abroad it was easy to inflame the ekklesiaRauchenstein, in his Introduction to this Speech (p. 146), aptly quotes Or. XXVII (Against Epikrates) § 11: οὐκέτι ὧν οὗτοι (the corrupt demagogues) κλέπτουσι ὀργίζεσθε, ἀλλ’ ὧν αὐτοὶ λαμβάνετε χάριν ἴστε, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς τὰ τούτων μισθοφοροῦντες ἀλλ’ οὐ τούτων τὰ ὑμέτερα κλεπτόντων.. There is nothing to show why Aristophanes or his father were put to death without trial. The point which is most strikingly brought out by this defence is the strength of the popular feeling which it had to combat. It is remarkable in how diffident a tone the speaker begins, how careful he is to put in the front of his case everything that can excite compassion, how he avoids directly praising or even defending Aristophanes. He gradually insinuates that Aristophanes was a worthy man—poor, but generous and patriotic. The speech is nearly half over before it comes directly to the real issue (§ 28), and argues that Aristophanes cannot, in fact, have left more property than appeared. Perhaps the modesty of the speaker is a little overwrought; but there is consummate art in the sketch of his father, the quiet citizen of the old school, and of Aristophanes, the adventurous patriot of the new. On the whole, this is one of the masterpieces of Lysias, in which all the resources of his tact were brought into play by a subject difficult enough to be worthy of them.

III. 3. Against Philokrates, Or. XXIX

3. Against Philokrates. [Or. XXIX.]—This case may be regarded as a sequel to that of Ergokles [Or. XXVIII]See above, p. 221.. Philokrates had sailed, as steward or purser (ταμίας § 3), under command of Ergokles as trierarch. Ergokles had now been put to death and his property had been confiscated. But a sum of thirty talents, which he was said to have gained by corrupt practices, had not been found (§ 2). A writ was therefore issued against Philokrates on the supposition that, since he had been in the confidence of Ergokles, he must know what had become of the money.

The speaker is one of several Public Prosecutors (συνήγοροι) and, as in the case of Ergokles, merely follows others with a summary of the leading points. The case Against Philokrates has been stated, and the evidence cited, by former speakers; this is the concluding speech for the prosecution; hence the title of epilogue or peroration Κατὰ Φιλοκράτους ἐπίλογος. The speaker says in § 1 that many persons who had promised to appear against Philokrates have not done so; but obviously this does not justify Francken's inference,—‘Altera pars inscriptionis (ἐπίλογος) manifesto falsa est; statim enim ab initio totidem verbis neminem esse praeter se accusatorem orator testatur’ (Comment. Lys. p. 226). The absence of witnesses and proofs in this speech is conclusive, as Blass says (Att. Bereds. p. 454), on the other side. given in the MSS. to this as well as to the speech Against Ergokles. The date is probably the year of the trial Date. of Ergokles—389 B. C.

Many persons, says the speaker, who had promised to Analysis. appear against Philokrates have failed; an additional proof that he has the money, and has been able to buy off numerous accusers. The thirty talents have not been discovered: who can have them but the most intimate friend of Ergokles, his subaltern and his steward? It rests with Philokrates to show either that Ergokles was wrongly condemned, or that some one else now has the missing sum (§§ 1—5). Three talents, it is well known, had been promised to public speakers if they could save Ergokles. Philokrates has got this money back, and has possessed himself of the rest of his late chief's property; yet now he has the effrontery to pretend that he was his enemy. Is it likely that in that case he would have volunteered to sail with him as trierarch? (§§ 6, 7.)

The Athenians ought to defend their own interests, and compel Philokrates to give up their property. It is hard if those who cannot pay taxes incur the public anger, while the embezzlers of State-property escape. Indeed, the accomplices of Ergokles deserve not only a pecuniary penalty, but the same punishment which he suffered—death. While his trial was pending, his friends went about boasting that they had bribed upwards of 2000 men (§ 12). Let it be proved to them that no amount of bribery can save evil-doers. If the citizens are wise, they will reclaim what is their own (§§ 8—14).

Like the speeches Against Ergokles and Against Epikrates, this is the address of an official prosecutor, and of one who had but a subordinate part to perform. It has the characteristic excellences of the other two, compactness and vigour; but it is necessarily inferior to the speech Against Ergokles, in which the greater importance of the cause calls forth more oratorical vigour.

IV. Causes relating to a scrutiny ( δοκιμασία) before the senate; especially of officials designate.
IV. 1. Against Evandros, Or. XXVI

1. Against Evandros. [Or. XXVI.]—In the second year of the 99th Olympiad (381/2 B. C.) LeôdamasNot the orator of Acharnae, who was the advocate of Leptines in 355 B. C., but a man of whom nothing is known except from this speech and from a notice in Arist. Rh. II. 23. Thrasybulos had said in his accusation that the name of Leôdamas had been inscribed on a pillar [recording traitors &c.] on the acropolis (ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει), but was erased in the time of the Thirty. Leôdamas answered that he was not likely to have erased it then. The Thirty would have trusted him the more for his enmity to the people being registered (ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ). drew the lot to be First Archon for the following year; and Evandros was at the same time designated First Archon in reserve ἐπέλαχε: Harpokr. s. v. Cf. Aesch. in Ktes. § 62.. Leôdamas, before entering upon the archonship, had to pass a scrutiny (δοκιμασία) before the Senate. On this occasion he was accused by Thrasybulos of Collytos; the Senate rejected him; and the office thus came to Evandros. But Evandros also had to pass a scrutiny; and the present speech is made to the Senate in order to prove that he is ineligible.Date.

The case is heard on the last day but one of Ol. 99. 2, i.e. at about midsummer of our year 382 B. C.The Olympic year, reckoned from July to July, is counted as that year B. C. in which its first half falls. The year 382 B.C. comprised the second half of Ol. 99. 2 and the first half of Ol. 99. 3. Hence the date of this speech, which belongs to the end of Ol. 99. 2, is, in strictness, 382 B.C.; and the following Greek year, Ol. 99. 3, in which Evandros was Archon, is also conventionally 382 B. C.. The last day of the Attic year was a public holiday, on which no law-court could sit, and on which a sacrifice to Zeus Sôtêr was celebrated by the First Archon. If, therefore, the Senate rejected Evandros, no time remained for an appeal to an ordinary court; and the State would be left without its chief magistrate at one of its great solemnities (§ 6).

The election of Evandros was, in fact, ratified; for Evandros actually Archon in 382 B.C. he appears in the lists as Archon for the following year, Ol. 99. 3. This date is confirmed by allusions in the speech.

Thrasybulos the Collytean is charged in § 23 with having estranged Boeotia from Athens and with having lost Athenian ships. The first accusation refers to the establishment of oligarchies in the Boeotian cities, through Spartan influence, after the Peace of Antalkidas; and is curiously illustrated by the reference of Aeschines to Thrasybulos of Collytos as a man of great influence at ThebesAeschin, in Ktes. § 138.. The second accusation refers to an incident of the war on the Hellespont five years before. In 387 B. C. eight triremes under the command of this Thrasybulos were captured by Antalkidas near Abydos Xen. Hellen. v. 1. 27. Xenophon's account, it may be observed, gives no support to the accuser's statement (§ 23) that Thrasybulos betrayed his ships..

All the first part of the speech has been lost in those eight pages of the Palatine MS. which contained the conclusion of the Twenty-fifth Speech and the whole of that Against NikidesSee p. 200.. The special charges made by the accuser, and the depositions to which he alludes (§ 8), were in this part. What remains is chiefly his answer to certain pleas which he conceives that Evandros may urge. Analysis.

It is hard—the speaker says—that, not content with impunity for his offences against the people, Evandros should ask for office. Evandros relies on the recent sobriety ( ἡσυχιότης, § 5) of his life—which has been compulsory: and on his father's liberality—who used the influence thus gained to overthrow the democracy (§§ 1—5). He has contrived to delay his scrutiny until the last day but one of the year, when there is no time to appoint another First Archon. But the sacrifices of the morrow will surely be more pleasing to the gods, though offered only by the King Archon and his colleagues, than if the celebrant were a man whose hands are stained with the blood shed in the days of the Thirty Tyrants (§§ 6—8). One of the principal objects of the law of Scrutinies (ὁ περὶ τῶν δοκιμασιῶν νόμος, § 9) is to exclude from office in a democracy those who have abused power under an oligarchy. The mere fact of having been an ordinary knight or senator under the Thirty disqualifies a man for a place in the Council of Five Hundred. Evandros was more than this; he was guilty of special crimes against the people; and shall he be First Archon? He will thus become a member of the Areiopagos for life, and murderers will be tried by a murderer. And this through the influence of Thrasybulos, a traitor to Athens. It must not be supposed that the speaker opposes Evandros for the sake of Leôdamas. Leôdamas would be well pleased that the Senate should prove itself oligarchical by confirming so unpopular an appointment (§§ 10—15).

Evandros appeals to the Amnesty [of 403 B. C.]; but that Amnesty did not mean that the honours, as well as the toleration, of the State should be accorded to its recent enemies (§§ 16—20). Let the Senate compare the accuser with the advocate of Evandros. The accuser is pure of all connection with oligarchies; his ancestors fought against the Peisistratidae; his family have exhausted a large fortune upon the State. Thrasybulos has alienated the Boeotians from Athens; has lost her ships, and brought her to despair. If the Court reflects which of these two men ought rather to prevail, it will decide rightly upon the claims of Evandros (§§ 21—24).

Unwillingness to mar a great annual festival may have influenced the Senate when they confirmed the election; but there is no proof that the grounds upon which it was opposed were good. The accuser must have felt that his case was well-nigh hopeless. This, Tone of the Speech. and the feeling of Lysias himself towards all who had been concerned in the violence of the Anarchy, will partly account for the extreme bitterness and unfairness of this speech. In two places the tone is especially marked. First, where the accuser admits that since the restoration of the democracy Evandros has been a thoroughly good citizen, and then argues that he deserves no credit for it (§§ 3—5); again, where he maintains that the dokimasia was instituted for the express purpose of keeping oligarchs out of office (§ 9). The outburst against Thrasybulos at the end is of a piece with this (§ 23). A certain boldness of expression, hardly congenial to Lysias, corresponds with the excited tone of the speechSee especially §§ 3, 4., which has the air of having been written in haste, to support a cause already desperate.

IV. 2. For Mantitheos, Or. XVI

2. For Mantitheos. [Or. XVI.]—The name occurs only in the title, which, contrary to the general rule, is perhaps of the same age as the speech—‘A Defence for Mantitheos on his Scrutiny before the Senate.’ What the office was to which this scrutiny related, can only be guessed; perhaps it was that of an ordinary senator, since in § 8 the speaker cites instances of persons who had really done what he is charged with doing, and had yet been admitted to the Senate. The complaint against him was that his name appeared on the list (σανίς, cf. § 6) of those who had served as Knights in the time of the Thirty. As the speech Against Evandros shows (§ 10), the fact of such service under the Tyrants became, after the restoration of the democracy, a disqualification for the office of senator. Mantitheos must, then, have been at least eighteen years of age in 405 B. C., and so must have been born before 422. He refers to his share in campaigns subsequent to that of 394 B.C. (§§ 15—18). On the other hand, the tone of the joke in § 15 rather suggests that Thrasybulos, its object, was still alive;—that is, that the speech is earlier Date. than 389 B. C.Thrasybulos died in Ol. 97. 3 (Diod. XIV. 94, 99: Xen. Hellen. IV. 8. 30), i.e. 390—389 B.C.: probably, as Clinton (F. H.) says, in the early part of 389.. The date may have been about 392 B. C. The speaker, who was taunted with youthful presumption (§ 20), cannot have been much more than thirty. Analysis.

The first disproves the charge against him of having served as a Knight under the Thirty Tyrants. Before the disaster on the Hellespont [405 B.C.], his father had sent him and his brother to the Euxine, to Satyros [king of the Kimmerian Bosporos]; and they did not return to Athens till five days before the democratic exiles captured the Peiraeus [404 B.C.] (§ 4). The appearance of his name upon the list of Knights at that time proves nothing; the list has many false entries and many omissions. Here is a better proof on the other side:—when the democracy was restored, the phylarch (captain of cavalry) of each tribe was directed to recover from each Knight who had served under the Tyrants the sum paid to him by the State for his equipment when he was first enrolled (κατάστασις, § 6). Now Mantitheos was never called upon to refund, nor brought before the Fiscal Board (σὑνδικοι, § 7)—(§§ 1—8).

Having disproved the charge against him, he goes on to urge his positive merits. His private life has been blameless. After his father's death, he portioned his two sisters and helped his brother. Men who are fond of dice and wine have a marked aversion to him (§ 11). Then his public services have been constant. He volunteered on the expedition for the relief of Haliartos [395 B.C.] (§ 13). In the next year he fought in the disastrous battle of Corinth, and retreated later than ‘the majestic Steirian [Thrasybulos], who has taunted all the world with cowardice’ (§ 15). In the autumn of the same year [394 B. C.] he and his company volunteered for service against Agesilaos in Boeotia. Since then, he has constantly served in the field or in garrison (§ 18).—(§§ 9—19).

Some have taunted him with forwardness because, though so young, he has spoken in the ekklesia. His own affairs, however, compelled him to do so at first. Perhaps, indeed, he has been too ambitious. But he could not help thinking of his forefathers, who had always been in public life and served the State, and he saw that Athenians, to tell the truth, respected none but those who could act and speak for the city. ‘And why should you be annoyed with such men? You yourselves and none else are their judges’ (§§ 20, 21).

Perhaps hardly anything in Greek literature has The character of Mantitheos. a fresher or brighter charm than this short speech— the natural, wonderfully vivid expression of an attractive character. Mantitheos is the brilliant, ambitious young Athenian, burning to fulfil the Homeric ideal by distinguishing himself in council as in war; an Alkibiades made harmless by the sentiment of chivalry. The general tone of simple self-reliance, and possibly the gibe at Thrasybulos, may have been found refreshing by elderly senators. Mantitheos had really done good service in the field; and his statement of this is followed by an ingenuous apology for over-eagerness to shine in the ekklesia. The last passage is masterly. The virtue of ‘minding one's own affairs’ (ἀπραγμοσύνη) was often praised at Athens; but Mantitheos goes to the centre of Athenian instincts when he tells the judges that ‘to say the truth’ they respect no men who do not take part in public lifeThe speech is described by Dobree ( Adv. I. 192) as ‘vividis et paene comicis coloribus exprimens στρατικὴν αὐθάδειαν ea simul arte ut hoc ipso placeat’—a description which does no justice to the delicacy of the delineation. ‘Ex verbis Dobrei alterum quendam Pyrpolinicen expectes,’ as Francken says (Comment. Lys. p. 118)..

IV. 3. Against Philon, Or. XXXI

3. Against Philon. [Or. XXXI.]—This speech may be considered as a companion-piece to the last; being an Accusation, as the other is probably a Defence, at a dokimasia for the Senate. Philon—a man otherwise unknown—had been chosen by lot a member of the Senate of Five Hundred; and had appeared before that body, with others designated to places in it, in order to pass the scrutiny. The speaker, himself a senator, comes forward to oppose the admission of Philon. The date cannot be fixed. Philon is accused of having gone about Attica, plundering ‘the oldest of the citizens,’ who had stayed quietly in their Probable Date. demes (§ 18); and some of these citizens were still alive: some time between 404 and 395 B. C. may therefore be assumed.Analysis.

The speaker begins by protesting that no private enmity, but only regard to his oath as senator, induces him to appear against Philon. What is the definition of a worthy senator? One who both is, and desires to be, a citizen (§ 5). Now when the troubles came on Athens [405 B. C.], Philon proved how little he valued his citizenship. He neither stayed with the oligarchs in the town, nor joined the exiles at Phylê, but went to Orôpus—paid the resident-alien's tax, and lived under the protection of a patron. This shall be proved by witnesses (§§ 1—14). If he says that he was unfit for fighting, it can be shown that his name does not appear among those of the citizens who, instead of personal service, paid money or armed their demesmen (§§ 15, 16). Nor was he merely passive: he did positive wrong to aged citizens of Athens whom he met with in the country (§§ 17—19). This corresponds with his treatment of his own mother, who transferred the keeping of her money from her son to a stranger (§§ 20—23). Why should such as he be a senator? The betrayer of a garrison, a fleet, or a camp is punished; but Philon has betrayed the State itself (§§ 24—26).

‘He has broken no law,’ he says. No: for an offence so enormous was never expressly contemplated by any legislator (§§ 27, 28). If the aliens who helped Athens in her need were honoured, surely the citizens who abandoned her should be disgraced. The advocates who claim honour for Philon now would have done better had they advised him to deserve it then (§§ 29—33). Let each senator ask himself why he was admitted to that dignity, and he will see why Philon ought to be shut out from it (§ 34).

The tone of this address is in contrast with that The attack strong, but temperate. of the protest against the election of Evandros: it is severe and decided, but not bitter or unfair. A character which seems to have been really contemptible is drawn without passion, each statement being supported by evidence; and the assertion of the speaker, that only a sense of duty prompted him to accuse, is at least not contradicted by his method. The style is rhetorical, and rather more openly artificial than is usual with Lysias (see esp. §§ 11, 32); but it has all his compactness and force—of which the short appeal at the end is a good example. One point of Allusion to the crime of Neutrality. historical interest comes out. Philon is accused of having taken part, in 405 B. C., neither with oligarchs nor with democrats. He pleads:—‘Had it been an offence not to be present at such a time, a law would have been made expressly on that subject.’ The answer is, that, owing to the inconceivable enormity of the offence, no law has been enacted on the subject (§ 27). So completely had Solon's enactment against neutrality—to which the speaker could have appealed with so much rhetorical effect—passed out of the remembrance of that generationRauchenstein, in his introduction to the speech (p. 116), brings together the chief passages in which Solon's law is mentioned:—Plut. Sol. c. 20 (ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηδετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον): Cic. ad Att. x. 1: Gellius II. 12 (translating an extract from Aristotle —perhaps from his πολιτεῖαι ) si ob hanc discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in duas partes fieret et ob eam caussam irritatis animis utrinque arma caperentur pugnareturque, tum qui in eo tempore in eoque casu civilis discordiae non alterutripartise adiunxerit sed solitarius separatusque a communi malo civitatis secesserit, is domo patria fortunisque omnibus careto, exul extorrisque esto. .

IV. 4. Defence on a Charge of seeking to abolish the Democracy, Or. XXV

4. Defence on a Charge of seeking to abolish the Democracy. [Or. XXV.]—This title, given to the speech in the MSS., is clearly wrong. The speaker is, indeed, chiefly concerned to prove that he is guiltless of any share in the crimes of the Thirty Tyrants; but it is clear that he was not upon his trial for high treason. There is no reference to any penalties which threatened him. The question is whether he shall, or shall not, be admitted to certain privileges. Thus in § 3 he insists on his claim to participation in the advantages of citizenship; in § 4 he speaks of rights which citizens who have done no evil ought to share with positive benefactors of the State; in § 14 he says to the judges:—‘If, when I might have had office, I declined it, I have a right to receive honour from you now.’ Clearly this speech was delivered on The Speech really connected with a Dokimasia. the occasion of a dokimasia for some office to which the speaker had been designated, but his admission to which was opposed. The cause is heard by an ordinary court—probably under the presidency of the ThesmothetaeSince the Thesmothetae had jurisdiction in causes connected with δοκιμασίαι: Pollux 8. 44.—and on appeal from a decision for the speaker already given by the Senate. The date Date. must be placed between 402 and 400 B. C.; probably nearer to the lower limitRauchenstein (Introduct. p. 91) supposes 402 B. C.; Blass (Att. Bereds. p. 509) prefers 401 or 400.The arguments for the earlier date are these:—(1) The general tone of the speech, referring to the troubles of the Anarchy as recent: (2) § 17, where the speaker says προθυμήσομαι χρηστὸς εἶναι—as if he had not yet had time to prove his reformed character: (3) §§ 23 —24, where the exiled adherents of the Thirty are described as still hoping for a reaction at Athens: (4) § 28, from which (Rauchenstein thinks) it appears that the law of Archinos was not yet passed—a law enacted soon after the restoration of the democracy, providing that persons against whom, in despite of the Amnesty, accusations were brought in violation of the Amnesty, should be allowed at once to enter a παραγραφή, and to speak first at its hearing (Isokr. Kall. § 2).For the later date it is argued (1) that in one place at least—§ 21 —the events under the Thirty are spoken of as if some considerable interval had elapsed; (2) that the restored democracy was old enough for abuses to have grown up,—§ 30 [this is, I think, a strong point]: (3) that § 28 does not prove the law of Archînos to be non-existent, since that law would have had no bearing on a δοκιμασία.. The accusers were Epigenes, Diophanes and Kleisthenes (§ 25). The defendant is not named.

It would not be strange, he says, if the speeches made Analysis. against him had excited the indignation of the judges against all, without distinction, who had remained at Athens under the Thirty. Much more might, indeed, have been said about the crimes of the Tyrants. But it is unmeaning to charge those crimes upon men who had no share in them. If he can prove that he is innocent, he may surely claim at least the ordinary privileges of citizenship in common with men of more distinguished services (§§ 1—6). No man is born an oligarch or a democrat. He becomes one or the other according to his private interest (τῶν ἰδίᾳ συμφερόντων, § 10). This is proved by history. Phrynichos and Peisandros were demagogues before they became oligarchs. Men who helped to overthrow the Four Hundred were afterwards numbered with the Thirty: many of the Four Hundred themselves were with the democrats at the Peiraeus; some of those who had expelled the Four Hundred were afterwards among the Thirty; and some of the men who gave in their names for the march against Eleusis, after going forth with the people, were besieged along with the Tyrants§ 9 εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσῖνάδε ἀπογραψαμένων, ἐξελθόντες μεθ’ ὑμῶν, ἐπολιορκοῦντομετ’ αὐτῶν. The Thirty Tyrants, when their government fell and was succeeded by that of the Ten, withdrew to Eleusis. After the restoration of the democracy, an expedition was made from Athens against Eleusis, and they were dislodged: Xen. Hell. II. iv. 39, 43. The question is, whether οἱ Ἐλευσῖνάδε ἀπογραψάμενοι are (1) men who enrolled themselves at Athens for this expedition, but afterwards deserted to the Tyrants—in which case ἐξελθόντες means ‘having marched out:’ or (2) men who, having been driven from Athens by the Thirty, remained in Attica, and, instead of joining the democrats, joined the tyrants at Eleusis —in which case ἐξελθόντες means ‘having left Athens’ under stress of the Tyranny. I prefer the former view as giving (a) a clearer meaning to ἀπογραψαμένων, ( b) a clearer contrast between ἐξελθόντες μεθ’ ὑμῶν and ἐπολιορκοῦντο μετ’ αὐτῶν..

The explanation is simply that their interests varied at different times. Now, the interest of the speaker lay wholly with the democracy. He had been five times trierarch and had been in four sea-fights (§ 12). The establishment of the Thirty destroyed his chance of reward for these services. Neither under the First Oligarchy nor under the Second did he hold office (§§ 7—14). If he did no wrong in the Anarchy, much more will he be a good citizen under the restored Democracy. The victims of the Tyrants must not be confounded with their agents. It was the error of the Thirty that they visited the sins of a few corrupt demagogues on all the citizens: let not the people so err now (§§ 15—20). Dissensions among the Thirty gave the exiles their first hopes of success; let not disunion in the democracy now give occasion to the enemies of Athens, but let the oaths of amnesty be kept towards all (§§ 21—24). After the fall of the Four Hundred, the rigours which bad advisers caused to be adopted against their political opponents brought the city to ruin. And now sycophants, counselling a revengeful policy, oppose themselves to the views of those who were really active in restoring the democracy. Such men show what they would have been had they shared the power of the Thirty. The friends of the city advise differently. Let the Amnesty hold good for all. When those who are really answerable for the past troubles are brought to account, severity is excusable; but innocent men must not be mixed up with them (§§ 25—35).

The speaker had evidently been closely connected with the party of the Tyrants; for though he states his services to the democracy before 405 B. C., of his political character since that time he has nothing better to say than that it has been harmless; indeed, he implies a contrast between himself and those who had been true to the democracy at its need (§ 4). It is hard to understand the high praise which The Speech overpraised. has been given to this speech by some critics of LysiasAs by Reiske (‘egregia, luculenta, Lysiae nomine dignissima,’ Or. Att. v. p. 759): and by Francken (Comment. Lys. p. 184).; it is barely conceivable that one of the ablest of them should count it his best work‘Lysiam relegenti videtur haec oratio esse omnium optima.’ Dobree, Adv. I. 247.. The speaker's interpretation of the Amnesty is, indeed, larger and truer than the opposite view taken by the accuser of EvandrosOr. XXVI. §§ 16—20: see above, p. 244.; and his elaborate exposition of the doctrine that political creed is purely an affair of self interest may claim the praise of candour. The style has vigour, but neither brilliancy nor dignity; and the êthos of the speaker, as a moderately intelligent and thoroughly practical man, can scarcely be accounted persuasiveIt is difficult not to suspect that Lysias—himself a loyal friend of the democracy in two disasters— wrote this defence of easy tergiversation with deliberate, though disguised, irony; irony which perhaps ran no danger from the acuteness of his client..

IV. 5. For the Invalid, Or. XXIV

5. For the Invalid. [Or. XXIV.]—This speech may conveniently be classed with the four preceding, since it was written for a dokimasia, although the scrutiny in this case was of a different kind. At Public Charity at Athens. Athens a certain allowance was made by the State to the ἀδύνατοι It is not clear whether the term ἀδύνατος, in this technical sense, referred only to bodily infirmity, or included (as Francken thinks, p. 171 n.) also the idea of poverty. The Invalid was said by his adversary (1) τῷ σώματι δύνασθαι καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, § 4, and (2) δύνασθαι συνεῖναι δυναμένοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναλίσκειν § 5, a phrase evidently as an antithesis —possibly humorous—to ἀδύνατος.: that is, to persons who were unable, through bodily ailment, to earn a livelihood, and who had less than three minae of private property. Once a year, or perhaps oftener, the list of applicants for such relief was scrutinised by the SenateAeschin. in Timarch. § 104. and then passed by the ekklesia (§ 22). It is on the occasion of such a scrutiny that the present speech is made. The speaker had for years (§ 8) been in receipt of an obol daily (§ 26) from the State; but lately it had been attempted to show that he was not entitled to public relief. This objection is termed in the title to the speech (not in the speech itself) an eisangelia; but had, of course, nothing in common with eisangeliae technically so called except that it was an accusation laid immediately before the Senate. The Date. date appears from § 25 to have been later than 403 B. C.

Having premised that jealousy is the only conceivable Analysis. motive for this attack upon him, the speaker comes to the two objections which have been made to his receiving the public alms:—that he is not really a cripple; and that he has a trade (§§ 1—4). He answers the second objection first (§§ 5—9); and then refutes the other with a good deal of grim humour (§§ 10—14). Lastly, he defends his general character (§§ 15—20), and concludes with an entreaty not to be deprived of his obol a day (§§ 21—27).

Harpokration seems seems, for his words are (s. v. ἀδύνατος), ἔστι δὲ καὶ λόγος τις ὡς Λυσίου περὶ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου: some MSS. having ὡς λέγεται Λυσίου (Blass, Att. Bereds. p. 648). to have doubted the genuineness No ground for doubting the genuineness. of this speech; possibly on the ground taken by Boeckh Staatsh. I. p. 260 ff. referred to by Blass l.c. Blass classes this speech with such ‘bagatelle’ speeches as λόγος περὶ τῆς ἐγγυθήκης, λόγος περὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ τρίποδος, &c., ascribed to Lysias; and remarks that all such trifles, without distinction, were held spurious by the old critics, whom Harpokration and Athenaeos follow. But it should be noticed that Athenaeos, while he adds εἰ γνήσιος to his mention of the περὶ τοῦ χρ. τρίποδος (VI. p. 231 B), only says of the περὶ τῆς ἐγγυθήκης that it is ‘ascribed’ to Lysias—acquiescing, apparently, in the ascription (v. p. 209 F).—that Lysias would not have written, nor the Senate endured, so elaborate an address on such a subject. This seems a most unsafe argument against a composition excellent of its kind, and excellent in a way suggestive of Lysias. The humour, broad, but stopping short of burlesque, exactly suits the condition of the speaker; and there is true art in the ironical pathos of the invalid, when, using an Attic illustration, he remarks that his infirmity is disputed with him by his adversary as eagerly as if it were an heiress (§ 14).

V. Causes relating to military offences ( λιποταξίου—ἀστρατείας), Or. XIV and XV

1. Against Alkibiades, on a Charge of Desertion [Or. XIV.].

2. Against Alkibiades, on a Charge of Failure to Serve [Or. XV.].The two Speeches concern the same fact.

These speeches do not refer to two distinct accusations, but are merely two different ways of stating the same accusation. Alkibiades, son of the famous Alkibiades, had taken part in the expedition sent from Athens to the relief of Haliartos when Boeotia was invaded by Lysander in 395 B. C. But, instead of serving with the heavy-armed infantry, he had chosen to serve with the cavalry, although he had not passed the scrutiny (dokimasia) required before enrolment among the Knights. His accusers might have indicted him under a special law which attached the penalty of disfranchisement to such a fraud (Or. XIV. § 8). They preferred, however, to bring against him a more invidious charge—desertion of military duty.Law about Military Offences.

The principal military offences were dealt with at Athens by one law. Under this law a citizen was liable to indictment and if convicted to disfranchisement for 1. Failure to join the army—ἀστρατείας: 2. Cowardice in battle—δειλίας: 3. Desertion of his post—λιποταξίου. This third term properly denoted an offence distinct from the other two. But it was sometimes so extended as to include either of the other twoIt does not appear quite certain whether there was a γραφὴ δειλίας distinct from a γραφὴ λιποταξίου. In § 6 of the First Speech Against Alkibiades they appear to be identified. But in the following passages (among others) they are distinguished.—Aeschin. in Ctes. § 175 Σόλων—ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιτιμίοις ᾤετο δεῖν ἐνέχεσθαι τὸν ἀστράτευτον καὶ τὸν λελοιπότα τὴν τάξιν καὶ τὸν δειλὸν ὁμοίως· Andok. de Myst. § 73 ὅποσοι λίποιεν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἀστρατείας ἢ δειλίας ἢ ἀναυμαχίου ὄφλοιεν ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀποβάλοιεν: and Plato's distinction (Legg. XII. 943 F) of ἀστρατείας —λιποταξίου—ῥιφθέντων (the last equivalent to δειλίας) may be supposed to correspond to a like distinction in the actual Attic law. Obviously a γραφὴ λιποταξίου might be needed for cases in which a γραφὴ δειλίας could not be preferred. On the other hand, the γραφὴ λιποταξίου might probably include the case of ἀστρατεία: just as the δίκη λιπομαρτυρίου (compared by Francken, Comment. Lys. p Ill) lay against a man who refused to give evidence; not merely against one who, having undertaken to do so, failed to appear.. Now Alkibiades had served, indeed, but had not served with the hoplites. His offence, then, might be looked at from two points of view. He might be considered as a man who, on service, had been found out of his place, and who was liable to an indictment for Desertion of his Post—γραφὴ λιποταξίου. Or he might be considered as a man who had never been present in his place, and who was liable to an indictment for Failure to Serve—γραφὴ ἀστρατείας. The First Speech takes the former point of view; the Second takes the latter.

The date and occasion of the speeches are not Date. directly indicated, but can be determined almost certainly. This was the first military trial since ‘the peace’ (XIV. § 4);—a campaign had just taken place, but no battle had been fought (§ 5), though the generals had given satisfaction to the State (XV. § 1). All this corresponds with the campaign of the year 395. It was the first since the peace, or rather truce, with Sparta in the spring of 404. No battle had been fought, because, before the Athenian force arrived at Haliartos, the Lacedaemonians had already been defeated, and Lysandros slain. The Athenian Generals had only to assist at the arrangement of the humiliating truce under which Pausanias led his army out of Boeotia ( Xen. Hellen. III. v. 16). In 395 B. C. the younger Alkibiades must have been about twenty years of ageSince from Isokr. de Bigis (Or. XVI) § 45 it appears that the younger Alkibiades was born in, or just before, 415 B. C. .

The Court was composed of soldiers (στρατιώτας δικάζειν, Or. XIV. § 5), the Generals presiding (τῶν στρατηγῶν δέομαι, XV. 1). Archestratides, the chief accuser, had opened the cause and produced the evidence; these two speakers are his friends and supporters. (Or. XIV. 3; XV. 12.)Analysis.— First Speech.

The accuser explains his appearance in that capacity. An explanation is, indeed, hardly necessary, considering the character of Alkibiades; but in his own case a feud inherited from his father supplies a special motive. (§§ 1—3.) He then addresses himself to a technical point. The law against Desertion is so worded (it has been argued) that it does not apply where there has been no battle. He answers that one of the two offences which that law contemplates—namely Failure to Serve—is manifestly proved against Alkibiades, who did not take his place among the hoplites. Of the other offence—Desertion of his Post through cowardice—he is virtually guilty, since his reason for preferring to serve with the cavalry was that there he would run less risk. Others, who were really knights, waived their privilege in this instanceThis statement is exactly illustrated by the Speech For Mantitheos (Or. XVI) § 12, where Mantitheos, speaking of this very expedition to Haliartos, says:—ὅτε ...εἰς Ἁλίαρτον ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὑπὸ Ὀρθοβούλου κατειλεγμένος ἱππεύειν, ...ἑτέρων ἀναβάντων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἀδοκιμάστων παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἐγὼ προσελθὼν ἔφην τῷ Ὀρθοβόυλῳ ἐξαλεῖψαί με ἐκ τοῦ καταλόγου ., and served as hoplites. Alkibiades seized a privilege to which he had no claim (§ 10). Such audacity must be punished for public example. Let the soldiers who sit in judgment remember how much each of them sacrificed to his duty, and then decide what punishment is merited by such contempt of duty (§§ 4—15). The advocates of Alkibiades will plead his youth and his parentage. Neither his own nor his father's character deserves sympathy. If relatives plead for him, it is they who ought to have restrained him; if officials, they must show that he is legally innocent. (§§ 16—22.)

Then follows a bitter attack upon the defendant and his father. Alkibiades the younger is described as vicious from his youth, and as a traitor to his own fatherAn allusion in § 26 is obscure. It is said that the younger Alkibiades μετὰ Θεοτίμου ἐπιβουλεύσας τῷ πατρὶ Ὠρεοὺς προὔδωκεν. Francken suggests Ὀρνεάς (the town in the Argeia); and thinks that the young Alkibiades may have had something to do with a betrayal of that place to the Lacedaemonians in 416 B. C.: cf. Thuc. VI. 7 (Comment. Lys. p. 106).; all the treasons of the elder Alkibiades are recounted at length. He prompted the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia—he incited Chios to revolt—he preferred a home even in Thrace to Athens. He betrayed the Athenian fleet to Lysandros: both his greatgrandfathers, Megakles and Alkibiades, were ostracised. (§§ 23—40.) An attack on the family in their private relations, as stained with every impurity and impiety, leads to the conclusion. Much, the accuser says, has been omitted: the judges must imagine it. He then causes to be read the laws on which he relies; the judicial oath; and the indictment. (§§ 41—47.)

The Generals, the presidents of the Court, say that they Second Speech. allowed Alkibiades as a special favour to serve with the cavalry. Why, in that case, was he rejected by the phylarch of his own tribe, and not struck off the list of hoplites by the taxiarch? Why, when he took the field, was he treated with scorn by all the knights, and driven to place himself among the mounted bowmen? It is strange if the Generals can enrol a man among the knights at their pleasure, when they cannot so enrol him among the hoplites. If, however, the Generals have exceeded their real powers, then the Court cannot recognise their arbitrary act. (§§ 1—8.) The law is, indeed, severe; but the judges must administer it as unflinchingly as if they were marching against the enemy (§§ 9—12).Feeling towards the elder Alkibiades.

The first especially, of these two speeches should be compared with the Defence written shortly before by Isokrates—probably in 397 or 396 B.C.—for the same man. Both bear striking witness to the hatred felt for the memory of the elder Alkibiades in the early years of the restored democracy. Here, denunciations of the father fill about one-half of the speech against the son; there, the son devotes more than three-fourths of his address to a defence of his father. The speech Against Alkibiades ascribed to Andokides, but probably the work of a late sophist, indirectly illustrates the same feeling; being, in fact, an epitome of the scandalous stories about Alkibiades current at the same period.Doubt of the genuineness—not well founded.

Harpokration refers to Oration XIV. with a doubt of its authenticitys. v. Ἀλκιβιάδης .; Oration XV. is cited by no ancient author. The genuineness of each has been called in question by modern criticsSee Francken (Comment. Lys. pp. 110—115), who refers to the doubts of Boeckh and others, but himself expresses positive suspicion only of Or. XV: Blass (Att. Bereds. pp. 491—4), who adds Scheibe to the secptics, and himself inclines to doubt both speeches; though allowing, with Francken, that they certainly are not mere sophistic exercises. Taylor thought the second spurious (Reiske Or. Att. v. 553).; chiefly on grounds of internal evidence. It has been noticed that the composition varies in some points from the usual Lysian character; and that the special marks of his power are absentBlass notices especially the heaping together of homoioteleuta in §§ 41 and 35. Markland observes on Or. XIV § 47, μεγάλη δ’ εὐτυχία τὸ τοιούτων πολιτῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι πόλει, hi non sunt numeri Lysiani: ille potius scripsisset μεγάλη δ’ ἐυτυχία τῇ πόλει τοιούτων πολιτῶν ἀπαλλαγῆναι (ap. Reiske O. A. v. 553). The absence of ἦθος and χάρις is the more general accusation—a vague one.. The two speeches must stand or fall together. If not the work of Lysias, they are certainly the work of a contemporary writer for the law-courts. But the evidence, external or internal, against their genuineness appears too slight to warrant even a strong suspicion.

VI. Causes relating to murder or intent to murder (γραφαὶ φόνου — τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας).
VI. 1. Against Eratosthenes, Or. XII

1. Against Eratosthenes. [Or. XII.]—Polemarchos, brother of Lysias, had been put to death by the Thirty Tyrants. Eratosthenes, one of their number, was the man who had arrested him and taken him to prison. In this speech Lysias, himself the speaker, charges Eratosthenes with the murder of Polemarchos, and, generally, with his share in the Tyranny.

A question has to be considered in regard to the Form of procedure. form of the accusation. Was Eratosthenes prosecuted under an ordinary indictment for murder? Or was he accused on the occasion of his coming forward to render account of his office as one of the Thirty?

On the former supposition it is hard to say before what court the trial took place. Clearly it was not the Areiopagos. If it was the Delphinion, then Eratosthenes must have pleaded some justification of the homicide; but he admits its guilt, and lays the blame on his colleagues (§ 24). If it was an ordinary heliastic court under the presidency of the Eleven, then there must have been an arrest ( ἀπαγωγή) by the Eleven; but this does not seem to have taken placeThe arguments against the hypothesis of an ordinary γραφὴ φόνου are well given by Blass (Att. Ber. pp. 540—1) Scheibe (ib) thinks that the trial was ‘fortasse apud heliastas ad Delphinium;’ Rauchenstein apparently (Introd p. 16) before an ordinary heliastic court. Francken also (Comment. Lys. p. 79) seems to reject the idea of an accusation at the εὐθῦναι..

The other supposition offers less difficulty. A special clause in the Amnesty of 403 B. C. excluded the Thirty Tyrants, the Ten who had succeeded them, and the Eleven who had served them. But any one even of these might enjoy the Amnesty if he chose to stand a public inquiry, and was acquittedXenophon ( Hellen. II. iv. 38) mentions the exclusion from the Amnesty of the Thirty, the Eleven, and ‘the Ten who had ruled in the Peiraeus.’ Andokides (De Myst. § 90) gives the words of the Amnesty: καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενί, πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα καὶ τῶν ἕνδεκα [καὶ τῶν δέκα]· οὐδὲ τούτων ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ εὐθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἦρξεν. Francken cannot be right in referring τούτων here to τῶν ἕνδεκα only (Comment. Lys. p. 79). The words τῶν δέκα are added by Sauppe and Baiter with Schneider and others.. When the oligarchy was finally overthrown, Pheidon and Eratosthenes were the only membersPheidon had been one of the Thirty and also one of the Ten. Eratosthenes had been one of the Thirty, but not one of the Ten. This is clear from §§ 54, 55. of it who stayed at Athens. As they dared to do this, they must have availed themselves of the permission to give account of their office. And Lysias could have had no better opportunity for preferring his accusation than that which would be given by the public inquiry into the conduct of Eratosthenes. Two things in the speech itself tend to show that it was spoken on this occasion. First, its general scope. It has a wider range, and deals more generally with the history of the Anarchy, than would be natural if it was concerned exclusively with an ordinary indictment for murder. Only the first third of the speech relates to Polemarchos; thenceforth to the end his name is not mentioned, even in the peroration; the political offences of Eratosthenes are exclusively dwelt upon. It may be noticed, too, that at the commencement Lysias speaks in the plural of ‘the defendants’ and their hostility to Athens, as if Eratosthenes was only in the same predicament with several other persons. Secondly, an expression in § 37 should be noticed. The speaker there says that he has done enough in having shown that the guilt of the accused reaches the point at which death is deserved. He would not have said this if death had been the necessary penalty in case of conviction. But he might well say it if his charge was preferred, among many others, when Eratosthenes was giving his account, and when the question was what degree of punishment, if any, he was to sufferThe view that Lysias accused Eratosthenes at his εὐθῦναι is taken by Blass (Att. Ber. p. 540) and by Grote (vol. VIII. p. 402). I have purposely abstained from bringing into the question the fact that Lysias was only an isoteles. On the one hand, as Rauchenstein says, a resident-alien was probably allowed to prosecute personally, instead of being represented by his προστάτης, when the duty of avenging blood came upon him as the nearest relative. On the other hand, it can hardly be doubtful that a resident-alien would, as Blass thinks, have been allowed to prefer an accusation at the euthunae of any official whose acts had touched him: it certainly is not doubtful that such a man as Lysias would have been allowed, under the democracy which he had just helped to restore, to impeach one of the Thirty Tyrants. . Date.

The date must be 403 B. C., the year of Eukleides. After their flight from Athens the Thirty maintained themselves for a short time at Eleusis. Soon after the restoration of the democracy, an expedition was made against Eleusis; the generals of the Thirty, who came out to ask for a parley, were seized and put to death; and the Tyrants, with their chief adherents, fled from Attica (Xen. Hellen. II. iv. 43). But it is clear from § 80 of the speech that this expedition had not yet taken place.

Again, in §§ 92 f. Lysias addresses successively two distinct parties—the ‘men of the city’ who remained in Athens under the Thirty, and the ‘men of the Peiraeus.’ The line of demarcation could have been drawn so sharply only while the war of parties was quite recent; not two or three years later, when exiles and oligarchs had long been fused once more into one civic body. It was, no doubt, remembered for years who had been on one side and who on the other. But in a speech made (say) in 400 B. C., we should not find the ‘men of the city’ and the ‘men of Peiraeus’ addressed separately as if they still formed two distinct camps.

The speech falls into two divisions. The first and shorter (§§ 1—36) deals with the special charge against Eratosthenes; the second, with his political character and with the crimes of the Tyrants generally.

I. §§ 1—36. Analysis.

The difficulty here is not how to begin, but where to stop. Ordinarily the accuser is expected to show that he has some motive for hostility to the accused. Here it would be more natural to ask the accused what motive he and his fellows have had for their hostility to Athens (§§ 1—3).

Lysias then enters on his narrative of the facts. His father had been invited by Perikles to settle at Athens as a resident-alien, and had lived there peaceably for thirty years. His family had never been involved in any troubles until the time of the Thirty Tyrants. Theognis and Peison, members of that body, suggested the policy of plundering the residentaliens. These two men first paid a visit to the shield-manufactory of Lysias and his brother, and took an inventory of the slaves. They next came to the dwelling-house of Lysias, and got all his ready money, about three talents. He managed to slip away from them, and took refuge with a friend in the Peiraeus; then, hearing that his brother Polemarchos had been met in the street by Eratosthenes and taken to prison, he escaped by night to Megara. Polemarchos received the usual mandate of the Thirty—to drink the hemlock; and had a beggar's burial. Though he and Lysias had yielded such rich plunder, the very earrings were taken from the ears of his wife (§ 19). Now the murderer of Polemarchos was Eratosthenes (§§ 4—23). Here he is briefly cross-examined:—

‘Did you arrest Polemarchos or not?’ ‘Terrified by the orders of the authorities—I proceeded to do so.’ ‘And were you in the council chamber when we were being talked about?’ ‘I was.’ ‘Did you support, or oppose, those who advised our execution?’ ‘Opposed them.’ ‘Opposed our being put to death?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Considering such treatment of us to be unjust—or just?’ ‘Unjust.’

Lysias comments indignantly on these answers. If Eratosthenes had really protested against the sentence, he would not have been selected to make the arrest. He was one of the Thirty themselves and had nothing to fear. All the circumstances disprove his pretence of good-will; instead of contenting himself with a visit to the house of Polemarchos, he seized him in the street; he gave him no friendly hint beforehand. If it is true that he opposed the sentence, he must at least prove that he did not make the arrest, or did not make it in a harsh manner. The judges are then reminded of the importance which their decision will have as an example for both citizens and foreigners. The fate of the generals who conquered at Arginusae is contrasted with the deserts of those who profited by the defeat at Aegospotami. If those suffered death, what is due to these? (§§ 24—36.)

II. §§ 37—100.

To say more is superfluous: the guilt of Eratosthenes has already been shown to be capital. But lest he should appeal to his past life, this must be exposed. In the first oligarchy [411 B. C.] he had to fly from the Hellespont after an unsuccessful attempt to corrupt the democratic crews of Athenian vessels there. After the defeat of Athens [405 B. C.] he and Kritias were first among the Five Ephori and afterwards among the Thirty Tyrants. Perhaps he will say that he obeyed the Thirty through fear. No, in the cause of Theramenes he dared to oppose them. But this opposition was not patriotic; all the quarrels among the Thirty were selfish. The so-called moderate party to which Theramenes belonged was represented by the later Board of Ten. And the Ten, instead of promoting peace, waged war with the exiles more bitterly than the Thirty (§§ 37—61).

Theramenes is the man whom Eratosthenes takes credit for having defended. It can be fancied how eagerly he would have claimed friendship with Themistokles, who built the walls of Athens, if he is proud of friendship with Theramenes —who pulled them down. Theramenes, when a member of the first oligarchy, betrayed his own closest friends, Antiphon and Archeptolemos; after Aegospotami, he undertook to make peace without loss of honour, and yet it was he who proposed at Sparta that Athens should lose her walls and her fleet; it was he who advocated the proposal of Drakontides for the establishment of the Thirty; and it is this man— twice the enslaver of Athens—whom Eratosthenes glories in having defended! (§§ 62—78.)

This is no season for mercy. The man who condemned, untried, the fathers, sons, brothers of those who now judge him, does not deserve even a trial. His advocates can urge no merits either of his or of their own. His witnesses are mistaken if they think that they can shield from peril of death the men who made it dangerous to attend a burial. They will say that Eratosthenes was the least criminal of the Thirty. Is he to escape because there are twenty-nine greater villains in Greece? (§§ 79—91.)

Lysias now addresses himself, first, to those who remained in Athens during the Anarchy, then to the exiles who returned from the Peiraeus—speaking as if he had before him two definite bodies of men. He reminds each party of their peculiar reasons for hating the Thirty. The ‘men of the city’ should hate that despotism; for it shared with them nothing but its shame, and forced upon them an unholy strife. The ‘men of Peiraeus’ should hate it: it proscribed them, persecuted them, severed them from country and kinsfolk. Had it triumphed, no sanctuary would have protected them, nothing could have saved their children from outrage at home or slavery abroad. But it is needless to speak of what might have been: what has been is too great for words. It can only be felt—felt, with boundless resentment for the shrines which these men desecrated, for the city which they humbled, —for the dead, who are listening now to mark if the judges will avenge them.

‘I will cease to accuse. You have heard, seen, suffered:— you have them:—judge.’ (§§ 92—100.)

The result is unknown. But as the accused had Result of the Trial. evidently strong support, and as Lysias complains of the difficulty which he had experienced in finding witnesses to some of the principal facts, it is probable that the penalty of death, at least, was not inflictedGrote vol. VIII. p. 402: Rauchenstein Introd. p. 16: Blass Att. Ber. p. 542. As to the number of men who supported Eratosthenes, see §§ 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91. As to the difficulty about witnesses, §§ 46, 47. See Or. x (Against Theomnêstos) § 31, and the remarks on it below..

The Speech Against Eratosthenes must take the Character of the Speech. first place among the extant orations of Lysias. In the two parts into which it naturally falls the speech presents, in perhaps unique combination, two distinct styles of eloquence,—first, the plain earnestness of a private demand for redress—then the lofty vehemence of a political impeachment. The compass of the power shown may best be measured by the two passages which mark its limits —on the one hand, the account of the arrest of Polemarchos, which has almost the flow of Herodotean narrative;—on the other hand, the passionate appeal to the two classes of men who had suffered from the Thirty—worked up with all the resources of a finished rhetoric. As regards the first, what may be called the private, division of the speech, it is very noticeable how little attempt Lysias makes to excite compassion; he contents himself with a bare recital of facts. He relies less on the atrocity of the wrong itself than on its significance as part of that system of organised crime which he sees personified in Eratosthenes. He therefore throws his whole weight upon the second, the public, division of his subject; and here he gives us, first, two political biographies, the lives of Eratosthenes and Theramenes—then, a retrospect of the government to which they belonged. In one sense this speech of Lysias may be compared with that of Demosthenes On the Crown. The question at issue involves a whole chapter of Athenian history, in which both the parties to the case were actors. But there is a difference. Demosthenes, the statesman, reviews the train of events with which he deals from the level of one who has helped to determine their course. Lysias stands on the lower ground of a private person; he sees the events of the Anarchy as they were seen by the masses who suffered, but were powerless to control; he does not discuss two rival lines of policy, but recalls, as a common man, experiences familiar to thousands. It is just because he speaks from among the crowd that he is so successful in denouncing Eratosthenes, and leaves the impression that in his attack upon the worst of close oligarchies he was the spokesman of an entire peoplePerhaps sceptical criticism has produced no greater marvel than an essay De oratione in Eratosthenem Trigintavirum Lysiae falso tributa, by A. Hecker (progr. Gymn. Leid. a. 1847—8). After proving to his own satisfaction the spuriousness of this speech, the author ends by regretting that he has spent some time in emending the speech Against Agoratos; ‘quam suppositam esse a Graeculo ludimagistro idoneis argumenti sevincam. Antiphonteae omnes et omnes pariter Andocideae orationes spuriae sunt. Quae brevi singula persecuturus sum.’ Literature has lost a curiosity by the non-fulfilment of this promise..

VI. 2. Against Agoratos, Or. XIII

2. Against Agoratos. [Or. XIII.]—Agoratos, son of a slave, had gained the Athenian citizenship by pretending to have had a hand in the assassination of Phrynichos in 411; a merit to which, according to his accuser, he had no claim. (§ 76.) For six years afterwards he had lived at Athens, exercising the trade of informer, and laying ‘all conceivable indictments’ (τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γραφάς § 73) before the law-courts. He is now charged with having slandered away the lives of several distinguished citizens just before the establishment of the Thirty.

It was in the spring of 404 that Theramenes came back from Sparta with the hard conditions of peace. Athens had been suffering for months the extreme of famine and misery; the mass of citizens were thankful for relief on any terms. But there were still a few men, influential by their position and service, who stood out against the bargain which the oligarchical party were about to strike with Sparta. The oligarchs, impatient to get rid of their opponents, had recourse to the aid of Agoratos. It was arranged that he should himself be charged with plotting to defeat the peace, and should then denounce a certain number of other persons as his accomplices. One Theokritos accused him before the Senate. A party of senators went to the Peiraeus to arrest him. Agoratos, feigning alarm, took sanctuary at the altar in the temple of Artemis at Munychia. Certain citizens who suspected him to be the victim, or the agent, of a plot, gave bail for him, and offered to take him out of Attica to await quieter times. He declined this proposal, and appeared before the Senate to give information. He denounced, first, the men who had bailed him; then several of the Generals and taxiarchs (§ 13), among whom were the General Strombichides, Dionysiodôros (kinsman of the accuser in this case), and probably EukratesEukrates is not named in this speech; but see § 5 of Or. XVIII., which refers to the confiscation of his property. the brother of Nikias; also a number of other citizens. These, with Agoratos himself, were imprisoned; and it was decreed that they should be tried both by the Senate and by a special court of Two Thousand. Immediately afterwards the peace with Sparta was ratifiedThat, according to Lysias, the informations of Agoratos were made before the acceptance of the peace and the surrender of the city, appears distinctly from § 17, εἵλοντο πρὶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης γενέσθαι τούτους (the popular leaders) εἰς διαβολὰς καὶ κινδύνους καταστῆσαι. It follows also from § 16.Grote (VIII. p. 320) believes that Lysias has misdated the informations of Agoratos, placing them before the surrender, whereas they were, in fact, given after it. He remarks: (1) That it is difficult to suppose an interval sufficient for these accusations between the return of Theramenes and the ratification of the peace, for which the people were most impatient. (2) That the bailers of Agoratos could not have proposed to convey him away by sea from Munychia, when the harbour was blocked up. (3) That the expression ‘till quieter times’ (ἕως κατασταίη τὰ πράγματα , ib.) would have been inappropriate at a moment just before the surrender.Now, (1) all that Lysias relates about the informations need not have occupied more than one day; there is room for them, then, between the return of Theramenes and the ratification of the peace (on the day after his return, Xen. Hellen. II. ii. 22). Lysias describes the capitulation and entrance of Lysandros into Athens as following immediately on the act of Agoratos, § 34. (2). We do not know how strict the blockade established in November 405 may have been in March 404: the ‘two boats’ may have lain ready at some point in Munychia outside the harbour. (3) The third objection I do not understand. Surely the time just before the surrender—when Athens was full of misery and faction—might be called a troubled time.No doubt Lysias had a motive for placing the informations of Agoratos before the capitulation, and thus representing him as responsible for it. On the other hand, it may be observed that the oligarchs would not have had the same motive for suborning Agoratos when the peace, which gave them the ascendancy, had been ratified.An ingenious attempt has been made (by Christian Renner, Comment. Lysiac. cc. duo, Gottingen 1869) to show that it is consistent with the narrative of Lysias to suppose that the peace had been accepted, and that the popular leaders, when denounced by Agoratos, were only agitating for a revision of it. But the words in § 17 bar this view. Renner can get over them only by supposing them corrupt. He proposes with Frohberg to strike out the words τὴν περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης after ἐκκλησίαν. This is to cut the knot. .

The government of the Thirty having been established, the prisoners were tried; but not by the Two Thousand; only by a new oligarchical Senate. They were all condemned to death, except Agoratos, who was banished. In 404 he joined the democratic exiles at Phylê, and afterwards returned to Athens with them; but appears to have been ill received (§ 77). He is now accused of murder by Dionysios, cousin and brother-in-law to Dionysiodôros.Mode of procedure.

The procedure was not by an indictment before the Areiopagos or the Delphinion, but by an information (endeixis) laid before the archon, followed by a summary arrest (apagogê)—precisely as in the case of the Mitylenean charged with the murder of Herodes, for whom Antiphon wrote a defence; the case was therefore heard by an ordinary court under the presidency of the Eleven. There had, however, been a slight informality. Strictly speaking, endeixis and apagogê were applicable only in cases where the accused had been taken in the act; though, as appears from this and from the Herodes case, the limitation was not always observed. Here the accuser had left out the words ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ in drawing up the indictment; but had been compelled to add them by the Eleven, although in this instance they had no real meaning (§§ 84, 86).Date.

The trial took place ‘long after’ the events to which it referred (§ 83); and the condemnation of Menestratos, who himself suffered on the same account ‘long after’ his offence (§ 56), is mentioned as if it was not very recent. At least five or six years, then, must have elapsed since 404 B. C. The speech cannot be placed earlier than 400; probably it may be placed as late as 398 Rauchenstein Introd. p. 55: Blass Att. Ber. p. 557..Analysis.

The speaker begins by explaining that both on private and on public grounds he is entitled to be the accuser of Agoratos. On private grounds, since Dionysiodôros was his cousin and brother-in-law; on public, because the crime of Agoratos affects the whole State (§§ 1—4).

The narrative of the facts (§§ 5—48) falls into four parts. (i) From the defeat at Aegospotami in 405 to the moment when Agoratos made his accusations, in the spring of 404: §§ 5—34. (ii) The trial and condemnation of the accused: §§ 35—38. (iii) Their last injunctions to their relatives: §§ 39—42. (iv) The sequel of their deaths—the reign of terror, which they had foreseen and endeavoured to avert: §§ 43—48.

The pleas which Agoratos may set up in his defence are next considered. He may deny the fact of having informed; but the decrees of the Senate and of the ekklesia will confute him. He may pretend that he informed in the interest of the State: but the events disprove that. He may say that he was forced to inform; but the circumstances of his arrest show that he did so willingly. He may throw the blame on Menestratos, who also informed. Nay, Menestratos was afterwards a victim of Agoratos, whose turn it is now to suffer himself. Compare the conduct of Agoratos with that of Aristophanes, who died rather than turn accuser (§§ 49—61).

The eminent men whom Agoratos destroyed may be contrasted with himself and with his family. His three brothers have all suffered death for base crimes; he himself obtained the citizenship by pretending to have assassinated Phrynichos. It is a dilemma; let him suffer for the murder or for the fraud (§§ 62—76).

He will perhaps claim sympathy as having joined the exiles at Phylê and returned with them. The fact was that, when he appeared at Phylê, they would have put him to death, had not the general Anytos interfered; and when, at the entry into Athens, he presumed to bear arms in the procession, Aesimos, its leader, came and snatched away his shield (§§ 77—82).

Or he will raise technical objections. He will say that the time which has elapsed ought to exempt him from penalties; but there is no statute of limitations (προθεσμία, § 83) here. Or he will say that the words ἐπ’ αὐτοφώρῳ were omitted in the indictment; which is much the same thing as arguing that he is guilty, indeed, but was not caught in guilt. Or he will plead the Amnesty. This is in itself a confession. Moreover, the Amnesty was a covenant between the oligarchs in the city (§§ 83—90) and the democrats of the Peiraeus: it has no force as between two democrats.

The judges, the whole people, are bound by the solemn injunctions of the dead. To acquit Agoratos would be to confirm the sentence by which they perished. A democratic court must not be in unison with the courts of the Tyrants. By condemning Agoratos, the judges will mark the difference between them; will avenge their friends; and will have done right in the sight of all men (§§ 91—97).

In historical interest the speech Against Agoratos stands next, perhaps, to the speech Against Eratosthenes; but it is conceived in a totally different Character of the Speech as compared with Or. XII. spirit. No transition from a private to a public character, like that which is so marked in the other case, occurs here. From beginning to end the accuser of Agoratos confines himself to his special task, that of demanding vengeance for the death of his kinsman. Much of the general history of the time is necessarily introduced, and the speaker of course avails himself of the great advantage which he possesses in being able to represent the slander of Agoratos as treason to the State. But there is no such large view of a whole period as is given in the speech Against Eratosthenes. The historical references are scattered, not concentrated, and, instead of forming pictures, are only picturesque; individual interests are in the foreground throughout. Lysias accusing Eratosthenes hardly attempts to excite a personal sympathy; he relies rather on the hatefulness of that system of crime to which this particular crime belonged; Dionysios accusing Agoratos describes the wives, mothers, sisters of the condemned visiting them in prison, and receiving their last messages of vengeance—a passage which strikingly resembles in conception and tone the prison-scene in the speech of Andokides On the Mysteries. The arrangement of the topics here, as usually with Lysias when he takes pains, is clear and good; though perhaps the speaker tries to make too many distinct points towards the end, and thereby rather impairs the breadth and strength of his argument. This is particularly the case in §§ 70—90; where the sophism about the Amnesty—that it was not meant to hold good between two men of the same party—is a curious exception to the usual tact of Lysias in argument.

VI 3. On the Death of Eratosthenes, Or. I

3. On the Death of Eratosthenes. [Or. I.]— Euphilêtos, an Athenian citizen of the humbler sort, had slain one Eratosthenes of Oea ( Οἴηθεν, § 16 ), whom he had taken in adultery with his wife. He is now prosecuted for murder by the relatives of Eratosthenes; and pleads in his defence the law which allowed the husband, in such cases, to kill the adultererDem. in Aristocr. § 53 ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἑκών...ἢ ἐπὶ δάμαρτι, κ.τ.λ....τούτων ἕνεκα μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα. (§§ 30, 31). As the law was clearly against them, the accusers were driven to allege that Euphilêtos had himself decoyed Eratosthenes into his house (§ 30); and that the real motive of the homicide was fear, enmity, or cupidity. This line of argument may have had some plausibility if Athenian husbands were in the habit of compromising such casesIn one instance, at all events, we find that the injured husband λαμβάνει μοιχόν...καὶ εἰς φόβον καταστήσας πράττεται τριάκοντα μνᾶς—not an excessive sum: Dem. in Neaer. § 65. As Blass notices (Att. Ber. p. 577) this case of Eratosthenes happens to be the only recorded example of that extreme and summary vengeance which the law allowed.. But the assertion of the accusers would be hard to prove; and Euphilêtos speaks throughout like a man confident of a verdict.

The cause would be tried, probably by heliastic judgesAfter the year of Eukleides, heliastic judges sat at the Palladion: see Isokr. adv. Callim. § 54, Dem. in Neaer. § 90. Probably at the Delphinion also they had taken the place of the Ephetac., at the Delphinion, the court for cases in which an admitted homicide was defended as justifiable. There is nothing to indicate the date. Analysis.

The accused asks the judges to imagine themselves in his place: all Greece, he says, would recognise the justice of his act. He had no motive for it but the dishonour done to his wife, his children and himself (§§ 1—4). Then comes the narrative (§§ 5—28), followed by the citation of witnesses and laws (§§ 29—36). He meets the suggestions of the defendants; as (i) that Eratosthenes was decoyed into the house, §§ 37—42; (ii) that the homicide was prompted by a former enmity, or by cupidity, §§ 43—46. In any of these cases, he would not have slain him before witnesses. The decision of the judges will have a good effect if it accords with the laws; if it does not, then these laws should be annulled, since citizens are only entrapped (ἐνεδρεύονται) by them. His life and property are at risk because he trusted to the laws of the city (§§ 47—50).

The first part Social interest of the Speech. of this speech (§§ 5—28) is curious as a vivid picture—vivid with almost Aristophanic life—of a small Athenian householdThe passage §§ 6—18 may be noted as a locus classicus on the architecture of Athenian houses.; especially as illustrating the position of a married woman of the lower class. The husband says that, at first, his wife gave him entire satisfaction as a housekeeper; on his part, he ‘watched her as far as possible, and gave all reasonable attention to the subject;’ at length, however, at her mother's funeral, she for once left the house; and hence the intrigue. Lysias has been clever in making the defence homely and at the same time dignified; Euphilêtos, the plain citizen, feels strong in the law of the city.

VI. 4. Defence Against Simon, Or. III

4. Defence Against Simon. [Or. III.]—The accused, an elderly Athenian of good family and fortune (§§ 4, 47), is accused by one Simon of having wounded him in a quarrel about one Theodotos, a young Plataean. The indictment was for Wounding with Intent (τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας), a charge which, in this case, seems to have been made merely in the sense of ‘wounding deliberatelyThe τραύματος γραφή seems to have been notorious as an instrument of false accusation. Cf. Dem. adv. Boeot. II. § 32 ἐπιτεμὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν αὑτοῦ τραύματος εἰσ’/ Αρειον πάγον με προσεκαλέσατο, ὡς φυγαδεύσων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως. Aeschines charges Demosthencs with having brought a false γραφή of the same kind against one Demomeles (De F. L. § 93, in Ctes. § 51); indeed, he says, this was one of his habitual villanies—τὴν μιαρὰν ταύτην κεφαλὴν καὶ ὑπεύθυνον . . . μυριάκις κατατέτμηκε καὶ τούτων μισφοὺς εἴληφε τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας γραφὰς γραφόμενος (in Ctes. § 212). Compare Lucian Timon § 46 ΓΝΑΘΩΝΙΔΗΣ. τί τοῦτο; παίξις, ὦ Τίμων· μαρτύρομαι. ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἰοὺ ἰού. προσκαλοῦμαί σε τραύματος ἐς Ἄρειον πάγον..’ But, as the accused justly says, the ‘intent’ to which the law referred was not merely intent to wound, but intent to kill (§§ 40—43). It was for this reason that the Areiopagos had jurisdiction in such cases, as well as in those of actual murderFor the law see Dem. in Aristocr. § 22. In [Lys.] in Andoc. § 15 it is loosely said that ‘according to the laws of the Areiopagos’ the penalty was banishment ἄν...τις ἀνδρος σῶμα τρώσῃ κεφαλὴν ἢ πρόσωπον ἢ χεῖρας ἢ πόδας—the mention of the πρόνοια being omitted.. The present trial took place before that court (§§ 1, 3); the penalty was banishment (§ 47), and further (as appears from Or. IV. § 18) confiscation Date. of property. The battles of Corinth and of Koroneia had already been fought (§ 45); the speech is therefore later than 394 B. C.Analysis.

After observing that Simon ought to be defendant rather than prosecutor, and requesting the indulgence of the court for the weakness which had involved him in so unpleasant a dispute (§§ 1—4), the accused gives his own account of the quarrel between himself and the prosecutor (§§ 5—20). He then refutes the account given by Simon (§§ 21—39). The formula, ‘wounding with intent,’ does not, he says, apply to this case (§§ 41—43). He wishes that he was at liberty to give illustrations of Simon's character [the Areiopagos not allowing the introduction of irrelevant matter]. As it is, he will mention only one fact—that Simon was dismissed from the Athenian army at Corinth (§§ 44, 45). Simon, he concludes, is one of those informers ‘who force their way into our houses, who persecute us, who snatch us by force out of the street.’ He appeals to the services of his ancestors, and to his own; and says that compassion is due to him, not only in the event of being condemned, but for the very fact of having been brought to trial (§§ 46—48).

VI. 5 On Wounding with Intent, Or. IV

5. On Wounding with Intent. [Or. IV.]—The first part of this speech has been lostThe loss must have taken place before the Palatine MS. was written. Sauppe (O. A. p. 73), regarding the speech as complete in its present shape, thinks that it was the last or at least the second (‘epilogus vel deuterologia’) made for the defence. In that case, as Blass says (Att. Ber. p. 590), the preceding speech or speeches can have contained little more than the narrative; since our speech deals with the proof. Francken (Comment. Lys. p. 37) and Scheibe (Blass l.c.) agree in thinking the speech imperfect., and with it the original title. It is a defence before the Areiopagos on a charge of wounding with murderous intent in a quarrel for the possession of a slave girl. The defendant asserted that the slave was the joint property of himself and the accuser; the latter claimed sole ownership (§ 10). The penalty threatening the accused was banishment and confiscation of property (§ 18).

The speech, as now extant, begins at the point where the Analysis. defendant is answering the assertion that a personal enmity of long standing accounts for the murderous character of the assault. It is not true, the defendant says, that they were at this time enemies; they had been reconciled. He had been called upon to perform a costly leiturgia, and had challenged his present accuser either to undertake it himself or to exchange properties (ἀντίδοσις); and this had been cited by the accuser in proof of the alleged hostility. But it has been shown that this exchange was never actually made; friends mediated, and the defendant took the leiturgia. The accuser had, indeed, already received some property of his, with a view to the exchange; but had returned it when the reconciliation took place. Another proof is given that they were on good terms. The accuser had been nominated by the defendant as judge of the prizes at the Dionysia. Unfortunately, when lots were drawn, he was not among the judges elected. If he had been, his goodwill to the defendant would have been publicly shown; for he was prepared to give the prize to the defendant's tribe, and left a written memorandum of that resolve§ 3 ἐβουλόμην δ’ ἂν μὴ ἀπολαχεῖν αὐτὸν κριτὴν Διονυσίοις, ἵν’ ὑμῖν φανερὸς ἐγένετο ἐμοὶ διηλλαγμένος, κρίνας τὴν ἐμὴν φυλὴν νικᾶν· νῦν δὲ ἔγραψε μὲν ταῦτα εἰς τὸ γραμματεῖον, ἀπέλαχε δέ:—‘I could have wished that he had not missed the lot to be judge at the Dionysia, as then he would have proved to you that he was reconciled to me, by adjudging the victory to my tribe. As it was, he made a note of it in his tablets, but failed to draw the lot.’The reference is apparently to a private compact between the defendant and the accuser. The judges of the prizes at the Dionysia were nominated by the Senate; the names of all the nominees were put into an urn, and lots woro then drawn (Isokr. Trapez. § 33). The defendant—being at the time a senator—had so nominated the accuser, under a compact that he should award the prize to the chorus furnished by the defendant's tribe. The accuser had registered this compact; but, in the end, his name was not drawn. This is Francken's explanation (Comment. Lys. p. 38); and no better has been offered. The shock which the candour of the defendant must have given to the Areiopagos is perhaps not a decisive objection. (§§ 1—4).

Assuming, however, that this personal enmity did exist, yet the very circumstances of the assault exclude the idea of premeditation. The accuser had made the utmost of a black eye (ὑπώπια § 9), and had pretended illness. At the same time he has refused to allow the slave, who was the cause and the eyewitness of the quarrel, to be put to the question (§§ 5—11). After dwelling further on the refusal of this challenge (πρόκλησις) as presumptive evidence in his own favour (§§ 12—17), the defendant ends by contrasting the gravity of his danger with the worthlessness of its cause, and begs the court not to award so disproportionate a penalty to him, and so excessive a triumph to his unjust accuser (§§ 18—20).Special points illustrated by the Speech.

This fragment has at least some antiquarian interest. It is curious to find from § 2 that the fact of having offered a man the antidosis could be quoted in court as presumptive evidence of ill-will towards him. The difficult passage in § 3 regarding the appointment of judges at the Dionysia has already been noticed. Section 4 illustrates a point in the peculiar procedure of the Areiopagos—that no witness could be examined who did not swear either to or against the guilt of the accused in regard to the particular facts before the court.Taylor's doubt of its genuineness.

Taylor's suspicion that in this piece a sophistic writer has imitated the Defence against Simon seems gratuitous‘Multis modis mihi videtur hace declamatiuncula in umbra Scholae μελετᾶσθαι, ad imaginem superioris orationis elaborata, eni deinde ob argumenti affinitatem in scriptis codd., ut fieri solet, perpetuo adhaesit.’ Taylor ap. Reiske Or. Att. v. p. 164. Blass (p. 594) answers some objections raised by Falk to the arrangement of the speech; by Scheibc, to the weakness of the πίστεις and to some points of expression.. If the fragment which has been preserved is neither clear in arrangement nor strong in argument, it has at least the vigorous simplicity by which Lysias knew how to make the appeal of a commonplace man effective without making it rhetorical.

VII. Causes relating to impiety (γραφαὶ ἀσεβείας, ἱεροσυλίας κ.τ.λ.).
VII 1 Against Andokides, Or. VI

1. Against Andokides. [Or. VI.]—This is certainly not the work of Lysias; but in any survey of his works its claim to be ranked with them must at least be examined. It is probable that it was really spoken against Andokides at his trial in 399 B. C. The occasion and the circumstances of that trial have already been discussedpp. 114 ff.. Of his three accusers—Kephisios, Epichares and Melêtos—one, Kephisios, is mentioned by the speaker (§ 42): it is possible that the speaker himself may have been one of the other twoAll that can be gathered from the speech about the speaker is that he was the grandson of one Diokles, whose father Zakoros had held the office of ἱεροφάντης, or initiating priest at Eleusis; § 54.. Two lost pages of the Palatine MS. contained probably the latter part of the speech Against Kallias, and the first part of this speech Against Andokides. But it is not likely that the part thus lost was so large as to include, besides the proem, a connected statement of the whole case. It remains to suppose that such a statement had been made by a previous speaker and is only supplemented here. This is what might have been expected; Kephisios, the chief accuser, would properly have made the leading speech.Analysis.

The fragment begins in the middle of a story told to show how surely the goddesses of Eleusis resent an insult. A certain man cheated them of an offering; and there came upon him this doom, that he starved amid plenty; for though good food was set before him, the goddesses made it seem loathsome to him. Let the judges beware, then, of showing mercy to Andokides, whose punishment is claimed by these same deities (§§ 1—3). If he should be acquitted, and, as Archon Basileus, should some day conduct the festival of the Mysteries, what a scandal for comers from all parts of Greece! For he is known to them, not only by his deeds at Athens, but by his conduct during his exile in Sicily, in Italy, in the Peloponnesus, at the Hellespont, in Ionia, at Cyprus (§§ 4—8).

He will say that the decree banishing him from the agora and the temples has been cancelled. Let the advice of Perikles be remembered, that impious men should be liable not only to written laws, but to the unwritten laws of the Eumolpidae. Andokides has aggravated his offence against the gods by presuming to make himself their champion. Before he had been ten days at Athens, he accused Archippos of having defaced a Hermes, and withdrew the charge only on receiving money (§§ 9—12). He will say that it is hard if the informer is to suffer when the denounced have been pardoned. The court is not responsible for that pardon; besides, these men denied their guilt; he confesses it. A man is banished for injuring his fellow; shall he not be banished for injuring the gods? Diagoras of Melos mocked the religion of a strange land; Andokides outraged the religion of his own. It is a further proof of atheism that, not dreading his own crimes, he committed himself to the dangers of the sea. [A notable petitio principii.] But the gods were reserving him for a late reckoning. Let the judges consider what his life has been since his first great crime. Imprisoned, and escaping only by betraying kinsmen and friends; disfranchised and banished; rejected by oligarchy and by democracy at home, ill-treated by tyrants abroad; and now, in this same year, twice brought to trial! Men ought not to lose faith in the gods because they see Andokides surmount so many dangers: the life of pain thus spared to him is no life (§§ 13—32).

But he is not content to have escaped punishment; he dares to meddle in public affairs, even in the concerns of religion (§§ 33, 34). And now he will be ready with various pleas. That his informations relieved Athens from distress: —but who had first caused it? That the Amnesty shields him: but it was only political. That Kephisios is as bad as he is: perhaps so, but that is irrelevant. That no one will inform in future, if he suffers: nay, he has had his reward— he saved his life. He is now in danger because he has forced himself upon Athens—more shameless than Batrachos, the informer of the Thirty, who at least hid his infamy abroad (§§ 35—45).

Why should Andokides be acquitted? Not for his services in war, for he has never made a campaign. Not for services rendered by his boasted wealth; for at the citizens' sorest need he did not so much as buy them corn (§§ 46—49). [Here, after the ἀνταποδούς, follows a lacuna: see above, p. 201.]

The profanation of the Mysteries is an old story now, and men's horror of it is faded: but let them for a moment imagine Andokides mocking the awful rites of the Initiated, and then remember the priests standing with their faces to the west, and waving the crimson banners as they cursed him! The city must be purged and the gods appeased by his expulsion. Once, when it was proposed that a Megarian guilty of impiety should be put to death without trial, Diokles said that he ought to be tried indeed, but that every judge must come into court resolved to condemn. And now, let not the judges be moved by entreaty. Compassion is not for murderers but for their victims (§§ 50—55).

The doubt with which Harpokration twice s. vv. καταπλήξ, φαρμακός. It may be an accident that in a third citation, s. v. ῥόπτρον, the words εἰ γνήσιος are not added. names this speech is the only clue to the opinion of the ancients. Modern critics are all but unanimous in rejecting it.The speech not by Lysias.

The diction shows many words and phrases which Lysias could hardly have usede.g. §§ 4, 44 ἀθῷος: §§ 18, 48 κομπάζειν: § 30 ἀλώμενος: § 50 καταπλῆγες: § 49 ποῖα ἁμαρτήματα ἀνακαλεσάμενος, ποῖα τροφεῖα ἀποδιδούς. Blass further notes as nonLysian such redundancies as § 53 τὴν πόλιν καθαίρξιν καὶ ἀποδιοπομπεῖσθαι καὶ φαρμακὸν ἀποπέμπειν καὶ ἀλιτηρίου ἀπαλλάττξσθαι, &c. (Att. Ber. p. 574).; but it is not by the diction nor by the compositionThe composition, indecd, is not very different from that of Lysias. It is free from the diffuse periods of the later rhetoric—such as those, for instance, of the speech Against Alkibiades attributed to Andokides—undoubtedly a late sophistic work. that his authorship is disproved. The question is decided by broader characteristics. In arrangement Lysias was not faultless; but he would not have tolerated the chaotic disorder which is found here. Again, in several of those passages which dwell on the crimes of Andokides and on the vengeance of the gods there is a certain hollow pathos, a certain falseness and affected elevation, which are utterly remote from the style of Lysias. Further the whole speech has what may be called (in the Greek sense) a sycophantic tone; it is rancorous, palpably unfair and prodigal of unproved assertion. Lastly it is singularly deficient in the foremost general quality of Lysias—in tact; it is preeminently a blundering speech. The accuser makes at least four mistakes. First, he recites at length the sufferings which Andokides has been enduring without respite for the last sixteen years; intending thereby to prove the displeasure of the gods, but forgetting that he was more likely to move the compassion of men. Secondly, he observes that, strange to say, Andokides has always come safely through his perils; but that it would be wrong to suppose the gods capable of protecting him;—an awkward allusion to the natural inference, and almost a prophecy of acquittal. Thirdly, in noticing the charges brought by Andokides against Kephisios, he allows that there is something in them, and objects to them only as irrelevant; thus needlessly throwing over his own colleague, the leader of the prosecution. Fourthly, he ends by begging the court to remember a saying of his own grandfather—that, in certain cases, it was the duty of the judges to be prejudiced against the accused. Any one of these faults would have been striking: taken together, they make the authorship of Lysias inconceivable.

It is a further question whether this Accusation Was the author a contemporary of Lysias or a later sophist? was written by a contemporary of Lysias and was actually delivered in the Mysteries-trial, or is merely a rhetorical exercise of later date. Those who take the latter view, lay stress upon the discrepancies between this speech and the speech of Andokides On the Mysteries. Two of these discrepancies are important. (1) Andokides complains of having been specially charged with denouncing his own father (De Myst. § 19): here, he is only accused generally of denouncing his kinsfolk (§ 23). Again (2) he speaks of having been charged with placing a suppliant's bough in the temple at Eleusis (De Myst. § 110); here nothing of the kind is mentioned. But in regard to such differences, it should be remembered that this speech, itself mutilated, was not the only one for the prosecution; and that, where the subjects of accusation were so large and covered so many years, it would have been strange if every point had been touched by every accuser. On the other hand a rhetorician who had prepared himself by studying the Speech On the Mysteries would have aimed at a more exact correspondence with it. He would probably have taken the charges against Andokides in the order set by his model, and have given paragraph for paragraph, or at least topic for topic. He must have been a subtle artist indeed, if with a general agreement he combined so many intentional differences of detail. It may be noticed that in § 46. Andokides is said to be ‘upwards of forty years old.’ This statement has been used as an argument for the late origin of the speech by those who identify the orator Andokides with the general named by Thucydides (I. 51) as holding a command in 435 B.C. But if, as is most probable, the general was the grandfather of the orator, and the age of the latter in 399 B.C. was really about forty, then the statement in § 46 is one reason the more for ascribing the speech to a contemporary of AndokidesSee above, p. 71. The inference is strengthened by the fact that the mistake which is not made by this speaker seems to have been a common mistake in later times. The author of the Plutarchic Life of Andokides, for instance, puts his birth in 468 B. C.. As regards the faults of expression, of method or of general tone, these help to disprove the authorship of Lysias; but they are not of a kind which help to prove that the author was a late sophist. Bad taste is of no age; and the fact of being contemporary with Lysias need not have given a good style to Epichares or Melêtos.

VII. 2. For Kallias, Or. V

2. For Kallias. [Or. V.]—The shortness of this speech does not necessarily prove it to be a fragment. It opens with an express statement that the case for the defence had already been fully argued by others; and it ends with a completed idea. Since, however, two pages of the Palatine MS. have been lost just at this place, comprising the first part of the speech Against Andokides, that For Kallias has probably suffered alsoHarpokration s. v. τίμημα has: —τίμημα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνέχυρον καὶ οἷον ἀποτίμημα (i.e. ‘instead of ‘ security,’ or almost in the sense of ‘mortgage, ’) Λυσίας ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ Καλλίου· οὗτοι δὲ φάσκοντες πλείονος μισθώσασθαι καὶ τίμημα καταστήσασθαι. Sauppe thinks that these words are a fragment from our speech; οὗτοι being the slaves of Kallias, who accused their master of having agreed to rent some sacred land (‘fundum sacrum’) at a higher rate than he himself admitted (O. A. II. p. 192).. As it now stands, it gives no direct clue to the special nature of the case. The traditional title, ‘Defence on a Charge of Sacrilege,’ must therefore have been taken from the part now lost. The accused is a resident alien (§ 2), an elderly man (§ 3), against whom his own slaves, in hope of being rewarded with liberty, have informed.

In the view of sacrilege taken by Attic law, its Sacrilege —how viewed by Attic law. aspect as a robbery seems to have been more prominent than its aspect as an impiety. Thus it is mentioned in the same category with ordinary theft, housebreaking, kidnapping and like offences Xen. Mem. I. ii. 62 ἐάν τις φανερὸς γένηται κλέπτων ἢ λωποδυτῶν ἢ βαλαντιοτομῶν ἢ τοιχωρυχῶν ἢ ἀνδραποδιζόμενος ἢ ἱεροσυλῶν, τούτοις θάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ζημία . Id. Apol. Socr. § 25 ἐφ’ οἷς γέ μην ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἱεροσυλίᾳ, τοιχωρυχίᾳ, ἀνδραποδίσει, πόλεως προδοσίᾳ .. In this instance it appears from the address, ἄνδρες δικασταί (§ 1), that the trial was not before the Areiopagos. The cause must have been heard by an ordinary heliastic court, under the presidency either of the Thesmothetae or of the ElevenMeier and Schömann suggest that ἱεροσυλίας γραφαί may have been tried (1) by the Areiopagos, when, besides the question of fact, there was a further question as to whether the fact, if established, would amount to sacrilege: (2) by heliasts with the Thesmothetae for presidents, when the question was of the fact only, the alleged act being clearly sacrilegious: (3) by heliasts with the Eleven for presidents, when the committer of sacrilege had been taken in the act (Att. Proc. pp. 306 ff.)..Analysis.

The speaker says that, were it not a case of life or death, he would have forborne to come forward, considering the defence to be already complete; as it is, he desires to give a public proof of friendship for Kallias (§§ 1, 2). He then refers very briefly, first, to the high character of the accused; secondly, to the worthless nature of the informations. It is the hope of winning freedom which has prompted the calumny of the slaves. If they are believed, servants who desire liberty will henceforth think, not how they are to oblige their masters, but what lie they can tell against them (§§ 3—5).Conjecture suggested by § 4.

The phrase used by the speaker in reference to Kallias—‘those who bring themselves into danger by lending their services to the Treasury’ (τῷ δημοσίῳ βοηθοῦντες § 4)—is noticeable. It suggests that the ‘sacrilege’ of which the title speaks may have been connected with the sacred treasury on the Acropolis. Kallias may have had some employment under the Stewards of the sacred fund (ταμίαι τῆς θεοῦ, τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων) which gave him access to the inner chamber ( ὀπισθόδομος) of the Parthenon; and may have been accused of profiting by that opportunity to commit a theft.

VII. 3. On the Sacred Olive, Or. VII

3. On the Sacred Olive. [Or. VII.]—The man (VII. 2) for whom this defence was written—a rich Athenian citizen (§§ 21, 31)—had originally been charged with destroying a moria, or sacred olive, on a farm which belonged to him. As to do this was a fraud upon the public Treasury, the form of the original accusation had been an apographê (ἀπεγράφην, § 2). But the charge was not supported by the persons who had rented from the State the produce of the moriae on this farm (οἱ ἐωνημένοι τοὺς καρποὺς τῶν μοριῶν, § 2). The accusers had therefore changed their ground. They now charge the defendant merely with uprooting the fenced-in stump (σηκός) of a moria; and they lay against him an indictment for impiety. The chief accuser is one NikomachosNot the Nikomachos of Or. XXX, who had held public office in 411 B. C.; whereas this Nikomachos was a youth in 399 B. C. (§ 29). .

Throughout Attica, besides the olives which were private property (ἴδιαι ἐλαῖαι, § 10), there were others which, whether growing on public or on private lands, were considered as the property of the State. These were called moriae ( μορίαι)—the legend being that they had been propagated (μεμορημέναι) from the original olive which Athene herself had caused to spring up on the AcropolisThe μορίαι were under the special protection of Ζεὺς Μόριος (Soph. O. C. 705) .. This theory was convenient for their conservation as State property; since, by giving them a sacred character, it placed them directly under the care of the Areiopagos, which caused them to be visited once a month by Inspectors (ἐπιμεληταί, § 29) and once a year by special Commissioners (γνώμονες, § 25). To uproot a moria was an offence punishable by banishment and confiscation of goods (§ 41)In such cases the ἀγών was ἀτίμητος, and there was no fixed period (προθεσμία) after which the hability of the offender ceased: Meier and Schömann. Att. Proc. p. 307..Technical terms.

The technical terms used in this speech need definition: see especially §§ 20, 24. Ἐλαία was the generic term. Common olive-trees were called, either ἐλαῖαι simply, or ἴδιαι ἐλαῖαι; sacred, either μορίαι ἐλαῖαι, or μορίαι simply. Σηκός properly meant the enclosure or fence intended to guard the stump ( στέλεχος) of a moria which had been cut down or burnt down (πυρκαιΐα, § 24)—as often happened in the raids of the enemy during the Peloponnesian WarOn the vitality of the olive, see Her. VIII. 55, Verg. G. II. 30, 181. (§ 6). Then σηκός came to denote the fence with the stump itself; and this is the sense which it bears in this speech: see § 11, σηκὸν ἐκκεκόφθαι It is true, of course, that as Rauchenstein says (Introd. to this speech, p. 171) σηκός was never a mere equivalent for the ‘stump’ or ‘stock;’ on the other hand, an Athenian could say σηκὸν ἐκκόπτειν, thinking rather of the στέλεχος than of the fence itself. This is probably what Harpokration means when he says loosely σηκὸν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ μορίαν ὀνομάζουσι τὴν αὐτήν.. In §§ 2, 5 ἐλαία as opposed to σηκός means a full-grown moria.

The case is tried by the Areiopagos under the presidency of the Archon Basileus. The offence was alleged to have been committed in the archonship Date. of Suniades (§ 11), Ol. 95. 4, 397 B. C. To judge from § 42 (τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ ὕστερον) the trial took place not earlier than 395; probably later.

A quiet life, the defendant had thought, was its own Analysis protection; but he has been taught that hired informers have a power which the unborn might dread (§§ 1—3). He will have done enough if he can show that there has been neither moria nor stump of moria on the farm since it came into his possession. This he proves by the evidence of tenants who had rented it from him (§§ 4—11).

After commenting on the unlikelihood of his having done a deed which could hardly have escaped detection (§§ 12— 18), he observes that the accuser has failed to bring any witnesses (§§ 19—23). The defendant has several other farms, on which olive-trees abound; but, notwithstanding the strict watch kept by the Areiopagos, he has never been accused of any such offence as this. And here the risk would have been peculiarly great. It is strange if Nikomachos has discovered what escaped the regular Inspectors (§§ 24—29).

He then speaks of his own public services; of the accuser's refusal to give up his slaves for torture, and of the absence of witnesses for the prosecution. He describes the malice of his enemies who had bribed Nikomachos to bring this charge; and refers to the cruel sentence which hangs over him (§§ 30—41). He then concludes with a short review of the whole case. It depends upon an unproved assertion, which the accuser has refused to bring to the test (§§ 42, 43).

One attraction, which elsewhere seldom fails Lysias, is wanting in this speech;—there is no narrative, for there is no story to tell, except the former history of the farm. In this, one rather curious point may be noticed. The farm had belonged, it seems, to Peisandros; had been confiscated; and had then been given as a public gift to Apollodôros of Megara. Now Apollodôros, as is known from the speech Against Agoratos (§ 71), was one of the two men who planned the assassination of Phrynichos; and so it appears that he had been rewarded for destroying one leader of the Four Hundred by receiving the property of another. As Êthos of the speaker. regards the character of the defendant, Lysias has described with a few touches the quiet citizen who shrinks from publicity (§ 1), but with whom, at the same time, it is a point of honour to discharge his public duties in the best way (§ 34); a man who, in Greek phrase, is at once ἀπράγμων and φιλότιμος. Photios says that some critics doubted the authenticity of this speech: and that the rhetorician Paulos of Mysia, in particular, absolutely denied its genuineness, for the unconvincing reason that he could not understand a word of itPhot. Cod. 262 ἀμφιβάλλεται παρ’ ἐνίοις ὁ περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ λόγος. Παῦλος δέ γε ὁ ἐκ Μυσίας τὸν περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ λόγον, οὐδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων συνιείς, τῆς γνησιότητος τῶν Λυσιακῶν ἐκβάλλει λόγων..

Lysias: Forensic Speeches in Private Causes; Miscellaneous Writings; Fragments
I. Action for defamation (δίκη κακηγορίας), Or. X

Of the speeches of Lysias in private causes only four are extant; but each of these four represents a class.

Against Theomnêstos. [Or. X]—The occasion of I. Against Theomnêstos. this action was as follows. (1) Theomnêstos, a young Athenian, had been indicted by one Lysitheos for throwing away his shield in battle; but had been acquitted. The present speaker had been among the witnesses of Lysitheos; and in the course of the trial had been called a parricide by Theomnêstos. (2) A certain Dionysios, also a witness of Lysitheos, was next prosecuted by Theomnêstos for perjury; and was sentenced to disfranchisement (§ 22). (3) The present speaker then brought his action against Theomnêstos—which was thus the third of a series.

The Athenian law against Defamation (κακηγο‐ Law against Defamation. ρίας) punished with a fine of 500 drachmas (about £20) the utterance of certain reproaches classed as ἀπόρρητα (§ 2). To call a citizen a murderer, a striker of father or mother, or to charge him with having thrown away his shield in battle, were among theseSee the speech §§ 6—9: ἀνδροφόνος—πατραλοίας—μητραλοίας —ῥῖψαι τὴν ἀσπίδα. From Dem. in Eubul. § 30 it appears that to reproach a citizen with trading in the marketplace (τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐργασίαν) came under this law.. The present case had already been submitted to arbitrators (§ 6); it now came before an ordinary court, under the presidency of the ThesmothetaeMeier and Schmann, Att. Proc. p. 67..Date

From § 4 the date is certain. The speaker had been thirteen years old in the time of the Tyrants (404—3 B. C.), and was now thirty-three: the speech belongs therefore to 384—3.Analysis.

Witnesses can scarcely be needed, since many of the judges themselves heard the libel when it was uttered in court. The prosecutor holds it mean and pettifogging ( ἀνελεύθερον—φιλόδικον) to go to law about abusive words; but the taunt of parricide has driven him to it (§§ 1—3). He then proves by witnesses that he was only thirteen years old at the time of his father's death; and that he was directly a sufferer by it, since he became the ward of his father's elder brother, PantaleonThe language in § 5 leaves it ambiguous whether Pantaleon was uncle or brother of the speaker; Sauppe assumes the former, which is more likely. The speech of Lysias κατὰ Πανταλέοντος ( Frag. v.) may, he thinks, have had this man for its object. He conjectures that the father of the speaker—who is said in § 27 to have died for the democracy—may have been that Leon of Salamis who was put to death by the Thirty (Or. Att. II. p. 202)., who has defrauded him (§§ 4, 5).

Theomnêstos owns that he used the taunt; and the taunt has been proved false. But Theomnêstos argues that it is not, in the view of the law, a libel. He said only ‘slew:’ not ‘murdered.’ Is it lawful, then, the speaker asks, to reproach a man with ‘flinging’ away his shield? The law speaks only of ‘throwing.’ He gives further instances; and then observes that, in the procedure of the Areiopagos, ‘slaying’ is the term always used (§§ 6—14). Not content with this exposure of the quibble, he adds some illustrations from the old laws of Solon. These are full of obsolete words; but their meaning is the same now as ever (§§ 15—20).

If Theomnêstos got satisfaction for having been charged with cowardice, much more should the plaintiff get satisfaction for having been charged with parricide. Theomnêstos has had one favour done him already:—Dionysios, a brave man, has been his victim. For the plaintiff, what could be so shameful a reproach as to be accused of murdering his father —a man who, after serving the democracy all his life, died for it at the hands of the oligarchs? His bravery has to this day its memorials in the temples of Athens; even as the cowardice of Theomnêstos and of his father have their memorials—in the temples of the enemy (§§ 21—29). The plea that the libel was uttered in anger is no defence at law (§ 30). Let the court bear in mind that he, who is now accused of murdering his own father, had in his youth impeached the Tyrants before the Areiopagos. Remembering this, the laws and their oaths, let the judges stand by his father and him (§§ 31, 32).

If not one of the most artistic or the most powerful, The Speech suspected in antiquity —but probably genuine. this is at least one of the most spirited of the speeches of Lysias‘Oratio prior in Theomnestum ad optimas Lysiae referenda,’ says Francken: which is true so far, certainly, that ‘indignationis et justi plena doloris est oratio’ (Comment. Lys. p. 72).; and the doubt of its genuineness which seems to have existed in antiquityHarpokration adds εἰ γνήσιος to his citation of the speech S. VV. ἀπίλλειν, ἀπόρρητα, πεφασμένης, ποδοκακκη: but not S. VV. ἐπιορκήσαντα, οἰκέως. must be explained—as in the case of the speech For the Invalid—by the slightness of the matter on which the case turned. The verbal quibble of Theomnêstos is, indeed, treated at somewhat excessive length; but the absurdity of the defence was perhaps felt to be among the best supports of the complaint. The conclusion of the speech bears the sure stamp of genuineness. It was a characteristic of Lysias that he loved to end, not with a rhetorical appeal, but with a definite point, put in the fewest and plainest words. Just such an ending we have here. There are besides in the speech several passages quite worthy of Lysias;—for instance, the opening remarks (§§ 1—3); —the reference to the fate of Dionysios (§§ 24, 25);— and the speaker's tribute to his own father (§§ 26—28).Reference in § 31 to ‘the Tyrants.’

The reference in § 31 is of some interest. The speaker says that, immediately on reaching the age of eighteen—that is, in 399 or 398 B. C.—he had prosecuted ‘the Thirty’ before the Areiopagos. Now when the Thirty Tyrants left Athens in 403 B. C., Pheidon and Eratosthenes alone of their number are known to have stayed at Athens. If the allusion here is to them, then we see that Eratosthenes escaped at least the penalty of death when impeached by Lysias in 403.The ‘Second’ Speech an Epitome.

The so-called Second Speech Against Theomnêstos [Or. XI.] is merely an epitome of the First, made by some grammarian later than HarpokrationWho in no one of his six references to the speech Against Theomnêstos (see above) distinguishes it by ά.. The epitome preserves for the most part the very words of its original, with which it corresponds as follows:—

Epitome §§ 1— 2 = Speech §§ 1— 5

Epitome §§ 3— 6 = Speech §§ 6—20

Epitome §§ 7—10 = Speech §§ 21—29

Epitome §§ 11—12 = Speech §§ 30—32.

II. Action by a ward against a guardian (δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς), Or. XXXII

Against Diogeiton. [Or. XXXII.]—After describing II. Against Diogeiton. in detail the characteristics of Lysias, Dionysios illustrates his criticism by giving extracts from a Forensic, an Epideictic and a Deliberative Speech. The Olympiakos and the Defence of the Constitution (Or. XXXIV.) supply his examples of the two latter classes. The speech Against Diogeiton is chosen by him to Special prestige of this Speech. represent the distinctive excellences of Lysias in the forensic styleDionys. de Lys cc. 20—27.. Photios, too, says expressly that it was among the most admired of all its author's worksPhot. Cod. 262 θαυμάζονται μέντοι γε αὐτοῦ ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ λόγοι καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ πρὸς Διογείτονα ἐπιτροπῆς. After praising it in detail, he concludes—καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅλος ὁ λόγος ἄξιος θαυμάσαι κατά τε τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ νοήματα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ τὴν ἐναρμόνιον τούτων συνθήκην, καὶ τὴν εὕρεσίν τε καὶ τάξιν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων.. It belongs to a class of private speeches to which Dionysios gives a special title—the ἐπιτροπικοί, or those made in actions brought by wards against their guardians De Lys. c. 20 ἔστι δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτροπικῶν..

Diodotos, an Athenian citizen, went to the coast Occasion and Date. of Asia as a hoplite under the command of Thrasyllos in 410 B.C. Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος, Dionys. Lys. c. 21, in his ὑπόθεσις to the speech.,—the year of the battle at Kyzikos. In 408 he was killed at Ephesos, when the troops under Thrasyllos were defeated by the allies of SpartaXenophon distinctly refers the battle at Ephesos, in which the troops of Thrasyllos were engaged, to the archonship of Euktêmon in Ol. 93. 1, i.e. 408 B C.: see Hellen. I. ii. 1 and 7. Blass (Att. Ber. p. 620) puts the battle in 410; Grote in 409 (vol. VIII. p. 174). But the statement of Xenophon, at least, is clear. I once thought that in § 7 of the speech we might read Ἐρέσῳ instead of Ἐρέσῳ: since Eresos in Lesbos was in fact attacked by Thrasyllos in 411 B. C. (Thue. VIII. 100). But this, on the other hand, does not agree with the ἐπὶ Γλαυκίππου ἄρχοντος of Dionysios.. Before leaving Athens he had entrusted his two sons and his daughter to the care of Diogeiton, who was at once their uncle and their grandfather, since Diodotos had married his own niece, the daughter of Diogeiton. Eight years (§ 9) after his father's death—that is, in 400 B.C.—the eldest son attained his majority. Thereupon he was informed by Diogeiton that the property left by Diodotos was exhausted, and that he and his brother must shift for themselves.

This action was brought—probably in 400 B. C.— by the eldest son. It is contended that Diodotos had left altogether 15 talents and 26 minae. Diogeiton had at first represented the sum left as only 20 minae 30 staters, i.e. 26 minae altogether. But he had since confessed to 7 talents and 40 minae additional, i.e. 8 talents 6 minae in all. His accounts, however, made him out to have spent 8 talents 10 minae on his wards in eight years; so that, instead of having a balance to hand over to them, he was 4 minae out of pocket.

The speech is directed to showing, first, that the property left by Diodotos was about double of that to which Diogeiton owned; secondly, that his alleged outlay was incredible.

The speaker is husband of the daughter of Diodotos and brother-in-law of the plaintiff. An action of this kind was τιμητή,—that is, the plaintiff named the sum which he claimed; as Demosthenes, for instance, claimed ten talents from his guardians. It does not appear what precise sum was claimed from Diogeiton. The case would come before an ordinary court; and, as a ward was suing his guardian, the president of the court would be the first Archon.

The speaker begins by explaining the necessity which Analysis. forces him to appear against a relative. His brothers-in-law, cruelly wronged, have besought his aid. Their grandfather Diogeiton had rejected all attempts at mediation; they were therefore driven to seek a legal remedy for his flagrant abuse of his trust (§§ 1—3).

The narrative of facts falls into two parts:—(i) The circumstances under which Diogeiton was appointed guardian, and his assumption of the office on the death of Diodotos: §§ 4—8. (ii) The disclosure made by him to his eldest ward on the latter coming of age, and the interview which followed between the young man's mother and her father Diogeiton: §§ 9—18.

These facts having been proved by witnesses, the speaker turns to the case set up by the defence. The defendant (i) has denied receiving part of the property; and (ii) professes to account for the rest:—§ 20. This account is scrutinised in detail, and shown to be absurd. On the most liberal reckoning, a balance of six talents should have been forthcoming (§§ 19—29).

Here the extract given by Dionysios ends. The statement of the defendant as to the amount which he had originally received must have been the next topic; followed, probably, by the peroration.

This speech—or fragment—is admirable for two The twofold merit of the Speech. things; the compact marshalling of a mass of intricate details, so that the broad result is made triumphantly clear; and the artistic treatment of character. Nothing could be better fitted to disarm prejudice, or even to create one favourable to the speaker, than the simple opening words. They show no bitterness against Diogeiton,—on the contrary, annoyance at having to appear against him—a necessity for which no one but himself is to blame. But the rhetorical skill is highest in the dramatic passage where the plaintiff's mother is brought in upbraiding her father Diogeiton with his purpose of disinheriting her sons, and the effect of the pleading on those who heard it is described (§§ 12—18).

III. Trial of a claim to property ( διαδικασία), Or. XVII III. On the Property of Eraton.

On the Property of Eraton. [Or. XVII.The title in the MSS. is περὶ δημοσίων α·δικημάτων. Reiske (Or. Att. v. 588) thinks that this title is common to our speech and to the next (περὶ δημεύσεως τῶν τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ): and that it may have stood originally thus—ΛΥΣΙΟΥ ΠΕΡΙΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΛΤΩΝ ΛΟΓΟΙ. Dobree concurs in this view (Adv. I p 233) Sauppe follows Schott (O. A. I. p. 110) in changing ἀδικημάτων to χρημάτων and so prints it in his edition; but this is unsatisfactory. Hoelscher (ap. Blass, Att. Ber p. 628) suggests πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον περὶ τῶν Ἐράτωνος χρημάτων (better περὶ τῶν Ἐ. χρ. πρὸς τὸ δ.); and this would be a better title]—This is the only extant speech of Lysias in a diadikasia,— i.e. in a case of a disputed claim (διαδίκασμα, § 10) to property either between two private persons or between a private person and the State. Here the dispute lies between a private claimant and the State.

The speaker's grandfather had lent two talents to Eraton, who died without having repaid them. Eraton's three sons, Erasiphon, Eraton, and Erasistratos, failed to pay the interest. The speaker's father therefore brought an action against Erasistratos, the only one of the three brothers who was at Athens; and obtained an order for the payment of the entire debt, principal and interest.

His father having died about this time, the speaker, in right of the verdict, took possession of certain lands of Erasistratos at Sphettos, and claimed at law certain other lands at Kikynna, which the representatives of Erasiphon, the eldest brother, refused to give up to him.

Meanwhile—for what reason is not stated—all the property which had belonged to the elder EratonIn § 6 Ἐρασιφῶντος must be altered to Ἐράτωνος (meaning the elder Eraton), as appears from §§ 4 f. was confiscated by the State. The speaker was obliged to give up the lands at Sphettos, which he had already for two years been letting to tenants (§ 5,) and to withdraw his claim to the others.

He now brings an action against the Treasury for the partial satisfaction of his claim upon the property of Eraton. The whole of this property was (he says) insufficient to satisfy his claim. Yet he is ready to give up two-thirds of it to the State; and rates the remaining third, which he demands for himself, at 15 minae (§ 7);—i.e. one-eighth of the sum originally lent by his father to Eraton.

The case is heard by an ordinary court, of which the fiscal board of syndici (§ 10) were presidents. Since the action against Erasistratos fell in the archonship of Xenaenetos (§ 3), i.e. in 400 B. C., and Date. three years had elapsed since (§ 5), the date is 397 B.C., of which the winter months had already passed (ib.).

The plaintiff begins by expressing a fear that the judges Analysis. give him credit for powers of speech which he does not possess—an exordium which suggests that he was at least in some way distinguished (§ 1.) He then gives a narrative, in three parts, of the facts just stated, witnesses being called at the close of each part: (i) § 2: (ii) § 3: (iii) §§ 4—9. He ends by simply asking for a verdict (§ 10).No ground for supposing this to be an epitome.

In this short speech there is no argument; the proofs are all ‘inartificial,’ ἄτεχνοι πίστεις: i.e. derived directly from witnesses and documents. But there is certainly no reason for suspecting that we have here merely an epitome of a longer oration, like the so-called ‘Second’ speech against TheomnêstosFrancken (Comment. Lys. p. 123) says ‘probabile mihi videtur, esse hanc orationem commentarium, aut potius excerptam esse ex genuina Lysiaca;’ and at p. 238 he describes it as ‘epitome.’. Short as it is, the speech is in every respect complete and clear. There is nothing of that crowding which is generally apparent in a summary; the whole is on a small scale, but the symmetry of the parts is perfect. Besides, each section of the narrative is followed by a short recapitulation (§§ 3, 4, 10). An epitomist would have left out epitomes.

IV. Answer to a special plea (πρὸς παραγραφήν), Or. XXIII IV. Against Pankleon.

Against Pankleon. [Or. XXIII.]—The speaker had formerly indicted Pankleon, a fuller living at Athens (§ 2), for some offence not specified; and believing him to be a resident-alien, had summoned him before the Polemarch, who heard cases in which foreigners were concerned. Pankleon thereupon put in a ‘plea to the jurisdiction,’ on the ground that he was a Plataean by birth, and, as such, entitled at Athens to the rights of an Athenian citizen: and that, therefore, the action ought not to have been brought before the Polemarch. This plea (παραγραφή) gave rise to a previous trial to decide whether the action, in its original form, could be brought into court (§ 5). In such a case the first speech was usually made by the maintainer of the special pleaSee e.g. the speeches of Demosthenes For Phormio and Against Pantaenetos, and that of Isokrates Against Kallimachos.: here it is evidently made by the opponentMeier and Schömann, Att. Proc. p. 648. The speaker makes a full statement of the facts. He would have assumed a general knowledge of the case on the part of the judges, and would have addressed himself rather to particular points, if Pankleon had spoken before him.. The date is uncertain.

With a promise that he will be brief, the speaker comes Analysis. to the facts. Pankleon, on being summoned before the Polemarch, stated himself to be a Plataean by birth, son of Hipparmodôros, and enrolled in the Attic deme of Dekeleia. On inquiryThe particulars of the inquiry are curious. The speaker goes to look for the Dekeleia men at a barber's shop in the Hermae street (leading from the Old to the New Market-place), a regular resort for the men of that deme—τὸ κουρεῖον τὸ παρὰ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς ἵνα οἱ Δεκελεῖς προσφοιτῶσιν (§ 3). He seeks the Plataeans, again, at the cheese-market in the Old Agora—hearing that on the first of every month ἐκεῖσε συλλέγονται οἱ Πλαταιεῖς (§ 6)., the speaker learned that Pankleon was in fact a runaway slave of a Plataean named Nikomêdes. A few days afterwards, Nikomêdes actually claimed Pankleon as his slave; but the latter was rescued by a gang of bullies (§§ 5—12). He had once before been brought before the Polemarch by a certain Aristodikos, and had blustered, but had eventually given in. Before doing so, he had withdrawn for a time to Thebes—a signal proof that he was no Plataean (§§ 13—15). If the judges bear in mind these plain facts the speaker is confident of a verdict (§ 16).

As in the last speech, so here all is narrative; there is no argument but the logic of facts. These are not stated with the same conciseness and clearness as in the former case; but there is no better ground here than there for suspecting, with Francken, the work of an epitomist Comment. Lys. p. 238 ‘excerpta ex Lysiaca.’ At p. 164 he says only ‘equidem spondere ausim, hanc Lysiacam esse; sed aut non satis ab auctore aut satis superque ab aliis refictam.’ Dobree notices, and appears to endorse, a doubt of its genuineness; but without assigning grounds (Adv. I. 245). .

Miscellaneous Writings.
To his Companions: a Complaint of Slanders. [Or. VIII.]

A friend addresses friends who have wronged him—states his grievances—and formally renounces their acquaintance.Analysis.

The opportunity is favourable for approaching this painful but unavoidable subject. He has before him both those whom he wishes to accuse and those whom he wishes to witness the accusation (§§ 1—2). His so-called friends have spoken of him as having thrust his society upon them (§§ 3—8). They have also persuaded him to buy an unsound horse, and have since taken part with the seller (§§ 9—13). Lastly, they have charged him with inciting others to slander them (§§ 14—17). For all these reasons he renounces their friendship. He will be safe now—for they attack only their friends (§§ 18—20).

It is scarcely worth while to inquire how this curiously absurd composition first came among the works of Lysias. As it is too uniformly dreary to be mistaken for a joke, not even a grammarian's conception of his sportive style can explain the imputation. The person who could thus take leave of his friends is certainly hard to imagine; but it is perhaps equally difficult—notwithstanding the amplitude of fatuity conventionally supposed in ‘the late sophist’—to fancy any one taking such a subject for an exerciseBenseler—a very close observer of the style of Lysias—points out that in this Eighth Oration there are hardly any examples of hiatus, and that such as do occur can easily be removed — e.g. in § 7 by reading εὐνοοῦντες for εὖνοι ὄντες. Here, then—in this marked avoidance of hiatus—we have at least one definite mark of a postLysian style (Bens. de hiatu, pp. 182 f.). In § 17, again, one may recognise very distinctly the ring of the scholastic rhetoric— ᾤμην γὰρ ἀπόθετος ὑμῖν εἶναι φίλος, κ.τ.λ. Some phrases in §§ 2, 14 again— ἐναντίον τῆς ἐλπίδος—ὁ δὲ τοσοῦτον ὑπερεῖδε τὸ δἰ ἐμέ—are not like the Attic of Lysias..

The Erotikos in the Phaedros.

2. The Erotikos in Plato's Phaedros (pp. 230 E —234 C).—Plato makes Phaedros read to Sokrates a speech of Lysias in which the claims of the nonlover are urged as against those of the lover. Even to ask whether this speech is or is not an actual work of Lysias might seem at first sight to argue a want of sympathy with the broad literary characteristics of the dialogues. This speech of Lysias, it might be assumed, is as much Plato's own creation as the funeral speech by Aspasia which Sokrates repeats in the Menexenos,—or as the discourses put into the mouths of the sophists in the Protagoras,— or as those delivered by Aspasia, Agathon, Aristophanes and others in the Symposium. The gravity of the imitation is, of course, perfect; but only a matter-of-fact reader could be misled by it.

This is probably the light in which the question would appear at first to most readers of Plato. But a nearer examination of the Phaedros brings out two points which seem to distinguish this case in an important way from cases apparently analogous. 1. Preparation for a verbally exact recital.

The first point is the elaborate dramatic preparation made for such a recital of the speech as shall be verbally exact. Phaedros is asked to repeat it from memory—makes excuses—is pressed; and presently it turns out that he has the book with him. Now if the speech was merely Plato's imitation of Lysias, surely this preface would be somewhat heavy —inartistic, indeed, as forcing attention too strongly upon the illusion. It is perfectly fitting, on the other hand, as the dramatist's apology for bringing into his own work of art so large a piece of another's work Phaedr. p. 228. It may be noticed that at p. 243 C the speech of Lysias is designated, with the same emphasis which I recognise in the opening scene, as ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθείς.. There is surely a special emphasis here:—

Phaedr. What do you mean, Sokrates? How can you imagine that I, who am quite unpractised, can remember or do justice to an elaborate work, which the greatest rhetorician of the day spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

Sokr. I believe that I know Phaedros about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that he heard the words of Lysias, not once only, but again and again he made him say them, and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would satisfy him, he got hold of the book, and saw what he wanted—this was his morning's occupation—and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, which may not have been very long....Therefore, Phaedros, as he will soon speak in any case, beg him to speak at once.

Phaedr. As you don't seem very likely to let me off until I speak in some way, the best thing that I can do is to speak as I best may.

Sokr. That is a very true observation of yours.

Phaedr. I will do my best, for believe me, Socrates, I did not learn the very words; O no, but I have a general notion of what he said, and will repeat concisely, and in order, the several arguments by which the case of the nonlover was proved to be superior to that of the lover; let me begin at the beginning.

Sokr. Yes, my friend; but you must first of all show what you have got in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised upon me, if you have Lysias himself herepp. 234 E—235 A. (From the Translation by Professor Jowett.).

The second point to be observed is the closeness 2. Character of the criticism. of the criticism made by Sokrates on the speech— corresponding to the elaborateness of the contrivance for an accurate report of it. General criticism of expression or of moral drift would have been perfectly in place even if the speech had been fictitious. But detailed criticism—recognition, on the one hand, of ‘clearness,’ ‘roundness,’ ‘polish’ in every phrase— on the other hand, ridicule of the chaos of topics, of the repetitions, and especially of the beginning which is no beginning—would this have much meaning or force if the satirist were merely analysing his own handiwork?

Sokr. Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and accuracy, and tournure of the language?...I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of painsp. 235 E.....

Again, further on:—

Sokr. Read, that I may have his exact words.

Phaedr. (reading). ‘You know my views of our common interest; and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.’

Sokr. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood of words to the place of starting....Then as to the other topics—are they not a mass of confusion? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic or any other topic follow in that order? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote freely off just what came into his headp 263 E.....

Then comes the comparison of the speech to the epitaph on Midas, and Phaedros can bear it no longer:—

You are making fun of that oration of ours.

Sokr. Well, I will say no more about your friend, lest I should give offence to youp. 264 D. ....

It is surely clear that the speech of Lysias is both so introduced and so handled by Plato as to stand on a wholly different ground from such dramatic fictions as those in the Protagoras, where the sophists are persons of the drama, imitated in their general method and style of discourse; or from the fiction of Aspasia's authorship in the Menexenos—a fiction, indeed, which Plato has taken so little trouble to keep up that he makes her allude to the Peace of Antalkidas Menex. p. 245 C.. It would not be much to the purpose to analyse the composition of the Erotikos, or to show that it bears the special marks of the style of LysiasBlass (Att. Ber. p. 422) points out that, plain as the style of the Erotikos is on the whole, there is rather more rhetorical ornament of the type made popular by Gorgias than Lysias usually employed: see e.g. p. 233 E ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσι καὶ ἀκολουθήσουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἥξουσι | καὶ μάλιστα ἡσθήσονται καὶ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην χάριν εἴσονται καὶ πολλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὔξονται. In such a piece as this—written very likely, as Grote suggests ( Plato I. 254), simply for the amusement of friends — it was natural enough that Lysias should have drawn upon the ληκύθια of the Sicilian school rather more than he would have allowed himself to do in a graver performance.. This could prove nothing. Plato could have imitated Lysias, if he had chosen, without much danger of being found out by us. It is the evidence of the dialogue, not the evidence of the speech itself, which is important.

Lysias is the earliest known writer of Erotic discoursesDr Thompson, Phaedr. p. 151 note 3.; and he is in a twofold sense the object of Plato's attack in the Phaedros. The primary subject of that dialogue is the antithesis between the false and the true Rhetoric. The true Rhetoric springs from Dialectic, and Dialectic from love of the ideas. Hence the secondary subject of the dialogue is the antithesis between false and true Love. Lysias is by his profession a representative for Plato of the false Rhetoric; by his Erotikos in particular he is the representative of the false Eros. Plato could have imitated well enough for his purpose the general rhetorical characteristics of Lysias; but he embodied the Erotikos in his dialogue, because, further, he wished Lysias to speak for himself upon a special subjectIn the foregoing discussion I have purposely abstained from attempting to examine several arguments, turning on more or less fine points of style, which have been brought forward on each side. The fact that we have to do with such a literary artist as Plato seems to minimize the value of any argument which might be founded on the internal evidence of the speech. As to external evidence, we know only (1) that Dionysios and the pseudo-Plutarch mention ἐρωτικοί among the works of Lysias; (2) that this particular ἐρωτικός was thought really his by Diogenes Laertius (III. 25), by Hermeias p. 63 (quoted in Spengel's συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, p. 126); and (as Dr Thompson points out, Phaedr. p. 184, Appendix III.) by Cornelius Fronto—who took it as one of his models in his extant ἐρωτικός to Marcus Aurelius. I would add that the reference of Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδ. I. 12, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 331) makes it plain that he thought the ἐρωτικός authentic. The evidence of the dialogue in which the speech is set must decide the question. This is, to my mind, conclusive for the authenticity.Modern critics have been much divided. Among those who believe the Erotikos genuine are Sauppe (Or. Att. II. p. 209), Spengel (συν. τεχνῶν, p. 126), Blass (Att. Ber. p. 416—423 — where L. Schmidt is quoted as agreeing) —and Dr Thompson in his edition of the Phaedros: see esp. Appendix I. Among those who regard the discourse as fictitious are Stallbaum (Lysiaca ad illustrandas Phaedri Platonis origines, Leipz. 1851); C. F. Hermann (Gesammelte Abhandlungen, pp. 1 ff.); K. O. Müller (Hist. Gr. Lit. c. 35, vol. II. p. 140 ed. Donaldson); and Professor Jowett, in his Introduction to the dialogue (Translation, vol. I. p. 553). .

Fragments.

Three hundred and thirty-five fragments of every kind, from speeches, letters or unknown works, are arranged and examined by Sauppe, Oratores Attici, vol. II. pp. 170—216. Of this number, 252 represent 127 speeches of known title. Six of the 127 are represented by fragments more considerable than the rest. These six demand a few words of notice. In a Public Cause. 1. Against Kinesias [LXXIII., LXXIV. Frag. Speeches. 143 in Sauppe]. In Private Causes. 2. Against Tisis [CXIX. 231, 232]. 3. For Pherenikos [CXX. 233, 234]. 4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates [LXII. 124]. 5. Against Archebiades [XIX. 44, 45]. 6. Against Aeschines [I. 1—4].

1. Against Kinesias.

1. Against Kinesias.—Harpokration mentions two speeches of Lysias against Kinesias. One of these was probably identical with that speech of Lysias ‘For Phanios’ from which Athenaeos (XIII. p. 551 D) gives an extract. Phanios had been accused by Kinesias of proposing an unconstitutional measure (παρανόμων). The short extract in question is a personal attack upon Kinesias, whose impiety, and unfitness, therefore, to be the champion of the laws, are set forth. He is described as having belonged to a club the members of which styled themselves κακοδαιμονισταί—‘the Mephistophelians’ —in ridicule of societies who chose carefully euphemistic namesSuch as the νουμηνιασταί mentioned in Frag. 143—ἀντὶ νουμηνιαστῶν κακοδαιμονιστὰς σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τοὕνομα θέμενοι.. As the latter held their meetings on the first of the month, the seventh, or some such auspicious day, so this society made a point of meeting on one of the black days of the calendar (ἀποφράδες ἡμέραι). Kinesias is satirised by Aristophanes, partly for his dithyrambs, partly for his atheism Ar. Ran. 366 : Eccl. 330: Lys. 838, 852.; and enjoyed the distinction of having a whole comedy written about him by StrattisMeineke, Com. Graec. I. pp. 227 f..

The next four fragments have all been preserved by Dionysios; who quotes the first of them in comparing Lysias with Demosthenes—the other three, in contrasting Lysias with Isaeos.

2. Against Tisis.

2. Against Tisis.—Tisis, a young Athenian, had quarrelled with one Archippos at the palaestra; had treacherously invited him to supper afterwards; and then tied him to a pillar and flogged him. Archippos brought an action for assault and battery (αἰκίας δίκη); and the present speech was written for him by Lysias. The extract given by Dionysios De Demosth. c. 11. contains the narrative of the facts, which he compares with the similar narrative in the speech of Demosthenes against Konon (§§ 3—9). The critic remarks that to other excellences Demosthenes joined those which distinguished the narrative style of Lysias—clearness and naturalness.

3. For Pherenikos.

3. For Pherenikos.—This fragment is concerned with historical names. Plutarch Pelop. c. 5. mentions Pelopidas, Androkleidas, Pherenikos as the principal of the Thebans who fled to Athens when the Kadmea was seized by Phoebidas in 382 B.C. It appears that Androkleidas had died soon after their arrival, and that Pherenikos had taken possession of his property. He was sued for it by a rival claimant, probably also a Theban; and the present speech was made in his defence by an Athenian citizen, who had been hospitably received at Thebes by Kephisodotus, father of Pherenikos, in the exile of 404 B. C. Dionysios expressly says that the speech was made for Pherenikos as for a ξένος—which is against the improbable statement of Aristeides Panath. p. 300 c. that the Athenian franchise had been given to the Theban exiles on this occasion. As the exiles were restored to Thebes in 379, this speech must belong to the year 381 or 380, and is therefore the latest known work of Lysias. Quoting a passage of the same kind from a lost oration of Isaeos ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθους, εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαίρεσις. Dionys. de Isae. c. 6. On this and the two next Fragments, see vol II pp. 277 f., 365 f.—in which the advocate explains the motives of gratitude which have prompted him to come forward—Dionysios compares it with this extract. In Isaeos, we hear the rhetorician; here it is the private friend who recounts in the simplest but most telling words the great services which Pherenikos and his father had rendered to the Athenian refugees.

4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates

4. Against the Sons of Hippokrates.—A guardian is here defending himself against a charge of malversation in his trust which had been brought against him by his wards. Dionysios De Isaeo c. 6. places an extract from the opening of this speech beside a defence written by Isaeos for a guardian; and remarks upon the difference between the styles in which they respectively resent the imputation. The client of Isaeos uses elaborate phrases; the client of Lysias speaks like a plain man, expressing a natural sense of hardship at the recompense which his wards are giving him.

5. Against Archebiades.

5. Against Archebiades.—A young Athenian citizen who has lately succeeded to a fortune by his father's death is sued by Archebiades for a debt alleged to have been contracted by his father. The point of the contrast which Dionysios De Isaeo c. 10. illustrates by an extract from this speech is the same as in the two last cases. Isaeos, too, had once occasion to write for a young client inexperienced in lawsuits. Yet even here he could not prevent his artificialism from showing itself. Lysias, on the contrary, has given to the life the character of a man who was never in a law-court before, who does not deserve to be there now, and who hopes never to be there again.

6. Against Aeschines.

6. Against Aeschines.—The Aeschines in question here is that disciple whom Sokrates once advised ‘to borrow from himself by shortening his commons’Diog. Laert. II. 62, φασὶ δ’ αὐτῷ λέγειν Σωκράτην, ἐπειδήπερ ἐπιέζετο ὑπὸ πενίας, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ δανείζεσθαι τῶν σιτίων ὑφαιροῦντα.. AthenaeosXIII. p. 611 D. quotes a curious passage from this speech by way of exemplifying the truth that philosophers are not always philosophers. ‘Who would have supposed,’ he says, ‘that Aeschines the Sokratic had been such a character as Lysias makes him in one of his speeches on contracts?’ (ἐν τοῖς τῶν συμβολαίων λόγοις.) The ‘contract’ to which the speech cited by Athenaeos referred was a debt, due from Aeschines to the speaker. It is not clear, as Blass remarks, how Aeschines came to be plaintiff instead of defendant in the action; that he was so, however, is plain from the opening words. Aeschines had applied for a loan to help him to set up in business as a distiller of perfumes (τέχνην μυρεψικὴν κατασκευάζεσθαι). The speaker had lent him the money, ‘reflecting that this Aeschines had been a disciple of Sokrates, and was in the habit of discoursing impressively concerning Justice and Virtue.’ Then come some scandalous stories about Aeschines. The genuineness of the speech has been elaborately attacked by WelckerThe substance of his view, as explained in an essay, Unachtheit der Rede des Lysias gegen den Sokratiker Aeschines, is given by Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 170., who takes it to be the work of a later rhetorician, inspired by hatred of philosophers generally. He thinks it too coarsely defamatory for Lysias. This kind of argument is scarcely satisfactory when not supported by particular evidence; and in this case there is none. Sauppe and Blass seem right, then, in holding the fragment to be genuine. The broad comedy of the latter part is remarkableBesides this fragment — to which Athenaeos (XIII. p. 611 D) gives the title, πρὸς Αἰσχίνην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν χρεώς—two others are cited by the lexicographers; viz. (1) κατ’ Αἰσχίνου περὶ τῆς δημεύσεως τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων: Harpokr. s. v. Χύτροι: and (2) πρὸς Αἰσχίνην βλάβης: Bekker anecd. p. 132, 23. Sauppe thinks that neither of the two latter was against the Sokratic. Aeschines was one of the commonest names. Diogenes Laertius (II. 64) mentions eight bearers of the name who were all more or less distinguished. The speech περὶ συκοφαντίας which Diogenes notices in the same chapter as having been written by Lysias against the Sokratic Aeschines is very likely that from which our fragment comes: see its opening words—νομίζω δ’ οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸν ἑτέραν ταύτης (δίκην) συκοφαντωδεστέραν ἐξευρεῖν. .

Letters.

Letters are mentioned among the writings of Lysias by Dionysios, by the pseudo-Plutarch and by SuidasDionys. De Lys. c. 3, cf. c. 1. [Plut.] Vit. Lys.: Suidas s. v. Αυσίας. . The last-named speaks of seven; one, ‘a business letter’ (πραγματικήν), is generally identified with the letter to Polykrates cited by Harpokration. In the other six may probably be included the letter (or address) in the Phaedros; the Erôtikos quoted by Harpokration; and the letters to Asybaros and Metaneira. A few short sentences are all that remain. But two of these are interesting; each belongs, apparently, to a letter written after some coolness or misunderstanding with a friend; and each of them shows in the writer a characteristically eager warmth towards friends.

Isokrates: Life
Birth and parentage

ISOKRATES was born five years before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War and died just after the battle of Chaeroneia. It might have been expected that such a life, touching both limits of such a century, would have been in its written records the vivid image of that century itself, with all its vicissitudes of struggle, with all its variety of impressive contrasts. One whose youth had known the intense and desperate energy of that war in which Imperial Athens was fighting for existence, whose early manhood had witnessed the terrible and moving drama of her overthrow, whose middle age had been passed under the dominion of Sparta now changed from the deliverer into the despot, whose later days had seen the restoration of Athens to the headship of a great Confederacy, the rise of Epameinondas—a second, though a Theban, Perikles for Greece—and his death before his national patriotism could give a new coherence to the nation, then the space of hopeless quarrelling and confusion, with the voice of Demosthenes heard above it all, but heard in vain, till Philip came in and struck his blow—surely, it might have been thought, a political essayist with such a compass of personal experience must be of almost unique value for the comparison of period with period. Isokrates in one sense disappoints any such hope. For us, he lives and thinks and feels almost exclusively in the years 380—338 B.C. By his ideas and aspirations, by the whole bent of his character, he is thoroughly detached from that order of things under which the first part of his long life was passed; he has carried little or nothing of its mind on with him; it is a memory, giving a certain tragic irony to his afterlife, not a force blending with the new forces. As Antiphon breathes the spirit of the elder commonwealth, as Andokides is associated with the troubled politics of Athens in the second half of the Peloponnesian War, as Lysias expresses the ordinary citizenlife of the restored democracy, so Isokrates is distinctively the man of the decadence—an Athenian, still more a Greek, of the age of declining independence.

Isokrates was born in 436 B.C. (Ol. 86. 1.)— five years before the birth of XenophonCurtius (v. 147, Ward) follows Bergk in assigning the birth of Xenophon to 431 B.C., a native of the same deme of Erchia, and seven years before the birth of Plato. His father Theodoros owned slaves skilled in the trade of flute-making,—a fact of which Comedy, when it attacked Isokrates, did not forget to avail itselfStrattis, Atalanta, frag. 1, Meineke, p. 292.,—and was rich enough to have been choregus; his mother's name was Hêduto. He had three brothers, Diomnêstos, Telesippos and Theodoros; and a sister. The teachers of the young Isokrates are variously enumerated. One thing is clear, that two contrasted influences came to bear upon his early training; the influence of Sokrates and the influence of the sophists.

The augury of the Platonic Sokrates.

The dramatic date of the Phaedros—whatever is its actual date—may be placed about 410 B.C., when Isokrates was twenty-six years of age, and when Lysias, according to the received account, was forty-eight. At the end of the conversation, Sokrates suggests that Phaedros should relate it to his friend Lysias.

Phaedros. And you—what will you do? Your friend ought not to be neglected either.

Sokrates. And who is he?

Phaedros. The gentle Isokrates. What message will you take to him, Sokrates? What are we to call him?

Sokr. Isokrates is still young, Phaedros; but I do not mind telling you what I prophesy of him.

Phaedros. And what may that be?

Sokr. He seems to me to have a genius above the oratory of Lysias, and altogether to be tempered of nobler elements. And so it would not surprise me if, as years go on, he should make all his predecessors seem like children in the kind of oratory to which he is now addressing himself; or if—supposing this should not content him—some diviner impulse should lead him to greater things. My dear Phaedros, a certain philosophy is inborn in him. This is my message, then, from the gods of the place to my pet Isokrates —and you have your message for your Lysias Phaedr. pp. 278—279 E, where see Dr Thompson's note. .

This memorable prophecy offers to Isokrates the choice of two careers; and the fact that, in Plato's sense, he did not eventually rise to the higher career only increases the interest of such a testimony. The ‘philosophy’ of Isokrates—the way in which he was affected by Sokrates, and his relation to the Sokratics—must be considered separately. At present we are concerned with the outer facts of his life. It appears, then, from the Phaedros that Isokrates was intimate with Sokrates; and further, that there was a time in his earlier life when he seemed to Plato capable of rising from the art of expression to the highest search for truth. The companionship of Sokrates has left a broad mark upon his work, in his purpose of bringing his ‘philosophy’ to bear directly on the civic life: the ‘philosophic’ bent which raised and disappointed the hopes of Plato may perhaps be traced in his constant effort to grasp general conceptions and to bring phenomena back to principles.

Early relations with the Sophists.

Nearly all the popular sophists of that day are named as teachers of Isokrates Prodikos is named by [Plut.], Suidas and the anon. biographer (in Dind. ed. of Isokr. 1825):— Protagoras by Suid.: Theramenes by [Plut.], Dionys., Anon.: Gorgias by [Plut.], Dionys., Suid., Anon. Tisias is added, no doubt wrongly, by [Plut.] Dionys., Suid.; and Suidas gives Ἐργῖνος,—corrected by Ruhnken (Hist. Crit. p. 60) into Ἀρχῖνος (the patriot of 403: Dem. in Timocr. § 135).. Prodikos, skilled in the distinguishing of synonyms, seems to have been esteemed by Sokrates; and it is probable that Isokrates, like Xenophon, was a pupil of both. Protagoras may have helped to form, by grammatical studies, a style which was afterwards as correct as it was free. Theramenes was the master through whom Isokrates first knew the art of Gorgias. Of all the merely literary influences which reached Gorgias. Isokrates, that of Gorgias was by far the strongest. Isokrates was not, indeed, a mere imitator. His matured style was not only severer but more completely artistic than that of Gorgias can ever have been. But the first literary inspiration of Isokrates came from the great Sicilian rhetorician; and it is another proof of the astonishing natural force, the power of impressing and fascinating, which Gorgias certainly possessed. It was probably not until about 390 B. C., after he had begun his professional life at Athens, that Isokrates came into personal contact with Gorgias. He then visited Gorgias in Thessaly Orator § 167. For the residence of Gorgias in Thessaly, Isokr. Antid. §§ 155, 6.—J. G. Pfundt, de Isocr. vita et scriptis p. 14, puts the visit in Ol. 97,— 390—386 B.C. The Panegyrikos belongs to 380 B.C.; and, in all likelihood, brought back with him the idea of the work which occupied him for the next ten years,—the Panegyrikos.

Life of Isokrates to 404 B.C.

Want of nerve and weakness of voice—defects which at Athens, as he says, entailed more than the ignominy of disfranchisementThose who want φωνή and τόλμα are ἀτιμότεροι τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῶν δημοσίῳ : Panath. (XII) § 10.—kept Isokrates out of public life. During the last years of the Peloponnesian War,—that time so vividly described in the Memorabilia, when it was easier to find money in the streets of Athens than a man able and willing to lend it (Xen. Mem. II. vii. 2.),—Isokrates lost all his patrimony Antid. (xv.) § 161.. Then came the taking of Athens by Lysander and the eight months' rule of the Thirty Tyrants—from July, 404, to February, 403. In the autumn of 404 Theramenes was put to death. When he was denounced by Kritias, and sprang for safety to the altar, Isokrates alone, so the story went, dared to rise and make an attempt to plead for him. Theramenes begged him to desist;—death would be bitterer if it was the death of a friend too [Plut.] Vit. Isocr. The story is amplified by the Anonymous Biographer, but not noticed by Dionysios, although he makes Isokrates a pupil of Theramenes. Compare the story of Isokrates daring to wear mourning for Sokrates [Plut].. Whatever may be the worth of this story, it is likely that Isokrates, a young man of promise and a disciple of the new culture, should have been an object of suspicion to the party of Kritias; and the proscription of the Art of Words would have been another motive for leaving Athens in the case of one who, having lost his fortune and being unfitted for a public career, had now to rely on some kind of literary work.

Stay of Isokrates at Chios, 404—403 B.C.

It can hardly be doubted that it was at this time—in the autumn of 404—that Isokrates left Athens for Chios: In that island he opened a school of Rhetoric, and had some success. He seems to have returned to Athens either just before or just after the Athenian democracy was formally restored in September, 403The date of I.'s sojourn at Chios is a vexed question.(1) Sauppe, followed by Rauchenstein (Introd. to Select Speeches, p. 4), thinks that Isokr. was at Chios from about 393 to 388 B.C. His argument is this. Cicero ( Brut. § 48) quotes Aristotle as saying that Isokrates first wrote forensic speeches, and afterwards taught rhetoric. But his earliest known forensic speech, Or. XXI, refers to 403 B.C.; the latest (Or. XVII, XIX) belong to 394 or 393. If, then, Aristotle is right, his teaching at Chios cannot have begun before 393.(2) Sanneg (De Schola Isocratea, Halle, 1867) puts the stay at Chios in 398—395 B.C.; arguing that the years 395—388 are claimed for Athens as against Chios by the life-chronology of certain of I.'s pupils (esp. Eunomos—Philomêlos—Androtion: Antid. § 93).The important point, in my view, is this:—Isokrates wrote forensic speeches for about ten years from 403: he began to teach regularly at Athens about 392. He may have taught for a livelihood at Chios in 404—3, but this was an accident. It does not represent a period of his life-work. Cic. Brut. § 48 does not apply to it. Surely some such strong outward pressure as the Tyranny makes I.'s migration more intelligible. I find that A. Kyprianos, τὰ ἀπόρρητα τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους, Athens, 1871 (pp. 22—3) agrees with me..

Life at Athens as a writer for the lawcourts, 403—393 B.C.

Now begins the first period of his regular professional life—that period during which he wrote speeches for the law-courts. The six forensic speeches which are extant cover a period of about ten years. The speech Against Euthynus (XXI) may be placed in 403, immediately after the restoration of the democracy; that Against Kallimachos (XVIII) in 402; the De Bigis (XVI) in 397 or 396; the speech Against Lochites (XX) in 394; the Trapezitikos (XVII) and Aeginetikos (XIX) in the second half of 394 or early in 393.

In his later writings Isokrates nowhere recognises this phase of his own activity. He speaks His later repudiation of Forensic Rhetoric. with contempt of those who write for the law-courts, and emphatically claims it as his own merit that he chose nobler themesSee especially Paneg. [Or. IV] §§ 11, 12: Panath. [XII] § 11: Antid. [XV] §§ 3, 48—51, 227—8, 276.. It may have been partly the tone of such passages which emboldened his adopted son Aphareus to assert that Isokrates had never written a forensic speech. This statement is decisively rejected by Dionysios, who concludes, on the authority of Kephisodoros, the orator's pupil, that Isokrates wrote a certain number of such speeches, though not nearly so many as Aristotle had reportedDionys. Isocr. c. 18.. The modern hypothesis that Isokrates composed the extant forensic orations merely as exercises (μελέται), not for real causes, is another attempt to explain his later toneThis hypothesis has been maintained (e.g.) by (1) Westermann (in his Hist. of Greek Oratory, p. 82), (2) Benseler, De Hiatu, p. 56 so far as regards Orr. XVI, XVIII XIX, XX. He thinks XVII and XX spurious. On the other side, see Müller Hist. Gr. Lit. II. 159 (Donalds.); Henn de Isocr. rhetore (he justly lays stress on Arist.'s notice); Starke De Oratt. Forens. Comment. p. 1, note; Rauchenstein Introd. p. 4.. But these later utterances merely mean that Isokrates regarded his former work for the law-courts as an unworthy accident of his early life previous to the beginning of his true career. Nowhere, be it observed, does he deny that he ever wrote for the courts, or that, to use his own phrase, he had been a doll-maker before he became a Pheidias 3 Antid. § 2, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴτις Φειδίαν τὸν τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἕδος ἐργασάμενον τολμῴη καλεῖν κοροπλάθον.. He only says that his choice, his real calling, lay in another direction.

392 B.C. Beginning of his career as (1) an educator, (2) a publicist.

It was about the year 392 that this choice was finally made. He opened a school at Athens near the LykeionProbably between the Lykeion and the Kynosarges; see Sanneg. de Schol. Isocr. p. 14; Anon. Biogr. πρὸς τῷ Λυκείῳ τῷ γυμνασίῳ. The talk of the Sophists about him in the Lykeion (Panath. § 18) was held, then, in his close neighbourhood.; and thenceforth his social function was twofold. He was first of all an educator; next, not for his pupils only but the whole Greek public, he was a political essayist.

The discourse Against the Sophists is the manifesto which he put forth (about 391) at the beginning of his professional life, as the speech on the The Discourse ‘Against the Sophists.’ Antidosis is the apologia in which about forty years later he reviewed it. In this first pamphlet he negatively defines his view of culture by protesting against three classes of ‘sophists’; (1) the Eristics, by whom he seems to mean the minor Sokratics—the reference to Plato is not certain here, as in the Helenae Encomium—especially Eukleides and the Megarics: (2) the ordinary professors of deliberative and forensic speaking, whom he censures chiefly for the imposture (ἀλαζόνεια) of ascribing a boundless and infallible efficacy to a technical method; (3) the earlier writers of ‘Arts,’ of whom he complains, as Aristotle complained afterwards, that they confined themselves to the least worthy, the forensic, branch of Rhetoric.

Leading ideas of the Isokratic culture.

Here, then, we have hinted the leading ideas of the new culture which Isokrates was preparing to interpret: (1) it is to be practical—avoiding barren subtleties: (2) it is to be rational—resting on the development of the whole intelligence, not on technicalities; (3) it is to be comprehensive—not limited to any single professional routine.

To judge from the ages of the men who were his pupils, Isokrates must have been successful from the first. The outer history of his school falls into three periods: 1. from 392 to 378: 2. from 376 to 351: 3. from 350 to 338 B.C.

First period of his School, 392—378 B.C; second period, 376-351 B.C.

From 392 to 378 his pupils were almost exclusively Athenian. His own literary activity is marked by the Busiris (391 or 390)—in which he undertakes to shew Polykrates, a rhetorician afterwards of some repute, how to treat mythical subject matter: and by the Panegyrikos, which made his name known throughout Greece.

In 378 the new Confederation revived for The years 378—376. Athens at least a shadow of that naval supremacy which had been given up just a century before. It was probably during the next two years (378—376) that Isokrates was the companion and the secretary of Timotheos the son of Konon—known to him since about 384Pfundt de Isocr. vit. et scr. p. 16. From [Dem.] ἐρωτικός § 46 it appears that Timotheos was not in early youth a pupil of Isokrates., and at this time successfully energetic in organising the new League both in the Archipelago and in the Ionic SeaCurtius v. 87 (Ward): Sanneg de sch. Isocr. p. 10.. The friendship of Isokrates with Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, the friend of Konon and his son, may have begun at this time.

Between the years 376 and 351 the school of Isokrates reached the height of its prosperity and Second period of the School, 376—351 B.C. fame. His own reputation, and the new rank of Athens as the centre of the Naval Confederacy, combined to bring him pupils from all parts of Greece, from Sicily in the West and from Pontus in the East. Some of these pupils stayed three years with him, some even four. Meanwhile he was writing much. In the letter To Nikokles (374 B.C.) and the discourse, Nikokles, or the Cyprians (372?), he discusses the mutual duties of king and subjects. The letter of advice To Demonikos is of about the same date. The Helenae Encomium (370) and the Evagoras (365) are examples of imaginative and of historical panegyric. The Plataikos (373) and the Archidamos (366) deal with the contemporary affairs of Boeotia and Lacedaemon; the Areopagitikos (355) and the oration On the Peace (355) treat the domestic and the foreign politics of Athens. The speech On the Antidosis (353) reviews the professional life of the writer—then eighty-three—and defends the ideas to which it had been devoted.

In the year 351 Mausôlos, dynast of Karia, died; and his widow Artemisia proposed in honour of his memory a contest of panegyrical eloquence which brought a throng of brilliant rhetoricians to Halikarnassos. No competitor (it is said) presented himself who had not been a pupil of Isokrates; and it was certainly a pupil of Isokrates—Theopompos the historian—who gained the prize. A tradition that this day of glory for the school was a day of personal defeat for its master may safely be rejected. One who had always been deterred by want of nerve and of voice from speaking in the Athenian ekklesia was not likely, at the age of eighty-five, to ignone these defects, for the purpose of competing in a foreign city with his own pupils. The Isokrates named as a competitor by Suidas was unquestionably Isokrates of ApolloniaSuidas (s. vv. Ἀμύκλα, Ἰσοκράτης) says that none but pupils of Isokrates entered, and mentions ‘Isokrates’ as a competitor. Taylor (Lectt. Lys. III. p. 233), Ruhnken (IIist Crit. p. 85) and Clinton (F. H. sub anno 352) understand the Athenian orator. So also [Plut.] Vit. Isocr.Photios cod. 176 quotes Theopompos as speaking slightingly of his master Isokrates; and Porphyry's statement (ap. Euseb. Praecept. Evang. x. 3. p. 464 C) that Theopompos scorned Isokrates because he had beaten him was probably founded on this. Sanneg thinks that the Athenian wrote an oration which the Apolloniate spoke; an ingenious but surely an improbable compromise..

Third period of his School, 351—338 B C.

The speech On the Antidosis (353) would have been a fitting farewell to a long and prosperous career. During the last thirteen years of his life (351—338) the foremost interest of Isokrates cannot have been in his work as a teacher. Philip of Macedon was coming to his full power; and in the Philippos (346) Isokrates already hails the destined restorer of Greece. But to the end of his life Isokrates continued to teach. The Panathenaikos was begun in 342. It was about half-finished when he was attacked by a disease against which—when he finished the discourse in 339—he had been fighting for three years Panath. [XII] § 267.. But he was still working hard every day. He speaks of himself, in another place Ib. § 200., as revising it with some young pupils. He was then ninety-seven.

The importance of his school for Athens and for Renown of the School. Greece can best be judged from the series of men whom it helped to form. Hermippos of Smyrna wrote a book on the ‘Disciples of Isokrates’;Athen. XIII. p. 592 D. and the monograph of a modern scholar has brought together forty-one of theseThe excellent and exhaustive essay of Sanneg, De Schola Isocratea (pp. 60: Halle, 1867), has already been more than once cited.. In the speech On the Antidosis it is part of the imaginary accuser's indictment that the pupils of Isokrates have been not only private persons but statesmen, generals, kings Antid. § 5.. Cicero describes the school of Isokrates as that in which the eloquence of all Greece was trained and perfected ( Brut. 32: Orator § 40.). Its disciples were the foremost speakers or writers of their time—brilliant, as he says elsewhere, ‘either in battle or in pageant’. De Orat. II. § 94, partim in pompa, partim in acie illustres. According to Dionysios, Isokrates was the most illustrious teacher of his day; he educated the best youths of his own city and of all Greece—distinguished, some as politicians, some as advocates, some as historians; and made his school the true image of AthensDionys. Isocr. c. 1, τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως εἰκόνα ποιήσας τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σχολήν.. Among the statesmen are Timotheos, the orator Leôdamas of Acharnae, Lykurgos and Representative pupils of Isocrates. Hypereides. Among the philosophers or rhetoricians are Isaeos, Isokrates of Apollonia, successor of his master in the school, and Speusippos, successor of his uncle Plato in the Academy. History is represented by Ephoros and Theopompos.

But it was not only or most directly through the statesmen, speakers and writers whom he His influence as a political writer. trained that Isokrates was related to the public interests of his day. His own political writings, read throughout Greece, gave him greater influence upon popular opinion than belonged to any other literary man of the time; and he used this influence principally to enforce one idea.

Isokrates and Greece

The fourth century B.C. is filled with the feverish struggle of the Greek States for two objects, one of which was no sooner partly gained than it seemed Conflict of tendencies in the 4th century B.C. to conflict with the other;—the unity of Greece, and the freedom of the individual Greek state. Athens is the centre of this struggle. The sentiment of Greek unity created by the Persian Wars revived after the exhausting struggle of the Peloponnesian War. For the next twenty years, however, it was kept down by the oppressive dominion of Sparta. In 378 it received a partial expression in the new Naval Confederacy of which Athens was the head, just as, in 478, it had been more completely expressed by the Confederacy of Delos. But the second hegemony, like the first, gradually passed into an empire irksome to the allies. At the end of twenty years it was broken up by the Social War. Unity was overthrown in favour of freedom. Two speeches of Isokrates mark the two crises. The Panegyrikos (381) is a call to the unity partly realised just afterwards: the speech On the Peace The Panegyrikos and the De Pace. (355) foreshadows the victory soon to be gained by the rival principle of separate autonomyThe general relation of Isokrates to the Greek and Athenian politics of his day is well sketched in Oncken's Isokrates und Athen (Heidelberg, 1862). In his introduction (pp. v. vi) he has brought out this contrasted significance of the Panegyrikos and the De Pace. .

Under this struggle, as the cause of its feverishness and its futility, lay the mortal disease which Gradual separation of Society from the State. had already stricken Greek civilisation. From the close of the colonizing period that civilisation had been almost stationary; for it was not so highly or so flexibly organized that it could go on developing itself greatly on a limited area or continue to advance otherwise than by self-diffusionThe edition of the Orations of Demosthenes and Aeschines On the Crown, by Mr G. A. Simcox and Mr W. H. Simcox (Oxford, 1872) contains an excellent Essay by Mr G. A. Simcox, On the Practical Politics of the Age of Demosthenes (pp. lxvii—xcii), to which I shall have occasion to refer again. See § 3, ‘Arrest of the Material Development of Greece.’. And now the arrest of development had given place to the beginning of dissolution. The process of this dissolution might be defined as the gradual divorce of Society from the State. In the normal Greek conception Society and the State were one. The man had no existence apart from the citizen; morality was inseparable from civic virtueOncken (Isokr. u. Athen, p. 2) points out how,—even when society was most overpowering and breaking up the State,—the theory of this identity was kept up.. But meanwhile new intellectual and moral needs had come into being, to which the limited elasticity of the state-life could no longer respond; and on the other hand Greek democracy had passed the point up to which, organized as it was, it was capable of a healthy growth. The individual had begun to draw more and more away from the State. Instead of the citizen's duty being the standard of spiritual life, the needs of individual development became the measure of what could reasonably be expected from the citizen. The most striking proof of this is the decay—almost the disappearance—of a virtue which has its root in the idea of the State—readiness for personal self-sacrifice. Active love of one's own city—the central instinct of healthy Greek life—begins to merge in contemplative citizenship of the worldSee especially Curtius, V. 116 and 204 (Ward). .

Athenian cosmopolitanism.

At Athens this cosmopolitanism at least assumed its noblest form. It was there that the distinction between Greek and barbarian had taken its finest edge; and it was there that the first movement was made towards effacing it. The old Greek communal feeling, now no longer in sympathy with the State, found its new seat in the schools of the philosophers, in a republic of the cultivated and the thoughtful. They formed a polity apart, of which the franchise was possible for all who could prove kinship with the Hellenic spirit. Isokrates was the prophet, as Epameinondas and Timotheos were the practical exponents, of this new and more comprehensive Hellenism which is not of the blood but of the soul. ‘Athens,’ he says, ‘has so distanced the rest of the world in power of thought and speech that her disciples have become the teachers of all other men. She has brought it to pass that the name of Greek should be thought no longer a matter of race but a matter of intelligence; and should be given to the participators in our culture rather than to the sharers of our common origin Panegyr. § 50..’

But it was not only in this ideal sense that the sympathies of Isokrates were panhellenic: he was animated by a practical patriotism for the whole of Greece, a patriotism which was vividly affected by the miseries of the time and which burned with the hope of relieving them. The special evils springing The three special evils of the time from the general condition of Greece were mainly three. First;—after the Peloponnesian War the wealth of the community had ceased to grow, as population had ceased to grow about fifty years sooner. The rich went on accumulating; the poor, having no means of enriching themselves by enterprise, were for the most part occupied in watching for some chance of snatching from the rich a larger fraction of the stationary total. Secondly, the Greek desire of personal distinction was manifesting itself— since the breach between Society and the State—as the egotism of unprincipled ambition. Hence the traitors and reprobates who, as Demosthenes says, were positively admired De Fals. Legat. § 265, οὐχ ὅπως ὠργίζοντο ἢ κολάζειν ἠξίουν τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, ἀλλ’ ἀπέβλεπον, ἐζήλουν, ἐτίμων, ἄνδρας ἡγοῦντο.. Thirdly, swarms of ‘men without cities,’ paupers, political exiles, malefactors, were for ever moving over the face of Greece, ready to take military service with any one who would pay them. In 401 Cyrus had found it difficult to raise ten thousand mercenaries from all Greece. In 338 ten thousand mercenaries formed a single contingent at ChaeroneiaCp. Mr G. A. Simcox's Essay cited above, § 4, pp. lxxiii—lxxxiii.. In his Letter to Archidamos, Isokrates draws a fearful picture of the misery caused by these roving desperadoes, ‘who speak our language, but in character are barbarians. They slay, they banish, they plunder; children are outraged; women, whom none but kinsmen had ever seen even veiled, are stripped before all eyes Ep. IX § 10..’

Idea of invasion of Asia.

How were these evils to be cured? By inducing the Greeks to lay aside their quarrels with each other, and to unite in some common cause. And Isokrates conceived that there was but one cause which could so unite them—war against Persia.

He was not the first advocate of this idea. Gorgias had long ago proclaimed it in his speech at Olympia. Lysias had eloquently urged it at the same festival in 388Above, vol. I. p. 203.. Isokrates set it forth with all the power and finish of consummate art, in his Panegyrikos; a work which he had probably conceived during his visit to Gorgias in Thessaly. It is said to have occupied him ten yearsQuint. X. 4 § 4; auctor περὶ ὕψους c. 4 (Spengel Rh. Gr. I. 294), Οἱ μὲν (the Lacedaemonians) τριάκοντα ἔτεσι Μεσσήνην παρέλαβον, ὁ δὲ (Isokrates) τὸν πανηγυρικὸν ἐν μόνοις δέκα συνετάξατο.— Plutarch, in the De Gloria Atheniensium ( Moral. p. 350 E) calls it rhetorically ‘almost three olympiads’—μικροῦ τρεῖς ὀλυμπίαδας ἀνήλωσεν ἵνα γράψῃ τὸν πανηγυρικὸν λόγον., and was published in 380 B.C., probably at the time of the Olympian festival in the autumn; though it is Possible leaders of the invasion. Athens and Sparta. unlikely that it was actually spoken. He calls upon Athens and Sparta to forego their jealousies, and to take the joint leadership of an expedition to Asia.

The appeal failed. Isokrates ceased to hope that either of the foremost States, as such, would lead forth the united Greeks to the East. But for thirtyfour years he persevered in the endeavour to find some man who would lead them.

Jason of Pherae was master of Thessaly from Jason of Pherae 374 to 370,—a man of great ability and great ambitionFor the ability and the plans of Jason, Grote X. 266 (ch. 78): Curtius IV. 443. Isokrates notices Jason's talk of going to Asia in the Philippos (Or. IV.) § 119; their personal friendship in Ep. VI. § 1.; he had talked of a war with Persia, and had gained popularity thereby. He was the pupil of Gorgias and the friend of Isokrates. If the latter did not directly appeal to him he must certainly for a time have hoped in him. Jason was assassinated in 370. It was then, probably, that Isokrates turned his eyes on Dionysios I., tyrant of Syracuse. The Dionysios I. fragment of the extant letter to Dionysios is only prefatory; it appears to have been written in 368 B.C. and encourages Dionysios with the prospect of Athenian support; elsewhere he takes credit for having spoken boldly Philippos § 81. As to the Letter itself ( Ep. I.) see below.. Dionysios died in 367. Archidamos Archidamos III. III., who succeeded his father Agesilaos as a king of Sparta in 361, next attracted the hopes of Isokrates. The letter to Archidamos belongs probably to 356 B.C. It urges him to undertake a task to which his father Agesilaos was devoted, and in which he failed only because he tried to do two things at once—to make war on the Great King and to restore his political friends to their cities Ep. IX. § 13.. But meanwhile Philip of Macedon had become strong. After a fitful Philip. war of ten years, peace was made between Philip and Athens in March, 346. The letter or pamphlet which bears his name was addressed to him by Isokrates about April in 346. Philip is summoned as a Greek and a descendant of Herakles to levy war against Asia. Either he will conquer Persia, or at least he will detach from it all that lies westward of a line drawn from Cilicia to Sinôpê. In either case he will free the Asiatic Greeks and make new settlements for the Greeks who are now homeless. Seven years later—in 339—Isokrates remonstrates with Philip for recklessly exposing his life in frays with barbarians which only delay his real task Ep. 11.. In the Third Letter—of which the genuineness, though not unquestioned, is hardly questionable —he rejoices, a few days before his death, that he has lived to see part of his hopes fulfilled by the battle of Chaeroneia.

In the conventional view this is enough. Isokrates is condemned. He has blindly abetted, to the last moment, the destined enslaver of Greece, even if he has not congratulated him on success. It may be worth while, however, to consider these two questions;—first—what was the abstract worth of this ruling idea of Isokrates—war with Persia? Secondly—how far is he to be held the dupe, or, if not the dupe, the unpardonable accomplice of Philip?

Isokrates believed that the first necessity of the War with Persia as a cure for the ills of Greece. day was to heal the strife of Greeks with Greeks by enlisting all Greeks in one cause. This was undoubtedly true. He believed that such a cause would be furnished by an aggressive war on Persia. Here he was probably mistaken. The state-life of the separate cities, and consequently their capacity for acting, as cities, with each other, was so thoroughly undermined that they could be united by nothing but an evident and imminent danger. Now Persia did not represent such a danger. On the contrary, the Great King influenced Greek affairs, in so far as he did so, through Greece itself. Union might have been had for a war of defence. Union was not to be had for a war of aggression. Demosthenes saw the truth, when speaking in 354 of war with Persia, and of the proposal to anticipate the rumoured preparations of Artaxerxes Ochus by a bold initiative, he said—‘Do not talk of calling the Greeks together when they will not listen to you.’Dem. περὶ συμμοριῶν (Or. XIV.) § 38. The special results which Isokrates expected obviously do not affect the merit of his scheme as a remedy in the first instance for disunion; and it is of secondary importance that here he was partly wrong. He expected three main results:—(1) the liberation from Persia of the Asiatic Greeks; (2) the drafting of the dangerous classes into new Asiatic settlements; (3) a certain influx of wealth into Greece Proper. Now when a Greek expedition against Persia really took place, the chief result corresponded to the second of the hopes of Isokrates— only it was on a much grander scale. The new settlements were made; but then all Hellenism moved eastward; Pergamus, Antioch, Alexandria became the Athens, Thebes, Sparta, of the futureCp. Mr G. A. Simcox's Essay (quoted above) pp. lxxiii and xci..

Relations of Isokrates with Philip.

But next—how far was Isokrates deceived by Philip? Or is he to be called false to Athens or Greece?

Isokrates had despaired of Athens and of Greece unless some strong State or some strong man could unite the discordant cities, by the spell of a national enthusiasm, under a leadership which must be military. He pictured this man as another Agamemnon. There had been a time when his hope was that Greece should be saved by Athens. He could hope that no longer. The best type of the individual State had been found wanting. He turned from the ambition, though not from the patriotism, of an Athenian to the ambition of a Greek; he looked for the deliverance of Greece by all the Greeks, united under one who could command them.

The whole thought of that age was setting in Tendency of the age towards Monarchy. the same general direction. Nothing is more characteristic of it than the new tendency in favour of monarchy. In the dialogue, attributed to Xenophon, between Hieron of Syracuse and Simonides, the despot fails to convince the poet that the estate of the absolute ruler is not enviable or that he may not be a public benefactorSee especially the summary of his own view given by Simonides at the end. Xen. Hier. c. 11.. So far as a speculative thinker may be supposed likely to be influenced, in the way of attraction as well as of repulsion, by the actual political tone around him, Plato is a witness to this bentCurtius, speaking of Plato in connexion with this tendency of the age, points out what was monarchical in his spirit (v. 209, Ward).. Where Aristotle is describing that unique combination of gifts which belongs to the Greek race—warlike, like the continental Europeans, but of greater subtlety, keen, like the Asiatics, but with a higher spirit—here, he says, is a race, which, if brought under one polity, might rule the worldArist. Polit. VII. 7, τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος—δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. Eaton ad loc. quotes St Hilaire:— ‘Cette pensée d'Aristote a sans doute quelque rapport aux entreprises politiques des rois de Macédoine. Ce fut Alexandre qui réussit enfin à réunir la Gréce en un seul état; et ce fut là, en quelque sort, la condition préalable de sa grande expédition.’. It was under the presidency of Macedonia that Aristotle foresaw a possible renewal and a larger future for the outworn life of the Greek republics. He is said to have advised Alexander to treat the Greeks in the spirit of a leader (ἡγεμονικῶς), and the barbarians in the spirit of a master (δεσποτικῶς)Plut. Alex. Virt. I. vi.. The same kind of leadership which in old times had been exercised by Argos, by Athens, by Sparta, or by Thebes, was now to be vested in the person of a Macedonian King. There is nothing to show whether Aristotle had considered any probable difference between the old hegemony of a city and the new hegemony of a strong dynasty except the obvious difference that the latter was likely to be steadier. But in one sense, at all events, his dream of a boundless sway for the Greek race, when ‘brought under one polity,’ came to pass. It has been too much the custom to speak of Chaeroneia as if it were something by which Grecian history was brought to an abrupt end. A crushing blow to the spirit of political freedom in the old Greek sense Chaeroneia indeed was. But it was also the beginning of a new life to replace the life so hopelessly decayed—of that new empire for Greek thought and Greek art which opened in Macedonian times, an empire which made Greece to Asia and Europe what Athens had been to Greece, and by which Aristotle's prophecy was at last fulfilled in the world-wide and immortal dominion of which he was himself a founderOn Aristotle's presentiment for Greece, see Oncken Isokr. u. Athen, pp. 38 f.; Curtius V. 476 (Ward)..

Isokrates held with Aristotle that the first The view of Isokrates compared with that of Aristotle. condition of greatness for Greece was unity. Seeing that the old civic life was thoroughly corrupted, he did not believe that this unity could be attained under the hegemony of a State. But he believed that it could be attained under the hegemony of a chief who should draw together the sympathies of all the States. The difference between the view of Aristotle and the view of Isokrates seems to have been this. Aristotle conceived such a personal hegemony as political and permanent, without perhaps having formed to himself a definite idea of the manner in which it would affect the individual city. Isokrates conceived it as primarily military, and as assumed for the special purpose of an expedition to Asia. Absorbed in this scheme, and believing in it as a cure for all evils, he does not seem to have contemplated the probable permanency of such a leadership. But if he had been told that such permanency was a condition of the enterprise, he would unquestionably have consented. Only he would have insisted, as Aristotle did, on the distinction between leader and master. Isokrates idealized his Agamemnon of Pella; he could not read Philip's mind. Had he been able to read it, however, what would have grieved him would not have been the idea of an established Macedonian hegemony, but the discovery that Philip desired this more for its own sake than for the sake of the expedition to Asia. On the other hand, assuredly Greece and Athens had no more loyal citizen than Isokrates, no one prouder of their glories, no one to whom their welfare was dearer; and, before he is judged, let it be remembered that his notion of the largest good possible for them differed only by lesser clearness from that of the greatest thinker in practical politics who then livedNiebuhr, it is well known, pronounces Isokrates ‘an utterly bad citizen’ (Lectures on Anc. Hist. II. 335). It is curious to see how Niebuhr is, all through, yet half unconsciously, trying Isokrates by a Roman standard. He is always thinking of him as the man who had despaired of the republic. He does not stop to ask what was the republic for an Athenian of that time..

Isokrates and Athens.

The first concern of Isokrates was with Greece. But two of his speeches relate specially to Athens; the De Pace to her foreign policy, the Areopagitikos to home affairs.

The root of all the troubles which beset Athenian Foreign Affairs of Athens. action abroad was this, that few citizens performed military service. Campaigns were longer than they used to be; war had become a profession in which amateurs were at a disadvantage; and the spirit of sacrifice for the State was extinct. A General, representing the city, commanded mercenaries. When things went wrong, the citizens at home avenged themselves directly on their representative. Hence the standing strife between the orators and the Generals. On the other hand, the General could keep his mercenaries together only by payment. He was obliged to turn the war, now and then, to some lucrative quarter. Burdened with this necessity, he could neither obey definite orders from home nor form any large plan for himself. His situation forced him to become more and more independent of the other States. It was natural that he should often form connexions with foreign princes on his own account. Timotheos was in alliance with Jason of Pherae, with Alketas the Molossian and with Amyntas of Macedonia. He is said to have received the towns of Sestos and Krithôtê as a gift from Ariobarzanes. Iphikrates was the ally of Kotys, whose sister he married and from whom he received the town of Drys in Thrace. Charidemos was the ally and brother-in-law of Kersobleptes; Chares was in alliance with Artabazos and had his residence at Sigeion; Chabrias did almost as he pleased in EgyptCurtius V. 123 f. (Ward).. Home affairs were in no better condition. Home Affairs. Politics had ceased to have a living interest for the best men; such men held aloof; while in the ekklesia ‘one went and another came, and there was no one to care for the common goodDem. de F. L. § 136, ὁ μὲν ἦλθεν, ὁ δ’ ἀπῆλθεν, μέλει δ’ οὐδενὶ τω—ν κοινῶν..’ There was an active and intelligent public opinion, but it had no organised or effective expression; there were cliques but there were no parties. While the higher aspects of the festivals were vanishing, the Theôrikon, or money given by the Treasury to the citizens to pay for their places at the theatre— already doubled and trebled since the time of Perikles—had become the most important item of the budget. It must never be forgotten that the Theôric fund meant essentially a provision for public worship and only accidentally a provision for public amusement. When Eubulos took office as Treasurer in 354, he brought in a law making it capital to propose any diversion of the Theôrikon to other purposes. It was the sacred character of the fund which made it possible for him to do this and so hard for Demosthenes to get it undoneCurtius (V. 136, Ward) seems to put too much out of sight the religious character of the Theôric fund, which has been so clearly set forth by Grote; and to bear rather hardly on Eubulos.. On the other hand, in a religion which identified worship with festivity the merely festal spirit was sure to prevail more and more over the devotional as the general tone of the community became lower. The policy of Eubulos found favour with the people mainly because it provided them with shows. This was the true significance of the phrase used by Demâdes when he called the Theôrikon the ‘cement of the democracyPlut. Moral. p. 1011 B, ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, κόλλαν ὀνομάζων τὰ θεωρικὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας. (Sauppe, Or. Att. II. 315.).’ Eubulos was further supported by that party of commercial interests which the Essay ‘On the Revenues of Athens’—ascribed, but no doubt wrongly, to XenophonOn the Περὶ προσόδων (later than Ol. 96. 2, i. e. 355 B.C.) see Curtius V. 174 (Ward). Oncken (Isokr. und Athen) points out that the leading idea of the Essay On the Revenues is the same as that of the De Pace of Isokrates. He contrasts with both the words of Demosthenes (De Cor. § 89)— τῆς εἰρήνης ἣν οὗτοι κατὰ τῆς πατρίδος τηροῦσιν οἱ χρηστοὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς μελλούσαις ἐλπίσιν.—represents with an almost grotesque candour. The social life which Social Life this political life implies hardly needs to be described. On the one hand there was an intellectual world apart; on the other, there was the people, consoled for what was unsatisfactory abroad and at home by a certain provincial joviality. Philip is said to have offered the sum of a talent for a report of the proceedings at the meetings of an Athenian club called the Sixty who dined together at the HerakleionThe Sixty seem to have had a corporate reputation as wits. τοσαύτη δ’ αὐτῶν δόξα τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας ἐγένετο ὡς καὶ Φίλιππον ἀκούσαντα τὸν Μακεδόνα πέμψαι τάλαντον, ἵν’ ἐγγραφόμενοι τὰ γελοῖα πέμπωσιν αὐτῷ. (Athen. XIV. 615 E.).

Isokrates on Foreign and Domestic Policy.

Such was the Athens to which Isokrates had to address his counsels. The Speech On the Peace was written probably in 355, just before the conclusion of the treaty which closed the Social War and broke up the Naval Confederacy of 378. Athens is urged to resign the dream of supremacy, and to treat allies as friends, not slaves. In his fervour the orator personifies that Empire which, like a false mistress, has allured and betrayed the two foremost Republics of Greece. ‘Is she not worthy to be hated?’ De Pace [Or. VIII] § 105. Cf. §§ 133—5. Let Athens turn from her and prize, next to the favour of the gods, the esteem of Greece. It is substantially the policy of Eubulos which is advocated; but it is advocated on higher grounds than those of the holiday-makers or the merchants. Isokrates held that hegemony passes into empire, and that empire begets an insolence which at last ruins the imperial State. The experience of Athens and of Sparta bore him out: and, as he conceived the interests of Greece, there was nothing to be gained by Athens striving at all hazards to keep the League together. The Areopagitikos (also 355 B.C.) supplements the De Pace with his view of what Isokrates on Home Policy. is wanted in home politics and in private life. ‘We sit in the taverns abusing the state of affairs; we say that never under a democracy were we worse governed; yet in practice and in our policy we prefer this to the democracy handed down by our fathers.’ Areop. [Or. VII] § 15. His ideal is the elder democracy of Solon and Kleisthenes. Under it, citizens were not to be seen casting lots for their daily bread outside the law courts, while they paid mercenaries to fight their battles—nor choregi, splendid in golden robes, who were destined to shiver through the winter in rags ib. § 54.. Let us return to the elder democracy of Solon and Kleisthenes, when equality meant honour where honour is due, and magistrates were not chosen by lot. Above all, let us restore to the Areiopagos its control over the education of the young and its general censorship of morals. When habits of industry are enforced, there will be no more pauperism; and when public men are forced to be respectable, the affairs of the city will go on well. Isokrates was certainly right in holding that a great need of the day was a sense of shame; though he was probably mistaken in thinking that the vices of a society such as that of the new Athens were within the reach of a censorship. To govern Athens by the Areiopagos would indeed have been like governing Greece by the Amphictyonic CouncilSimcox, p. lxxxi..

Private Life of Isokrates.

The private life of Isokrates was too evenly prosperous to have a history. He is said to have taught his Athenian pupils gratis, and to have taken fees only from foreignersAnon. Biogr. ἐλάμβανε δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλα ὑπὲρ τῆς διδασκαλίας, παρὰ μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδέν, ὥσπερ γέρας τοῦτο κατατιθέμενος καὶ τροφεῖα καταβάλλων τῇ πατρίδι, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ξένων χιλίας δραχμάς. Kyprianos (ἀπόρρητα τοῦ Ἰσοκρ. p. 30) takes this statement as literally true, and refers, in support of it, to the language of Isokr. himself in Antid. §§ 39, 146, 164. These passages say merely (1) that Isokr. did not live, like the forensic rhetoricians, on the lawsuits of his fellow-citizens; and (2) that his wealth came chiefly from the gifts of foreigners.See, on the other hand, Dem. πρὸς Λάκριτον (Or. XXXV). Lakritos had been a pupil of Isokrates (§ 15)—and, says the speaker, πιστεύει τῷ λέγειν καὶ ταῖς χιλίαις δραχμαῖς ἃς δέδωκε τῷ διδασκάλῳ (§ 42). Cf. ib. § 40, εἴ τις βούλεται σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ Ἰσοκράτει ἀργύριον ἀναλίσκειν. It is conceivable, of course, that there should have been an earlier and a later period of his practice in this respect.. However this may be, the wealth derived from his school appears to have excited the envy of his rivals; and he says that they exaggerated it Antid. §§ 155 f.. He was one of the 1200 richest citizens ib. § 145. who, after the financial reform of 378 B.C., formed the twenty unions (or ‘symmories’) for the assessment of the war-tax; he had thrice been trierarch; and had besides discharged other public services in a liberal manner. On marrying Plathanê, the widow of Hippias of Elis, he adopted Aphareus, one of her three sons,—afterwards a rhetorician and a tragic poet of some mark. It was a somewhat rare distinction for an eminent Athenian to have had only one lawsuitAs to the mistake of the pseudoPlutarch in saying that Isokr. was twice challenged to an antidosis, see below, introd. to Or. XV.; and in this—a challenge to take the trierarchy, or exchange properties, offered to him in 345 by one Megakleides—Isokrates, who was ill at the time, was represented in court by Aphareus. The verdict seems to have gone against him Antid. § 5..

His death.

In 338 B.C. Isokrates was in his 98th year; his health, which had been strong throughout his long life, had broken down under an illness which had attacked him three years before. According to the Difficulties in the ordinary account of it. usual account, he was in the palaestra of Hippokrates when he heard the news of Chaeroneia. He repeated three verses from Euripides—verses commemorating three aliens who had been conquerors of Greeks—Danaos,—Pelops,—KadmosEach the first line of a drama —a fact which adds some point to the story:—(1) Δαναὸς ὁ πεντήκοντα θυγατέρων πατήρ. (v. 1 of the lost Archelaos: —Nauck frag. Trag. p. 340.)(2) Πέλοψ ὁ Ταντάλειος εἰς Πῖσαν μολών (Iphig. in Taur. v. 1.) (3) Σιδώνιόν ποτ’ ἄστυ Κάδμος ἐκλιπών. (v. 1 of the lost Phrixos:— Nauck p. 493); and four days afterwards, on the burial-day of those who fell at Chaeroneia, he died of voluntary starvation. This dramatic picture of a violent disenchantment and a mortal despair—a picture consecrated by tradition and by poetry—is hard to reconcile with the repeated testimony of Isokrates himself to his own views and hopes. There is no good reason for doubting the genuineness of his Third Letter —a Letter which was evidently written just after Chaeroneia, and which ends with these words:— ‘For this only do I thank old age, that of those early aspirations which I sought to express in my Panegyrikos and in my Address to you, I see part already coming to pass by your agency, and the rest, I hope, soon to come’ Ep. III. § 6.. That is to say, there was now an established leader for Greece; and there would soon be a war with Persia. Suppose, however, that the Third Letter is spurious. Still, how is the motive of the suicide to be explained? Undoubtedly Isokrates regretted the struggle between Athens and Philip; it had been brought on by a policy which he disapproved. But the result of the struggle was that the idea of his life—the idea on which depended, as he thought, the welfare of Athens and of Greece—had become practicable. Isokrates cannot have destroyed himself because Philip had won. The conduct of Philip to Athens after Chaeroneia was studiously temperate and conciliatory; there was nothing in it to estrange Isokrates from his ideal Panhellenic chief, who, having struck one necessary blow, was now bent on healing the discords of Greece. It is more conceivable that Isokrates should have destroyed himself because he saw Athens still resolved to resist, and because he dreaded the conflict, when Philip should be at the walls, between his duty to Athens and his duty to Greece. If the tradition of the suicide is considered too strong to be set aside, this seems the most reasonable account of itThe authorities for the story of the suicide are (1) Dionys. Isocr. 1 (2) Pans. I. 18. 8: (3) Philostr. Vit. Sophist. 1. 17. 4: (4) Lucian(?) Μακρόβιοι § 23: (5) [Plut.] Vit. Isocr. § 14: (6) Anon. Biogr. (Dind.'s Isocr. p. XII).The story has been examined by Blass in the Rheinisches Museum for 1865, pp. 109—116. Aphareus, the adopted son of Isokrates, had written some forensic speeches as well as tragedies—and had appeared for his father in the lawsuit brought by Megakleides. [Plut.]: Dionys. Isocr. c. 18. Blass suggests that the suicide may have been a fiction to which Aphareus first gave currency in a forensic speech, and which friends diligently spread, in order to redeem the name of Isokrates from imputations of disloyalty to Athens.Blass points out that the Third Letter is too moderate in tone for any but the most skilful of forgers —supposing him to have had a hostile motive; and, except a hostile motive, there could have been no motive for going against the ordinary account.—Schäfer ( Demosth. III. p. 5 note) gives no reason for pronouncing the letter spurious except its conflict with the tradition.—Cartelier (Le Discours d'Isocr. sur lui-même, Paris 1862, p. xcix) ingeniously suggests that the whole tradition of the suicide may have arisen from the accident of Isokrates dying on the burialday of those who fell at Chaeroneia. [Plut.]—Kyprianos (p. 42) and Oncken (Isokr. und Athen, p. 17) believe in the suicide.— Curtius observes that the authority of the Third Letter—which he thinks doubtful—cannot invalidate the tradition; and offers the explanation noticed above. (Hist. Gr. v. 459 Ward.).

Isokrates was buried on a piece of rising ground near the Kynosarges,—a sanctuary of Herakles, with a gymnasium, just outside the Diomeian Gate on the east side of AthensFor the Kynosarges, see Dr Dyer's Ancient Athens (1873), pp. 285 f.. The tombs of his kindred were there,—covered once by six tablets of stone, which had disappeared, however, before the Plutarchic Life was written. On the tomb of Isokrates himself was a column about forty-five feet high, crowned with the image of a siren,— a symbol of winning eloquence in which only a thoroughly modern ingenuity could discover an unconscious irony. Near this column was a pictorial stone tablet representing Isokrates with his teachers and with some of the poets. It is significant that Gorgias, looking at an astrological sphere, was the central figure, with his pupil standing at his side. A bronze statue of Isokrates, on a column near the Olympieion, bore a votive inscription by his adopted son; another, the work of Leôchares, in the temple of Eleusis, recorded the admiring friendship of Timotheos[Plut] Vit. Isocr.: Paus. I. 18: Philostr. I. 17.—The inscription at Eleusis wasΤιμόθεος φιλίας τε χάριν ξύνεσίν τε προτιμῶνἸσοκράτους εἰκὼ τήνδ’ ἀνέθηκε θεαῖς. Leôchares ranked as a sculptor beside his contemporaries Skopas and Praxiteles. On his work, see Curtius v. 198 f. (Ward.).

Character of Isokrates.

In his strength, as in much of his weakness, Isokrates may be compared with Cicero. He was a master of expression, with few ideas, but with much ingenuity in combining and varying these; a politician between whom and the power of seeing facts as they were, over any wide field, there usually floated the haze of some literary theory which vanity made golden; a man of warm, if somewhat exacting, benevolence, always ready to do his best for those who believed in him; industrious, earnest, with that simplicity which has been called an element of nobleness, and with the capacity for a generous enthusiasm which was never kindled to a brighter flame than by the glories of his city or his race. Cicero's powers, naturally more various, were more thoroughly brought out and far better disciplined by a life in which studious retirement alternated with public cares. Isokrates missed those lessons of the world which are proverbially useful to a successful teacher; but in an unbroken privacy he kept his ardour for work unchilled and the purity of his ideal hopes unstained. His chief efforts were given to promoting what he believed to be the interests of Athens and of Greece; and it has been the misfortune of his fame that his conception of these interests set him in contrast with a loftier genius and a more heroic nature than his own. In his school he did a service peculiarly valuable to that age by raising the tone and widening the circle of the popular education, by bringing high aims and large sympathies into the preparation for active life, and by making good citizens of many who perhaps would not have aspired to become philosophers.

Isokrates: Theory of Culture
Usage of the term ‘philosophy’ in the time of Isokrates.

IN a passage of the Phaedros p. 278 B. just before that quoted at the beginning of the last chapter, Sokrates asks what a man is to be called, who, whatever may be his particular line of work—whether for instance he is a Homer, a Lysias, or a Solon—works in the light of true knowledge, using no terms which he cannot define, making no statements which he is not prepared to defend. It might be presumptuous, Sokrates says, to call such a man, or any man, ‘wise;’ but he may fairly be called ‘a lover of wisdom,’ a ‘philosopher.’ It is probable that the term ‘philosophy’—said to have been invented by Pythagoras—did not come into general use at Athens much before the time of Sokrates; and that, for nearly a century at least, ‘philosopher’ continued to be the laudatory name for the man of intellectual or literary pursuits generally,—as ‘sophist,’ used with the same large meaning, came by degrees to have more and more of a disparaging sense. The paramount intellectual eminence of Plato and Aristotle, as well as the lessened importance of Rhetoric after the extinction of the old political life, led to the name ‘philosopher’ being gradually appropriated, from about the end of the 4th century B.C., to the speculative seeker for truthOn the history of the term φιλοσοφία, see Dr Thompson's note to Phaedr. p. 278 D.. Aristeides, writing in the latter half of the second century A. D., objects to this restriction of the term, saying that in the best times ‘philosophy’ meant simply ‘literary study and refinement;—being used, not in its present sense, but for discipline or culture (παιδεία) generallyAristeid. II. 407, Dind. (quoted in the note just referred to): φιλοσοφία meant φιλοκαλία τις καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους, καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν τρόπος οὗτος ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς.I would add that in Aristotle there is at least one clear example of the older and larger use of the word,—Rhet. II. 20, where he is saying that, if we have no illustrations at hand from real life or history, we must taken them from fiction—τοῦτο δὲ ρ/ᾴδιον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, i.e. ‘literary knowledge will make this easy.’ In Rhet. II. 23, the verb φιλοσοφεῖν has a corresponding sense; but I do not press this, because there may be, as Spengel thinks, a reference to Isokr. Antid. § 173; and in that case the use of the word might be ironical.In the letter (purporting to be Aristotle's) which some later hand has prefixed to the ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον (Speng. Rh. Gr. I. 173), Rhetoric is called ἡ τῶν λόγων φιλοσοφία ..’ Now it is in this general sense that Isokrates applies the term ‘philosophy’ to his art, ‘the discipline of discourse,’ ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία, as he more precisely terms it. In the speech On the Antidosis he expressly marks this general sense:— ‘Now you have heard all the truth about my faculty, or philosophy, or study—whichever you like to call it Antid. § 50, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐμῆς εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως εἵτε φιλοσοφίας εἴτε διατριβῆς, ἀκηκόατε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν..’

This use of the term ‘philosophy’ though Modern prejudice against him caused by his use of it. warranted by the ordinary usage of his day, has in modern times proved a serious misfortune for Isokrates. ‘Philosophy’ has for us only its later and restricted meaning: its original and larger meaning has been forgotten. Isokrates and Plato were strictly contemporaries—one, the great speculative thinker, the other, the great popular educator, of his century. The tendency to contrast them is natural. On the one side stands the true philosopher; on the other, the graceless anti-Plato who is continually insisting that his political rhetoric is philosophy. Now, to be just, we ought to remember that the point of the supposed contrast depends partly on an altered verbal usage. When Isokrates speaks of his Philosophy, he means his Theory of Culture. It may be worth while to inquire what this theory was, and to see how far that which Isokrates professed to do was done well by him.

His Theory of Culture described

The two important documents for the ‘philosophy’ of Isokrates are the discourse Against the Sophists (Or. XIII. 391 B. C.), and the speech On the Antidosis (Or. XV. 353 B.C.), the alpha and the omega of his professional life. In the first of these he declares what his ‘philosophy’ is not; in the second he explains what it is.

It is distinguished, then,—first, from all theoretic (1) negatively, inquiries, as from those of the Ionic physicists, and from the ethical and political speculations of the Sokratic schools. Secondly, from Eristic, or the art of disputing for disputation's sake. Thirdly, from mathematical science. Fourthly, from all literary activity which has no direct bearing on the higher political life: as (i) mythological research, ‘genealogies of the heroes,’ and the like; (ii) history, considered as the compiling of annals, apart from political essay-writing; (iii) philology and criticism of the poets; (iv) rhetoric applied to low or trivial subjects, whether forensic, or of the sportive epideiktic kind Adv. Sophist. [XIII] passim: cp. esp. Helen. Encom. [X] §§ 1— 13: Antid. [XV] §§ 45, 46..

It forms the last and highest department of the (2) positively citizen's education. Boys at school learn grammar and read the poets. Older youths may profitably study astronomy or geometry up to a certain point, for the purpose of sharpening their faculties; a profound study of these subjects is useful only for professional specialists Antid. §§ 261—264.. Eristic may be used for practice in the same way; but the student must take care that his nature is not ‘dried up by it,’ and that he is not ‘stranded’ in such barren subtleties as (for instance) those of Empedokles and Parmenides ib. § 268, μὴ μέντοι περιιδεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὑτῶν κατασκελετευθεῖσαν—ἐξοκείλασαν ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν.. Then, when the faculties have been thus prepared and trained, ‘philosophy’ comes in. What Gymnastic is for the body, Philosophy is for the mind. The teacher of Gymnastic practises his pupils in all the artificial exercises (σχήματα) which have been devised as preparatives for real contests. The teacher of Philosophy trains his pupils in all the artificial resources§ 183, τὰς ἰδέας ἁπάσας αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος. With reference to literary composition, ἰδέα is used by Isokr. in two distinct senses:—(1) ἰδέαι in Antid. § 11 arc the τρόποι λόγων of § 45,— the several branches or styles of literary composition; e.g. historical, rhetorical, critical: (2) ἰδέαι in Panath. § 2 are the figures of rhetoric, properly called σχήματα, such as antithesis or parisôsis.Here, in Antid. § 183, the meaning seems akin to (2), but larger— including all those resources of a literary composer which can be reduced to formulas. For a precisely similar use, see Adv. Soph. [XIII] § 16. which prose-composition can employ. Then he tries them in real work, in putting together (συνείρειν) the particular things which they have learned, so that they may grasp them more firmly, and may be able to use them readily in any combination which any given occasion may require. It is impossible to foresee exactly all these occasions; there can be no science of them. There can only be opinion, conjecture about them; and he is the wisest man who—exact foresight being out of the question —can best conjecture what any given crisis will demand of him ib. §§ 184—185: cf. § 271, and Helen. Encom. § 5.. ‘Philosophy’ cannot of itself engage to produce a man able to speak and to act. Three things go to make such a man—natural capacity, training, and practical experience. The second has no power comparable to that of the first and third. All that training can infallibly do is to make the man better Antid. §§ 187—191.. And what is of supreme importance is the class of subjects to which the oratorical and literary faculty, as it grows, is turned. These must be (1) practical; (2) concerned with the largest public interests;—not with such private interests as employ forensic rhetoric, nor even with the exclusive interests of a single city ib. §§ 276, 46: cp. Panath. [XII] §§ 1—3, 13: Philipp. [V] § 82.. Isokrates cites from his own works two examples of such ‘nationally political,’ Hellenic subjects: one is the thesis—‘Athens has a better right than Lacedaemon to the hegemonyRepresented by an extract from the Panegyrikos (§§ 51—99), introduced in Antid. § 59.’; another is—‘What measures are needed to reform the foreign and home policy of AthensRepresented by an extract from the De Pace (§§ 25—56, &c.), introduced ib. § 65.?’

Relation of Isokrates to his professional brethren.

The ‘Philosophy’ of Isokrates is, then, the Art of Definition. speaking and of writing on large political subjects, considered as a preparation for advising or acting in political affairs.

But something more than such a definition is needed for the accurate appreciation of his work. It is necessary to determine his relation to other teachers who professed to be doing nearly the same thing. Isokrates conceives himself as belonging to a numerous and honourable profession, but as distinguished from most of his brethren by certain characteristics which give him a higher moral and intellectual dignity. The members of this profession he calls generically SophistsSee esp. Antid. § 203.; when he wishes to disparage he speaks of vulgar Sophists τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν , Panath. [XII] § 18.. Under this general name of ‘Sophist’ he includes two What he means by ‘Sophist.’ distinct classes of teachers;—(1) those whom we should call philosophers,—as the Sokratics, in three of their principal sects,—Plato and the Academy, Antisthenes and the Cynics, Eukleides and the Megarics Helen. Encom. [X] § 1.;— (2) those whom we ordinarily mean when we speak of ‘sophists,’—teachers of political (that is, forensic or deliberative) discourse; who professed to give a training, based on Rhetoric, for practical life Adv. Soph. [XIII] § 9..

The power of speaking, coherently and effectively, Analogy of Sophistic to Journalism. in a law-court, in a public assembly or at a public festival, held a place in old Greek life roughly analogous to that which the journalistic faculty holds in modern Europe. The citizen of a Greek republic might be called upon at any moment to influence public opinion in behalf of certain interests or ideas by a neat, pointed, comprehensive address, which must be more or less extemporary. ‘Sophists’ in the ordinary sense were men who undertook to teach methodically the art of saying, under all possible circumstances, something which should pass muster at the time; and, in controversy, of rebutting arguments, whatever their intrinsic worth, by counterarguments which should at least serve the turn. In most hands such a discipline was probably either keen but immoral, or superficial and non-moral: Isokrates wanted to make it thorough and moral.

Distinctive merits of Isokrates as a popular educator

The art which he and the ordinary sophists alike professed was thoroughly established as the essence of a practical Athenian education. In the speech On the Antidosis that place is vindicated for it, against those who denied its existence as an art, by an appeal to its proved and normal efficiency; it produces the results at which it aims, and produces them with as much regularity as any other art Antid. §§ 199—209.. It was the educational merit of Isokrates that he strove honestly and in a great measure successfully to give to this established art a larger intellectual field and a higher tone. Let us forget that by a perversity, which at the worst is but verbal, he chose to call this art, in phrase sanctioned by his day, ‘philosophy;’ let us forget what is sometimes ludicrous in his egotism, in the literary self-complacency which believed itself statesmanlike; and let us see what there is in his conception and practice of his art which is really distinctive and really deserving of respect.

The first characteristic of Isokrates, as compared 1. Largeness of View. with the ordinary practical educator, is largeness of view. In the discourse Against the Sophists he remarks that the vision of these teachers is generally limited to the narrowest circle of an Athenian citizen's interests; their object is to prepare victory in the Athenian lawcourts, victory in the Athenian ekklesia Adv. Soph. § 20.. His own aim, on the contrary, is to enlarge the mental horizon of his pupils by exercising them on subjects wider and nobler than the concerns of any single city; he describes these subjects of his choice as Hellenic e. g. Antid § 46.. The Panegyrikos deals with such a subject. And even when his immediate subject concerns a particular city, the treatment is still in his own phrase, Hellenic; his point of view is not local but national. The Archidamos, the Plataikos, the Areopagitikos are instances. Now at the time when Isokrates was writing, this breadth was useful in two ways, intellectually and politically. Intellectually; for the divorce of society from the State brought with it a sharper separation between the few thinkers, who lived more and more apart, and the mass of the citizens, whose social life had lost the higher spiritual elements almost as completely as it could do so without ceasing to be Greek. It was a great thing that a young citizen, who perhaps would never have been drawn into the sphere of the philosophers, should have set before his mind some interests wider and higher than those suggested by the routine of business or pleasure in his own city. Besides this intellectual gain, it was especially a political gain when he was reminded that, over and above the duties of local citizenship, he owed a loyalty to the higher unity of Greece. Most men found it hard to remember this in a time when the selfishness of the individual State, or citizen, was everywhere breaking the strongest and most sacred ties of the old common life. To keep constantly the idea of Greece before the minds of men who would afterwards have power at various points of Greece—and the pupils of Isokrates came from all cities—was a good service in itself, apart from the worth of any given doctrines, and independently of the mental enlargement which it implies.

The second distinctive mark of Isokrates is 2. Elevation of moral tone. general nobleness of moral tone. He did not attempt to find a philosophical basis for morals: rather he naively makes it his merit that, while theoretical moralists set before men a conception of virtue ‘which no one else can recognise and about which they themselves dispute,’ the virtue which he teaches is ‘that which all men allow Antid. § 84..’ But if he was not a philosophical moralist, he had a genuine respect and love for the best and highest things that he knew, a genuine contempt and hatred for what he felt to be mean and bad. He lived in times of which the deadly disease in public and social life was a narrow, dishonest and impudent selfishness; the spirit which animates his writings was in itself wholesome as a protest against this corrupt and abject cynicism. Isokrates has not passion; but in his eloquence ‘one breathes a large and pure air:’ the fineness of his spirit has its kindred weaknesses; but, when it is truest to itself, ‘it is marked by respect and love for all worthy sentiments; by the habit of moderation, by a just dislike for dishonest agitations; by antipathy alike for the brutal force of despots and for the brutal passions of mobs; by distance from superstition; by faithful attachment to what he called ‘philosophy’—including under that name the double benefit of the thought whichillumines and of the speech which charms and touches —lastly, by the faculty of admiration,—the finest gift of his genius,—and by that lively feeling for the great aspects of his country in which we can still rejoice with him. And, however far Demosthenes may outstrip him, yet Demosthenes may have heard not without respect—perhaps not without envy— that serene eloquence, free from all precipitation and all rashness, which selects its thoughts as well as its words, which has never to lend itself to offensive sentiments, which never degrades itself or those who listen to it, which is nourished only on generous ideas, and which thus reflects the human spirit always on its nobler sideCartelier, Le Discours d'Isocrate sur lui-même (the Antidosis) p. lxii. The Introductory Essay from which I quote is throughout a subtle and sympathetic appreciation of Isokrates—especially on the moral side; and suggests how much has been lost to French literature with the scholar from whose pen it came..’

Thirdly, Isokrates is distinguished by his method 3 Thoroughness of Method. of teaching. Aristotle notices the system followed by the ordinary sophists. It consisted in making their pupils commit to memory, first speeches, then dialogues. This method, Aristotle observes, was quick, but inartistic and barren of results; and was very much as if a shoemaker, instead of making his apprentices acquainted with the processes of the art, should content himself with showing them several pairs of shoesArist. περὶ σοφιστ. ἐλέγχων xxxiv. 7.. Granting that this account of their procedure may be partly unfair to average sophists, it still seems clear that Isokrates stood alone in the stress which he laid, and the critical pains which he bestowed, on work done by his pupils themselves. First came technical expositions; then the learner was required to apply abstract rules in actual composition, and his essay was carefully revised by the master Antid.§§ 183f.: cp. Epist. VI. § 8.. Isokrates recognised fully the use of example; but while for most other teachers the setting of finished patterns before their school was almost everything, Isokrates seems to have regarded these patterns chiefly as counsels of perfection for advanced and gifted pupilsSee Adv. Sophist. § 18.; the real essence of his method consisted in developing the learner's own faculty through the learner's own efforts Antid. § 188. This fact is expressed by the tradition, preserved in the Plutarchic life and by Photios cod. 260, that Isokrates taught not merely by μέθοδος— i. e. technical precept—but also by ἄσκησις—practice under the eye of the master.. He lays great stress upon industry; he seems to have regarded a feeling for the pleasures of hard work as one criterion of a noble spirit Areopag. [VII] § 43.; and in his ninety-seventh year, when he was suffering from illness, he prides himself on being still able to work hard Panath. § 267.. His course of teaching, besides being so much more thorough, seems to have been of longer duration than the ordinary; his pupils stayed with him from three to four years Antid. § 87. Cf. § 200, where he ridicules the popular notion that one year of such training ought to make a finished ῥήτωρ. .

It results from his whole conception of his art, 4 Desire of Permanent Result. and it is implied in his method of teaching, that Isokrates aimed at the production of work which should have a lasting value. This is a fourth characteristic which distinguishes him strongly from the mass of his profession, and, in a certain degree, even from its better members. Since the end of the fifth century B. C. a literature of political pamphlets had been coming into existence; writing was now recognised as a mode of influencing public opinion on the affairs of the day. Thrasymachos pleaded for the Larisaeans, as Isokrates for the Plataeans, in a rhetorical pamphlet; in the same way Isokrates attacked, and Alkidamas defended, the new MesseneOn the lost speech of Thrasymachos ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων, see Sauppe Or. Att. II. p. 162: on the Μεσσηνιακός of Alkidamas (which may be contrasted with the Archidamos of Isokr.) ib. p. 154. Cp. Curtius Hist. Gr. v. 173 (Ward).. Now to Isokrates belongs the credit of trying to raise the dignity and worth of this intermittent journalism. He aimed at making his essays on contemporary events something more than telling pamphlets; he wished them to have a lasting value both literary and political, answering to the conscientious labour and thought which had been spent upon them. The ambition which he set steadily before his school is not simply that of rising above the forensic eloquence which triumphs for a day; it is that of producing work which shall be respected—he says it boldly—‘in all companies and for all time Antid. § 40..’ To be thorough; to aim at solid results—this rule, meant first for writers, was not less needed in that age for the future men of action; and in literature it had this special result, that literary skill, seeking some enduring form in which it might embody itself, was now applied with a new zeal to history. Three pupils of Isokrates are especially representative of this impulse. Androtion, in his Atthis, treated the local traditions and antiquities of Attica, and carried the history of Athens at least to 394 B.C. Ephoros wrote a History of Greece, in thirty books, from the Return of the Herakleidae to the siege of Perinthos by Philip in 341 B. C. Theopompos was the author of a supplement to Thucydides—relating, in twelve books, the events from the battle of Kynossema to the battle of Knidos (411—394 B. C.); and, in his Philippica, a work in no less than fifty-eight books, made Philip of Macedon the central figure of what seems to have been in fact a History of Civilization, arranged as a great picture of the contemporary world Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xliii. Vol. II. pp. 374—381 (for Ephoros and Theopompos), pp. 391 f. (for Androtion): Curtius, Hist. Gr. v. pp. 176 f. (Ward).. It was a benefit to an age intellectually poor in all but speculative interests to have turned literary energy towards something more substantial than the study of form. This was done by the historical school of which Isokrates became the indirect founder, and which shows, in one special manifestation, a general bent of his teaching.

These, then, are four chief things by which Summary. Isokrates is distinguished from contemporary teachers of political rhetoric;—breadth of view; nobleness of moral tone; practical thoroughness of method; encouragement of solid work.

Isokrates and the Sokratics.

The relation of Isokrates to the Sokratics is in fact rather a biographical question than one which concerns the examination of his art. His so-called ‘philosophy’ had no point of true contact with the Sokratic schools except his personal obligation to Sokrates. But, in so far as there was a real or an apparent antagonism between them, some attempt to estimate this may help to make the exact position of Isokrates clearer.

Sokrates held that it is of the essence of true philosophy to have a direct bearing on civic life. His relation to Sokrates. When Isokrates turns away from physical speculation and from all abstract study, considered as an end, he is so far SokraticCompare Antid. §§ 263—265, with Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 3 and 7.. But his master is the Xenophontic, not the Platonic Sokrates. He has taken the doctrine in too literal and too narrow a sense; he has not seen that the theoretic is the way to the best practical life. On the other hand he is versed in the maxims of just such a homely moral philosophy as Xenophon ascribes to Sokrates. Many parallelisms might be pointed out between the Memorabilia and (for instance) the Letter to Demonikos Compare Ad Dem. [Or. I] § 24 with Xen. Mem. II. vi. 6: Ad D. § 26 with Mem. III. ix. 8: Ad D. § 34 with Mem. III. ix. 14: Ad D. § 40 with Mem. I. ii. 15.. Though the ideal tendency of Isokrates distinguishes him from Xenophon almost as decidedly as his unscientific habit distinguishes him from Plato, yet, in all that they owe to their common teacher, Xenophon and Isokrates are strongly alike.

At whatever time the Phaedros was written, Supposed references of Plato to Isokrates. whether when Isokrates was really a young man, or, as Cicero thinks ( Or. § 41), when he was of maturer age, there can hardly be a question that it is no sarcastic prophecy after the eventSee Spengel, Isokr. und Platon pp. 19, 39.. When Plato wrote, he really hoped that Isokrates might choose what was in his opinion the noblest career. In the Gorgias there is a parody which need not be treated as passing the bounds of a friendly irony; Isokrates had said in his speech Against the Sophists that to be a good speaker requires ‘a manly and imaginative spirit;’ Sokrates is made to say in the Gorgias that rhetoric is the affair of ‘a manful and conjectural spirit Adv. Soph. § 17, ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς: Plat. Gorg. p. 463 ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας..’ A passage in the Euthydemos is stronger and more significant. Kriton reports to Sokrates the remarks made upon Sokrates and the philosophers by a critic who is not named, but who is described. The chief traits of this critic are, (1) that he identifies Dialectic with Eristic; (2) that he has a rhythmical and antithetical style, of which Kriton gives a specimen; (3) that he lives a life withdrawn from action; and (4) that he dwells ‘on the borderland between Philosophy and Statesmanship.’ Sokrates is not harsh to this critic; we ought not to be irritated, he says, by claims of this kind; rather ‘we ought to esteem every man who says anything holding of practical wisdom, and goes with manly perseverance through his workPlat. Euthyd. pp. 304—6. The passage is discussed by Dr Thompson ( Phaedr. Append. II, pp. 179— 182); who, with Spengel (Isokr. und Pl. pp. 36, 7), recognises the allusion to Isokrates. .’

In the discourse Against the Sophists it seems Supposed references of Isokrates to Plato. doubtful whether there is any special reference to Plato, who at that time,—about 391 B.C.,—was perhaps not yet conspicuous; but the teachers of absolute knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) for pay must at any rate be some of the minor Sokratics Adv. Soph. §§ 3, 4: Thompson (l. c.), p. 177, note 9.. In the Helenae Encomium, however (370 B.C.), the allusion to Plato is distinct. He is brought in between Antisthenes and Eukleides,—being indicated as teaching that Valour, Wisdom and Justice form the subjectmatter of one science Helen. Enc. § 1. Antisthencs and the Cynics are indicated by their paradoxes, Eukleides and the Megarics by their eristic.. In the Panathenaikos (§ 118) there is what seems a controversial reference to Plato's maxim in the Gorgias and the Republic, that it is better to be wronged than to wrong. ‘The Laws and Polities written by the Sophists’ which are slightly mentioned in the Philippos (§ 2) may possibly be meant for Plato's works; though this seems less certain. Lastly, in several passages Isokratic preference of Opinion to Knowledge—its relation to the Platonic antithesis. of Isokrates the attainment of judicious ‘opinion,’ as distinguished from ‘knowledge,’ is declared to be the end of education. It is worth while to inquire how far these remarks strictly apply to the Platonic antithesis. In the discourse Against the Sophists (§ 16) Isokrates says:—‘When people see that those who merely opine agree better and succeed oftener than those who profess to know, they naturally despise them.’ In the Helenae Encomium § 5:— ‘It is much better to form probable opinions about useful things than to have an exact knowledge of useless things.’ The Speech On the Antidosis § 271: —‘Since it is impossible for human nature to acquire any science by which we should know what to do or say, in the next resort I deem those wise who, as a rule, can hit what is best by their opinions; and I call those men philosophers who give themselves to studies by which they will soonest acquire practical wisdom.’

In no one of these passages, nor elsewhere, does Isokrates deny a possible science of absolute truth; rather he implicitly recognises it. His contention is that this knowledge, supposing it attained, is worth less than judicious, though inexact, opinion on the affairs of practical life. That ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ of which he does deny the possibility is a science of the contingencies which may arise in practical life. These cannot certainly be foreknown; the words or deeds which a future crisis may demand can never be more than matter of guesswork.

The supposed allusions of Plato to Isokrates prove nothing more than his regret—sometimes Summary— probable relations between Plato and Isokrates. expressed with sarcasm—that ability and industry should have been lost to the search for knowledge. The references of Isokrates to Plato show vanity and petulance; but no more than those on the other side do they justify the hypothesis of a serious feud. An inner friendship or harmony was impossible between the two men. But Plato seems to have regarded Isokrates with a sometimes pitying good will; and Isokrates, when not temporarily out of humour with Plato, was probably willing to visit him in the country, and to talk—as an impartial Peripatetic is said to have described—‘concerning poets“The philosopher [Plato] was a friend of Isokrates; and Praxiphanes has written a dialogue in which they are represented as conversing περὶ ποιητῶν in Plato's country-house where Isokrates was a guest:” Diog. Laert. III. 9 (quoted by Dr Thompson l. c. p. 178). I assume that Praxiphanes had pardoned to old age the designation of Aristotle's philosophy as τὴν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας (Isokr. Epist. v. § 3)—if the Dialogue On Poets had not been written before..’

Isokrates: Style
Isocrates a rhetorical artist

IT has been seen that the end which Isokrates set before himself in all his work was practical, and practical in a high way. His teaching aimed at forming good citizens, not only of Athens, but of Greece. His writings aimed at showing how literary skill might be applied to the treatment of really political subjects. But, except during those few Isokrates less an orator years of his earlier life in which he wrote for the law-courts, he had nothing to do with practical oratory. Want of nerve and of voice hindered him from coming forward in the ekklesia. With the exception of the six forensic speeches, all his extant compositions were meant to be read, not to be spoken. Considered in regard to subject-matter, he is a publicist. Considered in regard to form, he is a stylist. And his distinction as a stylist is this, that he was the first Greek who gave a really artistic than an artist in rhetorical prose. finish to literary rhetorical prose.

Rhetoric at Athens about 390 B.C.

Isokrates began the career of his choice—when the labours not of his choice were over—about 392 B.C. Rhetoric was then represented at Athens chiefly by two classes of men. First, there were the writers of speeches for the law-courts. Lysias, The writers for the lawcourts. then at the height of his fame, was the most eminent of these, and had already set before his brethren a new standard of excellence; though it is not likely that, so early as 390 B.C., the ‘plain style’ had made much way. Secondly, there were The teachers of Rhetoric. teachers of rhetoric who professed to impart a method of deliberative or forensic speaking, but who in the exercises which they wrote as models, seem to have preferred subjects of an epideictic character taken from mythology. Extant examples are the Speech of Odysseus against Palamedes, the Defence of Palamedes, the Controversy between Ajax and Odysseus for the arms of AchillesFor the Ὀδυσσεὺς κατὰ Παλαμήδους προδοσίας, see Sauppe Or. Att. II. 156; for the ὑπὲρ Παλαμήδους ἀπολογια, ib. 132: for the Αἴας— Ὀδυσσεύς, ib. 167. Tho first used to be ascribed to Alkidamas; the second to Gorgias; the third to Antisthenes. H. E. Foss in his Gorgias (pp. 81 f.; 78 f.; 94 f.) has shown each to be the work of a later writer.. It was in a half-disdainful rivalry with such efforts that Isokrates wrote his Busiris and Distinctive aim of Isokrates. his Encomium of Helen. But the real ambition of Isokrates was to raise the Art of Rhetoric above such themes as were supplied either by the law-courts or by the myths. He held that the subject-matter of Rhetoric was to be found neither in the petty concerns of to-day nor in a far-off age of heroes, but in the largest practical interests of Greek citizenship. He held, further— and here he was completing the theory of Gorgias— that not only may prose be artistic, but that the utterance of Rhetoric may be, ought to be, a work of art as complete and as substantive as the utterance of Poetry; that it has its own ascertainable laws of rhythm and of harmony; and that the artist who, having mastered these laws, addresses himself to the treatment of a great subject, has with him a power, beside and beyond the strength of his cause or of his genius—a power coming to him, as to the poet, through his art, and springing from an essential music latent in language which his art has shown him how to bring upon the ear.

Dionysios on the ‘smooth’ harmony.

It has been said in a former chapterVol. I. p. 21. that Dionysios distinguishes three principal ‘harmonies’ or modes of composition, whether in verse or in prose, —the ‘austere,’ the ‘smooth’ and the ‘middle;’ Antiphon being his oratorical representative of the ‘austere,’ Isokrates of the ‘smooth,’ Demosthenes of the ‘middle.’ The ‘smooth’ (or ‘florid’) harmony is thus described:—

‘It does not seek that each separate word should be conspicuously seen, as if set on a broad, firm pedestal; or that the pauses between the words should be long. The slow, steadfast manner is not at all to its mind. Rather it likes movement and impetus of language; it wishes word to come on word as wave rides wave, each lending buoyancy to each, like flowing waters that never are still. It requires that all the parts of the context should be taken together and find their power in their whole effect. This result is wrought by a nicety of joining which leaves no pause that can be felt between word and word. In this, the style is like a web of fine warp, or a painting of which the lights melt into the shadows. Then it wishes that all its words should be musical, smooth, delicate, as with the bloom of a fair young face. It may be said to be at feud with rough syllables and all clashing sounds; and to be wary of everything rash and venturesome.

‘Nor is it only between word and word that it seeks this apt juncture and coherence. It desires that clause should be closely knitted to clause; that every sentence should be rounded to a period; that each segment of a period should be neither shorter nor longer than the just mean; and that the whole period should be within the compass of one full breath. A sentence not periodic, a period not jointed into members, or a member not symmetrical with the rest, are thoroughly foreign to its workmanship. The rhythms which it employs are not the longest but the middle or the shorter. It wishes the last words of a period to be rhythmical and firmly set, as on a base squared by line and rule;—thus reversing, in the structure of these final clauses, its practice in the ordinary harmonies of words. Ordinarily it makes word slide into word. But it would have the closing words of a period to stand clear, and be seen, as it were, from every side. The figures which it uses are not those which have an antique air, or which are notable for majesty or impressiveness or ruggedness; but rather the luxuriant and voluptuous, in which the elements of illusion and stage-glitter are strong. To speak generally—this ‘smooth’ or ‘florid’ style is in essentials the opposite of the austereDionys. de comp. Verb. c. 23..’

This description may serve at the outset to Representatives of this style hint the broadest characteristics of Isokrates as contrasted with the elder school represented by Antiphon. The typical poets of the ‘smooth’ style, in poetry, according to Dionysios, are, in epos, Hesiod; of lyrists, Sappho, Anakreon, Simonides; among tragedians, Euripides only. When Dionysios comes to in prose. name a representive historian, he is at a loss; no one, he says, is strictly apposite; but Ephoros and Theopompos are so ‘more than most.’ This illustrates the degree in which the style of Isokrates was distinctive. The only prose-writers in the ‘smooth harmony’ whom Dionysios finds to mention are Isokrates and two pupils of Isokrates.

Diction of Isokrates

In applying more closely to Isokrates the general description just quoted, the first point to be noticed is his choice of words. His diction is tempered of two opposite elements. It is a compromise between the ‘elaborate’ diction represented by Thucydides and the ‘plain’ diction represented by Lysiasid. Demosth. c. 4.. But it is infinitely more Lysian than Thucydidean.

Of its Lysian qualities, the first is purity; an Its Purity. excellence alreadyVol. I. p. 168. explained as including two ideas —avoidance of obsolete, or novel or too poetical wordsAs exceptions, note the words οὐρανομήκης, Antid. [XV] § 134: φιλοπροσήγορος (‘courteous’—more general than εὐπροσήγορος, ‘affable’) Ad Demon. [I] § 20: τερθρεία (‘jugglery’), Helen. Enc. [X] § 4: φθόη, Aeginet. [XIX] § 11: τύρβη Antid. § 130: ἐπικήρως, Bus. [XI] § 49. ἐνδελεχέστατος , Antid. § 156: κατασκελετευθεῖσαν, Ant. § 268: διασκαριφᾶσθαι, Areop. § 12. Also the metaphorical use of εἱλωτεύειν (Pan. § 131), ἐξοκείλας, Ant. § 268 and Ep. II. § 13. (Sandys, Ad Dem. and Paneyr. pp. xi, xxxiv.Aristotle instances ἔτλησαν (Pan. § 96) and φήμη (ib. § 186) as poetical words legitimately used in a climax: Rh. III. 7.,—and correctness of idiom. In this Isokrates was the nearest rival, though not the equal, of LysiasDionys. de Isokr. c. 2: Lys. c. 2: Dem. c. 4.. Next, though the general effect of Its Simplicity. Isokrates is ornate and the general effect of Lysias is plain, yet the Lysian simplicity belongs in a certain sense to the language of Isokrates. His composition abounds in figures—to be noticed presently; but his diction generally avoids tropes id. Dem. c. 18—where Dionys. is criticising a passage from the De Pace (§§ 41—50) taken as showing Isokr. at his best—and notices the avoidance of τροπικαὶκατασκευαί as even excessive. Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδεῶν ά c. 12, Speng. Rh. G. II. 33) observes that the first condition of beauty in expression is purity; now tropes give vividness, but are against purity; hence Isokr., who thought most about beauty, made least use of tropes.; that is, it uses the individual word in the normal sense. Yet here again there is a difference. Lysias prefers common words; Isokrates, though he can distinguish occasions, has a general bent towards grandeur σεμνολογία (Dionys. Isokr. c. 20), σεμνοτὴς πομπική (ib. 2), καλλιλογία (Dem. c. 4).. There is far less of this in the six forensic speeches than elsewhere; yet even here there is somethingSpeaking of the forensic work of Isokr. generally, Dionys. remarks that here he comes near to the manner of Lysias ( Isocr. c. 18). Then examining the Trapez. [XVII] §§ 1—14 in detail, he points out that the manner is ὅλῳ τω—| γένει distinct from that of I.'s deliberative or epideictic speeches; yet that it is Isokratic still—it bears the predominant stamp of art (c. 20).—Perhaps Or. XVIII (Against Kallimachos) and XIX (Aeginetikos) are the best examples of I.'s plain manner..

Composition of Isokrates.

But choice of words was of comparatively small importance in determining the style of Isokrates, between whom and the elder ‘austere’ school the essential point of contrast was just this, that they relied much on words, while he relied almost wholly on composition. It was Isokrates who developed, though he did not originate, the idea of a literary prose-rhythm. The Greek theory distinguished a Prose-rhythm. music proper to the continuous (συνεχής) exertion of the voice in prose-declamation from the music of its exertion at intervals (διαστήματα) in singingVolkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer (1872), p. 430.. As singing can scarcely charm the ear or make claim to beauty until it has brought itself under definite laws, partly of rhythm, partly of harmony, so oratorical prose cannot give artistic pleasure until it has become, in its proper measure, rhythmical. This implies the bringing out of that musical element which is inherent in all language; and the technical Rhetoric early began to take account of the proserhythm into which this element must be wrought. Thus Aristotle Rhet. III. 8—where he observes that metre in prose is ἀπίθανον, i.e. destroys the rhetorical illusion, but rhythm desirable—simply, he thinks, as the period is—because ‘all men like to see to the end.’ Cf. Volkm. p. 447. discusses the relative merits for rhetorical prose of the dactyl—which is too epic for ordinary use—the iambus, which is too common to give any distinctive effect—the trochee, which is too light—and the paeon, which he thinks on the whole the most serviceable,—the ‘first’ paeon (¯˘˘˘) for the beginning of the period, the ‘fourth’ (˘˘˘¯) for the end. Poetry has its strict correspondence of rhythms and its precision of metres. Prose has its irregular rhythms and its wandering melody in the fall of syllables—rhythms and metres not bound by any rigid framework, yet reducible to certain general laws which the attentive ear can discover, and which the skilful speaker can apply in ever-varying combinationsDionys. Dem. cc. 49, 50. Prose is to be εὔρυθμος and εὔμετρος— not like Poetry, ἔρρυθμος and ἔμμετρος, bound. Quintilian (IX. iv. 45) distinguishes the metre (dimensio quaedam) of verse from the rhythm (numeri) of prose: and so Cic. has numerus=ῥυθμός, Or. § 67.. Now the mistake of Gorgias had consisted in trying to bring the essentially free rhythms and metres of prose too near to the strict rhythms and metres of verse. Thrasymachos of Chalkedon was probably more judiciousThe artistic use of the pacon in prose is dated by Aristotle from Thrasymachos (Rh III. 8). Cp. Curtius, Hist. Gr. v. 168 (Ward).. But Isokrates was the earliest great artist in the rhythm proper to proseFor the precept of Isokr. in his own words, see the fragment of his τέχνη in Sauppe II. 225:—ὅλως δὲ ὁ λόγος μὴ λόγος ἔστω (mere prose), ξηρὸν γάρ· μηδὲ ἔμμετρος· καταφανὲς γάρ· ἀλλὰ μεμίχθω παντὶ ῥυθμῷ, μάλιστα ἰαμβικῷ ἢ τροχαικῷ. Aristotle would have considered this recommendation of the iambus or trochee as retrograde—Thrasymachos having brought in the paeon. In Adv. Soph. (XIII) § 16 Isokr. speaks of the study needed in order εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν.,—so distinctly so, that Cicero more than once calls him its discoverer‘Isokr. was the first to see that in prose too a certain measure and rhythm (modum et numerum) must be observed’: Brut. § 32. In Orat. § 175 he quotes Thrasymachos himself to the same effect.. Great artist as he was, however, he was only a developer, not a perfecter; and the chief reason why he fell short of the highest excellence seems to have been this, that he sought too constantly to base his rhythms on a certain type of composite period.

The Periodic style

With AntiphonVol. I. p. 34., as we saw, the structure of a period was still a matter of effort—admitting, too, of little variety: in Lysias ib. p. 166. the power of forming terse, compact periods is nearly perfect, and is combined with skill in avoiding monotony; with how developed by Isokrates. Isokrates, the periodic style passes into an altogether new phase. The distinctive mark of the new Isokratic period is a certain luxuriant amplitude. Instead of aiming at the vigorous compression fittest for real contests, it rejoices in rich diffuseness—it unrolls itself like a clear river, luring the hearer on from bend to bend through the soft beauties of its winding courseThis is the image used by Dionysios (Dem. c. 4) to describe the ὑπαγωγικὴ περίοδος, the meandering period, of Isokrates. Cf. de Isocr. c. 12, τὸ κύκλιον τῶν περιόδων.. Three kinds of period are distinguished by Demetrios: the Rhetorical, terse and round;—the Conversational, slack and simple;—the Historical, intermediate between these twoDemetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 19. (Speng. Rh. Gr. III. 265.) He illustratcs the Rhetorical Period by the opening of Dem. adv. Lept.; the Conversational, by the opening of Plat. Rep.; the Historical, by the opening of Xen. Anab. . Lysias, as has been noticed, uses what may be called a ‘historical’ period in one special part of his work—in narrative parts of his public speeches. Isokrates, as a rule, uses everywhere the historical rather than the rhetorical period Dionys. Dem. c. 18 notices the period of Isokr. as being rather ‘like that of the historians’ than ἐναγώνιος fit for real contests.—giving to it, however, a certain long and stately flow which is his own. The great fault of his management is monotony. Lysias knew at least how to brace or relax his framework; Demosthenes was a master of structural contrasts; but, in all the speeches of Isokrates, except the forensic, one long and finished period follows another with little variety or relief. He must always round his sentenceDionys. de comp. Verb. c. 19 observes that the best style is sometimes more, sometimes less, periodic: but that Isokr. did not understand such variety: cf. his κρίσις τῶν ἀρχαίων, c. 5. This wholly periodic style (with no alloy of εἰρομένη) is essentially epideiktic: cp. Cic. Or. § 207, Volkmann, p. 435.. Not only the form but the matter often suffers for this artificial uniformity. A thought has sometimes to be diffusely, and therefore weakly, expressed, in order to afford a symmetry of clausesThe invariable desire for a period and a rhythm drives Isokr. to use παραπληρώματα λέξεων, padding, as Dionys. says (de Isocr. c. 3). The critic illustrates this minutely in his analysis of De Pace § 42 ( Dem. c. 19). ‘These drooping folds might have been pinned up more neatly’—ταῦτα κεκολπωμένα σφίγξαι μᾶλλον ἐνῆν.. But although there is this grave fault in his handling of the periodic style, it must not be forgotten that Isokrates gave a really important development to the idea of the period itself. Hitherto it had been too cramped: he was the first to give it a large and free expansion. He was the first, too, who showed how the ampler period might be worked up through the series of clauses and members to an artistic climaxCp. Müller, Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxxvi. (Donalds. II. 154—5.).

His use of Figures.

Next to this general characteristic, luxuriance, the special marks of the periodic style in Isokrates depend on his use of figures. In order to see just what Isokrates does here, it will be a help to keep in mind the strict distinction between a ‘trope’ and ‘Trope’ and ‘Figure.’ a ‘figure’ (whether of language or of thought). A trope is the use of a particular word in other than its normal sense—as ‘fire’ for ‘zeal’ (metaphor) or ‘steel’ for ‘sword’ (synekdochê)—to take two of the commonest tropes. A ‘figure’ is an affair of whole clauses or sentencesSee Volkmann, Die Rhet. der Gr. und Römer, pp. 392 f. Cp. Quint. IX. 1 § 4.. The ‘figure of language’ is a combination of words (each of which may be used in its normal sense) for the artificial expression of an idea—as antithesis. The ‘figure of thought’ depends on no special combination of words, but on an assumed attitude of the speaker's mind—as irony. Now Isokrates rarely uses ‘tropes’ —indeed, his avoidance of them was expressly noticed as a cause of tameness in his dictionDionys. Dem. c. 18: Hermog. περὶ ἰδ. ά, c. 12 (referred to above).; nor— with one exception to be noted presently—does he often use ‘figures of thought.’ But he uses abundantly certain ‘figures of language.’ It was Gorgias who first brought a throng of the ‘figures of Figures of Language. language’ into Greek RhetoricDionys. Thuc. c. 24. Quintilian (IX. 3 § 2) subdivides the ‘figures of language’ as (1) grammatical— mere peculiarities of pathology or syntax, with no rhetorical purpose —e.g. the schema Pindaricum: (2) rhetorical—where a certain effect is meant to be wrought by the combination. Volkmann (who refers the distinction between σχήματα λέξεως and διανοίας not to Caecilius of Calacte, but back to Theophrastos, p. 392) analyses both kinds in detail, pp. 396—430.. In so far as Isokrates saw more clearly than Gorgias where the line falls between prose-rhythm and verse-rhythm, Isokrates moderated the Gorgian use of these figures. On the other hand he established some of them as the distinctive ornaments of the ‘florid’ Rhetoric by developing them artistically within certain limits. The specially Isokratic figures of language are those which depend on a parallelism. These are chiefly threeCp. Sandys Ad Dem. and Panegyr. p. xiv.. (1) A parallelism in sense—Antithesis: which may arise either (i) from two words of opposite sense used in the expression of a single idea—‘let the rich give to the poor:’ or (ii) from the contrast of two ideas without contrast of words: ‘he did them good, but they took away his good name;’ or (iii) from the contrast both of ideas and of words—‘he did them good but they did him evil.’ (2) A parallelism in form and size merely between two or more clauses or sentences—Parisôsis. (3) A parallelism of sound—Paromoiôsis: when the latter of two clauses gives to the ear an echo of the former, either in its opening or at its close or throughoutHermogenes has an excellent remark (περὶ ἰδ. ά c. 12, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 331) on the use of these two last figures— παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις—by Isokr. and Demosthenes respectively. Demosth. has rarely a direct and absolute symmetry or consonance of clauses— Hermog. says he remembers only one instance, In Androt. § 1. Elsewhere Demosth. disguises the παρίσωσις either by ‘cutting it in two’ —inserting a clause ( ἐπεμβολή) between the two balanced clauses— or by taking care that the clauses equal in length shall not be symmetrical in structure: while he avoids the direct παρομοίωσις by shifting one of the two words which would have jingled..

The idea of all these three ‘figures’ is the same— that idea of mechanical balance in which the craving for symmetry is apt to take refuge when it is not guided by a really flexible instinct or by a spiritual sense of fitness and measure. No one can read Isokrates without feeling with what a leaden weight this elaborately wrought ornament lies on much of his work, often chilling the thought and almost crushing out its lifeGellius (N. A. XVIII. 8) quotes some lines from Lucilius in which the satirist ridicules those ‘tasteless persons’ (apirocali) who wish to seem Isokratic, and who accordingly overload their sentences with ὁμοιοτέλευτα, πάρισα and the like. Dionysios, greatly as he admires Isokr., repeatedly blanies his ‘puerile’ or ‘vulgar’ use of the Gorgian figures. He instances Panegyr. §§ 71—81 (De Isocr. c. 14): Trapez. §§ 9, 11 (especially—ib. c. 20): De Pace, §§ 41—50 ( Dem. c. 20). Nothing, he says, more ‘paralyses his force,’ nothing more averts the ear, than these frigid figures.. But a distinction must be noticed between his earlier and his later manner. The Earlier and later manner of Isokrates. practical life of Athens had a gradual reflex action on that Sicilian Rhetoric which had been drawn into its sphere; and this was felt even by IsokratesThis is well marked in two passages: (1) Philip. (v) § 27,—346 B.C.; (2) Panath. § 2,—342 B.C.— where he says that he has quite given up attempting ‘antitheses and parisôses and those other figures which compel applause.’ Quintilian expressly recognises the two phases: IX. 3 § 74. Cp. Rauchenstein Introd. p. 12.. In the Philippos and still more plainly in the Panathenaikos he intimates that he had outlived much Figures of Thought. of his early taste for the ‘figures of language.’ As for those vivid reflections of the speaker's own mood which are called the ‘figures of thought,’ they belonged, generally, to a later and more animated schoolSee above, Vol. I. p. 99: cp. Volkmann, pp. 416 f. The great master of the ‘figures of thought’ was Demosthenes: Cic. Orat. § 136.; the large use of them by Andokides being precisely one of those points which show how little his natural faculty had been tamed to the technical Rhetoric of his day. Least of all were the figures of thought congenial to the smooth and tranquil manner of Isokrates. There is perhaps but one exception; he is fond of the rhetorical question in concluding an argumentFor examples of this ἐρώτησις, see Panegyr. (iv) §§ 121, 183: De Pace (viii) §§ 11, 100, 105, 113: Panath. (xii) §§ 121 f. Volkmann (p. 424) notices an instance of the figure called ἀντίφρασις or παράλειψις—when the speaker says that he will not mention a thing, but does—joined with hyperbole, in De Pace §§ 56, 81..

Avoidance of hiatus.

Before we leave the technical traits of his composition, one striking trait remains to be noticed as the special cause of his ‘smoothness.’ This is the studious, the even pedantic care with which he avoids allowing a vowel at the end of a word to be followed by a vowel at the beginning of the nextFor his own precept, see the frag. of his τέχνη (Sauppe II. 225)— ‘vowels must not come together’ (δεῖ τὰ φωνήεντα μὴ συμπίπτειν), ‘for the effect is lame,’ χωλὸν γὰρ τὸ τοιόνδε. Benseler, in his work De Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Graecis, has applied this test to the whole extant text of Isokrates (Bk. I. Ch. 1).. Dionysios says that he had gone through the whole of the Areopagitikos without finding one instance of such a collision De Comp. Verb. c. 23 (where he analyses §§ 1—5). Benseler examines this statement (pp. 7—9). Among the more striking instances of hiatus in our text of the Areopagitikos are ὑμᾶς γε ᾤοντο, § 57: —ὥστε οὔτε, § 80.. The artificialism soon makes itself felt; and, as one critic justly says, a possible music of clashing sounds is lostDemetrios περὶ ἑρμηνειας § 68: who adds, in § 72, that such clashing, σύγκρουσις, suits the μεγαλοπρεπὴς χαρακτήρ. Dionysios (Dem. c. 4), Quintilian (IX. 4 § 35) and Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδ. ά c. 12) agree with Demetrios in thinking the solicitude of Isokrates in this matter excessive: while Plutarch, with a somewhat frigid sarcasm, asks how Isokrates, ὁ φοβούμενος φωνῆεν φωνήεντι συγκροῦσαι—could help shrinking from the Macedonian phalanx? (Deglor. Athen. c. 8, Mor. p. 350 E.) On the other hand, Longinus praises him for avoiding harsh collocations ‘which make the texture of the speech rougher and do not slide into the ear, but offend it, while they also arrest the speaker's breath’ (Rhet. § 9, p. 560 in Speng. Rh. Gr. I. 306).. In this, as in greater things, Demosthenes knew how to hit the meanSee Schäfer, Demosth. Vol. III. p. 317 note 2..

Treatment of Subject-matter.

Passing from the province of Expression to the treatment of matter with its two departments of Invention and Arrangement, we find that here also Isokrates has his distinctive merits. As regards Invention—the art of discovering the available Invention. resources of a theme—Dionysios pronounces Isokrates equal to Lysias De Isocr. c. 4.; Quintilian praises not merely his facility but his effort to bring out the higher aspects of his subjectX. 1 § 79, in inventione facilis, honesti studiosus. . In analysing the epideictic branch of Rhetoric, Aristotle notices one device as specially frequent in Isokrates—the use of the topic of comparison for the purpose of magnifying or extollingArist Rh. I. 9. ‘If one has no positive merits to urge, one should give the man relative merit by comparing him with others—as Isokrates used to do, owing to his familiarity with suit-pleading’ (διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν—where Spengel's ἀσυνήθειαν is surely made improbable by the general sense, by the testimony of Dionys. Isocr. 18, and by the contemptuous word δικολογεῖν). (αὔξησις). The Philippos will supply an instance;— in order to show that Philip of Macedon could easily conquer Asia, Isokrates points out that harder things were done with smaller means by Alkibiades, Konon, Dionysios and the younger Cyrus Philip. [v] §§ 58—67.. The author of the Essay on Sublimity blames Isokrates— and rightly—for a too constant and ostentatious effort to heighten rhetorically the greatness of his theme περὶ ὕψους in Speng. Rh. Gr. I. p. 287.. This effort is akin to the essentially epideictic spirit of all his work, the spirit which is always tending to transform advice, as in the Panegyrikos and Philippos, or apology, as in the Antidosis and De Bigis, into encomiumSee Dionys. Rhet. c. 9 § 12: Volkmann p 83..

In Arrangement Isokrates is very clever. He is Arrangement. generally said to have invented the fourfold division of the speech—used, however, before him by Lysias—with proem, narrative, proof, epilogueVol. I. p. 180 note.; but his distinctive skill lay in the management of a more complex system. According to Dionysios, the arrangement of Isokrates excels that of Lysias in two main points—in fineness of subdivision and in variety,—this variety arising either from new combinations within the subject itself or from the introduction of episodes not strictly proper to it De Isocr. c. 4 ἰδίαις μεταβολαῖς —ξένοις ἐπεισοδίοις.Arist. Rh. III. 14. The keynote (ἐνδόσιμον) of the Helenae Encomium is, of course, Helen. But Isokr. preludes with an attack on the Eristics (§§ 1—131).. The use of the latter is illustrated by a remark of Aristotle in regard to the opening of an epideictic speech. Here, he suggests, the speaker may take a hint from the flute-player. The flute-player preludes with anything that he can play effectively, and then knits this on to the keynote of his theme. So it is, says Aristotle, in the proem to the ‘Helen’ of Isokrates; the Eristics have nothing to do with Helen. ‘And here, even if the speaker pass into a foreign region (ἐκτοπίσῃ), it is better than that the speech should be monotonous.’ The ‘episode’ on Agamemnon in the Panathenaikos (§§ 74—87) is a good instance.

One uniform type of structure may be recognised in all the best discourses of Isokrates. There is a leading idea—generally some large proposition about the affairs of Athens or of Greece—which is worked out on the principle of antithesis. Every contrast which it can yield is developed: but through all divisions and subdivisions the dominant idea is kept before the mind; and, at the close, the simplicity of the original proposition emerges from these intricate, yet never confused, antitheses in the simplicity of the conclusion. Take, for instance, the Panegyrikos. The leading idea is—A Greek war with Persia. ‘Greece’ is dealt with in Part I., ‘Persia’ in Part II. In Part I. Athens is contrasted with Sparta; the services of Athens to Greece are analysed as (1) civil, (2) military—and here, as in wars between Greeks or in wars between Greek and barbarian. Part II. shows that (1) Persia is open to attack while (2) Greece has every motive for attacking. Then the conclusion:—A Greek war with Persia is both just and expedient. It is this power of dealing luminously with a large array of facts grouped round a central idea which Hermogenes praises as the ‘distinctness’ of Isokrates εὐκρίνεια· περὶ ἰδεῶν ά c. 4, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 283.. Like his moral bent towards subjects of practical moment and towards permanence of literary result, this faculty of arrangement set an example useful beyond the sphere of Rhetoric. It helped to show the historian how large masses of material might be wrought into a form at once clear and interesting Curtius Hist. Gr. v. p. 175 (Ward)..

Isokrates compared with the Practical Orator.

But the merits of Isokrates whether on the verbal or the real side are not those which are best fitted to succeed in a law-court or in an assembly. It is true that, as Hermogenes περὶ ἰδ. β’ c. 11, Sp. II. 412. says, he has in a very high degree that purity of diction and that distinctness of method which are at least two virtues of civil eloquence: it is true that, as Dionysios De Isocr. c. 4—where πολιτικὴ δύναμις denotes the complete faculty of being a citizen as distinguished from the power of civil rhetoric. says, lessons may be learned from him in everything that goes to form the complete ‘faculty of citizenship.’ Yet his practical rhetoric is not oratory. It is for the palaestra, not for the battle-fieldQuint. X. 1 § 79.. It has not the stamp of vigorous nature. The great speaker in real contests holds his own argument, and can seize that of his adversary, with an iron grasp; he is impassioned and can kindle passion, he can animate the embodiment of his thought with a living soul which seems to come to it, through him, from a present and inspiring power; the artist of the school—and it is as such that Isokrates most often appears—suffers neither keenness of controversy, nor feeling, nor even what perhaps is most divine in the idea which he is enforcing, to agitate him as he marshals the slow and stately pageant of an eloquence which moves with always the same cold brilliancy. One who had tried the experiment of declaiming the discourses of Isokrates says that he had found that they would not bear delivery with raised tones, or passion, or gesture: Isokrates, he says, has dropped his voice to the key in which a slave reads aloud to his master ἀναγνώστου παιδὸς φωνήν, Hierônymos ap. Dionys. Isocr. c. 13.In Phil. [V] § 26 he complains of one who reads him μηδὲν ἦθος ἐνσημαινόμενος: in Panath. [XII] § 17 of those who read him διαιροῦντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ.. The disappointed reciter is too severe; but that such compositions should be better suited for reading than for declaiming is natural; and it is worthy of notice that when Isokrates himself complains of his speeches being marred by bad reading, the two points of which he deprecates the neglect are both consistent with a subdued manner—namely, attention to the êthos (general moral tone)—and attention to the cadences of the rhythm. Dionysios has been at pains to contrast a passage of the De Pace (§§ 41—50) with a passage of the Third Olynthiac (§§ 23—32)—the contrast coming to this, that the former is a display of graces and the latter a stirring summons to actionDionys. Dem. cc. 17—22.. But the fact is that it is unmeaning to compare Isokrates and Demosthenes at all. While practical oratory was parting more and more distinctly into two branches—the pure Deliberative, best represented probably by Kallistratos, the Forensic, by Isaeos, branches of which the excellences were for once to meet in Demosthenes—Isokrates was occupied apart from both in His real province. developing a literary rhetoric, important, certainly, in its influence on the practical oratory of a later day, but of contemporary significance in the way Influence of his work on contemporaries. of style chiefly for that Rhetorical school of history in which Ephoros and Theopompos are the earliest great names. Chiefly—yet not solely. In so far as merely literary lessons have to be learned by a great speaker, Demosthenes learned much from Isokrates: but the spirit of Demosthenes was not to be bound to any rigid outward law of euphonyCp. Curtius, Hist. Gr. v. p. 228 (Ward).. In the epideictic kind we can see from the Funeral Oration of Hypereides just the two points of contact between Hypereides and Isokrates—the large freedom of development, and the tone, sincere in all its rhetorical elevation, of a moralist speaking the language of panegyricThe Isokratic elementin Hypereides is well estimated by Cartelier (Le Discours d'I. sur lui-même p. lxxviii)—who observes that the younger contemporaries of Isokr., generally, must have owed to him in no small degree their greater abundance of development and richness of phrase (p. lxxvi).. But the best representative of Isokrates in his influence on the Its later influence. Cicero. development of oratory is Cicero. Cicero was intellectually stronger than Isokrates; he had the power for real contests—living force and passion; and the greater width of his mental horizon was not due simply to the age in which he lived. But as a stylist he is inferior to Isokrates. The idea which Cicero got from Isokrates was that of numberSee especially De Orat. III. 44, § 173. The sweetness which he elsewhere praises (De Orat. III. 8, § 28) as distinguishing this ‘father of eloquence’ (ib. II. 3, § 10) means chiefly that same smooth, harmonious rhythm. So Quint. X. 1 § 108 says that Cicero had ‘artistically reproduced (effinxisse) the force of Demosthenes, the wealth of Plato, the charm of Isokrates.’. To this Cicero added special Isokratic graces with more than the richness but with less than the elegance of the Greek master. Seldom, perhaps, has an unconscious criticism on self told the truth more neatly than does the phrase of Cicero when he speaks of having used ‘all the fragrant essences of Isokrates and all the little stores of his disciples Ad Att. II. 1, totum Isocratis μυροθήκιον atque omnes eius discipulorum arculas. .’ The brilliancy of Isokrates had come to Cicero through the school of RhodesIn concluding this review of Isokr. under the technical aspects of his style, it may be worth while to quote, for those who care to look at it, the criticism of Hermogenes (περὶ ἰδ. β/ c. 11, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 412)—a masterpiece (as usual with him) of compression, in which almost every word is pregnant—or rather overloaded—with technical meaning. I have tried to make this version do the work of a glossary:—‘As regards purity of language and perspicuity of arrangement— those characteristics which make a speech luminous—Isokrates is the greatest master of civil eloquence; but want of moral charm and of a natural simplicity lessen his power of persuading. In finish however, and in ornament, he excels; nor is he less distinguished by elevation, save that his vehemence and his asperity—if indeed he can be said ever to employ these—are deprived of nervous force by his elegance. In words he is not very diffuse; but in developing a thought he amplifies to the uttermost. Of fiery earnestness he has not a trace. Further —though the criticism may seem harsh—he is characterised by a certain languor and slackness, as well as by a pervading elderly sententiousness. Just because he is naturally poor in spontaneous impulse he is over-industrious in artifice, as if bent on the display of ingenuity— often for no practical purpose. This may be seen from cases of contrast between the treatment of an argument by Isokrates and by Demosthenes. Compare (e. g.) the opening of the Fourth Speech Against Philip’ [our First Philippic] ‘with the opening of the Archidamos. The proposition is the same in both places—viz. that young men ought to be heard even though they rise before their elders—but Isokrates has made it a distinct thesis, and has demonstrated it at full length; while Demosthenes has been content to support it by a single observation. At the same time the power of exposition possessed by Isokrates is by no means slight.’.

Influence of Isokrates on the Greek Language.

It was inevitable that when such a manner as that of Isokrates was developed and became widely popular it should have a certain reflex action on the language; and the nature of this action was determined by the fact that Isokrates had the Greek impulses in art without the sureness or fineness of the best Greek instinct. The invariable desire of rounding periods led to periphrasis, the craving for antitheses to a bold use of synonyms. Hence came a certain loss of that strict yet always graceful precision which had marked the best Attic, when the accurate expression of a clearly defined thought was the first thing, and the light which played over the words came through the eyes of the thought. That language which had been as a perfect human body to a vivid soul began in these later days to be more like a dress fitting loosely to a form still fair and stately; a dress which Oriental taste gradually changed into a flowing robe, with always ampler folds and heavier embroideries as there was less and less of natural vigour or comeliness beneath.

Yet, if Isokrates does not give the intimate Attic charm, it must not be forgotten that a Greek could still distinguish him from Lysias by saying that Lysias was to Kalamis and Kallimachos what Isokrates was to Praxiteles and PheidiasDionys Isocr. c. 3.: his beauty and his majesty are genuinely Greek; and, until the sense of these is wholly lost, Isokrates must always take rank as one of the great masters of expression. The growing divergence of the modern ideal from his has already, perhaps, narrowed the modern faculty of appreciating him; but most readers can still admire his power of feeling, and of honouring, what is admirable. A French scholar has observed that, in Modern analogue for his oratory— that of the pulpit. regard to expression, the grave oratory of the preacher alone preserves for the modern world an image of that in which Isokrates excelled; and has at the same time rendered to Isokrates a tribute as high, perhaps, as the modern world could offer, in bringing proof that Isokrates had some share in forming whatever owed its virtue to form in the eloquence of BossuetCartelier, Le Discours d'I. sur lui-même p. lxxxvi. Plato, Demosthenes and Isokrates are the three Greeks to whom Bossuet acknowledges a debt in the matter of style..

Three representative passages

Isokrates cannot be represented by extracts; the structure and the total effect are especially important for him just because he is specially an artist. But three passages may be taken as showing the bent rather than the compass of his art,—the contrast, in the Areopagitikos, between the social lives of the old and of the new democracy; the eulogy, in the Panegyrikos, of the first Athenian empire; and the passage on beauty in the Helen.

Areop. [VII] §§ 51—54.

In the Areopagitikos he is contrasting the social Athens of 500 B.C. with that of 355 B.C.:—

‘Under the supervision of that Council, the city was not distracted with law-suits and grievances and taxes and penury and wars; people lived on good terms with their neighbours and peaceably with all men. Athenians were the trust of Greece and the terror of barbarians; they had saved their country, and had so punished the enemy that he was glad enough to be let alone. And so, thanks to this, they lived in such security that the houses and establishments in the country were handsomer and richer than those within the wall,—many citizens never coming to town even for the festivals, but preferring their own snug homes to a share in the bounty of the State. The public spectacles, for which they might have come, were managed sensibly, and not with an insolent profusion. People did not measure happiness by shows, or by rivalries in the equipment of a chorus, or by the like forms of pretentiousness, but by soberness of life, by everyday comfort, by the absence of destitution among citizens. These are the tests of a real prosperity as distinguished from a policy of low makeshifts. Is there any sane man who can help being stung by what goes on nowa-days — when he sees numbers of citizens actually drawing lots for daily bread before the lawcourts, yet condescending to feed any Greeks who will row their ships for them,—coming on the stage in golden apparel, and passing the winter in garments of which the less said the better—with the rest of those economical contrasts which redound to the infamy of Athens?’

Panegyr. [IV] §§ 103— 106.

In the Panegyrikos the first Athenian empire is used as an argument for making Athens equal leader with Sparta in a war against Asia. An implied contrast with the Spartan influence from 405 to 380 B.C. runs through the whole:—

‘All, I think, would expect that State to be the best president of Greece under whose former rule those who accepted it were, as a fact, happiest. Now it will be found that under our leadership private households throve best and cities, too, became greatest. We were not jealous of the growing States; we did not sow the seeds of strife by setting up in them a government adverse to their own, in order that they might be divided by faction and that both factions might pay court to us; rather, holding the concord of our allies to be a common good, we governed all the cities by the same laws, debating their affairs in the federal spirit, not in a spirit of absolutism; watching over the interests of the whole league, but leaving every member of it free,—helping the commons and warring against despotisms,—thinking it a shame that the many should be under the few, that men worse than their fellows in nothing but fortune should be scouted for office, aye, and that, when Greece is the mother of us all, some Greeks should be tyrants while others are barely residents on sufferance, and that a franchise bestowed by nature should be cancelled by law. Finding these vices, and more than these, in Oligarchy, we gave to our allies the same form of government under which we lived ourselves—one which I see no need to praise at much length when it can be described so shortly. Under that government the allies lived for seventy years unvexed by tyrants, independent of barbarians, at unity among themselves, at peace with all the world.’

Helen. Encom. [XI] §§ 54—58.

In the Helen it is interesting to mark both the likeness and the deep unlikeness to a Platonic strain:—

‘They had reason for their choice, and I for the greatness of these praises; for she was gifted above all others with Beauty, the first of all things in majesty and honour and divineness. It is easy to see its power; there are many things which have no share of Courage, or Wisdom, or Justice which yet will be found honoured above things which have each of these; but nothing which is devoid of Beauty is prized; all things are scorned which have not been given their part of that attribute; the admiration for Virtue itself comes to this, that of all manifestations of life Virtue is the most beautiful. The supremacy of Beauty over all other things can be seen from our own dispositions towards it and them. Other things we seek merely to attain, as we may have need of them; we have no further affection of the mind about them; but beautiful things inspire us with love—love, which is as much stronger than wish as its object is better. We are jealous of those who excel in ability or anything else, unless they conciliate us by daily benefits and constrain us to feel kindly towards them: but the beautiful inspire us with goodwill at first sight; to them alone, as to the gods, we are never tired of doing homage, delighting to be their slaves rather than to be rulers of others, and feeling more gratitude to those of them who set us many tasks than to those who lay no commands upon us. We reproach the subjects of any other despotism with the name of flatterers; but we see only a clear-eyed and noble zeal in the lieges of Beauty. Care for that gift is to us so perfectly a religion that we hold the profaners of it in themselves more dishonoured than sinners against others, but honour for all time, and as benefactors to the State, those who have guarded the glory of their own youth in the chasteness of an inviolable shrine.’

Isokrates: Classification of Works; Scholastic Writings
The state of the text

TWENTY-ONE Speeches or Discourses, and nine Letters, are extant under the name of Isokrates. All these are probably genuineAs to the questions raised in the cases of Or. XVII, XVIII, XXI, see below.. Nor is any lost work, except the ‘Art of Rhetoric,’ known from a definite citationThese, indeed, have been supposed to be lost:—(1) An ἐπιτάφιος Γρύλλου [Gryllos, Xenophon's son] was written, according to Hermippos ap. Diog. L. II. 55, by Isokrates; but this probably refers to Isokrates of Apollonia: see Sauppe O. A. II. 227. The same explanation applies to the case of (2) a Μαυσώλου ἐγκώμιον ascribed to our Isokrates in the Plutarchic Life, which Jerome Wolf follows (p. 684, ed. of 1570). Suidas expressly ascribes this ἐγκώμιον to the Apolloniate. (3) From Arist. Rh. II. 19 it has been quite needlessly assumed—as by Benseler de Hiatu p. 56—that there was a λόγος πρὸς Εὔθυνον distinct from the extant πρὸς Εὐθύνουν [Or. XXI]. But see Sauppe O. A. II. 227. (4) From the Philippos [Or. IV] § 81, Wolf, l. c., assumes a lost ‘oratio ad Dionysium.’ But the allusion—even if it does not refer to the first of the extant epistles—evidently does not warrant any definite inference. As regards the ‘Art of Rhetoric,’ see below.. Suidas speaks of thirty-two discoursesS.V. Ἰσοκράτης.. In the Plutarchic Life, the number given is sixty,—of which only twenty-eight were allowed as genuine by Caecilius and only twenty-five by Dionysios[Plut.] vit. Isocr. § 20.. Photios knew only twenty-onePhot. cod. 159, οὕτω μὲν καὶ τοσούτους ἔγνωμεν Ἰσοκράτους λόγους, ἕνα καὶ εἴκοσιν ὄντας. In 260,— φέρονται δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ξ/ (60), &c.—The statement is simply a transcription from the Plutarchic Life. Dionysios, the strictest, may be taken as also the best canon. If it may be assumed that his collection included ours, we have all but four of those compositions which he thought genuine.

The text of our collection is tolerably perfect. Text. The only gaps of any importance are at the end of Oration XIII (Against the Sophists); at the beginning of Oration XVI (‘De Bigis’); and probably at the end of Letters I, VI and IXIn the case of each of the three Letters, another explanation is possible—that they are merely prefaces, προπεμπτικά, to essays or pamphlets sent along with them or after them..

Jerome Wolf's classification.

The writings of Isokrates are arranged differently in different MSS.A table showing the arrangement in the Urbino MS, and in six other manuscripts, is given by Baiter and Sauppe Or. Att. Vol. I, preface to the Text of Isokrates, p. iv. The order followed in most modern editions is not that of any one manuscript, but that which was adopted, for the sake of convenience, by Jerome WolfFor Wolf's own account of this classification, see p. 684 of his edition of 1570.. His arrangement aims at a fourfold distribution:— Hortatory. I. To Demonikos. II. To Nikokles. III. Nikokles. Deliberative. IV. Panegyrikos. V. Philippos. VI. Archidamos. VII. Areopagitikos. VIII. On the Peace. Epideictic. IX. Evagoras. X. Encomium of Helen. XI. Busiris. XII. Panathenaikos. XIII. Against the Sophists. Forensic. XIV. PlataikosThe Plataikos is an appeal to the Athenian ekklesia. Wolf gives its forensic vehemence of tone as his reason—a strange reason—for classing it as forensic.. XV. Antidosis. XVI. Against Alkibiades (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους ). XVII. Trapezitikos. XVIII. Against Kallimachos. XIX. Aeginetikos. XX. Against Lochites. XXI. Against Euthynus

With this elassification according to form, it is worth while to compare that of Photios (cod. 159): — I. συμβουλευτικοί: To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles, On the Peace, Panegyrikos, Areopagitikos, Plataikos, Archidamos, Philippos. II. ἐγκώμια: Busiris, Helen, Evagoras, Panathenaikos. III. δικανικοί: Antidosis (δικανικός τις εἶναι δοκεῖ), and then the real Forensic Speeches, omitting, no doubt by an oversight, the περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους,—which is wanted to make up the 21. The κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν is characterized merely as κατηγορία τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων αὐτῷ σοφιστῶν.

A stricter classification according to form would be:— I. Deliberative: Philippos, Archidamos, Plataikos, Areopagitikos, On the Peace: II. Forensic: Or. XVI—XXI: III. Epideictic: Evagoras, Panegyrikos, Panathenaikos, Busiris, Helen, Against the Sophists, Antidosis: IV. Hortatory: To Demonikos, To Nikokles, Nikokles.

.

The principle of this classification seems hardly Objections to it. the best. ‘Deliberative’ has to be strained in various directions in order to include the Panegyrikos, the Philippos, the Areopagitikos. ‘Epideictic’ applies ill to the essay Against the Sophists. The Antidosis, though thrown for literary purposes into the form of a defence in court, cannot properly be called ‘forensic.’

Another classification.

Setting the six real Forensic Speeches apart, the other writings of Isokrates ought to be classified, not according to accident of form, but by subject-matter. They may be considered as I. Scholastic, II. Political. The whole list will then stand thus:— A. SCHOLASTIC WRITINGS. I. Hortatory Letters or Essays. To Demonikos. [Or. I.] To Nikokles. [Or. II.] Nikokles. [Or. III.] II. Displays. Busiris. [Or. XI.] Encomium on Helen. [Or. X.] Evagoras. [Or. IX.] Panathenaikos. [Or. XII.] III. Essays on Education. Against the Sophists. [Or. XIII.] Antidosis. [Or. XV.] B. POLITICAL WRITINGS. I. On the relations of Greece with Persia. Panegyrikos. [Or. IV.] Philippos. [Or. V.] II. On the internal affairs of Greece. Plataikos. [Or. XIV.] On the Peace. [Or. VIII.] Archidamos. [Or. VI.] Areopagitikos. [Or. VII.]Benseler (German Translation of Isokrates, vol. I, Life p. 16) thus arranges the speeches aceording to subject-matter: — I. Relating to War with Persia: Panegyrikos, Philippos. II. Relating to internal feuds of Greece: Plataikos, Archidamos, On the Peace. III. Concerning Athens and her Constitution: Areopagitikos, Panathenaikos. IV. Cyprian Discourses: Evagoras, To Nikokles, Nikokles, To Demonikos. V. Writings against the Sophists: Against the Sophists, Busiris, Helen. VI. An Apology for his Life: Antidosis. VII. Forensic Speeches soon after the time of the Thirty. Against Kallimachos, Against Lochites, Against Enthynus. VIII. Three other Forensic Speeches:— Aeginetikos, On the Yoke of Horses, Trapezitikos. C. FORENSIC SPEECHES. I. Action for Assault (δίκη αἰκίας). Against Lochites. [Or. XX.] II. Claim to an Inheritance (ἐπιδικασία). Aeginetikos. [Or. XIX.] III. Action to recover a Deposit (δίκη παρακαταθήκης). Against Euthynus. [Or. XXI.] Trapezitikos. [Or. XVII.] IV. Action for Damage (δίκη βλάβης). On the Yoke of Horses. [Or. XVI.] V. Special Plea (παραγραφή). Against Kallimachos. [Or. XVIII.] D. LETTERS.—FRAGMENTS.

Scholastic works I. Hortatory letters or essays.
I. 1. To Demonikos

1. To Demonikos [Or. I.]—The person to whom this Letter of Advice is addressed is known only from the Letter itself. Demonikos lived in a monarchical State (§ 36), which may have been CyprusThe author of the Greek argument says:—Ἱππόνικός τις, ὡς ἔχει ὁ πολὺς λόγος, Κύπριος μὲν ἦν τῷ γένει, Ἰσοκράτους δὲ φίλος τοῦ σοφιστοῦ. The λόγος was founded probably on the fact that three other treatises of Isokrates were connected with Cyprus.. He was still a youth (§ 44); rich, and of distinguished (§ 49), though not of royal (§ 36), birthReferring to § 36, Mr Sandys (Ad. Dem. and Panegyr. p. xxxi) observes that it disproves the statement of Tzeztes that Demonikos was son of Evagoras king of Cypins; and the statement of Porphyrogenitus that Demonikos himself ruled the island.. His father, Hipponikos, lately dead (§ 2), must have been in some way a well-known man (§ 11).

The date at which the Letter was written cannot Date. be determined; but it may be assigned conjecturally to about the same time as the two other Hortatory Discourses—the Letter to Nikokles and the Nikokles I have given my reasons above (Life of Isokr.) for believing that his stay at Chios was from the autumn of 404 to the autumn of 403 B. C. Mr Sandys, inchning to Sauppe's view that Isokrates was at Chios from 393 to about 388 B. C., ascribes to the local lonic influence (cf Herod. I. 142) certam forms which occur in the Ad Demonicum: viz. θαρσαλέως (§ 7), συνειδήσεις (§ 16). Now the form θαρσαλέως, though Ionic, is, as Mr Sandys observes, early Attic too; and in Antid. § 121, two good MSS. (Urb. and Vat.) read θαρσήσουσι ( Introd. XXXIV). If, again, εἰδήσω is more Ionic than Attie, it is at any rate used by Aristotle (Magn. Mor. I. i. 3, 18, Sandys, note to § 16).—374—372 B.C.

The Letter consists of three parts: I. Analysis. Introduction, §§ 1—12; II. Precepts, §§ 13—43; III. Epilogue, §§ 44—52.

I. There is no greater difference between good and bad men (σπουδαῖοι—φαῦλοι) than in the durability of their friendships. Isokrates wishes to testify his friendship to Demonikos, and his regard for the young man's late father Hipponikos (§§ 1—2). He does not intend this letter to be a mere stimulus to intellectual exertion (παράκλησις) but an exhortation to moral excellence (παραίνεσις §§ 4, 5).

II. The following are the principal heads under which the precepts in §§ 13—43 may be brought:—

1. Duty towards the gods; § 13.

2. Duty towards men; prescribed generally as the obligation to be just (§§ 38, 39) and true (§§ 22, 23); and specially in three chief relations, (a) as towards the State, §§ 16, 37: cf. § 36: (b) as towards parents, § 14: (c) as towards friends, §§ 24—27, 33: cf. § 30.

3. Duty of regulating personal character, in respect (a) to the use of wealth, §§27, 28, and of pleasures, §§ 17, 32: (b) to the exercise of body and mind, § 40; and particularly to the acquisition of knowledge, §§ 18, 19; (c) to demeanour in society, §§ 15, 41, 42, 31.

III. Many of the rules just given will not suit the present age of Demonikos; but by and by he will need them, and this letter will then serve him as a storehouse ( ταμιεῖον) of advice (§ 44). The reward of Herakles, and the doom of Tantalos, are warnings to strive after real nobleness (τῆς καλοκαγαθίας); and, in so striving, we must seek help from every quarter. ‘For hardly, by this care, may we master the failings of our nature’ (§§ 51—52).

The authenticity of a treatise remarkably Genuineness of the Letter needlessly doubted characteristic of its author has, with singular perversity, been questioned both in ancient and in modern times. ‘Feebleness of diction’ ἔγραψε πολλοὺς λόγους, ὧν εἰσὶν αἱ παραινέσεις, εἰ καί τινες ἠβουλήθησαν αὐτὰς μὴ εἶναι αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς φράσεως. Auct. Argum. ad init. As Mr Sandys shows, in his first note on the Argument, its date cannot be earlier than the fourth century A. D. is the trait which the writer of the Greek argument mentions as having been found suspicious in this and like compositions of Isokrates. Alleged peculiarities or solecisms in language, dialect or grammar,—the occurrence, in a few instances, of hiatus,—and defective arrangement of subject-matter, are the tokens of spuriousness which the most recent and most careful scepticDr G. E. Benseler, in the preface to his edition of Isokrates, Leipsic, 1851. His objections, and those of earlier crities, are examined, and (in my judgment) disposed of, by Mr Sandys, in his Introduction to the Speech, pp. xxxii—xxxviii. has discovered. It is needless, here, to examine these objections in detail. It is enough to say that, even if they could all be proved, they would be decisively outweighed by the thoroughly Isokratic stamp of the treatise as a whole, in language, in structure, in spirit. As to external testimony, DionysiosDionys. Ars Rhet. V. 1. and HermogenesHermog. περὶ μεθὀδου δεινότητος 25. are affirmative witnesses; in HarpokrationHarpokration, s. VV. ἐπακτὸς ὅρκος, gives the Ad Demonicum to Isokrates of Apollonia. Elsewhere, s. v. παράκλησις, quoting some words from § 5, he adds, Ἰσοκράτης παραινέσεσιν,—where in the absence of definition, we must understand the Athenian. two passages cancel each other.

The distinguishing mark of the Ad Demonicum, Its general stamp. viewed as a treatise on morals, is a combination of loftiness and meanness. It is the man of the world who assumes the part of the preacher. Where he gives, in a simple form, the maxims of a somewhat vulgar prudence, he is excellent; it is when he strives to connect them with doctrine that he fails. The morality of the Ad Demonicum is probably at least on a level with the average practical morality of Greece; on the other hand, the higher sentiment which it contains is not affected; but the absence of harmony between them is Isokratic.

I 2. To Nikokles.

2. To Nikokles. [Or. II.]—Nikokles, to whom the Second and Ninth Discourses are addressed and for whom the Third was written, succeeded his father Evagoras as king of the Cyprian Salamis in 374 B.C.

It was probably soon after the accession of Date. Nikokles that Isokrates addressed this speech to him. The opening words have a formality which suggests that the writer is either wholly or almost a stranger; and the tone of the Letter generally implies that Nikokles was young both in years and in office. The intercourse thus opened appears to have become intimate; and it is possible that Nikokles may have been among the pupils of IsokratesCp. Antid. [XV.] § 30, οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἰδιώτας φησί μου γεγενῆσθαι μαθητάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ βασιλέας καὶ τυράννους..

‘The usual offerings to a king, Nikokles, are garments, or Analysis. gold, or bronze, things in which he is richer than the givers: I offer you advice. Private men are schooled by the struggle of life, by the laws, by the poets: kings have little schooling. Hence those frequent disasters which, even in vulgar eyes, balance the pleasures of a royal lot. People fancy that the office of a king, like that of a priest, may be assumed without any special preparation§ 6. τὴν βασιλείαν, ὥσπερ ἱερωσύνην, παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εἶναι νομἰζουσιν .. In particular crises, you will have the counsel of others: my counsels shall be general (§§ 1—8).

‘First—What is the function of a king? To stay the troubles, to guard the welfare, to raise the greatness of his realm (§ 9).

‘In order to perform this task well, you ought, in the first place, to be intelligent. By converse with the ablest men, and by reading, you must make yourself capable of deciding small questions, and of grappling with great§ 13. παρασκεύαζε σεαυτὸν τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων κριτήν, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀγωνιστήν. (§§ 10—14).

‘Next, you must be the friend of mankind and of your realm (§ 15). Keep the people alike from doing, and from suffering, outrage (§ 16). Let your laws be not only just and consistent, but framed for the settlement, rather than for the raising, of issues (§ 17). Rule the State like your own house, generously but carefully (§ 19). Let your word be held surer than other men's oaths. Honour less those strangers who bring gifts than those who deserve to receive them (§ 22). Be royal, not in severity, but by the recognised supremacy of your wisdom: warlike in knowledge and preparation, peaceful in abstinence from aggression (§ 24). Choose your associates with care, knowing that the many will judge you by them (§ 27). Deem it the most kingly thing of all to be subject to none of your own desires (§ 29). Take it as a sign that you are reigning well if you see your subjects growing richer and better (§ 31). Let your dress be splendid and your life hardy (§ 32): be witty, and be dignified (§ 34). Observe the fates of kings and of private persons; and divine the future from the past (§ 35). Let safety for the State and for yourself be your first object: but, if you are forced into danger, choose a noble death before a life of dishonour. In all things remember your royal office, and be mindful to do nothing unworthy of it (§§ 36, 37). Since your body must die, seek to make the memory of your spirit immortal (§ 37). If you emulate a man's fame, copy his actions (§ 38). Think those wise who can speak well on great questions, not those who can refine on trifles;—and those whose prosperity shows their prudence, or whose resignation proves their philosophy (§ 39).

‘Practical advice must not aim at being novel, and can hardly hope to be amusing (§§ 54—56). Hesiod, Theognis, Phokylides are praised—and neglected: Homer and the dramatists are the poets of the people (§§ 40—49). You, Nikokles, are a king, and ought to think first of what is useful. A good adviser is the most royal of possessions (§§ 40—53). Encourage others to bring you gifts like mine; gifts which, instead of wearing out in use, become more valuable the more they are used’ (§ 54).

Isokrates wrote for the cultivated. His idea of Claim made for the Nikokles in the Antidosis an expedition to Asia needed the help of the powerful. On both grounds it was natural that he should cultivate friendly relations with Hellenic kings and tyrants,—with Nikokles of Salamis and Timotheos of Herakleia no less than with Dionysios of Syracuse and Philip of Macedon. In the Antidosis, (where he is answering the imputation of being too much a friend to monarchy,) he quotes the speech which many years ago he had addressed to Nikokles. He claims to have spoken in it ‘freely and worthily of the city’; to have upheld the cause of the people; to have ‘reproved monarchy’ by observing how ill monarchs are usually trained for their duties. The claim is somewhat exaggerated. On the other how far just. hand, Isokrates might fairly have taken credit for setting before Nikokles a standard, higher than the common, of the king's duty to the subject. His ideal monarchy is absolute, but it is intelligently and honestly paternal.

I 3 Nikokles.

3. Nikokles or The Cyprians. [Or. III.]—In the last Discourse Isokrates had traced for Nikokles the duty of a king: in this it is Nikokles who sets forth the duty of subjects (§ 11). The piece was no doubt written to order; Nikokles perhaps thinking that the perception of a king's obligations which the former work may have quickened in some Salaminians might be usefully complemented by a sense of their own. Since the prince can appeal Date. to his people's past experience of him as a ruler (§ 63), the date can hardly be earlier than 372; on the other hand it cannot be later than 355; and may probably be placed between 372 and 365.

I. ‘Some people are hostile to all discussion on the Analysis. ground that selfish gain, not virtue, is its aim. Why do not those who blame the endeavour to reason well blame also the desire to act rightly? Action, not debate, is the chief instrument of selfishness. It is the faculty of persuading which has civilized life.

‘For a king, the first questions are of the relations between rulers and ruled. Isokrates has traced the duty of a king; I will now attempt to trace the duty of subjects (§ 11). But first I will try to show (1) that monarchy is the best form of government; and (2) that I am entitled, historically and personally, to be your king (§§ 1—13).

II. ‘A Monarchy, as compared with a limited or with a pure Republic, has these advantages:—1. It discriminates the different degrees of merit. Equality is the principle of republics. A Monarchy gives the first place to the best man, the second to the second-best, and so on (§§ 14, 15). —2. It has, more than other forms of government, an insight into the natures and actions of men; merit, wherever it exists, is therefore sure of recognition.—3. It is the mildest of governments; since it is easier to propitiate one man than many (§ 16).—4. Its ministers, being not annual but permanent, learn and discharge their duties more thoroughly and composedly (§§ 17, 18).—5. It is prompt in action. A popular assembly consists of men who are immersed in private affairs, and who meet only to wrangle: in a cabinet there are fewer distractions and delays (§ 19).—6. It has no jealousies. In a Republic there are always at least two parties, each of which hopes that the other will mismanage the country as grossly as possible. A monarch, having no rivals, has no spite (§ 20).—7. It has a more direct interest in good government. Republicans regard themselves as stewards, a monarch regards himself as the owner, of the State (§ 21).—8. It is more effective in war. Secret preparation, striking display, versatile intrigue, are easier for it than for other governments (§ 22).

‘Experience shows that these advantages are not imaginary. In Persia, devotion to Monarchy has been rewarded with unequalled greatness. In Sicily, the absolutism of Dionysios has not only delivered an enslaved country, but has made it the first in Greece. Carthage and Sparta, oligarchies at home, become monarchies in the field. Athens, the most anti-monarchical of States, has generally failed when she sent out a committee of generals, and succeeded when she gave the command to one. Lastly—Is not Zeus monarch of the gods? Whether the gods really live under that form of government or not, the fact of men ascribing it to them proves at least a human sense that it is the best (§§ 22—26).

‘Having shown the advantages of Monarchy, I will show more briefly that I am entitled to be your monarch. First, historically. Teukros, the founder of our house, brought hither the forefathers of the present Cyprians. His throne, lost for a time by his descendants, was regained by my father Evagoras, who put down Phoenician rule at Salamis and restored it to its original kings (§§ 27, 28). Next, personally. At my accession, I found the treasury empty, the State disturbed, Cyprus on bad terms with the rest of Greece and with Persia: and I met all these difficulties without wronging any man (§§ 29—35). Nor have youth (§ 45) and opportunity ever drawn me into licence (§§ 36—46).

III. ‘As the lawful holder, then, of a beneficent power, I may advise with a right to be heard—Let each man do his appointed task carefully and fairly (§ 48).—Do not make haste to be rich (§ 50).—Murmur not at one of my commands, knowing that those who serve me best will best serve their own fortunes.—Let everyone be sure that nothing of which his own conscience is aware will escape me (§ 51).— Form no clubs, hold no meetings, without my knowledge (§ 54).—Guard the present constitution, and desire no sort of change (§ 55).—Be humble to me, and magnificent in the service of the State (§ 56).—Consider that the greatest and surest wealth which you can leave to your children is my favour (§ 58).—Be not jealous, but emulous, of my counsellors (§ 60).—Think my words, laws—and keep them.— In short, be to your king what you wish your subordinates to be to you (§ 62).

‘If you follow this course, while I do not change mine, your prosperity and my power will grow together. Such a hope might well encourage to any toils. But you need not toil at all. You need only to be just and loyal’ (§§ 63—64).

Perhaps the most interesting part of this Discourse is that in which the writer, putting himself at the king's point of view, offers a popular plea for Monarchy as against Republic. Here Isokrates is essentially the professional rhetor—it being distinctive of Rhetoric as an art that, like its counterpart Dialectic, it is equally ready to argue either side of a question τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, Ar. Rhet. I. 1.. Isokrates has given us the other side in the Panathenaikos and the Areopagitikos, where he interprets his own ideal—a democracy tempered by a censorship.

II. Displays.
II I. Busiris.

1. Busiris [Or. XI.]—The Busiris and the Encomium on Helen [Or. X.] are slight essays by Isokrates in a province which was not his own. Declamations on subjects taken from epos or from the myths had always a prominent place among the ‘displays’ of ordinary Sophists. Such, for instance, are the Encomium on Helen and the Defence of Palamedes ascribed to Gorgias; the speech of Odysseus Against Palamedes ascribed to Alkidamas; the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, in the contest for the arms, ascribed to AntisthenesSee above, p. 55, note 1.. The bent of Isokrates, as Purpose of the ‘Busiris’ —merely illustrative. he himself tells us Panath. § 1., was not towards this kind of composition. He was not, indeed, hostile to it, any more than he was hostile to criticism of the poets and other branches of literary work which employed the SophistsCf. Antid. § 45. In Panath. §§ 19 ff. he shows how much he had been nettled by the charge of depreciating all kinds of literary work except his own.. The encomia which he depreciates in Or. X. § 12 are encomia on bumble-bees and salt; on the other hand he expressly commends the choice of such a subject as Helen (§ 14); and if he speaks of Busiris as a poor theme (Or. XI. § 22) he clearly means only that it is one which baffles the panegyrist. Yet it is important to note that he comes upon this field of ‘display’ not as a candidate for distinction but merely as a critic. The Busiris and the Encomium on Helen are alike criticisms, in which he first reviews the work of others, and then shows, for the sake of vindicating his right to criticise, how he would have done the work himself.

The Busiris is addressed to Polykrates, who has Polykrates. lately been driven by need to become a professed rhetorician. Isokrates has never seen him; but, sympathising with his misfortunes, wishes to help him with advice. Pausanias says that Jason of Pherae preferred Gorgias to Polykrates, although the school of Polykrates had then gained no small repute at AthensPaus. VI. 17, 9, Ἰάσων ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ τυραννήσας, Πολυκράτους οὐ τὰ ἔσλατα ἐνεγκαμένου διδασκαλείου τοῦ Ἀθήνησι, τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπίπροσθεν Γοργίαν ὁ Ἰάσων ἐποιήσατο. Here τυραννήσας can hardly refer to the ταγεία, for Jason was not tagos till about 374 B. C.: cf. Curtius IV. 445.. Gorgias died about 380 B.C. At some time, then, before 380 Polykrates had made a name at Athens. But the Busiris speaks of him as a beginner; and it is known from Diogenes Laertius that the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ His ‘Accusation of Sokrates.’ mentioned in § 4 contained an allusion to the rebuilding of the Long Walls by Konon,—i.e. was written later than 393 B. C.Diog. Laert. II. 5. 39, Φαβωρῖνος δέ φησιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων μὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον τὸν Πολυκράτους κατὰ Σωκράτους· ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ, φησι, μνημονεύει τω—ν ὑπὸ Κόνωνος τειχῶν ἀνασταθέντων, ἃ γέγονεν ἔτεσιν ἓξ τη—ς τοῦ Σωκράτους τελευτῆς ὕστερον. All the conditions will be satisfied if we suppose that Polykrates published his ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ in 393 or 392, and the ‘Defence of Busiris’ soon after; that he had become a teacher of repute at Athens about 388 B. C.; and that Isokrates wrote the Busiris soon after the appearance of the ‘Defence’ which it criticises,—perhaps in 391 or 390. At this time, Date of the ‘Busiris.’ Polykrates was teaching at Cyprus γράφει πρὸς Πολυκράτη τινὰ σοφιστήν, Ἀθηναῖον μὲν τῷ γένει, σοφιστεύοντα δὲ νῦν ἐν Κύπρῳ. Others—who believe that in 391 Isokrates was at Chios—suggest, though without sufficient ground, that the auctor argum. has invented this statement to account for Isok. and Polyk. being strangers (Spengel Συν. Τεχν. p. 75).; he and Isokrates —as the essay tells us—had never met.

Polykrates evidently held a respectable rank among the rhetoricians of his time. He is mentioned by Dionysios in company with Antiphon, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, Kritias, Theodoros of Byzantium, Anaximenes, Zoilos and IsaeosWith Antiphon, Thrasymachos, Kritias and Zoilos, Isae. c. 20: with Antiphon, Theodoros, Isaeos, Zoilos and Anaximenes, Dem. c. 8.. He was, however, no favourite of Dionysios, who describes him as ‘empty in practical oratory, frigid and vulgar in the rhetoric of display, and devoid of grace in the subjects which demand it Isae. c. 20: κενὸς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ψυχρὸς δὲ καὶ φορτικὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ἄχαρις δὲ ἐν τοῖς χαριεντισμοῦ δεομένοις. By τὰ ἀληθινά, as opposed to τὰ ἐπιδεικτικά, Dionysios seems to mean the treatment of practical questions either in Forensic or in Deliberative speaking. Demetrios, περὶ ἑρμ. § 120 (in Walz, Rhet. IX. 54), makes the want of earnestness the great defect of Polykrates. ἔπαιζε γάρ, οὐκ ἐσπούδαζε, καὶ αὐτὸς τῆς γραφη—ς ὁ ὄγκος παίγνιόν ἐστι—a passage which Spengel ingeniously compares with the Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον of [Gorg.] Helen Enc. § 21, in support of his view that Polykrates wrote that piece; but the point is not a very strong one..’ He wrote for the law-courts; and the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’ itself was supposed by some to have been actually spoken at the trialDiog. Laert. II. 5, 39 notices this tradition, but contradicts it on the authority of Favorinus: see p. 94, n. 2. Cf. Quint. II. 17, 4 ( Polycrates) composuisse orationem, quae est habita contra Socraten, dicitur. By the auctor argum. Polykrates is described as καὶ σοφιστὴς καὶ λογογράφος .. But ‘display’ was probably his chosen branch. His ingenuity appears from the circumstance that he composed an encomium upon miceArist. Rhet. II. 24., and his versatility from the fact that he praised both AgamemnonDemetr. περὶ ἑρμ. § 120, in Walz's Rhet. IX. p. 54. and KlytaemnestraQuint. II. 17, 4..

No weight can be given to the suggestion made Fancied motive of the piece. by the author of the Argument that the real meaning of Isokrates was to attack Polykrates for the ‘Accusation of Sokrates’, and that, deterred by the temper of Athens from doing this openly, he did it under pretext of a criticism upon the ‘Defence of Busiris.’ There is no trace in the piece of any such covert intention; the vindication of Sokrates, so far as it goes, is perfectly frank; and this very frankness defines its place as a secondary topic.

‘Your worth, Polykrates, and the change in your way of Analysis. life are known to me by report. I have read some of your writings, and would gladly discuss freely with you the whole theory of those studies to which you have given yourself. General precepts, however, shall be reserved until we know each other. In the meantime I send you some special criticisms. Wishing you well, I do not shrink from the risk of giving offence.

‘You put trust in your Defence of Busiris and your Accusation of Sokrates. As to Busiris, you have made his case worse than ever; others accuse him of having immolated strangers; you, of having eaten them. As to Sokrates, your ‘Accusation’ glorifies him; you make him the teacher of Alkibiades,—who is not known to have been his disciple, but who certainly was a remarkable man. Could the dead hear you, you would have the thanks of the philosopher and the hatred of the king. Such, too, is your disregard of consistency that you have described Busiris as emulating the fame of Aeolos and Orpheus, who lived long after him; and who, moreover, were utterly unlike him. I will try to show you briefly how the subject ought to have been handled (§§ 1—9).

‘The father of Busiris was Poseidon; his mother, Libya, daughter of Epaphos the son of Zeus, and earliest queen of the land which bears her name. Not content with his mother's realm, Busiris, after wide conquests, founded a monarchy in Egypt. He saw that that country had the best climate in the world, was the most fertile, and had in the Nile a perpetual barrier against invasion. For other lands, the steward of rains and droughts is Zeus; for Egypt, the Nile. That river is at once their protector and their nourisher, giving them the wealth of a continent with the security of an island (§§ 10—14).

‘Having got a good country, Busiris next sought to give Civilisation of Egypt. it a good government. He divided the population into priests,—craftsmen of various sorts,—and soldiers. In his theory of a really good economy, each kind of work ought to have its permanent workmen. Sparta has taken one hint from this system. She has made her citizens a military caste. But her defect is that she is purely military. Egypt provides at the same time for the protection, and for the prosecution, of industry (§§ 15—20).

‘Nor was mental culture neglected. The priests, having wealth and leisure, developed a science of medicine,—to which it is due that the Egyptians have the best health and the longest lives. Other sciences were cultivated also; and while the elder men were busied with great affairs, the younger studied astrology, logic, geometry.

‘But it is for their reverent worship of the gods that the Egyptians are most admirable. Exaggeration is harmful in most things; but it is good for human life that men should have an even exaggerated idea of the gods' power to reward or punish. To the Egyptian mind this power is so awful that oaths taken in Egyptian temples have a greater sanctity than elsewhere. The Egyptians believe that retribution will follow sin, not bye-and-bye, but instantly. Their priests enjoin upon them a multitude of observances, meant both to strengthen the habit of obedience and to test, by visible proof, their reverence for things unseen.

‘The philosophy of Egypt, and the spirit of its scrupulous ritual, were first brought into Hellas by Pythagoras; who felt sure that, if not requited by the gods, he would at least be esteemed by men. And to this day the silence of his disciples is more admired than the eloquence of others (§§ 21—29).

‘You will perhaps say that I have praised the laws, the piety, the thought of Egypt without proving that these are due to Busiris. It would ill become you to reproach me as illogical; you have yourself said that it was Busiris who distributed the Nile by its seven channels through the land, and who, at the same time, slew strangers on his altars; thus ascribing to him at once the fury of a beast and the faculty of a god. But my account is not merely as reasonable as yours; it has intrinsic probability. The benefits which it imputes to Busiris have not been shown to be due to any one else; and who is more likely to have wrought them than the son of Poseidon and of Libya,—the most powerful man of his time? The falseness of the charges laid against him is seen in this, that they represent him as having been slain by Herakles. Herakles lived four generationsi.e. about 130 years: cf. Herod. II. 142, γενεαὶ...τρεῖς ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν ἔτεά ἐστι . after Chronology of the Heroes. Perseus. Busiris lived two centuries before Perseus (§§ 30—37).

‘But you have had no care for truth—you have followed the blasphemies of the poets, who love to represent the gods as more vicious than men. These blasphemers have often suffered, though less than they deserved; some have become wandering beggars, some blind, some exiles, some foes, of their own kindred: Orpheus, the worst of them, was torn to pieces. Now it is my faith that not the gods only, but their children, are without spot of vice. If the gods have not the wish to make their own sons good, they are worse disposed than men; if they have not the power, they are less able than sophists (§§ 38—43).

‘Much more might be said; but my object is to give hints, not to make a display. You have defended Busiris from the charges against him by admitting them, but arguing that they might be brought against others. How would you yourself like to be defended in this fashion? Or if any of your own friends had acted like Busiris, would you praise him? You will say, perhaps, that you wished merely to set an example of defending difficult causes. But a defence of this kind is futile, and tends also to bring philosophy into disrepute. In future you must choose better subjects, or treat those which you do choose more judiciously. Do not resent the advice of a stranger who has not even the privilege of age; it is not age or intimacy, it is knowledge and goodwill which give the right to advise in such matters' (§§ 44—50).

The subject of the Busiris—so well-worn by Remarks. logographersSee §§ 37, 38— λογοποιῶν—ποιητῶν. By λογοποιοί here, as in Philipp. § 109 (οὔτε τῶν ποιητῶν οὔτε τῶν λογοποιῶν), &c., are meant the chroniclers who were called λογογράφοι before the latter word got its forensic meaning. So Herod. V. 125 calls Hekataeos λογοποιός Cf. Verg. Geo. III. 5. and poets—is treated by Isokrates in a very simple manner. He praises the customs, religious and political, of Egypt; and then remarks that Busiris is as likely as another to have been the founder of these. The crimes imputed to the inhospitable king he rejects as blasphemies. But if, as an encomium, the piece has not even the merit of ingenuity, it has a real interest of another kind. It illustrates very strikingly the attitude of Isokrates towards the myths generally. He complains that Busiris has been represented as contemporary with Aeolos and Orpheus; whereas the fathers of the two latter were not born in the time of the former (§ 8). How, he asks, can Busiris have been slain by Herakles, who lived four generations after Perseus, while Busiris lived more than 200 years before Perseus? (§ 37.) He rejects the current legends about Busiris because they shock his religious instinct: not only the gods but the children of the gods must be deemed sinless (§ 41). Thus, like Herodotos, Isokrates accepts the myths as a wholeFor example, he treats as historical the list of kings from Kekrops to Theseus, Panath. §§ 12 ff.; the adventures of Herakles, Archid. § 18, cf. Philipp. § 111; the divine origin of Aeakos;—the battle of Peleus with the Centaurs and his marriage with Thetis, Evag. 14—16, &c.,— distinguishing in history a human and a superhuman race, and regarding the latter as not less real than the former; on the other hand, he applies to the myths not, like Herodotos, a strict historical criticism, but only certain general notions of the becoming.

II. 2. Encomium on Helen.

2. Encomium on Helen. [Or. X.]—In § 14 Isokrates praises ‘the writer on Helen’ for his choice of a subject, but finds one fault with his work—viz. that it is less an encomium than an apology. He then says that he will endeavour to show this writer how the subject ought to have been treated; and that he will avoid topics already handled by others.

It is probable, if not certain, that the allusion The Encomium ascribed to Gorgias. here is to the Encomium on Helen extant under the name of Gorgias. The criticism of Isokrates exactly applies to this composition, which is, in fact, a defence,—with the apologetic character indeed strongly markedSee, for example, § 2 of the [Τοργίου] Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον (printed in Sauppe's Orat. Att. II. 132), where the writer declares at the outset that his object is ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην. And at the conclusion (§ 21) he says— ἀφεῖλον τῷ λόγῳ δύσκλειαν γυναικός, κ.τ λ.. Further, the Isokratic encomium keeps clear of the ground traversed in the encomium ascribed to Gorgias. The chief topics of Isokrates are (1) Theseus, who loved Helen: §§ 18— 38: (2) the preciousness of Helen shown by the choice of Paris and by the expedition against Troy: §§ 39—53: (3) the power of Beauty generally: §§ 54—60: (4) the divinity of Helen: §§ 61—66. The other writer, after some introductory remarks (5) devotes the rest of his composition to the various theories by which Helen's desertion of her home can be explained. She may have been taken to Troy (1) by divine agency: (2) by violence: (3) by persuasion: (4) by love: and, on any of these suppositions, says the writer, is excusable: §§ 6—20. Thus the work attributed to Gorgias answers both conditions of the case. It is called an encomium, while it is really an apology; and its special topics are not the topics of Isokrates.

But was Gorgias indeed the author? After Question of its authorship. censuring Gorgias by name in § 3, it would have been strange if Isokrates had praised him in § 14 without naming him. Besides, the language of § 3 implies that Gorgias is dead; the language of § 14 implies that the unnamed writer is alive. Nor does the so-called encomium bear any distinctive marks of the style of Gorgias. SpengelSpengel, συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, pp. 74, 75. would ascribe it to Polykrates. But then if Polykrates had been the author, Isokrates either would have addressed him, as in the Busiris, or would at least have named him. The author of the Argument rejects the notion that Polykrates is meant; remarking that, instead of Isokrates attacking Polykrates, it was Polykrates who attacked Isokrates for this work: and concludes that the allusion is probably to Anaximenes of Lampsakos; ‘a speech by whom is Was Anaximenes the author? extant which is rather a defence of Helen than an encomiumSee this ὑπόθεσις in Benseler's edition of Isokrates, vol. I. p. lx..’ It appears not improbable that Anaximenes may have been the real author of the work ascribed to Gorgias; and that it is Anaximenes of whom Isokrates speaks. But on this point we must be content with conjectureBlass (Att. Bereds. p. 66) thinks it unlikely that Anaximenes is the writer meant by Isokrates. The author of the Argument notices also the view that Gorgias is the writer alluded to. This, Blass thinks, shows that an Encomium of the kind described was then extant under the name of Gorgias; and this, he argues, can hardly be other than the Encomium which we possess. But, then, is it not singular that, while the author of the Argument mentions the fact of such a work by Anaximenes existing, and cites this fact in support of the theory that Anaximenes is meant, he does not say that there is any work by Gorgias to which a reference can be supposed? If he had known of any Encomium by Gorgias corresponding to the description of Isokrates, he would surely have mentioned it, as he mentions the Encomium by Anaximenes. I am strongly inclined to believe that the speech extant under the name of Gorgias was known to the writer of the Greek Argument only as the work of Anaximenes. .

Two indications help to fix the time at which Date. Isokrates wrote. 1. From § 3 it may be inferred that Gorgias was deadSpengel, συν. τεχν. p. 74. Among ‘Protagoras and the sophists of that day’ Gorgias is mentioned as he ‘who presumed to say,’ &c.: § 3.; and Gorgias died about 380 B.C. 2. In § 1 there is an allusion to the three chief Sokratic sects—the Cynics, the Academy, the Megarics. These sects must have already been mature. The language implies further that Antisthenes, founder of the Cynics—who died in 376 B.C. —is still alive. The Encomium may probably be put about 370 B.C. Thompson, Phaedr., Appendix II. p. 175. The references are thus marked:—(1) Cynics. ‘Those who have grown grey,—where the tense, καταγεγηράκασιν, suggests that Antisthenes was alive—‘in asserting that it is impossible to lie,’ &c.—alluding to the Cynic paradoxes. (2) Academy. ‘Those who hold that Valour, Wisdom, Justice are the same thing,’ &c. (3) Megarics. ‘Those who pass their time in disputes ( ἔριδας) which can serve no purpose but that of giving trouble to their pupils'— the Eristic.

‘There are persons who pride themselves on being able Analysis. to treat tolerably some paradoxical thesis;—as that one cannot lie; that courage, wisdom, justice, are the same thing —namely, knowledge; that nothing exists; that the same things are at once possible and impossible. This style of discussion has not even the charm of novelty. Who does not know the paradoxes of Protagoras and Gorgias, of Zenon and Melissos? The experts in this jugglery would do better if they took subjects which had some bearing on practical life. But in fact their only aim is to get money from young men, whom these subtleties amuse. The pupils have an excuse; the teachers have none. Some of the impostors go so far as to maintain that beggars and exiles are more enviable than other men. Preference for such themes is a sure sign of weakness. If a man wishes to prove himself a good athlete, he does not go to a palaestra which he will have all to himself. A panegyrist of bees or of saltCf. Plat. Symp. 177 B, ἀλλ’ ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλ’ίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφέλειαν· καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωμιασμένα. Besides his encomium on mice (Ar. Rhet. II. 24) Polykrates wrote in praise of χύτραι and ψῆφοι (Menander rhetor, p 611 Ald.). has no difficulty in appearing equal to his subject. But it is harder to rise to the height of a great argument. On this ground I give all praise to the writer on Helen—for celebrating one who was brilliant beyond compare in birth, beauty and fame. One point, however, has escaped him—that, while he professes to have written an encomium, he has, in fact, offered a defence. And—lest I seem to be doing what is so easy—blaming the work of others without showing my own—I will myself attempt to speak of Helen, omitting all that has been said by others (§§ 1—15).

‘Of all the children whom Zeus begat, the dearest to him were those of whom Alkmene and Leda were the mothers. Herakles and Helen were both destined by him to deathless life in heaven and deathless fame on earth; but to Herakles he gave strength—to Helen, that beauty which vanquishes the strong (§§ 16—17).

‘Her first lover was Theseus, called the son of Aegeus, but in truth the son of Poseidon. He fell in love with her when she was yet a young girl; and when Tyndareus rejected his suit, bore her away from Lacedaemon toAphidna in Attica.

‘Now the man who thus loved her stands alone in Theseus. completeness of merit, having not some great qualities, but all. Contemporary with Herakles, he rivalled him. Both were athletes in the cause of human life; but with a difference;— the exploits of Herakles redounded more to his own glory— those of Theseus, to the good of others. Many deeds prove his courage and his reverence for the gods. His wisdom and moderation were proved by this,—that he was the first who joined Monarchy to Political Equality; gathered scattered villages into one town; and opened to all its citizens a free career, making their goodwill his bodyguard§ 37. For the Isokratic view of Theseus, cf. note on Panathen. § 126. (§§ 18—38).

‘When Theseus descended with Peirithoos to Hades, Helen returned to Sparta. The oath taken by her suitors— that he who won her should, if robbed of her, be helped by the rest—showed their foresight of the strife which she must cause. That foresight proved true, though the private hope of each was baffled. Alexander, son of Priam, was chosen Paris. umpire of beauty by the goddesses. Hera offered him the sovereignty of Asia,—Athene, victory in war,—Aphrodite, the hand of Helen. He could not tell which goddess was fairest; but he knew which offered the best gift. He chose Helen; desiring not her beauty alone, but to be allied with Zeus. Have those who, looking to the sequel, blamed his choice, a judgment better than that to which gods deferred? Or do they blame him for electing to live with her for whom demigods were content to die? (§§ 39—48).

‘And who would have scorned wedlock with her for whose The war of Troy. sake all the Hellenes went to war as if Hellas had been ravaged? They regarded the issue as lying, not between Alexander and Menelaos, but between Europe and Asia. The land which held Helen must be most blest. As thought men, so thought the gods. Zeus sent his son Sarpedon, Eos sent her Memnon, Poseidon sent Kyknos, Thetis sent Achilles, to a fate which they foreknew, but which, they deemed, could not be more glorious (§§ 40—53).

‘And naturally: for Helen was endowed beyond compare The power of beauty with beauty—the most august, the most honoured, the most divine of all things; the quality for which, if absent, nothing can make up; which, where it is present, wins goodwill at first sight; which makes service sweet and untiring, which makes tasks seem favours; beauty, the profanation of which by those who possess it we deem a crime more shameful than any wrong which they can do to others, while we honour for all their days those who guard it sacred as a shrine (§§ 54—58).

‘Before beauty Zeus himself is humble—approaching it and of Helen. by craft often, never with violence; it is beauty which has raised most mortals to the gods (§§ 59—60).

‘Helen's power was proportionate to her supremacy in this gift. She became not only immortal but omnipotent. When her brothers were already the prisoners of Death, she lifted them to heaven; and in token of the change, set in the sky that star to which storm-tost sailors pray. To Menelaos, too, she gave deliverance from earthly troubles, and a place in heaven at her side; and at this day, at Therapnae in Lacedaemon, Helen and Menelaos are worshipped, not as blessed spirits only, but as gods. When Stesichoros blasphemed her, she struck him blind; and when he recanted, gave him back his sight. Some of the Homeridae say, too, that it was Helen who stood by Homer in the night, and bade him sing the War of Troy. Seeing then that she can punish and can reward, let rich men honour her with gifts, wise men with praise (§§ 61—66).

‘More than has been said remains untold. Besides the arts, the ideas, the other gains which Greece owes to her and to the Trojan War, it owes its very freedom from the barbarian. Before that time, Greece was a refuge for unlucky foreigners—for Danaos, for Kadmos, for Pelops, for the Karians who settled in the islands. After the war, our race grew strong enough to conquer towns and territory from the alien. If others choose to work out this theme, they will find no lack of matter for past praise of Helen’ (§§ 67—69).

The Encomium on Helen is, as a composition, greatly superior to the Busiris. The effort to adorn an ungrateful theme renders the Busiris constrained and somewhat frigid; here, there is more freedom and more glow. But the principle of the two pieces is the same. Isokrates conceived that dignity and gravity might be added to encomia of the conventional type by connecting with mythical subject-matter some topic of practical interest, political or moral; and he was willing to allow to such topic a greater prominence than its bearing on the special subject could warrant. This purpose is served in the Busiris by the discourse on the institutions of Egypt; in the Helen by the devotion of a large space to the reforms of Theseus.

II. 3. The Evagoras.

3. Evagoras [Or. IX.]—On the occasion of a festival held by Nikokles in memory of his father Evagoras, Isokrates sends this encomium as his tribute. The words in § 78—(πολλάκις σοι διακελεύομαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν)—have been taken as indicating the Letter To Nikokles, and as showing, therefore, that the Evagoras is later than that workThe scholiast who wrote the argument to Or. 9 takes this view (Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 8): and so Dr O. Schneider, Isocr. Ausgewahlte Reden, Part I. p. 31.. The scholiast further remarks that, though the speech is an epitaphios, it lacks two regular elements of such a composition— the lament (τὸ θρηνητικόν) at the beginning and the consolation (τὸ παραμυθητικόν) at the end; a fact for which he accounts on the supposition that many years had elapsed since the death of EvagorasSee the scholium on Or. 9. § 1 (Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 9).. Neither this inference nor that drawn from § 78 appears safe. Another, perhaps of greater weight, may however be derived from another circumstance. The death of Evagoras was violent. He was assassinated in 374 B.C. by Thrasydaeos, a eunuch whose master, one Nikokreon, had just fled from Salamis on the detection of a plot against the king's lifeCf. Grote, c. 76, vol. X. p. 32.. Now, §§ 70—72 of this speech are so worded as to imply, without saying, that Evagoras had closed a prosperous life by a happy death§ 71, κάλλιστα κτησάμενος τὴν βασιλείαν ἐν ταύτῃ διετέλεσε τὸν βίον...τοσοῦτον δ’ ἐβίω χρόνον ὥστε μήτε τοῦ γήρως ἄμοιρος γενέσθαι μήτε τῶν νόσων μετασχεῖν τῶν διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν γιγνομένων.. If Isokrates had been writing while the memory of the king's death was fresh, could he have written thus? The Letter To Nikokles may, as we saw, be placed in 374 or 373, the Nikokles between 372 and 365. The Evagoras is probably as late as 365; possibly later The Evagoras cannot, of course, be later than 353, since in 353—which may be assumed as the date of the Antidosis—Nikokles is no longer alive: Antid. § 67. We get no help, then, from § 8, in which this speech is said to be the first encomium of the kind ever written in prose. This only shows the speech to be earlier than 351 B. C. (Schäfer: Clinton, 352), in which year Artemisia proposed a contest of prose ἐγκώμια in honour of Mausolos (above, p. 11)..

The speech is arranged as follows:—I. Proem, §§ 1—11. II. Evagoras: (1) his lineage and his acquisition of the throne, §§ 12—40: (2) his character, and his domestic reforms, §§ 41—50: (3) his wars, §§ 51—64: (4) general retrospect of his career, §§ 65 —72. III. Hortatory conclusion, §§ 73—81.

I. ‘Seeing you, Nikokles, bringing costly offerings to Analysis. the tomb of your father,—honouring his obsequies with contests of athletes and of poets, with chariot-races and trireme-races,—I, too, wish to bring my tribute. If the soul of Evagoras is aware of what is done on earth, I believe that nothing could be more grateful to him than the commemoration of his virtues and his trials. The splendour of shows, the rivalry of self-glorifying poets, does not supply this; plain prose, then, shall attempt it. If it were the fashion to extol contemporary, instead of ancient heroes, a double gain would accrue; the panegyrist would be forced to respect truth, and his hearers would be encouraged to effort by the hope of praise. Envy hinders this. But the custom prescribed by envy must be broken through; without innovation there can be no improvement. The task is hard, since prose does not command the graces of poetry; yet it shall be tried whether merit cannot be praised without the help of metre§ 11. Isokrates appears to mean that the ἐγκώμια recited at banquets, in honour of living victors at the games, &c., or at funeral festivals in honour of the dead, had hitherto always been in verse. Prose encomia on mythical or other subjects had, of course, long been in vogue as exercises with the Sophists,—such as the Helenae encomium and the Busiris of Isokrates himself. (§§ 1—11).

II. ‘The descent of Evagoras, well-known though it be, must be mentioned. The house of the Aeakidae, the noblest in Greece, was founded by a son of Zeus, Aeakos, to whom stands the temple in Aegina—a memorial of that intercession with his father by which he once delivered Greece from a sore drought (§ 18). From Aeakos sprang Peleus and Telamon; from Peleus, Achilles; from Telamon, Aias and Teukros. Teukros, after the taking of Troy, founded in Cyprus the town of Salamis and the present dynasty (§§ 12—18).

‘That dynasty has not, however, reigned uninterruptedly. How Evagoras won the throne. A Phoenician exile came of old to Cyprus; won the trust of the king; ousted him, and took his throne§ 19. κατὰ μὲν ἀρχὰς οἱ γεγονότες ἀπὸ Τεύκρου τὴν βασιλείαν εἶχον· χρόνῳ δ’ ὕστερον ἀφικόμενος ἐκ Φοινίκης ἀνὴρ φυγάς, κ.τ.λ. When Evagoras was born, the descendants (ἔκγονοι) of this man were ruling: § 21.Isokrates conceived the Phoenician usurper as having seized the throne at some time—he did not know at precisely what time— long after the first establishment of the Teukrid dynasty; but also long before the birth of Evagoras. A succession of Phoenician kings had reigned over Salamis in the mean time. This is intimated not only in §§ 19—21, but also in § 47, where Salamis is described as having been barbarised διὰ τὴν Φοινίκων ἀρχήν.At the time of the Ionian revolt (500 B.C.) Salamis was governed by Greek princes (Her. v. 104— 114);—the appearance in whose family of the Phoenician name Siromos (Hiram) may perhaps be accounted for, as Professor Rawlinson suggests, by intermarriage. Mr Grote would place the dispossession of the Greek dynasty by the Phoenician usurper about 450 B.C. (c. 76: vol. X. p. 21). This seems very probable. But to my mind the words of Isokrates convey the notion that he, at any rate, imagined the Phoenician usurpation to have taken place much earlier.. The usurper's descendants still ruled when Evagoras was born. Distinguished in youth by beauty, strength, temperance, in early manhood by courage, wisdom, justice, Evagoras gave uneasiness, but not alarm, to the reigning house. He seemed too brilliant for a private lot, and yet too honest to snatch a royal one. Fortune fulfilled both auguries. It gave him a crown without driving him to a crime. One of the powerful nobles§ 32. εἷς γὰρ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἐπιβουλεύσας τόν τε τύραννον ἀπέκτεινε, κ.τ.λ. By οἱ δυναστεύοντες here Isokrates seems to mean the great men of Salamis. The slayer of the Phoenician usurper was Abdêmon—a Citian, according to Theopompos (frag. 111): a Tyrian, according to Diodoros (xiv. 98). Mövers, thinks that he may have been a native of Citium who had migrated from Salamis to Tyre (Grote, X. p. 22, note 1). formed a conspiracy against the despot, and slew him; and sought at the same time to lay hands upon Evagoras, who fled to Soli in Cilicia. He there rallied round him a band of fifty men; landed with them in Cyprus; and, forcing his way the same night into Salamis, attacked the palace. The mass of the inhabitants standing neutral, he succeeded in taking it; expelled the usurpers; and restored the sceptre to his own houseThe date of the restoration of the Teukrid dynasty by Evagoras cannot be exactly determined. At his death in 374 B. C. he was οὐ γήρως ἄμοιρος (§ 71). Andokides is said to have visited Cyprus just after the fall of the Four Hundred, which took place in the autumn of 411 B.C., and to have found Evagoras reigning at Salamis: [Lys.] in Andoc. § 28. Mr Grote concludes that Evagoras began to reign ‘about 411 or 410 B. C.’ (411 B. C. is probably the latest year we can take)— justly observing that ‘he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful, when he ventured to harbour Konon in 405 B. C., after the battle of Aegospotami.’ (vol. X. p. 25). (§§ 19—32).

‘If I were to say no more, the surpassing merit of Evagoras would have been sufficiently proved. No hero of legend or of history ever won kingly power in a manner so brilliant. Take the most famous instance of all—that of the elder Cyrus, who transferred the empire from the Medes to the Persians. Cyrus conquered by his army; Evagoras by his own courage: Cyrus slew his mother's father; Evagoras incurred no guilt’ (§§ 33—40).

‘His use of power was worthy of the manner in which he had gained it. Gifted with great and ready talents, he was at the same time minutely and incessantly diligent. He attended personally to all affairs; knew every citizen; did nothing on hearsay. The love of the gods for him, and his own love of men, were so apparent in his government that strangers visiting Cyprus envied the subjects no less than the king. Enemies found him resistless, friends pliant; he was dignified, but never harsh; consistent in deeds as in words; versatile in taking from every form of constitution its best part; at once a friend of the people, a large-minded statesman, and a far-seeing general (§§ 41—46).’

‘The history of his reign will be found to justify these His reforms in Cyprus. praises. He found the State barbarised by the Phoenicians; ignorant of arts, without commerce, without even a harbour; at enmity with all Hellas§ 47. The disposition of Phoenicians in Cyprus towards Hellenic visitors at this period is strikingly illustrated, as Mr Grote observes (X. p. 22 n.) by [Lys.] in Andoc. § 26: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν (Ἀνδοκίδης) ὡς τὸν Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ μόνον θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα, οἰομένος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι.. He not only repaired these evils, but acquired territory, built forts, created a fleet, and thus put his city on a par with any in Greece. His civilising influence reached even the barbarian countries adjacent to Cyprus. That island itself became a resort of distinguished settlers from the rest of GreeceThe years 413—405 were years of great distress for Athens; and, after 405, cases of banishment and confiscation were numerous in every city where there was a Spartan dekarchy. Thus the early years of the reign of Evagoras coincided with a period when such a refuge as Salamis was likely to attract the greatest number of settlers. See Grote, X. p. 26. (§§ 47—50).

‘Foremost among these was Konon. The friendship, His friendship with Konon. closer than kinship, which at once sprang up between him and Evagoras was strengthened by the bond of a common sympathy for humiliated Athens. That Persia made the war against Sparta a maritime and not a land war, was due to the joint council of Konon and of Evagoras. They saw that a victory on the Asiatic continent could benefit only the Asiatic Greeks; but that a victory at sea must benefit all Hellas. And so it proved. The battle of Knidos was fought, and the bondsmen of Sparta were freed. Statues of Konon and Evagoras, placed side by side near the statue of Zeus the Deliverer, commemorated the gratitude of Athens (§§ 51—57).

‘Meanwhile Artaxerxes had viewed uneasily the genius His war with Persia. and the fortune of Evagoras; and he now seized a pretext for hostilities. Though utterly without material resources, Evagoras, by his own ability and that of his son Pnytagoras, triumphed more marvellously than before. He reduced almost the whole of Cyprus; ravaged Phoenicia; stormed Tyre; threw Kilikia into revolt; filled Persia with mourning and with loathing of the war, until, against all precedent, the Great King made peace before the rebels were in his hands§ 64. 396—394 B. C. Isokrates considers the war between Persia and Sparta as having virtually begun in 396 B.C.—in which year Agesilaos took the command in Asia, and Konon took the chief command of the Persian fleet. He considers that Persia took away the empire (ἀφείλετο τὴν ἀρχήν) of Sparta by the victory of Knidos in 394.This is, of course, a rhetorical exaggeration; for though it is true that the maritime power of Sparta was crushed at Knidos, the Spartan ἀρχή in Hellas lasted till Leuktra. The three years' war spoken of here is called ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ῥόδον in Panegyr. § 142.. In a war of less than three years, Persia had stripped Sparta of Empire; after a war of ten years§ 64. Probably 385—376 B. C. The date of the war is discussed in a note on Panegyr. § 134., Persia was compelled to leave Evagoras in full possession of his kingdom (§§ 57—64).

‘Legend celebrates the conquest, by united Hellas, of the town of Troy; but must not that achievement yield to the defeat, by the single city of Salamis, of all Asia? Or where in history is the man who, after winning a throne and civilising a kingdom, won victories which changed the destinies of a race? It is hard to decide whether Evagoras is most admirable for his warfare against Sparta, for his warfare against Persia, for his acquisition, or for his exercise of power.

‘If the gods ever bestowed immortality in reward for virtue, surely it may be deemed that they have given it to Evagoras. During his lifetime, their favour graced him with all gifts of mind and body, with unchanging prosperity, with fame, with years, with noble children (§§ 65—72).

‘Failing powers have not suffered me to praise Evagoras aright; yet a slight tribute, at least, has been offered; and the portrait of a man's character is a better memorial than an image of his body. For you, Nikokles, and for your children, that character should be a spur to excellence. Most men have to take example from strangers; you need not go beyond your own family. I did not forget that you have begun your course well; I exhort you only as bystanders cheer a runner who is winning. Persevere, and you will prove worthy of yourself’ (§§ 73—81).

The Evagoras is professedly an encomium; but the praise which it awards does not, on the whole, appear to be exaggerated. The chief facts known about Evagoras speak for themselves; they show him to have been a man of unusually strong character, and of great abilities both military and political. A memoir of him is valuable not only on this account, but also on account of the peculiar position in which he was placed. Cyprus was divided between Phoenician settlements, such as Citium and Paphos, and later Greek settlements, such as Salamis and Soli. But the bulk of the population was, till long after the time of Evagoras, PhoenicianSee Professor Rawlinson's note (8) on Herod. v. 104.; and continual contact with the non-hellenic East must always have tended to depress the Greek element in Cyprus. Evagoras was the champion of Hellenism against The Cyprian Salamis an out-post of Hellas. barbarism at this out-post; first, as restorer of that Greek civilisation which the Phoenician and Tyrian masters of Salamis had effaced; afterwards, as antagonist of Persia in a War of Independence. Perhaps the most striking passage in the memoir is that which describes how commerce, arts, letters, humane intercourse with the outer world, having become extinct under the rule of the barbarian, speedily sprang into a new life under the rule of the Hellene§§ 47—50..

IV 4 Panathenaikos.

4. Panathenaikos [Or. XII.]—Isokrates began the Panathenaikos when he was 94 years of age (§ 3) —i.e. in 342 B.C. A celebration of the Great Panathenaea — mentioned in § 17—fell in Hekatombaeon (July—August) of that year, the third of Olympiad CIX. 3. It was probably the original intention of Isokrates that his speech should be published at this festival, as the Panegyrikos was probably published at Olympia: thus in § 135 he defends himself against the charge of discussing subjects unsuited to a great festal gathering. But this design, if he entertained it, was frustrated. He had written about half the discourse when he fell ill (§ 267); but at last it was completed and published when he was ninety-seven years old (§ 270), i.e. in Date. 339. It is thus the latest of his worksThe ἤδη ἀπειρηκώς of § 268 tallies with the παντάπασιν ἀπειρηκώς of the Third Letter (§ 4)— written in 338..

The Panathenaikos falls into three parts. I. §§ 1 Analysis. —34: Introduction. Of these sections only §§ 1—4 are properly introductory. The rest—§§ 5—34—form a parenthetical defence of his ‘philosophy’ generally, in reply to an attack make upon him by some ‘vulgar’ (ἀγελαῖοι) sophists ‘a little before the Great Panathenaea’ (§ 17).—II. §§ 35—198. The praises of Athens.—III. §§ 199—265. A supplement, in which the author notices certain criticisms upon his work, and rélates the circumstances under which it was composed.

I. ‘In my younger days I used to write, not on legends or remote history, nor in forensic causes, but on practical interests of Athens and Hellas—bringing to bear upon these all the resources of rhetoric. Such subjects and such a style do not now become my ninety-four years; rather it becomes me to speak as all men are apt to think that they could if they would, but as none can without toil.

‘I shall speak of the deeds of Athens and the goodness A personal vindication. of our ancestors. But first I must touch upon a personal matter. All my days I have been misrepresented by obscure and worthless sophists, and misjudged by those who knew me but from hearsay. Health, wealth, a certain repute among the educated have been mine; and yet, in old age, I am discontented. Nature denied me force for action, and gave me but imperfect talents for speech. Strength of voice and firm nerves were denied to me; and at Athens it is more discreditable to lack these than to owe money to the treasury. Not daunted, however, I took refuge in a literary life; and hoped, as the counsellor of Hellenic unity and of war against Asia, to gain more esteem than the speakers who rail against each other in the ekklesia. This hope has failed; I have been praised,—and slighted. It is not strange, indeed, that the public should treat me thus, when the professional sophists, who make their living by plagiarising from me, are my worst enemies. Their slanders never annoyed me until, a few days before the Panathenaea, I learned that a group of them, talking in the Lykeion about Hesiod, Homer and other poets, had spoken of me as scorning all such subjects,—as ignoring all fields of thought, all lines of culture, except my own. I thought that I was safe from a charge of this kind; but I find that I did not overrate the spite which has baulked me of due recognition. Instead of retorting upon the slanderers, or arguing with those whom they influence, I will state in a few words what my notion of culture is. Geometry, astrology, eristic dialogues are good for the young, if only as employing them; but they do not make practical men. By an educated man I understand one who can deal with all that comes upon him day by day; who is honest and mannerly in society; who rules his desires; who is not spoiled by good fortune. So much for culture: my views about the poets shall be set forth at some other time. I have already passed the limits of a preface (§§ 1—34).

II. ‘The beneficence of Athens to Hellas has often ere now been praised by me incidentally; but it has never been, as now, my special themc. I am moved to choose that subject at once by the intemperate censure and by the feeble, or else extravagant, praise bestowed upon our city; also by my own advanced age, which will make failure pardonable and success more creditable (§§ 35—38).

‘As purple or gold is most brilliant when it has a foil, Athens will be best estimated if we place beside her another great city—Sparta (§§ 39—41).

‘The comparison may begin from the Dorian conquest of Athens contrasted with Sparta. the Peloponnesos. Now our ancestors will be found to have cherished loyally the traditions of the Trojan war—concord with Hellas, and enmity against the barbarian. When the Kyklades, about which there had been disputes in the time of Minos, were at last seized, by the Karians, Athens restored them to the Hellenes§ 43. The relations of the Karians to Minos are thus described by Herodotus (I. 171): τὸ γὰρ παλαιὸν ἐόντες Μίνω τε κατήκοοι καὶ καλεόμενοι Λέλεγες εἶχον τὰς νήσους, φόρον μὲν οὐδένα ὑποτελέοντες, ὅσον καὶ ἐγὼ δυνατός εἰμι μακρότατον ἐιξικέσθαι ἀκοῆ·| οἱ δὲ, ὅκως Μίνως δέοιτο, ἐπλήρουν οἱ τὰς νέας . See, as an excellent commentary on Herodotos, Curt. Hist. Gr. bk. I. c. iii. vol. I. pp. 71 ff. tr. Ward. Cf. Clinton F. H. I. p. 39. ‘It seems, however, that at the death of Minos the Karians retained, or at least recovered, possession of the Kyklades; and that they were not finally expelled till the time of the Ionian colonies; for Isocrates and Plutarch [de exil. p. 603 B] describe them as possessing the Kyklades after the return of the Heraklidae into Peloponnesos, and ascribe their expulsion to the Athenians.’ Clinton thinks that the words of Isokr. in this passage refer ‘to the Ionic migration, when the colonists seized upon the Kyklades’. ib. p. 39, note g.. She founded cities on either Services to Civilization continent, drove the barbarians from the Asiatic seaboard, and taught the Greek communities how to live. Sparta, meanwhile, careless of agriculture and of all civilising arts, was concentrated upon one selfish object—the conquest of the Peloponnesos; all of which, save Argos, fell under her power. Thus, so far, Athens had been a friend to Hellas; Sparta, only to herself (§§ 42—48).

‘When, later, Xerxes invaded Greece, Sparta, the ruler Services against Persia of the Peloponnesos, sent but ten triremes to Salamis— Athens sent more than all the other states together. Sparta was represented by Eurybiades, who all but ruined Hellas; Athens, by Themistokles, who saved it (§§ 49—52).

‘Each of the two cities was in turn empress of the sea, The two Empires. and thereby of the greater part of Hellas. Athens used that power to give to her allies the same form of government which she had herself found best; Sparta used it to impose upon her subjects an unheard-of form of tyranny—the dekarchies, which led to such enormous evils. We held our empire 65 years; when attacked by Greece and Persia combined, we resisted ten years, and afterwards reestablished our power in less time than it had cost to overthrow it. The Spartans kept their empire barely ten years; lost it by a single battle; and have never recovered it. In treating with the Persian king, we forbade him to come west of Halys or Phaselis§ 59. See Panegyr. § 115 note Areop. § 80 note.; the Spartans made him master of Hellas (§§ 53—61).

‘Those who reluctantly admit the positive merits of The faults of Athens compared with those of Sparta. Athens will perhaps attempt to qualify them by citing her crimes. I do not say that Athens has been faultless; but only that, where she has sinned, Sparta has sinned more. We are accused of having forced our allies to bring their causes to our tribunals. Is not the number of those summoned before our courts smaller than the number of those whom Sparta put to death without trial? We are accused of having taxed our allies. But they paid tribute of their own choice, for their own defence, out of property which we had preserved to them; and, in return, were brought by us out of their forlorn condition to a prosperity as great as that of the Peloponnesians who paid no impost. We are accused of cruelties to Melos, Skione, Torone. If Athens has sometimes been guilty in this respect, the sufferers were petty islands or towns; while the cities which Spartan ambition has made desolate are the greatest in the Peloponnesos, —Messene, which sent Nestor to Troy,—Argos, which sent Agamemnon (§§ 62—73).

‘(Can I pass by Agamemnon without a word of special (Digression—Agamemnon.) praise, feeling for him, as I do, the sympathy of one who, like him, has missed his due fame? What element of greatness did Agamemnon lack? The only man who ever was leader of all Hellas, he led it against Asia, with kings for his subalterns; fought, not for his own gain, but for the safety of Greece, against such foreign adventurers as Pelops, Danaos, Kadmos; and, after keeping his army together for ten years by his own ability, took Troy, and quelled the insolence of the barbarians.) §§ 74—87.

‘I was saying that the victims of our severity have been insignificant; those of Sparta's illustrious, and, moreover, her own allies against Troy; the Messenians, namely, whom she drove from their country; and the Argives, with whom she is still at war. Plataea, the only city of Boeotia loyal to Hellas in the Persian war, was soon after taken by Sparta, and most of its citizens were put to death, in order to please Thebes. Athens, on the other hand, gave an asylum at Naupaktos to the Messenians, and bestowed her franchise upon the surviving Plataeans (§§ 88—94).—Both Athens and Sparta are accused of having reduced those cities, of whose liberty they professed themselves champions, to vassalage. Now in the early history of Athens there is no instance of her having aimed at ruling a single other city; whereas the policy of Sparta in the Peloponnesos has been from the first aggressive. Down to the time of our disaster at the Hellespont, we had never caused in any city the factions, the bloodshed, the revolution which, under Sparta, became rife everywhere. It was only when the Lacedaemonian power, after having become the first in Greece, began to decline, that two or three of our generals were guilty of imitating in a few cases a policy of which Sparta had set the earliest example.

‘Lastly, there is an offence against Hellas which Sparta has committed, but Athens, never. When most closely pressed by her neighbours, Athens has never forgotten the enmity which all Greeks ought to feel against the barbarian. Sparta used the alliance of the great king to advance her own power in Hellas; and rewarded him by supporting the rebel Cyrus with the forces led by Klearchos. Then, when Persia had defeated the Spartans at Knidos, they conciliated her by giving up the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 95—107).

‘Discreet admirers of Sparta will admit the truth of these criticisms. But those who cannot allow any fault in her will perhaps try to shift the ground of comparison to the relative merits of the Spartan and Athenian Constitutions. They will contrast the temperance and discipline which prevail there with the licence common among us.

‘I hope to show the superiority of the Athenian Constitution—not, Athenian Constitution. indeed, in its present form, but in the form which it had under our ancestors; and which they abandoned, not because they were dissatisfied with it, but from necessity. A land-empire is maintained by moderation and strict discipline; a maritime empire requires nautical skill, hands to row the ships, and a certain reckless, piratical spirit. It was plain that in becoming naval, Athens must lose her old decorum and her hold upon the affection of the allies; but even this was better than submitting to the rule of Sparta.

‘The history of our ancestors’ polity must be traced from a time when as yet Oligarchy and Democracy were not; when barbarians and Greeks alike lived under Monarchies. If the savage heroes of other cities have claimed mention, much more do those of Athens deserve it. The horrors of which, in those days, Thebes and Argos were full, have supplied endless material for tragic poets; Athens, meanwhile, had already a noble civilisation. The favour of the gods was shown by this rare blessing—that from Ericthonios to Theseus the line of hereditary kings was unbroken§ 126. As Mr Clinton observes (F. H. vol. I. c. 2, p. 61), Isokrates considers Ericthonius properly as the first of the Attic kings. And it is probable, though not certain, that he regarded Theseus as the last. See § 130: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Θησέως ἀρετῆς νῦν μὲν ὡς οἷόν τ’ ἦν ἀνεμνήσαμεν ˙ περὶ δὲ τῶν παραλαβόντων τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν ἣν ἐκεῖνος παρέδωκεν οὐκ ἔχων τίνας ἐπαίνους εἰπὼν ἀξίους ἂν εἴην εἰρηκώς......κατεστήσαντο γὰρ δημοκρατίαν. This would naturally mcan that, on the death of Theseus, a Democracy was established. And such an interpretation is in perfect harmony with Helen. Encom. § 36—ὥσθ’ ὁ μὲν (Theseus) τὸν δῆμον καθίστη κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, οἱ δὲ μόνον αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ἠξίουν, ἡγούμενοι πιστοτέραν καὶ κοινοτέραν εἶναι τὴν ἐκείνου μοναρχίαν τῆς αὐτῶν δημοκρατίας. It was not monarchy, but his monarchy, which they preferred: on his death, then, they would have the democracy.. Elsewhere I have spoken at length of Theseus, or this would have been a fitting time to celebrate him. It was his glory that he chose work before the mere pleasures of a Theseus. kingly lot; and that he shared the government of the city with the people. His successors established a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy. Some regard Aristocracy, like Timocracy, as a distinct type of polity§ 131. Isokrates denies that ἀριστοκρατία and ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων πολιτεία are to be reckoned ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. See, on the other hand, Plato Polit. § 291 D, where the three types of government (as popularly conceived) are said to be:—1. Monarchy, subdivided into (a ) βασιλεία, constitutional monarchy, (b) τυραννίς, unconstitutional: 2. ‘The rule of the few,’ ἡ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεία, subdivided into (a) ἀριστοκρατία, the good term, (b ) ὀλιγαρχία, the bad. 3. Democracy: of which the good sort and the bad are called by the same name. In Aristotle (Politics III. vi.— viii) we have three normal (ὀρθαί) types—1. μοναρχία, 2. ἀριστοκρατία, 3. πολιτεία (Republic): and three corresponding perversions (παρέκβασεις)—1. τυραννίς: 2. ὀλιγαρχία. 3. δημοκρατία.. I recognise but three distinct types—Oligarchy, Democracy, Monarchy. The principle which selects the best men for office is applicable to any one of these; and, in all alike, insures prosperity. At present we have to consider the application of this principle to Democracy only. If the subject seem to some too grave for such an occasion as this, it will at least interest those whom I most wish to please; though I doubt my own power of doing justice to it.

‘The excellence of the old Democracy was due to the The Old Democracy. moral discipline to which the people had been subject under the monarchy. They did not forget the lessons learned then; they chose for leaders men friendly to the new system, but characterised by the old virtues of justice and sobriety. Under the presidency of such men, they soon got a thoroughly good code of laws,—compact, fair, useful, and consistent. Officials were chosen by the demes and tribes, and looked upon office as a task, troublesome, indeed, but honourable. The punctual discharge of this task was followed by moderate praise and designation to some fresh labour; the slightest failure in it was infamy and ruin. Office, therefore, was rather shunned than courted in those days; and the people were content with a constitution which, while exempting them from services, gave them sovereign power over their servants. The proof of this contentment is the fact that the constitution remained unchanged for not fewer than 1000 years,—from its origin to the time of Solon and of Peisistratos§ 148 οὐκ ἐλάττω χιλίων ἐτῶν. The Constitution spoken of here must be that δημοκρατία just mentioned (§ 147)—δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένη (§ 131)—which succeeded the Monarchy. There would be no point in the passage if in αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία he meant to include the Monarchy. We are driven, then, to infer that the Isokratean date for the close of the Monarchy is 1560 B. C.—some 500 years earlier than the date assigned by the commoner tradition to Kodros, and about 400 earlier than that assigned to Theseus, whom (as was remarked above) Isokrates seems to have regarded as the last king. (In the Encom. Helen. Isokr. himself makes Theseus a lover of Helen.) But, in the vagueness of the legends about early Attica, a writer—especially a rhetorical writer—was at liberty to take almost any round number that suited his purpose.. The latter used his demagogic power to make himself a despot. If it is objected that I speak too positively of a remote past, I reply that this is at least a generally credited account (§§ 108—150).

‘The principles of the old polity have been stated; it Mutual Political Lessons. remains to speak of its results. But a possible objection must first be met. It will, perhaps, be said that both the civil and the military institutions of Athens in the earliest times were borrowed from Lykurgos. The resemblance may be allowed. But it was Sparta that borrowed from us the idea of a Democracy tempered with Aristocracy, and of elective, instead of sortitive, offices. The Areiopagos, again, was the model of the Gerousia (§§ 151—154).

‘As regards military science, too, it can be shown that Military Science. the Spartans did not practise it earlier, or use it better, than we did. First, however,—in order to appreciate the manner in which our ancestors used their military skill,—it is necessary to remember how both Athens and Sparta dealt with Hellas after the Persian wars. They made peace with Persia, and attacked each other. Argos and Thebes followed their example; and to this day Persia is arbiter of Hellas (§§ 155—160).

‘The rulers of Athens before the Persian war had no aim but the national well-being. They mediated between cities which were at variance; drove the barbarian from the islands and coasts which he had seized; and thus gave the Greeks wealth and security (§§ 161—167). Their military repute may be judged still better from their interference on behalf of Adrastos, when the Thebans, alarmed at their approach, consented to bury the Argive dead (§§ 168—171). (In the Panegyrikos § 58. the Athenians were spoken of as having prevailed by force; but the more exact account given here proves no less the fame of their arms (§§ 172—174.)

‘Further, compare the early wars of Sparta with those of Early wars of Athens and of Sparta. Athens. Immediately after the Dorian conquest, the aristocratic party became predominant in Lacedaemon; and, instead of allowing the people to share the franchise, fixed them to dwell as vassals in outlying villages, subject not only to the burdens of war, but to outrage and death at the caprice of the civic body. The victories of our Athenian ancestors were not of this shameful kind, but were won in three different periods of war against aliens. One period was that of the struggle with Xerxes; another, that of the war for the possession of the Asiatic colonies,—in which no Dorian took part. In the third (the earliest) period, Thracians, Scythians, and Eurystheus with his Peloponnesians, were in turn defeated; and, later, the troops of Dareios were routed at Marathon. Victorious so often, our fathers were yet true to their old, steadfast character; for they knew that the highest soldiership is impossible to immorality (175—198).

III. ‘Here, at its climax, this discourse would naturally Epilogue. have ended. I will explain how I have been forced to prolong it.

‘It had been written thus far, and I was revising it with three or four of my young pupils. We thought that nothing but a conclusion was wanted; but it occurred to me to ask a friend of oligarchical sympathies, and devoted to Sparta, if he could point out any misstatement which we had over looked. He came; heard, and praised, the greater part of Conversation with a friendly critic. the essay; but evidently disliked the criticisms upon the Spartans. ‘If Hellas owes them nothing else,’ he said, ‘it should be grateful to them for this—that they discovered the noblest rules of conduct, which they observe themselves and have taught to others.’—‘All would allow,’ I replied, ‘that piety, justice, prudence, are the best rules of conduct. The Spartans have been settled no more than 700 years in the Peloponnesos. If, then, these rules were first observed at Sparta, were they unknown to Herakles and Theseus, to Minos, Rhadamanthos, Aeakos? Again, discoverers are usually men of more than average intelligence and knowledge; but the Spartans are ignorant of the rudiments of letters. And as for their morality, they train their youth to rob the surrounding country; punishing them if they are found out, and promoting them if they are not.’ ‘By rules of conduct,’ he answered, ‘I did not mean piety, justice, prudence. I meant a manly, warlike training, and loyalty to one common purpose.’ ‘None are so blameable,’ I said, ‘as those who put good things to a bad use. The Spartans employ their warlike science to harass, and their unanimity to divide, the other Greeks’ (§§ 199—228).

‘My opponent was silenced, and went away a wiser man, inasmuch as he had learned the lesson recommended at Delphi. He had learned to know himself—and Lacedaemon. I had my essay written out immediately. But three or four days later new misgivings assailed me. It seemed to me New misgivings. that I had been too supercilious and too bitter in my expressions about Sparta. At last I called a council of friends to decide whether the composition should be burnt or published. It was read to them, and well received. The rest were The critic as a comforter. talking it over among themselves, when my original adviser, the partisan of Sparta, addressed me. ‘I suspect,’ he said, ‘that you are not really uneasy about the manner in which you have spoken of the Lacedaemonians, and that you have brought us here only to try us. Your first idea was to extol Athens by comparing it advantageously with Sparta. Then, conscious that you had always been a panegyrist of Sparta, you became afraid of seeming inconsistent. Accordingly, you gave the semblance of censure to what was really praise. You have reproached the Spartans as arrogant, warlike, grasping. Now arrogance is allied to a lofty spirit. It is a warlike, not a peaceful temper which enlarges and guards possessions. Covetousness on a petty scale is, indeed, unpopular, and so defeats its own ends; but the covetousness of nations and despots has results which all the world admires. I am no enemy to the fame of your performance in thus pointing out its covert meaning. The hint will assist intelligent Spartans to perceive that, in accusing their city of having conquered all its great neighbours, you have glorified it; and that, in dwelling upon the faction and bloodshed among its dependents, you have implied the exemption of Sparta from such evils. You are to be congratulated upon the fame which you must win for having made both Athens and Sparta appear admirable;— Athens, to the many; Sparta, to the thoughtful. Do not burn your essay, but publish it, adding the discussion to which it has given rise; and so prove that you are as superior to the ordinary writers for the festivals as Homer to the poets who have copied him.’

‘These remarks were applauded enthusiastically; and all urged me to take the counsel. I thanked my able adviser; but did not tell him how far he had hit, or missed, my real mind (§§ 229—265).

‘My work is finished; a word in conclusion as to the Conditions under which the work was written. circumstances under which it was done. It was begun in the 94th year of my age, and was half-completed, when I was seized with the disorder against which I have been struggling for three years. For a long time I did not allow it to stop my labours; but had at last given in, when friends pressed me not to leave this speech unfinished. I did as they wished, though in my 97th year, and in a state in which few could bear to be listeners, much less writers. This is not said to win indulgence, but simply in order to make the facts known. An acknowledgment is due to those who value instructive and artistic essays above mere displays; and a warning to those who judge rashly what they do not understand’ (§§ 266—272).

Isokrates prefaces the Panathenaikos with the Remarks remark that both in respect to subject-matter and in respect to style it belongs to a different class from those works which employed his best years. Those works dealt with contemporary politics; this is purely historical: those displayed all the resources of an elaborate rhetoric; this is in a plain, though finished, style. He fears that the Panathenaikos will seem somewhat languid—μαλακώτερος—if compared with its brilliant predecessors: it must be judged, he says, in view of its own special scope.

There is one comparison, however, which can The Panathenaikos compared with the Panegyrikos. hardly be avoided on this plea. The chief topics of the Panathenaikos are embraced in the first half of the Panegyrikos. These are:—1. The early services of Athens to Hellas in founding colonies, and in repelling the barbarians: Panath. §§ 42—48: Panegyr. §§ 34—37. 2. The early wars of Athens: Panath. §§ 175—198: Panegyr. §§ 51—70. 3. Athens in the Persian wars: Panath. §§ 49—52 and 189: Panegyr. §§ 71—74, 85—98. 4. The maritime empire of Athens: Panath. §§ 53—61: Panegyr. § 104, &c. 5. The misdeeds in Hellas of Athens and of Sparta respectively: Panath. §§ 62—107: Panegyr. §§ 100—132. Now, it is not merely in rhetorical brilliancy, it is in point and definiteness of thought, in vigour, in clearness of arrangement, that the Panegyrikos is so greatly superior to the Panathenaikos. The Panegyrikos is the earliest of its author's longer compositions, and the best; the Panathenaikos is the latest, and must be pronounced the weakest. The symptoms of the condition in which the writer then was—‘exhausted both by sickness and by old age’ (§ 268)—are indeed evident in many places. They appear in the diffuse yet incomplete reply to his detractors inserted at the beginning; in the long digression on Agamemnon, closed by the avowal that he knows not whither he is ‘drifting’ (§ 88); in the disorder especially of §§ 155—198; and in the rambling supplement §§ 199—265. This last raises a curious point. Isokrates evidently felt that his vehement censures of Sparta in the Panathenaikos were inconsistent with much in the general tone of his other writings (§ 239). But how far did he seriously mean to hint, as his own, the view which he makes his critic suggest—that these censures were, in their esoteric meaning, praise; since arrogance, aggressiveness, rapacity often win prizes which command [vulgar] admiration? In § 265 he declines to say how far the critic's suggestion had hit or missed his mind. If the critic was in any measure right, then the ingenuity of Isokrates had, indeed, declined.

The Panathenaikos contains, as has been seen, Isokrates on Early Athens. little that is not said better in the Panegyrikos; but it has at least one passage of distinctive interest. In §§ 108—154 Isokrates sketches his theory of the early Constitutional History of Athens. The characteristic feature of this theory is that it ignores any Oligarchical period, properly so called, between the Monarchy and the Democracy. The Monarchy is immediately succeeded by a Democracy; a Democracy tempered, indeed, by the principle of preferring the ‘best men’—δημοκρατία ἀριστοκρατίᾳ μεμιγμένη (§ 153). The term ‘oligarchic,’ as applied to the statesmen of this period, was a mere calumny of Peisistratos (§ 143). The elasticity of meaning which Isokrates gave to ‘democracy’ may be illustrated from Areopag. § 61, where he says that the Lacedaemonians are best governed because they are most democratic. It is noticeable, however, that in the Areopagitikos he dates that elder Democracy which he holds up to imitation, only from Solon— ὁ δημοτικώτατος (§ 16); perhaps because that preSolonian democracy which he here extols appeared to him a practically unattainable ideal.

III. Essays on education.
III 1 Against the Sophists.

1. Against the Sophists [Or. XIII.]—As Isokrates himself tells us, this discourse was written at the beginning of his professional life ὅτ’ ἠρχόμην περὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν πραγματείαν: Antid. § 193. He wrote it ἀκμάζων (opposed to παυόμενος τῆς φιλοσοφίας), ib. § 195.; and it may probably be assigned to the year 391 or 390 B. C.Sauppe would place it in, or about, 388 B.C. But a passage in the Gorgias has been taken, and no doubt rightly, as alluding to a phrase in the κατὰ σοφιστῶν. Gorg. p. 463 A, δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι (ἡ ῥητορικὴ) ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τί ἐπιτήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἄνθρώποις. Cf. κατὰ σοφιστ. § 17, ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. It can scarcely be doubted that Plato's στοχαστικός is a sarcasm upon δοξαστικός as used by Isokrates. Now, the composition of the Gorgias is probably to be placed in the interval between 395 and 389. The κατὰ σοφιστῶν, then, is probably earlier than 389. Sanneg (de Schol. Isokr. p.7) puts it in Ol. 96 (396—393 B. C.). Date. The speech would thus have the character of a manifesto in which, at the outset of his career, the teacher protests against the system adopted by other members of his profession, and declares the principles by which he himself intends to be guided. In its extant form the discourse is plainly imperfect. It breaks off at the point where Isokrates is passing— as he passes in the introductions to the Busiris and the Encomium on Helen—from destructive criticism to positive illustration Busir. [Or. XI.] § 9: Helenae Encom. [Or. X.] § 15. In both these places the transition is marked by the very same phrase which in the κατὰ σοφιστῶν introduces the concluding sentence of § 22:—ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῦ ‘but lest I seem (to be criticizing others while unable to do better myself).’ The lost part of the κατὰ σοφ. contained that exposition of the author's own principles to which these words led up..

‘If those who undertake to instruct others would only Analysis. tell the truth, instead of promising more than they can perform, they would not have been in such ill-repute with the non-professional world. As it is, their reckless boasting has brought discredit upon literary studies generally.

‘First, the professors of Eristic Discussion are to blame. Teachers of ‘Eristic.’ They assert that their pupils will know how to act under all circumstances, and will, through this knowledge, be happy; thus claiming a prescience which Homer, wisest of poets, denies to the gods,—for he represents them debating. And this precious secret of happiness is sold by its proprietors for three or four minae. Most absurd of all, they do not appear to believe that the persons whom their course of teaching is to inspire with virtue and moderation will be ordinarily honest at the end of it. They take securities from their pupils for the payment of fees. Is it not natural that plain men should look upon such teaching as an imposture? (§§ 1—8.)

‘Next, the teachers of Forensic and Deliberative speaking§ 9 πολιτικοὶ λόγοι. See below, p. 131, n. 4. Teachers of Rhetoric. are to blame. They say that the art of speaking well on all occasions can be taught as certainly as the alphabet. Would that it were so! As it is not so, such idle talk ought to be stopped. All literary men suffer by the prejudice which it excites. It is surprising that teachers can succeed who assume an analogy between an art depending on fixed rules and the exercise of a creative faculty. The letters of the alphabet are the same for every one. The conditions of a good speech are not precisely the same for any two persons. A speech, to be good, must be wortny of the subject, suitable to the occasion and to the speaker, and in some measure original. All would allow that the art of speaking has often been mastered, both in theory and practice, without professional aid. Talent and experience are the two requisites for success. Instruction can polish, but cannot make, oratorical power. It is not difficult to learn the elements ( ἰδεῶν)For this use of ἰδέα, see above, p. 39, note 4. out of which all speeches must be composed. But to combine and temper these elements rightly, and to give to the resulting whole a proper colouring, requires a vigour, an imaginative force, which cannot be communicated; although, where these exist, they will be developed under a teacher who himself possesses them. (§§ 9—18).

‘The pretentious school of sophists which has lately sprung up, however flourishing now, will, I feel sure, be at last reduced to admitting this. As for the sophists before our time who wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric, they, too, had their faults. They undertook to teach the mode of conducting law-suits—thus confining their subject to its most Writers of ‘Arts.’ odious branch, and falling below the Eristics, who at least professed to aim at virtue, whereas these avowed themselves teachers of rapacity. Now the study of practical rhetoric, though insufficient to form a good speaker, might at least have been used to inculcate fairness in argument. Justice cannot be taught; but a spirit of justice may be encouraged and developed by lessons in Deliberative speaking.

‘That I may not seem to be complaining of what others undertake to do, and myself, at the same time, undertaking what is impossible, I will give the reasons which have led me to this view’...... (§§ 19—22: Conclusion wanting).

Isokrates was, and called himself, a sophistIt is true that Isokrates often speaks with contempt of ‘sophists’; but these are ‘vulgar’ sophists (ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταἱ, Panath. § 18): ‘obscure and worthless sophists’ (σοφισταὶ ἀδόκιμοι καὶ πονηροί, ib. § 5); or persons who claimed the honourable name of sophist without having any real title to it—τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ φάσκοντας εἶναι σοφιστάς, Helen. Encom. § 9: so τῶν φασκὁντων εἶναι σοφιστῶν ἄλλο δὲ τι πραττόντων, Antid. § 215: and τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφιστῶν, ib. § 221.It is in reference to these vulgar, these sham sophists, that Isokrates describes himself as ἀνομοίως ζῶντα καὶ τοῖς σοφισταῖς καὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις, Antid. § 148.On the other hand, he distinctly calls himself a σοφιστής in the general sense of that term, as describing a man who followed a certain profession; who gave literary, and in particular rhetorical, instruction for pay. The whole of §§ 167—269 of the Antidosis—his Apology for his life—is devoted to answering ἡ κοινὴ περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διαβολή (§ 168). In § 157 he says — referring to exaggerated reports about his own wealth— that it is a mistake to suppose that a sophist's business is as lucrative as an actor's. And in refuting the charge, laid against himself and others, of corrupting the youth, he says, with evident allusion to the distinction attained by many of his own pupils—‘It is a sophist's noblest and greatest reward if some of his pupils prove themselves men of high character, sensible men, men respected by their fellow-citizens’—σοφιστῇ μισθὸς κάλλιστός ἐστι καὶ μέγιστος, ἢν τῶν μαθητῶν τινες καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ καὶ φρόνιμοι γένωνται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολιταῖς εὐδοκιμοῦντες ( Antid. § 220)., that is, a professional teacher of philosophy and rhetoric; though he distinguished himself from the ἀγελαῖοι σοφισταί, the common herd of the profession. Who, then, are those sophists whom in this Definition of the censures. speech he condemns; and what was the extent of his disagreement from them?

Three classes of teachers are censured. (1) The (1) The ‘Eristics.’ Eristics,—οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας διατρίβοντες (§ 2). Their chief characteristic, as described by Isokrates, is that they profess to impart, for a small fee, absolute knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, § 3), which will enable its possessor to act rightly under all circumstances; virtue being included in the knowledge so taught (§ 6). In this description, the sarcasm upon knowledge, and the preference given to intelligent opinion (§ 8), would seem to reflect upon the Sokratics; just as elsewhere Isokrates speaks of ‘Eristic dialogues’ with apparent reference to the Platonic dialogues τοὺς διαλόγους τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς καλουμένους οἷς οἱ μὲν νεώτεροι μᾶλλον χαίρουσι τοῦ δέοντος, τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων οὐδείς ἐστιν ὅστις ἂν ανεκτοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι φήσειεν: Panath. § 29. This is undoubtedly an allusion to the popularity of the Platonic (and, generally, of the Sokratic) dialogues, as Dr Thompson points out (Appendix II, Phaedr. Append. II. p. 176).—ignoring that distinction between Dialectic and Eristic on which Plato insists in the Philebos and the Euthydemos See, e.g., Phileb. p. 17 A: Euthyd. p. 278 E, and ad fin. Cf. Arist. περὶ σοφ. ἐλέγχ. c. 11, οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοί (i.e. unsound reasoners) ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εὶς χρηματισμόν, σοφιστικοί.. It may be questioned whether here Isokrates means Plato, as he certainly does in a later work, the Encomium on Helen; but at least there must be a reference to the minor Sokratics, and especially to EukleidesThompson l.c. p. 177; Spengel, Isokrates und Platon, p. 15. On the other hand, Mr H. Sidgwick (Journal of Philology, vol. IV. no. 8, p. 292, ‘The Sophists’,) thinks that the Platonists are included..

(2) The second class of teachers blamed by (2) The Teachers of Rhetoric. Isokrates are the professors of ‘Political Discourse’, that is, of Practical Rhetoric, Deliberative and ForensicThis was the proper sense of πολιτικὸς λόγος: see Vol. I. p. 90. But Isokrates considered as πολιτικοὶ λόγοι only those discourses (whether, in form, Deliberative or not) which treated what he called political subjects (above p. 41). He regards Forensic speeches as merely sham πολιτικοί. cf. § 20, &c. —ἐκεῖνοι δ’ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους παρακαλοῦντες ...... πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας ὑπέστησαν διδάσκαλοι εἶναι.. Now it was the professed aim of Isokrates, no less than of ProtagorasCf. Plat. Protag. 318 E: where Protagoras undertakes to teach εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, and power τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν., to impart a practical training for the active duties of a citizen. The clue to the meaning of the censure pronounced here is to be found in that passage of the Antidosis where Isokrates defines the scope of his ‘philosophy’ Antid. §§ 186—191. He there says that three things go to form a first-rate public speaker—nature, discipline, experience. Of these, natural aptitude is by far the most important; experience ranks next; instruction, παιδεία, is of least moment; for without one, at least, of the other qualifications it can do little. At the same time all persons, whatever their capacity, who have been properly taught, will bear the stamp of a uniform scientific method Antid. § 205.. What, then, he means to censure in the professors of whom he speaks here is not their pretension to a scientific method of teaching Practical Rhetoric; it is the unlimited efficacy which they claimed for instruction, independently of nature or experience. They promised unconditionally to make anyone a good speaker: this promise Isokrates denounces as imposture (ἀλαζονεία § 10).

(3) Besides these two classes—the Eristics and (3) Writers of ‘Arts.’ the teachers of Political Discourse, who are described as of recent growth—a third class of sophists is condemned by Isokrates. This consists of ‘those who lived before our time and wrote the so-called Arts of Rhetoric.’ Here, again, the limits of the censure must be noted. Isokrates himself probably wrote an ‘Art;’ at any rate, some of his extant precepts on rhetorical composition might certainly have had a place in such a treatise. It is not the attempt to reduce the theory of Rhetoric to a system which he is condemning here. He is complaining that the earlier writers of Arts devoted themselves entirely to the least noble branch, the Forensic. They professed to teach men ‘political discourse’; but really ‘they undertook to be teachers of meddlesomeness and greed’ (§ 20), whereas the Eristics at any rate aim at imparting virtue. The writers on Rhetoric primarily meant are, no doubt, Korax and Tisias—perhaps also Antiphon. Such treatises as those of Gorgias, Thrasymachos of Chalkedon, and Polos, however unsatisfactory in other respects they might seem to Isokrates, were probably less liable to the particular censure passed here. It may be presumed that they dealt, not with Forensic Rhetoric exclusively, but with Rhetoric in all its branches, especially the Epideictic. The complaint of Isokrates is in one aspect perfectly just. It is repeated by Aristotle; who remarks that the earlier writers of Arts almost confined themselves to Forensic Rhetoric just because they had not a really scientific method, and therefore preferred that field in which chicanery (τὸ κακοῦργον) had the freeest scopeArist. Rhet. I. 1, § 10. .

The Speech Against the Sophists ought to be Relation of this Discourse with the ‘Antidosis’. read along with the Speech On the Antidosis, written some thirty-five years later, when his career was drawing to a close. Taken together, they express his whole educational and literary creed. There is a thorough harmony between the principles of the two essays; but there is likewise a difference between their points of view. In the earlier discourse, Isokrates is concerned solely in distinguishing himself from false brethren. In the later, he is not only defending himself, but vindicating the entire profession to which he belonged, from the criticism of laymen.

III. 2. On the Antidosis.

2. On the Antidosis [Or. XV.] The discourse was written when Isokrates had completed his 82nd year (§ 9), i.e. later than midsummerCf. Clinton, Fast. Hellen. s. ann. 436 & 354., 354 B. C.; and alludes to the fine imposed upon Timotheos (§ 129), who was now dead (§ 101). Timotheos was brought to trial about midsummer, 354, and died at Chalkis later in the same year. This speech may probably, then, be placed in the first half of 353 Date. B. C. The latest work of Isokrates quoted in it is the Speech On the Peace (§ 66), which belongs probably to the earlier half of 355 B. C. Isokrates had lately been called upon to undertake the trierarchy, or to make exchange of properties ( antidosis) with his challenger. The case had come to a trial; the trierarchy had been imposed upon Isokrates, and he had discharged it (§ 5). Vexed, however, by the general prejudice against his pursuits to which he felt that the verdict had been due, he determined to publish an Apologia—a discourse ‘which should be an image of his mind Form of the discourse. and life’ (§ 7). This he throws into the form of a speech made in court against one Lysimachos (§ 14), who, by working on popular prejudice, is seeking to cast the burden of the trierarchy upon him. Much of the discourse is not, he allows, in the forensic style (§ 10); yet, by the concluding allusion to a verdict (§ 323), he aims, in a measure, at sustaining the fiction to the end.

It is known that, in 355 B. C.The date is fixed by Dionys. De Dinarch. c. 13—ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας— i e. the last campaign of the Social War, in the spring of 355 B.C., Isokrates had The fiction based on fact. really been challenged to an exchange of properties by one Megakleides; and, being unable through illness to appear in court, had been represented by his adopted son Aphareus, whose speech on the occasion is quoted by DionysiosDionys. De Dinarch. 13: De Isocr. 18.. Now this is probably the trial to which Isokrates refers as having been decided against him. It must have taken place at least a year before the date of this discourse, since it is implied that the public service had now been discharged (§ 5). Lysimachos is a fictitious person who stands for the Megakleides of the real trialSee § 8, εἰ δ’ ὑποθείμην συκοφαντήν τινα. It was evidently through taking Lysimachos to be a real person that the pseudoPlutarch was led into stating that Isokrates had had two lawsuits ( ἀγῶνες) about the trierarchy (Vitt. X. Oratt.). Isokrates and his adopted son Aphareus were among the 1200 richest citizens (συντελεῖς), and had thrice borne the trierarchy as well as other leiturgies (§ 145). The Aphareus mentioned as a past trierarch by Dem. (Agst. Euergos and Mnesippos § 31) is probably this one: Schäfer, Dem. III. Append. v. p. 197..

‘If this speech were an ordinary specimen of the Forensic Analysis. or Epideictic class, it would need no preface. As it is of a new kind, its origin must be explained. I had long known that some of the sophists slandered my pursuits, and represented me as a writer of speeches for the law-courts. They might as well have called Pheidias a doll-maker, Zeuxis or Parrhasios a sign-painter. Believing that I had made it clear that my subjects are not private disputes but the greatest and highest questions, I supposed such idle calumnies to be powerless. Now, however, at the age of 82, I have discovered that they influence the general public. A person who had been called upon to serve as trierarch challenged me to exchange properties with him, or else to take the duty. A lawsuit followed. The plaintiff dwelt upon the evil tendency of my writings, upon my wealth and the number of my pupils; and the court imposed the trierarchy upon me. The expense I bore with equanimity; but I wish to correct the prejudices which led to such a verdict. This discourse is Motive and nature of this piece. meant as an image of my mind and life. It is cast into the form of a defence in an imaginary trial. It contains some things that might be said in a lawcourt; some, unsuited to such a place, but illustrative of my philosophy; some, which may profit young men anxious to learn; some, taken from my former writings and introduced here in harmony with a special purpose. The resulting whole must not be judged as representing any one class of speech, but as made up of several distinct elements brought in with several distinct aims. It ought to be read, not continuously, but part by part. (§§ 1—13.)

‘The worst knave is he who brings against another Appeal to the Court. charges to which he himself is liable. Lysimachos, delivering a composed speech, has dwelt most of all upon the insidious skill of my compositions. Do not be swayed by calumny; remember the oath taken yearly by judges that they will hear impartially accuser and accused. Ere now Athens has regretted a hasty verdict; and it would be shameful that Athenians, reputed in all else the most merciful of the Greeks, should be rashly cruel in their own law-courts. No one of you, the judges, can tell that he will not be the next victim of Lysimachos. A good life is no protection from such men; they show their power upon the innocent in order to be bribed by the guilty. Never till this day have I been brought before judge or arbitrator; now, if you will hear me, I hope to prove my real character.—Read the indictment. [Indictment.] (§§ 14—29)

‘Here, in the indictment, he charges me with corrupting Isokrates has been conversant, the youth by teaching them to be tricky litigants. In his speech, on the other hand, he represents me as the most wonderful of men;—as one among whose pupils have been public speakers, generals, kings, despots. He thinks that I shall be envied on the latter account, and detested on the former. Dismiss prejudice, and decide upon the merits of the case. That my literary skill has not been used for bad purposes, appears from the fact that I have no enemies. If I had, they would have profited by this trial to appear against me. This skill itself, if it has been well used, is a claim to esteem. The difference between me and a writer of lawspeeches will appear if you compare our modes of life. Men not with Forensic Rhetoric, frequent the places from which they draw their subsistence. Those who subsist by your litigation almost live in the lawcourts. No one has ever seen me in a council-chamber, at the archon's office, before judges, before arbitrators. Pettifoggers thrive at home; my prosperity has always been found abroad. Is it probable that Nikokles of Cyprus, sovereign judge among his people, should have rewarded me for aiding him to become a pleader? No mere writer of law-speeches has ever had pupils; I have had many. But it is not enough to show that my line of work has not been this. I will shew you what it has been. (§§ 30—44.)

‘First, it must be remembered that there are as many branches of prose as of poetry. Some prose-writers have spent their lives in tracing the genealogies of the Heroes. Others have been critics of the poets. Others have compiled histories of wars. Others have woven discussions into dialogues. My work has lain in yet another field,—in the composition of discourses bearing upon the politics of all Hellas, and fitted for recitation at Panhellenic but with Panhellenic Politics. gatherings. Such discourses evidently stand nearer to poetry than to forensic rhetoric. Their language is more imaginative and more ornate; there is greater amplitude, more scope for originality, in the thoughts which they strive to express. They are as popular as poems; and the art of writing them is much studied. Unlike forensic speeches, they deal with matters of universal interest; they have a lasting value, independent of any special occasion. Besides, he who is a master of these could succeed also in a law-court; but not vice versa. At these I have worked; and have got by them a reputation better than law-courts could give. (§§ 45—50.)

‘I am ready to impose the severest terms upon myself. Achallenge. Punish me, not merely if my writings are proved harmful, but if they are not shown to be matchless. It is not necessary here to argue on probabilities. My writings are themselves the facts in question. Samples of them shall be shown to you, and you shall judge for yourselves. The discourse from which the first sample shall be taken was written when Sparta was at the head of Greece and Athens in a low estate. It seeks to rouse Hellas against Persia; and disputes the claim of Sparta to sole leadership.—(Begin at the mark in the margin, and read them the passage about the hegemony.) [Here is read an Extract from the Panegyrikos, §§ 51—99.] (1) Quotation from the ‘Panegyrikos’. (§§ 51—59.)

‘Is the writer of this a ‘corrupter of young men,’ or their inciter to noble daring? Does he deserve punishment; or is he to be thanked for having so praised Athens and your ancestors that former writers on the same theme feel remorse, and intending ones, despair? (§§ 60—61.)

‘Some who, themselves unable to create, can only criticise, will say that this is ‘graceful’ (they could not bring themselves to say ‘good’); but that praise of the past is less valuable than censure of present mistakes. You shall hear, then, part of another speech in which I assume this office of censor. Its immediate subject is the peace with Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium; it goes on to show the drawbacks to a maritime supremacy; and ends by addressing to Athens exhortation, censure and advice.—(Begin there, and read this extract to them.) [Here is read an Extract from the Speech On the (2) Quotation from the Speech ‘On the Peace.’ Peace, §§ 25—56: §§ 132After the words καθεστάναι πολιτείαν in § 133 is introduced a sentence which does not occur in our text of the De Pace, but which is a paraphrase of the opening words of § 136 of that speech. ff. to the end.] (§§ 62—66.)

‘You have now heard parts of two discourses; a short passage from a third shall be read, in order that you may see how the same tendency goes through all that I have written. Here, addressing Nikokles of Cyprus, I did not aim at regular composition, but merely strung together a number of detached precepts upon government. It is not for their literary merit, but simply as showing the spirit of my dealing with princes as well as with private men, that they are quoted here. One who so boldly advised a king to care for his people, would surely be no less frank in the popular cause (3) Quotation from the Discourse ‘To Nikokles’. under a Democracy.—I begin by blaming the usual neglect of special preparation by a monarch; and then urge Nikokles to regard his office as a task calling for serious labour. [Here is read an Extract from the Discourse To Nikokles, §§ 14— 39.] (§§ 67—72.)

‘This shall be the last of these long extracts; but I reserve the right of referring in detail to my own writings whenever it can be useful. I offered just now to bear any penalty, not Comments. merely if it could be shewn that my writings were harmful, but unless it could be shewn that they were incomparable. That boast has been justified. What attempt could be holier or more righteous than the attempt to praise our ancestors worthily of their exploits; what theme nobler than his who urges Hellenes to unite against barbarians? Good laws are allowed to be the greatest blessings to human life. Yet these benefit only the individual city; my discourses profit all Hellas. It is easier to be a legislator than to be a competent adviser of Athens and Hellas. The legislator, in an advanced stage of civilisation, is often little more than a compiler; the thoughts of an effective speaker must be his own. Teachers of moral philosophy differ from each other and from the world as to what is virtue; the virtue which I inculcate is recognised by all. Those theorists seek only to draw disciples to themselves; my object is to impress a public duty upon Athens. The alleged vices of my teaching are disproved by the affection of my pupils; who, at the end of three or four years, have left me with regret. Lysimachos has accused me, without a shadow of proof, of corrupting them; but I will refute him formally. (§§ 74—92.)

‘You know my writings; you shall now hear who have His friends have been good men. been my associates from childhood, and the evidence of my contemporaries shall prove the statement. Among my friends in youth were Eunomos, Lysitheides, Kallippos; afterwards Onetor, Antikles, Philonides, Philomelos, Charmantides Eunomos is perhaps identical with the Eunomos who commanded an Athenian fleet in 388 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. v. i. §§ 5—9), and with the Eunomos mentioned by Lysias as sent on a mission to Sicily (de bon. Arist. §§ 19 ff.) 2. Lysitheides is named by Dem. adv. Callipp. § 14, as a friend of lsokrates and Aphareus; and in Mid. § 157, along with Kallaeschros, as among the wealthiest citizens. 3. Kallippos is perhaps identical (as Sauppe thinks) with the person against whom Demosthenes wrote Or. LII. 4. Onetor, the brother-in-law of Aphobos: Dem Oratt. XXX. & XXXI. 5. Antikles, unknown. 6. Philonides, unknown: unless he is the Φιλωνίδης Μελιτεύς against whom Lysias wrote his speech in a trial βιαίων (Sauppe Att. Oratt. II. 208), and whom the comic poets ridiculed (Bergk Rell. Com. Att. pp. 400 ff.). 7, 8. Philomelos, Chirmantides, unknown.. All these were crowned with golden crowns for their services to Athens. Whether you suppose me to have been their adviser and teacher, or merely their companion, my character is vindicated. If it is not, what would it have been if among my intimates had been such a man as Lysimachos? Some will perhaps say that I am citing good men whom I barely knew, but keeping out of sight the rascals who were my pupils. I am ready to waive all credit for honourable friendships, and to bear the full discredit of any which can be shown to have been disreputable. (§§ 93—100.)

‘The general charge against me in the indictment—that Timotheos. of corrupting my associates—has been sufficiently answered. But special stress has been laid upon my friendship with Timotheos; and, since the interests which he long controlled were so great, especial pains have been taken to slander him. I, therefore, who am supposed to have been his adviser and teacher, cannot be silent. If he is shown to have been a bad man, let me share the blame. If he is proved to have been incomparable as a general and as a citizen, let the honour be his alone. Now, in the first place, no general ever took so many and such important cities. Corcyra, important in regard to the Peloponnesos,—Samos, for Ionia,—Sestos and Krithôtê, for the Hellespont,—Potidaea, for Thrace,—were taken by him with slender resources. He forced Lacedaemon into the present peace§ 109. ταύτην αὐτοὺς ἠνἅγκασε συνθέσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην—i.e. the Peace of Kallias, 371 B.C. The victories of Timotheos had, by weakening Sparta, led up to this peace; although it cannot properly be represented as the direct result of them., the most advantageous ever concluded by Athens. In a word, he took 24 towns at a smaller outlay than the single siege of Melos cost our fathers. These exploits were achieved at a time when we were weak and our enemies strong. By what qualities did Timotheos achieve them? He was not of the ordinary type of your generals,— neither of a robust frame, nor trained in the camps of mercenaries. But he knew against whom, and with whose aid, to make war; how to form, and to use, a force suitable for each attempt; how to bear privations, and to remedy them; how to win for Athens the trust and the love of Greece. A general who, like Lysander, has one brilliant success is less great than one who for years deals wisely with ever-varying difficulties. Yet Timotheos was brought to trial for treason; and, although Iphikrates took the responsibility for what had been done, Menestheus for what had been spent, they were acquitted, while Timotheos was fined in an unheard-of sumThe sum was 100 talents—i.e. about £24,000: Deinarch. in Demosth. § 14.. Ignorance, envy, excitement, go far to explain this result; but it must be owned that the character of Timotheos contributed to it. He was no anti-democrat, Why Timotheos was condemned. no misanthrope, not arrogant; but his unbending loftiness of mind made him liable to seem all this. Against my advice, he refused to conciliate the speakers who sway the ekklesia and those who direct the opinion of private circles. These men made it their business to frame falsehoods about him— falsehoods which, had I space, I could bring you to see and hate. But I must go back to my own case. (§§ 101—139.)

‘I hardly know how to arrange the topics on which it remains for me to speak; perhaps it will be best to take each as it occurs. But here I am checked by the warning of a A friend's counsel. friend,—which you shall hear. ‘If you describe your blameless life,’ he said, ‘you will only provoke jealousy. That you should have so written as to deserve public gratitude, and that your intimates should have been men whom Athens delighted to honour; that, till now, you should have been a stranger to lawsuits; that, while seeking no public emoluments, you should have enrolled yourself and your son among the twelve hundred who pay the war-tax and bear the public services; that you and he should thrice have discharged the trierarchy, and performed the other services at a greater cost than the laws enjoin; that you should receive presents from abroad, and avoid all display at home—these things will but irritate your judges.’ When my friend said this, it seemed to me that it would be strange if any reasonable men could object to my bearing the city's burdens and yet declining its rewards. I decline its rewards not from arrogance, but from preference for a quiet life. It is not because I am very rich that I take so large a share of its burdens. No sophist has ever made a great fortune. Gorgias The wealth of Sophists exaggerated. of Leontini, who passed much time in Thessaly when it was the richest part of Greece—whose life was spent in seeking wealth from city to city, and who had no family burdens— left only 1000 staters. The income of a sophist must not be judged by that of a popular actor. Compare me, if you will, with the most successful men in my own profession; and you will find that I have been at once a thrifty householder and a liberal citizen. (§§ 140—158.) Things have changed at Athens since I was a boy. Then wealth was not only dignified but safe, and every one affected to be richer than he was. Now it is more dangerous to be suspected of wealth than of The new dangers of riches. the worst crime. When my fortune was wrecked in the Peloponnesian war, and I resolved to repair it by teaching, I hoped that success in my new profession would bring credit and respect. It has brought, however, only envy and slander. Lysimachos, who lives by the informer's trade, is accuser—I, who have not preyed on you, but have prospered through the gratitude of men whom I had saved, stand in danger. Our ancestors made Pindar their public friend (proxenos), and Pindar and Athens. voted him 10,000 drachmasAbout £400—not an illiberal douceur, even if we adopt that version of the story which represents the poet as having been heavily fined for this panegyric by his fellow-countrymen, and the Athenians as merely reimbursing him with 100 per cent. interest— διπλῆν αὐτῷ τὴν ζημίαν ἀπέδοσαν, [Aeschin.] Ep. IV. Pindar's words were αἵ τε λιπαραὶ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀοίδιμοι (Ελλάδος ἔρεισμα, κλειναὶ )Αθᾶναι, δαιμόνιον πτολίεθρον (Frag. 46, ed. Donaldson, p. 346) because he bore witness that Athens is the stay of Hellas. It would be hard if I, who have given her praise ampler and nobler than that, should not be allowed even to end my days in peace. (§§ 159—166.)

‘The indictment has now been answered. But from the first I have foreseen that I should have to combat, not merely the charges against myself, but the prejudice against these studies generally. Reflection, however, assured me that among you I should find fairness, and that the cause of Philosophy could be satisfactorily defended. In the fact of the prejudice against it there is nothing strange. Athens is large and populous. Public opinion here is irregular Public Opinion at Athens. and vehement as a winter-torrent. It sweeps down all men and all things that it chances to seize. This has befallen my studies. But you must decide calmly. Remember that it is not my case alone which is at issue, but the education of our youth—upon which the future of Athens must depend. If Philosophy is a bad thing, it should be absolutely banished; if it is a good thing, it should be encouraged, and its detractors should be silenced. I wish that this accusation had been brought against me (if it was to be brought) at a time when I could have pleaded the cause of philosophy with the vigour of a younger man. However, I will try to set before you, as well as I can, its nature—its power—its relation to other sciences—the benefits which it is able to confer—and the degree in which I profess to impart them. If the style of the defence is singular, pardon it to the difficulty of the subject. (§§ 167—179.)

‘What Gymnastic is for the body, Philosophy is for the Analogy of Philosophy to Gymnastic. mind. In the one as in the other, the pupil learns first the technical rudiments, and then how to combine them. The physical and the mental training will alike improve natural powers. But the master of the palaestra cannot make a great athlete, nor the teacher of Philosophy a great speaker. To make the latter, three things are needed—capacity, training, and practice. Capacity—which includes intellect, voice, and nerve—is the chief requisite. Practice, however, can by itself make a good speaker. Training is by far the least important of the three. It may be complete, and yet may be rendered useless by the absence of a single quality— nerve. (§§ 180—192.)

‘Do not suppose that my claims are modest only when I Proof that Isokr. has always discountenanced false claims. address you, but larger when I speak to my pupils. In an essay published when I first began to teach, the excessive pretensions of some teachers are expressly blamed.—This passage will explain my view.

[Here is read an Extract from the Essay Against the Sophists, §§ 14—18.]

You see, then, that at the outset as at the close of my career, in safety as in danger, I have held this language.

‘This, I well know, will not satisfy those against whose prejudices I am contending. Much more must be said before they can be converted or refuted. Their prejudice utters itself in one of two assertions:—that the system of the sophists is futile; or that it is effectual, but immoral. (§§ 193—198.)

‘Those who say that it is futile try it by a standard The Sophistic system is (1) effectual, which they apply to none of those arts in which they believe. They demand that all its disciples shall become finished speakers in a year. The success of the sophists is, in fact, equal to that of any other class of teachers. Some of their pupils become powerful debaters; others become competent teachers; all become more accomplished members of society, better critics, more prudent advisers. And what proves the training to be scientific, is that all bear the stamp of a common method. These who despise such culture assume that practice, which develops every other faculty, is useless to the intellect; that the human mind can educate the instincts of horses and dogs, but cannot train itself; that tame lions and learned bears are possible, but not instructed men. (§§ 199—214.)

‘Others maintain that Philosophy has an immoral and (2) not immoral. tendency, and hold it responsible for the faults of a few who pervert it. I am not going to defend all who say that they are sophists, but only those who say so truly. And first—What are What motive has a Sophist for being dishonest? the objects which tempt men to be dishonest? I answer that the object is always one of three things—pleasure, profit, or honour. Could it be pleasant, profitable, or honourable for a sophist that his pupils should be known as rascals? It may perhaps be replied that men do not always calculate; that a margin must be left for intemperate impulse. But, even if a sophist indulged such impulses in himself, it could be no more for his pleasure than for his interest to encourage them in his pupil. Are the strangers who come from Sicily, from the Euxine and other quarters to the rhetorical schools of Athens brought hither by the desire to become knaves? Or, if that were their wish, could they not find teachers at home? But the whole tenor of their life among us proves them honest men. Again, if power in discourse is in itself a corrupting thing, all those who have possessed it, and not some only, ought to have been tainted by it. Yet the best The best statesmen have been orators. statesmen of our generation and of the last were those who had most studied oratory. To go back to old times, Solon, Kleisthenes, Themistokles, Perikles, were all distinguished orators: Solon was even called one of the Seven Sophists. Perikles studied under Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, and under DamonDamon, the musician, is mentioned as a master of his art in Cic de Orat. III. xxxiii. § 132, and was said to have taught Perikles. (Plat. Per. c. 4). Plato's high estimate of him appears from the Laches, p. 180 D, where Nikias says that Sokrates has lately recommended to him a teacher of music for his sons—‘Damon, a pupil of Agathokles—amost accomplished musician, and not merely that, but in every respect a desirable companion for young men at their age.’, who was the ablest Athenian of his time (§§ 215—236).

‘But I can point out the places in which may be found The real corrupters are the sycophant. those who are really liable to the charges falsely brought against the sophists. Read the tablets, giving notice of lawsuits, which are published by the Thesmothetae, by the Eleven, and by the Forty§ 237 οἱ τετταράκοντα—judges who went circuit through the Attic demes (δικασταὶ κατὰ δήμους), deciding cases of αἰκία and βιαίων and δίκαι in which not more than ten drachmas were at stake: Smith, Dict. Anlt. s. v. . Among the names of wrongdoers and of false accusers which figure there will be found those of Lysimachos and his friends,—not mine, nor that of any member of our profession. Were we really corrupters of youth, our accusers would have been the fathers and relatives of those whom we corrupted,—not such men as Lysimachos, whose interest it is that Athens should be demoralised. Just now I spoke of the hostility which some educated men feel towards our art. That hostility, I venture to hope, will have been disarmed by these plain statements. But there is, I think, a jealousy which is even more widely spread. It is How men worship ‘Persuaston’ at Athens. because all ambitious men wish to be able speakers, but are too indolent to work for that end, that they dislike those who are ready to go through the necessary toil. It is strange that, while Athenians reproach the Thebans and others with neglecting culture, they should revile their fellow-citizens for seeking it; that the goddess of Persuasion should be honoured with yearly sacrifice, while those who wish to share her power should be regarded as desiring something evil; that bodily training should be esteemed, while mental training— to which Athens owes her place in Hellas—is slighted (§§ 237—257).

‘If a man used his inherited wealth, his skill as a hoplite or as an athlete, in doing harm to his fellow-citizens, he would be punished, though the founders of his fortune, the teachers of his skill, might be praised. The gods have given Speech— man's noblest gift us speech—the power which has civilised human life; and shall we not strive to make the best use of it? (§§ 251—257.)

‘Lysimachos and such as he are not the only enemies of Rhetoric. It is attacked also by the professors of Eristic. The true place of ‘Eristic’ in education. Instead of retorting their reproaches, I wish simply to aid you in estimating their studies relatively to ours. Eristic discussion, like Astrology or Geometry, seems to me not to deserve the name of Philosophy, since it has no practical bearing; but, rather, to be a good preparation for Philosophy. Schoolboys are trained to work and to think accurately by grammar and literary study; Philosophy forms a more manly discipline of the same sort for young men. But no one should allow his mind to be dried up by barren subtleties, or to drift into such speculations as those with which the Ionic physicists juggled (§§ 258—269).

‘Having said what Philosophy is not, I musttry to explain Philosophy is the art of conjecturing what should be done. what (as I think) it is. My view is very simple. A wise man is one who can make a good guess (knowledge being impossible) as to what he ought to say and do. A philosopher, a lover of wisdom, is one who spends his time in the pursuits by which he may best gain such perception. And what are these pursuits? My answer will probably shock you; but I should be ashamed to betray the truth for the sake of peace in the fraction of life remaining to me. Well, then, I hold Virtue cannot be taught. that there is no communicable science of Virtue or Justice; but that a man ambitious of speaking well, of persuading others, and (in the true sense) of gain, will incidentally become more virtuous and more just. Desirous of speaking But the philosopher will be virtuous. with applause, he will occupy himself with the noblest themes, and dwell upon the worthiest topics of these. Desirous of persuading, he will strive to be just, since nothing is so persuasive as a character which is felt to be upright. Desirous of real gain, he will seek the approval of the gods and the esteem of his fellow-citizens. It is only by a perversion of language that the ‘desire of gain’ has been associated with knavery; as ‘wittiness’ with buffoonery, and ‘philosophy’ with the mystifications of the elder sophists. This conception of philosophy as something unpractical—this tendency to discourage all systematic training for affairs— has its result in the lives of our youth. Their occupations Young Athens. are to cool wine in the Enneakrunos,—to drink in taverns,— to gamble, —to haunt the music-schools. The informers do not molest those who foster these pursuits. They attack us, who discourage them; and say that youths who spend on their education a tithe of what others spend on vice, are being corrupted (§§ 270—290).

‘Power of speaking, when simply natural, is admired; it The culture of eloquence is strange, then, that blame should be cast upon the attempt to cultivate it. When acquired by labour, the faculty is more likely to be used discreetly than when it is an accident of genius. Athenians, of all men, ought not to despise culture. It is cultivated intelligence which distinguishes distinctive of Athens. men from beasts, Hellenes from barbarians, Athenians from Hellenes. Athens is regarded as the teacher of all who can speak or teach others to speak; the greatest prizes, the best schools, the most constant practice are supplied by her. For her to disown the study of eloquence would be as if Sparta laid disabilities on military education or the Thessalians on skill in horsemanship. In athletic prowess, Athens has many rivals; in culture, none. Her intellectual culture is what Her alory and her shame. most commands the admiration of foreigners; as the prevalence of informers is the one blot to which they can point. You ought to punish those who bring disgrace upon you, and honour those who do you credit. Miltiades, Themistokles, Perikles, became great by the pursuits which these informers vilify. Remembering this, strive to keep the lawcourts pure for the citizens generally; and honour the ablest and most cultivated among them as the truest guardians of the democracy (§§ 291—309).

‘The length of my defence has already passed due limits; Epilogue. but there are still a few words that I would say to you. It is bitter to me to see the informer's trade prospering better than the cause of education. Would our ancestors have Ancient respect for culture. Solon. looked for this? Solon, eldest of the Sophists, was put by them at the head of the State; against informers they appointed not one mode of procedure only but many,—indictment before the Thesmothetae, impeachment before the Senate, plaint to the Assembly. And informers are worse now than they were then. Their audacity has grown with The demagogues. the licence of those demagogues to whom our fathers entrusted the protection of the Athenian empire; who, by reproaching our most distinguished citizens as oligarchs and partisans of Sparta, made them such,—who harassed, and so estranged, our allies,—who brought Athens to the verge of slavery. Time is failing me; I must cease. Others conclude by committing their cause to the mercy of their judges and the entreaties of their friends; I appeal to my past life. The gods, who have protected it hitherto, will protect it now. Your verdict, whatever it may be, will be for my good. Let each of you give what sentence he will’ (§§ 310—323).

The speech On the Antidosis falls into two main divisions. In §§ 1—166 Isokrates defends himself. In §§ 167—323 he defends his Art—‘the discipline of discourse’, ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία (§ 168). His own practice, as described in the first part, agrees with his theory, as set forth in the second. What that theory was—what Isokrates claimed, or did not claim to do—and how he was distinguished from his brother ‘sophists’—it has been attempted to explain in a former chapterCh. XIII. p. 36..

Isokrates: Political Writings
I. On the relations of Greece with Persia.
I 1. Panegyrikos.

1. Panegyrikos [Or. IV.]—The date of the speech is determined by § 126. It is there said that the Spartans are besieging Olynthos and Phlius. Olynthos was besieged in 383 B.C., Phlius early in 380; both fell towards the close of 379. The speech cannot, then, have been published before 380 or after 379. Now the year 380 B.C. was the first of the hundredth Olympiad. The title Panegyrikos— given to the speech by Isokrates himself—points only to some great festival, and has been referred by one critic Preller, Demeter and Persephone, p. 71 n., who refers to § 62, εἰς τὴν χώραν ταύτην: but ταύτην merely answers to ἐξ ἧς—(that land, from which). The Greater Panathenaea fell in the third year of each Olympiad. The celebrations nearest to 380 B.C. would therefore have been those of 382 and 378; and the Lesser Panathenaea can scarcely be thought of. to the Greater Panathenaea. But, taking the other circumstances into account, it seems hardly doubtful that the Panegyrikos was published at the time of the Olympic festival in the autumn Date. of 380 B.C.An ingenious, but to my mind improbable view, has lately been suggested by W. Engel (Rauchenstein, Introd. to Panegyr. p. 21). Engel thinks that the whole speech —except §§ 125—132—was written and published as early as 385 B. C. He observes that (1) in §§ 125—132 the Spartans are spoken of with a bitterness which is in contrast with the conciliatory tone used towards them in the rest of the oration: (2) in § 141 the defeat of Evagoras by the Persians (placed by Diod. in 386 B. C.) is alluded to; but Isokrates seems to know nothing of the capitulation of Evagoras in 385 (acc. to Diodoros XV. 4). Engel thinks that the war between Evagoras and Persia began in 394 B. C. It lasted 10 years, and ended in 385 B C. (Diod. XV. 9). The six years of § 141 are then, 391—385.Now argument (1) from the tone of §§ 125—132 appears to me wholly untenable; since in §§ 129 —132 Isokrates expressly and elaborately apologises for whatever may seem harsh in the tone of §§ 125—128. As regards argument (2), it is valid only if the chronology of Diodoros is accepted. Clinton, F. H. vol II. p. 279 (Appendix c. 12, on the Cyprian War), thinks that Diodoros is clearly wrong. He believes that the war began in 385 and ended in 376. Grote, too, rejeets the authority of Diodoros, and places the war in 390—380 B.C.: c. 76, vol. x. p. 30 n.

The duty of Hellenic unity against the barbarian had already been the theme of Gorgias and of Lysias in speeches delivered at OlympiaSee above, on the Olympiakos of Lysias.. It is not likely Mode of publication. that, like theirs, the oration of Isokrates was recited at the festival by its author. His want of nerve and voice, and much in the contents of the speech itself, would probably have deterred him from such an attempt. The speech may, indeed, have been recited for him; but it is more likely that it was first introduced to the Greek public by copies circulated at Olympia, and sent to cities in which Isokrates had friends among the leading menSandys, Introd to Paneg. p. xli. .

His appeal to Panhellenic patriotism was made State of the Greek world in 380 B.C. at a time when such patriotism was sorely needed. By the Peace of Antalkidas in 387 B. C. Artaxerxes II. had become master of the Asiatic Greeks, and ultimate arbiter in the affairs of western Hellas; the Aegean, no longer protected by an Athenian fleet, was infested by pirates; the party strife which the dekarchies had exasperated was everywhere filling the smaller cities with bloodshed; and Sparta, regardless of the autonomy which the Peace had guaranteed to every state, was using these troubles for her own ends. In 385 the Spartans had destroyed Mantineia; in 383, besieged Olynthos; in 382, seized the Kadmeia; in 380, besieged Phlius.

The Panegyrikos falls into two main divisions. Analysis. In the first (§§ 1—132) Isokrates urges that Athens and Sparta, laying aside their jealousies, should assume the joint leadership of Greece. He argues that, if Sparta at present holds the first place, Athens has the better historical claim to it; and that, therefore, a compromise might well be made. In the second part (§§ 133—189) he shows the direction in which the forces of Greece, once consolidated, ought to be turned — namely against Persia.

I. ‘It is strange that the founders of the great Festivals should have kept all their rewards for a physical prowess which serves only the athlete himself, and should have assigned no honour to the mental toil from which flow benefits to all. Content, however, with the hope of simple approbation, I am here to offer counsels of unity among Greeks and A summons to unity. war against the barbarian (§§ 1—3). If the theme is not new, it admits of better treatment than it has received (§§ 4 —5). The crisis is not yet past,—nor, therefore, the season for advice (§§ 3—5); and it is of the essence of oratory that it seeks to put familiar facts in a more impressive way (§§ 7—10). There are some who dislike all elaborate speaking, and who cannot distinguish between occasions for safe plainness and for a loftier effort. I address myself to those who expect speakers on a great theme to rise above the common level; and I crave no indulgence if I fail to do so (§§ 11—14).

‘That the various cities of Greece should renounce their Obstacle to Greek concord— Sparta. feuds and turn together against the barbarian, has often been urged; but the point from which such unity must begin has been missed. Hellas is divided, for the most part, between oligarchies dependent on Sparta and democracies dependent on Athens. Before the lesser States can be in harmony, the leaders must be reconciled, and must consent to share the headship (τὰς ἡγεμονίας διελέσθαι, § 17). Sparta is the obstacle. She fancies that she has an ancestral right to sovereignty. If it can be shown that this right belongs rather to Athens, Sparta will either yield something, or, if she does not, will be clearly in the wrong (§§ 15—20).

‘Maritime Empire belongs of right to Athens, whether Claims of Athens to Empire. the test be (a) naval efficiency, (b) antiquity, or (c) services done to Greece. Her services have been of two kinds, (1) civil, and (2) military (§§ 21—27).

(1.) ‘The first things which human life needs came to Gifts of Athens to primitive Greece. Hellas through Athens. Demeter, visiting Attica in her search for Persephone, gave to its inhabitants two gifts,—the corn-crop, and the rite of the Mysteries. Athens did not keep these blessings to herself, but freely shared them with all. If the tradition be questioned because it is lost in antiquity, on the other hand this antiquity implies wide acceptance. It is accredited by the fact that most Greek cities pay to Athens a yearly tribute of first-fruits. It has also an a priori likelihood. The earliest men, most needing, were most likely to obtain, direct help from the gods; and the people of Attica are confessedly the oldest of races (§§ 28—33).

‘The next great boon which Athens bestowed on early Athens the mother of Colonisation. Greece, was the enlargement of the area covered by Greeks. Seeing the barbarians widely spread and the Hellenes straitened for space, she provided the cities with leaders under whom they conquered from the alien new homes both in Europe and in Asia; peopled islands in every sea; and, in opening a career to colonists, saved the mother country (§§ 34—37).

‘These primary benefits were followed by others. Athens Athens the founder of civil life. was not content with having given the Hellenes the necessaries of life; she gave them civilisation. Hers were the earliest laws, hers was the earliest Constitutional Polity. With her originated the arts which minister to men's needs or pleasures. The central emporium of Hellas, the Peiraeus, was established by her. All the advantages, all the charms of those great gatherings at which Greeks of every city forget their differences in a sense of common worship and of common blood, are supplied in an unequalled measure by the The Athenian Festivals. festivals of Athens; nay, she herself is for all visitors a perpetual festival. Practical philosophy, the deviser and organiser of all these things—rational eloquence, the permanent distinction of high natures—are honoured by her as by no other city. So pre-eminently is she the seat of national culture that a man is not considered in the fullest sense a Hellene merely because he is of Hellenic blood, unless, further, he bears the stamp of the Athenian mind (§§ 38—50).

(2.) ‘Such are the services which Athens has rendered Athens the military champion, to the civil life of Hellas. Her military services have been equally great, both in wars between Greeks, and in wars of Greek against barbarian.

‘In Greece she has always shown herself the unselfish (1) of oppressed Greeks: champion of the oppressed. Thus she successfully aided Adrastos against the Thebans and the Herakleidae against Eurystheus. The greatness of Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese—a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring, or claiming to rule, Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta, were in early times, as they are now, the foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was greater than them all—the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded Sparta (§§ 51—65).

‘Against the barbarians Athens has waged more wars (2) of Greeks against barbarians. than could fitly be told here: a few of the chief only shall be named. In the infancy of Hellas, Attica was invaded by the Thracians under Eumolpos, son of Poseidon, and, later, by the Scythians leagued with the Amazons, daughters of Ares. The Thracians were so crushed that they withdrew from their old seats on the Attic frontier to a more distant abode. Of the Amazons, not one who came hither returned; and those who had stayed behind were driven from their realm on account of the disaster (§§ 66—70).

‘Similar in spirit and in result were the wars against The Persian Wars. Dareios and Xerxes. In these, Athens won a double victory; she drove back the apparently irresistible hordes of the enemy, and took the prize for valour from allies whose bravery it seemed impossible to surpass. Lacedaemon, indeed, did brilliant service; the greater the glory for Athens of having outshone such a rival. The Persian Wars claim special mention here, illustrating, as they do at once the heroism of our ancestors and the hostility of Greek to barbarian. The subject has been well-nigh exhausted by the speakers of Funeral OrationsCf. the note of Mr Sandys on Paneg. § 74, where he enumerates the known early ἐπιτάφιοι, viz. (1) that of Perikles in honour of those who fell at Samos in 440 B C.: (2) the speech of Perikles in 431 B.C.: (3) the ἐπιτάφιος of Gorgias. (4) the ἐπιτάφιος commonly ascribed to Lysias: (5) the Menexenos of Plato: (6) the ἐπιτάφιος ascribed to Demosthenes and purporting to have been spoken after Chacroneia: (7) the ἐπιτάφιος of Hypereides.; but, as it relates to my present purpose, I must not shrink from touching upon it (§§ 71—74).

‘Praise is due, first of all, to those earlier generations of Public spirit of old. Athenian and Spartan statesmen who sowed the seed of the valour which afterwards saved Hellas. They were characterised in all things by unselfish public spirit. They were thrifty of the resources of the state; they were sensitively loyal to its honour and to its interest in their personal conduct and in their legislation. Political parties, political clubs then vied only in benefits to the city. Thus were formed the men who, surpassing the captors of Troy, vanquished Asia; men whose merit transcends all that has been said or sung of them. Surely some god must have ordained that struggle in order to bring into full light natures worthy of the demigods of old (§§ 75—84).

‘The rivalry between Athens and Sparta was never so noble as in the Persian wars. When the army of Dareios invaded Greece, the Athenians, without waiting for the allies, met it at Marathon; the Lacedaemonians, on hearing of the Marathon. peril, had no thought but to hasten to the rescue. When, later, Xerxes came with his host, marching over the Hellespont and sailing through Athos, Sparta won glory at Thermopylae. Arlemision. Thermopylae, Athens at Artemision. Then began the last period of the war: and in this the Athenians distanced all competitors. Scorning the overtures of an enemy who actually held their city, and true to allies who had forsaken them, they made ready to fight alone at Salamis. Shame brought the Salamis. Peloponnesians to their side; but, of the Greek ships engaged, Athens furnished more than all the other States together.

‘If there is now to be an expedition against the barbarians, who ought to lead it? Who but the foremost fighters, the most unselfish sufferers, in the former war; the founders, in ancient days, of cities to which, later, they became saviours? Would it not be hard if, having borne most evil, we did not receive most honour; if, having once been chosen to lead, we should now be forced to follow? (§§ 85—99.)

‘Everyone must allow that, up to the close of the Persian Charges against Athens. wars, Athens had deserved the supremacy. But it is objected that, after her attainment of maritime empire, she did much evil to Greece; notably in the cases of Melos and of Skione§ 100, τὸν Μηλίων ἀνδραποδισμὸν καὶ τον Σκιωναίων ὅλεθρον. The fate of the Melians in 416 B. C. (Thuc. V. 84—116) and of the Skioneans in 423 B.C. (Thuc. V. 37) was the same;—the men of military age were put to death, the women and children sold as slaves. If any real antithesis is meant between ἀνδραποδισμός and ὄλεθρος, it must refer to the fact that the very name of Skione was effaced. The territory was given to the Plataean refugees: Thuc. v. 32.. Now, these were towns which had made war upon her; they were treated simply with a rigour usual in war. The true test of Imperial Athens is to be found in the condition of her Test of Imperial Athens. loyal subjects. These, during seventy years, enjoyed exemption from tyrants, from barbarians, from the strife of factions, from enmity in any quarter. The settlement of Athenian citizens upon the lands of conquered rebels has been quoted in evidence of her rapacity. But such settlements The kleruchiae. were meant merely as defensive garrisons, not as outposts of aggression. If Athens is indeed so acquisitive, why has she never seized Euboea? (§§ 100—109.)

‘Though we have given such proofs of moderation, we Imperial Sparta. are actually accused of selfishness and harshness by those partisans of Sparta who supported the dekarchies in the various cities;—who inflicted on their own countries a fate worse than that of Melos;—who enslaved themselves to a HelotLysander was a μόθων,—i.e. the son of a Helot, brought up as fosterbrother of a Spartan, and afterwards freed: see Lidd. and Scott s. v., and honoured the assassins of their fellow-citizens more than their own parents;—who brought such misery to every hearth that no man had time to grieve for his neighbour. These presume to criticise the tribunals of Imperial Athens,—although they, in three months, put to death untried a greater number of persons than Athens put on trial during the whole period of her empire. A single decree might have cancelled the ‘severities’ of our rule; the bloodshed and lawlessness of theirs are irreparable (§§ 110—114).

‘Sparta has, indeed, given nominal peace§ 115, the Peace of Antalkidas. and nominal Present condition of Greece. independence to the Greek cities. But the state of Hellas is very different from what it was in the days of Athenian ascendancy. Pirates on the sea, marauders on land render life insecure. The ‘independent’ towns, if not desolate, are subject to despots, to harmosts, or to Persia. Formerly, when the Great King invaded our territory, Athens made him tremble for his own: she even forbade him to launch a warship west of Phaselis§ 118, ἐπὶ τάδε Φασήλιδος. The so called Peace of Kimon has usually been placed in 450 B.C.: Clinton F. H. The tradition was founded on the fact of an Athenian embassy to Persia headed by Kallias: Her. VIII. 151. Grote and Curtius take different views of this. Grote thinks that Kallias really negotiated a treaty—in 449 B. C.; c. xlix. vol. v. pp. 455—464. Curtius thinks that the embassy of Kallias failed; no treaty was formally concluded, but the terms of the legendary treaty represent truly the relative positions of Persia and Hellas at the time. (Hist. Gr. vol. II. p. 412 tr. Ward.) Note that (as Mr Sandys observes) the cessation of Persia from hostilities is described in § 118 as a simple result of Athenian victories; in § 120, as the result of a definite convention. This well illustrates the view of Thirlwall, Curtius and others, that the belief in a definite treaty grew out of the vague boasts of orators who were seeking a contrast to the treaty of Antalkidas.. Now, he has landed troops in Laconia, taken Cythera, ravaged the Peloponnesos. The treaty made with Persia under our empire was a notable contrast to that which has just been concluded. Sparta went to war for the purpose of freeing the Greeks, and has ended by giving up a large proportion of them to Persia. The Ionians are not merely tributaries to the barbarian, they do not merely see his garrisons in their citadels: they suffer worse bodily usage than our bought slaves. Sparta is answerable for this. She has become the ally of absolutism against constitutional freedom. She has devastated Mantineia, seized the Kadmeia, besieged Olynthos and Phlius; she is in league with Amyntas of Macedon§ 126. Amyntas II. began to reign in 394 B C. In 393 the Illyrians invaded Macedonia. Amyntas, compelled to evacuate Pella, made over to the Olynthian Confederacy the towns and territory on the Thermaic gulf, and withdrew to Thessaly. In 383 he succeeded in recovering the greater part of his kingdom. But the Olynthians refused to restore that part of it which he had given into their keeping. Hereupon, in 383, Amyntas sent envoys to Sparta asking for help against Olynthos (Diod. XV. 19). Envoys from Akanthos and Apollonia came on the same errand about the same time: Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 11. Throughout the Olynthian war(383—379) Sparta was actively aided by Amyntas: Diod. XV. 19—23., with Dionysios of Syracuse, and with the master The Spartan alliances of Asia. Is it not monstrous that the city which claims to lead the Hellenes should have formed against them a perpetual alliance with the barbarians?

‘I have spoken harshly of Sparta; but not as an enemy who would denounce,—rather as a friend who would admonish. Instead of making her neighbours helots to herself, Appeal to Sparta. let her make the barbarians dependents of Greece. Instead of crushing the Aegean islands with taxation, let her seek wealth on the continent of Asia (§§ 115—132).

II. ‘To lookers-on our conduct would seem madness. While we quarrel among ourselves, the king of Persia profits by our divisions. We suffer him to blockade one Greek The position of Persia. armament [that of Evagoras] in Cyprus§ 134. The war between Evagoras and Persia lasted ten years (Isokr. Evag., Or. IX. § 64: Diod. XV. 8, 9). In the course of it, Evagoras got together 200 triremes and attacked the Persian fleet at Citium, but was utterly defeated; was blockaded soon afterwards in Salamis; and, after a brave resistance, capitulated.Diodoros assigns the war to 394 —385 (XV. 8, 9); the seafight to 386 (XV. 2, 3); the capitulation (ib. 8) to 385. Isokrates alludes in § 141 to the seafight, and here (§ 134) speaks of the blockade as existing. He says, moreover, that the king of Persia has now wasted six years in the war; which naturally means, and has always been taken to mean, that it is six years since the war began.I. Engel reconciles Diodoros with Isokrates by supposing that, with the exception of §§ 125—132 which allude to 380 B.C., the Panegyrikos was published in 385, just before Evagoras capitulated. The ‘six years’ of Isokrates are, then, 391—385, during which the war was actively prosecuted,—394—391 having been years chiefly of preparation. (See Rauchonstein, Introd. to Panegyr. p. 21 and note above.)II. Clinton, holding the natural view that the entire Panegyrikos was first published in 380, sets aside the chronology of Diodoros. He believes that the war began in 385, in which year Evagoras suffered his defeat at sea, and ended in 376. The ‘six years’ of Isokr. are, then, 385—380. The blockade of Salamis must have followed soon upon the defeat; and we have, then, to suppose a resistance of some nine years on the part of Evagoras, if, as Diodoros says, the blockade was terminated only by his surrender.III. Grote also places the Panegyrikos in 380. But he assigns the war to 390—380 or 379. Xenophon (Hellen. IV viii. 24) mentions that an Athenian fleet was sent to the aid of Evagoras in 390 B. C. Grote relies on this fact as showing that the war between Evagoras and Persia had begun in 390. Clinton, on the other hand, thinks that this Athenian expedition, and a subsequent one in 388, related to hostilities which preceded formal war. Grote does not define the ‘six years’ of Isokr.; but suggests that they may be taken either from the Peace of Antalkidas (from which, however, 380 was the eighth year) or from the defeat of Evagoras in 385.It seems impossible—in the absence of better data—to arrive at a certain or satisfactory conclusion. For my own part, I incline to prefer, with Clinton, the authority of Isokrates to that of Diodoros; to suppose that the Athenian expeditions of 390 and 388 preceded any formal declaration of war; that the actual war began in 385; that the naval defeat of Evagoras also fell in 385, and was soon followed by the blockade; but that Evagoras held out (whether able to take the sea again or not) till 376.; while another—the Ionian contingent with Teiribazos§ 134. The Persian fleet (at this time blockading Salamis) was commanded by Gaos; the Persian land-forces by Orontes and the satrap Teiribazos. With Teiribazos served a contingent of Ionian Greeks: οἱ μετὰ Τειριβάζου στρατευόμενοι, § 135.—fights his battles. If, instead of disputing about the Kyklades§ 136. The particular dispute —if any such is referred to—is unknown. Isokrates perhaps means merely that Athens and Sparta contended for the hegemony, and for that privilege of levying contributions on the Aegaean islands which belonged to the head of a naval confederacy. Cf. § 132, χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ νησιώτας δασμολογεῖν. Rauchenstein remarks: ‘Das nahere uber diesen Hader ist nicht bekannt, aber Athen konnte den Verlust der Kykladen in Folge des Friedens (§ 115) nicht verschmerzen.’, we united in marching on Asia, these very Ionians would be with us. As it is, Artaxerxes holds such a position as no Persian king ever reached before. He is king of all Asia and master of the Asiatic Greeks (§§ 133—137).

‘Some stand in awe of his strength. Were he indeed The real weakness of Persia. strong, that would be but another reason for attacking him before he is stronger. But he is not strong. His importance has been due to our dissensions. Even Chios§ 139. Alluding to the revolt of Chios from Athens at a critical time in 412 B. C.: Thuc. VIII. 7. has ere now made a difference by throwing itself into one or other of two trembling scales. Egypt resisted for three years§ 140. This revolt of Egypt is not known from other sources; but is again alluded to in the Philippos, § 101. As Mr Sandys observes, it must at any rate have been over before the active hostilities of Persia against Evagoras began, and may be placed about 392—390, or 390—388., and finally discomfited, the three best generals of the great king— Persian repulses. Abrokomas, Tithraustes and Pharnabazos. Evagoras has kept him at bay for six years. In the war around Rhodes§ 142. By ὁ πόλεμος ὁ περὶ Ρόδον is meant the naval war which the Persian fleet, under Konon and Pharnabazos, waged with the Lacedaemonian fleet under Pharax and Peisandros, beginning nearly at the same time as the first campaign of Agesilaos in Asia, and ending with the battle of Knidos: 396—394 B. C. Artaxerxes allowed the whole fleet,—led by the ablest living commander, Konon, and favoured by the sympathy of Sparta's oppressed subjects—to be held in check§ 142. The Greek words answering to ‘held in check for three years’ are τρία ἔτη πολιορκούμενον. But by πολιορκούμενον, as Schneider on § 142 points out, is meant not merely the literal blockade of Konon by Pharax in Kaunos (Diod XIV. 83) in 395;—that, of course, did not last three years;— but the fact that, during 396—394, even after the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, Konon kept his fleet in harbours, avoiding engagements on the open sea, until just before Knidos. for three years by 100 Lacedaemonian triremes. It was only the formation of the leagueThe alliance against Sparta of Athens, Thebes, Argos, Euboea and Corinth in 394 B.C., the first year of the Corinthian war: ‘Corinth was the συνέδριον of the allies (Xen. Hellen. IV. 4. 1. and Diod. XIV. 82)’: Mr Sandys ad loc. of which Corinth was the centre which at last drove him to fight—and conquer. I pass over the successes, against Persia, of Derkyllidas, of Drakon, of Thimbron§ 144. Thimbron commanded in Asia in 400: Derkyllidas in 399—397: Agesilaos in 396—395. Derkyllidas having taken Atarneus in Mysia in 398 placed Drakon there as harmost: Xen. Hellen. II. 11., of Agesilaos. Nor is the mettle of Persian troops better than the quality of Persian generalship. This was well seen in the case of the Greeks who accompanied Cyrus. After the loss of their leader, surrounded by difficulties of every kind, The ‘Ten Thousand.’ they effected their retreat as smoothly as if the Persian force which sought to harass it had been a guard of honour. Chastised when he invaded Europe—defeated on the seaboards of Asia—the Persian king has actually been mocked under the walls of his own palaces§ 149. Cf. Xen. Anab. II. 4. 4. (in allusion to the victory at Kynaxa): ἐνικῶμεν τὸν βασιλέα ἐπ ταῖς θύραις αὐτοῦ καὶ καταγελάσαντες ἀπήλθομεν.. (§§ 138—149.)

‘This weakness naturally results from the political and Causes of Persian weakness. social system of Persia. The country cannot have good soldiers while the mass of the people is an unruly, nerveless, slavish mob. It cannot have good generals while the men of the upper classes are insolent and abject by turns, with pampered bodies and craven spirits, grovelling before their human master, and scorning the gods. The satraps who come down to the coast of Asia do not belie their home training. Faithless and arrogant to friends, they quail and cringe before enemies. Thus they lavished gifts on the army of Agesilaos, but maltreated the Greeks who helped them against Cyprus. Konon, who led them to victory, was seized that he might be put to death§ 154 ἐπὶ θανάτῳ. Konon was seized by order of Teiribazos in 390. How he actually perished was never known. According to Deinon, an historian of the 4th century, quoted by Cornelius Nepos, Con. § 3, Konon escaped from the Persians.: Themistokles, who defeated them, was enriched. (§§ 150—154.)

‘They merit our hatred; and they are hateful also to our Greek hatred of Barbarians. gods, whose shrines they have desecrated. The Ionians did well when they swore that every temple burnt by the Persians should remain in ruins, a perpetual record of the impiety which had destroyed it. Nor has Athens been less constant in its enmity. The business of our Ekklesia and of our Senate is always prefaced by an anathema upon any citizen who shall make overtures to Persia. We delight most in those legends which immortalise the disasters of Asia. Nay, we find a special charm in the poetry of Homer, because it embodies our hereditary loathing of the barbarians. (§§ 155 —159.)

‘We have every motive, then, for attacking Persia. The Reasons for a War on Persia. moment is favourable. Egypt and Cyprus§ 161. See notes above on §§ 134, 140. are in revolt; Phoenicia and Syria§ 161. Evagoras had ‘ravaged Phoenicia, stormed Tyre, made Cilicia revolt from the king’: Isokr. Evag. (Or. IX.) § 62. are desolate; Tyre has been stormed; the greater part of Cilicia is with us. The prince of Karia, Hekatomnos§ 162. Hekatomnos, Greek prince of Karia, had been appointed by Artaxerxes admiral of the Persian fleet at the beginning of the war with Evagoras (Theopomp. frag. 111, ed. Müller, quoted by Mr Sandys on § 134); but had afterwards become disaffected, and had secretly supplied Evagoras with money (Diod. XIV. 98)., has virtually, if not openly, rebelled. From Knidos to Sinope the Greeks are impatient to rise. If we delay, Rhodes, Samos and Chios may incline to the enemy; but, if we preoccupy them, Lydia, Phrygia and the up-country generally will probably come into our power. Our fathers, having allowed Persia to be beforehand with them and to get Ionia, were forced to stand a death-struggle at home. Let us take warning. Let us go in time to Asia. There is a further reason for making war now. The present generation has a claim to be indemnified for long sufferings and privations. There never was in Hellas a greater mass of individual distress; though, indeed, the troubles of individuals seem Suffering in Greece. almost trivial at a time when whole countries are afflicted— as Italy§ 169. In 389—387 B C. Dionysios I. had reduced successively Kaulon, Hipponium and Rhegium in Magna Graecia: Diod. XIV. 106 ff. has been devastated and Sicily§ 169. Dionysios had surrendered some Sicilian towns—as Akragas, Himera, Selinos—to Carthage; and brought others—as Naxos, Leontini, Messene—under his own power: see Diod. XIII. 114. enslaved by Dionysios. (§§ 160—169.)

‘Since the leading statesmen of the various cities are apathetic or timid, it is the more incumbent on men outside the political sphere to press this grave question. Before we can have firm peace, we must have common war against Asia. Before we can shake off our poverty, we must cease to prey upon each other, and must unite in gathering spoils elsewhere.

‘The Treaty of Antalkidas is no real obstacle. Its more Peace of Antalkidas. creditable articles—those guaranteeing the autonomy of the Greek cities in Europe—have been violated already. Only its shameful articles—those which surrender our allies to Persia—have been observed. These must forthwith be annulled: they were never compacts—they were dictates. The negociators of the Treaty are much to blame. One of three courses ought to have been taken by them. They ought to Its terms criticised. have stipulated that each Greek State should hold (1) simply its own original territory; or (2) all that it had ever acquired by conquest; or (3) as much as it actually held at the time of the treaty.—As it was, the terms of peace were left to be settled arbitrarily by the Great King. As if he were parcelling out the world between himself and Zeus, he has taken one-half of it§ 179. The meaning seems to be:—‘Zeus is absolute lord of the whole earth. But Artaxerxes claims to be absolute lord of half the earth, i. e. of the continent of Asia. Europe—the other of the δισσαὶ ἤπειροι—is all that he leaves for Zeus.’; and this stands recorded in our public temples. If, for Helen's sake, our fathers rallied against Troy, The invasion will be a theoria. ought not an insult to Hellas to kindle a war now—a war which will move forward, not liable to repulse, but with the stately progress of a sacred embassyI have ventured to paraphrase the meaning of the image—so deeply suggestive to a Greek— contained in the words θεωρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ στρατείᾳ προσεοικώς (§ 182).? (§§ 170—182.) Summary.

‘From every point of view this is the right course. Those who look to nothing but abstract justice cannot refuse to punish our malignant foes. Those whom the sight of unmerited prosperity provokes, indeed, yet leaves prudent, may safely resent a grandeur almost superhuman which is, at the same time, divorced from merit. Those who wish to consult both justice and expediency see before them evil-doers who are rich and helpless. The cities will gladly bear the burden of the campaign; and its fame will surpass that of the war against Troy. (§§ 183—186.)

‘At the outset I had hopes of doing some justice to my subject; now, at the close, I feel how inadequately I have handled it. Try, then, to imagine for yourselves what an Asia shall pour its wealth into Europe. achievement it would be to transfer to Europe the prosperity of Asia. And let aspirants to oratorical distinction, instead of engaging in petty rivalries, vie in the treatment of this great theme. So shall they benefit themselves, and be regarded as benefactors by others.’ (§§ 187—189.)Fame of the Panegyrikos.

The Panegyrikos is the greatest work of Isokrates. The renown which it enjoyed in antiquity is attested by DionysiosDionys. de Isocr. c. 14 ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ, τῷ περιβοήτῳ λόγῳ. and Philostratos Philostr. Vit. Soph. I. 17.—Isokrates himself, in the Philippos (Or. V.) § 11, notices the prestige of the Panegyrikos. ; and the tradition, found in several writers Quint. Inst. X. 4: Plut. Mor. p. 350 E (‘almost three Olympiads’): [Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt.: Phot. Cod. 260., that it employed Isokrates for ten or more years, whether literally true or not, at least shows that the speech was recognised as a masterpiece of careful work. It is, indeed, artistic in a double relation, in regard to expression and in regard to structure. Merits of expression. The expression has not only a finished and uniform— almost too uniform—brilliancy; it has also in some places a wonderful felicity, a deep poetical suggestiveness; as when it is said that the expedition to Asia will be less a march through an enemy's country than such a solemn and secure procession as, at the seasons of the great Festivals, goes forth from each city to the welcoming shrine of the Delphian Apollo or the Olympian Zeus (§ 182); and that Sparta, instead of making Greeks helots to herself, ought to make the barbarians dependents of Greece (περίοικοι, § 131). It is, however, in the structure of the Merits of structure. entire work that the highest power of the master is seen. The central idea is simple:—‘To give counsel about war against the barbarian and unity among Greeks’ (§ 3). But in the development of this idea a vast range of topics must be surveyed;— the historical claims of Athens and of Sparta to lead Greece; the recent history and actual state of Persia, with all the multitude of particulars which group themselves round each of these large questions. As the speech goes on, the mass of facts with which it has to deal is ever growing. Yet so thorough is the writer's grasp that each thought leads to the next without violence and without confusion. As the circle of ideas gradually widens, the central point is still kept clearly in view; and the details, even where most complex, are seen to belong to an organic whole.

Foremost among its author's works in merits of Historical interest. execution, the Panegyrikos stands first also in the interest of its subject-matter. Its value as a political pamphlet has been considered in a former chapterAbove, p. 20.; and on this head, one remark only need be added here. Isokrates emphatically claims (§§ 15—17) to be not only more philosophical, but more practical, than previous speakers on the same subject; alluding, no doubt, to Gorgias and Lysias among the rest. As regards Gorgias, this claim cannot now be decided. As regards Lysias, it is questionable: at least the large fragment of his Olympiakos offers advice not less definite or less sensible than that in the Panegyrikos See vol. I. p. 206.. But whatever was, at the time, the political worth of the Panegyrikos, its permanent historical worth can hardly be overrated. To the history of Greece it contributes a vivid picture of the whole Hellenic world, and of the barbarian worldSee esp. §§ 133—159. in contact with Hellas, at a critical moment. To the history of Athens it contributes a striking sketch of the growth and influence in Greece of the specially Athenian ideas, religious, political and social§§ 28—50.. For the personal history of Isokrates it is of surpassing interest; it is the earliestSee the Philippos (Or. v.) §§ 128, 129. and most completeIn the Philippos, § 84, he speaks of the difficulty of putting his conceptions in a new way— the Panegyrikos has beggared him; he can only say over again what he has said there: ὁ λόγος ὁ πανηγυρικός, ὃ τοὺς ἄλλους...εὐπορωτέρους ποιήσας, ἐμοὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρέσχηκεν . expression of the ruling thought of his life; the thought which he afterwards urged upon Dionysios, upon Archidamos,—at last upon Philip.

I. 2 Philippos.

2. Philippos [Or. v.]—Philip had taken Amphipolis in 358 B. C. and Potidaea in 356. The hostilities between him and Athens, carried on intermittently from 356Cf. Grote, c. 86, vol. XI. p. 332., were closed in March, 346, by the socalled Peace of Philokrates. Before that event Isokrates had been composing a letter to Philip ‘On Amphipolis,’ urging peace on the ground that Amphipolis, the chief cause of the war, was not a desirable possession either for Athens or for the king of Macedon (§§ 1, 3).

This letter had not been sent when peace was concluded (§ 7). Isokrates now writes on another Motive of the Discourse. and a larger subject. He sees in Philip, at length reconciled to Athens, the man who can lead the united Hellenes against Persia. Ever since the failure of the Panegyrikos to bring about such an expedition under the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta, he had been looking for an individual powerful enough to execute his favourite plan (§§ 84, 128, 129). He had already applied to Dionysios I.— probably about 368 B. C. (Ep. I. § 8)—and in 356 to Archidamos III. (Ep. IX. § 16). This oration was addressed to Philip soon after the peace (§§ 8, 56), but before the conclusion of the Sacred War (§§ 54, Date. 74); that is, between March and JulyCf. Clinton, F. H. sub ann. 346., 346 B. C.

‘Do not be surprised, Philip, if before entering upon the Analysis. immediate subject of this address I say a few words upon another. The war between Athens and you, which arose out of your acquisition of Amphipolis, has just been closed by a Peace (§ 7). Before this Peace was concluded, I was preparing to write to you in reference to Amphipolis. It was my purpose to show that it was not your interest to hold that town, since, if you surrendered it to Athens, you would still be virtual master of it, and enjoy our goodwill besides; nor yet the interest of Athens to receive it from you, since she would, in return, have been obliged to consult your designs in that quarter—paying you the same kind of homage which the elder Amadokos§ 7. Ἀμάδοκος, or Μήδοκος, king of the Thracian Odrysae, is called here ὁ παλαιός to distinguish him from the Amadokos who inherited, in 358 B. C., part of the dominions of Kotys, and who was perhaps his son: see O. Schneid. ad loc. The elder Amadokos is first heard of in 405 B.C.: Diod. XIII. 105. Xen. Hellen. IV. 8 says that in 390 B.C. Thrasybulos, then commanding an Athenian fleet, reconciled Amadokos to Seuthes, ruler of Lower Thrace (ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἄρχοντα), and received both of them into friendship and alliance with Athens:—νομίζων καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ Θράκῃ οἰκούσας πόλεις Ἑλληνίδας φίλων ὄντων τούτων μᾶλλον προσέχειν ἂν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τὸν νοῦν. Isokrates speaks here as if the object of the favour shown to Amadokos had been rather to restrain him from interfering with the Athenian colonies in Thrace than to impress the Greeks in that region with the influence of Athens over the Thracian princes. Cf, Dem. in Aristocr. p. 623. formerly received for protecting our colonists in the Chersonese. This argument for peace has become unnecessary; but the desire that the Peace itself should be permanent leads me to offer you counsel on another subject. (§§ 1—9.) This subject is a noble one—too great, perhaps, for my failing powers. I am going to urge you to place yourself at the head of a united Hellas, and to make Philip must lead Greece against Asia. war upon the barbarian. (§§ 10—16.) Friends at first dissuaded me from the presumptuous design of offering advice to the statesman who has brought Thessaly to acquiesce in obeying, instead of ruling, Macedonia—to the general who has subdued the Magnetes, the Perrhaebi, the Paeonians, all Illyria save the seaboard of the Adriatic; and who has given to Thrace what masters he pleased. But when my dissuaders heard what I had to say, their opposition was changed into encouragement. (§§ 17—23.) Advice on great and pressing questions is more effective when it is given orally. Mine will not have that advantage; nor is it set off with rhetorical ornament. It is a plain statement of facts; but these facts are so supremely important to you that I hope for your attention. (§§ 24—29.)

‘I say, then, that you ought, as their common friend, to His first duty. bring into amity the four great cities of Hellas—Argos, Sparta, Thebes, Athens.

‘This obligation is laid upon you by your descent. Argos His hereditary position. was the native city of your ancestors§ 32. According to Herodotos VIII. 137—8, Perdikkas I., founder of the dynasty of Edessa, was an Argive of the house of Têmenos. Another tradition—which cannot, however, be traced above Theopompos—made Karanos, also an Argive and a Têmenid, the founder of the monarchy: see Grote, c. 25, vol. IV. p. 21. Cf. Liv. 27. 30 Macedonum reges ex ea civitate ( Argis) oriundos se referunt. . Thebes honours above other deities Herakles, the founder of your line. Sparta has long been ruled by the Herakleidae: and Athens was their friend at need. No quarrel should ever have divided these cities from you or from each other. There have been faults on all parts. But now you have a glorious opportunity of benefiting them and yourself too,—when harassed by war, each of them resembles rather a single combatant, following a blind, vindictive impulse, than a State with a government and a policy. (§§ 30—38.)

‘The attempt which I propose to you can be shown to be feasible:—and first, on general grounds. The difficulty which would have been presented by the great predominance of any one State, as of Athens and Sparta, has vanished; changes of fortune have placed all the cities of Greece upon one level. Your position, on the other hand, is supreme. Experience It is possible for him to reconcile the Greeks. proves that no enmities are too bitter to be overcome. Greece was reconciled to Xerxes; Athens has been the ally successively of Sparta and of Thebes. The interest of the moment is, in fact, the sovereign controller of political combinations. (§§ 39—45.)

‘The practicability of the attempt may be shown, further, on particular grounds. It is favoured by the respective conditions of the several States concerned.

‘Sparta wishes for peace, because, deprived of her empire Sparta. Leuktra, she is now harassed by her neighbours and by her own serfs—distrusted and disliked throughout Hellas—and in daily dread of the Thebans making up their quarrel with the Phocians and turning upon her.

‘Argos desires peace, because her distress resembles, but Argos. exceeds, that of Sparta. She, too, is constantly harassed by her neighbours—with this difference, that they are stronger than herself. And in the intervals of war she is a prey to fierce democratic risings.

‘Thebes wishes for peace, because, through abusing the Thebes. results of her great victory, she is now worse off than if it had been a defeat. No sooner had she won Leuktra than she began to interfere in the Peloponnese; enslaved Thessaly; threatened Megara; encroached upon Athens; ravaged Euboea; sent a fleet to Byzantium. Lastly she has made war upon Phokis,—a war which she thought to finish rapidly and to pay for out of the treasures of Delphi; but which, in the event, has brought her to the brink of despair.

‘Athens is no longer yearning for peace; she has had the Athens. good sense to embrace it already. (§§ 46—56.)

‘The possibility of reconciling Hellas may be seen from The task is even easy. these considerations. The ease, for you, of the attempt may be judged from the cases of other men, who, though less favoured by circumstances, have changed the destinies of whole countries. Alkibiades, exiled from Athens and resolved to force his way back, effected it by first throwing all Greece into a tumult. Konon, disgraced through no fault of his own, not only retrieved the disgrace by his own unaided energy, but lived to restore the glory of Athens. Dionysios, an ordinary Syracusan, made himself master of Sicily. The elder Cyrus, whom, in his infancy, his mother left to perish at the roadside, became sovereign of Asia. Shall not the achievements of these men be equalled by one who is, from the outset the descendant of Herakles, the king of Macedonia, the lord of such great multitudes? (§§ 57—67.)

‘The enterprise is one which may well rouse your ambition. What nobler position can be imagined than that of president of Greece—acknowledged arbiter of her destinies? It is also an enterprise which would silence certain calumnies now current against you. Some ill-disposed persons pretend What illnatured people say of Philip. that your avowed purpose of helping the Messenians merely veils a scheme for subjugating the Peloponnesos, as a step to subjugating all Greece. These slanders are heard gladly by three classes of people—by those who, like the slanderers, secretly desirc such an event; by those who, themselves indifferent to the public safety, are grateful to those who affect to care for it;—and by men who, admiring you, fancy that imputations such as these are fitted to raise your importance in the eyes of Greece;—not seeing that a project, which, if imputed to the king of Persia, would increase his reputation for courage, would be infamy for a Greek—for a Heraklid. Having a perfectly good conscience, you perhaps think it beneath you to notice such calumniators. Still you ought not to underrate the importance of being cordially trusted by all Greece,—trusted as your own friends trust you, or as Sparta trusts her Heraklid kings. (§§ 68—80.)

‘The counsel which I offer to you—as I offered it to Dionysios after he became master of Syracuse§ 81, πρὸς Διονύσιον την τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. Dionysios I. became master of Syracuse in 406 B.C.: but Isokrates certainly did not write to him till after 380 B.C.: cf. Philipp. §§ 128, 129: Ep. I. § 8. The words τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον do not, however, imply that the application of Isokrates immediately followed the acquisition of the tyrannis by Dionysios. Benseler and O. Schneider read τὸν τὴν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον. The meaning would then be:—‘Dionysios I., founder of the despotism,’ as opposed to Dionysios II. who succeeded him in 367.—does not come from a General, from a public speaker, from a person of influence in any way—but merely from one who lays claim to common sense and to education. (§§ 81, 82.)

‘Your duty towards Greece has been spoken of; it Invasion of Asia. remains to speak of the expedition against Asia. The Panegyrikos has left me little that is new to say upon this topic —but I will attempt to trace its outlines with additional clearness.

‘The first condition of a successful attack upon Persia is First condition of success. this—that you should have all the Greeks either as helpers or at least as favouring spectators. It was here that Agesilaos failed. He tried to do two things at once—to make war Why Agesilaos failed. upon the Great King, and to restore his friends§ 87, τοὺς ἑταίρους—oligarchs who had been driven by political troubles from the towns of Asia Minor: see Ep. IX. § 13. to power in their respective cities. The feuds engendered by the latter purpose defeated the former. (§§ 83—88.)

‘All would admit that the sympathy, active or passive, of Hellas is a primary requisite. But most people, if they wished to encourage you by example, would quote wars in which Greece triumphed over Asia. I prefer to cite an expedition in which we were considered to have been worsted A precedent. —that which was led by the younger Cyrus and Klearchos. The Greeks, victorious at Kynaxa, missed the rewards of victory by the death of Cyrus. Yet, though they were left forlorn and in danger by his loss, the Great King did not dare to attack them openly. He resorted to treachery in order to seize their leaders.—The example has been used by me before§ 93. Cf. Panegyr. § 91.; but fact, not literary novelty, is important here.

‘Next, consider how far more favourable circumstances Comparative advantages of Cyrus the younger and Philip. will be for you than they were for Cyrus. First, as regards facility of raising troops. The Asiatic Greeks looked coldly on his expedition, thinking that its success would probably aggravate the Spartan tyranny under which they groaned:— they will favour your expedition; and the great multitudes of homeless exiles and wanderers, ready to serve as mercenaries, will make it easy to raise a large army. Secondly, as regards the character of the former, and the actual, king of Persia. The father§ 99. Artaxerxes II. (Mnemon), king of Persia, 405—359 B.C.: Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append. c. 18. of the present king proved too strong both for Their respective opponents. Athens and for Sparta; the reigning kingArtaxerxes III. (Ochos): 359 —339 B.C. is unable even to hold the towns given up to him by the treaty of Antalkidas. Thirdly, as regards the position of Persia. Then, as now, Position of Persia. Egypt was in revoltAs regards the earlier revolt mentioned here, see Panegyr. § 140 note. The chronology of the later revolt, spoken of here as not yet subdued, is uncertain. Schäfer (Demosth. u. seine Zeit, vol. I. pp. 436 f.) thinks that Ochos made three expeditions against Egypt: (1) On the occasion noticed, but without date, by Diod. XVI. 40. (2) In the winter of 351—350 B.C., when Nectanebos II. was assisted by Diophantos and Lamios: Diod. XVI. 48: cf. Isokr. Ep. VIII. § 8. This would be the expedition, alluded to here, in which Ochos was ignominiously repulsed. (3) In 340 B.C., when Egypt was reconquered—Ochos again commanding in person. See Thirlwall, c. 48, vol. VI. p. 187 n.: Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append c. 18.; but then Egypt dreaded an attack of the Great King; now, the attack has been made—and has failed. Cyprus, Phoenicia, Cilicia, were then§ 102. ‘Then’—i. e. at the time of the earlier Egyptian revolt, which was probably earlier than 385 B.C.: see note on Panegyr. § 161. arsenals of the Persian navy: now, Cyprus and Cilicia have revolted, Phoenicia is desolate. Idrieus§ 103. Idrieus, second son of Hekatom nos, succeeded Artemisia, widow of his brother Mausôlos, as dynast of Karia in 351 B.C., and reigned till 344. On the chronology of the princes of Karia, see Clinton, F. H. vol. II. Append. c. 14., the wealthiest prince in Asia Minor, is bitter against Persia. Not he alone, but some of the satraps also will come over to you if you make heard throughout The true spell for Asia. Asia that word—Liberty—which in Hellas has been the spell before which our empire, and the Spartan empire, vanished. (§§ 89—104.)

‘If I went on to offer you advice as to the conduct of the war, I might be reproached with want of military experience. But as to the object of the war, and as regards the general These counsels are in the spirit of Philip's ancestry. spirit of my counsels, I feel sure that the voices of your ancestors, if they could be heard, would be with me. The voice of your father§ 106. Amyntas II., who began to reign in 394 B.C. and died in 370.—for he was ever friendly to the cities which I urge you to befriend. The voice of the founder§ 106. Perdikkas I.: see note on § 32. of the Macedonian kingdom—for, while establishing his own power securely, he abstained from every attempt to impose it upon Greece; and thus, alone of all Greeks, came safely through the perils of monarchy. The voice of Herakles, author of your line—for, after composing a distracted Hellas, he made war upon Troy—after conquering it, he slew all the kings of barbarian tribes§ 112, τοὺς βασιλέας τῶν ἐθνῶν τῶν ἐφ’ ἑκατέρας τῆς ἠπείρου.—ἐθνῶν here can mean only βαρβάρων. ‘Man hat also für Europa nicht mit Benseler auch an griechische Fürsten, Neleus in Pylos, Hippokoon in Lacedämon, sondern nur an Barbaren wie an den Thrakerfürsten Diomedes (Apollodor 2, 5, 8) zu denken; für Asien (und Afrika) ist an Mygdon, die Hippolyte, Sarpedon (über Alle Apollodor 4, 5, 9), Busiris (obwohl Is. über diesen 11, 36 seq. anders urtheilt), Antaeus u. s. w. zu denken.’ O. Schneid. ad § 112. on the shore of either continent,— and then set up the pillars which bear his name as memorials of his victory over the barbarians, and as boundaries of the Hellenic territory. If you cannot rival him in all things, you can emulate the spirit of his dealing with Greece. You have only to look to the examples in your own family to learn with whom, and against whom, an Heraklid should fight. (§§ 105—115.)—You may think that I am saying too much on ‘gentleness’ and ‘kindliness.’ Yet are not the kindly and gentle gods called ‘Olympian,’ and honoured with shrines and temples, while expiatory rites express our horror of an omnipotence which is cruel? (§§ 116—118.)

‘The popularity which a Persian war would command in Greece may be estimated from the case of Jason of Pherae. Jason of Pherae. He rose to greatness through his profession—never fulfilled —of an intention to attack Persia§ 119. In regard to this intention, see the conversation which Polydamas of Pharsalos reported at Sparta as having passed between himself and Jason of Pherae: Xen. Hellen. VI. 1. 12.. What will your reputation be, if you put such a scheme into act?

‘Three different degrees of success—the lowest of which is glorious—are possible. You may conquer the Persian empire. Results possible for Philip. Or you may detach from it the portion of Asia Minor west of a line drawn from Cilicia to Sinôpê, and found, in this, new cities for the homeless Greeks who now are roving mercenaries. Or, at the worst, you cannot fail to free from Persia the existing Greek cities of Asia. We should be mad if, instead of wasting our strength on quarrels at home, we did not turn it upon our certain prey, the effeminate Asiatics. (§§ 119—127.)

‘It may be made a reproach to me that I call upon you, and not upon my own city, to lead the enterprise. I have Athens. already appealed to Athens; but she gives less heed to me than to the brawlers of the platform. The greater credit is mine for constancy in asserting my principle, and for seeking everywhere the agents who seem most capable of putting it into practice. (§§ 128—131.)

‘Shame should forbid us to see, unmoved, Asia more prosperous than Europe,—the descendants of Cyrus more prosperous than the descendants of Herakles. It is not power or wealth—you have more than enough of both already—it is glory that ought to be your motive. Hear, in this counsel of mine—would that it were more complete!—the suggestion of your forefathers,—of the heroes,—of the present opportunity. Do not believe that the despotism built up by a Asia cannot resist Greece. rude barbarian can defy a Greek champion of freedom. If, in a single city, the man who combines statesmanship and generalship is honoured, what honour will be yours, when the field of your statesmanship is Hellas,—of your strategy, Asia? No successor will surpass your fame; your have already outdone all your predecessors.

‘Beneficence, not brilliancy, is the ultimate test of Beneficence is the test of achievement. exploits, not only for the olden time, but in our own. Tantalos, Pelops, Eurystheus yield in popular repute to Herakles, Theseus and the captors of Troy. Athens took her highest glory, not from her empire or her wealth, but from Marathon and Salamis: Sparta owed more renown to the defeat at Thermopylae than to any of her victories. (§§ 132—148.)

‘If my words seem, in themselves, weak and poor, set it A message from the gods. down to old age; but receive the thoughts which they have strived to utter as a message from the gods. The gods do not benefit men directly, but through human agents. They have prompted me to speak for them—they have chosen you to act. Your triumphs hitherto have been given to prepare you for this crowning effort. It is no disparagement, but the best praise, to say that what you have already done falls short of what you are worthy to do. (§§ 149—153.)

‘This, then, is the sum:—“Be the benefactor of Greece; Summary. the king (not the despot) of Macedonia; the governor, in a free Hellenic spirit, of Asia.”’ (§§ 154, 155.)

Dionysios extols the Philippos as an appeal to Remarks. a powerful man to use his power for the noblest ends Dionys. de Isocr. c. 6.. That generous earnestness which the Discourse certainly breathes is not for us, however, its most striking featureSee Thirlwall's remarks on §§ 73—80 of the Philippos: c. 44: vol. V. p. 480.. The leading characteristic of the whole is emphatic recognition of Philip as the first of Hellenes and the natural champion of HellasSee esp. §§ 32—38: 76—80: 108.. It is an accident that his subjects are aliens; the Heraklid spirit is still as true in him as it was in the Argive founder of his dynasty. This was the sincere belief of Isokrates. For Demosthenes, Philip was no Hellene who chanced to rule barbarians; he was in his own person the representative barbarianDemosth. Philipp. III. p. 118, § 31, directly calls Philip βάρβαρος—with political, if not with technical truth. Cf. Grote, c. 90, vol. XI. p. 604.—the head and front of the antihellenic interest.

II. On the internal affairs of Greece.
II. 1. Plataikos.

1. Plataikos [Or. XIV.]—The revolution of 379 B. C. at Thebes had been a blow to Spartan influence throughout Hellas, and especially in Boeotia. Agesilaos in 378 and 377, Kleombrotos in 378 and 376, The Theban Revolution. had invaded Boeotia without gaining any advantage. By the end of 376 the oligarchies supported by Sparta had been abolished in all the Boeotian towns except OrchomenosGrote, c. 77, vol. X. p. 217, n. 1.; and the Boeotian Confederacy, with Thebes at its head, had been reconstituted.

After its destruction in 427 Plataea had been Plataea. non-existent till 386, when it was rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold against Thebes. Cut off from Spartan support, Plataea had been brought, in 377 or 376, into the revived Boeotian Confederacy; but, like Thespiae and Tanagra (§ 9), had joined it unwillingly. The relief felt by most other towns at riddance from the philo-Spartan oligarchies was more than balanced, in the case of Thespiae, Tanagra and Plataea, by hatred of Thebes. DiodorosDiodor. XV. 46. states that the Plataeans secretly offered their town to Athens. At any rate the alarm felt at Plataea was so great that it was only on the days of public assemblies at Thebes that the men ventured to go into the fields, leaving their wives and children within the wallsPaus. IX. 1. 6.. On one of these days a Theban force under the Occasion of this Speech. Boeotarch Neokles surprised Plataea, in the latter half of 373 B. C.Pausanias (IX. 1. 8) defines the time as the third year before Leuktra, when Asteios was Archon (i. e. midsummer 373—midsummer 372). Schäfer (Dem. I. 61), whom I follow, takes the last half of 373: Grote (c. 77, vol. X. p. 219) the first half of 372. Clinton, F. H. 374 B.C.. The town was destroyed and the territory was again annexed to Thebes. The inhabitants, with such property as they could carry, sought refuge, like their ancestors in 427, at Athens. Their case was discussed there, not merely in the ekklesia, but in the congress of the allies (συνέδριον § 21); Kallistratos being the foremost advocate of Plataea, as Epameinondas of ThebesDiod. XV. 38: Grote c. 77, X. 221.. It was not till 338, after Chaeroneia, that Plataea was restored; this time through the enmity of Philip, as formerly through the enmity of Sparta, towards ThebesPaus. IX. 1. 8..

The speech of Isokrates is supposed to be spoken by a Plataean before the ekklesia; and there is nothing in the matter or form of the speech itself to make it improbable that it was actually so deliveredCf. Grote, c. 77, X. 220.. The date is 373 B. C.Date.

‘We know, Athenians, that it is your custom to help the Analysis. wronged and to remember those who have done you good. We have come, therefore, to beg that you will not allow Object of the Appeal. Plataea to be devastated, in time of peace§ 1. εἰρηνης οὔσης. This is understood by Grote (c. 77, vol. X. p. 217 n.) as meaning simply that Plataea and Thebes were at peace —the autonomy of Plataea, subjcet to the Boeotian confederacy, having been guaranteed by Thebes when she reconstituted that confederacy in 377—376. Thirlwall, on the other hand (vol. V. pp. 70—73), understands the peace of 374 between Athens and Sparta, to which, he thinks, Thebes was a party, and under which the Spartan garrisons had been withdrawn from Boeotia. The words ἢν πάλιν γένηται πόλεμος (§ 43) must, as the context shows, refer to a prospective war between Athens and Sparta; and imply that, when the Plataikos was written, those States were at peace. But the peace of 374 was of very short duration; and, if the reference is to it, the Plataikos would appear to belong to the year 37 4/3. Diodoros does, indeed, place the surprise of Plataea in that year (XV. 41, 46), and Clinton agrees with him. On the other hand, the clear and precise specification of the year 37 3/2 by Pausanias (IX. 1. 3—8) as that in which Plataea was seized, can scarcely be set aside. Schäfer, placing the Plataikos in the latter half of 373, thinks that the peace of 374 was still formally in force, but that Athens was on the point of resuming hostilities against Sparta; cf. § 38 (Schäf. Demosth. I. p. 61 n.)., by Thebes. No people have ever been more injured than we are; no people are more closely bound to you. We have to contend, not only against the Thebans, but against those Athenian advocates whose aid they have procured with our property. It will be necessary for us, then, to speak at some length. To describe our wrongs adequately would be difficult; enough that you know our town to have been razed and our lands seized. We will try to expose the arguments by which the Thebans hope to mislead you (§§ 1—7).

‘It is sometimes their pretence that they have thus dealt Pretexts of Thebes: (1) that Plataea rejected dependence: with us because we refused to be enrolled as dependents of Thebes. Judge if this is a sufficient warranty for such usage, or if it became Plataea to accept upon compulsion such a dependence. Thespiae§ 9. The walls of Thespiac had been razed soon after the destruction of Plataea (Diod. XV. 46), but the inhabitants had not, like the Plataeans, been driven from their territory. Pausanias speaks of the Thespians as retreating from their town to Kerèssos, a neighbouring stronghold, after Leuktra (IX. 14. 2). The praycr to the Athenians, which Xenophon puts into their month—μὴ σφᾶς περιϊδεῖν ἀπόλιδας γενομένους—is snfficiently explained by the destruction of their walls—to which the τῶν μὲν τὰ τείχη κατεσκάφασι of § 35 may (as Mr Grote suggests) refer. Cf. Schäf. Dem. I. p. 62, n 1. and Tanagra also refused it; but they were not treated as Plataea has been treated; they were not destroyed, but simply compelled to obey. It is difficult to see what is the claim of Thebes to such obedience. Historically speaking, Orchomenos is the head of Boeotia. Or if the peace of Antalkidas is to be recognised, then all cities, great or small, are independent (§§ 8—10).

‘Perhaps, however, the Thebans will take a different (2) that Plataea was leagued with Sparta. ground. They may say that we were leagued with Sparta against them, and that they have acted in the interest of their entire Confederacy. In any case the treaty ought to have protected us. But, moreover, we were the allies of Sparta perforce. A harmost and a garrison being in our town, while our army was at Thespiae, we had no choice. Many other Greek States are in the same plight. By allowing us to be punished, you will alienate them (§§ 11—16).

‘Remember that the war which you suddenly undertook, Athens must defend the autonomy of the cities. with Thebes, against Sparta, was not for liberty—you and your allies had liberty already—but for the independence of those whose rights, conferred by the Peace of Antalkidas, were being violated. Will you allow cities which you wished to vindicate from slavery to Sparta to be destroyed by Thebes? The Thebans complain of the Lacedaemonian seizure of the Kadmeia; but they themselves raze the walls of their neighbours. They were jealous of Oropos§ 20. In 412 B C. Oropos had been treacherously seized by the Boeotians (Thuc. VIII. 60), and in 402 it was still in their power (Diod. XIV. 17). But at some time between 402 and 374 Oropos had placed itself under the protection of Athens. At the congress of 374 at Sparta—resulting in the brief peace between Sparta and Athens —Thebes probably laid claim to Oropos, but without success: cf. § 37 and see Schäf. Dem. I. 47. In 366 Oropos was seized by a party of exiles and placed in the hands of the Thebans (Xen. H. VII. 4. 1). It was not until, in 338, Philip gave the town to the Athenians that their possession of it became secure: see Paus. I. 34. 1. having voluntarily given itself to Athens; yet they themselves usurp territory by force (§§ 17—20).

‘They pretend that they have acted in the common The Theban policy. interest of their allies. But, before the act, Athens ought to have been consulted. While the war lasted, Thebes spoke much of the common cause; now that she is secured by peace, she thinks only of her own advantage (§§ 21—25).

‘They cannot plead that there is danger lest, if we get Plataea and Thebes— their deeds towards Athens contrasted. back our territory, we should go over to Lacedaemon. Plataea has been twice besieged and twice takeni.e. in 427 and in 373 B.C. on account of its loyalty to Athens. The Thebans, on the other hand, have been repeatedly false to you. Having caused the Corinthian war, and having been brought safely through it by you, on the conclusion of peace they forsook your alliance for that of Sparta; while Chios, Mytilene and Byzantium remained true. They were punished by the Spartan seizure of the Kadmeia,—when they found a refuge at Athens. But no sooner had they been restored to their city, than they made new overtures to Sparta, which were frustrated only by the severity of her terms. Yet these Thebans taunt others with ‘Laconism,’—they, who have been the slaves of Spartan ambition. Did they ever fail to take part in an invasion of Attica? Were they not your worst foes in the war of Dekeleia? Did they not, finally, give their solitary voteIn the debate held at Sparta, after Aegospotami, on the terms which should be granted to Athens (405 B.C.). But Isokrates exaggerates. Not the Thebans alone, but the Corinthians and many others of the Peloponnesian allies, voted for the extermination of Athens. It was by Sparta alone that Athens was saved.—Xen. Hellen. II. ii. 19; Grote, c. 65, vol. VIII. p. 311. for the enslavement of your population and the conversion of your country into sheep-pastures like those of Krisa? (§§ 26—32).

‘It may be said that Boeotia is the bulwark of Attica; No danger from Thebes. and that, if you break off your friendship with the Thebans, they will join Sparta. They will not be so mad. It would be the ruin of the democratic party at Thebes,—watched, as it is, at once by the oligarchical exiles and by the malcontents in the Boeotian towns. Treat them as you did when they blustered about your acquisition of Oropos. When you excluded them from the peace§ 37. The Thebans were excluded from the peace of 374 B.C. between Athens and Sparta—as afterwards from the general peace of 371—because they insisted on the formal recognition of Thebes as head of the Panbocotic confederacy: Schäf. Dem. I. 47., they became humble; and they will become so now, if treated with like firmness (§§ 33—38).

‘Even supposing, however, that they were likely to act The Peace of Antalkidas must be upheld. differently, it does not become Athens to regard their friendship more than the treaty to which she has sworn. Experience shows, moreover, the value in war of being able to appeal to a just cause. It was thus that Sparta roused Hellas against Athens; it was thus that Athens reft the empire from Sparta. Show your readiness to espouse the cause of right, and, in any future war, all Hellas will be with you. If, on the contrary, you allow Thebes to break her oaths, who, hereafter, will help you to make Sparta keep hers? Would it not be monstrous if you upheld the constant allies of Sparta against those who, in a single instance, were forced to side with her? (§§ 39—45).

‘Who could be found more wretched than we are? Our Miseries of the Plataeans. city, our land, our fortunes have been taken from us in a single day. With whom shall we take refuge? If with fellow-sufferers, we shall share their troubles; if with happier men, we shall be reminded of our own. Parents comfortless in their old age—children threatened with slavery on account of some paltry debt§ 48, μικρῶν ἕνεκα συμβολαίων δουλεύοντας. Isokrates has borrowed this touch from Lysias Against Eratosthenes (Or. XII.) § 98, μικρῶν ἂν ἕνεκα συμβολαίων ἐδούλευον.—wives separated from husbands, daughters from mothers—are the miseries which we mourn daily. Have care for us; we are near to you in friendship,—many of us, in blood; for, through the right of intermarriage given to us, many of us are sons of Athenian mothers. Athens helped Adrastos to get from the Thebans burial for his dead; let her help us to save those who yet live (§§ 46—55).

‘We ask you to give us back our land and town. Alone Appeal to gratitude: of all the Greeks, you owe us this charity. It is said that when, in the Persian Wars, your fathers were driven from their homes, our fathers, alone of all the dwellers outside the Peloponnesos, shared their perils. At least, if you do not care for our lives, defend our land—in which are the trophies of the victory won by Hellas from all Asia. Think of the and to the sacredness of the Plataean land. gods and heroes who hold the place; think of your fathers, and of the feeling which would be theirs, if they could know that their graves were unvisited by offerings because the traitors who fought against them had swept their comrades from the soil. You used to make it the greatest reproach against the Spartans that Plataea had been destroyed to please Thebes; do not let that reproach fall upon you. Much must be left unsaid. But remember your oaths and the treaty; remember our friendship and their enmity; and give righteous judgment in our cause’ (§§ 56—63).

The Plataikos shows great power of a certain Remarks. kind: it is a glowing denunciation of a cruelty; and the peroration especially has true and noble pathos (§§ 56—62). But if the reasoning is examined it will appear that the pleas urged are liable to some abatement; and that, on grounds of general policy, there was something to be said for the Thebans. When the Plataean speaker appeals to the peace of Antalkidas§ 18., he forgets that Plataea could derive no right from that treaty, since Plataea did not exist when the treaty was madeCf. Grote, c. 77, vol. x. p. 220.. And, though the character of the town since 386 as a Spartan outpost may have been imposed upon it by force§§ 11—16., it was still natural that that character should make Plataea obnoxious to the head of an anti-Spartan Confederacy. Thebes might urge with plausibility that the measures taken against Plataea, however severe, were necessary in the interest of the allies§§ 21—25.. This view—as we learn from the speech itself—was taken by several Athenian debaters§ 3.; and it was the view which prevailed, The result. for no attempt was at this time made to restore Plataea.

II. 2. On the Peace.

2. On the Peace [Or. VIII.]. Like the Areopagitikos, this political pamphlet has the form of a deliberative speech, purporting to be spoken in the ekklesia (§§ 1, 15). But the fiction is not so well kept up as in the case of the Areopagitikos, which concludes with an appeal to the assembly. Here the conclusion is more suitable to an essay than to a speech in debate, as if the writer had forgotten the supposition with which he set out (§ 145). In 357 B.C. Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium revolted from Athens. The Social War was concluded about midsummer, 355, by a treaty which declared the revolted states to be independent, and no longer members of the Athenian Confederacy. The Speech On the Peace Date. was probably written while negotiations for peace were pending, i.e. in the first half of 355 B. C.Clinton says ‘before the conclusion of the peace—perhaps in the beginning of 355.’ Thirlwall— ‘while the negotiation with the allics was pending, or soon after the peace’; but, Isokrates would hardly have delayed the publication till the question which he discussed had been aetually settled. Schäfer puts the speech in 355; so, too, Benseler (1854). Oncken (Isokrates und Athen, Appendix) argues for 357 B.C.— just after the attack of Chares on Chios.. The ambassadors whose ‘offers’ are spoken of in § 25 must be envoys sent by the alliesCf. Schäf. Dem. I. 169.. But the first overtures of peace had come from Athens, under pressure of Persian threats; and it is rather singular that no allusion to Persian hostility occurs in the speechThirl. v. p. 325, ch. 42..

‘It is the custom of everyone who addresses this assembly Analysis. to premise that the subject on which he is about to speak is the greatest and the gravest that could be discussed. In this instance, if in any, such a preface would be fitting. We are here to consider the question of peace or war.

‘You are wont to drive from the platform all speakers but those whose advice meets your wishes; for, though in private life you hate flattery, you tolerate it in the counsels of the State. On the present occasion the advocates of war are Popularity of the WarParty. naturally your favourites. They promise you the recovery of wealth and power. The supporters of peace have no such inducements to offer; they can only represent that it is best to remain quiet and not to seek dishonest gains. They preach that most difficult of virtues,—contentment. I fear for their success; for I observe that some are as eager for war as if it had been revealed to them by a god that we must conquer. If, however, the future is not indeed so certain, you ought not only to hear both sides, but to hear with especial attention that side to which your first inclinations do not lean.

‘The older among you ought to recollect, the younger must have heard, that advocates of war have ere now brought us into trouble,—but advocates of peace, never. Yet we are Athens too ready to espouse quarrels. always ready to plunge into war in anyone's quarrel, even when we cannot promote our own advantage. The reason is that, whereas in our private affairs we pick our advisers carefully, in public concerns we listen to drunkards rather than to sober men, to folly rather than to prudence.

‘It is up-hill work to oppose your prejudices; we have a democracy, but freedom of speech is enjoyed only by the most foolish members of this Assembly and by the comic poets in the theatre. As, however, I am not here to court your votes, I shall say what I think; first, about the special business which the presidents have brought before us; then, about the affairs of Athens generally (§§ 1—15).

‘I say, then, that we ought to make peace, not only with True basis for peace— the Treaty of Antalkidas Chios and Rhodes, and Byzantium but with all the world;— that we ought to adopt, not any special treaty drawn up for this occasion, but that broad treaty, arranged between Sparta and Persia, which guaranteed the independence of every Hellenic city.

‘It will be asked why, if Thebes is to keep Plataea and Thespiae, Athens should needlessly resign what she holds. I hope to show on general grounds that all unjust acquisition is impolitic; but I will first endeavour to show what would be the results of this particular peace.

‘Security—prosperity—the esteem of Greece:—should Advantages of peace for Athens. we be satisfied if we obtained these things? What more we can desire, I know not. Well, all these things have been taken from us by the war, and will be restored by the peace. The war has given us peril—poverty—unpopularity. If we renounced it, we could obtain by diplomacy all that we are vainly fighting for. Philip§ 22. Philip had now been for two years (since 357 B.C.) in actual possession of Amphipolis. would not contest Amphipolis with us;—Kersobleptes Ib. By a treaty concluded in 357 between Chares and Kersobleptes, the Thracian Chersonese, with the exception of Kardia, was formally recognised as belonging to Athens. But the treaty was not at once fully executed,—Sestos, among other places, still remaining in the hands of Kersobleptes; and hence Isokrates can still, in 355, speak of that prince as disputing the claim of Athens. See Schäf. Demosth. I. pp. 144, 380. would not contest the Chersonese,— if they were once convinced that we were safe neighbours and that our policy was not aggressive. They would even resign to us something of their own, in order to have us as guarantors of their own power. We could get a slice of Thrace large enough for ourselves and for some of the distressed Greeks too. Athenodoros§ 24. Athenodoros of Imbros, by birth an Athenian citizen (Dem. in Aristocr. § 12), had served with distinction as a captain of mercenaries in the army of Artaxerxes Ochos during the war (360 B. C.) between the king and his satrap Orontes, who was supported by an Athenian force under Chares, Charidemos and Phokion. In that contest for the throne of Thrace which ensued on the death of Kotys in 359, Berisades was supported by Athenodoros, as Kersobleptes by Charidemos, and Amadokos by Simon and Bianor. The position of Athenodoros at that time (359— 357) would have been one of sufficient influence to enable him to become founder (oekist) of a new town, though he was merely an ἰδιώτης, i.e. neither a prince nor the official representative of a city. Schäf. Dem. I. pp. 137—144., a private man, and Kallistratos Ib. Kallistratos of Aphidna, the orator, was condemned to death, and withdrew into exile, in 361 B. C. It was in 360 (Schäf. Dem. I. 120), that he induced the Thasians to recolonise the decayed town of Daton or Datos on the coast of Thrace, N.W. of Thasos. The excellence of the site, and its neighbourhood to the gold mines of Pangaeos, gave rise to the proverb Δάτος ἀγαθῶν (Zenob. prov. Graec. Cent. 3. 11). The young colony was destroyed four years later, when, in 356, Philip founded Philippi in its near neighbourhood. Daton was probably on the site of Neapolis, the port of Philippi (Scylax, p. 27 § 67). Schäfer places the return of Kallistratos to Athens (immediatcly followed by his death) in 355, before the end of the Social War, and observes that there is nothing in this passage to warrant the inference that he was alive when it was written. But the perfect γεγόνασιν (§ 24) surely implies that Kallistratos, as well as Athcnodoros, still lived. The return of Kallistratos may perhaps be placed in 354, the year after this speech, when Aristophon and Chares brought Iphikrates, Menestheus and Timotheos to trial. Kallistratos, sympathising strongly with the accused, would have been tempted to come back to Athens at any risk for the sake of standing by them at such a time., an exile, have planted towns there; much more could we. And such enterprises would become our rank in Hellas better than wars waged by mercenary troops (§§ 16—24).

‘This is enough to show that the offer of the envoys is advantageous. But I wish you to go away, not merely Aggressive ambition is a snare. persuaded to accept this peace, but convinced that, universally, it is better to be quiet than to meddle. We fancy that nothing can go well with us unless we hold the sea with a large fleet and force the other cities to pay rates to us and to send deputies to Athens. It would not be difficult to show that honesty is the best national pohcy; and that a State which is tempted to become aggressive is like an animal which a bait draws into a trap. But, after proving this in theory, it is less easy to enforce it in practice. Athens has long been corrupted by a class of bribed impostors who presume to bid us imitate our ancestors. What ancestors? Those who won Marathon, or those who brought on the disaster in Sicily? If the former, then The men of Marathon. the contrast between their policy and that recommended to us is such as nothing but a sense of our desperate state could give me the courage to bring before you. Those ancestors fought for the Greeks against Asia. We bring Asiatic mercenaries against Greece. They exposed their lives for the safety of Hellas. We will not risk ours even to gratify our greed. Out of our penury, we pay mercenaries whose crimes we screen, but who would join a higher bidder against us. Not only when Athens was popular, but when she was most hated, her citizens fought her battles themselves, although the treasury was overflowing. Then, the aliens and slaves rowed the triremes and the citizens fought. Now, Citizens no longer fight. Athens is like Persia—an employer of hireling troops; and, in her fleet, the needy citizens are forced to row, while foreigners carry arms. When we make a descent on a hostile coast, the alien comes ashore with shield and spear,—the citizen—with a cushion (§§ 25—48).

‘Our prospects abroad, however, would not be hopeless if Home affairs. it was well with our domestic affairs. But these are in a state which calls for indignation. We, who are so proud of Alien intruders. being children of the soil, have lavished our franchise on aliens with as little care for the purity of our blood as if we were Triballi or Leukani. The penalty for bribing is death; and yet the largest bribers of the ekklesia become our generals. Corruption. We cherish the Constitution as the very life of the State; yet we reproach the advocates of peace with desiring an oligarchy, and court war, though by war the democracy has twice been overthrown. We are practised in debate and administration; yet we do not know our own minds for a day. We consider ourselves the most intelligent of the Greeks—and listen to the most contemptible advisers, making the worst citizens guardians of the city. Our ancestors judged that the ablest counsellors made the best generals. Our The statesmen are no longer the generals. counsellors are not trusted to lead; we send out as generals, with plenary powers, our most incapable men (§§ 49—56).

‘Some one to whom these remarks apply may be stung into asking—‘How is it that, if our policy is so bad, we are still on a level with any city in Greece?’ ‘Because,’ I Thebes is as bad as Athens. answer, ‘our competitors are as weak as ourselves. We save the Thebans, and they save us. It would be worth the while of either to provide pay for the ekklesiasts of the other. The oftener either holds assemblies, the better for its rival.’ If some more thoughtful questioner, admitting that the evils exist, were to ask me what remedy I propose, I should be more at a loss for an answer; not for a satisfactory answer, but for one which would find favour with you (§§ 57—62).

‘True national prosperity depends on a religious respect The remedy —to resign the Empire of the sea for the rights of one's neighbours. How is the character which respects those rights most readily to be produced among us? By the surrender of our maritime Empire. Bear with me if I tell you that that empire is unjust, untenable, unprofitable. Unjust, because one city cannot claim to rule Hellas—a principle which we ourselves proclaimed in the case of Sparta; untenable, because wealth failed to hold it, and we are poor; unprofitable for both these reasons, and for others of which I will speak, if you will hear me as the admonisher, not denouncer, of Athens (§§ 63—73).

‘Let us compare the period before, and the period after, Athens before and after she was Imperial the city's acquisition of maritime empire. The difference between them is the difference between Aristeides, Themistokles, Miltiades on the one hand, and Hyperbolos, Kleophon, the demagogues of to-day, on the other. Athens had formerly commanded the admiration and the confidence of the Greeks for whom she had fought. Empire demoralised and abased her; her citizens dared not go outside their walls to meet the enemy; her fleet, manned by all the scoundrels in Greece, was its scourge; nothing but the moderation of Sparta saved her from political annihilation. The men of Imperial The men of the Empire. Athens had reduced the art of unpopularity to a science. In the theatre, at the Dionysia, they used to display the balance of the money levied on their allies,—bringing in, at the same time, the children of those who had fallen in the war; thus reminding the allies of the extortion practised upon them, and the other Greeks present of the misery wrought by means of this plunder. It was the men of the empire who formed designs against Sicily, Italy, Carthage, at a moment when enemies held the suburbs§ 85. Dekeleia—here called a προαστεῖον of Athens—was 14 miles N. of it, and as many from the Boeotian frontier. It was occupied by the Pcloponncsians in the spring of 413 B.C.; and the Sicilian disaster came in September of the same year. It is of this passage that Dionysios is probably thinking when he speaks of Isokrates as censuring, in the De Pace, τοὺς πρὸ τῶν Δεκελεικῶν γενομένους (de Isocr. c. 8). As to the large schemes of conquest—embracing Italy and Libya—entertained at Athens in 415, see Curtius Hist. Gr. bk. IV. C. IV. VOL. III. p. 303 tr. Ward. of Athens. Under their What they brought about. rule more disasters happened than in all the earlier or later history of the city—disasters in Egypt§ 86. Alluding to the destruction, in 455 B C., of the Athenian armament sent to aid Inaros., at Cyprus Ib. In 449 B.C. Kimon laid siege to Citium in Cyprus. After his death, hissuccessor Anaxikrates was compelled by famine to raise the siege; but the fleet was soon afterwards victorious near Salamis (Thuc. I. 112). Either Isokrates is here inisrepresenting the unsuccessful siege as the destruction (διεφθάρησαν, § 86) of an Athenian armament; or he may refer to the earlier expedition in 460 B.C. of the Athenians and their allies, with 200 ships, to Cyprus, which Thucydides mentions (I. 104), but of which he gives no particulars, except that it was ultimately abandoned for the purpose of helping Inaros in Egypt., at Daton§ 86. ἐν Δάτῳ δὲ μυρίους ὁπλίτας αὑτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἀπώλεσαν. As to the site of Daton see note above. Herodotos mentions—but without closer definition of the time than that it was after 378 B. C.—an incident to which Isokrates is perhaps referring:— αὐτὸν δὲ Σωφάνεα χρόνῳ ὕστερον τούτων κατέλαβε ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενόμενον Ἀθηναίων στρατηγέοντα ἅμα Λεάγρῳ τῷ Γλαύκωνος ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ Ἠδώνων ἐν Δάτῳ περὶ τῶν μετάλλων τῶν χρυσέων μαχεόμενον, IX. 75 . But the μυρἱους looks as if Isokrates was thinking also of the destruction, by the Thracians, of 10,000 Athenians at Drabëskos near Ennea Hodoi in 465 B.C.: Thuc. I. 100., in Sicily, in the Hellespont; until the public tombs were filled with citizens and the public registers with aliens. The happiest people is that by whom the old families are cherished; the best statesmen are those who deserve, but do not grasp, power. Such was the Athens, such were the Athenians of the time of the Persian Wars; and therefore they did not lead the lives of pirates. Their successors, instead of ruling for the good of their subjects, wished to tyrannise for their own; and they met with the fate of tyrants. No person not reckless alike of the past and of the future could wish to imitate them. The earlier and the later experiences of Athens prove, in fact, two things; that Attica produces good men, and that empire spoils them (§§ 74—94).

‘The effect of naval supremacy may be further seen in Imperial Sparta, the case of Sparta. Her polity, unaltered and unshaken through seven centuries§ 95. The beginning of the ‘seven centuries’ is taken from 1104 B C.—the legendary epoch of the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesos. Cf. Isokr. Archid. § 12 δόξαν ἣν οἱ πρόγονοι...ἐν ἑπτακοσίοις ἔτεσι κτησάμενοι κατέλιπον; and Panathen. § 204., was all but overthrown when she became imperial. Her sins against Greece were thus far worse than ours, that faction and bloodshed, entailing perpetual feuds, were rife in her subject cities. She was her insolence; ungrateful, also, to all her benefactors in turn—to Thebes, to Chios, to Persia. She established despots in Italy and Sicily; and in the Peloponnesos outraged Elis, Corinth, Mantineia, Phlius, Argos. In fact she never ceased doing violence until she had prepared for herself the calamity of her fall. Leuktra,—which was not the beginning of her misfortunes but the result of her folly. She was ruined by the arrogance of Empire—Empire, which allures and betrays like a false mistress. Ought not the traitress to be detested who has brought both Athens and Sparta to misery? It is no marvel that, nevertheless, all woo Empire. No men know their own real Dangers of Empire. interests. We, by meddling, prepared the Spartan ascendancy, and they, by insolence, brought about a reaction in our favour. The demagogues led up to the Thirty Tyrants, and these, in turn, made all of us ultra-democrats. The case is the same in regard to monarchy. Absolute power is universally coveted, though all know that an absolute ruler has an anxious life and usually a violent death. You admit this, and are yet unwilling to apply the same reasoning to the case of an Imperial State. You even allow that the despotism of Thebes wrongs Boeotia; but will not admit that your own government injures your allies. If, then, you listen to me, you will consider through what causes Athens and Sparta rose to rule Hellas, and then came into peril of enslavement; through what causes the Thessalians have lost their hereditary wealth, while the Megarians, placed among enemies and originally Why Megara is rich. poor, have become the richest of the Greeks. It is moderation that has brought the blessing, intemperance that has brought the curse,—a curse which sometimes tarries, which an individual sometimes eludes by death, but from which there is no escape for the immortality of a State (§§ 95—120).

‘Remembering this, you must not be led by demagogues The demagogues. who, in their words and in their deeds, resemble those who brought Athens to ruin. It was not such men as these who made, and kept, the city great; or who brought back from exile the victims of the Peisistratidae or of the Thirty. While Athens acquires a name for rapacity throughout Greece, these men enrich themselves at our cost. Perikles, one of Perikles. the earliest demagogues§ 126. Περικλῆς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τοιούτων δημαγωγὸς καταστάς. Cf. Panathen. § 148, where Peisistratos also is described as a δημαγωγός., at least did not fill his own purse, though he left 8,000 talents in the akropolis. Now, we hear nothing but the lamentations of those who are absolutely starving, or of those who, though not destitute, are crushed by public imposts. Unprincipled speakers and demagogues are our worst enemies. They do not merely compromise our national name; it is their interest that each one of us should be in actual want, and so at their mercy. They delight, therefore, in impeachments, indictments, and all that machinery of calumny by which we can be brought to the beggary which makes their wealth (§§ 121—131).

‘To sum up—the conditions of restoring Athens to Three conditions of welfare. prosperity are three:—that we should cease to assume that every informer is a true democrat, and every honourable man an oligarch;—that we should treat allies as friends, not as slaves;—that we should value above all things the esteem of Greece.

‘If you do this—and if, at the same time, you show yourselves warlike in preparation, but peaceful in the justice. of your policy—Greece will be tranquillised, seeing your power ready to step in to the support of the injured. In any event, however, Athens will gain reputation. If wars cease, the credit will be ours. If they do not, we shall be the recognised champions of the weak. The infirmities of age do not suffer me to express all that I foresee as in store for us. But, in one word, let us be the deliverers, not the despoilers of Greece.

‘The position among the Hellenes at which Athens ought to aim is like that which the kings of Sparta held among the Lacedaemonians. These kings are not despots, but leaders The Spartan Kings. who command a devoted loyalty; the Spartan who shrank from dying for them would be more disgraced than if he cast away his shield.

‘Two things warn me to cease—the length of this speech, and the number of my years. Let younger men strive, by speaking and writing, to give an honest direction to the politics of Greece. They may remember that, when Greece prospers, her most thoughtful men prosper too’ (§§ 132—145).

The Speech On the Peace excels in one respect Remarks. almost all the other compositions of Isokrates. The elaborate evenness of his usual style is here broken by a sincere indignation; the disasters, moral and material, brought on Athens by the war rouse him to direct and vigorous utterance. Chares and Aristophon, the leaders of the War Party, are the men at whom his attack is specially levelledCf. Schäf. Dem. I. p. 168. Arist. Rhet. III. 17.. It is this definite significance which gives their sting to his invectives against the corrupt generals§§ 45—56. and the corrupt statesmen§§ 121—131..

Dionysios admires the Speech as an exhortation to a just and upright policyDionys. de Isocr. c. 8.; Isokrates himself quotes it in the Antidosis Antid. §§ 62 ff. as an example of practical advice on contemporary affairs. The tenor of the advice is this:—Let Athens resign empire (ἀρχή), and be content with hegemony,—the headship of a Confederacy of which all the members shall be free —such a Confederacy as she presided over just after the Persian Wars. Abstinence from aggression, and the manifestation of a just temper, of a resolution to protect the weak against the strong, will suffice to place and to keep Athens at the head of such a league. Isokrates fails to remark that the Athenian hegemony of 478, and the revived hegemony of 378, had passed into empire by the same inevitable process. He has an ideal of a free confederacy which experience has not taught him to be impossible; and for the attainment of this ideal he believes nothing to be needful but that Athens should become and appear virtuous. In the Areopagitikos he propounds a simple return to old constitutional forms as the remedy for the internal disorders of Athens; in the speech he maintains that her On the Peace. foreign policy may be amended and made triumphant by a return to the spirit of AristeidesCf. § 75.. The counsel is in itself good and noble, but is thoroughly unpractical; it estimates in a manner infinitely too flattering what Athens was capable of doing and what Hellas was ready to accept.

II. 3. Archidamos

Archidamos [Or. VI.]. At the beginning of 366 B. C. Sparta, Athens, Corinth and the smaller states dependent on Corinth, as Epidauros and Phlius, were allied, and were at war with Thebes and her allies, of whom the chief was Argos. But in that year the treacherous attempt of Athens to seize Corinth gave the Corinthians a sense of insecurity and a desire for peace. TheyAnd not the Spartans, as the author of the ὑπόθεσις wrongly says: cf. Grote, c. 79, vol. x p. 309 n. accordingly sent envoys to Thebes, asking on what terms peace would be granted to the allies. The Thebans prescribed, as one condition of peace, the recognition of the independence of Messene, the new state founded by Epameinondas in 370Grote and Schäfer place the first invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas, and the commencement of the new town of Messene, at the close of 370 B.C.; Clinton, at the beginning of 369 B.C. Xenophon speaks of the restoration as complete in 368: Hellen. VII. 1. 27.. A congress met at Sparta. The Spartans refused to recognise the independence of Messene; and accordingly remained, with Athens, at war against Thebes. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, and probably some other small statesAs Troezen and Hermione: Grote, c. 79, x. p. 400., accepted the condition, and made peace on their own account, B.C. 366: see § 91.

The Archidamos is in the form of a deliberative speech. It purports to be spoken, in 366 B. C., by Date and occasion. Archidamos III., son of the king Agesilaos, during a debateIt may be questioned whether the scene of the debate was (1) the Gerousia, or (2) the Assembly of Spartan citizens above thirty. (ἄπελλα, Plut. Lys. 35), or (3) that more select assembly of citizens— probably limited to the ὅμοιοι— which is heard of as being convened in special emergencies: Xen. Hellen. III. 3. 18. But, except the kings and the ephors, no citizen under 60 years of age could be a member of the Gerousia. On the other hand it is certain that the Public Assembly (ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, Thuc. I. 87) was sometimes the scene of a real debate, (and not merely of passive voting)—as of the debate in which the Peloponnesian War was decided upon: Thuc. I. 79—87. The king Archidamos and the ephor Stenelaidas are, indeed, the only speakers named on that occasion: and probably a private citizen could speak only by permission. Archidamos, though a Heraklid and next heir to the throne, apologises for presuming to speak: but mainly on account of his youth: §§ 1—2. at Sparta on the Theban proposal. There seems no reason to doubt that the speech was written in 366 B.C., either just before or soon after the actual decision of the questionReferring to the opinion of Niebuhr that the Archidamos was written after the battle of Mantineia, Thirlwall says—‘We must however remember the speech which Cleon made for Lysander, and that Xenophon (H. VII. 4. 9) gives us reason to believe that the spirit prevailing at Sparta was just that which breathes through the Archidamus’: V. p. 178, c. 40.. It may have been composed in the first instance as an exerciseThe Μεσσηνιακός of Alkidamas of Elaea (Ar. Rhet. I. 13. II. 23) may, as Spengel thinks (συναγ. τεχν. XXIV), have been composed in rivalry of the Archidamos. ; yet, as discussing a question of contemporary politics from the point of view which a large party at Sparta must really have taken, it claims to be considered as something more. Isokrates probably sent it to Archidamos,—not, of course, for delivery, but as a proof of sympathy with the Spartan policySpengel says of the Archidamos (συν. τεχν. XXIV) ‘non est ut Philippus oratio Archidamo missa, sed declamatio.’ It is not easy to see why the fact of the speech being a declamation should exclude the hypothesis of its having been sent to Archidamos.—The speaker's apology for the length of his remarks (§§ 15, 16) may be noticed as an attempt to give the composition something of a Spartan air. But Spartan brevity was now no longer so severe as formerly: cf. Plut. Apophth. 16 (quoted by Thirlwall V. 179), where Epameinondas replies to a Spartan's invective—‘At least the Thebans have taught you to make longer speeches.’.

‘Perhaps some of you will be surprised that I, who have always been loyal to the customs of Sparta, should, in spite of my youth§ 1. νεώτερος ὤν. Archidamos is mentioned as a young man in 378 B.C.: Xen. H. V. 4, §§ 25—33: and as commanding Spartan armies in 371 (H. VI. 4, §§ 17—26) and 367 ( H. VII. 1, § 28). He may now have been about thirty-five years of age., come forward to advise. Had my elders given counsel worthy of Sparta, I should have been silent. As it is, some of them have supported the demand of the enemy; others have but faintly opposed it. I must not, through regard for what becomes me individually, allow the State to pass a resolution which would dishonour it.

‘The royal house of Sparta is responsible for the conduct of war; surely it ought to have a voice in the debates on which war depends. The present crisis is the gravest in which Sparta has ever been placed. The question is not The issue. whether we shall rule others, but whether we shall obey the dictates of an enemy. As a descendant of Herakles, as son of a king of Sparta and heir of his dignity, I cannot look on in silence while the country left to us by our ancestors is made over to our slaves. Such a surrender would be for Thebes a triumph greater than Leuktra; a victory over that which they failed to conquer when they broke our ranks— the Spartan spirit (§§ 1—10).

‘Our allies urge us to resign Messenia and to make The allies. peace. Worse traitors than those who revolted from us formerly and ruined only themselves, these seek to rob us of the glory which our ancestors were seven hundred years§ 12. Cf. note on De Pace, § 95. in winning. We have often fought for our allies; they refuse to fight for us, and threaten, if we hold out, to make peace on their own account. Let them: a struggle without them will bring us the more honour (§§ 11—14).

‘I am no lover of words; but it will be useful at this moment to trace the historical claims of Sparta to Messene (§§ 15—16).

‘When Herakles had passed from earth to the gods, his Sparta's title to Messene. children were long vexed by Eurystheus; then, after their enemy's death, they settled among the Dorians. Their descendants in the third generation had occasion to consult the oracle at Delphi. It told them nothing as to the special object of their visit; but bade them go to their fatherland. Reflecting, they found that Argos belonged to them by hereditary right—since the offspring of Herakles were now the only representatives of Perseus: Lacedaemon, by gift—for Heracles had bestowed it upon Herakles who had restored him from exile: Messene, by conquest—for Herakles, wronged by Neleus and his sons, had slain them and taken their town.

‘Deeming that the oracle spoke of all these places, the Return of the Herakleidae. Herakleidae rallied your ancestors around them, promising to divide the territory among their followers, but reserving the royalty to themselves. It need not be told how they conquered the Peloponnesos and divided it into three chief kingdoms. You have kept to this day the compact which your ancestors made with mine. But the Dorian invaders of Messenia had scarcely been settled in it when they slew their own leader and founder, the Heraklid Kresphontes. His sons fled to Sparta, imploring vengeance for their father, and offering Messenia to us. Encouraged by an oracle, we made war and conquered the country. Our right to it thus Sparta's threefold claim. rests on the same grounds as our right to Lacedaemon; that is,—on the gift of the Herakleidae; on an oracle; and on conquest (§§ 17—25).

‘All titles to possession are made stronger by length of occupancy. We acquired Messene before the Persians were masters of Asia, and before some of the Greek cities had been founded. Yet the Thebans, while recognising, in the The Thebans. case of Persia, a right less than two hundred years§ 27. Dating from the accession of Cyrus to the empire, 559 B.C. old, deny, in ours, a right of more than twice that age. Only the other day§ 27. In 373 B.C.: cf. introd. to the Plataikos. they devastated Thespiae and Plataea; after an interval of four hundred years§ 27. ‘Three hundred’ would have been more accurate. The Second Messenian War ended, and the conquest of the country was completed, in 668 B.C. they restore Messene—in each instance breaking oaths and treaties. Were they only bringing back genuine Messenians, it would be unjust; but in fact they are planting Helots on our frontier.

‘Further, our claim to Messene has been indirectly allowed by our enemies. We have had ere now to make a humiliating peace; but neither Persia nor Athens has ever asked us for Messene. Our claim was also recognised by the oracle at Delphi,—the most august in Greece. It advised Delphic oracle. us to accept the offer of the sons of Kresphontes, and showed us how to succeed in the war; but was silent to our enemies. In brief—we received Messene from its former owners—established our own right of conquest—drove out the impious foe of the Heraklidae—and have had our title confirmed by time, by the verdict of enemies, by the voice of the gods (§§ 26—33).

‘We are urged to make our decision on grounds of expediency, not of abstract justice. This is wrong in principle, and not easy in practice; for what is expediency? It is not clear that, supposing we obeyed Thebes, we should obtain a firm peace. Concessions of this kind always invite new attacks (§§ 34—39).

‘There are plenty of instances in which disasters as great Examples of recovery from disaster. as ours have been retrieved. Athens, to say nothing of her perils in remote times, came safely through the Persian war, and gained empire, because, when her position seemed desperate, she refused to listen to the dictates of the enemy. Dionysios§ 44. i.e. Dionysius I. in 394 B.C.: cf. Grote, c. 82, vol. X. p. 695. was on the point of abandoning Syracuse to the Carthaginians, when a friend reminded him that “royalty is a good winding-sheet”:—he remained, and triumphed. Amyntas§ 46. See note on Panegyr. § 126. of Macedon, defeated by his neighbours and temporarily robbed of his whole realm, rallied, with a like result, from a like despair. Thebes is great now because she had patience to endure our attacks steadfastly. In short, good government and military skill are the two things needful to repair national misfortunes. No one will deny that in both these things we stand unrivalled (§§ 40—48).

‘Some advocate peace because war is a bad thing in itself. But that depends on circumstances. Peace is for the prosperous: war is certainly the best hope of the unfortunate. Those who would be free must make peace, not when the enemy bids them, but when they have become stronger than, or equal to, him (§§ 49—51).

‘We ought not to be less spirited in defending ourselves Spartans for Sparta. than we have always been in succouring others. Formerly, if a single Lacedaemonian went to the aid of a city allied with us, its deliverance was always ascribed to him. Pedaritos§ 53. When Chios revolted from Athens in 412 B.C. Pedaritos was posted there as Lacedaemonian governor: Thuc. VIII. 28. Soon afterwards the Athenians set about fortifying Delphinion, a promontory on the east coast of the island: ib. 38. Pedaritos having refused to help Astyochos in supporting the revolt of Lesbos, Astyochos refused to support Pedaritos at Chios. The Athenian fort was at length eompleted. Pedaritos then sent an urgent message to the Spartan fleet at Rhodes, representing that, unless help came speedily, Chios must be lost. In the mean time he made an attack on Delphinion with such forces as he had, but was defeated and slain: Thuc. VIII. 55. The words of Isokrates—εἰς Χίον εἰσπλεύσας τὴν πόλιν διέσωσε—are calculated, therefore, to convey an inaceurate imprcssion. Pedaritos did, indeed, hold out in Chios for a year; but his command ended disastrously. saved Chios, Brasidas saved Amphipolis, Gylippos saved Syracuse. What one Spartan could do for others, shall not the whole Lacedaemonian people be able to do for themselves? Asia and Europe are full of the trophies of our victories in the causes of others; in the cause of Sparta shall not one blow be struck? We can afford to keep numbers of horses at a great cost; and shall we make peace as if we were beggars? We have the name of being the most laborious of the Hellenes; and shall we accept the terms of the enemy after one defeat§ 56. i.e. Leuktra, § 10., one invasion§ 56. At this time Epameinondas had thrice invaded Peloponnesos—in 370, 369, 367. But he had invaded Lakonia only once, in 370. The next invasion of Lakonia occurred shortly before Mantineia in 362.—resigning so quickly the country for which the Messenians themselves stood a siege of twenty years§ 57. Referring to the siege of Ithome in the first Messenian War, 743—723 B.C., and forgetting the dangers by which our ancestors won it? (§§ 52—57).

‘Some, reckless of our honour, advise peace because Hopes from without. Sparta is weak and Thebes strong. But we have at least the strength of a good government, of temperate habits, of a brave spirit. Nor shall we lack external aid. Athens, though she is not with us in all things, will not see us destroyed. Dionysios of Syracuse; the king of Egypt; the various dynasts of Asia; the richest and most distinguished individuals in Hellas, whose political sympathies are with us—will help. Nay, even the democrats of the Peloponnese will soon begin to long once more for our protecting care, now that they have tasted the fruits of anarchy (§§ 58—69).

‘Even, however, if we were utterly forsaken, I should be ashamed to give up Messene, and to admit, either that our ancestral title to it was bad, or that we had relinquished a right. Probably the tide will turn soon. But, if the worst The last resort. comes, we must send away our women and children and old men to Sicily, Italy, Cyrene, Asia; we must quit Sparta; seize some strong position; and, from it, harass the enemy by land and sea. No city in the Peloponnese would long be able to bear what an army of desperadoes, unfettered by any polity, and able to plant themselves where they pleased, could inflict. Or if several towns combined, and brought their ill-disciplined levies to meet us in our fastnesses, what could serve us better? The essence of Sparta's strength lies in the resemblance of her civic system to an orderly and disciplined camp. If this resemblance becomes identity, what Sparta a camp. can resist us? The Athenians, in the cause of Hellenic freedom, once left their homes; the Phokaeans removed to Massalia rather than submit to the Persian king. It would be strange if we did not choose to quit Sparta for a time rather than to obey the dictates of our former subjects. But our thoughts ought not to dwell on the possible necessity of leaving Sparta,—they ought to anticipate our triumphant return to it. I have not spoken of what must happen; rather of what ought to happen before we surrender Messene. No lasting peace could be gained by such a compromise. If the Helots were once established at our side, endless annoyance and danger would be our portion (§§ 70—87).

‘There could be no nobler cause in which to die than the present, when the prestige, when the very existence of Sparta is threatened. Epidauros, Corinth, Phlius§ 91. See introductory remarks. may Appeal to reputation. without reproach prefer safety to honour; Sparta cannot. The reputation of the city ought to be as dear to each Spartan as his own: he ought not to suffer it to desert the post at which our fathers placed it. How could we ever show our faces at Olympia§ 95. As Mr Grote observes (c. 78, vol. X. p. 314, n. 2), no free Messenian theoria could have visited Olympia since 723 B.C. or at any Hellenic gathering, if we were to find our own slaves outshining us there by means of wealth taken from us? Dipaea§ 99. According to Herod. IX. 36 the five ἀγῶνες in which Tisamenos of Elis was victorious in company with the Spartans were— 1. Plataea, 479 B.C.: 2. a battle at Tegea against the Tegeatans and Argives: 3. a battle at Dipaea— a town of Maenalia in Arcadia— ‘against all the Argives except the Mantineans’: 4. the third Messenian War, 464—355: 5. Tanagra, 457. From this it may be inferred that the battle at Dipaea was fought between 479 and 464 B.C., where a single line of Spartans routed many myriads of Arcadians; Thyrea, where three hundred Spartans defeated all the Argives; Thermopylae, where a thousand Spartans held their ground against the seventy myriads of Persia—ought to teach us selfreliance now. Nothing is hopeless in war. It was by war, not peace, that Athens and Thebes grew. And in this struggle we should be stimulated by remembering that all Hellas is watching us (§§ 88—106).

‘The true view of this crisis may be shortly given. By Summary. staking our lives on this good cause we shall save them; cowardice would be not only base but fatal. Let us imagine children and parents pleading with us—these, for Sparta's future name; those, for her past. No king of our house has ever led you to defeat. Listen, then, as prudent men listen, to the advice of those who in practice have been found trusty guides’ (§§ 107—111).

The Archidamos has a real historical interest: it Remarks. may be taken as an expression, highly coloured but in the main faithful, of the feeling excited in a majority of Spartans by the reestablishment of Messenia at their side. The damage thus inflicted on Sparta did not consist merely in the reanimation of a hostile State which had long been in decay. It consisted in the creation anew of a hostile State which for three centuries had been dead; and in the subtraction, for that purpose, from Sparta of what had been for three centuries the fairest portion of her territory—of all the country from the Neda to C. Akritas and from the Western slopes of Taygetos to the seaCf. Grote, c. 78, vol. X. p. 313.. Archidamos denounces the allies who consented to such a measure as worse enemies to Sparta than helots and Messenians§§ 11—14.. He proposes that, if need be, the Spartans should send away the old and helpless— abandon Sparta—and pour themselves upon Messenia as homeless and desperate invaders§§ 70—87.. If the matter-of-fact narrative of XenophonXen. H. VII. 4, §§ 8—11. ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς τε Κορινθίοις συνεβούλευον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιήσασθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς μὴ βουλομένοις σὺν έαυτοῖς πολεμεῖν ἀναπαύσασθαι· αὐτοὶ δὲ ἔφασαν, κ.τ.λ. gives no hint of any feeling so passionate as that which is expressed by the second Tyrtaeos, it vouches at least for a resolution no less firm; a resolution which, four years later, again decided Sparta against accepting a peaceAfter Mantineia: Diod. XV. 89: Plut. Ages. 35..

II. 4 Areopagitikos.

Areopagitikos [Or. VII.]—In this speech Isokrates contrasts the Athenian democracy as it existed in the middle of the 4th century B.C. with the democracy of Solon and of Kleisthenes (§ 16). He dwells chiefly on two features of the elder democracy:— 1. the preference of election (αἵρεσις) to ballot (κλήρωσις) in the appointment of state officers, §§ 22 ff.; 2. the supervision of public morals exercised by the Council of the Areiopagos: §§ 36—55. It is owing to the prominence of the latter topic that the speech has been called Ἀρεοπαγιτικός. It is cast in a Form. deliberative form. Isokrates supposes himself to have given notice in writing to the prytanes of an intention to speak ‘On the Safety of Athens’ (περὶ σωτηρίας πρόσοδον ἀπογράψασθαι, §§ 1, 15); and to be now urging in the ekklesia, as absolutely necessary to the welfare of the city, the restoration of censorial power to the Areiopagos (cf. § 84). Like the De Pace (Or. VIII.), this speech was not delivered, or meant for delivery, in the assembly. The deliberative form was adopted merely for the sake of giving greater life and impressiveness to the pleading.

The date is to be inferred from five indications:— Date. (1) There was now peace on the frontiers of Attica (τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν), and a confident sense of security at Athens, §§ 1—3: (2) The Athenians had ‘lost all the cities in Thrace’, (§ 9): (3) had spent more than 1000 talents on mercenaries, ib.: (4) had got a bad name in Hellas and incurred the enmity of Persia, § 10: (5) had been forced ‘to save the friends of the Thebans’ and to lose their own allies, ib.

These notices point to one of two dates; to 346 B.C., in which peace was concluded between Athens and Philip; or to 355, in which the Social War, begun in 357, was closed by a peace between Athens and her allies.

The year 346 best suits (2), since it was only in Arguments for 346 B.C. 347 that Philip became master of Olynthos and its confederate towns. On the other hand, a general sense of security (1) could not be said to have existed at Athens in 346. The war with Philip had been thoroughly disheartening; and the deep dismay at Athens when Philip occupied Phokis a few daysDem. de F. L. § 125. after the final ratification of the peace, has been described by DemosthenesId. de Cor. § 169.. Further, if the speech belonged to 346, we should have expected in §§ 6, 7 some mention of Olynthos, the latest and most striking instance of sudden disaster to a confident city; and in §§ 8, 81 some mention of Macedonia as a quarter from which danger was supposed to threaten Athens; for, though Isokrates did not himself admit any such danger, he could not ignore the large party who in 346 apprehended it, and to whom he refers when he writes in that very year to Philip: Or. V. §§ 73—80.

The year 355 evidently fits (1), (2) and (4) of Arguments for 355 B.C. the conditions mentioned above. Though the necessity of recognising the autonomy of Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Byzantium had been humiliating for Athens, the number of smaller States which still paid the syntaxis was large enough to inspire the Athenians with pride and confidence, in the absence of any danger so formidable as that which presently began to threaten them from Macedonia. The troops of Chares had been almost wholly mercenaries, and it had been felt as a relief at Athens when Artabazos helped to pay them. Artaxerxes III., incensed by the aid given to his rebellious satrap, had sent (probably in 355) an embassy to Athens, threatening to help the Chians with 300 ships; and this threat had hastened the peaceDiod. XVI. 22.. As regards (2), it must be allowed that, if 355 is the true date, the ἁπάσας of § 9 is a rhetorical exaggeration. According to common usage, αἱ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεις mean not only the towns of the Chalkidic peninsula, but often also the Greek colonies all along the southern coasts of ThraceRauchenstein, Introd. to the Areopag. p. 107.. Philip had not yet got Olynthos or the 32 towns of its confederacy. He had, however, alienated the entire Olynthian confederacy from the Athenian interest; and had taken, in 358—356, Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea. As to (5), the words in § 10, τοὺς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων φίλους σώζειν ἠναγκασμένοι τοὺς δ’ ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, have been explained in two different ways. SchäferSchäfer, Demosth. u. s. Zeit, vol. I. p. 462 n.: Paus. IV. 28. 1, 2. refers them to the circumstance that during the Phokian war the Messenians, Argives and Megalopolitans had been threatened by Sparta, and on applying to Sparta had received a qualified promise of support. RauchensteinIntrod. p 108: Diod. XV. 79. finds a better clue in the fact that Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium had been, since 364, friendly with ThebesPeace was concluded about midsummer 355: Clinton, F. H. Rauchenstein places the Areopagitikos in 354, following Böhnecke, who assigns the embassy from Artaxerxes III. to that year. But according to Diod. XVI. 22 the embassy preeeded and hastened the peace; and the peace certainly belongs to 355.Clinton refers the Areopagitikos to 353, the year (probably) of the Antidosis, which he thinks must have been published before it. But on this point no inference ean be drawn from the fact that the Areopag. is not mentioned in the Antidosis. In the Antidosis Isokrates quotes from several, but by no means from all, of his important works; and, in such an apology for his life and teaching, it can be easily understood why he avoided reference to the Areopagitikos, which may have been represented as hostile to the democracy—a calumny which he himself antieipates, Areop. §§ 57, 70. Sehäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. III. 329, also puts the Areopagitikos in 355.. In allowing these important allies to be severed from her confederacy, and in guaranteeing their autonomy, Athens was therefore giving a deliverance to ‘friends of the Thebans.’ The sense thus put on σώζειν is somewhat strange; but, on the whole, the explanation seems tenable. The latter half of 355Oncken (p. 79) seems to refer the Areop. to 358 B C. B.C. may be taken as the date of the Areopagitikos.

‘It will be asked why I come forward to speak on the “safety” of Athens at a time when she has a fleet of more than two hundred triremes; peace on her frontiers; the command of the sea; numerous allies. It is, in truth, this very persuasion of security which alarms me. The rise and the fall, first of Athens, then of Sparta, prove that anxious watchfulness leads to success,—arrogance, to ruin. Our Dangers of confidence. present prosperity is hollow. We have lost the cities in Thrace, spent great sums on mercenaries,—become unpopular in Greece,—revived our enmity with Persia,—saved the friends of Thebes and lost our own. Yet we have twiceOne of these two oceasions was probably when Chares, aided by Artabazos, had defeated the Persian army under Tithraustes in 356 B.C.: see Grote, c. 86, vol. XI. p. 324. What the other occasion was is more doubtful. Schneider refers to the vietory gained by Chares over Adaeus, one of Philip's generals, at Cypsela on the Hebrus but this was in 353 B.C. (see Schäf Dem. I. 399) and no one, except Clinton, places the Areopagiticos later than 354: Schneider himself (p. 71) places it ‘soon after’ the end of the war in 355. held a public thanksgiving; and in the ekklesia we are taking affairs as easily as if their position was absolutely satisfactory. The reason of this apathy lies deep. The whole political constitution of Athens is vitiated. When the victories, first of Konon, then of Timotheos, had given Athens the control of Hellas, she could not keep it for a moment. Her polity, her very soul, is distempered; and yet we do not attempt to minister to its disease. Chatting in the workshops, we admit that never under a democracy was there worse government; but in practice we are content to have it so. It is on this account that I have given notice of an intention to speak on the “safety” of Athens. Year by year her course becomes more perilous; and the only hope which I can see for her is in a return to the old paths. I wish to put before you the characteristics of that elder democracy which Solon founded and which Kleisthenes reconstituted. You can then choose between it and the present (§§ 1—19).

‘Under that democracy, licence was not confounded with freedom. Political “equality” has been understood in two The old democracy. senses—as meaning either that all are to share absolutely alike, or that every man is to receive his due. Our ancestors preferred that “equality” which does not efface the distinction between merit and worthlessness. They did not take officials Its ‘equality.’ at random from the crowd, but picked the fittest for each taskIt is difficult to say how much Isokrates meant by this vague assertion. He states that the public officials generally (οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες) were selected aecording to merit (προκρίνειν). It is now pretty well ascertained:— 1. That, in the election of the nine archons, Kleisthenes substituted the democratic ballot (κλήρωσις) for election (αἵρεσις). 2. That at least the ten Strategi, and the Tamias or Steward of the Public Treasury, were at all periods, as a rule, αἱρετοί, not κληρωτοί. 3. That, as regards most other offices, lot was substituted for election about 478 B.C.—Isokrates probably believed that, in the case of archous, αἵρεσις continued to be the rule longer than it really did. It is possible, again, that in his time Strategi were sometimes appointed by ballot; and also that the proportion of inferior officials so appointed was larger than in former times.See Curtius, App. to bk. II. e. 2, vol. I. p. 478 tr. Ward: Rauehenstein Introd. to Areop. p. 112: C. F. Herm. Antt. § 112. 7.. They held, also, that appointment to office by lot was less truly democratic than selection. In the one case, chance prevails—in the other, the desire of choosing genuine friends of popular government. This system satisfied the people generally, because, in those days, everyone had his own business to attend to. Office was not yet looked upon as an easier source of income than private industry. The people collectively reigned; the rich men, who had leisure, served it as a duty (§§ 20—27).

‘Such was their political system. From it followed their Its general tone. relations to the gods and to each other. Their zeal in the services of religion was not spasmodic, but equable as the blessings for which it expressed their gratitude—regular as the sequence of seed-time and harvest. Their private intercourse was embittered by no class-feeling; the poor were proud of the great houses, and the rich helped all the enterprises of the needy. In a word, it was safe to have money, and easy to borrow it (§§ 28—35).

‘If it is inquired to what causes such results may be The Areiopagos: traced, the principal cause will be found to be this—that the education of the citizen did not end with his boyhood. The Court of the Areiopagos was the recognised guardian of public decorum. Its influence at that time upon the whole community may be judged from its influence at this day upon its own members. We see how the worst men, when raised to it, cease to obey their own natures and become loyal to its traditions. It was the principle of this Court that deterrent laws, however strict, are useless without positive moral discipline; that the happiness of citizens depends, not on guardian of the unwritten law. having the walls of their porticoes covered with laws, but on having justice in their hearts. The Areiopagos aimed, not at punishing merely, but at preventing crime. It was especially watchful over young men. For the poorer youths, work was found in agriculture and commerce; for the richer, in vigorous exercises of mind and body. This watch was maintained over the daily life even of adults, and was aided by the division of the town into wards, of the country into demes. The Supreme Court knew well that two things chiefly restrain crime; probability of detection and certainty of punishment. Thus controlled, the young men of that time did not spend their days in the haunts popular now; nay, if they had to cross the marketplace, they did so with downcast eyes. Disrespect to elders, dissipation, buffoonery, were not then in fashion.

‘I do not mean to be hard upon youthful follies. My censure is meant for those statesmen who, a little before our own time§ 50. The law of Ephialtes is usually placed in Ol. LXXX. 2, 459 B.C.: by Curtius in 460 (Hist. Gr. II. 381 trans.)., abolished the controlling power of the Areiopagos. While that power lasted, Attica was so secure from invasion Sense of security. and from faction that the houses in the country were handsomer than those within the walls; many citizens never came to town even for the festivals. The contrasts of a thoroughly vulgar policy were not to be seen then. There were no citizens casting lots for their daily bread§ 54: i.e. for employment as dikasts: cf. de Pac. (Or. VIII.) § 130 τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν δικαστηρίων ζῶντας. outside the lawcourts, while they paid strangers liberally to fight their battles: no choregi, blazing in golden robes, who were doomed to shiver through the winter in rags. The Areiopagos, while it had power, found employment for the poor and restrained the excesses of the wealthy (§§ 36—55).

‘Some who have heard this account of our ancestors’ life, while admiring it, have thought that my advice was unpractical—long habit cannot be broken through,—and also dangerous to myself. I shall be suspected, they say, of desiring an oligarchy. Now if I were praising some new This is no plea for oligarchy. scheme of government, and urging the appointment of a special commission to carry it out, I might incur suspicion. As it is, I have only been urging a return to that old system under which, as everyone knows, Athens was greatest. On all other occasions, too, I have censured dynasty and supported democracy—not a reckless democracy, but one tempered like that of Sparta, in which the principle of equality is most truly expressed. If we go through the chief cities of Hellas, a democratical, not an oligarchical, form of government will be found to have been most frequently prosperous.

‘Even our corrupt democracy would seem god-made by the side of the government of the Thirty Tyrants. It was The Thirty Tyrants. their doing that the walls of Athens were levelled; that the dockyards, which had cost 1,000 talents, were destroyed by contract for three; that 1,500 citizens were put to death untried, and more than 5,000 banished. When the exiles were restored, the ekklesia generously voted the payment of a debt contracted by the adherents of the Thirty in making war upon the Peiraeus; Athens resumed, on the proposal of Sparta herself, the empire of the sea, and, later, was besought for help by the Power which, under the Thirty, had constantly dictated to her. I say this to show, first, that I am no friend of oligarchies: next, that even a bad democracy is a less evil than an oligarchy.

‘You may ask why, then, I am dissatisfied with this The present Democracy. democracy, seeing that it has been productive of so much good? I answer that it is not enough to excel the Tyrants; we must strive to reach the standard of our ancestors. No race ought to be better than the Athenians. As other countries have their special products, Attica has her breed of men; we are of that breed, but at this moment we dishonour it. Enough of this: I return to my immediate subject (§§ 56—77).

‘If our general system of government remains unaltered, all its particular phenomena must continue the same—our conduct of war, our conduct of debate, the spirit of our private life. If we go back to the old system we shall get the old results. Then the Greeks trusted us; then the A contrast. Persians launched no war-ship west of Phaselis; moved no camp beyond the HalysDemosthenes de Fals. Legat. § 311 says that the conditions were —ἵππου μὲν δρόμον ἡμέρας πεζῆ μὴ καταβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλατταν βασιλέα, ἐντὸς δὲ Χελιδονίων (the Swallow Islands, opposite the frontier of Lykia and Pamphylia, and S.W.E. of Cape Phaselis) καὶ Κυανέων πλοίῳ μακρῷ μὴ πλεῖν. As Mr Grote observes (c. 45, v. 456), even the ‘one day's course for a horse’ is probably more than the truth. But the statement of Isokrates—if, indeed, he recollected where the Halys was—is a strange exaggeration. As to this legendary treaty, see note on Panegyr. § 115.. The generals can tell you how the Greeks hate us now; the mind of the Persian king may be seen in his letters. Then, the citizens were so educated as to be a terror to invaders and to live comfortably with each other; now, not a man will fight but for pay, and there are more citizens destitute than solvent. If we imitate our ancestors we shall get rid of our own troubles and save Hellas. Believing this, I have come forward to urge it; reflect, and vote as you think best for Athens’ (§§ 78—84).

The purpose of the Areopagitikos involves a contrast between old times and new; it has therefore a double interest, as a picture of the past and of the present. As a picture of the older democracy it supplements the Panegyrikos. The Panegyrikos describes the external relations of Athens at the time of her most splendid activitySee esp. Panegyr. §§ 51—99.; the Areopagitikos portrays the inner life by which that activity was created and nourished. As a picture of the new democracy, this speech may be compared with another spoken fourFor I follow Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Zeit, II. 66 ff., in placing the First Philippic in 351, and not, as it is usually placed, in 352. years later—with the First Philippic of Demosthenes. The First Philippic sets forth vividly the utter indifference of the Athenian public to the foreign concerns of Athens, their halfheartedness in all things, their habitual indolence broken by spasmodic efforts which always came too late: the Areopagitikos exposes in detail that civil and domestic life of which such a foreign policy was the counterpart. Demosthenes saw the true remedy in a more earnest attention to the actual crisis. Isokrates, who saw the inner decay but believed in no urgent danger from without, found the remedy in a simple return to old forms and mannersDionys. Isokr. 8 characterises the Areopag. as an exhortation to εὐκοσμία—the decorum of the old school..

The powers exercised by the Areiopagos before the reforms of Ephialtes were of two kinds, definite and indefinite. The definite powers were:—1. A limited criminal jurisdiction: 2. the supreme direction of religious worship, especially of the cultus of the Eumenides. The indefinite powers were:—1. A general supervision of all magistrates and law-courts: 2. a general guardianship of the laws, with the right of protest (though not of veto) when proposed new laws conflicted with old: 3. a general control of the education of the young: 4. a general censorship of public morals: 5. competence to assume, in emergencies of the State, a dictatorial authoritySuch as, e.g., it assumed in the year of Salamis. Niebuhr compares this to the power conferred on Roman consuls by the formula ‘videant ne quid detrimenti, &c.’ Vortrage ub. alte Gesch. II. 29..

The definite powers of the Areiopagos were never at any time taken from itIt has, indeed, been supposed that the jurisdiction of the Areiopagos was temporarily taken away by the Thirty Tyrants. It is in this sense that Mr Grote (c. 46, v. 498) understands Lys. de caede Eratosth. § 32:—ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν—the passage mainly relied on by those who, like Meier, Boeckh and O. Müller, think that Ephialtes abolished the criminal jurisdiction of the Areiopagos. But there I think with Hermann that the meaning is simply:—‘(that court) of which it is the ancestral right, and to which it has been assigned in your own time also, to try causes of homicide.’ The antithesis is between πάτριον and ἐφ’ ὑμῶν. ἀποδέδοται means, not ‘restored,’ but ‘rendered, assigned as a province.’ The idea might have been expressed thus—ᾧ καὶ πάτριόν ἐστι καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν ὑπάρχει. The statement of Demosthenes is precise and emphatic (in Aristocr. § 66) —τοῦτο μόνον τὸ δικαστήριον οὐχὶ τύραννος οὐκ ὀλιγαρχία οὐ δημοκρατία τὰς φονικὰς δίκας ἀφελέσθαι τετόλμηκεν.. But Ephialtes abolished almostThe Areiopagos retained the power, shared by the Senate of Five Hundred and by all magistrates, of inflicting small fines: cf. Grote, c. 46, v. 498. And on at least one occasion subsequent to the reform of Ephialtes—namely in 405 B.C., after Aegospotami— the Areiopagos is found acting in a dictatorial capacity: Lys. in Eratosth. (Or. XII.) § 69, πραττούσης τῆς ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆς σωτήρια. wholly the indefinite powers. It is for the revival of these—especially of (3) and (4)—that Isokrates is anxious. While it possessed these, the Areiopagos had been the strongest influence, though mainly a negative influence, in the State; it had been able to impress a conservative character upon the whole civic bodyCf. Curtius, Hist. Gr. bk. III, c. II., vol. II., p. 378 tr. Ward.. Deprived of these, it was merely a criminal court of narrow competence. Its connection with what was most venerable in the old religion, and the high standing of its individual members, still secured to it, indeed, a large measure of respect. Isokrates speaks of the influences which, even in his own day, changed bad men when they became members of the college§ 38. It is at least credible that democrats, on becoming members of an ancient and dignified official body, grew more conservative. On the esprit de corps of the Areiopagos Niebuhr says:— Der Areopag est ein merkwürdiges Beispiel von dem was man esprit de corps nennt in seiner schönsten Bedeutung, wie vor der französischen Revolution der pariser Parlament eine Gravität und Unabhängigkeit hatte, die sich allen Mitgliedern mittheilten und das ganze Leben und Weise übergingen.’ Vorträge üb. alte Gesch. II. p. 31.. But politically the Areiopagos was now powerless. The plea of Isokrates for a restoration of its strength is strikingly illustrated by the protest of Aeschylos against its enfeeblement. It is not on any welldefined function, but rather on those prerogatives which, being vague, were boundless, that orator and poet alike insist:— Here, on the Hill of Ares, Once seat and camp of Amazons who came In anger against Theseus, and defied From their new ramparts his acropolis, And poured blood unto Ares, where is now The hill, the rock of Ares—in this place Awe kin to dread shall hold the citizens From sinning in the darkness or the light, While their own voices do not change the laws. This Court, majestic, incorruptible, Instant in anger, over those who sleep The sleepless watcher of my land I set. (Eum. 660 ff.)

Isokrates: Forensic speeches

THE six forensic speeches extant under the name of Isokrates belong to the first period of his literary life, and cover about ten years 403—393 B.C. They are all in private causes, and may be classed thus:— I. Action for Assault (δίκη αἰκίας). Against Lochites. [Or. XX.] II. Claim to an Inheritance (ἐπιδικασία). Aeginetikos. [Or. XIX.] III. Action to Recover a Deposit (δίκη παρακαταθήκης). 1. Against Euthynus. [Or. XXI.] 2. Trapezitikos. [Or. XVII.] IV. Action for Damage (δίκη βλάβης). Concerning the Team of Horses (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους). [Or. XVI.] V. Special Plea ( παραγραφή). Against Kallimachos. [Or. XVIII.]

I. Action for assaultIt may be asked, ‘What is there to show that this is a δίκη αἰκίας rather than a γραφὴ ὕβρεως?’ The language of the speech itself is ambiguous. The offence complained of is alluded to as ὕβρις in §§ 2, 7, 9, 16. as αἰκία in §§ 5, 15. But on general grounds it seems likely that a man placed as the speaker was would have brought a δίκη αὶκίας, as being easier to sustain, rather than the more serious γραφὴ ὕβρεως. In § 5 his mention of the contumely seems to be an afterthought—ὑπὲρ τῆς αἰκίας—καὶ τῆς ὰτιμίας—ἥκω. I agree with Dobree, who says— ‘videtur esse actio αἰκίας, quam cum graviori ὕβρεως studiose confundit orator.>’ The speech of Demosthenes against Konon (a case of αἰκία) shows just a like attempt at δείνωσις. (δίκη αἰκίας).
Against Lochites.

Against Lochites [Or. XX.]—The plaintiff, ‘a poor man and one of the people’ (§ 19), brings an action against Lochites, a rich young citizen (§ 17), who has struck him a blow. The penalty demanded by the plaintiff is a heavy fine (§ 16).

Two points help to fix the date. (1) Lochites is Date. too young to have had any part in the doings of 405 B.C. (§ 11); (2) his insolence is compared to that of the oligarchs ‘who gave over our power to the enemy and levelled the walls’ (§ 11). This by no means proves, but it rather suggests, that the rebuilding of the walls by Konon had not begun; i.e. that the speech is earlier than 393 B.C. It is put by Sauppe in 394 B.C. Ap. Rauchenstein, Ausgewahlte Reden des Isokrates, Introd. p. 4 note.

The fact of the assault (the prosecutor says) has already Analysis. been established by witnesses‘Praecessit titulus MAPTURIAI,’ Sauppe. But it does not follow that the speech, as we have it, is a fragment.. Now, bodily injury is the most grievous kind of injury, and ought to be atoned for by the heaviest punishment. The framers of the Athenian laws have marked their sense of this by affording two special facilities for prosecution in such cases. First, the prosecutor is not required to deposit caution-money. Secondly, in cases of outrage (ὕβρις), the right of prosecuting is not confined to the person injured. Any citizen cognisant of the outrage can lay an indictment before the Thesmothetae. Again, it is in order to prevent personal violence that the penalty for abusive language has been placed so high as 500 drachmas (§§ 1—3). Outrages which were committed under the oligarchy are punished; much more is punishment due to outrages committed under the democracy (§ 4). Lochites will perhaps argue that the blow has proved harmless. But it is not for the damage, it is for the insult that the plaintiff claims satisfaction. Lochites acted in the spirit of that insolence which has twice overthrown the democracy itself, and of which every manifestation ought to be checked as dangerous to the whole community (§§ 5—14). Rich men alone are interested in the security of property. But rich and poor alike are concerned in the repression of personal violence. If the prosecutor is a poor man, it is not less the duty and the interest of the judges to give him the protection of the law (§§ 15—22).

The cleverness of this speech lies in the speaker's Remarks. identification of his own dignity ‘as a man of the people’ (τοῦ πλήθους εἷς) with that of the judges— men of the people too, exposed to the freaks of young men who happen to have the temper of the Thirty Tyrants. There is a good deal of rhetorical skill in the passage which points out that this insolence of Lochites is just the insolence which has twice overthrown public freedom (§§ 9—11). The speech has one special characteristic in common with that of Demosthenes against Konon. Each deals with an action for assault (αἰκία); but in each the plaintiff constantly speaks of the outrage (ὕβρις)— thus seeking to combine the forces of two distinct forms of accusationCf. Demosth. Or. LIV. §§ 1, 11, etc.: esp. § 17 θαυμάζω γὰρ ἔγωγε εἴ τίς ἐστι πρόφασις παρ’ ὑμῖν ἢ σκῆψις ἑορημένη δἰ ἥν, ἂν ὑβρίζων τις ἐξελέγχηται καὶ τύπτων, δίκην οὐ δὡσει ..

II. Claim to an inheritance (ἐπιδικασία ).
Aeginetikos.

Aeginetikos [Or. XIX].—Thrasylochos, a citizen of Siphnos, one of the Kyclades, had at his death left his property to the speaker, whom he had previously adopted as his sonThis being lawful (in all Greek States according to § 50) when the testator had no legitimate son, and wished to leave his property away from the next of kin, who would otherwise succeed: see Isaeos de Meneclis hered. [Or. II.] § 13.. The speaker's right to the inheritance is disputed by a daughter of the testator; and the speech is in answer to her claim (ἐπιδικασία). The case is tried at Aegina, where the speaker had settled (κατοικισάμενος, § 24) before his death.

The date is uncertain. In §§ 18—20, there is a Date. reference to the seizure of Paros by some exiles from that island and from Siphnos; who afterwards took Siphnos, and drove out the party to which the speaker belonged. Now, from what the speaker says about his family in § 36, it is probable that he belonged to the oligarchic party, and that the successful exiles were democratic. A democratic revolution would have had most chance of success just after the sudden blow dealt to the power of Sparta—the support, throughout Greece, of oligarchy —by the defeat at Knidos in August, 394 B.C. Probably, then, the speech may be put at the end of 394 or early in 393 B.C.Rauchenstein (Introd. to his Select Speeches, p. 4) quotes Blass as putting the speech in 394 B.C., but without mentioning his reasons. Others put it in 402 or 401, according to Henn, de Isocrate rhetore, Köln, 1861: (perhaps referring the troubles in Siphnos and Paros to the effect of the Restoration at Athens in 403 B.C.).

The relationship of the persons chiefly concerned is shown by this stemma:—

Thrasyllos first wife second wife daughter, the claimant against the speaker, § 6 Thrasylochos testator Sôpolis who died before Thrasylochos, § 11 daughter, wife of the speaker, § 9

The speaker is glad of the opportunity given him by this Analysis. trial of proving publicly how much better his right to the inheritance is than that of the female claimant (§§ 1—4). He then explains the relations between the family of Thrasylochos (the testator) and his own (§§ 5—9). From boyhood he had been intimate with Thrasylochos, and had nursed him in his last illness. His friend showed his gratitude by adopting the speaker as his son—the necessary legal preliminary to making him his heir, and securing him against the claim of the next of kin. This proceeding is shown to be in accordance with (1) the law of Aegina, in which island Thrasylochos and the speaker were resident when the will was made; (2) with the law of Keos, valid also in Siphnos, of which the parties were citizens; (3) with the law of the city to which the female claimant and her representatives in this action belonged. [The name of this city is nowhere stated] (§§ 10—15.)

The speaker next contrasts his own conduct towards Thrasylochos with that of the female claimant. In the first place he had saved the very property now in question. Thrasylochos and his brother Sôpolis, citizens of Siphnos, had, for security, placed the greater part of their fortune in the neighbouring island of Paros. Paros was suddenly seized by a party of democratic exiles, Parians and Siphnians, led by one Pasînos. At the risk of his life, the speaker sailed by night to Paros, and carried the endangered property back to Siphnos. Presently the democratic masters of Paros attacked and took Siphnos itself. The speaker—whose family belonged to the aristocracy of the island, and had even given it kings—was among those who were forced to fly. He took with him, not only his own mother and sister, but Thrasylochos, who was then in weak health. The speaker and his family wished to remain at Melos. But Thrasylochos entreated them to accompany him to Troezen; and, though they knew the place to be unhealthy, they consented. The speaker's sister and mother died soon after their arrival. He afterwards nursed Thrasylochos through a long and distressing illness in Aegina. During that illness the half-sister of Thrasylochos, who now claims his property, never once visited him; nor, on his death, did she attend his funeral (§§ 16—33).

Her advocates do not question the genuineness of the will, but complain of it as unreasonable and unjust. It is, however, perfectly reasonable, since, by adopting the speaker as his son, Thrasylochos provided against his family being extinguished and his mother and sister left destitute. It is also just; for the speaker was in all respects best entitled to the inheritance. The choice of him as heir would have gratified Sôpolis, the late brother, and Thrasyllos, the late father, of the testator (§§ 34—46). The speaker claims a verdict on the ground of his benefits to the deceased; of the will; and of the law with which the will accords (§§ 47— 51).

This is perhaps the best of the extant forensic Remarks. speeches of Isokrates. It is almost free from the artificialism which injures more or less the effect of all the rest. The passage in which the speaker gives the proofs of his devotion to Thrasylochos (§§ 18—27) is powerful because it is clear and plain. Nowhere else does Isokrates come so near to the especial excellences of LysiasCf. Vol. I. p. 173. .

III. Action to recover a deposit (παρακαταθήκης δίκη).
1. Against Euthynus.

1. Against Euthynus [Or. XXI.]—Soon after the establishment of the Thirty Tyrants, some personal enemies of Nikias the plaintiff threatenedAs the tense expresses (§ 2)— ἐξήλειφον—ἐνέγραφον. to strike his name off the list of citizens and to have him enrolled for military service under Lysander. Thereupon Nikias mortgaged his house, sent his servants out of Attica, deposited the sum of three talents with the defendant Euthynus, and went to live in the country. Presently, wishing to leave Attica, he applied to Euthynus for his money. Euthynus repaid two of the three talents, but disclaimed knowledge of the third. At the time, Nikias could only complain to friends. He now brings against Euthynus an action for withholding ( ἀποστερῆσαι The technical word, apparently. Among his ἀδικημάτων ὀνόματα, Pollux gives παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερῆσαι (VI. 154). § 16) the third part of the deposit. The speaker is a friend of the plaintiff; the date is evidently just after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C.Paulo post Thrasybuli et exulum in patriam reditum: Sauppe O. A. II. 199. Date.

Lysias wrote a speech, now lost, for Euthynus προς Νικίαν περὶ παρακαταθήκης, cited by Clemens Alex. Strom. VI. p. 626.—Blass (Att. Bereds. p. 358) and Sauppe (O. A. II. 199) agree in referring it to this lawsuit.. Diogenes Laertius also mentions a speech, in answer to that of Isokrates, by Antisthenes; which, if genuine, was probably a mere exerciseDiog. Laert. VI. 15 πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους ἀμάρτυρον. Sauppe (O. A. II. 167) thinks that this speech, or declamation, is directly alluded to by Isokrates, Panegyr. § 188, τοὺς δὲ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητοῦντας (χρὴ) πρὸς μὲν τὴν παρακαταθήκην καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν φλυαροῦσι παύεσθαι γράφοντας..

The speaker can show good reason for appearing as Analysis. advocate of the plaintiff. Nikias is his friend, an injured man, and has no practice in speaking (§ 1). The facts of the case are then stated (§§ 2—3).

As no one, freeman or slave, was present when Nikias deposited or demanded the money, no witness can be brought. The case for the plaintiff must rest solely on presumptive evidence (τεκμήρια, § 4). Now, vexatious lawsuits are usually brought by needy and fluent men against wealthy men who cannot speak. But, in this case, the defendant is poorer, and a better speaker, than the plaintiff. Again, the temptation to dishonesty was stronger for Euthynus than for Nikias; since for the former the gain was certain, but the claim of the latter might fail. The state of public affairs, too, at the time made robbery easy and redress hopeless (§§ 5—7).

Had Nikias wished to practise extortion, he would not have chosen as victim his own first-cousin Euthynus, a man, too, with little money but with many friends. Probably Euthynus himself would not have chosen out his kinsman to wrong, if the fact of the deposit had not made the opportunity too tempting (§§ 8—10). The strongest presumption for the defendant's guilt may be found in the time of the transaction. Under the Thirty, Euthynus was all-powerful. Nikias, merely on account of his wealth, was exposed to danger. Thus Timodemos extorted 30 minae from him by the simple threat of arresting him. At such a time, it is more likely that he should have been a victim than a slanderer (§§ 11— 15). Euthynus will perhaps say that it is unlikely that he should have repaid two talents and withheld the third. It was just the foreseen plausibility of this argument which emboldened him. Judicious frauds of this kind are common; they ought not to be encouraged by the acquittal of Euthynus. Besides, the same argument will serve Nikias. Why, if he wished to extort money, should he not have claimed all three talents? No fraudulent motive can be assigned for his demanding only one. But the motive of Euthynus in repaying two is clear. It was notorious that Nikias had deposited a sum of money with him; but the amount of that sum was unknown. He saw, therefore, that it would be safe for him to steal a part of it, but unsafe to steal the whole (§§ 16— 21).

Philostratos reckons this ‘unattestedEntitled in the MSS. πρὸς Εὐθύνουν ἀμάρτυρος, and cited by Philostratos simply as ὁ ἀμάρτυρος.’ speech Remarks. one of the two best of Isokrates, praising it for a temperate and compact power of expressionPhil. Vit. Soph. I. 17, ὁ δ’ ἀμάρτυρος ἰσχὺν ἐνδείκνυται κεκολασμένην πρὸς ῥυθμούς· νόημα γὰρ ἐκ νοήματος ἐς περιόδους ἰσοκώλους τελευτᾷ., as he praises the Archidamos for brilliancy and spirit. The choice may seem arbitrary; but at least there is no adequate ground for doubting the genuineness of the speech against Euthynus. Benseler thinks it spurious; first and chiefly, because the examples of hiatus are stronger and more frequent than he can conceive Isokrates admitting; then, on account of the short, compact periods Bens. de hiatu p. 56, Isocratem contenderim ne potuisse quidem...tam foedos hiatus admittere [e.g. § 2, ἐπειδὴ οἱ τριάκοντα—§ 4 ἀνάγκη ἐκ τεκμηρίων—§ 11, διενοήθη ἀδικεῖν].—Again: ‘Tota brevium sententiarum conformatio non Isocratea est’. Benseler is answered by Henn de Isocrate rhetore (Köln, 1861) p. 10 f.. But surely the canons observed by Isokrates in his mature style cannot be applied so rigorously to early works, especially when these are forensic. The composition of the Aeginetikos offers a contrast as strong as possible to that (for instance) of the Panegyrikos, and yet the authenticity of the Aeginetikos is thoroughly well attested.

2. Trapezitikos.

2. Trapezitikos [Or. XVII.]—A subject of Satyros, king of BosporosIt was to this Satyros that the Mantitheos of Lysias Or. XVI. (§ 4) was sent by his father.—Panticapaeum (also called Bosporos) in the Tauric Chersonese, on the W. shore of the Kimmerian Bosporos, was founded by Miletos about 550 B.C. It became the chief town of the kingdom of Bosporos; of which the territory stretched west, along the coast, about 50 miles to Theudosia, another colony of Miletos; and also included parts of the east coast of the strait. The first dynasty of Bosporian kings, the Archaeanaktidae, began to reign about 480 B.C. according to Clinton. Satyros I. reigned from 407 to 393 B.C. [See Clinton F. H. II., Appendix XIII., on the Kings of Bosporus.], brings an action against the banker Pasion, for the recovery of money alleged to have been placed in Pasion's hands. The details of the case are reserved for the analysis of the speech itself.

Two points fix the date. (1) The Lacedaemonian supremacy Date. on the sea is spoken of as a thing of the past (§ 36); that is, the time is after the battle of Knidos, August 394 B.C. (2) Satyros I. of Bosporos is alive (§ 57): but he died at the siege of Theudosia in 393 B.C.Diod. XIV. 93. Rauchenstein, Introd. The speech belongs, then, to the end of 394 or early part of 393 B.C.

‘An action of this class is always difficult to maintain. Analysis. The business between a banker and his customer is transacted without witnesses; and the banker usually commands money, friends, and credit (§§ 1—2). The facts of this case are as follows. I came to Athens, partly for pleasure, partly for business, having been sent out with two cornships by my father, who is governor of a large district, under Satyros, prince of Bosporos. I was introduced to Pasion and opened an account with him. Meanwhile my father had been arrested by Satyros on suspicion of treason. Some men from the Euxine who were at Athens received the orders of Satyros to take possession of all my property and to send me home. In this difficulty I consulted Pasion and decided to give up a small sum to the agents of Satyros, but to deny the existence of the larger sums which I had lying in Pasion's bank. To help the deception, Pasion was to represent me, not only as having no balance, but as owing money to himself and others. Having arranged matters with the agents of Satyros, I prepared to set out upon my homeward voyage, and applied to Pasion for my money. He told me that he had not the means of refunding it just then. I then sent to him my friends Philomelos and Menexenos; and to them he repudiated the debt altogether (§§ 3—10).

‘Presently news came that my father was restored to the favour of Satyros. Pasion, aware that there was now no longer any reason why legal proceedings should not be openly taken against him, hid his slave Kittos, who knew the truth. When Menexenos demanded that Kittos should be given up, Pasion retorted that we ourselves had made away with him, after bribing him to give us money from the bank. Presently, however, Kittos was found in Athens by Menexenos, who then demanded that he should be given up by Pasion for torture. Pasion at first asserted that Kittos was a freeman. Subsequently, however, he consented to submit him to the question: but, when we met for that purpose, refused to allow torture to be applied (§§ 11—16).

‘Finding that his conduct was blamed by everyone, he next sought a private interview with me. He pleaded poverty as the cause which had forced him to deny the debt. He then gave me a bond that he would accompany me to the Euxine and there pay the money—thus avoiding a scandal at Athens. The bond, which stipulated that, if we could not come to an agreement, Satyros should arbitrate, was placed in the hands of Pyron of Pherae, a merchant in the Euxine trade. In the event of an amicable settlement, he was to burn it; otherwise, to place it in the hands of Satyros (§§ 17—20).

‘Meanwhile Menexenos had upon his own account brought an action for libel against Pasion. Pasion was now terrified lest Menexenos should get hold of our bond. He implored my mediation, which I refused. Desperate, he bribed the slaves of Pyron, and found means of tampering with the bond. He then became defiant, and refused to go with me to the Euxine or to pay the money. When the bond was opened before witnesses, it was found to release Pasion from all claims on my part (§§ 21—23).

‘Pasion will rely much on this forged document. That it is a forgery, is evident (1) from the terms of the document itself; (2) from the absence of motive on my part for giving such a release; (3) from my daring to come into court now; (4) from Pasion's eagerness, before he had tampered with the bond, to have it cancelled. Such frauds are common. Last year, Pythodorus, a friend of Pasion, opened the balloting-urn of the Senate, and changed the names of those who had been nominated as judges in the festal contests. (§§ 22—34.)

‘Or perhaps Pasion will contend that I had no money at all here. Among other things which disprove this is the fact that he himself became security for me in seven talents when a vessel upon which I had lent money was denounced as being the property of a Delian, and was in danger of being put to death untried. In a word,—which is more probable—that, at a moment when I was helpless, I should have brought a false charge against Pasion, or that he should have been emboldened to defraud me? (§§ 35—50.)

‘Ultimately Pasion did not go himself to the Bosporos, but sent Kittus as his agent. Satyros declined to give a judgment, but took my part, and wrote in my behalf to Athens. It is the clearest argument for my claim that Pasion declined my challenge to have his slave tortured. Consider the strength of my cause; remember the benefits of Satyros and his father [Spartakos I.] to Athens, for whose sake he has often sent away empty the corn-ships of other States,—and give just sentence in my favour.’ (§§ 51—58.)

The Trapezitikos has a special interest as Remarks. illustrating the relations between Athens and the kingdom of Bosporos,—relations which remained no less friendly under the successors of Satyros I.Satyros I. was succeeded in 393 by his son Leukon, who reigned till 353. Leukon received the citizenship of Athens, and on his part granted exemption from the tax on exports (1/30th, τριακοστή) to Athenian corn-ships: Dem. in Lept. §§ 29 ff. In the time of Demosthenes, about 400,000 medimni of corn (roughly, 600,000 bushels) came to Athens yearly from the Bosporos (ib.). The Satyros mentioned by Deinarchos (Or. I. § 43) and called τύραννος, is probably Satyros II., who did not come to the throne till 310 B.C., but who at that time (324 B. C.) may have shared the power of his father Paerisades. Benseler believes this speech, like the last, to be spurious. His ground is the frequency of hiatusBens. de hiatu pp. 54 ff.. The Trapezitikos is, however, cited by Dionysios, not merely as genuine, but as the typical forensic work of Isokrates De Isocr. cc. 18—20. In c. 19, Trapez. §§ 1—14 are quoted and criticised. See above, p. 59.; and is thrice named by Harpokration without suspicions.vv. δημόκοινος, Καρκίνος, σκηνίτης.—Blass, Att. Bereds. II. 211— 214, affirms the genuineness.. It has been further asked—Was this a mere declamationBoth this and the speech Against Euthynus are apparently thought to be declamations by Benseler (l. c.) who gives no reasons. The same view is noticed, and rejected, in a good essay on this speech (de Isocratis Orationibus Forensibus Commentationis Specimen I.) by Hermann Starke, Berlin, 1845.? There is nothing whatever to prove it; and one point is against it. Pasion, the banker, bore a high character at AthensDemosthenes praises Pasion, (with whom his father had dealings, In Aphob. I. § 11,) even in the speech For Phormio, where he is attacking Apollodoros, Pasion's son (Pro Phorm. §§ 43—48).. The writer of a declamation would not have selected him as the object of an imaginary charge of fraud.

IV. Action for damage (δίκη βλάβης ).
Concerning the Team of Horses.

Concerning the Team of Horses (περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους). [Or. XVI.]—The speaker is the younger AlkibiadesIn Lys. Or. XIV. (κατ’ Ἀλκιβιάδου A.) § 28, Francken alters αὑτῆς to αὑτοῦ, making the Hipponikos mentioned there the brother of the younger Alkibiades; and thinks that it was for this Hipponikos that Isokrates wrote the speech. He is led to this view by a fancied discrepancy between the age of the speaker in Lysias Or. XIV. and the speaker here. But no son of Alkibiades named Hipponikos is anywhere mentioned. (Comment. Lys. p. 107 f.). Tisias, an Athenian citizen, alleges that the elder Alkibiades had robbed him of a team of four horses Ζεῦγος must mean quadrigae, as the race for two horses (συνωρίς) at Olympia was first held in Ol. 93. 1, 408 B.C.: Diod. XIII. 75., and sues the son for their value.

The charge has a close likeness to another Occasion. mentioned elsewhere. Alkibiades had entered seven four-horse chariots at the Olympic festivalOf Ol. 91, 416 B.C., according to Blass (Att. Bereds. II. 205): of Ol. 90, 420 B.C., acc. to Grote (VII. 76 n.) and Cox (Hist. Gr. II. 293): of Ol. 89, 424 B.C, acc. to Thirlwall (III. 316). I incline to 416 B.C.. One of these chariots had originally belonged to the city of Argos. Diomedes, an Athenian, had commissioned Alkibiades to buy it for him from the Argives; Alkibiades had done so, and had then entered it as his own. Plutarch identifies the case of Diomedes with this case of TisiasPlut. Alcib. c. 12. After telling the story about Diomedes, he adds —φαίνεται δὲ καὶ δίκη συστᾶσα περὶ τούτου, καὶ λόγος Ἰσοκράτει γέγραπται περὶ τοῦ ζεὐγους ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου παιδός, ἐν ᾧ Τισίας ἐστίν, οὐ Διομήδης ὁ δικασάμενος. There are two other versions of the wrong done by Alkibiades to Diomedes. (1) According to Diod. XIII. 74, Alkibiades was joint-owner with Diomedes, but left out the latter's name in entering the chariot for the race. (2) According to [Andok.] in Alc. § 26 Alkibiades took the horses from Diomedes by force— screened by his influence with the Elean ἀγωνόθεται. Hermann Starke, in his Commentary on this Speech and Or. XVIII., p. 16, identifies the cases of Tisias and Diomedes.. From § 49 of our speech it appears that the horses had won a victory for Alkibiades at Olympia, and in § 1 he is said to have bought them from ArgosThe substitution of ‘Diomedes’ for ‘Tisias’ may have been due, Blass suggests (Att. Ber. II. 205), to Ephoros (see above p. 48), from whom Diodoros probably got it. .

Tisias could not charge Alkibiades the son with Form of procedure. complicity in a fraud committed before he was born; he must therefore have brought against him simply an action for damageCf. Demosth. πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον καὶ Χενοπείθην [Or. XXXVIII.]. Nausimachos and Xenopeithes accused their guardian of malversation in his trust. After his death, they brought an action against his sons. But this was not a δίκη ἐπιτροπῆς: it was simply a δίκη βλάβης.. The damages were laid at five talents (§ 46). The defendant says (ib.) that, if cast in the suit, he will be disfranchised. This means that, as he was unable to pay, an action of ejectment ( ἐξούλης) would be brought against him: if cast in this, he would have to pay to the Treasury a sum equal to the original damages; and, failing to do this, he would be disfranchised (ἄτιμος) as a state-debtor.

In § 45 the speaker says that he was born just Date. before his father's banishment (in 415 B. C.); that is, at the end of 416 or early in 415 B. C. The action could not have been brought against him until he was eighteen years old; i.e. until the end of 398 or the beginning of 397 B. C. On the other hand, not much time would have been lost in bringing it. The date, then, is probably 397 B.C.The year 396 is assumed by Sauppe, ap. Rauchenstein, Introd. to Select Speeches (p. 4); by Krüger ad Clinton, F. H. sub anno Ol. 96. 1.: and by Hermann Starke in his Commentary on this Speech and the πρὸς Καλλίμαχον, p. 21.,—about two years earlier than that of the Lysian speeches ‘Against Alkibiades’Vol. I. p. 256..

The speech, as extant, appears to be mutilated at the beginning,—the lost part having contained the statement of the facts, followed by the citation of evidenceIn the Urbino MS. of Isokrates, according to Bekker, the words μνησθεὶς ἤδη in § 320 of Or. XV. are immediately followed by the words τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγῶσιν in § 3 of Or. XVI., though there is no mark of a lacuna. From this, Sauppe infers that a page or more was wanting in the archetype of our MSS. The title MAPTYPIAI probably stood, he thinks, before what now remains of Or. XVI. (Or. Att. I. 291.) The style of the opening is, as Blass says (Att. Ber. II. 206), decisive against the theory that the speech is a δευτερολογία.. The speaker now passes to a general defence of his father's life.

The specific charge against him, the defendant says, has Analysis. now been disproved. It has been shown on the evidence of the ambassadors from Argos, and of others acquainted with the facts, that his father had bought the yoke of horses in question from the city of Argos, and had not taken them by force from Tisias the plaintiff. But, as usual, the defendant's appearance in a private lawsuit has been made an opportunity for slandering his father's political career. No vindication of that conduct will be required by the older men present. For the sake of the younger, however, the facts shall be briefly stated. (§§ 1—4.)

Alkibiades was the victim of the men who concerted the Revolution of the Four Hundred. Finding that he would not come into their schemes, they brought against him the two most odious charges which they could devise,—that of profaning the Mysteries, and that of undermining the democracy. Their accusations broke down; and he was appointed commander of the expedition to Sicily. In his absence, they again caballed against him. Sentenced to an unjust banishment, he still respected the welfare of Athens. He went to Argos and lived quietly there, until the persecution kept up by his enemies at home at last drove him to Sparta. The acts imputed to him—his having caused Dekeleia to be fortified, having thrown the islands into revolt, having guided the tactics of Sparta—admit either of denial or of justification. Athenian citizens, who tasted the bitterness of banishment under the Thirty, ought to sympathise with an exile who was eager to return. Let them remember, too, what Alkibiades was before his banishment—how, with 200 hoplites, he gained for Athens the greatest cities of the Peloponnesus,—and how he commanded in Sicily. Again, let them remember what was the position of affairs at the moment when they received him back. The democracy had fallen; the democratic army at Samos regarded the oligarchic rulers of Athens as worse enemies than the Spartans; and the oligarchs were seeking help from the Spartan garrison at Dekeleia. The Persian king was paying the Spartan fleet; and 90 Phoenician ships were at Aspendos. Then it was that the generals sent for Alkibiades. Instead of disdaining them, he came at their call, and restored the prosperity of Athens at home and abroad. (§§ 5—22.)

It remains to speak of his private life—after a word as to his descent. On the paternal side, he sprang from the Eupatridac,—on the maternal, from the Alkmaeonidae—a family, one of whose members, Alkmaeon, was the first winner of a chariot-race at Olympia,—a family which was true to the people throughout the forty years of the Peisistratid tyranny, and which produced the leaders under whom the tyrants were overthrown. Alkibiades, whose father fell at Koroneia (great-grandson of him just named), became the ward of Perikles. On reaching the age for military service, he distinguished himself as one of 1000 picked hoplites whom Phormio led into Thrace. He afterwards married the daughter of Hipponikos,—whose hand was another prize won by him from many competitors. About the same time he conducted a sacred embassy to Olympia; and scorning to excel as a common athlete, sought a more splendid triumph in the chariot race. He entered more and better teams than the greatest State could have afforded; and gained the first, second, and third places. As regards his other public services, they might have been less brilliantly performed, and yet have formed the glory of other men: but to praise him for them would be trivial. (§§ 23—35.)

His loyalty to the democracy was proved by his sufferings. His banishment was the first preparation for the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and the first consequence of the oligarchy of the Thirty. His interests were, indeed, closely bound up with yours. The Tyrants knew this; and while they drove others from Athens, drove Alkibiades from Hellas; thinking that it would be vain to level the walls, unless they removed him who could restore them. Among those Tyrants was Charikles, brother-in-law of Tisias. Tisias himself was a senator under the Thirty, and yet dares, in this instance, to violate an amnesty which alone protects his own life. (§§ 36—44.)

The defendant appeals to the pity of the judges. He has had experience enough of troubles. He was not four years old when his father was banished,—his mother being already dead—and was then in danger of his life. He was still a boy when he was driven from Athens by the Thirty; and at the restoration of the democracy, was prevented by his enemies from benefiting by the grant of land made to those whose property had been confiscated. The damages are now laid at five talents. He is too poor to pay this, and will therefore be disfranchised. The father's victory at Olympia ought not to have for a result the son's disgrace,— a citizen who has ere now lost his privileges in the cause of the people ought not again to lose them by the people's vote. (§§ 45—49.)

Isokrates marks elsewhere his admiration for the Remarks. genius of the elder AlkibiadesSee Philippos [Or. V.] §§ 61, 67: Busiris [Or. XI] § 5.; and the praise given to him here, one-sided though it is, was probably not due merely to the partiality of an advocate. It has been suggested that so strong an eulogy of so unpopular a man can hardly have been written for delivery in court, and that the speech, as it stands, must have been retouchedRauchenstein, Schweizer. Mus. (1862), p. 277 f., ap. Blass Att. Ber. I. 490 and II. 207.. Rather in this very offence against forensic persuasion, and in the thoroughly epideictic character of the whole, we may recognise the first, and not the second, thoughts of Isokrates. Lysias took some verbal hints from this speech when (in 396 or 395) he wrote for the nephews of NikiasCompare especially Lys. Or. XVIII. § 3 with Isokr. Or. XVI. § 21. In Lys. § 4 compared with Isokr. § 5, Lys. § 4 with Isokr. § 46, &c., the imitation is less close, but still manifest.. It is interesting to contrast our speech with that Against Alkibiades of the pseudo-AndokidesVol. I. p. 133. , and with the two speeches of LysiasVol. I. p. 256.. In all four there is much wild misrepresentation; but together they are aids to estimating a man whom neither enemies nor friends could describe with moderation.

V. Special plea (παραγραφή).
Against Kallimachos.

Against Kallimachos [Or. XVIII.]—Kallimachos had brought against the defendant an Action for Damage (δίκη βλάβης). The defendant has entered a Special Plea to show that the action is not maintainable.

The facts of the case are these. In 403 B. C., during the short reign of the Ten who succeeded the Thirty, Patrokles, the Archon Basileus, denounced Kallimachos for having in his possession a sum of money which was liable to confiscation, as being the property of a man who had joined the exiles in the Peiraeus. The Ten referred the case to the Senate, and the Senate decided that the money should be confiscated. On the restoration of the democracy, Kallimachos brought an action (1) against Patrokles, from whom he recovered ten minae; (2) against one Lysimachos, from whom he recovered two minae; (3) against the defendant. The defendant compromised the case, paying two minae; and this compromise was sanctioned by the award of an arbitrator§ 10 δίαιταν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἐπετρέψαμεν Νικομάχῳ Βατῆθεν. It was first agreed between Kallimachos and the defendant that the latter should pay two minae. They then chose Nikomachos arbitrator. He had no discretionary power. His business was simply to give the formal sanction of an arbitrator's award to the terms already settled between the parties. This is the meaning of δίαιτα ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ‘Arbitration under terms.’ Cf. Or. XVII. § 19, εἰ δὲ μὴ ταῦτα ποιήσειε (Πασίων), δίαιταν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς ἐπέτρεπε Σατύρῳ, ἐφ’ ᾧ τε καταγιγνώσκειν ἡμίολῑ αὐτοῦ τὰ χρήματα. chosen by the parties. Such an award was a bar to further litigation. Notwithstanding this, Kallimachos presently sued the defendant for 100 minae on the same account. The defendant brought a witness to show that the action was barred by the previous arbitration. Kallimachos was then bound to prove that the witness was perjured. He did not attempt to do this, but, favoured by the Archon, merely brought his action afresh.

The defendant now avails himself of the new law Form. of Archînos, passed soon after the Restoration of the democracy. This provided that any person, against whom an action was brought in violation of the Amnesty, should be allowed to enter a Special Plea (παραγραφή); that such Plea should be heard before the cause was tried; and that the bringer of the Plea should speak firstIt seems probable that the παραγραφή itself, as a form of proceeding, came into existence with the law of Archînos; being at first limited to alleged breaches of the Amnesty, and afterwards extended to other grounds of exception. The older term for a special objection to the adversary's course of proceeding seems to have been ἀντιγραφή or ἐξωμοσία. (See C. R. Kennedy in the Dict. Ant. s. v. Paragraphe.). If either party failed to obtain 1/5th of the votes on the Special Plea, he was liable to the fine of the epôbelia (1/6th of the damages originally laidKallimachos is said to be threatened with ἀτιμία (§ 35) in the same sense as Alkibiades in Or. XVI. § 46: i.e. if he could not pay the damages, he would incur a δίκη ἐξούλης; if cast in this, a fine to the treasury; and for nonpayment of the fine, registration as a public debtor, which implied ἀτιμία.). As the original Action for Damage would have been tried under the presidency of the Thesmothetae, these would be presidents of the court at the hearing of the Special Plea also.

The Amnesty of 403 is recent (§ 29); on the Date. other hand, there has been time for examples of that tendency to violate it which led to the measure of Archînos (§ 2). Probably the speech may be referred to the year 402 B.C.§ 29 ὑπόγυιον γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ ...εἰς ὅρκους καὶ συνθήκας κατεφύγομεν, ἃς εἰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τολμῷεν παραβαίνειν, σφόδρ’ ἂν ἕκαστος ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειε. Weissenborn, quoted by Hermann Starke (Commentatio, p. 12, note 24), points out that the latter clause implies a time so soon after the troubles that Athens still lay at the mercy of Sparta. Blass (Att. Ber. II. 196) takes 399 B.C.: Pfund and Benseler (ib.) 397; Sanneg, 400; Rehdantz, 403—400; Krüger (ap. Starke) 400.

The Special Plea is a novelty, and its form must be Analysis. explained. The speaker then states the law of Archînos He can show that Kallimachos has violated the Amnesty; that the charge is untrue in itself; and that the matter in dispute had already been settled by arbitration. (§§ 1—4.)

A narrative of the facts follows. (§§ 5—12.)

‘Kallimachos intends,’ the defendant goes on, ‘to deny that any arbitration took place. It is not likely, he will say, that he should have chosen as referee my friend Nikomachos; or that he should have taken two minae in payment for a hundred. But the terms of the reference left no discretionary power to Nikomachos; and it is not surprising that a claimant who had no real case at all should have been satisfied by two minae. Even, however, if there had been no arbitration; even if no witnesses could be brought; you could infer the truth from my past character. When the oligarchy was strongest,—when injustice was easiest,—I never assailed the fortunes or life of any citizen, nor struck any one off the civic list to place him upon the muster-roll of Lysander. Is it likely that I should have dared to do so when the oligarchy was tottering? (§§ 11—18.)

‘This is enough to show that the accusation is untrue. It can also be shown that the action is illegal. The Amnesty, and the oaths which ratified it, shall be read to you. Kallimachos thinks to set aside the compact thus solemnly sworn to. Yet when Philon of Koelê was accused of malversation upon an embassy, and had no defence to offer, that compact protected him. And it deters your most influential citizens, Thrasybulos and Anytos, from claiming great sums of which they were robbed from those whom they know to be answerable. Do not allow Kallimachos to break an agreement which has been salutary to all Athens. Your verdict will affect the credit of public compacts generally. It is by these that civilized life is held together; in these, when we had been conquered by Sparta, we found refuge; and it would be ill for us if Sparta were to break her oaths. But how can we be trusted abroad if we violate pledges given among ourselves? You try this cause under two oaths—that which all judges take, and that which ratified the public amnesty. (§§ 19—34.)

‘Kallimachos will bewail his poverty and his peril; he will inveigh against the crimes of the oligarchy. The plea of poverty is no defence for a slanderer who has brought peril upon himself; the crimes of the oligarchy are irrelevant. (§§ 35—41.) Men will infer from your verdict whether the Amnesty is, or is not, to be observed. You yourselves know that that Amnesty has brought us peace and honour in exchange for an infamous civil war. (§§ 42—46.) Shall it be broken by a man of such life as Kallimachos? During the ten years of our war with Sparta, he kept away from us. When the Thirty came to power, he returned to Athens. When they were about to fall, he went to the Peiraeus; when the Spartan army had blockaded the exiles there, he fled to Boeotia. You do not know him as I do. Kratinos once had a lawsuit for a farm with the brother-inlaw of Kallimachos. A personal encounter took place; and the brother-in-law of Kallimachos swore that a female slave of his had died of a blow received from Kratinos during the fray. Kratinos allowed them to bring their action; and, as soon as Kallimachos had sworn that the woman was dead, produced her alive. That such a man should accuse others of falsehood is as if Phrynondas should say that his neighbours are blackguards; or, Philurgos, the stealer of the Gorgon's head, should tax his neighbours with sacrilege. (§§ 47—57.)

‘But there will be other opportunities of denouncing Kallimachos; I wish now to recall one of my own merits. When our fleet was lost at Aegospotami, I was one of the few trierarchs who saved their ships; and the only one who, on returning to the Peiraeus, did not lay down his trierarchy. In partnership with my brother, I continued to serve, bringing corn to Athens in defiance of Lysander's prohibition. For this you crowned us—at a time when crowns were less common than they now are. Remember the contrast between Kallimachos and me; remember the Amnesty; and decide in the interests of justice and of Athens.’ (§§ 58—68.)

The genuineness of the speech has been doubted Remarks. by some modern critics; one, at least, of whom is inclined to ascribe it to IsaeosFulvius Ursinus (Virgilius cum Graecis scriptoribus collatus, p. 230—quoted by Hermann Starke, Comment. p. 2) gives it to Isaeos on the ground of style. Spengel (συν. τεχνῶν, p. ix.) seems inclined to agree with him—‘si modo haec Isocratis cst; Ursino Fulvio Isaeus auctor videtur.’ Dobree has merely—‘Qu. an Isocratis’ (Adv. I. 281). Starke quotes Fabricius, Bibl. Gr. II. p. 789, as pointing out that these doubts probably arise from the fact that in Harpokration s. v. Ῥίνων, where the speech is quoted, Ἰσαι—ος was a false reading for Ἰσοκράτης. Under δέκα καὶ δεκαδοῦχος Harpokr. quotes Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Καλλ. παραγραφῇ without suspicion: and so the Schol. to Ar. Nub. 1134 .. In uniform plainness, indeed, it differs even more decidedly than the Aeginetikos from the latter writings of Isokrates. But this plainness accords with his own forensic ideal as hinted in the PanathenaikosIn Panath. § 1 he describes forensic speeches as τοὺς ἁπλῶς δοκοῦντας εἰρῆσθαι καὶ μηδεμιᾶς κομψότητος μετέχοντας. It is true that, there, he is describing the styles which (he says) he had not cultivated. But, assuming that he did write some forensic speeches, then probably—when most careful—he would have given them the characteristics which he recognises as distinctive of their class.; and, instead of proving anything against the authenticity, rather tends to show that his manner cannot be inferred from one period only of his work. The closeness and detail of technical argument, especially in §§ 1—41, is certainly like Isaeos. But this was made necessary by the complexity of the facts and by the very nature of the paragraphê, turning, as it did, upon the question of form.

Isokrates: Letters and Fragments
Letter I., To Dionysios.

THE nineThe letter beginning πρόπομποι καὶ ῥαβδοῦχοι, κ.τ.λ., which is printed in the older editions, with the heading ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΩΙ, as the Tenth Letter of Isokrates, is not his. It is by Theophylact Simocatta (flor. 610—629 A.D.) in whose extant collection of 85 letters it stands 79th. By a strange mistake it was added to the letters of Isokrates in the Basel edition of 1546; and, with a stranger negligence, it was retained in every subsequent edition until Baiter and Sauppe, in their Oratores Attici (1839— 43), set the example of expelling it. See their Preface to the text of Isokrates, p. vi.—This is the substance of the Byzautine letter:— ‘Escorts, ushers, heralds, the acquisition of a great throne are a mist upon philosophy, a severance from virtue. You have not changed your nature with your fortune; the shell which encases your spirit is still fleshly; why, then, are you so puffed up with vainglory? The soaring flights of your fortune have taken you out of your old sphere of quiet thought—have quelled your sober madness of philosophy. Of old you were sublime in your humility; now you are low and earthy in your high estate. Resign, then, this false prosperity; desert the fortune which will desert you; for, if you are beforehand with the heartless goddess, you will not grieve when the change comes on you suddenly.’ (§§ 1—2.) Letters of Isokrates may best be taken in their probable chronological order.

1. To Dionysios [Ep. I.]—This is the proem of a letter to Dionysios the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse from 405 to 367 B. C., urging him to interfere, for the common good, in the affairs of Greece. The fragment breaks off just as Isokrates is going to explain the purpose for which he asks this interference. But the purpose, which could hardly have Object of the Letter. been doubtful, is expressly stated in the Philippos (§ 8). Isokrates wished Dionysios to undertake the work which he had alreadyIn § 129 of the Philippos (346 B. C.) Isokrates says that he had urged Athens to lead Greece before he had asked any other power to do so. If this was taken literally, it would show that the Letter to Dionysios is later than the Panegyrikos; i.e. than 380 B.C. Such an indication could not safely be used as an independent argument. But it may be noticed as agreeing with the hypothesis about the date advanced below. pressed on Athens and Sparta and which he afterwards pressed on Archidamos and on Philip—the leading of united Greece against Persia.

Three points are helps towards fixing the date. Date. (1) Isokrates is too old and infirm§ 1, προαπείρηκα—in which, as the context shows, the προ does not mean ‘before my natural time,’ but ‘before the destined time for the war against Persia.’ for a voyage to Sicily: § 1. (2) The Spartan supremacy is past; the Carthaginians are in such a plight as to be thankful if they can keep their own territory: § 8. (3) Friendly relations exist between Dionysios and Athens. Now the references in § 8 might be applied to the latter part of 394 B.C.; in which year the defeat at Knidos destroyed at least the naval supremacy of Sparta, and Dionysios imposed an humiliating peace upon Imilkon. But in 394 B.C. Isokrates was only forty-two. And the good understanding between Dionysios and Athens was not established before 369 B.C.When Dionysios began to take part with Athens and the Peloponnesian allies in the war against Thebes. As to the Athenian flatteries of Dionysios at this time, see Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, I. 80. The time indicated is more probably 368 B.C. In that year Dionysios was again at war with the Carthaginians, and was at first, though not finally, successfulGrote, ch. 83, vol. XI. p. 61.— Dobree (Adv. I. p. 283) thinks that the Letter is written ‘ad Dionysium iuniorem, sub regni initia’ [i. e. 367 B.C.]. But in 367 the statement regarding Carthage would have been much too strong. Nor has Dobree observed that § 8 excludes the supposition of the Letter being addressed to the younger Dionysios:—ὅτε μὲν γὰρ Αακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶχον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἦν ἐπιμεληθῆναί σοι τῶν περὶ τὸν τόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον, οὐδὲ τούτοις ἐναντία πράττειν ἅμα καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολεμεῖν. Sparta lost the ἀρχή four years before the younger Dionysions came to the throne.. This letter may have been written at the time when the report of his first successes had reached Athens. Three years before, the Spartan empire had been finally overthrown at Leuktra.

‘Were I a younger man, I would not have written but Analysis. come to you. Written advice is at many disadvantages as compared with oral. But I trust that these disadvantages will be neutralised by your interest in the substance of my letter. Some have pretended that you prefer flatterers to advisers; but I do not believe that your pre-eminence in counsel and in action could have been reached if you had not been willing to gather the best thoughts of every mind. (§§ 1—4.) Do not take this letter for a rhetorical composition. Had display been my object, I should have sought my audience at some great festival. But my object is practical; I want a certain thing done, and therefore address the man who is able to do it. Purposing to give counsel for the welfare of Hellas, to whom ought I to speak but to the first of Hellenes? The time is opportune for such counsel. While Sparta was at the head of Hellas, you could not have interfered in our affairs without adding rivalry with Sparta to your actual struggle against Carthage. Now Carthage has been humbled; and Athens is ready to be your ally. (§§ 5—8.) Do not think it strange if one who is neither statesman nor general presumes to speak in the cause of Hellas, and to you. I can at least claim a share of culture, and of that culture which concerns itself with the greatest questions. But you shall at once judge for yourself whether my advice is worth any thing...’ (§§ 9—10.)

Letter VI., To the Children of Jason.

2. To the Children of Jason. [Ep. VI.]—Jason, tyrant of Pherae and tagos of Thessaly, was assassinated in Ol. 102. 3, 370 B.C. The facts known about his successors may be summed up thusSee esp. Diod. XV. 60, XVI. 14: Xen. Hellen. VI. iv. 33.:—

370. On the death of Jason, his brothers Polydoros and Polyphron become joint tagoi. Polydoros is soon afterwards murdered by Polyphron.

369. Alexander, son of Polydoros, murders Polyphron and reigns in his stead.

359Diodoros (XVI. 14) puts the death of Alexander in the year of Agathokles, 35 7/6 B. C.; but see Clinton, F. H. vol. II., sub anno 359, and Appendix XV. on Alexander of Pherae: also Schafer, Dem. I. P. 133, note 2.. Alexander is murdered, at the instigation of his wife Thebe (daughter of Jason), by her halfbrothers Tisiphonos, Peitholaos and Lykophron. Thebe and Tisiphonos share the chief power.

358. Tisiphonos dies. Lykophron and Peitholaos presently avail themselves of the distraction caused by the Phocian (or ‘Sacred’) War, 357 B. C., to establish a joint tyrannySee Schäfer, Dem. I. p. 457..

352. Philip of Macedon deposes Lykophron and frees Pherae from the tyranny.

This letter of Isokrates was written to Thebe and her half-brothers, the children of JasonPlut. Pelop. c. 28, Θήβη, θυγάτηρ μὲν Ἰάσονος οὖσα γυνὴ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου., in 359 B. C, soon after the death of Alexander. In §§ 7—14 Isokrates counsels the persons whom he addresses, and whom flatterers were ‘spurring on to despotism’ (ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννίδα παροξύνοντες, § 12), to think whether it is better to have honour from willing or from unwilling citizens. This is exactly illustrated by Diodoros, who says of Thebe and her brothers—‘At first they had great acceptance as despot-slayers; but afterwards they changed their minds,—made a bargain with hireling troops, and set themselves up as despots; and after putting out of the way many of those who wrought against them, and equipping their power to a noteworthy strength, seized the governmentDiod. XVI. 14..’ Isokrates wrote before they had wholly ‘changed their minds.’ The Athenian embassy noticed in § 1 had doubtless been prompted by the hope that the government of Pherae was about to become more democraticThrough not observing the fact that Thebe and her brothers were the children of Jason, some have made the mistake of supposing this Letter to have been written in 370 B.C.—eleven years before its real date. Thus Dobree says (Adv. I. 284)—‘Statim, ut videtur, post Jasonis mortem, Olymp. 102. 3. Ait Diodorus XV. 60 successisse Jasoni fratrem Polydorum; fortasse sub specie tutoris.’ In a modern Greek edition of Isokrates (vol. II. of the Ἑλληνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, Didot), the commentator says—εἰκὸς οὖν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην γεγράφθαι αὐτίκα μετὰ τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς θάνατον τοῖς παισίν, ἢ γοῦν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς αὐτῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἔτει, ὅπερ συμβαίνει τῷ τριακοστῷ ἑξηκοστῷ ἐννάτῳ [he ought to have said, τῷ τριακοστῷ ἑβδομηκοστῷ] πρὸ Χριστοῦ (p. 310). Blass (Att. Ber. II. 272) does not notice that Thebe was daughter of Jason; and supposes the παῖδες Ἰάσονος to be distinct persons from Thebe and her brothers. In the interval between the murder of Alexander and the setting up of the new tyranny, these sons of Jason may (Blass thinks) have been temporarily strong, and Athens may thus have been led to send envoys to them..

‘One of our envoys has brought me word that you asked Analysis. him privately whether I could be induced to take up my abode with you. For the sake of my friendship with Jason and Polyalkes I would gladly consent; but many things hinder me. First, old age. It would ill become me to leave Athens now, when, were I abroad, I ought to be hastening back to die. Next, to say the truth, I fear Athens. Her alliances, I see, are shortlived. Should her alliance with you prove so, I, who live among you, would incur at least the shame of siding with friends against friends. (§§ 1—3.)

‘I will try, however, to discuss your affairs as I would have done had I come to you. This letter is not meant for rhetorical display: it is written because I see you in great troubles. A man of my age is past writing well; but the very length of his experience qualifies him to advise. (§§ 4—6.) I always teach my pupils that, in composing a speech, the first thing needful is to define clearly the object which they wish the speech to effect; the next thing is to adapt the means to that end. This principle does not apply to the writing of speeches only; it applies to all enterprises, and to your case among the rest. You must reflect what mode of life, what kind of repute, you desire; whether you are ambitious of honours to be given by, or extorted from, your fellow-citizens; and then you must shape accordingly your daily conduct. To me the life of a private man seems better than that of a king,—the honours of a republic sweeter than those of a monarchy. I know that this view will find many adversaries, especially among those who are about you. They look only to the powers, the riches, the pleasures of royalty, ignoring its troubles and its dangers. Now this is just the feeling with which men dare crimes. They know that there is peril; but trust that they will contrive to avoid it. I envy such easiness of temper; but should be ashamed if, in advising others, I failed to state fairly both sides of the question. Expect, therefore, an impartial estimate.’...(§§ 7—14.)

Letter IX, To Archidamos

3. To Archidamos [Ep. IX.]—This Letter is addressed to Archidamos III., who succeeded his father Agesilaos as one of the kings of Sparta in 361 B.C., and died in 338. In his Sixth Oration (366 B.C.) Isokrates supposes this same Archidamos giving heroic counsels to Sparta; he now urges him to become the leader of Greece against Persia.

In § 4 there is a reference to ‘the battle in Date. the city:’ i.e. the attempt of Epameinondas to surprise Sparta in 362 B.C.See esp. Xen. Hellen. VII. V. §§ 9 f.—The achievement of Archidamos on this occasion consisted in routing, with 100 hoplites, the troops of Epameinondas, who was trying to occupy some high ground near the town. From § 16 it appears that Isokrates was now eighty. If he was not more, the Letter belongs to 356 B.C.

Either the Letter was meant merely to introduce a discourse sent along with it‘Propempticon, ut videtur orationis quam postea immutatam Philippo inscripsit’:—Dobree, Adv. I. p. 285., or it is itself fragmentary. The latter supposition seems the more likelyLetters I., VI. and IX. are fragments of just the same kind— prefaces to what must have been long discourses, like the Philippos, rather than mere Letters..

‘I leave to others, Archidamos, the easy task of praising Analysis. you, your father, and your race. Those who choose that theme have topics enough ready to their hand,—the splendour of a descent from Herakles and Zeus; the valour of the Dorian colonies of the Peloponnesos; the achievements of Sparta under the Herakleidae, and the virtues taught by the unchanging Spartan discipline; the wisdom of your father; his conduct in times of disaster; and lastly that battle at Sparta in which you saved the state. But my purpose is not to speak of your past exploits; it is the more arduous one of inciting you to enterprises of a new kind—enterprises which will benefit not Sparta only but all the Hellenes. (§§ 1—7.)

‘It is strange that no powerful statesman or speaker has yet taken pity on the present miserable condition of Hellas. The state of Greece. Every part of it is full of war, factions, massacres, woes unnumbered. Most wretched of all are those Greeks on the seaboard of Asia whom by the treaty we gave over, not merely to the barbarians, but to those of our own race who are barbarian in all save speech. These roving desperadoes, under any chance leader, form armies larger and better than those of the settled communities; armies which do trifling damage to Persia, but bring desolation to the Greek cities which they visit. They slay, they banish, they plunder; children are outraged; women, whom none but kinsmen had ever seen even veiled, are stripped naked before all eyes. (§§ 8—10.)

‘These miseries, now long continued, have as yet attracted the indignation of no leading city in Greece; nor of any leading man, except your father. Agesilaos stood alone Agesilaos. in his life-long desire to free the Greeks and to turn their arms against the barbarian. He failed only because he sought to combine the war against Persia with the restoration of his personal friends to their respective cities. He thus excited factions which left men no leisure for the war. The moral of his life is that the Greeks must be reconciled among themselves before they are led against the Great King. (§§ 11—14.)

‘Some, perhaps, whose so-called ‘philosophy’ has none but petty aims, will call it madness in me to suppose that Greece at large can be better or worse for any words of mine. But, though eighty years old and worn out, I am arrogant enough to believe that such counsels can come from no one so well as from me, and that perchance they will bear fruit. I believe that, if the other Greeks had to pick out the man who could best advocate, and the man who could best execute, measures recognized as useful, the choice would fall on none but you and me. My part is the smaller; to say what one thinks is not hard; but you should be moved by you descent, by your place in Sparta, by your name in Greece, to rise to the height of your new duty. Leave all else, and give your mind to two things only—the deliverance of the Greeks from their miserable feuds, and the crushing of barbarian insolence. That these things can be done,—that they are expedient for you, for Sparta, and for the rest of Hellas,— it shall now be my task to explain.’ (§§ 15—19.)

Letter VII., To Timotheos.

4. To Timotheos [Ep. VII.]—Klearchos, a citizen of Herakleia on the Euxine, had been a pupil of Isokrates, and also of Plato. He was recalled from Athens to Herakleia by the nobles, who wished for his help against the people. He changed sides, became a demagogue, and then, in 364 B.C., tyrantDiod. XV. 81. Justin (XVI. 4, 5) adds a plot between Klearchos and Mithridates of Pontus for the betrayal of Herakleia, which led only to the betrayal and seizure of Mithridates by Klearchos.. His reign was cruelTheopompos, in Book XXXVIII. of his Ἱστορίαι, stated of Klearchos ὡς βιαίως ἀνῄρει πολλοὺς καὶ ὡς τοῖς πλείστοις ἐδίδου κώνειον πιεῖν: Athen. III. p. 85 A.. He died in 353, leaving his brother Satyros guardian of his two sons Timotheos and Dionysios, and regent for the elder. Satyros seems to have ruled at least for some years, and worse even than Klearchos. But he was true to his nephews, and in due time gave up the royal power into the hands of Timotheos, who reigned from about 346 to 338. Timotheos then ‘began to make the government milder and more democratic; so that for his deeds he was called no more tyrant, but benefactor and saviour παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν οὕτω ταύτην ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾳότερον καὶ δημοκρατικώτερον μετερρύθμιζεν, ὡς μηκέτι τύραννον ἀλλ’ εὐεργέτην αὐτόν, οἷς ἔπραττε, καὶ σωτῆρα ὀνομάζεσθαι— Memnon ap. Phot. cod. 224. Memnon of Herakleia—whose date is uncertain, but who cannot have lived before the time of Augustus— wrote a history of Herakleia. Photios (cod. 224) gives an abstract of Books VI—XVI. inclusive, from which most of the above facts are taken. According to Memnon, Klearchos had been a pupil of Isokrates for four years—and also a hearer of Plato..’ He afterwards shared the power with his brother Dionysios, who succeeded him.

The date of this Letter can be only Date. approximately fixed. Timotheos had now had time to show himself a good ruler. The year 345 B.C. would probably not be far wrong.

‘You have probably often heard of the old friendship Analysis. between your family and me; and I rejoice to learn that you are ruling more nobly and more wisely than your father. His failings will but redound to your praise. (§§ 1—2.) Think by what means, with what aid, by what counsels you may repair your city's misfortunes—encourage the citizens to steady industry,—and make their lives and happiness more secure. A foolish king harasses and pillages his subjects. A wise one consults at once their happiness and his own safety; ruling so that none will plot against him, but guarding his own life as if it were in danger from all. You have no motive for incurring hatred in amassing wealth; your father has left you rich. (§§ 3—6.) If your objects are more money and more power, seek advice elsewhere; but if you prefer honesty and a good name, attend to my words and to worthy examples. Such an example is Kleommis of Methymna, under whom the whole community lives securely; who restores exiles and trusts the citizens with arms,—fearing no evil, or content to suffer if his generous confidence is belied. (§§ 7—9.)

‘Autokrator, the bearer of this letter, is my friend; our pursuits are the same, and I have often been helped by his skill. For these reasons I would have you use him well. Do not marvel that I thus write to you, though I never made any request of your father Klearchos. When he was with us, all agreed about his kindliness; but after he got power he was said to have changed. I was estranged from him; but your friendship would be prized by me. Farewell; if you want any thing from here, write.’ (§§ 10—13.)

Letter VIII, To the Rulers of Mytilene.

5. To the Rulers of Mytilene. [Ep. VIII.]—The democracy at Mytilene had lately been overthrown by an oligarchy. But the victorious oligarchs were now showing their moderation by recalling many of the democratic exiles. This letter prays the government of Mytilene to receive back their fellow-citizen AgênorAgênor and his school, the Ἀγηνόρειοι, are mentioned among the earlier musicians before Aristoxenos: Blass, Att. Ber. II. 304., a distinguished musician, with his father and his brothers.

The revolt of the allies from Athens was followed, at the close of the Social War (355 B.C.), by revolutions in many of the cities. Oligarchies arose at Corcyra, Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and in the cities of Lesbos—Antissa, Methymna, and Mytilene Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, I. 427, 434.. We know that, in 351 B.C., the government of Mytilene was oligarchicalDem. Or. XV., υπὲρ τῆς Ῥοδίων ἐλευθερίας, (date 351 B.C.) § 16.. And in § 8 of this Letter we read that, ‘if Konon and Timotheos were living, and if Diophantos had come back from Asia,’ they would interest themselves for Agênor. Timotheos, son of Konon, died in 354 B. C. And Diodoros names ‘Diophantos the Athenian’ and ‘Lamios the Spartan’ as serving Nectanebis, king of Egypt, against Artaxerxes Ochos in a campaign which occupied the winter of 350—351 B.C.Diod. XVI. 48. Cf. Schäf. I. 437. Now there can be little Date. doubt that it was by this struggle that Diophantos was detained in the East. The date of this Letter is probably 350 B.C.350 B.C. is the date taken by Blass (Att. Ber. II. 303). But another is possible, against which I have felt great difficulty in deciding—347 B.C. We know that the oligarchy at Mytilene was followed (whether immediately or not) by the tyranny of one Kammes; but that, in 347—6 B.C., the democracy was restored with Athenian help. (Dem. Or. XL. πρὸς Βοιωτὸν περὶ προικός, §§ 36 f.: Schäf. vol. III., Appendix, p. 224). Now:— 1. Isokrates certainly compares the moderation of the prevalent party at Mytilene to that of the Athenian democracy in 403 B.C., § 3: 2. Diophantos may not have come back from Egypt till 346 B C.: for, while Diodoros and Clinton (F. H. II. App. 18) put the end of the war in 350, Thirlwall (c. 48, VI. 187 n.) argues from Isokr. (Philipp. § 101) that the Persian reconquest of Egypt cannot have been achieved before the latter part of 346. My reasons for, on the whole, preferring 350 are these:—1. We do not know that, in 347, a party overthrew a party. When Kammes fell, the democracy may have been restored unanimously. 2. The letter is inscribed (as Blass has observed) τοῖς Μ. ἄρχουσι, not M. τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ. 3. In § 7 Isokrates takes credit for having always vindicated the ἐλευθερία and αὐτονομία of the Greeks,—in other words, as the context shows, the independence of the allies from Athens (ef.his Speech On the Peace). This would point to 350 rather than to 347, when, on the restoration of the democracy, Mytilene came again into the Athenian league.

‘My grandsons, the sons of Aphareus, have asked me to Analysis. write to you on behalf of Agênor, formerly their master in music; and to beg that, when you have restored some other exiles, you will allow him, his father and his brothers, to return to Mytilene. I objected that I, a stranger to you, could not reasonably ask so great a favour; but at length I yielded to their importunity. You have done wisely in being reconciled to your fellow-citizens, and in seeking, like Athens, to efface the memory of faction. But, even if you had received back no other exiles, Agenor and his family would deserve a pardon. Mytilene, a city famous in the history of culture, ought not to keep in banishment the man who excels all contemporaries in his art. (§ 4.) Other eities give their franchise to men distinguished in noble pursuits; you ought not to suffer your own countryman to be a sojourner among strangers. Such as he do more lasting honour to their city than successful athletes. (§§ 3—6.)

‘It will perhaps be said that this request is just, but that I have no claim to make it. I have not, indeed, been a statesman or public speaker; but I have been the adviser of the speakers truest to you and to our other allies; and have myself written more in defence of Greek liberty than all the ranters of the platform put together. Were Konon and Timotheos alive—had Diophantos returned from Asia—they would support my request. Think, then, by whom and for whom the favour is asked; and, if you can grant it, let Agênor and his brothers understand that they owe it, in some measure, to my mediation.’ (§§ 7—10.)

Letter II., To Philip.

6. To Philip. [Ep. II.]—In §§ 5—12 of this Letter, Isokrates remonstrates with Philip for recklessly exposing himself to personal danger; and, in § 12, says:—‘I would give a great deal that I had written this to you before the expedition; since then, if you had listened to me, you would not have run so great a danger; or, if you had not listened, at least I should not have seemed to be repeating in my advice what all the world has been persuaded of by the event.’

Philip was engaged in a Thracian War from 342 to 339 B.C.Schäfer, II. 414 ff. War between Philip and Athens was declared in 340 B.C. Now it is clear from the tone of § 14 that, when this Letter was written, the hostility between Philip and Athens was not yet open. Further, in 342, Philip had given a new constitution to Thessaly, appointing tetrarchs for the four chief districtsDem. Phil. III. § 26: Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, II. p. 402.. Isokrates alludes to this—evidently as recent (§ 20); and urges Philip to intervene, with the same prudence, in the affairs of Athens;— meaning that he should come forward as the reconciler of factions, and as the leader in one great common purpose — an expedition against Asia. The date of the Letter is probably the end Date. of 342 B.C.Dobree (Adv. I. p. 283) refers the Letter to 339 B.C., when Philip was wounded in an encounter with the Triballi, and reported dead. In noticing the Letter at p. 20 of this volume, I assign it to 339. But §§ 14, 20 are, I now think, decisive against this. See Blass, Att. Ber. II. 299.

‘Men are more grateful for praise than for advice. But Analysis. having undertaken once before to advise you as to what it would best become you to do, I must not shrink, in a more urgent crisis, from pronouncing upon what you have done. You are universally condemned for courting danger with a headlong rashness unbecoming a king. In the conduct of war you ought to imitate republics. When they send forth their armies, they are careful to keep safe at home those who are responsible for the commonweal. If the Spartan kings take the field, it is with a devoted body-guard of the most distinguished citizens. The value of a king's life may be judged from the cases of Xerxes and of Cyrus. Xerxes, when his troops were beaten, guarded his own life, and lived to restore the greatness of Persia; Cyrus, by throwing away his life, cancelled an actual victory, and brought upon his followers the extremity of suffering. (§§ 1—8.)

‘It is unworthy of you to aim at a reputation for mere reckless courage. The special risks of a monarch are enough without adding to them the risks of a soldier. Glory of a higher kind is within your reach. Carry war against the barbarians on your frontier no further than is necessary for the safety of Macedonia; and set the Greeks an example of making war upon the Great King. I wish that this advice had been given before your expedition; for then it might have averted your danger, or at least have proved my foresight. (§§ (—12.)

‘Though this letter is already too long, a word must be said in conclusion about Athens. If you blame Athens for listening to those who slander you, do not listen to those who slander her. The influence which worthless men have here is only the influence that might be yours. I do not deny that Athens has made some mistakes; but I maintain that no city in Hellas could be a more useful ally for you. Her merely passive friendship would give you strength both in Hellas and against the barbarian. You have been applauded for your just and benevolent interference in the affairs of the Thessalians, a high-spirited people torn by factions. Confer the same benefits upon Athens. The Thessalians are your neighbours in territory; we, in power. It is nobler to take gratitude, than cities, by storm. (§§ 13—21.) You may believe me when I speak of Athens; I have never been her flatterer, but always her severest censor. The careless crowd suspect you and me alike; you, because you are great; me, because I think. You can easily dispel that prejudice; for me it is too late. This, then, is my advice;— give your kingdom and your prosperity into the keeping of the goodwill of the Hellenes.’ (§§ 13—23.)

Letter V, To Alexander.

7. To Alexander. [Ep. v.]—Alexander was with his fatherThe phrase in § 1, περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα σὲ τόπον ἐκείνῳ, seems to imply a foreign region. The danger in which Philip's life had just been placed would account for Alexander having been summoned to him. at the time when Isokrates wrote this Letter, which was sent along with one addressed to Philip—doubtless the Letter just analysed. Philip was in Thrace or the Chersonese from May, 342, to the latter part of 339 B.C.; and, at some time after his departure, appointed Alexander his regent in MacedoniaSchäfer, Dem. II. 416.. But, when this Letter was written, that arrangement had not yet been made. Alexander, a boy of fourteen, is busy with his studies; and Isokrates cannot refrain from a little thrust at the young prince's new tutor. It was probably in this very year (342) that Alexander began to receive the lessons of AristotleApollodoros stated in his χρονικά that Aristotle came to Philip's court ἐπὶ Πυθοδότου ἄρχοντος, Ol. 109. 2, 34 3/2 B.C., Diog. V. 10. Apollodoros adds Ἀλεξάνδρου πεντεκαίδεκ’ ἔτη ἤδη γεγονότος. Alexander only completed his 14th year in July, 342 B.C. He can but barely have entered on his 15th year when Pythodotos ceased to be archon..

‘As I am writing to your father, and you are with him, Analysis. it would be strange if I did not greet you also, and show that old age has still left me some sense. (§ 1.) All say that you are kindly, fond of Athens, fond of learning,—and this in a wise way. The Athenians with whom you live are not uncultivated men, with low political views; but men pleasant socially, and also able to give sound counsel. Your chosen philosophy is not the eristic, which teaches subtlety in private discussion; but the practical philosophy which educates a statesman in debate, in political action, in discerning right and wrong. (§§ 2—4.) You do well to make this your study; and give promise of surpassing other men as far as your father has surpassed all.’ (§ 5.)

Letter IV. To Antipater.

8. To Antipater. [Ep. IV.]—This Letter was written after—probably soon afterThe words in § 1—νῦν ὅτε πολεμοῦμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, as opposed to τῆς εἰρήνης οὔσης—suggest that the declaration of war was recent.—the renewal of the war between Athens and Philip in 340 B.C. Antipater had now been for at least seven years prominent both as a soldier and as a diplomatist. In 347 he seems to have held a command in the Thracian war; in 347 and 346 he was the chief envoy from Macedonia to AthensSchäfer, Dem. II. p. 34.. At this time, in 340 or 339, Antipater is living in Macedonia, apparently as regent, or as chief minister of Alexander, during Philip's absence in Thrace.

The Letter commends to Antipater one Diodotos and his son, who wish to enter the service of Philip. Nothing is known from other sources about this DiodotosSanneg, in his essay De Schola Isocratea (Halle, 1867), notices Diodotos among the pupils of Isokrates; but has nothing to add to the information furnished by this Letter. In the modern Greek edition of Isokrates quoted above (p. 241 note) on Letter VI., the commentator suggests that this Diodotos is possibly identical with the interpreter of Herakleitos mentioned by Diogenes Laertios, IX. 15.. He seems to have been an Athenian who had taken service, probably as a captain of mercenaries, under more than one of the despots of Asia Minor. ‘For speaking freely to these about their own interests’ (§ 7) he had ‘been stripped of his privileges at home’; in other words, he had been deprived of the Athenian citizenship on the charge of supporting an anti-Athenian policy abroad. Alone of the nine Letters, this has the ease of a private friendship: Isokrates had made the acquaintance of Antipater at Athens.

‘Even in time of peace, a letter from Athens to Analysis. Macedonia runs risks; much more now, when we are at war. But I was determined to write to you about Diodotos, and, since I am too late to introduce him to you, at least to add my testimony in his favour. Men of various countries have been my pupils; some with a special faculty for speaking; some with powers of thought and action; some of small ability, but good men and pleasant companions. Diodotos has a nature so happily tempered that in all these respects he is perfect. (§§ 1—4.) You will find, too, that he is thoroughly outspoken. Princes of a large mind honour such frankness; it is the feebler who fear it, thinking that it will drive them into acting against their wishes, and not seeing that free criticism is most likely to put them in the way of attaining what they desire. No monarchy—nay, no republic—is likely to last without advisers who dare to offend. Yet such advisers are slighted,—as Diodotos has found to his cost. There are some princes in Asia whom he has served both by counsel and by perilous deeds; through freedom of speech, however, he has lost not only his dignities in his own country but many hopes besides. He is inclined to distrust princes as a voyager once unlucky fears the sea; but he has done well in going to you. He will benefit by your kindness; you, by his loyalty and ability. (§§ 5—9.)

‘His son, too, is advised by me to take service under your government. He is ambitious to do so; but feels like an athlete eager for a crown which he dares not hope to win. He is without experience; and has defects of person which he fears will be against him. In any case, whether he resides in Macedonia or (as a neutral) at Athens, pray watch over his safety and that of his father. Look upon them as a trust committed to you by my old age—my fame (if that is worth aught)—my friendship. Forgive the length of an old man's letter; I had but one aim,—to show goodwill for the best of friends.’ (§§ 10—13.)

Letter III., To Philip.

9. To Philip. [Ep. III.]—The biographical question raised by this Letter has been noticed in a former chapterCh. XII., p. 31. I have there noticed the suggestion of E. Curtius that, if Isokrates did indeed commit suicide, the motive may have been despair at seeing that Athens was still resolved to resist. If we hold, as I do, the genuineness of the Third Letter, this explanation of the suicide is admissible only on the supposition that the Letter was written before the conclusion of the peace between Athens and Philip. Now I confess I think the Third Letter was written after the conclusion of the peace, and was taken to Philip by Antipater on his return from Athens: see §§ 1 —2. Cf. Schäfer, III. 25.The tradition of a suicide prompted by patriotic despair must then be given up altogether. But the tradition of the suicide itself may be true. The real motive may have been an access of his disease: and Aphareus, or some friend—availing himself of the coincidence that Isokrates died on the day when those who fell at Chaeroneia were buried— may have invented the heroic motive. See Blass, Att. Ber. II. 89 f., 300.. The Letter was written in 338 B.C., some time after Chaeroneia, when Isokrates had completed his ninety-eighth year. It is thus the latest of all his extant writings.

‘I have already had some talk with Antipater about Analysis. your interests and those of Athens. But I resolved to write to you, too, regarding the course which, as I think, you ought to take after the peace. This letter will be to the same purpose as my discourse, but much shorter. (§ 1.) Formerly I urged you to bring about concord in Hellas by reconciling the chief states, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos. Now, persuasion is no longer needed. The recent struggle has proved them to have no will but yours, and to admit that the war which they have been making upon each other ought to be turned against Asia. They ask me whether the idea of an expedition against the barbarians was originally yours or mine; and when I say that, to the best of my belief, it was yours, they entreat me to confirm you in it. No deed, they say, could be nobler, better for Hellas, or more timely. (§§ 2—3.) Had not my powers utterly failed, I would have come to you and urged this in person. In one thing it is good to be insatiable—in the desire of true glory; and your glory will be perfect only when you have Philip's mission. made the barbarians helots to the Greeks. To that result it will be an easier step than it was from the first to the present stage of your power. That result gained, nothing will remain for you but to become a god. I thank old age for this alone, that those youthful projects which I set forth in the Panegyrikos and in the discourse sent to you are in course of completion by your agency, and will, I hope, be completed.’ (§§ 4—6.)

Fragments.

The only lost workAs to the Γρύλλου ἐπιτάφιος (Diog. L. II. 55), see above, p. 80; as to the supposed speech πρὸς Εὔθυνον (Ar. Rh. II. 19) see below. of Isokrates known from definite citations is his Art of Rhetoric. It has, indeed, always been questioned whether he was the author of the treatise once current under his name. Quintilian, in quoting it for an opinion of Isokrates, adds—‘if it is really his Quintil. Inst. II. 15 § 4.’; and Photios hints a like doubtPhotios, cod. 260. γεγραφέναι δὲ αὐτὸν τέχνην ῥητορικὴν λέγουσιν, ἣν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπιγραφομένην τῷ ὀνόματι. οἱ δὲ συνασκήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τέχνῃ χρήσασθαι κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τὸν ἄνδρα φασί.. Modern criticism Spengel, συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, pp. 154—172: Sauppe, O. A. II. p 224. Sauppe denies all force to the objections of I. G. Pfund, de Isocratis Vita et Scriptis, pp. 21 f, which Bernhardy on Cic. Brut. p. 37 appears to think of weight. is divided. Some infer from extant notices, direct and indirectThe direct references to the lost Τέχνη are collected by Benseler, Isocr. vol. II. p. 276. They are the references noticed here. Besides these, Sauppe has brought together ten other instances in which he believes that he has discovered allusions to the treatise. All, or most, of these are, however, doubtful. See Sauppe, O. A. II. pp. 224 ff., that Isokrates really published a systematic ‘Art.’ The direct notices are, with one exception, of slight interest. They inform us that Isokrates defined Rhetoric as ‘the science of persuasionSextus Empiricus, πρὸς μαθημ, II. § 62, p. 301 F: Ἰσοκράτης φησὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύειν τοὺς ῥήτορας ἢ ἐπιστήμην πειθοῦς. Quintilian, indeed, states that Isokrates said, ‘esse rhetoricen persuadendi opificem, id est πειθοῦς δημιουργόν’: Inst. II. 15. § 4. But, as Sauppe observes, Sextus is probably the more accurate. The definition mentioned by Quintilian is known to have been given by Korax and Tisias (Spengel, συναγ. p. 34) and is ascribed by Sextus himself to Xenokrates.,’ insisted, in reference to forensic speaking, on the importance of taking up a strong position in that general statement of a case (κατάστασις Max. Planudes, scholia on Hermogenes, περὶ ἰδεῶν β/, in Walz Rhet. Graec. V. 551. κατάστασις is here what Dionysios calls πρόθεσις:—that general setting forth of the matter in hand which usually comes (at least in the speeches of Lysias) between the exordium (προοίμιον) and the detailed narrative: (καὶ ἔστι μεθόριον αὐτῷ ἑκατέρας τῶν ἰδεῶν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ πρόθεσις: Lys. c. 17.)) which precedes the detailed narrative of facts, as well as on the need of comprehensiveness in the narrative (διήγησις) itselfSyrianos, scholia on the στάσεις of Hermogenes, in Walz Rh. Gr. IV. 302.; and observed on the dislike of ‘Atticists’ to coining new words οἱ Ἀττικισταὶ παντελῶς ἀποτρέπουσι τοῦ ὀνοματοποιεῖν καὶ μόνοις προστάττουσι κεχρῆσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις λέξεσι καὶ τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ὡς φησὶν Ἰσοκρἀτης: Max. Planudes (acc. to the Par. ms.), Walz Rh. Gr. V. 498. It is no rash assumption of Benseler's (Isocr. II. 276) that this remark must have occurred in the τέχνη.. The only citation more precise and satisfactory than these is made by Maximus PlanudesWalz Rh. Gr. V. p. 469.. ‘We learn,’ he says, ‘from the Art of Isokrates what kind of diction is called pure; for that writer has been so attentive to purity of style as to give in his own treatise such precepts as these upon the subject:—‘In composition δεῖ δὲ ἐν τῇ μὲν λέξει τὰ φωνήεντα μὴ συμπίπτειν, κ τ. λ. The words ἐν τῇ μὲν λέξει are opposed to ὀνόματι δὲ χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ., lower down. Λέξις means here the style of composition, as contrasted with ὀνόματα, the diction., vowels must not clashDionysios (de Isocr. c. 2) says that Isokr. deprecates (παραιτεῖται ) τῶν φωνηέντων τὰς παραλλήλους θέσεις, ὡς λυούσας τὰς ἁρμονίας τῶν ἠχῶν καὶ τὴν λειότητα τῶν φθόγγων λυμαινομένας. The ‘injury to the smoothness of the sounds’ is what is meant by the lameness—unevenness—spoken of here., for that has a lame effect; nor is it well to begin and end with the same syllable, as εἰποῦσα σαφῆ, ἡλικὰ καλά, ἔνθα Θαλῆς; or to put the same conjunctions close together, making the latter answer immediately to the former καὶ τοὺς συνδέσμους τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ σύνεγγυς τιθέναι καὶ τὸν ἑπόμενον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ εὐθὺς ἀνταποδιδόναι. For instance, if two consecutive sentences began with ἐπεὶ γάρ, the second ἐπεί would be ἀνταποδεδομένον, in regard to the first,—‘made to answer to it,’ placed in the same position in the sentence. Such repetitions, the rule says, ought not to be made εὐθύς— i.e. without a certain interval.. As to particular words, use those which are figurative, but not harshly so; or which are noblest—least artificial—most familiar. In short, your prose must not be prose,—that is dry; nor metrical,—for that betrays art; but tempered with all manner of rhythms, especially iambic or trochaic. In narrative, set the first incident, the second, and the rest, in regular sequence. Do not pass to a fresh point before you have done with the first, or then come back from the end to the beginning. Let your separate thoughts be severally completed and rounded off.’ These rough notes—for they are no more—doubtless represent the substance of precepts which Isokrates really gave at least orallyCf. Epist. VI. § 8 (λέγειν): Panathen. § 236. Cicero says, ‘We find no Art which is ascertained (constet) to be by Isokrates himself, though we meet with many technical writings by his disciples’ [e.g. Ephoros, Naukrates]: de Invent. II. 7. Aristotle, ap. Cic. Brut. § 48, says that Isokrates, on giving up forensic work, betook himself wholly ad artes componendas. Blass thinks (Att. Ber. II. 98) we may understand this of collecting notes, rules, &c., on the theory of Rhetoric—not of writing a formal treatise. to his pupils, whether their present form is, or is not, that in which they were actually put forth by him.

There is nothing to prove that any of the Apophthegms. numerousBenseler has collected thirtyseven: Isocr. vol. II. pp. 276 ff. apophthegms ascribed to Isokrates were taken from writings of his now lostOne disputed instance must, however, be noticed. Arist. Rhet. II. 19: καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον· ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκρἁτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. Benseler (de hiatu p. 56) thinks that this quotation is from a lost speech of Isokrates πρὸς Εὔθυνον, and that our Or. XXI. πρὸς Εὐθύνουν has been falsely attributed to him. But, as Sauppe (O.A. II. 227) says, it is more natural to suppose that the saying quoted by Aristotle referred to rhetorical skill generally, not to the arguments bearing on any special lawsuit.. Many of these apophthegms are mere repartees in conversation; others are maxims of morality or prudence which may, of course, have been found in books, but which are in no instance quoted from any particular book. The average quality of the sayings may be judged from a few specimens. On being asked how he, who was no public speaker, could teach others to speak, he answered that a whetstone cannot cut, but can fit iron to do soPlut. Mor. 838 E..—‘A father having said that he never gave his son any companion but a slave, —‘Well then,’ Isokrates answered, ‘you will have two slaves[Plut.] Vitt. X. Oratt. .’ ‘If you have a fair body and an ill mind, you have a good ship and a bad pilotAnton. Meliss. p. 65..’— ‘The root of learning is bitter, the fruit sweetHermog. I. 22..’— On being asked in what the industrious differ from the indolent, he said—‘As the pious from the impious—in good hopesSteph. Apophthegmat. p. 697. .’

It would, of course, be idle to inquire what proportion of these sayings is genuine. A master of neat expression, who was at the same time singularly sententious, could not fail to be credited with many such γνῶμαι as those with which the Ad Demonicum abounds, and for which the Greek taste received a new impulse from the Peripatetics‘Neque exstare (magnum numerum apophthegmatum) in tanti nominis isocratei claritate et studii quo Graeci inde a peripateticorum disciplina talia colligerent alacritate mirum est.’ Sauppe, O. A. II. 227..

Isaeos: Life
Comparative scantiness of evidence

THE silence which surrounds the life of Isaeos, in contrast with the reputation of his work, has a meaning of its own. Dionysios, in setting forth those few and barren facts which the Augustan age could discover to his search, unconsciously indicates the chief cause of their scantiness. ‘I cannot tell,’ he says, ‘what were the politics of Isaeos, —or whether he had any politics at all Dionys. Isae. c. 1, οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως τῶν πολιτευμάτων (εἰπεῖν ἔχω): οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν εἰ προείλετό τινα πολιτείαν ..’ Unlike Antiphon or Andokides, unlike even Lysias or Isokrates, Isaeos, so far as is known, had no definite relation, literary or active, with the affairs of Athens. Nothing could better illustrate the workings of that deep change which was passing over the life of Athens and of Greece. Half a century earlier, a citizen with the like powers could not have failed to find his place in the history of the city; and a resident who, like Lysias, did not possess the citizenship, would at least have left some evidence of his interest in Athenian or Panhellenic affairs, even if it had not been his fortune to impeach an Eratosthenes or to address the Greeks at Olympia. But, with the progressive divergence of Society from the State, the separation of the man from the citizen naturally expressed itself, not merely in apathy or in organized frivolity, but also, and with a graver meaning, in the clearer definition of all those pursuits which could be called professional. ‘Let the ekklesia be the care of the statesmen—my profession is to write for the courts’;—this is what the life of Isaeos, by the fact that it is almost hidden, declares. That change has set in which is to lead, without a break, from the old life of the republics to a cosmopolitan Hellenism, and thence to the modern world.

The date of his birth can only be guessed from Probable date of birth. the dates of his works. Of those extant speeches which can be placed chronologically, the earliest (Or. V., On the Estate of Dikaeogenes) may be assigned to 390 B.C.; the latest (Or. VII., On the Estate of Apollodoros) to 353. In 366 his reputation was fully established. The conjecture which places his birth about 420 B. C. is probably not far wrongHermann Weissenborn, in his excellent article on Isaeos in Ersch and Gruber's Encylopaedia, sect. II., part 38, pp. 286—310, takes Ol. 90 (420—417 B.C.)—assuming (rightly, I think) that Or. V. belongs to 390 B.C. Independently of that assumption, however—since at all events we have Or. X. in 384 B.C.—420 must be near the mark.. One account represents Isaeos as a Chalkidian[Plut.] vit. Isae. and vit. Demosth.: Demetrios ap. Suid. and Harpokr.: Photios cod. 263., another as an AthenianSuidas s.v. Ἰσαῖος: Hermippos (see above, p. 12) ap. Harpokr.— Dionysios gives the preference to this account: de Isae. c. 1 Ἀθηναῖος ἦν τὸ γένος· ὡς δὲ ἕτεροι γράφουσι, Χαλκιδεύς. The anonymous Γένος Ἰσαίου is taken almost wholly from Dionysios, our earliest source, to whom the Plutarchic Life also owes much: but the Γένος says merely κατὰ μέν τινας Ἀθηναῖος, κατὰ δέ τινας Χαλκιδεύς.; and the Parentage. theory which harmonises these statements by supposing the family to have migrated from Chalkis to Athens becomes something more than a mechanical compromise when it is recollected that, in 411, Euboea (except Oreos) revolted from Athens, and The revolt of Euboea. that at such a time, residents in Euboea whose sympathies were Athenian might well have crossed the EuriposSchömann praef. vi.: Weissenborn l.c. Curtius approves: V. 172 (Ward.) For the revolt of Euboea, see Thuc. VIII. 95. Chalkis was the place where the remnant of the Athenian ships sought refuge. Athenian kleruchs had held Oreos since the reconquest of Euboea by Perikles. Thuc. I. 14: Cox Hist. Gr. II. 494.. About 509 B. C.The exact date is uncertain: but see Cox I. pp. xiv. and 236., after an Athenian victory over the Chalkidians, the lands of the Was Isaeos a citizen? Chalkidian Hippobotae, or Knights, had been shared among four thousand Athenian kleruchsHer. V. 77.. If the family of Isaeos was descended from one of these settlers, the account which represents Isaeos as ‘an Athenian by descent’ would be justified, and the fact that the name DiagorasAnon. Biogr. For Διαγόρας Meier (ap. Weissenborn l.c.) proposed Ἰσαγόρας., attributed to his father, is not Athenian, would be explained. It might, indeed, be argued that the case of Isaeos is analogous to that of Deinarchos, who was certainly a resident alien, and who yet was represented by one account as an Athenian citizen[Plut.] Vit. Din. ὡς μέν τινες, ἐγχώριος, ὡς δέ τισι δοκεῖ, Κορίνθιος.. But the cases would be really parallel only if the foreign birthplace assigned to Deinarchos had been the seat of an Athenian settlement. Nor can abstention from political life be urged as disproving citizenship in the case of one who had a distinct and an engrossing occupationWestermann and Weissenborn think that Isaeos was somehow a citizen. Schäfer assumes the reverse, when he says (Dem. u. seine Zeit, I. 255) that to Isaeos ‘as an alien, the public career was closed’: and Blass favours the latter view (Att. Ber. II. 454)..

His Education.

In 400 B. C.—when Plato was twenty-nine years old, Isokrates thirty-six, and Lysias fifty-nine (or, according to the modern view of his birth-date, forty-four at mostVol. I. p. 144.), Isaeos was probably about twenty. That subtle and eager mind, destined to a narrow field, may well have had its early place in the most liberal converse that Athens could afford συνεγένετο δὲ τοϊς ἀρίστοις τῶν φιλοσόφων, Hermippos ap. Dionys. Isae. 1. I should certainly hesitate to infer—as Weissenborn and Meier do—that Isaeos had been a disciple of Sokrates.Curtius says that Isaeos ‘connected himself with Plato’ (V. 172, Ward) and so Weissenborn. The authorities for this (so far as they are known to me) are (1) Phot. cod. 265, p. 1472 R, and (2) [Plut.] vit. Demosth., whence Photios gets it.Now, I strongly suspect that Photios has mis-construed the passage in the Plutarchic Life. It says of Demosthenes:—σχολάζων Ἰσοκράτει, ὥς τινες ἔφασαν, ὡς δὲ οἱ πλεῖστοι, Ἰσαίῳ τῷ Χαλκιδεῖ, ὃς ἦν Ἰσοκράτους μαθητής, διάγοντι ἐν Ἀθήναις, ζηλῶν Θουκυδίδην καὶ Πλάτωνα, ᾧ τινες εἶπον προηγουμένως οὐτὸν σχολάσαι. Grammatically, the clause ζηλῶν, κ.τ.λ., might, of course, be connected with ὃς ἦν, κ.τ.λ.: Photios so took it; and hence the error. Manifestly ζηλῶν, &c., is meant to refer back to Demosthcnes. He is the ‘student of Plato and Thucydides.’. But the only master to whom Isaeos is given as pupil by a tradition at once definite and trustworthy is Isokrates. Their intercourse may be referred to Isokrates. the years 393—390, when Isokrates was just beginning to teach, or when Isaeos was about to enter on his own career as a writer of speeches for the lawcourts. Both these facts—that the teacher's manner was not matured, and that the discipleship must have been comparatively short—may help to explain why Isaeos kept so few traces of Isokratic expression. As we shall see, however, the Isokratic influence on Isaeos may clearly be traced in another province—in his handling of subject-matterThe authorities for Isaeos having been the pupil of Isokrates are Hermippos (a strong witness) in his book on the disciples of Isokrates (Harpokr. s. v. Ἰσαι—ος, Dionys. Isae. 1): [Plut.] vit. Demosth.,—in vit. Isaei the text is doubtful; and Suid. s. v. Δημοσθένης.—Schäfer (I. 255) questions the tradition, noticing the dubious ὡς δέ τινές φασι in [Plut.] vit. Isocr.—Benseler (p. 192), applying the hiatus-test, puts the discipleship only a little before 360, when Isaeos was past 50: but, as we shall see below, that test breaks down.. Isokrates asserts that, of all the numerous writers of speeches for the courts, no one was ever honoured with pupils Antid. (Or. XV.) § 41: παμπληθεῖς εἰσιν οἱ παρασκευάζοντες τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγωνιζομένοις. τούτων μὲν τοίνυν τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδεὶς πώποτε φανήσεται μαθητῶν ἠξιωμένος.. If Isaeos had been the pupil of Lysias, at least one Lysias. notable exception would have been established. It is worth observing, however, that the best authority speaks of Isaeos, not as the scholar, but as the student of Lysias; and this is undoubtedly the true accountDionys. Isae. 2, χαρακτῆρα δὲ τὸν Λυσίου...ἐζήλωσε (copied in the Γένος Ἰσαίου): c. 20, ζηλωτήν. In [Plut.] vit. Isae. the ordinary reading gives σχολάσας Λυσίᾳ, but should perhaps be emended to σχολάσας [μὲν Ἰσοκράτει, ζηλώσας δὲ] Λυσίαν, as Schäfer suggests ( Dem. I. 256 n.: or σχολάσας [Ἰσοκράτει, ἔοικε μάλιστα] Λυσίᾳ. From the pseudo-Plutarch Photios cod. 263 took his Λυσίου δὲ ἐγένετο μαθητής, οὖ καὶ μαθητὴς ἐχρημάτισε. See Blass, Att. Ber. II. 456..

Forensic work of Isaeos

Isaeos, like Antiphon and Lysias, was a professsional writer of forensic speeches. But a comparative survey of their work brings out one striking difference. Antiphon was occupied chiefly, Lysias largely, with Public Causes. Isaeos was occupied almost wholly in Private Causes. almost exclusivelySee below, ch. XXI. ad init. with Private Causes. These Private Causes were, moreover, principally of the class with which Demosthenes also was so much engaged, and for which Isokrates reserves his principal contempt,—claims to property or money between man and manIsokr. Paneg. [Or. IV.] § 11, τοὺς ἀγῶνυς τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων: so Antid. [XV.] § 3, &c.. The Practical Rhetoric, at first busied chiefly with the graver interests of the civic life, had thus in the course of its development come to embrace the smaller interests so completely that it could find in these a distinct and definite field. Among the twelve extant Speeches of Isaeos—since the fragment ‘For Euphiletos’ is now counted as the twelfth—four are of uncertain time. The remaining eight may conveniently be arranged in two groups, as they precede or follow the central event in the life of Isaeos—his connexion with Demosthenes. The first group will comprise the Fifth First group of Speeches. Oration, On the Estate of Dikaeogenes, 390 B.C.; the Tenth, On the Estate of Aristarchos, 377—371 B.C.; the Eighth, On the Estate of Kiron, 375 B.C.; and the Ninth, On the Estate of Astyphilos, 369 B.C. The second group will comprise the Sixth Oration, Second group. On the Estate of Philoktemon, 364—363 B.C.; the Eleventh, On the Estate of Hagnias, 359 B.C.; the Second, On the Estate of Menekles, 354 B.C.; and the Seventh, On the Estate of Apollodoros, 353 B.C. The First and Third Orations, On the Estates of Kleonymos and Pyrrhos, may probably be referred to the later period.

Isaeos and Demosthenes.

Demosthenes was born in 384, and came of age in 366. Before attaining his majority he had resolved on the contest with the guardians who had abused their trust. The two orations Against Aphobos belong to 363 B. C.; the two orations Against Onetor to 362. Now, in 366, Isaeos must have been known for upwards of twenty years as a successful writer of forensic speeches, and also as a master of Attic law, especially in the department of claims to property. No one could be better fitted to arm Demosthenes for his first encounter. There is no doubt whatever that Demosthenes had recourse to the aid of Isaeos. Afterwards, when that relative obscurity in which the critics left the elder orator was hardly broken save by this stray gleam from the glory of the younger, friendly biographers naturally welcomed everything that could add brightness to the borrowed rayEven Dionys. begins: Ἰσαῖος δέ, ὁ Δημοσθένους καθηγησάμενος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα γενόμενος περιφανής.. It is due quite as much to Isaeos as to Demosthenes that we should be on our guard against exaggerations. According to one story, Demosthenes, on coming of age, took Isaeos into his house, and studied with him for four years Ἰσαῖον ἀναλαβὼν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν τετραετῆ χρόνον αὑτὸν διεπόνησε, μιμούμενος αὐτοῦ τοὐς λόγους: [Plut.] vit. Dem. The same author represents these studies with Isaeos as having begun while Demosthenes was yet a minor and living in his mother's house; and so Plutarch, vit. Demosth. c. 5: Libanios vit. Dem. p. 3 (Reiske): Suidas s v. Δημοσθένης, &c. Schäfer ( Dem. I. 257) would date the relation only from 366. It was only after attaining his majority and receiving the guardians' account that Demosth. could have resolved on the law-suit.. He is further said to have paid Isaeos 10,000 drachms (about £400) on condition that the teacher should withdraw from a school of Rhetoric which he had opened, and should devote himself wholly to his new pupil[Plut.] vit. Isae.: Phot. cod. 263. Curtius adopts the tradition (V. 221, Ward). Schäfer suggests that it may have arisen from Demosthenes having made some present to Isaeos on winning the cause against Aphobos (Dem. I. 257).. ‘It was a close personal relation,’ writes a brilliant historian, ‘into which they entered, an intellectual armed alliance, in order with their united strength to carry on the contest of vengeance which Demosthenes, like the Heroes of ancient mythology, undertook against the desolaters of his paternal homeCurtius V. 220 (Ward)..’ It would be agreeable thus to conceive Isaeos,—as a Pylades divided by nothing but, perhaps, thirty-six years from his young partner in the chastisement of a triple Aegisthos. Plutarch, however, says merely that Demosthenes—‘employed Isaeos as his master in Rhetoric, though Isokrates was then teaching, either (as some say) because he could not pay Isokrates the prescribed fee of ten minae; or because he preferred the style of Isaeos for his purpose, as being vigorous and astute’ (δραστήριον καὶ πανοῦργον)Plut. vit. Dem. [not the pseudoPlutarch in the lives of the X. Orators] c. 5.. The school of Isaeos is nowhere else mentionedPlutarch, no doubt, mentions τοὺς Ἰσοκράτεις καὶ Ἀντιφῶντας καὶ Ἰσαίους among τοὺς ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τὰ μειράκια προδιδάσκοντας (de glor. Athen. p. 350 C): but this is vague; and need mean no more than that he knew an Art of Rhetoric (see ch. XXI. ad init.) to be extant under the name of Isaeos., nor is the name of any other pupil recorded.

The Sixth Oration, On the Estate of Philoktemon (364—363 B. C.), falls in the midst of those years (366—362) which the tradition supposes Isaeos to have reserved for Demosthenes; showing that, if Isaeos had no other disciples, he had at least concurrent occupations. Then another version claims for Isaeos the credit of having taught Demosthenes gratisSuidas s. v. Ἰσαῖος: ἐπαινεῖται ...ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀμισθὶ προαγαγών. Weissenborn (Ersch. and Gruber, Encycl. II. xxxviii. 286) adopts this account.. But the decisive argument is furnished by the speeches Against Aphobos and Onetor. These are not the compositions of one who had given himself wholly to the guidance of Isaeos, who was sitting at the master's feet, who was working under the master's eye. On the contrary, these earliest speeches of Demosthenes have a stamp of their own as marked as it is original. Some valuable hints Demosthenes unquestionably got from Isaeos, and an attempt will be made presently to show what these were. But the limits of the influence forbid us to think that the intercourse between Isaeos and Demosthenes as teacher and learner can have been either very intimate or of very long durationThe enemy—Pythcas, as Dionys. Isae. c. 4 conjectures—who reproached Demosthenes with having ‘swallowed Isaeos bodily’ (τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον σεσίτισται) paid a bad compliment to the discernment of his audience..

Date of death.

The death of Isaeos is conjecturally placed about 350 B.C. In a general view of his career, we are Antiphon and Isaeos. irresistibly struck with a resemblance and a contrast. Antiphon and Isaeos are brothers in accomplishment, in calling, in bent of genius, in subjection to the general disfavour which recognized but survived their success. Each was deeply versed, not only in rhetoric, but in law; each, too, was eminent in a branch—Antiphon in the law of homicide, Isaeos in the law of property. Each used his art for his client, not, indeed, without some attempt at persuasive simplicity, but with a masterful force which rendered the attempt little more than a tribute to usage. Each had a sinister reputation; Antiphon ‘lay under the suspicion of the people through a repute for cleverness,’ and never came before the people when he could help it; Isaeos, too, was deemed ‘clever in elaborating pleas for the worse partDionys. Isae. 4.,’ and, with the exception of the Greek Argument to his Oration On the Estate of Nikostratos—and that Argument is a worthless authoritySee the note on it below, ch. XXI.—there is no evidence that he ever spoke in a law-courtSchömann praef. vi. (where his ‘fortasse’ seems to leave the question as to Or. IV. open; but see p. 269 of his Commentary): Schäfer Dem. 1. 254. Curtius observes that Demosthenes could learn little as to delivery from Isaeos, ‘who himself never came forward in public’ (v. 226, Ward).. Each was the object of a public satire which reflected this unpopularity; Antiphon figured in the Peisandros of Plato Comicus, Isaeos in the Theseus [Plut.] vit. Isae.—The idea of the comedy was that Theseus, expelled from Athens, goes to Persia. We have two lines of a mock-heroie speech; predicting the wanderings of the hero, as those of Io are foretold by Prometheus:—ἥξεις δὲ Μήδων γαῖαν, ἔνθα καρδάμων πλείστων ποιεῖται καὶ πράσων ἀβυρτάκη,Meineke, Frag. Com. p. 306. of Theopompos. But, if thus far the personal analogy is close, there is a strange divergence of fates beyond it. Antiphon worked patiently, indeed, at his disliked and suspected calling through long years of judicious abstention from every battle-field of the civic life. But his climax was political; the strife of parties was the focus on which his disciplined powers were finally concentrated; and when the keen weapon which had so often served others was at last bared in his own hand, it was for no single combat, but for the encounter of oligarchy with democracy, for a struggle which filled Athens with bitterness, as it drowned his own life in blood. Isaeos, subtle and patient, but not, like Antiphon, passionate also, was congenially placed in days when an Athenian had ceased to be primarily a citizen. The early application of rhetorical art to politics—so natural, even so necessary, yet so crude—had long given place to a conception of the rhetorical province in which politics made only one department. With this department Isaeos recognised—probably with the indifference of the time—that he had nothing to do; the intellectual ardour which he clearly had was of a kind that his tasks at once satisfied and limited—making it enough for him to live and die the laborious, successful, rather unpopular master of Attic Law; not the first at Athens who had followed a calling, but perhaps the earliest Athenian type of a professional man.

Isaeos: Style
The judgement of Dionysios

AT the conclusion of his essay on IsaeosDionys. Isae. c. 19., Dionysios explains the principle of selection which has guided him in this and in the two other criticisms which are properly its companions, the essays on Lysias and Isokrates. He has chosen men who are not merely interesting in themselves but who have a certain typical significance. Lysias is the representative of those who cultivate terse, closelyreasoned discourse with a view to real contests, deliberative or forensic; and, having made a study of Lysias, he has felt himself exempted from discussing in detail the austere Antiphon, the frigid, inane and ungraceful Polykrates, the correct and subtle Thrasymachos, who, though inventive and forcible, is still a merely scholastic writer, the artificial Kritias and Zoilos, to whom, in different ways, the same general observation would apply. Isokrates, again, stands for all who have succeeded in the poetical, the elevated and stately manner; and, in like sort, absolves the critic from discussing Gorgias, ‘who lapses from moderation and is everywhere childish’; Alkidamas, his pupil, who is ‘somewhat coarse’; Theodoros of Byzantium, whose technical inaccuracies are not adequately compensated by ability, deliberative or forensic, and who, moreover, is antiquated; Anaximenes of Lampsakos, who aims at completeness, who would fain stand foursquare to rivalries from every quarter, but who, in every kind, is weak and devoid of persuasive charm; or, lastly, those contemporary imitators of Isokrates, in regard to expression, who are confessedly his inferiors, such as Theodektes, Naukrates, Philistos, Kephisodoros, Ephoros, Theopompos. But what or whom does Isaeos represent except himself? Might not he, if any man, he, an exclusively forensic writer, and that in the ‘plain’ manner, he, the close student and direct imitator of Lysias, have been taken as characterised when Lysias had been criticised? This is the answer of Dionysios:—‘As Distinction of Isaeos, according to Dionysios. to the third—Isaeos—if anyone were to ask me why I added him (to Lysias and Isokrates), being, as he is, an imitator of Lysias, I should assign this reason;—Because I think that the oratorical power (δεινὄτης) of Demosthenes—power which everyone deems to have reached an incomparable perfection— took its seeds and its beginnings from Isaeos Dionys. Isae. 20, ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος, ἣν οὐθείς ἐστιν ὃς οὐ τελειοτάτην ἁπασῶν οἴεται γενέσθαι, τὰ σπέρματα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ παρασχεῖν. Cp. ib. c. 3, where he says that the composition of Isaeos, in respect of the power, the impressiveness, of its embellishment (τῇ δεινότητι τῆς κατασκευῆς) ‘is in truth a fountain (πηγή τις) of the faculty of Demosthenes.’.’The estimate needs qualification.

The significance of Isaeos, when looked at closely, will prove to be something more independent and substantive than this judgment seems to make it. But here, at least, are two cardinal points for an attempt to estimate the place of Isaeos in the development of Attic oratory. We must endeavour to determine, first, his relation to Lysias; secondly, his relation to Demosthenes.

Isaeos compared with Lysias

A comparison of Isaeos with Lysias may begin in the province of expression, with its two departments of diction and composition, and thence pass to the province of subject-matter.

Diction.

As regards diction, the resemblance is close. Isaeos, emulous of that persuasive ‘plainness’ (ἀφέλεια) in which Lysias was so consummate an artist, takes the first step towards attaining it by imitating Lysias in the correctness, the conciseness, the simplicity of his language. When some errors of the manuscripts have been amendedI. § 1, βοηθεῖν τε τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ποιησαμένῳ με καὶ ἐμαυτῷ, where we should probably read βοηθεῖν τῷ τε. and so in VIII, § 1, οὗτυί τε τοῦ κλήρου λαγχάνουσιν ὡς ἐγγυτάτω γένους ὄντες, ἡμᾶς τε ὑβρίζουσιν. Similarly, in I. § 48, a false reading is καὶ νῦν μὲν ἐβούλετο ἡμᾶς, instead of καὶ νῦν ἐβ. ἡμᾶς μέν: in II. § 26, μὲν αὑτῷ for αὑτῷ μέν: in VI. § 18, Εὐκτήμων μὲν γὰρ ἐβίω ἔτη for Ἐ. γὰρ ἐβίω μὲν ἔτη, κ.τ.λ.—In VI. § 10, ἐπειδὴ δὲ προδιαμεμαρτύρηκεν ὡς υἱὸν εἶναι γνήσιον Εὐκτήμονος τοῦτον, Blass (Att. Ber. II. 469) would read for ὡς υἱὸν εἶναι γνήσιον Ε. τοῦτον, υἱοὺς εἶναι γνησίους— τούσδε. In XI. § 10, ἡμεῖς δέ, ἐγὼ καὶ Στράτιος καὶ Στρατοκλῆς—παρεσκευάζοντο, the 1st pers. plur. is no bold change.Priscian XVIII. c. 25 says:— Attici ὅταν ἔλθῃ de futuro dicunt. Isaeus etiam de praeterito: ὅταν ἔλθῃ, εἰώθει παρ’ ἐκείνῳ κατάγεσθαι . Et iterum: ὅταν ἔλθω, παρ’ ἐκείνῳ κατηγόμην. Antiquiores tamen ὅτε ἔλθοι de praeterito dicunt. These impossible solecisms must have been mere blunders of the copyist for ὅτε ἔλθοι, ὅτε ἔλθοιμι., few blemishes remain discernible in the purity both of grammar and of idiom with which Isaeos writes AtticOne or two instances of incorrectness or inelegance may be noticed. (1) VII. § 36, ἐγὼ τοίνυν ἕν γε τῶν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου δοκιμασθέντων πεποίηκα: ‘I have done one at least of the things about which he had satisfied himself’—i. e., which he felt sure that I would do [the speaker had been saying that he had been approved by his actions, δεδοκιμασμένος, to the testator, as likely to do public services]. where we should have expected πιστευθέντων. (2) VIII. § 6, λόγων ἀκοῇ καὶ μαρτύρων—objective and subjective genitives harshly joined. (3) I. § 41, διαθήκας... ἀψευδεῖς ἀπέφηναν, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ παράπαν οὐ γενομένας, ἐνίων δ’ οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένων. (4) III. § 35, οὐ χαλεπὸν γνῶναι ὅτι φαίνεται περιφανῶς, κ.τ λ. . The true exceptions to his conciseness are equally rareThe clumsy wordiness of a few passages seems to come from the wish of ἀφέλεια: e.g. II. § 38, Βούλομαι ὑμῖν καὶ αὐτους τούτους μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι, καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυροῦντας ἔργῳ καὶ οὐ λόγῳ, ἐξ ὧν ἔπραξαν αὐτοί, ὅτι ἐγὼ τἀληθῆ λέγω, cf. ib. § 18: VII. § 14, Ἀπολλοδώρῳ γὰρ ἦν υἱός, ὃν ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἤσκει καὶ δἰ ἐπιμελείας εἶχεν, ὥσπερ καὶ προσῆκον ἦν. On the other hand, Isaeos never repeats himself, as Lysias sometimes does, through the desire of parallelism.; and, if anyone would see how remote is Isaeos from a really inartistic diffuseness, he need only compare the oration On the Estate of Hagnias with two speeches, one of them concerning the same inheritance, which have wrongly been ascribed to Demosthenes—the speech Against Makartatos and the speech Against OlympiodorosXLIII. πρὸς Μακάρτατον: XLVIII. κατὰ Ὀλυμπιοδώρου βλάβης. See Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. Append. 5, 6, pp. 229—241: who thinks that they are by the same hand. The Hagnias of Isaeos and the Makartatos have to do with the same inheritance. Isaeos begins (XI. § 8) ‘Hagnias, Eubulides, Stratios (uncle of Hagnias), and myself, are sons of cousins’:—the pseudo-Demosthenes goes through the entire stemma of the Buselidae (§§ 19—21). Cf. Blass, II. 470.. In the combination of brevity with clearness, Isaeos stands, indeed, next to Lysias. In the avoidance of rare or poetical expressions, of tropes, of novel compounds, or of phrases akin to comedy, the nearest rival of Lysias is Isokrates; but Isaeos follows at no long intervalA few exceptions may be noticed:—1. Rare or poetical expressions σχέτλιος (XI § 5), ἀναίνεσθαι (II. § 25), ὁ ἐν Ἅιδου (II. § 45): ἀποσυλᾶν (V. § 30): λυμαίνεσθαι (VI. 18). —2. Tropes: καταφυγὴ τῆς ἐρημίας καὶ παραψυχὴ τοῦ βίου, said of Adoption (II. § 13): βραβευτάς in sense of δικαστάς (IX. § 35) μαρτύρια, = μνημεῖα ἀρετῆς, V. § 41: δοκιμασία in general sense of ‘test’, VII. § 34, and so βάσανος, IX. § 29: παρανοίας αἱρεῖν, to convict (the dead) of folly, ib. § 36: ἵνα αὐτῶν ἐκκόψαιμι ταύτην τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν, ‘that I might radically frustrate this their sacrilege’ (i.e. this attempt to rob the dead, VIII. § 39): ἃ παρακαταθέμενος ὑμῖν, ‘deposited in your memories’ (XI § 32). 3. Novel compounds: καθιπποτρόφηκας, κατεζευγοτρόφηκας (V § 43): ὑποπαρωθῶν (VIII. § 38): καταπεπαιδεραστηκέναι (X. § 25)—4. Phrases akin to Comedy: ἐπὶ τὰ Νικοστράτου ᾄξαντες (IV. § 10): ἐν τοῖς λιθουργείοις κυλινδεῖται (VI. § 44): ὑποπεπτωκότες τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ, of legacy-hunters (VI. § 29): οὐκ ἐτόλμησε γρῦξαι (VIII § 27).. Lastly, the diction of Isaeos, like that of Lysias, has vividness—ἐνάργεια—aptitude for ‘bringing under the senses what is narrated’Vol. I. p. 172.. It is when we turn from diction to composition, from the choice of words to the way of putting them together, that the marked unlikeness begins.

Composition.

Lysias, as we have seen, had exchanged the rigid monotony of the old periodic writing for a manner better suited to real contests, for a style more flexible and more various, in which the periods are relieved by sentences not periodic, and the proportion borne by one element to the other is determined by the scale of the subject. Lysias was, however, fond of antithesis; and the result is that, while his composition as a whole has variety, the structure of his periods themselves is apt to be too stiff and uniformVol. I. pp 166, 170.. Now Isaeos is exempt from this desire of formal antithesis, and, as a consequence, from this rigidity. His non-periodic passages have much of the old ‘running’ style; the use of τε in linking clause to clause is archaice.g. II. § 11, VI. § 7, VII. § 39, VIII § 18.; and the pursuit of free movement is occasionally carried even to an ungraceful negligenceSee, e.g., VII § 5: τούτοις οὐσίαν ὁ πατὴρ κατέλιπε πολλήν, ὥστε καὶ λειτουργεῖν ἕκαστον ἀξοῦσθαι παρ’ ὑμῖν. ταύτην ἐκεῖνοι τρεῖς ὄντες ἐνείμαντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους. τούτων τῶν δύο τελευτησάντων, κ τ λ. VIII. § 7: καὶ ἐκείνην τε ἔτρεφε παρὰ τῆ γυναικὶ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης παίδων, ἐκείνων τε ἔτι ζώντων. In the following places, the extreme abruptness has the air of an affectation: VI. § 3, Φιλοκτήμων γὰρ ό Κηφισιεὺς φίλος ἦν Χαιρεστράτῳ τουτωΐ δοὺς δὲ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ υἱὸν αὐτὸν ποιησάμενος ἐτελεύτησεν. IX. § 1, ἀδελφός μοι ἦν ὁμομήτριος, ὦ ἄνδρες, Ἀστύφιλος, οὗ ἐστιν ὁ κλῆρος ἀποδημήσας οὖν μετὰ τῶν ξἰς Μιτυλήνην στρατιωτῶν ἐτελεύτησεν: X. § 3, Ἀρίσταρχος γὰρ ἦν, ὦ ἄνδρες, Συπαλλήτιος. οὖτος ἔλαβε Ξεναινέτου Ἀχαρνέως θυγατέρα, κ.τ λ. . Yet, on the whole, the composition of Isaeos is mainly distinguished from that of Lysias by the stamp of art. The composition of Isaeos tends to keep the hearer's mind at strain by a continual sense, not merely of earnestness, but of trained and confident skill; it cannot be quite content to forego the advantage resigned by Demosthenes and the great deliberative speakers —of seeming comparatively artless; at the same time, its own eager strength renders it profoundly incapable of suppressing tones which are militant and aggressive. It is important to see clearly the general distinction between the two orators;—that, while Lysias is secure in a modest art of his own, Isaeos is halting between this indirect art, in which he is too sophisticated and morally not fine enough really to excel, and the direct, masterly art of eloquence to which he has not perfectly attained.

Proems of Lysias and Isaeos compared.

Good illustrations are afforded by those ‘proems,’ or openings, of Lysian and Isaean speeches which Dionysios has comparedThe three pairs of proems which follow are given by Dionysios De Isaeo, cc. 5—11, in this order.—(1) c. 5, Isaeos ‘For Eumathes,’ c. 6, Lysias ‘For Pherenikos’; c. 7, comments. (2) c. 8, Isaeos ‘Defence of a Guardian,’ Lysias ‘Against the sons of Hippokrates’; c. 9, comments. (3) c 10, Isaeos ‘Against the Demesmen,’ Lysias ‘Against Archebiades’; c. 11, comments.Speaking of Lysias and Isaeos, Sir W. Jones says in his Prefatory Discourse (XI.) that it is ‘almost impossible to convey in our language an adequate notion of the nice distinction between the different originals’; but this is too strong; and the ethical contrast in the specimens taken by Dionysios lessens the difficulty.. In the speech of Lysias ‘For PherenikosVol. I. p. 312.,’ an Athenian citizen thus prefaces his defence of his Theban friend:—

‘I think, judges, I must first tell you of my 1. Lysias, ‘For Pherenikos.’ friendship with Pherenikos, lest some of you should wonder why I, who have never been any man's advoeate before, am his now. His father Kephisodotos was my friend, judges; and when we were exiles at Thebes I stayed with him—I, and any other Athenian who would; and many were the good offices, public and private, that we received from him before we came home. Well, when he and his son had the like fortune, and came to Athens banished men, I thought that I owed them the fullest recompense, and made them so thoroughly at home in my house that no one coming in could have told, unless he knew before, whether it belonged to them or to me. Pherenikos knows as well as other people, judges, that there are plenty of better speakers than I, and better experts in affairs of this kind; but still he thinks that my close friendship is the best thing he can trust to. So, when he appeals to me and asks me to give him my honest help, I think it would be a shame to let him be deprived, if I can help it, of what Androkleides gave him.’

Now take the opening of a speech by IsaeosFor a notice of these and the two following fragments of Isaeos, see ch. XXI. ad finem.. The speaker, Xenokles, is asserting the liberty of a freedman named Eumathes whom the heirs of his former master claimed as a slave:—

‘Once, judges, on a former occasion, I proved Isaeos, ‘For Eumathes’ useful to Eumathes the defendant; and, on this, I shall be justified in aiding you, as best I can, to rescue him. Allow me, however, to say a few words to guard against any of you fancying that it is in a petulant spirit, or in any mood of aggression, that I have meddled with his concerns. When I was trierarch in the archonship of Kephisodoros, and tidings came to my kinsfolk that I had been killed in the sea fight,—property of mine being then in the hands of Eumathes,—he sent for my relations and friends, produced the property which I had entrusted to him, and restored the whole amount correctly and honestly. When I returned in safety, I therefore became still more intimate with him; and, when he proposed to establish a bank, I made him a farther advance. When, subsequently, Dionysios claimed him, I vindicated his freedom, knowing that he had been made free in a lawcourt by Epigenes.’

Lysias wrote a defenceThe speech ‘Against the sons of Hippokrates,’ vol. I. p. 313. for a guardian whom his wards had accused of abusing the trust:—

‘It is not enough, judges, for guardians to have Lysias, ‘Against the sons of Hippokrates. all the trouble they have from their office, but, for keeping their friends’ properties together, they are vexatiously accused by the orphans in many cases; and such is my case now. I was appointed trustee, judges, of the estate of Hippokrates, I managed the property till the sons came of age, I handed over to them the money which had been left in my keeping, and now they bring a vexatious and unjust law-suit against me.’

Isaeos, too, wrote a defence for a guardian against his ward:—

‘I could have wished, judges, that the plaintiff's Isaeos, ‘Defence of a Guardian.’ tendencies, where money is concerned, had not been so discreditable as to engage him in designs on the property of others and in law-suits such as the present. With better reason still might I have wished that my own nephew, the master of a patrimony ample enough for the discharge of public services, a patrimony of which you placed him in possession, had looked after his own fortune instead of grasping at mine. Thrift might have given him a better name with all men; and a larger liberality would have made him a better citizen for you. Now, however, as he has squandered, mortgaged, disgracefully and miserably wrecked his own property, and trusting to cabals and clap-trap, has assailed mine, there is nothing for it, I suppose—however much one may deplore such a character in a relation—but to meet his charges or his irrelevant slanders with the most energetic reply that I can address to you.’

Lysias supplied a defenceThe speech ‘Against Archebiades,’ vol. I. p. 314. to a young Athenian who had lately succeeded to his paternal estate, and who was sued by one Archebiades for a debt alleged to have been contracted by the defendant's father:—

‘As soon as Archebiades brought this action 3. Lysias, ‘Against Archebiades.’ against me, judges, I went to him, represented that I was young, unskilled in such affairs, and not at all desirous of entering a law-court. ‘I appeal to you, then,’ I said, ‘not to make capital out of my inexperience, but to take my friends and your own into council and explain to them how the debt arose. If they think your story true, you shall have no more trouble, you shall get your money and go your way. You ought, however, to give the full and complete story,—since the transaction was before my time,—in order that we may learn any facts that we do not know before we discuss your case, and so determine, if possible, whether you are making a dishonest attempt on my property, or are trying to get back your own.’ This was my challenge;—but he would never consent to have a meeting, or to talk over his claims, or refer them to arbitration, until you enacted the law concerning arbitrators.’

Isaeos wrote a speech for a man who claimed from his demesmen a farm which he had pledged to them; the speaker is supposed to be young and untrained (ἰδιώτης); and he begins thus:—

‘I should have wished, judges, if possible, not Isaeos, ‘Against the Demesmen.’ to be injured by any of my fellowcitizens—or, at least, to have found adversaries with whom my controversy would have caused me less disquietude. But now I am in a very painful situation; I am wronged by the men of my own deme, whom I can scarcely allow to rob me, yet with whom it is distressing to quarrel, seeing that our common rites must be celebrated in their society. It is hard, of course, to hold one's own against a multitude; numbers are no small help to plausibility; nevertheless, as I felt confident in my case, though a host of trying circumstances beset me, I resolved that I would not shrink from the endeavour to obtain my rights by your aid. I ask you, then, to be indulgent if, youthful as I am, I have ventured to address a court. It is through the fault of those who wrong me that I am compelled to take a part so alien from my character. But I will attempt to set the case before you from the outset, and in the fewest words.’

Êthos in Isaeos.

These examples will illustrate what it is needful to see clearly—that, in matter of expression, the difference between Lysias and Isaeos is one, not of diction, but of composition. They will always show how far, and in what sense, Isaeos sacrifices êthos to his more trenchant and metallic emphasis: it is the portrayal of the ingenuous youth or the plain man, the ἰδιώτης, that is damaged in point of art. So far from its being true that êthos is wanting in the speeches of Isaeos, there is perhaps only one of them—the third—in which it is not an effective element; and, in the third speech, the reason of its absence is simple—there is no room for it: all is argument. In the moral persuasion of vigorous insistance, of reasoned remonstrance, or of just indignation, Isaeos is at least equal to Lysias. It is in the attraction of a guileless and gracious simplicity that he is inferior. Where Lysias would have said, It is shameful, Isaeos says, It is absurd VI. § 1, δεομένων τούτων καὶ συνεξέπλευσα καὶ συνεδυστύχησα καὶ ἑάλωμεν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους. ἄτοπον δὴ εἰ ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπέμενον, νῦν δὲ οὐ πειρῴμην συνειπεῖν. .

His use of Figures.

Mention must be made once more of the technical distinction between ‘figures of language’ and ‘figures of thought’. A ‘figure of language’ is a combination of words for the artificial expression of an idea—as by antithesis. The object of such a figure is rhetorical ornament; and, if the form of expression is changed, the figure of language is destroyedThis is even the criterion taken by the rhetor Alexander Numenios (flor. circ. 120 A.D. under Hadrian) in his treatise περὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας καὶ τῆς λέξεως σχημάτων, c. 1 (Rhet. Graec. vol. III. p. 10, Spengel).—τὸ μὲν τῆς λέξεως κινηθείσης τῆς συσχούσης τὸ σχῆμα ἀπόλλυται...τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας σχήματος, κἂν τὰ ὀνόματα κινῇ τις, κἂν ἑτέροις ὀνόμασιν ἐξενέγκῃ τις, τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα μένει. He gives this instance:—the sentence, ἀλλ’ ἢ τούτους μεταπεμπτέον ἢ ἄλλην μὴ ἐλάττω στρατιὰν ἐπιπεμπτέον, the ‘figure of language’ (paronomasia) would be destroyed by the mere change of ἐπιπεμπτέον into ἀποσταλτέον.. A ‘figure of thought’ consists in the suggestion of an idea which is itself artificial, having for its object, not ornament, but êthos or pathos— moral persuasion or the excitement of emotionVolkmann, die Rhet. der Griech. u. Rom, pp. 395, 416. For his whole analysis of the figures in both kinds, pp. 396—430.. If the speaker prefaces a statement by asking the question which he is himself about to answer: if he feigns perplexity for the sake of giving the greater effect to his own solution: if, instead of relating what other persons have said, he introduces those persons as speaking with their own mouths: if he imagines his adversaries as raising an objection which he goes on to refute—these and the like devices are ‘figures of thought’. Unlike the figures of language, these figures of thought are independent of any form of words; the form of words may be changed without affecting them. Their general tendency is to give animation. The elder school of Attic oratory was too grave and too stately to admit this animation; Antiphon, who uses the figures of language sparingly, uses the figures of thought hardly everVol. I. p. 29.. That Andokides uses the figures of thought so much, is a strong mark of his comparative modernism and of his detachment from the art of his day ib. p. 99.. Lysias, the founder of a style free from the old rigour, had a reason of his own for still using the figures of thought with moderation,— namely, because they are too suggestive of thrust and parry, and, though they may serve êthos, tend to mar the special êthos at which he chiefly aimed, since they present the speaker too much as a combatant. Isaeos, while still desirous of a persuasive plainness, is also bent on exerting the essential vigour of his art. He has no longer, then, the same motive as Lysias for declining aids to vivacity or even vehemence; and accordingly—while he usually avoids the figures of languageSuch ‘figures of language’ as occur are chiefly—Antithesis, as I § 15, X. § 1,—with parison, V. § 39, —with parison and paromoion, V. § 44; cf. VII. § 44: anaphora (ἀφείλετο δὲ τὴν Δημοκλέους γενομένην γυναῖκα, ἀφείλετο δὲ καὶ τὴν Κηφισοδότου μητέρα) V. § 9, VI. § 43, XI. § 9: asyndeton [unlike Lysias] VI. § 62, VII. § 41, XI. § 41: polysyndeton, VII. § 42.—he uses the figures of thoughte.g. II. 21. ἡδέως δ’ ἄν μοι δοκῶ τούτου πυθέσθαι τοῦ φάσκοντος εὖ φρονεῖν, τίνα ποιήσασθυι ἐχρῆν ἀπὸ τῶν συγγενῶν; πότερα τὸν υἱὸν τὸν τούτου; ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἔδωκεν, κ.τ.λ. (‘hypophora’—suggested objection which the speaker solves); —so V. § 45, VII. § 33, XI. 25.—V. 13, πείθει Μενέξενον, τὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τε καὶ ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα, ἃ ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόμενος ἀναγκάζομαι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου πονηρίαν λέγειν,—τί ποιῆσαι (rhetorical question, ἐρώτησις); so VI. §§ 36, 63.—VI. § 53, πῶς ἄν τις περιφανέστερον ἐξελεγχθείη τὰ ψευδῆ μεμαρτυρηκὼς ἢ εἴ τις αὐτὸν ἔροιτο· Ἀνδρόκλεις, πῶς οἶσθα, κ.τ.λ. (prosopopoiïa): so VIII. § 24 with a freedom which brings him decidedly nearer than any of his predecessors to the practice of their greatest masterCic. Orator xxxix. § 136, Sed sententiarum ornamenta [τὰ τῆς διανοίας σχήματα] maiora sunt; quibus quia Demosthenes frequentissime utitur, sunt qui putent idcirco eius eloquentiam maxime esse laudabilem. Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam conformatione sententiae dicitur, &c., Demosthenes. When Photios says that Isaeos ‘set the example of using figures’, πρῶτος σχηματίζειν ἤρξατο—a statement strange at first sight in reference to one who came after Isokrates—this, it can hardly be doubted, is the meaningPhot. cod. 263. After observing that it is hard to discern the work of Isaeos from that of Lysias, πλὴν κατά γε τοὺς σχηματισμούς, Photios adds—καὶ γὰρ πρῶτος Ἰσαῖος σχηματίζειν ἤρξατο καὶ τρέπειν ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν τὴν διάνοιαν. Spengel (συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν, p. 181) explains the σχηματίζειν by that variety and subtlety in the distribution and arrangement of all the elements (including figures) of the spcech on which Dionysios dwells (de Isae c 3), and which will be noticed presently. But this explanation, though ingenious, is strained. Photios rather means that Isaeos was the first who really used the σχήματα of civil oratory—the σχήματα διανοίας. This is exactly confirmed by the striking remark that Isaeos was the first who turned his mind ἐπὶ τὸ πολιτικόν. Blass (Att. Ber. II. 465) seems to render the words of Photios:—‘He was the first to give his thought an artistic form (σχηματίζειν διάνοιαν) and to dress it in tropes (τρέπειν),:— quoting, for τρέπειν, Phot. cod. 259 (of Antiphon), μὴ κεχρῆσθαι τὸν ῥήτορα τοῖς κατὰ διάνοιαν σχήμασιν, ἀλλὰ κατευθὺ αὐτῳ καὶ ἀπλάστους τὰς νοήσεις ἐκφέρεσθαι, τροπὴν δὲ καὶ ἐνάλλαξιν οὔτε ζητῆσαι τὸν ἄνδρα. κ τ.λ. But surely σχηματίζειν does not govern διάνοιαν,—it is used absolutely; and τρέπειν means simply ‘to turn’.—As Blass notices, πολιτικὸς [add ἀγωνιστικὸς] λόγος is opposed by Aristeides to ἀφελής, ἁπλοῦς: Ars. Rh I. 1. Speng. Rh. Gr. II..

Hiatus.

It remains to notice one minor trait of the Isaean composition which is not without historical interest. Isokrates, as we saw, studiously shuns allowing a vowel at the end of one word to be followed by a vowel at the beginning of the nextSupra p 66.. The fashion thus set seems gradually to have found a modified acceptance in contemporary or later prose. In the earliest speech of Isaeos—the fifth—there is no trace of it: and in seven others (II., III., IV., VI., IX., X., XII.) there is very little. On the other hand, the avoidance of hiatus is marked in VIII. (375 B. C.), XI. (359 B. C.), VII. (353 B. C.), and I., as well as in two of the longer fragmentsThose of the Speech ‘Against the Demesmen’, and of the ‘Defence of a Guardian against his Wards’—1 and 2 of the Fragments noticed in Ch. XXI.; though it is nowhere so systematic as with IsokratesOration I. is, on the whole, as careful as any in the avoidance of hiatus; yet, even there, in § 3 we read—εἴ τι ἡμῖν ἢ τῷ πατρὶ ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ, ἀπεκρίνατο..

Treatment of Subject-matter.

That divergence of Isaeos from Lysias which thus widens at each step from the starting point of a common diction is found complete when we turn from the formal to the real side of his work. It is in the treatment of subject-matter that the distinctive art of Isaeos is fully manifested. Lysias adheres strictly to the simple fourfold partition—proem, narrative, proof, epilogue. Sometimes a narrative, properly so-called, may not be needed; sometimes the narrative may be in itself the proof; but, where the four parts are present, Lysias keeps them distinct and in their proper orderVol. I. pp. 179 f.. Isaeos shows the Variety of Arrangement. most daring and dexterous ingenuity, the most consummate generalship, in every novel adjustment or interfusion of these elements that can help the case in hand; his forces are moved with a rapidity and combined with an original skill which swiftly throws the stress of the assault precisely on the enemy's weakest point and assails it with blow upon blow. Everything varies with the occasion; nothing is managed by rule, yet all is done with art—art of which the artist is not the servant but the masterThe general characteristics of Isaeos, as compared with Lysias, in regard to treatment of subjectmatter, are bricfly noticed by Dionysios De Isae. c. 3: the special characteristics, in regard to (1) narrative, (2) proof, in cc. 14—18..

Proem.

Sometimes there is an ordinary proem, much in the manner of Lysias, explaining the friendship of the speaker for the litigante.g. Or. IV. (Nikostratos) § 1; very brief: Or. VI. (Philoktemon) §§ 1—2: and the fragment For Eumathes. or seeking to prepossess the court against the adversarye.g. Or. I. (Klconymos) §§ 2— 7: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 1—5.. Sometimes there is no proem, properly so called. Thus the third and ninth speeches open at once with the briefest possible statement of the case,—followed, in IX., by a sketch of what the speaker will go on to prove (πρόθεσις, § 1),—in III., by a preliminary argument (προκατασκευή, §§ 1—6). The same sort of preliminary argument forms the opening of Or. v., §§ 1—4; and immediately follows the recitation of laws which introduces Or. XI.See, too, the fragment ‘Against Aristogeiton and Archippos’, ch. XXI. ad fin. This bold abruptness is characteristic of Isaeos. The genuine forensic speeches of Demosthenes show not a single instance in which he ventured to dispense with a proem.

Narrative.

The narrative is sometimes shorte.g. Or. X. (Aristarchos) §§ 4— 6. So it was (Dionys. Isae. 14) in the lost speeches Against Medon and Against Hagnotheos, and in that speech Against the Demesmen of which the proem remains., and followed by a separate argument; more often it is a long and elaborate statement divided into sections, of which the proofs—from witnesses, from documents or from laws—are given, not collectively at the end, but section by sectione.g. Or. III. (Pyrrhos) §§ 1—56: Or. v. (Dikaeogenes) §§ 5—24: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) §§ 5—28. So it was (Dionys. Isae. 14) in the lost specches Against Hermon, and Against Eukleides, and in that speech For Euphiletos of which a large fragment remains.. The sixth speech, On the Estate of Philoktemon, is a good example. Here the adversaries (1) denied that the testator had adopted a son, (2) asserted that he had sons of his body; and there is a corresponding division of the narrative into two distinct parts (§§ 5—7, §§ 18—42), with the proofs subjoined. Will-cases would often, of course, involve such a long and intricate narrative; it would be difficult or impossible for the judges to follow the chapters of an argument detached from the corresponding chapters of facts; but Isaeos, in obeying a necessity, made it a virtue, and carried to a high perfection the combination of luminous recital with perspicuous reasoning. ‘Reading the narratives of Lysias,’ says Dionysios, ‘one would suppose that nothing was said artificially or insidiously, but everything in accordance with the dictates of nature and of truth,—forgetting that the imitation of nature was the chief task of his art. The narratives of Isaeos are apt to give the opposite sensation, and to make one fancy that nothing is spontaneous or unpremeditated, even when things are related as, in fact, they happened. All seems the result of artifice; all seems contrived to deceive, or to secure some sort of underhand advantage. Lysias will be believed even when he lies; Isaeos will not be heard without suspicion even when he tells the truth Dionys. Isae. 4..’ Dionysios greatly over colours the contrast,—as he sometimes does through that solicitude for ‘the meanest capacity’ which belongs to his eager and genial interpretation; but the main point is clear—the consummate and victorious art which he finds in the narrative of Isaeos. Now here we may almost certainly recognise a practical lesson which Isaeos owed to Isokrates—whose teaching in the matter of expression had influenced him so little. The Aeginetikos is perhaps the earliest example of narrative interwoven with proof in the manner which Isaeos perfectedCf. Dionys. De Isocr. c. 4: vol. I. p. 180. In the Aeginet. (vol. VI. p. 218) we have—(1) narrative, §§ 5—9: proof, §§ 10—15: (2) narrative, §§ 16—33: proof, §§ 34—46..

Proof.

In regard to proof, whether massed or sectional, the characteristic difference between Isaeos and Lysias is fairly represented by the remark of the same critic, that Lysias uses enthymeme, Isaeos uses also epicheireme Dionys. Isae. 16, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς διαλλάττειν ἂν δόξειεν Ἰσαῖος Λυσίου τῷ μὴ κατ’ ἐνθήμημά τι λέγειν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἐπιχείρημα.. By enthymeme, Aristotle meant a Enthymeme and Epicheireme. rhetorical syllogism: that is, a syllogism drawn, not from the premisses ( ἀρχαί) proper to any particular science—such, for instance, as medicine—but from propositions relating to contingent things in the sphere of human actionSee Arist. Rh. I. 1—3. Rhetoric, like Dialectic, deals with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὔλλως ἔχειν. But, while Dialectic deals with all such things, Rhetoric deals only with a certain class of them, viz. τὰ βουλεύεσθαι εἰωθότα, τὰ πραττόμενα, things of which men can influence the course: in short, τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὄντα., which are the common property of all discussion; propositions which he classifies as general (εἰκότα) and particular (σημεῖα); and accordingly defines an enthymeme as ‘a syllogism from probabilities and signsArist. An. Pr. II. 27, συλλογισμὸς ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημεἰων ..’ A misapprehension of Aristotle's meaning had, as early as the first century B.C., led to the conception of the enthymeme as not merely a syllogism of a particular subject-matter, but also as a syllogism of which one premiss is suppressed Quint. v. 10 § 3: this is what Juvenal means, Sat. VI. 449, by curtum enthymema. That the suppression of one premiss was not essential to Aristotle's conception of the Enthymeme, has been shown unanswerably by Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Logic, XX. vol. III. pp. 386 f. He observes: 1. That Aristotle, who regards the syllogism, not in relation to expression, but as an exclusively mental process (An. Post. I. 10 § 7), would not have distinguished a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident: 2. That, having defined the enthymeme as a syllogism of a peculiar matter (An. Pr. II. 27), he cannot have defined it by another difference (the suppression of a premiss) which has no analogy to the former. I would add: 3. That in Arist. Rh. I. 2, where the enthymeme is said to consist ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός, the πολλάκις can be explained on no other view. As to the interpolation ἀτελής in An. Pr. II. 27, see Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy, pp. 153 f.. The term epicheireme was then brought in to denote a rhetorical syllogism which is stated in full—an ‘essay’ to deal thoroughly with the issue at stakeOn the epicheireme, see Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer (1872), pp. 153 f.—Sir W. Jones (Prefatory Discourse, p. x) describes it with substantial correctness as ‘that oratorical syllogism where the premises are respectively proved by argument before the speaker draws his conclusion:’ but it was enough to constitute the epicheireme that the premisses should be stated. See Quint. v. 10 § 5, Propria eius appellatio et maxima in usu est posita certa quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus minimum partibus constat. Cicero rendered it by ratiocinatio, which Quintilian likes better than ratio or aggressio: he himself keeps epichirema.. Dionysios means, then, that Lysias is content with a sketching style of proof, a proof which is not formally complete, whereas Isaeos, aiming at a precise development, goes through every step of his argument. In other phrases of Dionysios himself, Lysias proves ‘briefly’ and ‘generally,’—Isaeos, ‘at length,’ and ‘accurately’ (διεξοδικῶς—ἀκριβῶς Dionys. Isae. 16. The necessary amplitude of epicheirematic, as compared with enthymematic, proof, is well expressed by the phrase of Dionys. Dinarch. c. 6 (of Hypereides as compared with Lysias)—πιστοῦται δ’ οὐ κατ’ ἐνθύμημα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἐπιχείρημα πλατύνων .). The difference between Example: Or. VII. epicheireme and enthymeme is well exemplified in the seventh speech. The question is whether Apollodoros, the testator, had really adopted the speaker. The speaker first proves the adoption by direct testimony, and then says that he will bring, further, some indirect testimony. At this stage, Lysias would probably have been content with an enthymeme to the following effect:—‘Thrasybulos, the nephew of the female claimant, has made no claim, though his right is better than hers.’ Isaeos, however, will be satisfied with nothing less than a systematic and rigorous demonstration. Eupolis had two daughters,—the claimant, and another, who has left a son. Now there is, indeed, a law which gives brother and sister equal claim to the estate of a brother. But, where the kinship is less near, men precede women. Hence, if the adoption is invalid, this daughter of Eupolis has no claim, while her nephew, Thrasybulos, has a right to all. But Thrasybulos has raised no claim. Presumably, therefore, he recognises the adoption as validOr. VII. §§ 18—21.. Isaeos, as Sir William Jones well says, lays close siege to the understandings of the jury. His reasonings, generally based on positive law, are constraining even when they are not persuasive. Often, again, an argument is founded on the feeling or conduct of the testator towards the speaker and the adversary respectivelye.g. Or. I. (Kleonymos) §§ 30— 33: Or. III. (Pyrrhos) § 75: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 8: Or. VIII. (Kiron) § 18: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) §§ 16 f., 31.: on the conduct of the adversary, as being inconsistent with his assumptione.g. Or. I. (Kleonymos) § 22: Or. II. (Menekles) § 39: Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 46: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 21 f.: on the services rendered by the speaker's client to the deceasedTo the deceased: e.g. Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 18, 36: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 37: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) § 27. or to the StateTo the State: e.g. Or. VI. (Philoktemon) § 60: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 41: Or. VIII. (Kiron) §§ 35, 40 f.: on the demerits of the adversary as regards general charactere.g. Or. II. (Menekles) § 37, Or. IV. (Nikostratos) § 28, Or. VI. (Philoktemon) passim., on his omission to perform public servicese.g. Or. v. (Dikaeogenes) §§ 35 f., 43: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) § 39., or on his anxiety to obtain the estate while he is content that the testator's house should be left desolatee.g. Or. II. (Menekles) §§ 26, 37: Or. VII. (Apollodoros) §§ 31 f., 44.. The example which the Greek critic selects is, for us, the only considerable specimen of the orator's work in a cause not testamentaryOn the fragment For Euphiletos—now ranked as Or. XII.—see ch. XXI.. Euphiletos had been struck off the list of his deme on the ground that he was not a trueborn citizen, and has appealed to a jury:—

Example: For Euphiletos

‘You have now heard, judges, not only our Isaeos, ‘For Euphiletos.’ evidence but the testimony of all the kinsfolk that Euphiletos the plaintiff is our brother. Consider, first, what motive our father could have had for telling an untruth, or for adopting this man if he had not been his son. You will find that all who act thus are constrained either by the want of trueborn sons or by poverty, hoping for benefits from the persons who by their means have become Athenians. Neither condition applies to our father. He has, in us, two legitimate sons, so that childlessness could not have prompted the adoption. Nor, again, did he look to Euphiletos for maintenance or wealth; he has substance enough; further, it has been deposed before you that he maintained the plaintiff from infancy, educated him, enrolled him in his clan —and these are no light expenses. Our father, then, was not likely, judges, to attempt anything so unjust when it could do him no good. Nor, again, will I be suspected of such madness as bearing false witness for the plaintiff in order to have my patrimony divided among a larger number. Hereafter, of course, I could not for a moment dispute the relationship; no one of you would endure the sound of my voice, if I, who now, standing in peril of the law, testify that he is our brother, should be found contradicting that statement. The probability is, judges, that true testimony has been borne, not only by us, but by the other kinsmen too. Reflect, in the first place, that the husbands of our sisters would never have perjured themselves in the cause of the plaintiff: his mother was the stepmother of our sisters, and somehow stepmothers and the daughters of a former marriage are wont to disagree: so that, if the plaintiff had been our stepmother's son by another than our father, our sisters, judges, would never have allowed their husbands to be witnesses. Again:—our maternal uncle, being, of course, no relation of the plaintiff, would not have gratified the plaintiff's mother by making a false deposition fraught with the manifest injury to us involved in our adoption of a stranger as our brother. Further, judges, how could any of you impute perjury to Demaratos, who stands there, or to Hegesippos, or Nikostratos—men whose whole lives will show a stainless record, and who, being our intimate friends and knowing us all, have severally testified their kinship with Euphiletos?

‘I should be glad, then, to learn from the most respected of our adversaries whether he could establish his Athenian citizenship by any other proofs than those which we have brought for Euphiletos. For my part, I do not think he could do more than show that both his parents are Athenians, and adduce the testimony of his relatives to the truth of that assertion. Then again, judges, supposing our adversaries were in peril, they would expect you to believe their friends rather than their accusers; as it is, though we have all that testimony on our side, shall they require you to put faith in their own story rather than in Euphiletos, in me and my brother, in our clansmen, in our entire family? Moreover, the adversaries are acting from private enmity, without personal risk to one of their number; we, who give our evidence, stand, one and all, within the peril of the law.

‘In addition to these testimonies, judges, the mother of Euphiletos, whom the adversaries allow to be an Athenian, was willing to take an oath before the arbitrator at the Delphinion that she and our father are the parents of Euphiletos; and who should know better? Then our father, judges, who ought to be the next best authority, was and is willing to swear that Euphiletos is his son by his wedded Athenian wife. If this is not enough, judges, I was thirteen years old, as I said before, when Euphiletos was born, and I am ready to swear that Euphiletos is the son of my father. Justly then, judges, might you deem our oaths more trustworthy than the adversaries' assertions; we are willing to make oath on a matter of which we have accurate knowledge, while they retail hearsay from the plaintiff's ill-wishers, or inventions of their own. We, moreover, bring our kinsmen as witnesses before you as before the arbitrators,—witnesses who have a claim to be believed; while, since Euphiletos brought his first suit against the corporation and its demarch now deceased, the adversaries have failed to find any evidence that he is not my father's son, though the case was before the arbitrator for two years. To the conductors of the arbitration these facts afforded the strongest presumption of falsehood, and both of them decided against the adversaries.—(Read the evidence of the former award.)—You have heard that the former arbitration went against them. I claim, judges, that just as the adversaries would have urged an award favourable to themselves in evidence of Euphiletos not being the son of Hegesippos, so the opposite result should now be testimony to the truth of our story, since they were adjudged guilty of having erased the name of Euphiletos, an Athenian citizen, after it had been duly registered. That, then, Euphiletos is our brother and your citizen, and that he has been subjected by the conspirators in his deme to injurious and outrageous treatment, sufficient proof, judges, has, I think, been laid before you.’

Iteration in argument.

A striking trait of Isaeos in the province of argument is iteration; and the preference of emphasis to form which this implies is worth notice as suggesting how the practical view of oratory was beginning to prevail over the artistic. Sometimes the repetition is verbal—an indignant question or phrase occurs again and again, where Isokrates would have abstained from using it twiceSee (e.g.) Or. III. (Pyrrhos) §§ 37, 39: and §§ 45, 49, 51.. More often, it is an argument or a statement which the speaker aims at impressing on the hearers by urging it in a series of different forms and connexionsThus in Or. III.—the longest of all, and for this very reason, since there is no narrative proper—the argument that, if Philê had been the true-born daughter of Pyrrhos, her relations would have acted differently, is drawn out in regard (1) to Nikodemos, (2) to Endios, (3) to the uncles of Pyrrhos: §§ 45—80.. Or even a document, cited at the outset, is read a second time, as if to make the jury realise more vividly that a circle of proof has been completedThus the argument, §§ 1—4, in Or. v. begins and ends with the reading of the ἀντωμοσία..

Epilogue.

The epilogue in Isaeos is usually a brief recapitulation, often concluding with an appeal in which the judges are urged to remember their duty to the deade.g. Or. II. (Menekles) § 47: Or. IX. (Astyphilos) § 36., whose house must not be left without some one who can make offerings at the grave: or there is a prayer for indulgencee.g. Or. IX. § 35. on account of inexperience,— though this is sometimes, and more naturally, placed in the introductione.g. Or. X. (Aristarchos) § 1.. The third speech ends no less abruptly than it opens—by the speaker calling on the clerk of the court to read a deposition; the eighth has the like ending, with this further peculiarity, that the testimony called is to a fact stated in the epilogue. A remark which applies to all the work of Isaeos applies especially to the epilogue; Isaeos represents the emotions more generically Dionys. Isae. 16, τὰ πάθη ποιεῖν γενικώτερον. It is easy and tempting to conjecture γεννικώτερον, ‘with more spirit.’ But the true meaning of γενικώτερον is shown by another passage in Dionysios —de Demosth. c. 39, where ἡ γενικὴ ἁρμονία is a manner of composition which does not stoop to petty neatnesses,—μὴ τὸ κομψὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἐπιτηδεύουσα, as he elsewhere puts it (§ 37): and so γενικώτατοι χαρακτῆρες , ib. Ernesti (Lex. Tech.) is mistaken in rendering γενικὴν ἁρμονίαν by ‘characterem orationis naturalem.’ than Lysias,—that is, with less attention to a special or personal propriety.

Isaeos and Lysias compared to schools of painting.

Dionysios sums up the relation of Isaeos to Lysias in one of those illustrations which he loves to draw from painting or sculpture. ‘There are some old pictures, simply wrought as to colouring, with no variety of tints, but accurate in drawing, and thereby delightful; while the later paintings are inferior in drawing, but more elaborate, with variety of light and shade, and derive their effectiveness from the multitude of their hues Dionys. Isae. 4..’ Lysias is compared with such correct and conscientious draughtsmen as Polygnotos and Aglaophon; Isaeos with such subtle chiaroscurists or colourists as Zeuxis and ParrhasiosSee Overbeek, Die Antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der Bildenden Künste bei den Griechen (1868), esp. pp. 67, 110, 204. Cf. Quint. XII. 10 §§ 1—6.—Can it be that, when Dionysios used this illustration, he had in his mind that place of the Poetics (I. 6) where Aristotle speaks of poets related to each other as Zeuxis to Polygnotos—ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἠθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεύξιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος —a comparison which so exactly and curiously suits the relationship between Lysias and Isaeos?. The estimate agrees substantially with the judgment of Hermogenes Hermog. περὶ ἰδεῶν B. C. 11 (Spengel Rh. Gr. II. 411).,— delivered in his own technical dialect:—‘In Isaeos, Hermogenes on Isaeos. besides the other things which constitute Political Oratory in the proper sense ἁπλῶς: as opposed to the sense in which it includes the πανηγυρικὸς λόγος: vol. I. p. 90. (i.e. Forensic and Deliberative speaking), the element of fiery earnestness As to ‘fiery earnestness’ (γοργότης), ‘finish’ (ἐπιμέλεια) and ‘amplification’ (περιβολή), in the language of Hermogenes, see vol. I. p 91 f. is large,—bringing him near, indeed, to the noblest type of civil eloquence. His finish, again, is consummate beyond the measure of Lysias. Complete, too, is his skill in amplifying, and in the other constituents of grandeur ‘Grandeur’ (μέγεθος, for which ἀξίωμα or ὄγκος is sometimes a synonym) denotes, for Hermogenes, one of those seven cardmal excellences of oratory which he finds in Demosthenes, his canon of eloquence: περὶ ἰδ, A. 1. This μέγεθος is, in its turn, composed of six specifie qualities (ἰδέαι): and all of these, says Hermogenes, Isaeos has. They are:—1. σεμνότης, majesty. 2. The power of ‘amplifying (περιβολή) just mentioned;—by which Hermog. means sometimes generalisation, sometimes development of an idea. 3. ‘Vigour,’ — ἀκμή, — a quality which springs, as a rule, from the union of the two next (see περὶ ἰδ. A. 10). ἀκμαῖος λόγος is a robust, sinewy eloquence, which presses the adversary hard. 4. τραχύτης, asperity: 5. λαμπρότης, brilliancy: 6. σφοδρότης, vehemence. [On the distinction between 4 and 6 see περὶ ἰδ. A. 7: τραχύτης is properly said of rebuking superiors—e.g. judges or ekklesiasts. σφοδρύτης, of rebuking (real or assumed) inferiors, e.g. ἀντίδικοι, or those whom the hearers like to hear censured: it is σφοδρότης when Demosth, assails Philip]Of these, 2 and 3 are named in the text: but we must bear in mind that the other four are understood ., especially in a certain striking vigour; so that, in these respects, though he is not a little inferior to Demosthenes, he is far superior to Lysias. That power which is shown in method is considerable in Isaeos,—but less than in Lysias.’ The last remark might seem disputable; for, as Dionysios truly says Isae. 14., Isaeos greatly excels Lysias in arrangement (οἰκονομία): by ‘method,’ however, Hermogenes means the faculty of seizing ‘the proper moment καιρὸς ἴδιος: Hermog. περὶ μεθόδου δεινότητος c. 1: above, vol. I. 91.’ for each oratorical artifice; and his estimate, therefore, amounts to this—that Isaeos, compared with Lysias, is superior in power, but inferior in tact. The result, obtained by too rigid and mechanical a process, is incomplete; but it is interesting for its careful and respectful estimate of an orator whom (with the great exception of Dionysios) the criticism of the Roman age neglected‘After all, one cannot help wondering, that, although Dionysius lived in the very age of Cicero, and was copied almost too closely by Quintilian, yet the name of Isaeus is not so much as mentioned in the rhetorical pieces of the two Romans’ (Sir W. Jones, Pref. Discourse, p. vi).Cicero, it is true, never mentions Isaeos. Quintilian, however, does once mention him—and then in not very select company. Speaking of the ‘Attici,’ he says (XII. 10 § 22), ‘Transeo plurimos, Lycurgum, Aristogitona, et his priores Isaeum, Antiphontem: quos, ut homines, inter sc similes, differentes dixeris specie.’ The style of Lykurgos was not highly esteemed by the Augustan or later critics; he is αὐξητικός and σεμνός, says Dionysios, but not ‘elegant or pleasing’ (ἀστεῖος—ἡδύς ), vet. scrip. cens. 3. As to Aristogiton, the adversary of Demosthenes (see [Dem.] Orr. XXV. XXVI. and Deinarchos Or. II.), he was of small repute every way. Maximus Planudes speaks of that sycophantic oratory, ἡ συκοφαντική, ἧς ἡγήσαντο Ἀριστογείτων καὶ Ἡγήμων (Proleg. in Walz Rh. Gr. v. 214): and he is mentioned, with Phrynon and Philokrates, among the ἄδοξα πρόσωπα by the scholiast on Hermog., ib. IV. 90. The truth is that Quint. made no careful study of the Greek orators, except Isokrates, Demosthenes, and (in a measure) Lysias: but this treatment of Isaeos is especially remarkable.; and it is not, so far as it goes, incorrect.

Isaeos and Lysias— Summary.

In diction, Isaeos has, then, like Lysias, purity, conciseness, clearness, simplicity and vividness; in composition, while still aiming at ‘plainness,’ he uses, on the whole, a more open and more vigorous art, and has, if not less ethical power, less of ethical charm; he abstains, like Lysias, from the more elaborate figures of language, but uses far more largely the figures of thought: in regard to subject-matter, his arrangement is not, like that of Lysias, uniform, but varies with each case, and is especially marked by the frequent interfusion of proof with narrative, and by the completeness with which the proof is worked out.

Isaeos and Demosthenes.

Now let us ask what is the meaning of that statement—so brief, so general, yet so strikingly emphatic—in which Dionysios embodies his reason for regarding the work of Isaeos, not as a mere result of Lysias, but as possessing a substantive and permanent interest. In what sense is it true that the oratorical power of Demosthenes took its ‘seeds and beginnings’ from Isaeos? The first point to observe is that, besides such special limitations of this statement as Dionysios himself elsewhere furnishes, there is a general qualification which from the outset we must supply for ourselves. Like other ancient critics Criticism of Dionysios— subject to a reserve. less excellent in detail than he, Dionysios tends to test the criticism of oratory too much on literary grounds. To one who reads Lysias, Isaeos and Demosthenes successively, it must be manifest that, in certain important respects of literary development, Isaeos stands between the other two. This was the sense to which Dionysios—reading the orators, three centuries after they spoke, as literature—has given expression in a phrase of which the emphasis is exaggerated by the vagueness; but of which it need not, perhaps, be very difficult to define the proper bearing.

Careers of Isaeos and Demosthenes.

Isaeos was, through life, a professional writer of speeches for the lawcourts, and this, so far as appears, almost exclusively in private causes. Demosthenes, after the lawsuit with his guardians, sought to repair the fortunes which they had brought low by working in the calling which such men as Antiphon, Lysias and Isaeos had followed before him. A host of private speeches, not his, are given to him in the collection of Kallimachos. But, to take those only of which the genuineness is tolerably certain, we have proof that he wrote for private causes from 361 to Demosthenes engaged in Private Causes: 345 B.C. After the two speeches Against Aphobos in 363 and the two Against Onetor in 362, we have, probably in 361, the speech Against Spudias (XLI.) and the speech Against Kallikles (LV.); in 356 (probably) the speech Against Konon (LIV.); in 352, the speech For Phormio (XXXVI.); in 350, the speech Against Boeotos concerning the Name (XXXIX.); in 345, the speech Against Pantaenetos (XXXVII.), and probably the speech Against Nausimachos (XXXVIII.)On the Private Speeches of Demosthenes, cf. Schäfer I. 311—315, and the Appendices to vol. III. Blass would seem to leave the question of genuineness open as to the πρὸς Σπουδίαν and the πρὸς Καλλικλέα: Att. Ber. II. 465. In the παραγραφὴ πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν, Demon, the speaker, quotes his cousin Demosthenes as thus excusing himself for not appearing as advocate: — ἐμοὶ συμβέβηκεν, ἀφ’ οὗ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν λέγειν ἠρξάμην, μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν πρᾶγμα ἴδιον προσεληλυθέναι. Mr G. A. Simcox, in the able Life of Demosthenes prefixed to ‘Demosthenes and Aeschines On the Crown,’ takes this to be a clue given us by Demosthenes himself. In that case, it would follow that Demosthenes had written for no private cause after 354. But Schäfer has shown, I think (Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. App. VII. pp. 296 f.), that the πρὸς Ζηνόθεμιν is certainly not by Demosthenes: and that it must be later than 336 B.C. Whether the author was Demon himself—as Schäfer thinks —or not, the statement about Demosthenes loses much of its authority.. But, meanwhile, he had another occupation, a higher, and one which, for him, made a stepping-stone to the highest. During the years 355—350 B.C. he was concerned with four public causes—Against in Public Causes: Androtion, Against Leptines, Against Timokrates, Against Aristokrates,—the object in each case being to obtain the repeal of a new decree or law which had been carried by corrupt influences and which was dangerous to the public interests. Each of these four speeches is at once an interpretation of positive right and a vindication of political morality —a protest against the civic apathy which was suffering the resources of the State to be crippled, its powers to be abused for personal ends, its safeguards against foreign foes to be broken down. The same five years saw Demosthenes enter on that in Politics direct participation in public life for which this concernment with public causes formed a preparation; his speech On the Navy Boards was delivered in 354, the First Philippic in 351. Thus, while continuing to exercise the profession of Isaeos, Demosthenes had already passed through a second phase of activity, and had even made trial of that crowning sphere in which the great work of his life was to be done. Almost from the first, therefore, Demosthenes Resulting difference. exerted his force under more liberal conditions than those prescribed by the narrow scope of the writer for private causes; almost from the first his natural intensity was free to ally itself with the oratorical bent of the age, and, instead of refining on the art which hides itself, to wield the art which triumphs and commands. A comparison of the two orators cannot reach far; but, within its limits, it will serve to warn us against doing wrong to either.

Similarities between Demosthenes and Isaeos

As regards composition, the likeness consists in Likeness of Demosthenes to Isaeos—in Composition: adaptation to real contests by the blending of terse, vigorous, and not too formal periods with passages of more lax and fluent easeSee, e.g., Dem. Or. XXXVI., For Phormio. The ease of Isaeos sometimes tends to be slipshod; that of Demosthenes, never.; in vividness of presentmentCf. Plut. Δημοσθένους καὶ Κικέρ. σύγκρισις, c. 1: Δημοσθένης ...ὑπερβαλλόμενος ἐναργείᾳ μὲν καὶ δεινότητι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγώνων καὶ τῶν δικῶν συνεξεταζομένους.; and in that dramatic vivacity which is given by rhetorical question, by irony, and, in general, by the ‘figures of thoughtSee above, p. 285..’ As regards treatment of in Treatment of Subject-matter: subject-matter, Demosthenes has borrowed the versatile arrangement of Isaeos; he shifts or interweaves the divisions according to the case; though his more temperate art nowhere copies his master in discarding the proem. That, however, in which the discipleship of Demosthenes to Isaeos is most surely and most strikingly seen is in his development and elaboration especially of Proof. of systematic proof — depending sometimes on a chain of arguments, sometimes on a single proposition illustrated and confirmed from several points of view, but always enforced by keen logic and apt lawTheon celebrates the legal learning of Demosthenes, referring to him as an exemplar of argument for the abrogation (ἀνασκευή) of laws—e.g. in the Speeches Against Timokrates, Aristokrates and Leptines (προγυμν. II. p. 166, Sp. Rh. Gr. II. 69): again in I. 150 (ib. p. 61) he adds to these the De Corona and Androtion as proofs that οἱ κάλλιστοι τῶν Δημοσθενικῶν λόγων εἰσιν, ἐν οἷς περὶ νόμου ἢ ψηφίσματος ἀμφισβητεῖται .. Closely connected with this is the most distinctive single trait which the younger man took from the elder, and which is the more noticeable because it is perhaps the chief Isaean lesson which Demosthenes was able to carry from the Forensic field into the Deliberative: what in Greek would be called τὸ ἐναγώνιον, and in English might be paraphrased as ‘the art of grappling.’

The art of grappling.

It was the secret of waging an oratorical contest, not, in the more stately manner of an elder school, as from contrary stages, but at close quarters, with the grip as of wrestlers, with the instance of pleaders who urge their case, point by point, on critics as exact as themselves, with the intensity of a prosecutor or prisoner, a plaintiff or defendant, who knows that the imminent award will be given by men whom the habit of listening to acute discussion has led to set their standard high, for whom the detection of sophistry has become a pastime and its punishment a luxury, and whose attention can be fixed only by a demonstration that the speaker is in earnest. Since the time when KleonVol. I. p. 39. described that keen and brilliant fencing in the ekklesia at which the majority of the citizens delighted to assist as at a spectacle, the fitness for such encounter had been becoming more and more important to deliberative oratory: but its peculiar sphere was forensic, and in that sphere Isaeos was its earliest master. As an example of the ‘agonistic’ quality of Isaeos—the new manner of strenuous and cogent assault—take this passage, in which the speaker is pressing home his argumentDionys. Isae. 12. The extract is from that same ‘Defence of a Guardian’ from which he quotes in c. 8: see ch. XXI.:—“What, in the name Example from Isaeos. of heaven, are the guarantees of credibility for statements? Are they not witnesses? And what are the guarantees of credibility for a witness? Are they not tortures? Yes: and on what ground are the adversaries to be disbelieved? Is it not because they shrink from our tests? Assuredly. You see, then, that I am urging this inquiry and bringing it to the touch of proof; the plaintiff is shifting them to a basis of slanders and hearsays—precisely the course that would be taken by a grasping adventurer. If he meant honestly, and was not trying to delude your judgments, obviously this was not the way for him to set to work: he ought to have given us figures and brought witnesses: he ought to have gone through each several item in the account, examining me thus—‘How many payments of wartax do your books show?’—‘So many.’—‘What sum was paid on each occasion?’—‘This.’—‘In accordance with what decrees?’—‘With these.’—‘Who received the money?’—‘Persons who are here to certify it.’— He ought to have examined the decrees, the amounts imposed, the amounts paid, the persons who collected them, and then, if all was satisfactory, he ought to have accepted my statement; or, if it was not, he ought now to have brought witnesses regarding any false item in the outlay which I charged to my wards' account.” It is the same kind of close and vehement insistance that gives their stamp to such passages as Example from Demosthenes. this in the Third OlynthiacDem. Olynth. III. §§ 34—35.: ‘What—do you mean a paid army?’ I shall be asked. Yes—and the same arrangement forthwith for all, Athenians, that each, getting his dividend from the State, may be what the State requires. Is peace possible? Then you are better at home, removed from the temptation to act dishonourably under the stress of want. Is there such a crisis as the present? Better to accept such allowances as I have described, and to be a soldier, as you ought, in your country's cause. Is any one of you beyond the military age? What he now gets by an anomaly, and without doing any good, let him receive under a regular system in return for supervising and managing necessary affairs. In a word—without taking away anything or adding anything, but simply by abolishing anomalies, I bring the city into order, I establish a uniform system of remuneration for service in the army, for service on juries, for general usefulness in accordance with the age of each citizen and the demands of each occasion.’ It is a peculiarity of Isaeos that he loves to make the epilogue, not an Agonistic Epilogue in Isaeos — Or. VI. appeal to feeling or to character, but the occasion for grappling with the adversary in a strict and final argument; there could scarcely be a better example of τὸ ἐναγώνιον than this ending of the speech On the Estate of Philoktemon: —

‘I ask you, then, judges,—in order that you may not be deceived,—to take note of the affidavit on which you have to give the verdict. Insist that his defence, like our plaint, shall be relevant to that affidavit. He has stated that Philoktemon did not give or bequeath the estate to Chaerestratos; this has been proved to be a falsehood: he gave and bequeathed it, and those who were present are the witnesses. What more? He says that Philoktemon died childless. Now, in what sense was he ‘childless’ who had left his nephew as his adopted son and heir, an heir to whom the law allows the succession just as to the issue of the body? The provision in the law is express—that if a son is born to a man who has already adopted a son, both sons shall share alike in the inheritance. Let the defendant prove then, as anyone of you would prove, that his clients are legitimate. Legitimacy is not demonstrated by stating the mother's name, but by a proof that the statement is true, supported by the evidence of the kinsfolk, of those who knew the woman to be Euktemon's wife, of the demesmen and of the clansmen, to these points:—whether they have heard, or are aware, that Euktemon ever discharged a public service on account of his wife's property: where, or among what tombs, she is buried; who saw Euktemon performing the rites at her grave; whither her sons still repair with offerings and libations for the dead; and what citizen or what servant of Euktemon has seen it. These things together will give us—not abusive language, but—a logical test. If you keep him to this, if you bid him give his proof in conformity with his affidavit, your verdict will be religious and lawful, and these men will get their rights.’ The First and Epilogues of the Speeches Against Onetor. Second Speeches Against Onetor were written just at the time when the influence of Isaeos on Demosthenes was probably most direct and mature. They have no mark more specially Isaean than this, that both conclude, not, like the two earlier speeches Against Aphobos, with a peroration of the more ordinary type, but with a keen argument swiftly thrust home Πρὸς Ὀνήτορα A (Or. XXX.) §§ 37—39: and B, §§ 10—14.—The comparison in Dionys. Demosth. cc. 17—22 between Isokrates De Pace §§ 41—50 (355 B.C.) and the Third Olynthiac §§ 23—32 (348 B.C.) exhibits in its perfection that which Demosthenes derived from Isaeos,—heightened in effect by the strongest contemporary contrast that could have been found. .

Demosthenes essentially manifold.

Isaeos influenced Demosthenes directly and decisively in the forensic province, and, through this, in the deliberative also. But Demosthenes himself is manifold; it is his very distinction that he is of no one character, the exclusive disciple of no one master ἑνὸς μὲν οὐδενὸς...οὔτε χαρακτῆρος οὔτ’ ἀνδρὸς ζηλωτήν,.. ἐξ ἁπάντων δὲ τὰ κράτιστα ἐκλεξάμενον: Dionys. Demosth. 33.; he excels the elder ‘lofty’ school in clearness, the ‘plain’ school in nerve, in gravity, in penetrating and pungent force, the ‘middle’ school in variety, in symmetry, in felicity, in pathos,—above all, in true propriety and in effectual strength ib. 34.; taught by nature and practice, he saw that the crowds who flow together to festivals or schools demand another style than the audiences in a law-court or in the ekklesia; that, for the former, there is need of glitter and of entrancement; for the latter, of exposition and help; that too much pedantry is as little suited to epideictic speaking, as a style too diffuse or too florid to practical oratory ib. 44. The word which I represent by ‘glitter’ is ἀπάτη,—a term used here like τὸ ἀπατηλόν in c. 45, merely of theatrical effect. In c. 45, again, Forensic Oratory is said to require ἡδονή—χάρις— ἀπάτη, where the last means artful ψυχαγωγία. It is very important to discriminate both these more innocent senses from that in which there is said to have been δόξα γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης about Isaeos; de Isae. 4.—‘Florid’ is τὸ λιγαίνειν—exactly what we mean by an operatic style.. Sometimes, accordingly, he has slowly-moving and spacious periods; sometimes his periods are close and compact; sometimes he stings, sometimes he soothes, the mind of the listener, sometimes he appeals to êthos, sometimes to passion ib. 43; in Deliberative Speeches, he makes most use of the ‘stately harmonies;’ in Forensic, of the ‘smooth;’ yet, here again, in differing measures according as it is a public or a private cause, and with this further discrimination, that simplicity and grace predominate in proem and narrative, dignity and more austere power in proof and epilogue ib. 45.. Even in that single field of private Various colouring of his Private Speeches. causes which Isaeos and Demosthenes share, Demosthenes proves the compass of his resources. The logical fineness of the two speeches Against Onetor, the moral dignity of the defence For Phormio, the vivid delineations of character in the speeches Against Pantaenetos and Konon, could have met in no other man of the age.

Place of Isaeos in Attic Oratory

Relatively to the history of Attic Oratory, it is, for us, the unique interest of Isaeos that he represents the final period of transition. His profession was to write speeches which others were to speak in the law-courts, and this almost wholly in private causes. He takes account, therefore, of the pattern first made clear by Lysias; he tries somewhat to make it seem as if the private person his client, and between ἀφέλεια not an expert, were speaking; he aims at plainness, ἀφέλεια. But, since the time of Lysias, the expert's art itself has been growing more complete, more confident, more irrepressible. By the side of the Lysian ‘plainness’ there has arisen, in its full strength, technical mastery, δεινότης,—no longer haughty, and δεινότης. distrustful, self-secluding, as in the days of Antiphon, but now each day more frankly and fearlessly triumphant. If Isaeos had been an artist of genius, he would have made his choice, even if he had not widened his scope, and probably would have hastened by one generation the maturity of civil eloquence. But, confined almost wholly to private causes, he did not dare altogether to forsake the Lysian simplicity for which he had no real gift, or decisively to assume that open, energetic art towards which his inborn strength drew him. He hesitated: and he remains, therefore, an able compromise—the His meaning, first advocate who was at once morally persuasive and logically powerful, without either entrancing by the grace of his ethical charm or constraining by the imperious brilliancy of his art; one from relatively to Demosthenes, whom Demosthenes learned the best technical lessons that Antiphon or Thucydides could teach, in a form, at once strict and animated, serviceable under conditions which they had not known; a contributor, by these means, to the success of Demosthenes both in the forensic and in other fields, but no more the author of his victories than he is the kindler of his enthusiasm: yet, for the modern world, not the and in himself less, but the more, a man who speaks with his own voice and stands for his own work—the earliest master of forensic controversy.

Isaeos: Works
Forensic speeches in private causes

SIXTY-FOUR speeches bearing the name of Isaeos—of which fifty were allowed as genuine—and an Art of Rhetoric, are mentioned by the writer of the Plutarchic Life[Plut.] Vit. Isaei, καταλέλοιπε δὲ λόγους ἑξήκοντα τέσσαρας, ὧν εἰσι γνήσιοι πεντήκοντα, καὶ ἰδίας τέχνας. This is the only definite mention of the Art of Rhetoric: though Dionysios ad Ammaeum I. 2 speaks generally of ‘Theodektes, Philiskos, Isaeos, Kephisodoros, Hypereides, Lykurgos, Aeschines,’ as being παραγγελμάτων τεχνικῶν συγγραφεῖς as well as speakers. Blass (Att. Ber. II. 458) suggests that it may have been a collection of commonplaces.. At least the accredited fifty appear to have been extant in the middle of the ninth centuryThe words of Photios (cod. 263) are: ἀνεγνώσθησαν Ἰσαίου διάφοροι λόγοι, οὗτοι δέ, ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, εἰς δ/ καὶ ξ/ (64) συναριθμοῦνται. τούτων δὲ οἱ τὸ γνήσιον μαρτυρηθέντες ν/ (50) κατ αλείπονται μόνον. Both the ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν and the συναριθμοῦνται as opposed to καταλείπονται seem clearly to imply that 64 were not then (circ. 850 A.D.) extant. The last sentence may obviously be rendered in two ways:—(1) ‘Of this number, those which, being attested as genuine, are extant are only 50’; —implying that others not so attested were extant. (2) ‘Of this number, only those 50 which have been attested as genuine are extant.’ I prefer the latter version.. ElevenThe Second Oration (‘On the Estate of Menekles’) was first discovered in the Laurentian Library in 1785, and was first edited by Robert Tyrwhitt in that year. In the MSS. known before that date all was wanting from the words ἢ ἐκείνῳ in Or. I. § 22 to ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀφῖκται in Or. II. § 47. These concluding words of Or. II. had, as Tyrwhitt notices (p. 21), been wrongly tacked on to the imperfect first part of Or. I. In the Translation of Isaeos by Sir William Jones (1779) we find this arrangement followed. The last paragraph of Or. I. in his Translation [‘To conclude; since this cause...conformably to the laws’] is a version of ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ.. ψηφίσασθε, the concluding words, in reality, of Or. II.,—which oration was then, of course, unknown to him. In Or. I. all from μὴ ποιήσαντες in § 22 to the end was first found by Mai in the Ambrosian Library at Milan and published by him in 1815., with large part of a twelfthThe large fragment of the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου preserved by Dionysios (de Isae. 17) is printed as Or. XII. by recent editors, as by Baiter and Sauppe in their Oratores Attici, and by Scheibe in his edition of Isaeos (Teubner, 1860)., have come down to us; forty-two more— of which three were suspected by Harpokration—are known from their titles; and we have thus a record of fifty-four imputed, or fifty-one unquestioned, worksFor the titles and probable subjects of the lost speeches see Sauppe's digest of the Fragments of Isaeos, Or. Att. II. pp. 228— 244. It will be seen that Sauppe reckons 44 lost speeches. He supposes a lost speech κατ’ Ἀριστοκλέους, his No. IV., which Blass, rightly, I think, identifies with the κατὰ Στρατοκλέους (XL. in Sauppe). Further, Sauppe reckons the ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου—already printed in his Vol. I. with the Orations—among the Fragments also, as No. XVII. Omitting, then, No. IV. and No. XVII., we get a total of 42. Blass reckons 43 lost speeches (Att. Ber. II. 459 ff.). But I agree with Sauppe in thinking that the πρὸς Ἀνδοκίδην ἀποστασίου (No. 30 in Blass) was the work of Lysias, to whom Harpokration twice assigns it, and that the ascription of it to Isaeos by Pollux was a carelessness or at least a mistake: see Sauppe Or. Att. II. 174.The three lost speeches to which Harpokration adds εὶ γνήσιος are: 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους [s. v. ὑπερήμεροι, if indeed, as seems probable, κατ’ Ἀριστοκλέους there is a false reading for κατὰ Στρατοκλέους: the latter, it must be owned, is mentioned by Harpokr. without suspicion s. v. ὀθνεῖος]: 2. κατὰ Μεγαρέων: 3. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν. .

So far as can now be judged, the orations of Isaeos Speeches of Isaeos wholly forensic were exclusively forensicThe titles of the lost speeches confirm the statement of Dionysios (Isae. 2)—γένους λόγων ἑνὸς ἀσκητὴς ἐγένετο, τοῦ δικανικοῦ. Yet one conceivable exception should be noticed—the speech thrice cited by Harpokration (s. vv. Ἀλκέτας, Ἐπικράτης, πέπλος) under the title περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων. But this too was probably forensic —being concerned with a παραπρεσβείας γραφή, possibly arising out of the negotiations regarding Amphipolis in 358 B.C.: cf. Sauppe II. 238.. It is a striking fact that only three of them appear to have dealt with Public and almost wholly Private. Causes1. Κατὰ Διοκλέους ὔβρεως (VIII. in Sauppe): 2. περὶ τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ῥηθέντων (XXVII.): 3. περὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων (II.). [Possibly the ὰποφάσεις or reports made by the Areiopagos to the ekklesia: see Deinarchos Or. I. §§ 53 ff.] The doubt as to the authenticity of the κατὰ Μεγαρέων has already been noticed.. All the rest were concerned with Private Causes. These may be classified as bearing on (1) Their subjects. cases of claim to an inheritance; (2) cases of claim to the hand of a heiress; (3) cases of claim to property; (4) cases of claim to the ownership of a slave; (5) an action brought against a surety whose principal had made default; (6) a special plea; (7) appeals from one jurisdiction to another(1) κληρικοί: (2) ἐπικληρικοί: (3) διαδικασίας [properly a general term, including will-cases]: (4) ἀποστασίου: (5) ἐγγύης: (6) ᾶντωμοσία [as=παραγραφή]: (7) ἔφεσις..

Principal class — the κληρικοί.

In the ancient collection of an orator's works, the largest or the most distinctive class of his speeches stood first. For Antiphon, this class consisted of the speeches in cases of homicide, the φονικοί; and these alone have been preserved,—the last of them (Or. VI. ‘On the Choreutes’) being apparently defective at the end, where the manuscript broke offVol. I. p. 64.. For Isaeos, this class comprised the speeches in willcases, the κληρικοί: and so, here too, these alone have been saved, with a like defect at the end of the speech (XI.) On the Estate of HagniasThat Or. XI. is imperfect seems certain from § 44 of that speech..

In these extant speeches the connexion with the The κληρικοί classified by legal form. will-case is sometimes direct, sometimes indirect. From the literary point of view, they belong to one class, the Testamentary. From the Attic legal point of view, they require to be further classified thus:— I. Trials of Claim to an Inheritance (διαδικασίαι Such a claim was ἐπιδικασία (Or. XI. § 15, τὴν ἐμὴν ἐπιδικασίαν): the trial of claims, διαδικασία.). 1. On the Estate of Kleonymos. [Or. I.] 2. On the Estate of Nikostratos. [Or. IV.] 3. On the Estate of Apollodoros. [Or. VII.] 4. On the Estate of Kiron. [Or. VIII.] 5. On the Estate of Astyphilos. [Or. IX.] 6. On the Estate of Aristarchos. [Or. X.] II. Actions for False Witness (δίκαι ψευδομαρτυριῶν). 1. On the Estate of Menekles. [Or. II.] 2. On the Estate of Pyrrhos. [Or. III.] 3. On the Estate of Philoktemon. [Or. VI.] III. Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship (ἐγγύης δίκη). On the Estate of Dikaeogenes. [Or. V.] IV. Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανοῦ). On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.] V. Appeal (ἔφεσις) from Arbitration to a Dikastery. For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]

Oldest documents illustrating laws of inheritance

The speeches of Isaeos are the oldest documents Peculiar interest of these speeches. in the world which illustrate with minuteness of detail the workings of a Testamentary LawIt is scarcely necessary to except, with Sir W. Jones (Commentary, p. 165), the Aeginetikos of Isokrates (Or, XIX. 394-3 B.C.)— which throws no light on legal points.. It has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that the idea of a man's legal existence being prolonged in his heir, or in a group of co-heirs, sprang from the attribution to the individual of that perpetuity which is the characteristic of the family Maine's Ancient Law, ch. VI. on ‘The Early History of Testamentary Succession.’. The idea of Origin of testation. continuing the family is that in which the testament begins. Now, in primitive societies, religious rites are the symbols and warrants of the family's continuity. The father of the Indo-European house was its priest as well as its master: the sacrifices which, in life, he offered at the hearth could, after his death, be offered only by the son in whom his personality survivedSee Cox's Hist. of Greece, Vol. I. pp. 14 ff.. These sacrifices were at once the most solemn obligations of his successor and the most sacred pledges of an inviolable succession. What, then, was to happen if there was no heir duly qualified by nearness in blood? To meet The Faculty of Adoption. this case, primitive society invented Adoption, that is, the authorized fiction of kinship. The faculty of adoption was the germ of testamentary power. But there is no proof that any ancient society, except the Roman, got beyond the faculty of adoption to a true power of testation. The Athenian Will Athenian law of succession. was only an inchoate Testament. Permission to execute a will was first given to Athenian citizens by the laws of SolonGrote, c. XI. vol. III. 186.. But it was expressly restricted to those citizens who had no direct male descendants. Those illustrations of Athenian testamentary succession which are supplied by the speeches of Isaeos have one general characteristic of striking interest, and it is in this, more than in the light which they throw on Attic details, that their great and lasting value resides. The Hindoo system of succession shows The Hindoo system. the primitive religious element completely predominant. When the childless Hindoo adopts a child, it is with a view to ‘the funeral cake, the water, and the solemn sacrificeMaine, l.c. p. 192..’ The Roman testamentary The Roman. law of Cicero's time, on the other hand, has broken free of religion; the sacra have passed under the separate jurisdiction of the Pontifical College; the obligation imposed by the Civil Law has become independent of the theological sanctionGaius II. § 57, in speaking of the case where Roman law allowed possession to be taken of a vacant inheritance by the usucaptive title called pro herede, suggests this explanation—quod voluerunt veteres maturius hereditates adiri, ut essent qui sacra facerent: quorum illis temporibus summa observatio fuit; et ut creditores haberent a quo suum consequerentur — showing how far back in the past the old religious feeling was to him.. The Athenian Relation of the Athenian to these, in form: system belongs essentially to the same stage as the Hindoo system. It has not, like the Roman law of Cicero's time, passed that point of development at which testation proper begins. But, in spirit, the in spirit. Athenian system, may be regarded as intermediate between the Hindoo and the Roman. The Athenian exercise of adoptive power retains, indeed, as its nominal first principle, the religious continuity of the family. ‘Succour him who is with the dead,’ cries the speaker to the jurors,—‘do not allow him— I beseech you by the gods and the immortal spirits— to be treated with contumely by these men:’ ‘think,’ he exclaims, ‘for what you will become responsible if you are persuaded by Kleon to give a different verdict:—first of all, you will send the worst enemies of Astyphilos to celebrate the rites at his grave.’ It would be an utter mistake to suppose that these pathetic or stately commonplaces are altogether hollow. The sentiment is real enough. But, at the same time, there is a difference between the Hindoo and the Athenian feeling. The Hindoo adopts a son primarily in order that his departed spirit may enjoy higher spiritual benefits than it could enjoy if the offerings at the grave were made by a relative less near than a sonIsae. Or. II. § 47: IX. § 36. See the Tagore Law Lectures for 1870, by Mr Herbert Cowell, (formerly Tagore Law Professor,) Lect. IX., On the Rite of Adoption, pp. 208 f. The original idea, that the son, by performing funeral rites, delivers the father from torment, has been partly lost sight of; but it is still held that the son can thus admit the father to some particular heaven which no other sacrificer could open to him.. The Athenian of the days of Isaeos adopted a son primarily because he wished to leave his property to a person who would not otherwise get it. For the Hindoo, that religious motive in which adoption originated is still foremost. For the Athenian of the days of Isaeos, the faculty of adoption, though necessarily associated with religion, is chiefly significant in its civil aspect, as a limited form of testamentary power.

Athenian rules of inheritance.

The following are the chief rules which, at Athens, governed succession and bequest:—

I. When a citizen died leaving sons, they shared the inheritance equally, the eldest having priority of choice.

II. Failing sons and sons' issue, daughters and daughters' issue succeededCf. Ar. Av. 1651—1666. .

III. But a daughter was never, in our sense, an heiress. She was, strictly, a person who went with the estate (ἐπίκληρος). The heir, properly speaking, was either (1) her nearest kinsman, who was bound to marry her; or (2) that person to whom her father had devised the property on condition of marrying her.

IV. Failing lineal descendants, the succession passed to collateral kinsfolk on the paternal side, as far down as to children of first-cousinsIt has sometimes been held (as by Sir W. Jones in his Commentary, p. 191) that second cousins were in the succession. Now the law, as quoted with perhaps intentional ambiguity in Or. XI. § 2, said μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων: meaning that A, B's son, is in the succession to C, if B and C were ἀνεψιοί, first-cousins. But the quibbling speaker there makes it mean that A is in the succession, not only to C, but to C's son. Hence the fallacy., with a preference to males. Failing these, it passed to the maternal side, with the like limit and preference. It then returned to the paternal side.

V. A man could not disinherit his son. Nor could he separate his estate from his daughter, though he could select the person whom she was to marry.

VI. A childless man might, either during his life or by testament, adopt any Athenian citizen as his son and heir.

VII. MothersOf the relationship between mother and son it is said expressly (Or. XI. § 17)—ὃ συγγενέστατον μὲν ἦν τῇ φύσει πάντων, ὲν δὲ ταῖς ἀγχιστεἰαις (degrees recognised by the law) ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστιν. certainly, fathersCf. C. R. Kennedy in the Dict. Ant. s. v. Heres, p. 595 a. probably, could not inherit from their children. But an inheritance could ascend collaterally; e.g. an uncle could inherit, or could marry the daughter with whom the estate went.

I. Trials of claim to an inheritance ( διαδικασίαι).
I. 1. On the Estate of Kleonymos. [Or. I.]

Polyarchos Kleonymos deceased one sister Deinias guardian of claimants, deceased elder claimant the speaker younger claimant Pherenikos Poseidippos Diocles

Polyarchos left two children, Kleonymos, and the mother of the claimants. On the death of their father the claimants became the wards of their paternal uncle DeiniasFrom § 9, it is clear that Deinias was not the brother of Kleonymos. In § 4 it is expressly said that Kleonymos was the son of Polyarchos.. They were heirs-at-law of their maternal uncle Kleonymos (§ 4). But Kleonymos, having quarrelled with Deinias, resolved to spite him by disinheriting his wards. He therefore made a will in favour of some remoter kinsmen,—Poseidippos (§ 4), Diokles (§ 14), Pherenikos and his brothers (§ 45)Scheibe seems right in assuming that Diokles and Poscidippos are not brothers of Pherenikos. It is by an oversight that the author of the Greek Argument has included among the defendants Simon, named as a friend of Deinias in § 31,—where αὐτῷ = Φερενίκῳ.. After the death of Deinias, however, Kleonymos relented. He took charge of his nephews; and in his last illness resolved to cancel his will. With this purpose he sent for the magistrate (ὁ ἀστύνομος § 15); but he died before he had seen him.

The claimants contend that the will had been virtually cancelled, and claim as next of kin (κατὰ τὴν ἀγχιστείαν, § 6). The defendants rely on the will (κατὰ διαθήκην ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, § 41). The eldest claimant is the speaker.

Benseler places the speech below 360 B. C., and Date. indeed regards it as one of the latest, because hiatus is avoided with a care, foreign, he thinks, to the earlier manner of IsaeosBens. De hiatu, p. 192.. In the case of Or. VIII., at least, as we shall see, this test hardly holds good. This, however, is a much stronger instance, and the speech may safely be referred to the years 360—353.

‘Kleonymos had intended us to be his heirs: now we are Analysis. in court with not only his legacy but our whole fortune at stake. The friends of the defendants recognise our right to at least a share of the legacy; but the defendants themselves, so far from admitting this, seek to deprive us of our very patrimony, on account of alleged debts to Kleonymos (§§ 1—5). We shrink from appearing against kinsmen; the defendants have no such feeling; they have mustered all their forces as against enemies (§§ 6—8).

[Then comes a narrative of the facts, §§ 9—14, supported by witnesses, §§ 15—16.]

‘It is pretended that Kleonymos sent for the magistrate not to cancel but to confirm his will. If, being then on the best terms with us, his nephews, he wished to clinch the wrong which, in a fit of anger, he had once meant to do us, he was mad, and his will ought to be set aside. But that this was not his purpose,—that he meant, not to revise, but to revoke his will,—was shown by the unwillingness of Poseidippos and Diokles to admit the magistrate (§§ 17—24). Besides, a mere correction or addition might have been made on a new tablet; by sending for the original document Kleonymos showed that he desired some substantial alteration (24—26). Not only on grounds of kinship but also on grounds of friendship Kleonymos was more likely to have left his property to us than to the defendants (§§ 27—38). There is always a presumption for claimants by blood as against claimants by will (§§ 41—43). Again, take the test of reciprocal obligation: if Kleonymos had died leaving daughters unprovided for, we, not the defendants, would have been liable to provide for them (§§ 39, 40). Or, if the defendants and we had alike died without issue, Kleonymos would have been heir, not to them, but to us (§§ 44— 47). Either the testator was of unsound mind, or we are the heirs’ (§§ 48—51).

I. 2. On the Estate of Nikostratos [Or. IV.]

grandfather of Nikostratos Thrasymachos Thrasippos Hagnon These brothers are the defendants, for whom a friend perorates, against one Chariades. Hagnotheos Nikostratos

Nikostratos, an Athenian citizen, had died abroad, after an absence from Athens of eleven years (§ 8), during part of which he seems to have been doing military service (§§ 18—26.) His first cousins, Hagnon and Hagnotheos, claimed his property as next of kin (κατὰ γένος). Their claim is disputed by one Chariades, who says that it is his under an express bequest (κατὰ δόσιν). Chariades had been absent from Athens for seventeen years before the death of Nikostratos (§ 29), and professed to have been intimate with him abroad.

In this speech, a friend (§ 7) of Hagnon and Hagnotheos recapitulates the points of their case. Hagnon (or, as he and his brother were boys, νεανίσκοι § 26, some one for them) had, probably, already spoken. That this speech is the second (ἐπίλογος) for the defence is clear from the fact that no witnesses are called. There is no ground for supposing, with the author of the Argument, that the speaker was Isaeos Ἰσαῖος οὖν ὁ ῥήτωρ, says the author of the Argument—and the οὖν is very characteristic of his airy assumptions—ὡς συγγενὴς ὢν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἅγνωνα, λέγει συνηγορῶν αὐτοῖς. He has taken his συγγενής simply from § 1, where the word ἐπιτήδειοι may, of course, mean ‘relations,’ as it does in § 18, but seems rather to mean merely ‘friends’:—Hagnon and Hagnotheos are my ἐπιτήδειοι, the speaker says, ‘as their father was before them. ’ Schömann (p. 269) remarks that the author's authority may have been Didymos, whose commentaries on Isaeos are mentioned by Harpokr. S.V. γαμηλία—a flattering supposition, I fear.. The date is uncertain.

‘Witnesses cannot be brought, nor false statements easily Analysis. refuted, in regard to transactions abroad. But the case of Hagnon and his brother can be proved from what has occurred at Athens. First,—Chariades calls Nikostratos the son of Smikros. Hagnon and his brother claim the property of Nikostratos, son of Thrasymachos. But for this discrepancy, the judges would have had to ask merely, Did or did not Nikostratos leave a will? Clearly Chariades wanted to perplex an issue, otherwise simple, by raising a question of identity (§§ 1—6).

‘Six other persons besides Chariades have put forward, and withdrawn, claims to the inheritanceThe passage in § 7 still offers an exercise to the ingenuity of critics. No sooner was the large property of the deceased Nikostratos sent home, than everyone shaved his head,—all Athens went into mourning for its relative. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπεκεἰρατο, ἐπειδὴ τὼ δύο ταλάντω ἑξάκις ἤλθετον; The ἑξάκις is the puzzle. I. Reiske would understand εἰς κρίσιν with ἤλθετον: ‘when the two talents came six times into dispute’. but (1) the grief would have been counterfeited before the contest: and (2) the ellipse of εἰς κρίσιν is utterly impossible. II. Schömann suggests, ἐπειδὴ τὼ δύο ταλάντω ἐξέκεισθον—i.e. ‘as soon as the two talents were announced for competition’—ἐκκεῖσθαι referring to notice given by the magistrates that claimants of the estate should come forward. III. Valcknär, ἐξ Ἄκης—which Scheibe, adopting his emendation, properly writes ἐξ Ἀκῆς. The Phoenician town Ἀκή is mentioned by Harpokration. The emendation is one of those which, when confirmed by the evidence of facts, are certain, but which, in the absence of such evidence, are only brilliant.May not ἑξἀκις be simply a marginal gloss by some one who, having counted up the claimants (other than Chariades) enumerated in §§ 8, 9, found that their number was six? The annotator may either, like Reiske, have taken ἤλθετον to mean ‘were contested’ and have meant his note for that word; or he may have mentally supplied his verb.. Chariades himself in the first instance claimed it on the ground of kinship. Then, shifting his ground, he claimed it under a will (§§ — 10). Such claimants, when defeated, ought to be fined, not merely in proportion to their assessed property (κατὰ τὸ τέλος), but in the whole amount of the estate claimed. A claim under a will which sets aside the natural succession requires scrutiny. Witnesses can prove only the fact of a will, not the identity of one will with another. Then the law requires that the testator should have been of sound mind.

‘Universally the presumption is strong in favour of claimants by kinship as against claimants under a will (κατὰ δόσιν, §§ 11—18). In this case Chariades was not on such terms with Nikostratos as make the bequest probable. Chariades was not the messmate (σύσσιτος) of Nikostratos. He was not even in the same company (τάξις) with him. He did not pay him the last offices (§§ 18—20). The property of persons dying abroad has often been claimed by strangers. On grounds both general and particular the probabilities are in favour of the defendants.

‘Certain supporters of Chariades pretend that they are themselves the next of kin to Nikostratos. In that case it is their interest to claim the estate on their own account. If defeated they will be able to try again: whereas, if Chariades once obtains the estate under an alleged will, no claim founded on kinship can afterwards be entertained (§§ 21—26).

‘Lastly:—contrast the antecedents of the parties to the cause. Thrasippos, father of the defendants, was a patriotic citizen, and his sons have always borne a good name. Chariades—who has been absent from Athens for 17 years—has been imprisoned for theft and indicted as a malefactor. Let the judges decide as the evidence and their oaths enjoin’ (§§ 27—31).

I. 3. On the Estate of Apollodoros [Or VII.]

Apollodorus? Eupolis Mneson deceased Thrasyllos I deceased mother of the testator Archedamos Apollodorus II deceased wife of Pronapes wife of Aeschines Apollodorus I testator one daughter deceased mother of the speaker Thrasyllos II speaker, adopted son of Apollodorus I Thrasybulos

Eupolis, Mneson and Thrasyllos were brothers. Mneson died childless. Thrasyllos was killed in the Sicilian expedition, and left his son Apollodoros I. to the guardianship of Eupolis. Eupolis abused the trust. He intercepted, by a pretended will, half of Mneson's property; and also embezzled much of his nephew's patrimony. Apollodoros I. found a friend, however, in his mother's second husband, Archedamos, who supported him in an action against Eupolis. Archedamos died, leaving a daughter who was married and had a son, Thrasyllos II. When Apollodoros lost his only son, he determined to adopt this Thrasyllos as his son and heir.

At the death of Apollodoros, his estate was claimed by his first-cousin, the elder of the two daughters of Eupolis, and wife of one Pronapes. She denied that Thrasyllos II. had been adopted by Apollodoros I. In this speech Thrasyllos defends his right.

The date must be about 353 B. C. For:— Date. 1. Apollodoros I., when about to set forth on a campaign to Corinth, made a will, and directed that his daughter, the speaker's mother, should marry one Lakratides (§ 9). The campaign was probably that of Ol. 96. 4, 393 B.C., or Ol. 97. 1, 392 B.C. At this time, then, the speaker's mother was unmarried. Her marriage—not to Lakratides, but to the speaker's father, Archedamos—may be put four or five years later: in 388 or 387 B.C.—2. The speaker, when adopted by Apollodoros, had already been a thesmothetes (§ 34); i. e. was at least thirty. But he cannot have been much more, for he is still a young man (§ 41).—3. Soon after his adoption, he went on a sacred embassy to the Pythian festival (§ 27). The first Pythiad after the speaker had reached the age of thirty was that of Ol. 106. 3, 354 B.C.—4. From §§ 14, 15 it may be inferred that Apollodoros I. did not live long after the adoption; and the contest for the property must have followed soon after his death. The adoption may, then, be placed early in 354; the trial, in 353The allusion in § 38 to the discharge of the trierarchy by companies instead of individuals (οὐκ ἐκ συμμορίας τὴν ναῦν ποιησάμενος ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν) would alone prove the speech to be later than 358 B C..

The speaker, Thrasyllos, was adopted by Apollodoros Analysis. during the latter's lifetime. This kind of adoption is always less open to suspicion than adoption under a will. The speaker might have barred the claim of Pronapes by an affidavit (διαμαρτυρία): but, confident in his cause, he has preferred a direct trial ( εὐθυδικία, §§ 1—4).

Gratitude to Archedamos had prompted Apollodoros to adopt the speaker; who, at the Thargelia, was duly received into the family and the clan (§§ 5—17). Had there been no such adoption, however, the next heir would have been, not the wife of Pronapes, but her nephew, Thrasybulos. The silence of Thrasybulos is evidence to the adoption (§§ 18—26); which was ratified by the demesmen of Apollodoros. At their meeting to choose the officers of the deme (ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίαις), they placed Thrasyllos on their register (ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον: §§ 27, 28)From §§ 26—28 it appears that ratification by the deme was necessary before enrolment by the γεννῆται and φράτορες could entitle the adopted person even to family rights; see Schäfer Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. ii. 27..

The wife of Pronapes and her sister had already inherited the property of their brother; but had ignored the obligation to constitute one of their children his representative before the law (εἰσποιεῖν υἱὸν αὐτῷ, § 31); and thus his line had become extinct (ἐξηρήμωται ὁ οἶκος, ib.). This would have been warning enough to Apollodoros. He would never have left his property to the wife of Pronapes (§§ 29—32). On the other hand, no one had stronger claims on Apollodoros than the speaker (§§ 33—36).

The public services of Apollodoros and his father, Thrasyllos I., are contrasted with those of PronapesIn § 39 it is said that Pronapes ἀπεγράψατο μὲν τίμημα μικρόν, ὡς ἱππάδα δὲ τελῶν ἄρχειν ἠξίου τὰς ἀρχάς, ‘returned his income as small, but claimed to hold magistracies, as if he paid the tax of a knight’—showing that the names, at least, of the Solonian classes were kept up. Schömann suggests that the offices for which the census of a knight was required may have been such as were concerned with the administration of the public money (p. 373).. The speaker has already served the state as far as his years allowed, and hopes to serve it more (§§ 37—42). Summary: §§ 43—45.

I. 4. On the Estate of Kiron [Or. VIII.]

Kiron's aunt Kiron's mother first wife of Kiron Kiron Kiron's brother wife of Nausimenes and of a second husband who is father of the children the speaker one brother, § 37 second wife of Kiron, sister of Diokles two sons, both deceased claimant against the speaker Kiron's grandfather

Kiron married his first-cousin, by whom he had one daughter. This daughter was married, first, to Nausimenes; secondly, to another husband by whom she had two sons, of whom the eldest is the speaker.

After the death of his first wife, Kiron married the sister of one Diokles, and had by her two sons, both of whom died young.

At the death of Kiron, his estate was claimed by his daughter's eldest son. But the son of Kiron's brother, instigated by DioklesThis Diokles of Phlya is the same against whom Isaeos wrote the lost speeches, κατὰ Διοκλέους ὕβρεως (possibly in the γραφή mentioned at § 41 of our speech), and πρὸς Διοκλέα περὶ χωρίου: fragments VIII. and IX. in Sauppe O.A. II. p. 230 ff. Diokles was ‘surnamed Orestes’ (§ 3, cf. § 44)—a nickname for any violent character, borrowed from the robber mentioned by Aristophanes—not without an Euripidean allusion. See Acharn. 1166, εἶτα κατάξειέ τις αὐτοῦ μεθύων τῆς κεφαλῆς Ὀρέστης μαινόμενος ., set up a counterclaim on two distinct grounds: 1. That Kiron's grandson is illegitimate: 2. That, supposing him legitimate, a brother's son has a better claim than a daughter's son‘According’—says the author of the Greek Argument—‘to the well-known law (κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἐκεῖνον) which prescribes that descendants in the male line shall be preferred to descendants in the female line.’ The writer was evidently thinking of Or. VII. § 20. But (1) the reference there is to ἀνεψιαδοῖ: (2) the question here is between lineal and collateral kinship. The nephew's claim on this second ground was baseless.. This speech is the defendant's answer.

The only indication of the date is that the Date. speaker and his brother were born after the archonship of EukleidesObserve the argument which, in § 43, is founded upon this fact. Diokles, says the speaker, imperils not only our fortune but our citizenship. If our mother was not a citizen, neither are we citizens: ‘for we were born after the archonship of Eukleides.’ This alludes to the law carried in 403 by Aristophon the Azenian,—that the son of a citizen shall be illegitimate, if his mother (as well as father) was not a citizen: ὃς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀστῆς γένηται, νόθον εἶναι (Athen. XIII. 577 B)., Ol. 94. 2, 403 B.C. (§ 43). The speech cannot, then, be put before 383 B.C. On the other hand, the speaker's plea of ‘utter inexperience’ (§ 5) implies youthfulness. Now, if he was a young man, the date cannot be much below 383On account of the avoidance of hiatus, Benseler would put Or. VIII (with I, VII, and XI) below 360 B C.: De hiatu 192. But, as Blass points out (II. 523), the large use of this oration made by Demosthenes in the two Speeches Against Aphobos would of itself forbid us to go below 363. , since otherwise it would have been superfluous for him to tell the judges that he was born after 403. The date is probably about 375 B.C.

The speaker denounces the impudence of this attempt Analysis. to defraud himself and his brother,—an attempt which has been organised by Diokles; but expresses his confidence of being able to defeat it (§§ 1—5).

I. First, he will show that his mother was the legitimate daughter of Kiron (§ 6). He states the facts as to Kiron's second marriage (§§ 7—9); and proves, in support of them, that he had challenged the other side to give up Kiron's slaves for torture, which challenge had been refused (§§ 9—14). He and his brother were always treated by Kiron as his nearest kinsmen (§§ 15—17). His mother was treated as Kiron's daughter both by her husband and by the women of Kiron's deme: he and his brother were formally enrolled by Kiron in his phratria (§§ 18—20). Lastly, Diokles himself allowed the speaker and his brother to assist at the funeral of Kiron—thus recognising the relationship (§§ 21—29).

II. Secondly, he will show that, as son of Kiron's daughter, he has a better claim than the son of Kiron's brother. Descent (γένος) is a nearer tie than collateral kinship (συγγένεια): descendants (ἔκγονοι) inherit before collateral relations (συγγενεῖς). This is illustrated by the law on the maltreatment of parents (ὁ περὶ κακώσεως νόμος, § 32). According to that law, the obligation to maintain relatives descends lineally. The corresponding right to inherit from relatives must descend lineally too (§§ 30—34).

An account of the property of Kiron and of the intrigues of Diokles (§§ 35—39) is followed by a personal attack on Diokles (§§ 40—42). This attack is resumed in the epilogue; and the speech concludes with the calling of evidence to show that Diokles had been guilty of adultery (§§ 43—46).

I. 5. On the Estate of Astyphilos [Or. IX.]

Thudippos father of Thudippos Euthykrates Kleon defendant Son of Kleon, alleged to be adopted son and heir of Astyphilos Sister of Hierokles married first to Euthykrates, then to Theophrastos Theophrastos sister Astyphilos claimant and speaker

Euthykrates and Thudippos were brothers. Thudippos had a son named Kleon. Euthykrates had a son Astyphilos and a daughter. On the death of Euthykrates, his wife married a second husband named Theophrastos, by whom she had a son.

Astyphilos died on military service at Mytilene. As soon as the news of his death reached Athens, Kleon took formal possession of his estateDirect possession could thus be taken only (1) by children or grandchildren of the testator: (2) by an adoptive son who had been adopted during the lifetime of the testator. A son adopted by will had, like remoter kinsfolk, to put in a claim to the inheritance ( ἐπιδικάζεσθαι) Kleon therefore must have appealed to the will, not to prove the adoption, but merely to prove that the adopted son was also the heir. (ἐνεβάτευσε, § 3) in the name of his own son, who, as he alleged, had been adopted by Astyphilos, and in evidence of whose claim he produced a will.

Presently the son of Theophrastos—who had been serving abroad—returned to Athens, and claimedBy the form of παρακαταβολή (Schöm. p. 404) in the strict sense —literally ‘deposit of security for costs.’ The term ἀμφισβητεῖν was used of any claimant in a willcase: παρακαταβάλλειν was properly said of one who (as here) asserted his right to the whole estate. the estate of his half-brother Astyphilos. In this speech he contends that the will alleged by Kleon is a forgery.

The date—a difficult point—is probably about Date. 369 B.C. Astyphilos (§ 14) ‘first went on a campaign to Corinth—then to Thessaly—then he served through the whole Theban War—in short, wherever he heard of an army being raised, he was off to it with a company (λοχαγῶν)......and this expedition to Mytilene was his last.’ The allusions to ThessalyFrom about 395 to 374 dynastic feuds were rife in Thessaly: see Thirlwall c. 38, v. p. 65. Jason of Pherae kept a large standing army of mercenaries. and MytileneI can, however, conjecture the occasion of this expedition to Mytilene. In 373 Timotheos was named commander of the fleet which was to help Corcyra. Not being able to man his fleet at Athens, he went on a cruise in the Aegean, to get men and money from the allies (Xen. H. VI. ii. 12 Grote x. 199). Now we know that, in 390 at least, Mytilene was the only Lesbian town not favourable to Sparta (Xen. H. IV. viii. 28). A levy of troops and money on Lesbos might easily give the laconising towns of the island a pretext for attacking the one notoriously philathenian town. The expedition in which Astyphilos was killed may have been sent to support Mytilene. Does not the phrase in § 1, οἱ εἰς Μιτυλήνην στρατιῶται, imply a succour? cannot be fixed. The others are to the Corinthian War of 394—387 and the Theban War of 378—371Dobree (Adv. I. 305) puts the speech in 374— 1 B.C.; but does not give his reasons Weissenborn (Ersch and Gruber's Encycl. p. 300) puts it about 369 B.C. Blass (Att. Ber. II. 525) says, ‘some time after 371 at earliest.’Schömann's view is widely different, and as, I think, indefensible. He puts the speech in 390 B C., ‘or not much later,’ and holds that (1) The Theban War means the invasion of Boeotia by Sparta in 395, when Athens helped Thebes, and Lysander was killed at Haliartos: (2) The expedition to Thessaly refers to 394, when Agesilaos marching through Thessaly, routed the Thessalian allies of Thebes, who may have been supported by Athenians: (3) The expedition to Mytilene is the visit of Thrasybulos and his fleet in 390— 389 B.C.I should object:—(1) that the order in § 14,—Corinth, Thessaly, Theban War, which the context shows to be chronological, is thus changed to Theban War, Thessaly, Corinth: (2) that the phrase τὸν Θηβαικὸνπόλεμον ἅπαντα clearly implies more than a single campaign: (3) that in 394 it is very unlikely that Astyphilos or an Athenian force should have met Agesilaos in Thessaly, since the allied forces, including Athenians, were waiting for Agesilaos in Boeotia: (4) that Mytilene—as Blass has observed—was never the immediate object of Thrasybulos: cf. Xen. H. IV. viii. 25. .

Kleon and his son have already been adopted into Analysis. another family; and have thus forfeited their claim as kinsmen to the estate of AstyphilosHad Kleon and his son not been thus adopted into another family, their claim to the estate of Astyphilos would have been better than that of the speaker. Of collateral kinsfolk, the law called to the succession, first, kinsfolk on the father's side down to the ἀνεψιῶν παίδας (or ἀνεψιαδοῦς), i.e. children of the children of a father's brother or a father's sister; secondly, in default of such, kinsfolk on the mother's side—a son of the same mother by another marriage ranking first among these. See Or. VII. § 20, and Schömann, p. 405.. Hence they resorted to the fiction of a will: and Hierokles, uncle of the speaker, pretends that this will was left with him. Astyphilos did not even receive the last rites from the man who pretends to have been his adopted son (§§ 1—6).

If Astyphilos had intended such an adoption, he would have called kinsmen or intimate friends as witnesses. But the witnesses now produced are strangers (§§ 7—13). Again, Astyphilos served in many expeditions before that to Mytilene. Is it likely that he should have delayed making his will—if he was going to make one—till just before the last campaign? (§§ 14, 15.) Astyphilos hated Kleon, because Euthykrates had died of injuries received from Thudippos, Kleon's father (§§ 16—21). Hierokles, ungrateful to the speaker's father Theophrastos, has plotted this fraud with Kleon (§§ 22—26). The speaker and Astyphilos were close friends from boyhood; and Theophrastos treated Astyphilos as a son (§§ 27—30). It is unlikely, then, that Astyphilos should have preferred Kleon's son to the speaker. The relatives of Astyphilos have never recognised the alleged adoption by admitting Kleon's son to the family sacrifices (§§ 31—33). Epilogue: §§ 34—37.

I. 6. On the Estate of Aristarchos [Or. x.]

father Aristomenes Aristarchos I Apollodorus sister Kyronides adopted by Xenaetos 1 Xenaenetos mother Demochares mother daughter who died young Aristarchos II adopted by Aristarchos I Xenaenetos II defendant, adopted by Aristarchos II speaker claimant two sisters

Aristarchos I. had two sons and two daughters. Kyronides, the eldest son, was adopted, during his father's lifetime, into the family of his maternal grandfather Xenaenetos I. At the death of Aristarchos I. the property went, therefore, to the second son, Demochares. Demochares died in youth. One of his sisters had died, without issue, before him. The other sister was thus left heiress to her father's estate; and might have been claimed in marriage by one of her near kinsmen. Her nearest kinsmen were, her uncle Aristomenes, brother of Aristarchos I., and his son Apollodoros. Neither of them claimed her hand. Aristomenes, as her guardian, gave her in marriage, with a small dowry, to a stranger: he then put her brother, now his son-in-law, Kyronides in possession of the estate of Aristarchos I.—to which Kyronides had forfeited all right by adoption into the house of Xenaenetos. Kyronides and the daughter of Aristomenes had two sons,—Aristarchos II. and Xenaenetos II. Aristarchos II. was made adopted son of Aristarchos I. in accordance with an alleged will by which the latter left his property to his grandson. At the death of Aristarchos II. his brother Xenaenetos II. was, under his will, declared his adopted son and heir.

The claim of Xenaenetos II. is now opposed by the grandson of Aristarchos I. He claims the estate on behalf of his mother as daughter of Aristarchos I., —not as sister (by adoption) of Aristarchos II.; though, at the preliminary inquiry (§ 2), legal form had required him to describe her in the latter manner.

Aristarchos ‘has been killed in the war,’ ἐν τῷ Date. πολέμῳ τέθνηκε (§ 22); words which imply both that his death is recent and that the war continues. Now this war is clearly not the Corinthian War (394—387), which, with the peace that closed it, is mentioned as something long past (§ 20). The war in which Aristarchos fell is probably the Theban War of 378—371. The speech may be placed between 377 and 371Schömann refers the specch to 384 at latest. For (1) he takes the war of § 22 to be the Corinthian (2) he takes the πολὺς χρύνος of § 18 to be the interval between the death of Aristarchos— say in 388—and the bringing of the action. Now this interval could not exceed five years, since that was the limit (προθεσμία, praescriptio) set by the law to the time within which an estate could be claimed when its holder was not the first heir, but that heir's successor. Here Xenaenetos II. was the heir of Aristarchos II., who was the heir of Aristarchos I. The estate of Aristarchos I must therefore be claimed from Xenaenetos within five years from the death of Aristarchos II. But it could have been claimed from Aristarchos II. at any time while he lived. The πολὺς χρόνος of § 18 means, however, as I think with Blass, the time during which Aristarchos had wrongfully possessed the estate..

After contrasting his own want of nerve and fluency Analysis. with the practised skill of the adversaries, the speaker explains why the form of his claim is inconsistent with its substance. He has been obliged to describe his mother, not as the daughter of Aristarchos I., but as the sister of Aristarchos II., although he denies the validity of the adoption on which the latter title depends (§§ 1—3).

He relates the facts (§§ 4—7); and then argues that Aristarchos II. could not have been adopted (1) by Aristarchos I., while the latter had a legitimate son, Demochares, living; nor (2) by Demochares, who died before he was competent to adopt; nor (3) by Kyronides, who had passed out of the family; nor (4) by Aristomenes or his son Apollodoros (§§ 8—14).

Xenaenetos II., the defendant, does not, however, rely only on the alleged adoption of Aristarchos II. He says that his father, Kyronides, had already acquired a right to the estate by discharging debts with which it was encumbered. But, the speaker replies, (1) the person liable for these debts was not Kyronides but the speaker's motherA petitio principii—that she was the ἐπίκληρος.: and (2) had the estate really been so encumbered, Aristomenes and Kyronides would not have been in such haste to procure the inheritance for Aristarchos II. (§§ 15—17).

The speaker answers the objection that his claim ought to have been made long ago. His father was deterred from taking proceedings by the fear of losing his wife, whom the next of kin threatened that they would claim at law ( ἐπιδικάζεσθαι), if he claimed the estate. The plaintiff himself has hitherto been prevented by military service, and then by a debt to the TreasuryA citizen who, on any account whatsoever, owed money to the Treasury, suffered total suspension of civic rights until the debt was paid. Cf. Isokr. Antid. § 10, ἀτιμότεροι...τῶν ὀφειλόντων τῷ δημοσίῳ., from bringing an action (§§ 18—21).

The personal worth of Aristarchos II. cannot excuse the fact that the property which he bequeathed was not his own. The holder of disputed lands is bound to produce the mortgager (θέτης), the seller, or the legal decision under which he occupies§ 24. ὥσπερ τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων χωρίων δεῖ τὸν ἔχοντα ἢ θέτην ἢ πρατῆρα παρέχεσθαι ἢ καταδεδικασμένον φαίνεσθαι. Here θέτης= ὁ θείς, the mortgager (the mortgagee being ὁ θέμενος): and καταδεδικασμένος ‘having got a verdict’ against the opposing claim., Just so the adversaries must prove their title to this estate. Kyronides and his family already possess the property of Xenaenetos I. They now seek to deprive the speaker of his patrimony. As a citizen of good character, public and private, he claims the protection of his rights (§§ 22—26).

II. Actions for False Witness (δίκαι ψευδομαρτυριῶν).
II. 1. On the Estate of Menekles [Or. II.]

Eponymos deceased speaker, adopted son of Menekles 1, advocate of Philonides brother first sister wife of Leukolophos second sister Philonides defendant daughter of Philonides Menekles I deceased brother of Menekles I prosecutor, has one son Eleios Menekles II two sons

At the death of Menekles, his estate was claimed by his brotherThe author of the Argument says, ἀδελφῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων. The source of his mistake is plain. Throughout, the prosecutors are spoken of in the plural; and in § 38 we read, ἀμφότεροι οὗτοι. But § 21 shows that Menekles had but one brother. The plural, and the ἀμφότεροι, mean this brother and his son, the nephew of Menekles.. But Menekles had left an adopted son; this son entered a protest that the estate, being his, could not be so claimed (διεμαρτύρησε μὴ ἐπίδικον εἶναι τὸν κλῆρον, § 2); and produced, as witness, his father-in-law (§ 36) Philonides. The brother of Menekles then brought an indictment for perjury (γραφὴ ψευδομαρτυρίας) against Philonides. In this speech, Philonides is defended by his son-in-law, the adopted son of Menekles.

The adoption had come about thus. Eponymos, a friend of Menekles, had four children:—the speaker of this speech; another son; and two daughters. The younger daughter was, for about two years (§ 6), the wife of Menekles; but, their marriage proving childless, they separated, and she took a second husband, Eleios. At some later time Menekles became anxious to adopt a son. His brother— the prosecutor in this case—had only one son. Menekles decided, therefore, to adopt one of the two sons of his friend Eponymos (§§ 3—12).

The date is probably about 354 B. C. (1) The Date. speaker says (§ 6):—‘Having given our sisters in marriage, and being of the full age, we betook ourselves to military service, and went with Iphikrates on an expedition to Thrace.’ This might refer to 389 B. C., when Iphikrates was sent to guard the Hellespont and the regions about itXen. Hellen. IV. viii. § 34.. But the tone implies that Athens was not then waging a great war. The reference is more probably to 383 B.C., when Iphikrates began hostilities against Kotys, who had then just got the chief power in ThraceSee Schäfer, Dem. u. seine Zeit, III. Append. p. 142.. (2) The adoption of the speaker by Menekles must have taken place about six years later (cf. §§ 7—19), in 377. (3) Menekles died 23 years after the adoption, § 15— i.e. in 354: and this cause must have soon followed.

After a narrative of the facts (§§ 1—12), it is shown Analysis (1) by the citation of a law, that a man without male issue can devise his property as he pleases: (2) by witnesses, that Menekles had adopted the speaker in due form, enrolling him among the members of his phratria, his gens, and his deme§ 16, φράτορας—ὀργεῶνας—δημότας. ὀργεῶνες has generally been taken as= γεννῆται. Schömann has an ingenious note, (Isae. pp. 208 f.,) in which he contends that ὀργεῶνες, here, at least, mean an inner circle of γεννῆται, connected, not merely by a civil or conventional tie (such as he thinks that of the γεννῆται to have often been), but by a tie of real blood-relationship. Possibly, however, ὀργεῶνες, the sharers of common ὄργια, may have been the members of a sacred brotherhood, independent of any civil or gentile tie. (§§ 13—16). At the desire of Menekles the speaker took a wife, the daughter of Philonides; and was in all respects treated as the son of his adoptive father (§§ 17—18).

The adversaries suggest that Menekles, when he adopted the speaker, was not in his right mind, and was influenced by his wife, the speaker's sister. It is replied that his sister was the wife of Eleios when the adoption took place; that she had two children of her own, in whose favour her influence would rather have been used; and that the speaker was the natural person for Menekles to adopt (§§ 19—22). The prosecutor's real complaint is that Menekles exercised the right of adoption—a right allowed by Greeks and barbarians alike, and one which the prosecutor would have used in a like case (§§ 23—26).

The prosecutor has no reason to be jealous; the speaker has inherited from his adoptive father little but the name of son. Menekles owed about £268 (§ 29) to the son of a deceased creditor (τῷ ὀρφανῷ, § 27). In order to pay this, he had resolved to sell a certain farm; but his brother, the prosecutor, maliciously laid claim to part of this farm, in order to delay the sale; hoping that thus it would be seized for debt (κατόχιμον γένηται, § 28), and that Menekles would be forced to resign the whole. Menekles, however, at once sold that part of it to which his right was clear; discharged the debt; and then brought an action against his brother for having interdicted the sale of the whole farm (δίκην ἀπορρήσεως, § 29). The matter was referred to arbiters; and these decided that Menekles should resign the piece of land claimed by his brother, who thus gained about £40; while property to the value of about £15 was all that remained for the speaker to inherit (§§ 27—37).

The validity of the act of adoption was acknowledged by the prosecutor and his brother themselves; for, on their reconciliation with Menekles, they exchanged the oaths of amity not with Menekles, but with the speaker as his son (§§ 38—40). The speaker would not have resisted the prosecutor's claim—there being, in fact, no property at stake— did he not deem it base to allow the name of his adoptive father's house to perish (§§ 41—43). Briefly recapitulating the points of his case, he implores the judges not to deprive the dead Menckles of the only kinsman who can do the sacrifice at his grave (§§ 44—47).

II. 2. On the Estate of Pyrrhos. [Or. III.]

Lysimenes Chaeron Pylades mother of Pyrrhos maternal grandfather of Pyrrhos Pyrrhos deceased sister of Pyrrhos Nikodemos defendant mother of Phile Phile illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos, wife of Xenokles Endios adopted son of Pyrrhos, deceased plaintiff the speaker Scheibe, in his stemma (p. xix.), makes Lysimenes, Chaeron and Pylades paternal uncles of Pyrrhos. Blass points out that §§ 71, 30 and 32 show them to have been mateinal uncles (Att. B. II. 502).

Pyrrhos had bequeathed his estate to his adopted son Endios, the elder of his sister's two sons. Endios enjoyed the inheritance for more than twenty years. At his death it reverted, according to law, to his mother, as sister of PyrrhosA mother had no succession to her son's property. It was because no legitimate children, nor brothers, nor brother's children of Pyrrhos were living, that his sister, the mother of Endios, inherited. Cf. [Dem.] in Leoch. § 68. The brother of Endios could not claim the estate, because the adoption of Endios by Pyrrhos cancelled the natural right of succession. ‘We,’ in this speech—when it does not (as in § 2) mean the speaker and Endios—means the speaker and his mother.. But her claim was disputed by Xenokles on behalf of his wife Phile. Phile, as this speech asserts, was the illegitimate daughter of Pyrrhos; but Xenokles made an affidavit (διεμαρτύρησε) of her legitimacy. The brother of Endios, acting as legal representative (κύριος) of his mother, then brought against Xenokles an action for perjury (δίκη ψευδομαρτυριῶν, § 4); and gained it. He now brings a like action against Nikodemos— brother of Phile's mother—who had, in the former cause, been a witness for Xenokles. The date is Date. uncertain; but the speech cannot, at least, be one of the earliest. Diophantos of Sphêttos (§ 22) was a witness for Demosthenes against Aeschines in 343 B.C.Dem. de Falsa Legat. § 198.: and Dorotheos of Eleusis (ib.) seems to have been living in 349 B. C.[Dem.] in Neaer. § 39.

The plaintiff states the facts; argues that the proved Analysis. perjury of Xenokles establishes the perjury of Nikodemos; and cites three documents:—(1) διαμαρτυρία—the affidavit made by Xenokles in the former action: (2) ἀντωμοσία— his own counter-affidavit in that action: (3) μαρτυρία—the evidence then given by Nikodemos (§§ 1—7).

Nikodemos says that his sister was the lawful wife of Pyrrhos. I would ask him these questions:—1. What dowry did he give with his sister to Pyrrhos, the possessor of a property of three talents (τριταλαντος οἶκος)? 2. Did she leave Pyrrhos before his death? 3. At the death of Pyrrhos, did Nikodemos recover her dowry; or, failing to recover it, bring an action for it, or for the maintenance of the widow (δίκην σίτου, § 9), against Endios? 4. The sister of Nikodemos had other lovers. Was she ever lawfully betrothed—ἐγγυητή —to any other of them (§§ 8—10)? Evidence to show that she was an ἑταίρα (§§ 11—15).

Her antecedents do not, indeed, prove that Pyrrhos did not marry her. But the story of the betrothal is improbable. According to Nikodemos, it took place in presence of a single witness, Pyretides; whose deposition, taken out of court (ἐκμαρτυρία, § 18), is adduced. But this deposition is disowned by Pyretides himself; and it is strange that Xenokles should have taken it before two persons only (§§ 16—26). The three maternal uncles of Pyrrhos—Lysimenes, Chaeron, and Pylades—are said to have been present at the betrothal: but this is improbable (§§ 26, 27); and, moreover, they say that the daughter of Pyrrhos was named Kleitarete, not Phile (§§ 30—34)As to the naming-day ( δεκάτη), when, on the tenth day after the child's birth, the father acknowledged it by naming it, cf. [Dem.] Boeot. II. § 28, &c.. It is strange, too, if Nikodemos gave no dowry, since a dowry would have bound Pyrrhos more firmly to his sister (§§ 28, 29); or that, if he gave any, he did not record the amount; since no dowry given without specification of value (ἀτίμητος) can afterwards be recovered§ 35, ἐάν τίς τι ἀτίμητον δῷ: i.e., as Schömann says, comparing Demosth. Euerg. p. 1156, μὴ ἐν προικὶ τετιμημένον, not valued, with a view to restitution (ἀποτίμημα) by the husband on the dissolution of the marriage. (§§ 35—39).

If Phile was legitimate, there were at least three earlier moments at which her legitimacy ought to have been asserted:—1. When, at the death of Pyrrhos, Endios claimed the estate (ἐπεδικάζετο). 2. When Endios gave Phile in marriage to Xenokles. Nikodemos, by an information laid before the archon ( εἰσαγγελία), might then have vindicated the rights of the heiress. 3. When, in the first instance, Pyrrhos adopted Endios with a view to making him his heir§ 42. οὔτε γὰρ διαθέσθαι οὔτε δοῦναι οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν θυγατέρων, ἐάν τις καταλιπὼν γνησίας τελευτᾷ: ‘Since a man can neither make an heir by adoption (διαθέσθαι), nor bequeath any part of his property to any one, irrespectively of (ἄνευ) such legitimate daughters as he may leave behind him.’ Schömann (p. 250), quoting Bunsen, de iure hered. p. 55, observes that διαθέσθαι is properly said of him ‘qui aliquem heredem simul et filium instituit,’ while δοῦναι is of course the general term; though διαθέσθαι and διαθήκη are often used of any testament. (§§ 40—56).

Xenokles and Nikodemos seem to ignore the adoption of Endios by Pyrrhos. Phile ought to have brought an action against Endios within five years of her father's death (§ 58); or, at the death of Endios, have claimed the property as her brother's. On any supposition, the course of procedure has been irregular. A legitimate child does not claim (ἐπιδικάζεται, § 59) a parent's property, but simply enters upon it (βαδίζει εἰς τὰ πατρῷα, § 62). This is what Phile should have done. A rival claimant would have opposed her at his peril (§§ 57—62).

Pyrrhos, if he had had a true-born daughter, would have had no motive for adopting Endios. It can be shown that, at the time of his alleged marriage, he neither gave a wedding-feast to his clansmen (γαμηλίαν εἰσήνεγκε, § 76), nor provided the women of his deme with the means of celebrating the Thesmophoria.—Witnesses: brief recapitulation (§§ 72—80).

If Phile had been legitimate, Endios, as merely the adoptive son of Pyrrhos, must have married her before he could legally take the inheritance (§ 69). And, if Endios and his brother had declined to marry her, the maternal uncles of Pyrrhos at least could not have suffered Phile to marry Xenokles, a stranger in blood: one of them must have married her himself (§§ 63—71).

II. 3. On the Estate of Philoktemon. [Or. VI.]

Mixiades mother of Philoktemon Euktemon deceased Philoktemon Ergamenes Hegemon wife of Chaereas wife of Phanostratos one daughter Chaerestratos adopted son of Philoktemon and client of the speaker one brother Dion Akte two sons clients of Androkles (the defendant) and Antidoros

Euktemon and his wife, the daughter of Mixiades, had three sons,—Philoktemon, Hegemon and Ergamenes; and two daughters, of whom one married Phanostratos, the other Chaereas. Euktemon, when an elderly man, formed an attachment to a freedwoman named Akte, who managed a lodging-house belonging to him in the Kerameikos. At last he left his home, divorced his wife, and lived altogether there. Akte had two sons,—the children, according to the speaker, of one Dion, a freedman. She persuaded Euktemon to enrol the eldest of these boys in his phratria, as his own son. Philoktemon protested; but was at length induced to consent, on the condition that Akte's son was to inherit only one of Euktemon's farms. Soon afterwards Philoktemon was killed in a battle at Chios, leaving a will by which his nephew, the son of Phanostratos, was declared his adopted son and heir. Several years later (§ 27), Euktemon drew up a will, embodying the terms on which Akte's son had been adopted, as agreed on between himself and Philoktemon, and deposited this with a friend Pythodoros.

About two years later (§ 29), Androkles and Antidoros, kinsmen of Euktemon, conspired with Akte. They persuaded Euktemon to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros, and to sell his land and house-property. They even alleged that the sons of Akte had been adopted by Ergamenes and Philoktemon; and, as guardians of the youths, called upon the archon to administer their ward's property: but the relations exposed the fraud to the court, and the plot was defeated. Euktemon died at the age of 96. As he left no legitimate sons, nor grandsons by Ergamenes or Hegemon, Chaerestratos, as adopted son of Philoktemon, claimed Euktemon's estate. Chaerestratos was opposed by Androkles and Antidoros. Androkles had at different times put forward two different and inconsistent claims:— 1. That he should receive in marriage, as nearest kinsman, the widow of Chaereas, with 1/5th of Euktemon's estate: 2. That the two sons supposed to be Akte's were legitimate sons of Euktemon by Kallippe, daughter of Pistoxenos; that the will of Philoktemon, adopting Chaerestratos, was a fiction; and that, therefore, the whole estate both of Euktemon and of Philoktemon should go to these sons of Kallippe. On this second ground, Androkles put in a protest (διαμαρτυρία) against the claim of Chaerestratos. Chaerestratos then indicted Androkles for perjury. The speaker here is supporting the indictment. But his speech contains the whole case. Chaerestratos appears to have been hindered by diffidence, or by a grandson's piety, from saying more than a few prefatory words.

It is now fifty-two years since the Athenian Date. armament sailed for Sicily in the archonship of Arimnestos (§ 14). Arimnestos was archon Ol. 91. 1—from July, 416 B. C., to July, 415. The expedition sailed in May, 415. The date is therefore Ol. 104. 1, 364—3.

The inner chronology requires attention. Allusion in § 27. Philoktemon, when trierarch, was killed in battle ‘near ( περί) Chios’ § 27. Dobree suggests the battle of Arginusae, 406 B. C. Advers. I. 298. Sir William Jones suggests one of the engagements which followed the revolt of Chios in 412 B.C.Xen. Hellen. v. viii. § 30. Now, the elder of Akte's two sons is said (§ 14) to be, in 363, ‘not more than twenty.’ But this was the boy whose admission into Euktemon's phratria had been opposed by Philoktemon (§ 22). ‘Not more than twenty’—οὔπω ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιν ἔτη—sounds suspicious. But, on the other hand, we can hardly suppose that the youth was fortythree or forty-nine. Neither 406 nor 412 B. C., therefore, is admissible. What, then, was this fight ‘near Chios’? In the latter part of 390 B. C. Thrasybulos the Steirian was sent out with forty ships against Teleutias. He went first to the Hellespont: then to Lesbos: then, descending the coast of Asia Minor, ‘he brought over some of the cities, and, plundering money for his soldiers from those which did not come over, he hastened to RhodesSo far as I know, the objection to the views of Dobree and of Sir W. Jones regarding the time and occasion of Philoktemon's death has not before been noticed. I should prefer to my own suggestion any which gave a later year, while keeping a distance above 378 B. C. sufficient for the ὕστερον χρόνῳ of § 37. But I can find no place for hostilities ‘near Chios,’ in which Athenians were likely to have been engaged, between 389 B. C. and the siege of Chios by Chares in 357..’ May it not have been then—early in 389—in some skirmish near Chios, that Philoktemon was killed? Akte's eldest son was therefore, in 363, really about 27. The annals of the speech will stand thus:—

460 B. C.? Birth of Euktemon.

415. The speaker goes with PhanostratosIn § 1 the vulgate has ὅτε γὰρ εἰς Σικελίαν ἐξέπλει τριηραρχῶν Χαιρέστρατος. For Χαιρέστρατος read Φανόστρατος. This, Reiske's emendation approved by Dobree (Adv. I. 298) and Scheibe (p. xxix.), is, I think, certain. Plainly the Sicilian expedition of 415 B. C. is meant; and Chaerestratos, who is still a young man (§ 60), would thus be made, like the speaker, upwards of seventy. Two MSS. give Μενέστρατος—a mere error: cf. Schöm. p. 323. H. Weissenborn proposed to alter Σικξλίαν into Θεσσαλίαν or Μακεδονίαν. The replacement of Φανόστρατος makes this needless. on the Sicilian expedition (§ 1).

389. Death of Philoktemon.

378. ‘Long after’ Philoktemon's death (ὕστερον χρόνῳ) Phanostratos sails as trierarch with Timotheos (§ 27).

376. Two years later (§ 29), Euktemon is persuaded to cancel the will deposited with Pythodoros in 378.

364? Death of Euktemon, aged 96 (§ 18).

363. This trial.

After explaining that he appears as a friend of Analysis. Chaerestratos and his father Phanostratos, the speaker shortly states the case. He calls witnesses to prove that Philoktemon had made a will in favour of Chaerestratos, and cites a law to show that he was entitled to do so (§§ 1—9).

Androkles and Antidoros pretend that the two youths, their clients, are legitimate sons of Euktemon by his second wife, Kallippe. This story is refuted (§§ 10—16). These youths are the sons of a freedwoman named Akte—as she said, by one Dion. The eldest of them was, indeed, enrolled by Euktemon among his phratores; but after opposition§ 22. At first the phratores did not receive him, ἀλλ’ ἀπηνέχθη τὸ κουρεῖον, ‘the victim was taken away:’ i. e. Euktemon was not allowed to offer the sheep which he had brought with him for sacrifice on the κουρεῶτις, or third day of the Apaturia, when new phratores were enrolled., and under conditions (§§ 17—26). The various intrigues by which Akte and her accomplices sought to obtain Euktemon's property are related in detail§ 36. While Euktemon still lived, the archon was asked by the conspirators to let (μισθοῦν) the house-property, as if their clients were orphans. When the archon and the guardian of an orphan let the orphan's estate, the person to whom it was let was required to mortgage as security a piece of ground or other real property. This was called ἀποτίμημα, and on it were set up slabs ( ὅροι), bearing the orphan's name. (§§ 27—42).

Androkles has at different times made two assertions:— 1. That his clients were legitimate sons of Euktemon: 2. That they were adopted sons of Philoktemon and Ergamenes. Now this alleged adoption would exclude them from succession to Euktemon's estate. The law forbids an adopted son to return (ἐπανιέναι) into the family out of which he was adopted; though, if he leave a legitimate son, that son may so return (§ 44). Again:—Androkles has claimed in marriage the widow of Chaereas, with one-fifth of her father Euktemon's estate. But this claim is inconsistent with the heirship of his clients (§§ 43—61). Epilogue (§§ 62—65).

III. Action to compel the discharge of a Suretyship (ἐγγύης δίκη).
III. 1. On the Estate of Dikaeogenes. [Or. v.]

Dikaeogenes I Menexenos I wife of Proxenos wife of Polyaratos wife of Democles wife of Kephisodon wife of Theoopompos Dikaeogenes II testator Dikaeogenes III Harmodios speaker one sister one brother wife of Protarchides Menexenos II one sister Kephisodotos one brother
In § 26, according to the vulgate, Dikaeogenes III. betroths to Protarchides τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ. The context favours the emendation of H. Weissenborn, adopted by Scheibe, τὴν ἀδελφιδῆν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ: but this cannot have been the speaker's sister.—Reiske proposed τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν ὲμαυτοῦ: Schomann, τὴν ἀδελφὴν τὴν τούτου (Kephisodotos) or τὴν τοῦ—, supposing the brother's name lost.—For a complete table of the House of Menexenos I. see Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III, Part 2, p. 212.

Dikaeogenes, son of Menexenos—who, for distinction from his grandfather, of the same name, we call Dikaeogenes II.—had four sisters. These, when he died childless, shared among them two-thirds of his estate. The other third went to his first-cousin, Dikaeogenes III., son of his uncle Proxenos, in accordance with a will produced by Proxenos, in which the deceased declared Dikaeogenes III. to be his adopted son, and heir to one-third of his estate (υἱὸς ποιητὸς ἐπὶ τρίτῳ μέρει τῆς οὐσίας, § 6).

Twelve years later (§ 7), Dikaeogenes III. alleged that this first will was invalid. Under a second will, he said, he was heir, not to a third only, but to the whole of the estate. He gained his cause. The sisters of the testator were deprived of their shares, and the whole was transferred to Dikaeogenes III.

Ten years more elapsed (§ 35). Meanwhile the nephews of the testator had grown up. They now resolved to seek redress for their mothers and themselves. They began by bringing an action against one Lykon, who had been called by Dikaeogenes III. as a witness to the second will. Lykon was convicted of perjury.

The state of things was now this:—Dikaeogenes III. had himself declared the first will—which gave him 1/3rd—to be invalid. The judges of Lykon had declared the second will—which gave him all—to be false. Accordingly, the nephews (with the exception of Menexenos II., who had deserted their cause) now sued Dikaeogenes III. for the whole estate. One Leochares interposed a protest ( διαμαρτυρία) that their claim was inadmissible. They indicted Leochares for perjury. Leochares was certain to be convicted. Dikaeogenes III. therefore made a compromise. He was to keep his original one-third, and leave his adversaries in secure ἀναμφισβήτητα, § 18 (=καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέπαφα, Argum.), ‘freed from all claims;’—whereas, in fact, he sold these two-thirds to other persons. possession of the other two-thirds. Leochares and Mnesiptolemos became his sureties for the performance of this engagement.

Leochares is now sued (by an ἐγγύης δίκη) to Form of the Cause. discharge his liability as surety, since his principal Dikaeogenes III. has made default. The speaker, son of Polyaratos (§ 5), is one of the nephews of the testator, and is supported by his first cousin Kephisodotos (§ 2).

The question of the date—a most difficult and, Date. for the chronology of Isaeos, a most important question—turns mainly on one point. Dikaeogenes II., when commanding the Paralos, was killed in battle ‘at Knidos’ (§§ 6, 42). Does this refer to the sea-fight off Knidos in 412 B. C.; or to the more famous battle in 394 B. C. ? If to the former, then the date of the speech is about 390 B. C. —earlier, by at least 12 years, than any other Isaean work of which we can approximately fix the time. If to the latter, then the date is about 372 B. C. The former view is the more probable. The annals will then stand thus:—

412 B. C., Ol. 92. 1. Dikaeogenes II. killed in the sea-fight off KnidosThuc. VIII. 42; cf. Cox, H. Gr. II. 453: (for we must think of this sea-fight, in which the Athenians lost six ships, rather than of the unsuccessful attack on Knidos noticed in c. 35, which does not seem to have been attended with any loss). The Paralos, it may be observed, is heard of soon afterwards as being with the army at Samos; Thuc. VIII. 74, 411 B C.. First will produced, making Dikaeogenes III. heir to one-third of the estate.

400 B. C. Twelve years (§ 7) after the first will, Dikaeogenes III. alleges a second will, which makes him heir to the whole estate; and gains his cause. Meanwhile Athens had suffered calamity, sedition, and civil strifeNote the language of § 7:— ἐκέκτητο ἐκαστος δωδεκα ἔτη ἃ ἔλαχε· καὶ ἐν τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ οὐσῶν δικῶν οὐδεὶς αὐτω—ν ἠξίωσε τὰ πεπραγμένα εἰπεῖν ἀδίκως πεπρᾶχθαι, πρὶν δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως καὶ στάσεως γενομένης κἀγῶνος οὑτοσὶ πεισθεὶς...ἠμφισβήτει.This does not say that the στάσις was going on at the time when the false claim was made. No doubt a slip of three years would not be impossible for what Schömann calls ‘oratoria magis quam historica fides’; but the apology is not needed here. (ib.: i.e. the defeat at Aegospotami, the tyranny of the Thirty, and the Anarchy).

393 B.C. Lechaeum, the western port of Corinth, is taken (§ 37) by the Lacedaemonians in the second year of the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.).

390 B. C. Ten years (§ 35) after the establishment of the second will, Dikaeogenes III. is sued by the testator's nephews. A great war is still going on, in which—while he has never served—‘Olynthians and islanders are dying (ἀποθνήσκουσι) for this land in battle with the enemy’: § 46Schömann would boldly alter Ὀλύνθιοι to Κορίνθιοι. Sir W. Jones (p. 159) actually proposed Ὀπούντιοι. But the context itself defends Ὀλύνθιοι. The meaning is:—‘You, an Athenian, have not served, while aid has been coming to Athens in this crisis from the uttermost parts of her confederacy.’ The great city of Olynthos, as well as the insular allies, doubtless furnished some troops in the course of a seven years' war which held all Greece in suspense. .

It is true that, in the Olynthian War of 382— 379 B. C., Olynthians were, in a sense, fighting the battle of Athens. It is also true that, in 374 B. C., war had been renewed between Athens and Sparta; and that the mention of ‘islanders’ might be explained by the fact that Corcyra was a centre of the hostilities. But the πόλεμος of § 46 cannot well cover the whole intermittent struggle against Sparta. Clearly it refers to the Corinthian War (394—387 B. C.)I long held that 372 B.C. was the date, and that the difficulties could be overcome, (1) by referring στάσις to the strife of factions at Athens between the partisans of Sparta and the partisans of the Theban patriots in 382 B. C. (see Xen. Hellen. v. iv. 19)—the year in which the Kadmeia was seized, and in which Athens, stripped of nearly all her possessions abroad and nearly destitute of allies, might be said δυστυχῆσαι (cf. Boeckh, Publ. Econ. I. 417): (2) by explaining Ὀλύνθιοι...καὶ νησιῶται ἀποθνήσκουσι of the Olynthian War, 382—379, and of the renewed hostilities in 374 between Athens and Sparta, of which Corcyra was a centre. But στάσις most naturally refers to the Anarchy.The consideration, however, which, for me, has finally turned the scale in favour of 390 is one which, so far as I know, has not been noticed—the tone of §§ 37, 38. Clearly the details set forth there are comparatively recent. They could not have been used thus effectively after 21 years. The great war of § 46 must be identical with the great war of § 37—the Corinthian. [For 391, 390 or 389 are Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. I. 255, cf. III. App. 211: Blass, Att. Ber. II. 508 ff.: Schömann, Isae. 290 ff.: Weissenborn, Ersch and Gruber's Encycl. II. xxiv. 295. For 372 are Benseler, De hiatu, p. 186; and (on second thoughts) Dobree, Adv. I. 297. Krüger— who takes 384—381—would have been for 372 if he had not overlooked the 10 years of § 35.] .

The speaker defines his case by quoting his own affidavit Analysis. (ἀντωμοσία, § 1). He then refers to a register (ἀπογραφή) of the property left by his uncle, to prove that Dikaeogenes III. has not refunded the due amount, and that Leochares has therefore not discharged his suretyship (τὴν ἐξεγγύην ἀπέδωκεν, §§ 1—4).

A narrative of the facts above stated follows—stress being laid on the conduct of Dikaeogenes III. to his own cousins, one of whom he made a sort of servant to his brother Harmodios (§§ 5—18).

Dikaeogenes had covenanted, not only to resign his claim to two-thirds of the estate, but to give the plaintiffs undisputed possession of them. He now pretends that he had agreed only to resign his claim. This would mean nothing, as he had already sold these two-thirds to other persons. He was bound to refund the price to the purchasers, and to explain that he could not warrant (βεβαιοῦν) their ownership. So far from doing this, he had allowed the plaintiffs to incur the cost of an unsuccessful attempt to eject (ἐξάγειν) one of these purchasers (§§ 19—24). To prove that Leochares was surety for Dikaeogenes, it is shown that Leochares had, on that very pretext, induced Protarchides, the husband of one of his nieces, to resign some property (§§ 25—27).

The plaintiffs have made fair allowance for the improvement of the property by Dikaeogenes III.; and arbitrators, half of whom were chosen by him, have recognised the justice of their claim (§§ 28—34). Dikaeogenes deserves no sympathy on the ground of patriotism. His public services have been ill done; and he has paid no war-tax (εἰσφορά). Once, indeed, after Lechaeum was taken, he promised a subscription; but he never paid it, and his name was posted as a defaulter at the statues of the Eponymi (§§ 35—38).

His private and public life is contrasted with that of the speaker's ancestors—whose great-grandfather, Dikaeogenes I., fell fighting for Athens at Eleusis§ 42, ὅτε ἡ ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι μάχη ἐγένετο. This battle at Eleusis has been referred (1) by Palmer, ap. Schöm. p. 342, to Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C., when there were hostilities in the Megarid between the Athenians and the Corinthians: (2) by Reiske to Ol. 83. 4, 445 B.C., when the Lacedaemonians, invading Attica under Pleistonax, advanced to Elcusis; Thuc. I. 114. But on neither occasion is a battle at Eleusis recorded.Read, with Dobrce, ἐν Ἁλιεῦσι. Having made a descent on the coast of Argolis, the Athenians were defeated by the Corinthians and Epidaurians at Halicis, Ol. 80. 4, 457 B.C.. Thuc. I. 104.; as his grandfather Menexenos fell at Spartolos§ 42. φυλαρχῶν (ἀπέθανε) τῆς Ὀλυνθίας ἐν Σπαρτώλῳ, as Scheibe rightly follows Palmer in reading. In Ol. 87. 4, 429 B C; when the Athenians were defeated by the Chalkidians at Spartolos on the Chalkidic peninsula: Thuc. II. 79. The vulgate Ὀλυσίας was actually taken by Sir W. Jones with φυλαρχῶν—‘captain of the Destructive cohort.’ Reiske's Ὀδρυσίας, Ὀδυσσείας (the latter as name of a cohort) were not much better. Thuc. (II. 79) mentions Spartolos as belonging to the Βοττιαῖοι. But now, in 389, it had come under the control of Olynthos: cf. Xen. Hellen. v. 2. 11., and his uncle, Dikaeogenes II., at Knidos. Nor can the defendant take credit for his ancestors Harmodios and Aristogeiton. He renounced them, and the privileges which their descendants enjoy— maintenance at the Prytaneion, places of honour (προεδριῶν), freedom from taxes—in order to be adopted by his cousinScheibe (praef. XXVIII.) says ‘videtur deesse epilogus’: but, as Blass rightly remarks, the rather abrupt ending is Isaean and does not prove that anything has been lost. (§§ 39—47).

IV. Indictment of a Guardian for maltreatment of a Ward (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως ὀρφανοῦ).
IV. On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI]

On the Estate of Hagnias. [Or. XI.]— Theopompos, the speaker and defendant, possesses the estate of Hagnias. Half of this estate is claimed from Theopompos on behalf of his own nephew, the son of Stratokles. The form of the prosecution is an Information for maltreatment (εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως); the son of Stratokles being considered as an orphan whom his uncle, Theopompos, has wrongedThe εἰσαγγελία κακώσεως was a special form of the γραφὴ κακώσεως. Any Athenian citizen might lay before the archon an Information regarding alleged wrong done to parents, women, or orphans; might address the court without limit of time; and. if defeated, suffered no fine. There was no fixed penalty for κάκωσις: but as, in some cases, it might be ἀτιμία, Theopompos speaks of himself here as κινδυνεύων ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος (§ 35). He observes that the adversary, instead of prosecuting him by this form of γραφή, ought properly to have sued him for the estate in a δίκη (§§ 28, 32, 35)..

Buselos Hagnias Eubulides I Stratios I Habron Kleokritos Polemon Phylomache I sister of Stratios II second husband Philagros Phanostratos Charidemos one sister, married with a daughter Hagnias testator Glaukon Glaukos Eubulides II Phylomache II wife of Sositheos Eubulides III Stratios II two sons Stratokles Theopompus speaker and defendant prosecutor four sisters Makartatos

Before it came into the possession of Theopompos, the estate of Hagnias had been the object of other claims. It is from the history of these former claims that the complexity of the case arises.

Failing lineal heirs, Attic law called collateral kinsfolk to the succession in this order:—

(1) brothers, being sons of the same father as the deceased:

(2) such brothers' children, males and females having an equal right:

(3) sisters by the same father:

(4) such sisters' children, males and females having an equal right:

(5) first-cousins (ἀνεψιοί) on the paternal side, males being preferred to females:

(6) children of such first-cousins ( ἀνεψιαδοῖ), with a like preference.

In default of the above, the succession reverted to the maternal side, and the next heirs were

(7) brothers born of the same mother as the deceased: and so on.

Reference to the accompanying table of the Buselidae will show that Philagros married his own paternal first-cousin Phylomache I. Their son, Eubulides II., was thus the paternal first-cousin of Hagnias, being sister's son of the father of Hagnias.

I. Hagnias died, leaving his estate to his sister's daughter. At her death, it was claimed by Glaukon, son of the mother of Hagnias by a second marriage. Glaukon's claim was contested by Eubulides II., and, on the death of Eubulides, by his daughter Phylomache II. The will alleged by Glaukon was declared false, and the estate was adjudged to Phylomache II.

This decision was just. Phylomache, as the daughter of a paternal first-cousin, had a better claim in kinship than any living relative of Hagnias. Glaukon, of course, had no claim until the paternal kinsfolk should be exhausted.

II. Phylomache's possession of the estate was, however, contested (1) by the mother of Hagnias, who, as sister of Stratios II., was second cousin of her own son: (2) jointly by Stratios II. and the brothers Stratokles and Theopompos—all three likewise second cousins of Hagnias. Stratios II. and Stratokles died before the case came on. Theopompos then claimed the whole estate for himself. He succeeded. The estate was taken from Phylomache II. and adjudged to Theopompos—though only by three or four votes[Dem.] adv. Macart. § 10. .

This was manifestly unjust. Phylomache II. was the daughter of the first cousin of Hagnias. Theopompos was son of the first cousin of Hagnias's fatherThe artifices by which Theopompos got this decision in his favour are noticed in the speech Against Makartatos §§ 29 f. Compare § 10 of our speech, where Theopompos calls himself ἀνεψιοῦ παῖς of Hagnias—a quibble meant to mislead inattentive judges, as it implies that the father of Theopompos was first cousin, not of Polemon, but of Hagnias himself.. The claim even of Glaukon was, therefore, better than the claim of Theopompos. On the other hand, the son of Stratokles, as son of the second cousin of Hagnias, had still less than Theopompos any natural claim on the estate. His case rested solely on the alleged covenant between his father and Theopompos.

Theopompos gained this cause. Long afterwards[Dem.] adv. Macart. § 67. , Date. his son Makartatos was sued by Eubulides III., son of Phylomache, for the estate of Hagnias. The pseudodemosthenic speech Against Makartatos cites (§ 31) a deposition ( μαρτυρία) stating that Phylomache obtained the estate from Glaukon in the archonship of Nikophemos—i.e. in Ol. 104. 4, 361 B.C. The Depositions and Laws quoted in the Demosthenic speeches are now usually held to be, in a large measure, interpolationsSee the introduction to the text of Demosthenes by Baiter and Sauppe, Or. Att. I. vi.. But that this particular deposition in the speech Against Makartatos is spurious, or that, if it is so, it is incorrect, is unproved; whereas the authenticity of the law quoted in § 57 of the same speech has recently been confirmedBy an inscription published in the Hermes, II. 28, by U. Köhler: see Blass, Att. Ber. II. 531 note.— Schäfer (Dem. u. s. Z. III. App. 234) rejects the μαρτυρία: Dobree adopts it ( Adv. I. 309, ‘post archontem Nicophemum’).. If we allow about two years between the first and the second trial, the speech On the Estate of Hagnias will belong to 359 B. C.To 360, according to Clinton sub ann., Schömann, p. 452, and Scheibe, p. xliii.: but I agree with Blass that we want a longer interval.In § 48 it is said that people still remember how Makartatos, brother-in-law of Theopompos, fitted out a trireme and sailed to Krete,—thereby causing some alarm at Athens lest the peace with Lacedaemon should be disturbed. Schäfer (l.c.) observes that this points to a time before the revival of the Athenian power at sea in 378 B.C. But the incident may well have been 20 years past. Nothing can be fixed by the embassy of Hagnias in § 8. Harpokration (s. v. Ἁγνίας) adds that Hagnias was seized and put to death by the Lacedaemonians. This, as Blass says (II. 531), may have been in the Theban War, 378 —371 B.C.

Theopompos reads the law for the succession of collateral Analysis. kinsfolk to an estate; and shows that the son of Stratokles is excluded (§§ 1—7).

He then relates the previous history of the estate—the dispossession of Glaukon by Phylomache, and of Phylomache by himself—and comments on the claim made, simultaneously with his own, by the mother of Hagnias (§§ 8—19).

He next refutes three assertions made by the prosecutor:—

1. First—that, in the action against Phylomache, there had been a bargain between Theopompos and his deceased brother Stratokles for the division of the estate. Such a bargain, Theopompos answers, would have been aimless. It would not have given them two chances instead of one; since, being related in the same degree to Hagnias, they were claimants on the same ground, and must win or lose together (§§ 20—23).

2. Secondly—that Theopompos had agreed to give his nephew half the estate (§§ 24—35).

3. Thirdly—that Theopompos is rich and his nephew poor; and that Theopompos, not content with defrauding his nephew, has failed to dower his nieces, the four daughters of Stratokles (§§ 36—39). In reply, Theopompos details the property left by Stratokles (§§ 40—43), and his own (§§ 44—46). He ends by challenging his nephew to halve with him the total of their joint properties (§§ 47—50).— Conclusion wanting.

V. Appeal (ἔφεσις) from Arbitration to a Dikastery.
For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]

For Euphiletos. [Or. XII.]—This speech—or rather fragmentPreserved by Dionysios de Isaeo, c. 17. As the most recent editors of Isaeos—Baiter and Sauppe in their Oratores Attici, and Scheibe in the Teubner series —print this large extract as Oration XII., instead of placing it among the fragments, it seemed best, for convenience of reference, to follow that example.—is the only extant specimen of its author's work which is not concerned with the law of inheritance. It belongs to a case of Appeal (ἔφεσις) from the decision of demesmen to an ordinary heliastic jurySchömann (p. 479) understands the appeal to be made by the demesmen from the decisions of the Arbitrators; but here I should agree rather with the author of the Greek Argument and with Dionys. de Isaeo, c. 14, by the latter of whom this speech is described as ἡ ὑπὲρ Εὐφιλήτου πρὸς τὸν Ἐρχιέων δῆμον ἔφεσις..

Every Attic deme from time to time revised the Revision of deme-registers. register of its members (ληξιαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον)The earliest recorded instance of such a revision belongs to 445 B.C. (Plut. Pericl. c. 37). Schömann (p. 478), on the other hand, would date the practice from a law of Demophilos passed in 419 B.C., therein following Harpokration s.v. διαψήφισις, whose notice, however, refers, not to 419, but to 346 B C.. At such revision, the name of each member was subjected to a separate scrutiny (διαψήφισις). If the voting decided that he was to be struck off the register (ἀποψηφίζεσθαι)—in other words, that he was not a true-born citizen—he had an appeal to a law-court,—at peril, however, of being sold as a slave and having his goods confiscated if the decision on the appeal went against him.

Euphiletos, son of Hegesippos (§ 12) by a second wife, had been struck off the register of the deme of Erchia on the ground that he was illegitimate. He then brought an action against the deme, represented by its demarch or president, and the issue was referred to one of the Public Arbitrators. The case was pending for two years; and during that time nothing was proved against the legitimacy of Euphiletos. A second Arbitration—in which the deme was represented by a new president—had the same resultThat there were two distinct Arbitrations is clear: see § 11, τῆς προτέρας διαίτης—κατεδιῄτησαν ἀμφότεροι. But two questions occur: 1. How could an issue once tried by arbitration be submitted to a second arbitration? Schömann's explanation seems probable—In the former arbitration, Euphiletos was acquitted in the absence, perhaps through illness, of his adversary, who died soon afterwards (§ 11); and the new demarch, on the ground that judgment had gone by default, applied for a second hearing (ἀντίληξις τῆς μὴ οὔσης)—which could be done within ten days after the first decision: Pollux VIII. 60—2. Public arbitrators held office for one year only. How then shall we explain δύο ἔτη τοῦ διαιτητοῦ τὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντος, § 11? To read τῶν διαιτητῶν...ἐχόντων would be a rough remedy. Schömann suggests that, as the cause could not be decided within the year, the arbitrator was specially reappointed for a second year (p. 481).. Redress being still refused, Euphiletos has now appealed to an ordinary court. The speaker is the son of Hegesippos by his first wife, and is therefore half-brother of Euphiletos, who was thirteen years his junior (§ 11). The extant part of the speech opens after the facts have been stated and the witnesses called. Dionysios seems to connect this cause Date. with a general revision of deme-lists throughout Attica De Isae. c. 16: but in ἐγράφη νόμος he may be referring only to the original institution of the rule.. The only such general revision of which we know belongs to the year of Archias, Ol. 108. 3, 346 B.C. On this view, the speech would fall in 343,—ten years later than any other work of Isaeos known to us. Probably, however, the revision meant in the speech was not general, but merely local and ordinary. In that case, we have no clue to the date.

All the kinsmen of Euphiletos have now borne witness Analysis. to his legitimacy,—his father—his brother, the speaker— the husbands of the speaker's sisters—his uncle: friends, too, have testified: and all these are trustworthy (§§ 1—6). How could any member of the deme prove his legitimacy better? (§§ 7—8). Further, the mother of Euphiletos has offered to take an oath; and his father and the speaker are ready to do the same (§§ 9—10). The arbitrators to whom the case was formerly referred gave it for Euphiletos (§ 11). As a different decision would have told against him, so ought their actual decision to be taken as evidence that his name has been removed from the register by a conspiracy§ 12. ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συστάντων. This is well illustrated by the Demosthenic speech (Or. LVII.) in a similar cause—that Against Eubulides (345 B.C.?) who is accused by Euxitheos of having intrigued to remove his name from the register of the deme— Cf. Schäfer, Dem. u. s. Z. III. App. 262 f. (§ 12).

Character of the collection

There is perhaps no Attic writer, certainly no Remarks. orator, of whom it is more true than of Isaeos that his work, to be understood, must be viewed as a whole. The monotony of subject in his extant Character of the Collection as regards matter: speeches is seldom relieved by such picturesque glimpses of Attic life as abound in Lysias. Such monotony might certainly be forgiven to a series of illustrations so valuable for a province of ancient law, showing, as they do, how the practice of Adoption worked in a society now developed beyond the conceptions in which that limited testation begins, though not yet arrived at the ideas embodied in the civil law of Rome. If, however, we turn from and as regards form matter to form, the character of the speeches is not monotony but variety. In the first, the second and the ninth oration, we have reproduced, in no slight measure, the dignified and austere pathos of Antiphon. In the seventh and twelfth, there is much of the êthos, the attractive simplicity and winning grace of Lysias; while in the third, the sixth, the eighth, and the eleventh, on the other hand, this moral charm is hardly less conspicuous by its absence. Excellences of narrative are prominent in the second, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh speech. Argument excludes everything else in the third. The fourth oration surprises us with something like the lighter humour of Lysias, if only in a single gleamOr. IV. § 7, relating how many persons became mourners for the deceased Nikostratos—‘when the two talents arrived.’. The typical Spceches — V., XI., VIII. But, of the twelve, there are three which stand out from all the rest, and which, taken together, symbolize their author's place in the progress of Athenian oratory. The fifth is Lysian, the eleventh is Demosthenic, the eighth is distinctively Isaean. The fifth recalls Lysias by the graceful and persuasive management of the narrative—for here argument has a subordinate part—by the general simplicity of the language, and not less by the skill which, in the epilogue, indulges itself with pointed and lively antithesis. The eleventh, renouncing everything like a semblance of artlessness, glorying, rather, in technical power, pours a torrent of indignation and contempt on an adversary who is in the wrong; and, alone among the speeches of Isaeos, has the stamp of Demosthenes in this, that from beginning to end it is the outcome of a single impulse. But the eighth oration is Isaeos himself; it is the very image of his faculty, displaying its several sides at their best, the old plainness with the modern force, artistic narrative with trenchant proof; and these, too, in the right proportions, for here the logical division dominates the rhetorical, and the department in which Isaeos was an imitator yields to that in which he was a master.

Fragments.

A hundred and seventy-two fragments of Isaeos, or notices of phrases or words used by him, have been collected by Sauppe Or. Att. II. 228—244.. Of these, 128 represent 42 speeches of known title. Three of the 42 were, however, suspected by HarpokrationViz. 1. κατὰ Στρατοκλέους, 2. πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικόν, 3. κατὰ Μεγαρέων:—IV., XV. and XXVIII in Sauppe.. Three others, and only three, are represented by fragments which are at all considerable. In each case it is Dionysios who has preserved the extract in his comparison of Isaeos with LysiasDionysios compares 1. Isaeos Against the Demesmen with Lysias Against Archebiades:—De Isaeo, c. 10: 2. Isaeos, Defence of a Guardian, with Lysias Against the Sons of Hippokrates:—ib. c. 8. 3. Isacos For Eumathes with Lysias For Pherenikos:—ib. c. 5.— See vol. I. pp. 313 f. .

1. Against the Demesmen, concerning the Farm 1 Against the Demesmen. (πρὸς τοὺς δημότας περὶ τοῦ χωρίου: VII. in Sauppe, III. in Scheibe). This is the proem of a speech in which the plaintiff claims back from the men of his deme—perhaps that of SphettosIt is s.v. Σφηττός that Harpokr. names the speech.—a farm which he had just pledged to them—probably as security for some land of the deme which he had rentedAs Schömann suggests (p. 491), referring to Boeckh, Publ. Econ. II. 337.. In form, the action would be either an Action for Ejectment (ἐξούλης δίκη) or a Trial of a claim to property (διαδικασία). The avoidance of hiatus suggests a Date. work later than 360 B.C.

2. Defence of a Guardian against his Wards 2. Defence of a Guardian. (ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογία: X. in Sauppe, VI. in Scheibe). Dionysios has given us two fragments of this lost speechFor the first fragment, see Dionys. Isae. c. 8: for the second, ib. c. 12. Schömann, Sauppe, Scheibe and Blass agree in referring both fragments to the same speech.. Its title is a point which has illustrated Its title. the ingenuity of critics. Sauppe identifies it with the lost speech Against Diophanes Harpokration, s.v. παρηγγύησεν, quotes Isaeos ἐν τῇ πρὸς Διοφάνην ἐπιτροπῆς ἀπολογίᾳ. The fact that the guardian is represented by Dionysios as ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν κρινομένῳ (De Isae. c. 8) is, of course, no objection, as Diophanes might have represented the rest; but the identification seems unsafe.. More probably, however, it is to be identified with that Against Hagnotheos. The latter is mentioned by Dionysios (Isae. c. 14), though not in connection with either of the fragments. Now the first fragment (c. 8) begins with these words:—ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ λίαν οὕτως ἀγνοηθέντα πρὸς χρήματ’ ἔχειν αἰσχρῶς. Schömann, whom Sauppe follows, was for altering ἀγνοηθέντα to ἀπονοηθέντα. Dobree saw that the corrupt word concealed a proper name. He suggested Ἀγλαοσθένη: it was reserved for Cobet to give Ἁγνόθεον Schömann, Isae. 488: Dobree, Adv. I. 311: Cobet, Var. Lect. 271..

Another puzzle remains. Harpokration quotes Its relation with the πρὸς Καλυδῶνα. a speech of Isaeos, ἐξούλης Καλυδῶνι πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον ἀπολογία s. v. ἐπισημαίνεσθαι ., and elsewhere another, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς s. v. Κεφαλῆθεν: cf. s. vv. Ἀνθεμόκριτος, ἀφ’ Ἑστίας μυεῖσθαι, κ τ.λ. —the latter also as πρὸς Καλυδῶνα simply. Combining these notices, Scheibe Praef. p. xlvii. infers that Isaeos wrote (1) For Hagnotheos, a πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐπιτροπῆς: (2) For Kalydon, a πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον ἐξούλης. Blass vindicates the loyalty of our orator by suggesting that Harpokration is to be emended; that we should read, s. v. Κεφαλῆθεν, πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἐξούλης (not ἐπιτροπῆς, for which ἐπιστολῆς is a variant), and s. v. ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, ἐν τῇ ἐξούλης πρὸς Καλυδῶνα ἀπολογίᾳ, (καὶ ἐν τῇ) πρὸς Ἁγνόθεον Att. Ber. II. 538.. It would follow that Kalydon and Hagnotheos have nothing whatever to do with each other, and have been brought into relation by no depravity except that of a text. The character of the two fragments, especially in regard to the êthos, suggests a comparsion with Oration XI.

3. For Eumathes: an Assertion of a Slave's 3. For Eumathes Freedom (ὑπὲρ Εὐμάθους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἀφαίρεσις: XVI. in Sauppe, XII. in Scheibe). Eumathes had been the slave of Epigenes, but had received his liberty from his master.

On the death of Epigenes, one of his heirs, Dionysios, acting for the restHarpokration s. v. ἄγοι cites these words of Dionysios (as quoted by Xenokles in our speech)— ἔβλαψέ με Χενοκλῆς ἀφελόμενος Εὐμάθην εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, ἄγοντος ἐμοῦ εἰς δουλείαν κατὰ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος. Schömann (p. 485) points out the inference., claimed Eumathes as a slave. Xenokles came forward and asserted Eumathes to be a freedman. Dionysios then brought against Xenokles an actionIn such an action the jury could inflict what fine they pleased (i.e. it was τιμητή); and half the τίμημα went to the treasury: cf. [Dem.] Against Theokrines (LVIII.) § 21. for this assertion (ἐξαιρέσεως δίκη). In this speech Xenokles defends himself, and reasserts the freedom of Eumathes.

The speaker says that he was trierarch in the Date. archonship of KephisodotosIn one place, Dionysios has ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (De Isaeo, c. 5); in another, ἐπὶ Κηφισοδότου ἄρχοντος (ib. c. 7). The latter is now adopted by Sauppe and Scheibe. Kephisodoros was archon in Ol. 103. 3, 366 B.C., a year which gives no probable clue to the sea-fight. Kephisodotos was archon in Ol. 105. 3, i.e. from July 358 to July 357; and the battle at Chios may, as Clinton suggests, have fallen within his year. But I would observe that it is only the beginning of the speaker's trierarchy which must have fallen within it. (Ol. 105. 3, 358 B.C.); and mentions a sea-fight in which he was engaged. This was probably the battle at Chios in the first year of the Social War—357 B.C.—in which Chabrias was killed. The speech For Eumathes may probably be referred to 356 B.C.

4. Lastly, Dionysios has briefly analysed, though without quoting extracts, a speech ‘Against Aristogeiton and Archippos on the Estate of ArchepolisDionys. Isae. c. 15. Sauppe shows by a comparison of 3 fragments (Or. Att. II. 229) that Westermann and Weissenborn err in supposing a speech πρὸς Ἄρχιππον distinct from that πρὸς Ἀριστογείτονα..’ The speaker is the brother of the deceased Archepolis. Aristogeiton had already taken possession of the estate. The speaker had summoned him to make restitution (εἰς ἐμφανῶν κατάστασιν). Aristogeiton had then entered a special plea (παραγραφή), asserting that the property was his under a will: and it was at the hearing of the special plea that this speech was delivered. The issue (ἀμφισβήτησις) was thus twofold,—(1) whether the will is genuine, (2) whether Aristogeiton was justified in taking possession before a legal decision. Isaeos first dealt with (2); and then, in a narrative, showed that the will was fictitious. The speech is cited by Dionysios as an example of Isaean arrangement. One characteristic is the treatment of the second issue in a discussion prefixed to the narrative ( προκατασκευή): another is the artistic division of the narrative itself into sections, with the proofs subjoined to each.

The Matured Civil Eloquence.
Deliberative Oratory as an art

WHILE a literary prose was being shaped, and while, on the other hand, a series of forensic writers were perfecting a series of types in their own branch, no artistic development that can be traced with the like clearness had been going forward in deliberative oratory. When, with Demosthenes and his contemporaries, deliberative oratory first comes clearly into view, its masters are found to owe their several excellences as artists to models taken from the other moulded on the Forensic and Epideictic. two departments, to a Thucydides or an Isokrates, to a Lysias or an Isaeos. Not only have we no evidence of their obligation, in point of art, to previous speakers in the same kind, but we are able to see for ourselves that the limits of such obligation would necessarily have been narrow. Now this is the reverse of what might have been anticipated. The ekklesia, considering its place in the democracy, might have been expected to be the great school, no less than the great field, of oratory. Further, the popular Dialectic, which, more than anything else, prepared the Athenian taste for artistic speaking, was far more favourable to the deliberative than to the forensic branch. The general profession of the Sophists was to teach men τὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν, to speak and to act in the affairs of the city. Protagoras would have regarded the Sicilian rhetors, such as Korax or Tisias, whose concern was chiefly with the law-courts, much as Isokrates regarded the merely forensic writers of his own day. Nor did the earliest artists cultivate one practical branch to the exclusion of the other. Antiphon was able to help those who were fighting a cause in a law-court or in the assemblyThuc. VIII. 68.. The thirty-fourth oration of Lysias was composed for delivery in the ekklesiaVol. I. p. 211.. Nevertheless it was not in the assembly, but in the law-courts or the schools, that oratorical prose was developed; and, when we are able to observe the political eloquence of Athens at its height, we see that what it has owed to the assembly is only the inspiring opportunity, not the discipline which has chastened it nor the secret of its strength.

Why oratory develops in the law-courts

It is worth while to consider the principal causes Reasons for this: of this phenomenon. They may, perhaps, be reduced to three.

I. Relation of Oratory to Rhetoric.

I. It was of the essence of Greek oratory, as will be seen most clearly when we come to the days of its decline, that its practice should be connected with a theory. Art is the application of rules, generalised from experience, for the production of results; and the Greek conception of speaking as an art implied a Rhetoric. This Rhetoric grew only gradually into a complete system; but from the first there was the fixed tendency to regard oratorical composition as susceptible of a regular analysis. Now, those rules of technical Rhetoric which were the earliest to be formulated could be applied with more precision and more effect in a speech for the law-courts than in a speech for the ekklesia. The true reason of this is not that given derisively by Aristotle Rhet. I. 1., that, in forensic speaking, chicanery (τὸ κακοῦργον) has the larger scope; the reason is that, in forensic speaking, the subject is fully and accurately known beforehand to the speaker; the utmost clearness of division is imperative, and is obtainable by a uniform method; and the problem is, how best to use all the resources of persuasion in a limited space of time. The two things to which the technical Rhetoric first addressed itself were, partition, and the treatment of probabilities. The law-courts, then, were the natural field of Rhetoric; and, owing to the closeness of the alliance between the theory and the practice, they were also for a long period the chosen field of Oratory.

II. Union of military and political functions.

II. In the true Greek conception the citizen was at once general and statesman. So long as this identity lasted, the men at the head of the State neither had leisure for the laborious training necessary to eminence in artistic oratory, nor felt its attainment to be of paramount importance. It was the separation of military from political functions that enabled some men to become finished speakers while others became accomplished soldiers. Perikles spoke the epitaph of those whom he had led to battle; but he had neither opportunity nor inducement to cultivate the art of war with the exactness of an Iphikrates, or the art of oratory with the exactness of a DemosthenesMacaulay, observing that the rise of Athenian oratory was contemporaneous with the decline of Athenian character and power, argues that this division of labour was the chief cause. (On the Athenian Orators: Miscellaneous Writings I 137 f.) As regards political oratory, it was certainly one of the chief causes. Macaulay's remark there, as to the silent and rapid downfall of Sparta having been due to the cultivation by others of scientific warfare, had been anticipated. The old advantage of Sparta in war and athletics —then lost—was due, says Aristotle, simply to Sparta studying these while her rivals did not: τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, Arist. Polit. V (VIII) iv § 4.. Yet the division of labour, when it came, was a proof that the civic life of Athens was decaying. Kleon's disaster at Amphipolis was enough, indeed, to indicate that such a division would thenceforth be the rule. The versatility of Alkibiades combined the two parts with a success which had no later parallel. But the definite and recognised separation of military from political leadership cannot be put much above the days of Timotheos and KallistratosSee Freeman, Historical Essays (Second Series) IV. ‘The Athenian Democracy,’ p. 138..

III. Outer history of Athens.

III. The outer history of Athens, from the disaster in Sicily to the battle of Chaeroneia, presents but two moments favourable to a great political eloquence. One is the struggle with Philip of Macedon. The other is the restoration of Athens, in 378, to the headship of a Naval League, followed by the contest at Athens between the Boeotian and antiBoeotian parties. Around this contest cluster the greatest names in deliberative oratory that appear before the reign of Philip. Kallistratos of Aphidnae, the leader of the anti-Boeotian party, was probably the most eloquent statesman between Perikles and DemosthenesOn Kallistratos, see Schäfer, Dem. I. 11 f. Dem. de falsa legat. § 297, πολλοὶ παρ’ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ καιρῶν γεγόνασιν ἰσχυροί, Καλλίστρατος, αὖθις Ἀριστοφῶν, Διόφαντος (the proposer of the decree in 352 for sending a force to hold Thermopylae): de Cor. § 219, πολλοὶ παρ’ ὑμῖν...γεγόνασι ῥήτορες ἔνδοξοι καὶ μεγάλοι πρὸ ἐμοῦ, Καλλίστρατος ἐκεῖνος, Ἀριστοφῶν, Κέφαλος, Θρασύβουλος, ἕτεροι μυρίοι.. His opponents, Aristophon of Azenia, Leodamas of Acharnae, Thrasybulos and Kephalos of Kollytos,—especially the two first—were powerful speakers. The meagre notices of their oratory warrant only two general inferences. First, that bold and vigorous illustration of argument was their characteristic merit. Secondly, that they had little or no pretension to artistic completeness of formA figure quoted by Arist. Rhet. II. 6 from the orator Kydias —who used it in dissuading the division of the lands at Samos, 350 B.C.—is very remarkable for being just in the boldly imaginative style of Perikles—not at all in the manner of Demosthenes or his contemporaries:—ἠξίου γὰρ ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἃ ἂν ψηφίσωνται. .

Extant literature of Political Oratory: 354—324 B.C.

Apart from the scantiest fragments,—preserved chiefly by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, and handed down to him mainly, it would seem, like the sayings of Perikles, by oral tradition—the extant literature of Attic Political Oratory begins with the speech of Demosthenes on the Navy Boards, in 354 B.C., and ends with the speeches of Deinarchos against Demosthenes, Aristogeiton and Philokles in 324 B.C.

In this period of thirty years, our concern, as defined by the scope of our inquiry, is no longer with details either of style or of work. It is, here, with tendencies or characteristics, considered as showing in what general relation the perfecters Deinarchos. stand to the inventors. Now, in the first place, Deinarchos may be set aside as being, for this purpose, valueless. The reason of Dionysios for not giving him a separate treatment is equally good for us. He was neither an inventor nor a perfecterDionys. de Dinarch. 1, μήτε εὑρετὴν ἰδίου γεγονέναι χαρακτῆρος τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὸν Λυσίαν, καὶ τὸν Ἰσοκράτην, καὶ τὸν Ἰσαῖον, μήτε τῶν εὑρημένων ἑτέροις τελειωτήν, ὥσπερ τὸν Δημοσθένην καὶ τὸν Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ὑπερείδην ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν . ib. c. 5. οὐδὲν οὔτε κοινὸν οὔτ’ ἴδιον ἔσχεν—‘no one stamp of his own—no distinctive trait’.. He has, indeed, been called the best among the imitators of Demosthenes ib. c. 8 τούτων (=τῶν τὸν Δημοσθένη προχειρισαμένων ) ἄριστον ἄν τις θείη Δείναρχον γενέσθαι .. But the praise would be faint, even if the epithetsDeinarchos was called ὁ ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης, Dionys. l.c. c. 8. Also, ὁ κρίθινος Δημοσθένης, Hermog. περὶ ἰδ. B. 11, Speng. Rh. Gr. II. 413. This curious epithet has been taken to mean (1) ‘coarse’, as barley opposed to fine wheat, Schol. in Walz Rh. Gr. v. 560 =οὐ σίτινος: (2) ‘skittish’, like a κριθῶν πῶλος, Ruhnken, Hist. crit. Or Gr.: (3) ‘like beer compared with wine’, Donalds. contin. of Müller Hist. Gr. Lit. II. 369, comparing Aesch. Suppl 930, ἀλλ’ ἄρσενάς τοι τῆσδε γῆς οἰκήτορας εὑρήσετ’ οὐ πίνοντας ἐκ κριθῶν μέθυ . The last is probably right. Α κρίθινος Δημοσθένης is one whose strength is rougher, and who has neither the flavour nor the sparkle. As Hermog. says, l.c., he has τὸ τραχὺ καὶ γοργὸν καὶ σφοδρόν, ὥστ’ ἤδη τινές—and so they call him κρίθινος. Cf. hordearius. with which antiquity qualified it, did not attest a coarseness in the copy which is not less evident to modern readers. Hermogenes, his too lenient judge, admits his want of finishHermog. l.c. ἧττον ἐπιμελὴς ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ. The same critic, in allowing him ‘fiery earnestness’ and ‘vehemence’, observes, with truth, that the latter quality depends rather on his thoughts and method than on his diction.. A more serious defect is his dependence on imitation or on plagiarism; and it follows that he has nothing to show us which is not incomparably better shown by Demosthenes.

Lykurgos, Hypereides, Aeschines, Demosthenes are the four men who illustrate the maturity of civil eloquence. Each has an interest of his own, and each serves, in his own way, to show the unity of the whole Attic development.

Lykurgos.

Lykurgos is indeed a striking and a noble figure in the Athens of Philokrates. He came of a house that, after the Persian war, had given a colleague to Kimon in his Thracian campaigns, and, in the next generation, a distinguished victim to the Thirty Tyrants. The stock of the Eteobutadae, claiming to spring from Erechtheus, were hereditary priests of Poseidon Erechtheus; from their house, too, was chosen the priestess of Athena Polias; and their services to the State, recognised for generations by public honours in life and in death, were thus enhanced by the most sacred dignities that Athens could revere. The special work that Lykurgos did for the city was to serve it as a steward of the public treasury for a period of office which was thrice renewedThe ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου was appointed for one πενταετηρίς only. The twelve years of Lykurgos have been differently placed; I follow Schäfer, Dem. u seine Zeit, chronol. table to Vol. III.: cf. ib. II. 298—304.. During twelve difficult years, from 338 to 326, he so managed the finances as to make them suffice both for the armament and for the embellishment of Athens. But, besides this task, there was a yet graver one that he had made his own. In the ancestral spirit of the great Athenian houses, he raised the voice of a hereditary priest and statesman in fearless reproof of the selfish apathy or luxury which threatened to merge both patriotism and morality. As his biographer[Plut.] vitt. X. oratt. expressively says, Lykurgos was παρρησιαστὴς διὰ τὴν εὐγένειαν, outspoken because he was noble. Nor did he stop at words. By restoring the festivals of the gods, by cherishing a faithful tradition of the great poetsThe negligence or caprice of actors had already begun to deprave the works of the great tragedians. It was Lykurgos, as is well known, who sought to arrest this process by the formation of those authoritative texts which afterwards passed into the library of Alexandria. This reverence for the elder dramatists—shown further by statues raised to Aeschylos, Sophokles and Euripides (337 B.C.)—is most characteristic of the man., by enacting sumptuary laws, and, above all, by facing the bitterly invidious task of prosecuting disloyal citizens, he made his name to be, like that of Drakon, a symbol for severity; probably with better reason, certainly in a more urgent cause[Plut.] vitt. X. oratt.: (Lykurgos was so severe) ‘that some of the sophists said that he dipped his pen, not in ink, but in death, when he drew laws against evil-doers.’ Demâdes had said of Drakon ὅτι δἰ αἵματος, οὐ διὰ μέλανος τοὺς νόμους ἔγραψεν, Plut. Sol. 17; cf. Tzetzes chil. 5. V. 348 in Sauppe O.A. II 316.. His character is the best comment on his oratory. Of his fifteen speeches, only one is now extant. It was spoken, probably about 332 B.C., against Leokrates, His speech Against Leokrates an Athenian citizen. Lykurgos brought against this man an indictment for treason (εἰσαγγελία προδοσίας), because, in 338, he had fled from Athens on the day that brought the fatal news of Chaeroneia.

This speech is a solemn and earnest protest on behalf of public spirit. There is not a trace of personal feeling, there is no attempt to disparage the man's private life. But the tone throughout is that of a lofty and inexorable indignation. And the form of expression is not less distinctive. Lykurgos was scarcely a born orator. The ancient Character of his Oratory. critics were right in denying to him elegance or charm, in blaming the harshness of his diction or his metaphors and his tendency to repeat or to digressDionys. vet. script. cens. V. 3 (after describing the power of Lykurgos), οὐ μὴν ἀστεῖος οὐδὲ ἡδύς, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖος. The harshness of his diction, and his tendency to digress, Hermog. περὶ ἰδ. B. 11. Lykurgos was conscious of the last fault: κατὰ Αεωκρ. § 100.. The structure of his sentences is, indeed clear-cut; he has a certain impressive majesty, due chiefly to his intense earnestness; and, as Dionysios says, he is powerful in denunciationDionys. l.c., αὐξητικός...διῃρημένος...σεμνός...κατηγορικός...φιλαληθής...παρρησιαστικός.. τούτου χρὴ ζηλοῦν μάλιστα τὰς δεινώσεις. In Ep. I. ad Ammaeum 2 he names Lykurgos between Hypereides and Aeschines among the ἀγωνισταὶ λόγων ῥητορικῶν.. But his peculiar interest for the history of Attic oratory depends on the union Two elements of his style of two elements.

Lykurgos had been the pupil of Isokrates; and the basis of his style is essentially Isokratic. But his moral and intellectual affinities with the elder Athens assert themselves. Engrafted on the smooth luxuriance of Isokrates, we meet once more the archaic, somewhat rigid stateliness of Antiphon: raised, however, above Antiphon's ordinary tone by the speaker's intimate sympathy with the elder poets, especially with the tragedians. The combination of these manners, the Isokratic and the archaic, has an effect which is not harmonious— Lykurgos lacked the force to fuse them—but which for that very reason is of much interest for a comparison between the elder and the later prose. In the following passages it has been attempted to keep something of the tone. The flight of Leokrates is thus described:—

‘After the battle of Chaeroneia, when you all rushed to Extracts from the speech Against Leokrates: §§ 16—18. the ekklesia, the people decreed that the children and women in the country should be brought within the walls, and that the generals should assign the duties of the defence to the Athenians and other residents as they pleased. Leokrates, however, without a thought for all this, packed up his property and put it, with his servants, on board the boat—the ship was already at moorings off-shore—and, late in the afternoon, passed with Eirenis through the gate to the public beach, rowed out to the ship, and was gone; neither pitying those harbours of Athens from which he was putting forth, nor ashamed before those walls of his native city which, for his part, he was leaving defenceless; nor was he afraid when he saw afar, as he forsook them, the temples of Zeus the saviour and Athena who saves, whom anon he will invoke to save him from his perils. And having come into port at Rhodes, as if he were bringing glad tidings of great blessings on his country, he began to announce how the town had been taken before he left, the Peiraeos blockaded —and he alone left to tell it; nor did he blush to name in one breath his country's fall and his own deliverance. So thoroughly did the Rhodians believe this, that they told off crews for their triremes, and set about launching the vessels; while the merchants or shipmasters who were ready to sail for Athens were led by this man to discharge their corn and other cargoes on the spot.’

Presently he describes the panic at Athens after Chaeroneia:—

‘In those days, Athenians, who would not have pitied §§ 39—42. the city—what citizen, aye, or what stranger that had visited it formerly? Who was then so bitter against the democracy or against Athens that he could have endured to find himself without a place in the ranks of the defenders, when the news came of the defeat and the disaster that had befallen the people, when the city was all excitement at the tidings, when the hopes of public safety had come to rest on the men past fifty, when you might see free-born women crouching in terror at the house-doors, asking if he is alive—the husband, the father, or the brother—a sight humiliating for the city and for her daughters; while men decrepit of frame, well-stricken in years, released by the laws from service under arms, men on the threshold that leads from age to death, might be seen hurrying helplessly through the city, with their mantles pinned in double folds around them? But, many as were the miseries in the city, great as was the ruin that had come on all the citizens, the keenest grief, the bitterest tears were due to the fortunes of the city itself— when the edict, declaring slaves to be free men, aliens to be Athenians, the disfranchised to be reinstated, was read by any man who once, perhaps, had prided himself on being a freeborn son of the Attic soil. The reverse that had befallen the city was even this; formerly she had vindicated the freedom of the Greeks—then she thought it enough if she could successfully defend her own existence; formerly she had ruled far and wide over the land of barbarians— then she was battling with Macedonians for her own; and the people whose aid was once invoked by Lacedaemonians, by Peloponnesians and by the Greeks of Asia was driven to seek succour for itself from the men of Andros, of Keos, of Troezen, of Epidauros.’

The peroration is, however, the most characteristic passage, not merely for its matter, but also for its form. While the resemblance to Antiphon is marked, there is a strain that surpasses him; but the speaker does not soar; he rises with effort, and shows at the end how his cultivated gift of speech laboured to utter his high enthusiasm:—

‘Be sure, judges, that each of you, by the vote which he §§ 146—150. now gives in secret, will lay his thought bare to the gods. And I deem that this day, judges, you are passing a collective sentence on all the greatest and most dreadful forms of crime, in all of which Leokrates is manifestly guilty; on treason, since he abandoned the city to its troubles and brought it under the hand of the enemy; on subversion of the democracy, since he did not stand the ordeal of the struggle for freedom; on impiety, since he has done what one man could to obliterate the sacred precincts and to demolish the temples; on illtreatment of parents,—for he sought to destroy the monuments, and to abolish the liturgy, of the dead; on a soldier's desertion of his post and avoidance of his duty—for he did not place his personal service at the disposal of the Generals. Who, then, will acquit this man,—who will condone misdeeds which were deliberate? Who is so foolish as, by saving this man, to place his own safety at the mercy of cowardly deserters,—who will show compassion to this man, and so elect to die unpitied at the hands of the enemy? Who will conciliate the gratitude of his country's betrayer, in order to make himself obnoxious to the vengeance of the gods?

‘In the cause of my country, of the temples and of the laws, I have fairly and justly set forth the issue, without disparaging or vilifying the defendant's private life or bringing any irrelevant accusation. You must reflect, every one of you, that to acquit Leokrates is to pass sentence of death and enslavement on your country. Two urns are before you; and the votes which you give are, in the one case, for the overthrow of your city, in the other, for its safety and its domestic welfare. If you absolve Leokrates, you will vote for betraying the city, the temples, and the ships—if you put him to death, you will exhort men to cherish and preserve their country, her revenues and her prosperity. Deem, then, Athenians, that a prayer goes up to you from the very land and all its groves, from the harbours, from the arsenals, from the walls of the city, deem that the shrines and holy places are summoning you to protect them, and, remembering the charges against him, make Leokrates a proof that compassion and tears do not prevail with you over solicitude for the laws and for the commonweal.’

Each urn was found to contain the same number Significance of the result of votes; and Leokrates benefited by the precedent of Orestes. But that the voices should have been equally divided when the prosecution could have been so easily represented as vexatious, and when the common temper of the city was with the accused, is a remarkable testimony to the character and to the eloquence of the accuser.

Hypereides.

The most complete contrast to Lykurgos, in everything except firm patriotism, is presented by his younger contemporary. Hypereides, son of Glaukippos, of a good Athenian family, had begun life as a forensic speech-writer. At an early age, in 360, he had prosecuted Autokles, a general charged with treason in a Thracian command. He had afterwards appeared as accuser against men so eminent as Aristophon of Azenia — whose oppression of the allies he exposed—and Diopeithes of Sphettos. From the Peace of 346 to the affair of Harpalos in 324 Hypereides stood by the side of Demosthenes as a leader in the struggle against Macedon. The Lamian War was especially his work; and he paid for it with his life. But while in the political sphere Hypereides was a loyal and fiery patriot, in his private character he was a true son of the new Athens. His philosophy was expressed in his own saying—μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μὴ μαθὼν τὰ καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ Ὑπερίδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἔφη μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, κ.τ.λ., Stob. append. florent. p. 41, frag. 239 in Sauppe, O. A. II. 305.: he could not live beautifully until he had learned what beautiful things there were in life. Perikles might have said that; but not in the sense of Hypereides; the study of the beautiful was ceasing to be combined either with frugality or with spiritual chastenment.

Hypereides was, like Lykurgos, a pupil of Isokrates. But while the measured and stately flow of Isokratic numbers was in unison with the character of Lykurgos, the basis of whose style is taken from his master, it was not truly congenial to Hypereides. His relation to Isokrates. The chief lesson which Hypereides has learned from Isokrates is the large development of the periodic sentence. As might have been expected, Hypereides is far more Isokratic in the Epitaphios than in anything else of his that we have. The reason is, however, not so much that his diction and composition are there modified by the epideictic form; rather it is that Hypereides has thoroughly caught from Isokrates the tone of elevated panegyric, and that, in the treatment of this really noble theme, the disciple unconsciously breathes the master's spirit.

But the essential tendencies in the style of His relation to Lysias. Hypereides are those of Lysias: and this arises from no accident, but from the natures of the men. Both men united energy in public action with an easy-going, pleasure-loving, humorous temper in social life, which made them peculiarly sensitive to the niceties of social idiom in their day, and peculiarly alive, too, to the real advantages which a public speaker can derive from tact, from wit, and from personal or literary allusion. What Athenian Sympathies of Lysias and Hypereides with Comedy. Tragedy was to Antiphon and Aeschines, that was Athenian Comedy to Lysias and Hypereides. The description by Lysias of a persistent borrower has been noticed as illustrating the reference of Demetrios to the ‘somewhat comic graces’ of LysiasVol. I. p. 184.. Hypereides had the same kind of affinity with the Middle Comedy; but he went further; he took words or turns of phrase from it; and unquestionably one great secret of his success as a speaker was his art of making a lively Athenian audience feel that here was no austere student of Thucydides, but one who was in bright sympathy with the everyday life of the time. It has been truly remarked Quarterly Review, vol. 132, p. 447. that the author of the ‘School for Scandal’ may be recognised in the accuser of Warren Hastings:—

‘He remembered to have heard an honourable and learned gentleman remark that there was something in the frame and constitution of the Company which extended the sordid principles of their origin over all their successive operations; connecting with their civil policy, and even with their boldest achievements, the meanness of a pedlar and the profligacy of pirates—alike in the political and military line, could be observed auctioneering ambassadors and trading generals;—and thus we saw a revolution brought about by affidavits; an army employed in executing an arrest; a town besieged on a note of hand; a prince dethroned for the balance of an account. Thus it was, they exhibited a Government which united the mock majesty of a bloody sceptre, and the little traffic of a merchant's counting-house, wielding a truncheon with one hand, and picking a pocket with the other.’

Hypereides was the Sheridan of Athens.Style of Hypereides, as characterised (1) by Dionysios:

Dionysios saysDionys. vet. script. cens. V. 6.:—‘Hypereides hits his mark neatly, but seldom lends grandeur to his theme. In embellishment of his diction he has surpassed Lysias; in the astuteness with which he disposes his subject-matter he has surpassed all. Then he keeps to the issue throughout, and insists on the really strong points of his arguments. He commands the resources of a large intelligence; he has an exquisite charm; and while he appears simple, is no stranger to consummate art. He is especially to be imitated for the subtlety and symmetry of his narratives, as well as in respect to the avenues (ἔφοδοι) by which he approaches his case.’ Elsewhere Dionys. de Dinarch. 7. he names (1) strength of diction, (2) simplicity of composition, (3) tact in the handling of subject-matter, and (4) avoidance of tragic pomp, as the marks of Hypereides. This criticism seems just in the main. Hypereides resembles Lysias in general simplicity, in grace, and in tact: but has a richer vocabulary, more subtlety of arrangement, and the ampler Isokratic period. Hermogenes puts the masters of civil oratory in this (2) by Hermogenes: order: Demosthenes, Lysias, Isaeos, Hypereides. Observing that Hypereides has ‘very little finish’, and that his special characteristic is a want of temperance and of elegance in his diction, he instances these words —μονώτατος, γαλεάγρα, ἐκκοκκύζειν, ἐστηλοκόπηται, ἐπήβολος Hermog. περὶ ἰδ. B. 11.. Clearly Hermogenes judges Hypereides harshly because he could not forgive his abundant colloquialisms and his borrowing from comedy or from any literary source that would furnish a point. With this judgment it is instructive to compare that of the so-called Longinus. It is the fullest, and (3) by the author of the περὶ ὕψους. in one respect the best, of the ancient notices. Dionysios does not mention the wit, the sarcasm or the irony of Hypereides; and in Hermogenes the omission is not surprising. The treatise On Sublimity does justice to these qualities[Long.] περὶ ὕψους c. 34.:—

‘If merits were to be counted, not weighed, Hypereides would stand far before Demosthenes. He has more tones in his voice than Demosthenes, and a greater number of special excellences. In fact, like the pentathlete, Hypereides is second-best all round; for the prize in any given branch, he comes after the specialists, but before the laymen. Besides imitating the merits of Demosthenes in everything except composition, Hypereides has further mastered in an eminent degree the excellences and the graces of Lysias. He expresses himself in the ‘plain’ manner, where it is fitting,—not with the sustained, unvarying tension of Demosthenes; and he has moral persuasiveness, with the flavour of an unstudied suavity. Incomparable wit plays about him; his sarcasm is in perfect keeping with political oratory; he is adroit with the weapons of irony; his jokes are not jarring, ill-bred, or importunate, in the ‘Attic’ manner of that generation; when he does pull people to pieces, he does it neatly, with much humour, and with the pungency of well-aimed banter; and with all this, there is a beauty of style beyond imitation. He has great power of pathos; in relating legends, he has a certain luxuriance, and a facile inspiration that wafts him most smoothly from point to point on his way;—for instance, he has managed Leto's storyAlluding to the lost Δηλιακός. From 422 to 346 there was a standing dispute between the Delians and the Athenians about the presidency of the Delian temple. In 346—5 Hypereides pleaded the Athenian cause before the Amphictyons, and prevailed. See Sauppe, O. A. II. 286 f. more artistically than any one else; and, in the Funeral Oration, has perhaps surpassed all in the panegyric manner. Demosthenes, on the other hand, has no gift for delineation of character; his style is not liquid, flexible, or adapted to display; and he is comparatively deficient in each and all of the qualities just mentioned. Again, where Demosthenes strives to be jocose or witty, he makes us laugh rather at him than with him; nor is he ever so far from graciousness as when he courts it. For instance, if he had tried to write the elegant defence of Phryne or of Athenogenes he [would have shown the superiority of Hypereides] still more. The beauties of Hypereides, though many, are yet wanting in grandeur; they are of a sober character, without energy, and allow the hearer to remain placid. No reader of Hypereides feels terror. But Demosthenes is of the greatest nature. He has lofty eloquence, intensity, living passion, copiousness, rapidity of thought. Above all, that which is his own—unapproachable mastery and force of oratorical art. These are heaven-sent, astonishing gifts—human they may not be called—and, having these in their fulness, he prevails over all other orators—even over those who, like Hypereides, have beauties which he lacks. His thunders, his fire, vanquish the speakers of every age; one might as soon face with steady eyes a descending thunder-bolt, as oppose a calm front to the storm of passions which Demosthenes can arouse.’

The two points to which exception may be taken in this otherwise good criticism are, the denial to Demosthenes of power happily to relax his style, or to delineate character; and (so far as we can judge) the denial to Hypereides of energy. As a whole, however, the estimate is probably just. Some ancient critics placed Hypereides before Demosthenes; this was preposterous; but, on the other hand, there are good grounds for believing that, among political orators, Hypereides was second to no one except Demosthenes.

The work of Hypereides is now represented by Extant work of Hypereides. (1) fragments of a speech for Lykophron—probably earlier than 349 B. C.: (2) the speech for Euxenippos, nearly complete, about 330 B. C.: (3) fragments of the speech against Demosthenes in the Harpalos trial, 324 B. C.: (4) the Funeral Oration over Leosthenes and the comrades who fell with him in the Lamian War, 322 B. C.: (5) several small fragments.

It is unfortunate that these remains nowhere illustrate what was especially characteristic of Hypereides—his lighter and more playful grace. But the Epitaphios is a noble monument of his graver eloquence. And the Speech Against Euxenippos— which shall first be noticed—shows his power of scathing reproof.

After the battle of Chaeroneia, Philip had Speech Against Euxenippos. restored Oropos to the Athenians. The territory consisted of five hills, one of which was assigned to every two of the ten Athenian tribes. A religious scruple arose about the hill assigned to the tribes Hippothoontis and Akamantis: had it not been already consecrated to the god Amphiaraos? It was resolved to ask the god himself for a sign. The ekklesia directed Euxenippos and two others to pass a night in the temple of Amphiaraos at Oropos. It does not appear what vision they reported. Polyeuktos, however— a well-known citizen—proposed a decree directing the two tribes to restore the hill to the god, and the other eight tribes to compensate them. This proposal was adjudged to be unconstitutional, and Polyeuktos was fined. He then impeached Euxenippos for reporting falsely to the people. Lykurgos was the accuser and Hypereides the defender. Hypereides shows that Polyeuktos is illogical; that his motive is merely vindictive; and proceeds:—

‘So, if you had been acquitted on that indictment, Col. XXX XXXIV (ed. Blass) Euxenippos would not have been guilty of perjury against the god; but, since it happened that you were convicted, Euxenippos must be ruined! For you, the proposer of such a decree, the penalty was laid at five and twenty drachmas; but he who, by the order of the people, passed the night in the temple must not even be buried in Attic ground!

“Yes,’ you say: ‘he behaved monstrously in allowing Olympias to dedicate that cup in the temple of the Goddess of Health!’ You introduce the name of Olympias to speed you on your course, you charge Euxenippos with a fictitious flattery, and you fancy that this will expose him to the hatred and anger of the judges.

‘My good friend, you should not invoke the names of Olympias and Alexander on your attempts to hurt your fellow-citizens; no, but when Olympias and Alexander lay unrighteous and improper commands on the Athenian people, then you should get up, and, on behalf of the city, protest, and argue for your rights with their emissaries, and go before the general assembly of the Greeks to uphold your country's honour. In that assembly you never rose: you never mentioned such things; but here you hate Olympias for the sake of Euxenippos, and say that he is a flatterer of her and of the Macedonians. If you can show that he ever visited Macedonia, or received any Macedonian into his house, or that he admits any one from that country to his intimacy or even to his conversation, or that he has expressed any views whatever of such matters either in a workshop or in the marketplace or anywhere else, or that he has not lived decorously and soberly, minding his own affairs, like any other citizen,—then let the judges do what they will to him.

‘If these charges were true, they would have been on other lips than yours,—they would have been the talk of Athens; just as all the other advocates or agents of Macedonia are well-known to the rest of their fellow-citizens, aye, to the children in the schools, even as they are known to their own consciences—the orators who draw Macedonian pay, the entertainers who open their houses to Macedonian visitors, and go to meet them on the roads when they approach. Here, again, you will find that Euxenippos has kept clear of all such association.’

The Funeral Oration belongs to a year hardly so The Funeral Oration. memorable for the catastrophe of the Lamian War as for the death of Hypereides himself, of Demosthenes, and of Aristotle. Hypereides, as has been noticed, had been a chief mover in the last effort of Greek freedom against Macedon. After the death of Leosthenes before Lamia a gleam of good fortune had come to the Greeks. Antiphilos had won a battle at Meliteia against Leonnatos. When Hypereides spoke the epitaph of Leosthenes and his comrades, the hopes inspired by this victory were still fresh. In August, 322—perhaps a month later than the speech—these hopes had been shattered by the battle of Krannon:—

‘Leosthenes, aware that all Hellas was abased, Col. V—VII. panic-stricken, ruined by those who take bribes from Philip and Alexander against their native cities,—that Athens was in need of a man, and all Hellas in need of a city, capable of exercising leadership,—gave himself as an offering to Athens, and Athens as an offering to the freedom of Greece. Then, having organised a force of mercenaries, and put himself at the head of the citizens, he saw the first who took the field against Hellenic freedom—Boeotians, Macedonians, Euboeans and their allies—fall before him on a Boeotian plain. Thence he went to the Gates,—seized those passes through which of old barbarians marched against Greeks, arrested the Greece-ward progress of Antipater, found Antipater himself in those regions, beat him in a battle, imprisoned and besieged him in Lamia; made allies of the Thessalians, Phocians, Aetolians and other people of the country; and, where Philip and Alexander had gloried in an extorted submission, received the tribute of a voluntary loyalty. His, indeed, it was to perform the cause that he had taken in hand; but not to evade the doom of destiny. And in justice we must give Leosthenes our gratitude, not merely for all that he did himself, but also for the victory won after his death, and for the other benefits which the campaign has brought to Greece; for it is on the foundations laid by Leosthenes that the achievements of his successors are arising.’

Then he imagines the greeting that awaits Leosthenes and his comrades in the place of the departed:—

‘With us, and with all the living, as we have seen, they Col. XIII— XIV. shall ever have renown; but in the dark under-world—suffer us to ask—who are they that will stretch forth a right hand to the captain of our dead? May we not deem that Leosthenes will be greeted with welcome and with wonder by those half-gods who bore arms against Troy,—he who set himself to deeds germane with theirs, but in this surpassed them, that while they, aided by all Hellas, took one town, he, supported by his own city alone, humbled the power that ruled Europe and Asia? They avenged the wrong offered to one woman; he stayed the insults that were being heaped on all the cities of Hellas—he and those who are sharing his last honours—men who, coming after the heroes, wrought deeds of heroic worth. Aye, and there, I deem, will be Miltiades and Themistokles, and those others who made Hellas free, to the credit of their city, to the glory of their names—whom this man surpassed in courage and in counsel, seeing that they repelled the power of the barbarians when it had come against them, but he forbade its approach; they saw the foemen fighting in their own country, but he worsted his enemies on the enemy's soil. And surely they who gave the people trusty proof of their mutual love, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, will count no friends so near to themselves, or so faithful to you, as Leosthenes and those who strove beside him, nor will they so consort with any dwellers in the place of the dead. Well may it be so, since these have done deeds not less than theirs, but, if it may be said, even greater; for they put down the despots of their own city, but these put down the despots of Hellas. O beautiful and wonderful enterprise, O glorious and magnificent devotion, O soldiership transcendant in dangers, which these offered to the freedom of Greece!’

The closing sentences are addressed to the Epilogue of the Epitaphios. kinsfolk of the dead; but here there is no frigid conventionalism of topics; there is a genuine, and therefore reticent, sympathy; above all, there is a tenderness which, though not Christian, is almost more than pagan; and it should be remembered that these words were spoken, over almost the last martyrs of Greek freedom, by one who himself was very soon to suffer torture and death in that cause:—

‘It is hard, perhaps, to comfort those who are in such a sorrow; grief is not laid to rest by speech or by observance; rather is it for the nature of the mourner, and the nearness of the lost, to determine the boundaries of anguish. Still, we must take heart, and lighten pain as we may, and remember not only the death of the departed but the good name also that they have left behind them. We owe not tears to their fate, but rather great praises to their deeds. If they came not to old age among men, they have got the glory that never grows old, and have been made blessed perfectly. Those among them who died childless shall have as their inheritors the immortal eulogies of Greece; and those of them who have left children behind them have bequeathed a trust of which their country's love will assume the guardianship. More than this,—if to die is to be as though we had never been, then these have passed away from sickness and pain and from all the accidents of the earthly life; or, if there is feeling in the under-world, and if, as we conjecture, the care of the Divine Power is over it, then it may well be that they who rendered aid to the worship of the gods in the hour of its imminent desolation are most precious to that Power's providence.’

Lykurgos and Hypereides are men with opposite Lykurgos and Hypereides — Summary faults, but of characters essentially generous,—with very unequal gifts for language, but alike men of cultivation and of deep sensibility,—who show the chief tendencies of Attic oratory, as already developed, in new combinations. Lykurgos is a thorough Isokratic who, by a natural affinity, reverts to the school of Antiphon. Hypereides is an Isokratic in the chief traits of composition only, who reverts, much more decidedly, to the school of Lysias, but in whom the Lysian manner becomes bolder and more various.

Aeschines

In relation to Demosthenes and the orators contemporary with him, the significance of Aeschines is closely similar to that which Andokides has for the age of Antiphon. Andokides is an amateur, compared with Andokides. not uninfluenced by what the artists are doing, but with no complete theory of his own. Just such an amateur is Aeschines in comparison with (for instance) Hypereides. On the other hand, the positive superiority of Aeschines to Andokides, as an orator, is immense. Scarcely more than Andokides did Aeschines possess the art, τέχνη, of speaking; but he had, in a far greater measure than Andokides, the practice, μελέτη, which, even without art, can do much to serve the need of the hour—this practice including both the habit of composition and skill in declamation. Lastly, he had in an extraordinary degree, the third and supreme requisite—faculty, φύσις. His natural gift was most brilliant. If we Aeschines the orator as conceived by himself. look to that conception of himself as an orator which Aeschines puts forward when he desires to appear at the greatest advantage over against Demosthenes, we shall find that it has two chief traits. First, Aeschines gives it to be understood that he is the man of spontaneous eloquence, while Demosthenes is the laborious rhetor. Secondly, Aeschines piques himself on his culture, meaning by this partly his familiarity with the standard poets, such as the old tragedians; partly a general sense of propriety or refinement, which, for instance, leads him to imitate the decorum ( εὐκοσμία) of the old orators, like Solon or Perikles, by speaking with his hand within his robe, instead of using vehement action;—and which helps to guard him, again, from such faults of taste in expression as he imputes to his rivalAt the end of his essay on the λεκτικὴ δεινότης of Demosthenes, Dionysios examines these aceusations made by Aeschines; cc. 55 —58. As to the particular examples cited by Aeschines (ἀμπελουργεῖν τὴν πόλιν, and the rest), Dionys. says he cannot find one of them in the extant work of Demosthenes. The speeches falsely ascribed to Demosth.—e.g. κατ’ Ἀριστογείτονος β/, κατὰ Νεαίρας, &c. —are, sometimes, ἀηδεῖς, φορτικοί, ἄγροικοι. The charge against Demosthenes, however, he characterises as not only calumnious but amazing. Those who seem inclined to adopt it ought well to consider this testimony of Dionysios.. This second pretension, in both its parts, is originally the tragic actor's; Aeschines is usually at his worst when he puts it forward; and at the end of his career it comes in as his evil genius in the disastrous peroration against Ktesiphon. As for his other pretension—of representing natural as against laboured oratory—Aeschines was too shrewd to have made this claim if it had not been roughly like the truth. We may be quite sure that a great many people thought it true. Pytheas, too, could taunt Demosthenes with his speeches smelling of the lamp: a taunt of evil augury for all Greek art. Aeschines had had no systematic Aeschines untrained in Rhetoric. training. One account, indeed, made him the pupil of Isokrates and Plato; others hint that he had imitated Leodamas or studied AlkidamasDemetrios Phalcreus—Caecilius—Suidas: Schäf, Dem. I. 229.. But the His style. best answer is the concise description of his style quoted by his scholiast from Greek criticsIn the scholia to Aeschines, Sauppe, O. A. II. p. 26. It has not finish, purity, or beauty of rhythm: it is blatant (κεχηνυῖα), inartistic, headlong (προπετής), easily betrayed into coarse abuse ill-becoming an orator; but it has a stamp of power and of facility such as would come of nature and of private study—μελέτης ἀφανοῦς, i.e. not under a master. When the Rhodians asked him to teach them Rhetoric, he said that he did not know it himself.

If, however, Aeschines was no rhetorical artist, His training as an actor: he brought to public speaking the twofold training of an actor and a scribe. He had a magnificent voice, under perfect musical control: ‘he compares me to the sirens,’ says Aeschines of his rival. As tritagonist, he had often to play showy parts, such as Kreon, Kresphontes, Thyestes; and the pose which he adopted when speaking, in contrast with the then customary ‘action,’ had been studied in the right stage-parts. In his rank of tritagonist, he was probably a good actor. A protagonist, when he had been assigned to the poet by lot, chose his two colleagues; and so eminent a protagonist as Theodoros would not have associated Aeschines with Aristodemos if Aeschines had not been efficient. Demosthenes represents Aeschines as having failed on the boards: the fact seems to be rather that he was ruined by an accident. The Oenomaos of Sophokles was being played at Kollytos. Aeschines was Oenomaos: in hurrying after Pelops, he stumbled and fell, and was helped to his feet by the leader of the chorus. Modern life has probably no adequate parallel for such a fiasco. If one could conceive the sum of all disasters that can mar a solemnity, or an opera, occurring before five thousand attentive Parisians, it might be easier to comprehend why Aeschines left the Attic stage. After having been clerk to some minor official, Aeschines as a scribe. was secretary to the statesmen Aristophon and Eubulos, and then, with his brother Aphobetos, for two years secretary to the ekklesia. He thus learned thoroughly the forms of public business, and gained that knowledge of laws and recorded decrees which, next to natural eloquence, was his chief weapon.

Without the intensity of Demosthenes, Aeschines Character of Aeschines as an orator. has a certain fluent vehemence; his diction, when neither low nor turgid, has that splendour τῇ τῶν λέξεων ἐκλογῇ πομπικὸς ἅμα καὶ δεινός, Dionys. vet. script. cens. v. 5: Cic. Orator § 110 says that the distinctions of Aeschines are lēvitas et splendor verborum . which both Dionysios and Cicero recognised; and if his descriptions are sometimes tedious or pointless, he is certainly strong in exposition and narrative. The fatal hindrance to his greatness in oratory is the contrast, which never fails to reveal itself in any ambitious passage of much length, between his brilliant impetuosity and his profound want of earnest conviction and of moral nobleness. It is not the occasional coarseness of his style, it is the vulgarity of his soul that counteracts his splendid gift for eloquence: of Aeschines as a speaker it might indeed be said ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων. Had he become an artist, his character would not therefore have risen to the height of his faculty; but his faculty would have been better restrained to the level of his character; the contrast just noticed would have been rendered less conspicuous; and if he would not have come so near to supreme success, at least he would not have been so utterly overthrown.

Demosthenes

Demosthenes belongs to the plan of the present Demosthenes —his place in the development work only in so far as his style has a definite relation to the historical growth and development of Attic oratorical prose. The first and principal question is—Has Dionysios conceived this relation as viewed by Dionysios. rightly? Dionysios sets out from the three types distinguished by Theophrastos. The archaic type, with its harsh dignity, is represented by Antiphon and Thucydides; the type of plain elegance, by Lysias; the middle or normal type, by Thrasymachos, Isokrates and Plato. Demosthenes, says Dionysios, joins the excellences of these three types. He uses the middle style ordinarily, and applies the other two where they are fitting: but in each one of the three types he excels its special mastersDionys. Demosth. 1—46.. Demosthenes thus represents the final stage in the development of Attic prose. For Thucydides, language is not as yet a plastic material; for Lysias, it is more plastic, indeed, but not perfectly so, and the treatment is one-sided; for Isokrates it is perfectly plastic, but the treatment is again one-sided. Demosthenes comes to find a middle prose mature, indeed, but limited; he enfranchises it by working in older tendencies native to Attic prose; and the result is the most complete organ of speech into which the elements were capable of being wrought. The same conclusion had been reached by others before Dionysios; but no one had so thoroughly worked out the process. Both the conclusion and the method will bear scrutiny, and may be accepted Dionysios is right, and by the right process. as sound. The doctrine involves two leading notions —that of a normal prose, and that of an eclectic and recombining genius. The first will be illustrated in the next chapter. The second appears to describe correctly what Demosthenes did in the province of expression considered as an art. The moral characteristics of his eloquence, the individual tone of the soul which he breathed into the form thus modelled, belong to another field of inquiry: though, since his art was essentially one with his enthusiasm, it must be attempted presently to suggest what the distinctive stamp of that enthusiasm was.

Aeschines and Demosthenes—the Speeches on the Crown.

The last great picture of political life at Athens is an oratorical contest in which, so far as eloquence is concerned, art, allied with genius, wins the day against clever empiricism. The theory of Greek eloquence had its final and its most splendid illustration in that trial which brought forth the two speeches On the Crown: nor could this part of our discussion conclude more fittingly than with an endeavour to call up some faint image of Demosthenes as in that great cause he stood opposed to Aeschines.

In 338, after Chaeroneia, Demosthenes had been Origin of the case against Ktesiphon. an active and liberal member of the Commission for the fortification of Athens; he had also been a trustee and a supporter of the theorikon. About March, 336The spurious ψήφισμα in Dem. De Cor. § 118 gives Pyanepsion 9 (beginning of Nov.) 337: on this error see Schäfer, Dem. III. 77 n. 2., Ktesiphon proposed that Demosthenes should for these services receive a golden wreath of honour from the State, and that the proclamation of his merit should be made in the theatre at the Great Dionysia. This proposal was adopted by the Senate, and deposited as a bill (προβούλευμα) among the public records. But before the bill could become an act (ψήφισμα) it must be passed by the ekklesia. Aeschines, to hinder this, gave notice in 336 that he intended to proceed against Ktesiphon for having proposed an unconstitutional measure: because (1) The accounts of Demosthenes, as trustee, had not been audited when the proposal was made, and no person liable to render such account could receive a public honour: (2) the proclamation should be made in the ekklesia, and could not lawfully be made in the theatre: (3) to record a bill describing Demosthenes as a public benefactor was to deposit a lying document among the public archives.

The first point was legally good. The second was a quibble. The third was the gist of the case. Had that policy towards Macedon which Demosthenes had pursued since 351 been condemned by Chaeroneia? Or, in spite of its failure, had it been right and patriotic?

Mere notice of the action against Ktesiphon was enough to stop the passage of the bill into an act. For six years Aeschines found it easy to shirk bringing the action. Alexander's strength was growing: in 334 he crossed the Hellespont, and in October, 331, the series of his victories culminated at Arbela. In 330, however, Agis raised war against Macedon in the Peloponnesos. In the spring of 330, probably, when there were still hopes of the Spartans prevailing, the patriotic party were emboldened to renew the bill of 337, now a dead letter. Aeschines was driven into a corner. He must again give notice of his action, or the bill will become law. And, having given notice, he must this time follow it up, or suffer the public judgment to go against him by default. So, in the summer of 330, the action was brought.

No public cause had ever drawn so great a Extraordinary interest of the cause. concourse, not merely of Athenians, but of Greeks from all parts of Hellas. Thirteen years before, the contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines on the Embassy had attracted a crowd. But, since then, the reputation of both men had greatly risen. And this was to be something more than a dazzling display or an exchange of personalities. It was to be a public verdict, after full hearing, on an issue which came home, for good or evil, to every Greek city, to every hearth, almost to every conscience: and for this verdict all Greece was in suspense.

Aeschines was now fifty-nine. Fifteen years The antagonists. earlier—when he spoke against Timarchos—he says that he was already grey, and looked more than his age. He was not tall, but was exceedingly handsome, and of a robust frame,—in contrast with his rather younger rival (Demosthenes was now fiftyfour) who, as a youth, had neglected the ordinary physical education. With his splendid voice, his trained elocution, and his practice in the statuesque manner which best suited him, Aeschines must have had an advantage over his opponent in many accessories of effect. Near him in the court stood a group of men who came to speak for him or to support him by their presence;—‘oligarchs’, as the other side called them,—leading members of the Macedonizing party. Round Demosthenes were gathered friends and advocates of the opposite politics—chiefly generals or men distinguished in other offices of the State. The dikasts who formed the court were probably at least a thousand in number. There was, besides, a throng of Athenian and other Greek spectators.

Aeschines, as accuser of Ktesiphon, opens the Speech of Aeschines. case. He warns the court not to be influenced by the strength of the cabal on the other side. He shows that a crown could not be given to an official whose audit was pending. He argues that the proclamation could not lawfully be made in the theatre. Then he comes to the great point. Demosthenes is not a public benefactor. He reviews the conduct of Demosthenes in four periods—from the Amphipolitan war to the peace of Philokrates; from the peace to the renewal of war; from that renewed war to Chaeroneia; lastly, the present. It was only when Philip had passed Thermopylae, when the Phocians were ruined and Thebes strengthened, and when the makers of the peace began to be reproached, that Demosthenes became the opponent of Macedon. It was Demosthenes who brought on the new war; who was the cause of the Amphictyonic Council attacking Amphissa, and thereby of Philip being called in: and all this in face of divine portents:—Aeschines in Ctes. §§ 130—134.

‘Did not the gods send us warnings and signs to be on our guard, aye, were they not eloquent with all but the voices of men? If ever I saw a city which the gods were seeking to save, and which certain talkers were bent on ruining, it was ours. Was not the occurrence at the Mysteries enough to enjoin watchfulness—the death of the initiated celebrants? Did not Ameiniades warn us to heed this, and to send to Delphi and ask the god what should be done, and did not Demosthenes object, pretending that the Pythian priestess ‘had Macedonian proclivities’—the ribald, the insolent, revelling in the license that you allowed him? Last of all, did he not send out the soldiers—before sacrifices had been consummated or accepted—to a peril which he foresaw? Yet the other day he hazarded the assertion that Philip's reason for not marching upon our territory was that the sacrifices had not been favourable. What do you deserve, then, Demosthenes, you who have the blood of Hellas upon your head? If the conqueror forbore to enter the country of the conquered because the sacrifices were against him, and you, when you could not tell what might happen, sent out the troops before the sacrifices had given a good omen, ought you to be crowned in honour of the city's disasters, or ought you long ago to have been cast beyond her borders?

‘And, accordingly, what paradox or what portent is there that has not come to pass in our time? Our days have not fallen on the common chances of the mortal life: we have been set to bequeath a story of marvels to posterity. Is not the king of Persia, he who cut through Athos and who bridged the Hellespont, he who demands earth and water from the Greeks, he who, in his letters, presumes to style himself lord of all men from the sunrise to the sunset, is he not struggling at this hour—no longer for authority over others—but for his own life? Do you not see the men who delivered the Delphian temple invested not only with that glory but with the leadership against Persia? While Thebes —Thebes, our neighbour city, has in one day been swept from the face of Greece,—justly, it may be, in so far as her general policy was erroneous, yet in consequence of a folly which was no accident, but the judgment of Heaven. The unfortunate Lacedaemonians, though they did but touch this affair, in its first phase, by their occupation of the temple,—they who once claimed the leadership of Greece,— are now to be sent to Alexander in Asia to give hostages, to parade their disasters, and to hear their own and their country's doom from his lips, when they have been judged by the clemency of the master whom they have provoked. Our city, the common asylum of the Greeks, to which of old embassies used to come from all Greece to obtain deliverance for their several cities at our hands—is now battling, no more for the leadership of Greece, but for the ground on which it stands. And these things have befallen us since Demosthenes took the direction of our policy. The poet Hesiod well interprets such a case. There is a passage, meant to educate democracies and to counsel cities generally, in which he warns us not to accept dishonest leaders. I will recite the lines myself,—the reason, I think, for our learning the maxims of the poets in boyhood is that we may use them as men:—

‘Oft hath the bad man been the city's bane, And scourged his sinless brethren for his sin; Oft hath the all-seeing Father vexed their town With dearth and death, and brought the people low, Slain their strong host, cast down their fencèd wall, Broken their ships upon the stormy sea.’

‘Strip these lines of their poetical garb, look at them closely, and I think you will say that these are no mere verses of Hesiod's;—they are a prophecy of the Demosthenes Administration; for, by that Administration's agency, our ships, our armies, our cities have been swept from the world.’

He then contends that Demosthenes is to blame for the league with Thebes, for the miseries of the present, and for the neglect of three successive opportunities to rise against Alexander: Demosthenes is ready to seek bribes, but not to do manly deeds:—

‘‘Oh, yes,’ it will be replied: ‘but then he is a friend of §§ 168—170. the Constitution.’ If, indeed, you have regard only to his delicacy—which stops at words—you will be deceived, as you were before; but not if you look at his character and at the facts. I will help you to estimate the characteristics which ought to be found in ‘a friend of the Constitution,’ in a sober-minded citizen; I will oppose to them the character that may be looked for in an unprincipled revolutionist; then you shall draw your comparisons, and consider on which part he stands—not in his language, remember, but in his life. Now all, I think, will allow that these attributes should belong to ‘a friend of the Constitution,’—first, he should be of free descent by both parents, so that the disadvantage of birth may not embitter him against those laws which preserve the democracy; secondly, he should be able to show that some benefit has been done by his ancestors to the people, or, at the worst, that there has been no enmity between them which could prompt him to revenge the misfortunes of his fathers on the State. Thirdly, he should be virtuous and temperate in his private life, so that no profligate expense may lead him into taking bribes to the hurt of the people. Next, he should be sagacious and able to speak—since our ideal is that the best course should be chosen by the intelligence, and then commended to the hearers by the trained eloquence, of the orator—though, if we cannot have both, sagacity must needs take rank before eloquence. Lastly, he must have a stout heart, or he may play his country false in the crisis of danger or of war. The friend of oligarchy must be the opposite of all this. I need not repeat the points. Now consider—How does Demosthenes answer to to these conditions? The scrutiny shall be strictly just.’

In the passage which follows, the speaker's hatred breaks out with an intensity which betrays conscious weakness. By half his parentage, Demosthenes is ‘a Scythian, Greek in nothing but language, and hence showing, in his very wickedness, the character of the alien’:—

‘But in his private life, what is he? The trierarch sank, §§ 173—176. to rise a pettifogger, a spendthrift ruined by his own follies. Then, having got a bad name in this trade too by showing his speeches to the other side, he bounded on the stage of public life, where his profits out of the city were as enormous as his savings were small. Now, however, the flood of royal gold his floated his extravagance. But not even this will suffice. No wealth could ever hold out long against vice. In a word, he draws his livelihood not from his own resources but from your dangers. What, however, are his qualifications in respect to sagacity and to power of speech? A clever speaker—an evil liver. And what is the result to Athens? The speeches are fair—the deeds are vile. Then, as to courage, I have a word to say. If he denied his cowardice, or if you were not aware of it, the topic might have called for discussion; but since he himself admits it in the assemblies, and you know it, it remains only to remind you of the laws on the subject. Solon, our ancient law-giver, thought that the coward should be liable to the same penalties as the man who refuses to serve, or who has quitted his post. Cowardice, like other offences, is indictable. Some of you will perhaps ask in amazement— Is a man to be indicted for his temperament? He is. And why? In order that every one of us, fearing the penalties of the law more than the enemy, may be the better champion of his country. Accordingly, the lawgiver excludes alike the man who declines service, the coward, and the deserter of his post, from the lustral limits of the marketplace, and suffers no such person to receive a wreath of honour or to enter places of public worship. But you, Ktesiphon, exhort us to set a crown on the head to which the laws refuse it: you, by your private edict, call a forbidden guest into the forefront of our solemn festival, and invite into the temple of Dionysos that dastard by whom all temples have been betrayed!’

The peroration is notable in the history of oratory:—

‘Remember, then, that the city whose fate rests with you §§ 256—260. is no alien city, but your own. Give the prizes of ambition by merit, not by chance; reserve your rewards for those whose manhood is truer and whose characters are worthier; look at each other and judge, not only with your ears but with your eyes, who of your number are likely to support Demosthenes. His youthful companions in the chase or the gymnasium? No, by the Olympian Zeus! He has not spent his life in hunting or in any healthful exercise, but in cultivating rhetoric to be used against men of property. Think of his boastfulness, when he claims, by his embassy, to have snatched Byzantium out of the hands of Philip, to have thrown the Acarnanians into revolt, to have astonished the Thebans with his harangue! He thinks that you have reached a point of fatuity at which you can be made to believe even this—as if your fellow-citizen were the Goddess of Persuasion, instead of a pettifogging mortal. And when, at the end of his speech, he calls as his advocates those who shared his bribes, imagine that you see on this platform, where I now speak before you, an array drawn up to confront their profligacy—the benefactors of Athens; Solon, who ordered the democracy by his glorious laws, the philosopher, the good legislator, entreating you, with that gravity which so well became him, never to set the rhetoric of Demosthenes above your oaths and above the law; Aristides,— who assessed the tribute of the Confederacy, and whose daughters, after his death, were dowered by the State,—indignant at the contumely threatened to Justice, and asking, Are you not ashamed? When Arthmios of Zeleia brought Persian gold to Greece, and visited Athens, our fathers wellnigh put him to death, though he was our public guest, and proclaimed him expelled from Athens and from all territory that the Athenians rule; while Demosthenes, who has not brought us Persian gold, but has taken bribes for himself, and has kept them to this day, is about to receive a golden wreath from you! And Themistokles, and they who died at Marathon and Plataea, aye, and the very graves of our forefathers—do you not think that they will utter a voice of lamentation, if he who covenants with barbarians to work against Greece shall be—crowned?’

This was the true climax. But Aeschines felt the pressure of the Attic rule. He must not end thus. The storm must be laid in a final harmony. And so he passed on to the most tremendous failure that ever followed so close upon a triumph:—

‘O Earth and Sunlight! O ye influences of Goodness, of Intelligence, of that Culture by which we learn to distinguish things beautiful or shameful—I have done my duty, I have finished. If the part of the accuser has been performed well and adequately to the offence, then I have spoken as I wished, —if defectively, yet I have spoken as I could. Judge for yourselves from what has been spoken or from what has been left unsaid, and give your sentence in accordance with justice and with the interests of Athens.’

Apart from all faults of form, the hearers must Fatal weakness of the Speech. have felt that this speech had one signal fault of matter. Aeschines had not dared to show his colours. He had not dared to say—‘I maintain that it was expedient to be friendly with Macedon, and therefore I deny that Demosthenes was a patriot’. He had tried to save appearances. He had dealt in abuse and in charges of corruption. But he had left the essence of the Demosthenic policy absolutely untouched.

Ktesiphon, as ostensible defendant, introduced Reply of Demosthenes. the defence. Demosthenes then spoke. He stands, he says, in a greater danger than Aeschines—his whole political existence is at stake. After noticing irrelevant changes made by his adversary, he draws a picture of Greece at the end of the Phocian war. The results of the Peace of Philokrates were due to Athens being misled by the Macedonian party. Having given the judges a firm basis for an estimate of his policy, he turns to the two legal points. Then he comes to the great point. Has he deserved well of Greece? He describes the Hellenic policy which he, on the part of Athens, had represented; he recalls the course of events down to the moment before Philip seized Elateia; and he proceeds:—

‘Having by these means brought the cities into such Demosth. De Cor. §§ 168—191. dispositions to wards each other, Philip, encouraged by these decrees and these replies, came in his strength, and seized Elateia—sure that, happen what would, we and the Thebans could never more conspire. Enough—you all know what a storm then awoke in the city. Yet listen to me for a moment, suffer me to give you the barest outline.

‘It was evening when a courier came to the presidents of the assembly with the news that Elateia had been seized. The presidents instantly arose from table—they were supping at the moment: some of them hastened to clear the marketplace of the shopmen, and to burn the wickerwork of the booths: others, to send for the Generals and order the sounding of the call to the Assembly. The city was in a tumult. At dawn next day the presidents convoked the Senate, you hurried to the Ekklesia, and before the Senate could go through its forms or could report, the whole people were in assembly on the hill. Then, when the Senate had come in, when the presidents had reported the news that they had received, and had introduced the messenger, who told his tale, the herald repeatedly asked, Who wishes to speak? But no one came forward. Again and again he put the question—in vain. No one would rise, though all the generals, though all the public speakers were present, though our Country was crying aloud, with the voice that comes home to all, for a champion of the commonwealth—if in the solemn invitation given by the herald we may truly deem that we hear our Country's summons. Yet, if they should have come forward who wished Athens safe, every man in this court, aye, every man in Athens, would have risen and moved towards the platform. Every man of you, I know well, wished the city to be saved. Or, if it was a time for the capitalists, there were our three hundred richest men; or if for the representatives of patriotism and wealth combined, there were the men who, a little later, proved at once their loyalty and their opulence by giving such large benevolences. But no—it seems that that crisis, that hour, demanded not merely a patriot, not merely a capitalist, but a man who had followed the train of events from the beginning, who had accurately reasoned out why and wherefore Philip was acting thus. A man who did not know this, who had not made it the subject of long and thorough research, might be ever so loyal, might be ever so rich, but he was not the man to see what should be done or to direct your course. Such a man was found that day in me. I came forward and spoke words to which, for two reasons, I now claim your attention; first, that you may see how I was the only one of the speakers or the statesmen who, in danger, did not desert the patriot's post, but brought myself to the proof by proposing and framing measures for your welfare in the very hour of panic; secondly, because this bestowal of a few moments will place you in a much better position for estimating the future of your entire policy.

‘What I said was this:—‘They who are so much alarmed by the belief that Philip has already got the Thebans do not, I think, comprehend the situation; I feel convinced that, if this was the case, we should have been hearing of him, not at Elateia, but on our frontiers. That he has come, however, to make things ready at Thebes, I am certain. Look (I said) how it stands. Every Theban that could be bribed or blinded has been made a tool by Philip: those who withstood him from the first, and who oppose him now, he can never win. What does he mean? Why has he seized Elateia? He means, by displaying his power and planting his camp close at hand, to cheer and embolden his own friends, and to strike terror into his opponents, so that they may either concede from fear what they now refuse, or may be compelled to the concession. Now, if we choose (I said) to make this a time for remembering any unpleasantness that the Thebans may have brought into their relations with us, and to distrust them as if they were to be classed with enemies, then, in the first place, we shall be doing what Philip would pray for; in the next, I am afraid that those who are now his adversaries may open their arms to him, and so, with one accord, they will all become Philip's men, and he and they will march on Attica together. If, however, you will listen to me, and will give yourselves to thinking, instead of wrangling, over my suggestions, I believe that I shall be pronounced to be in the right, and shall avert the danger impending over Athens. What, then, do I advise? First, that we should remit our present fear: next, that we should transfer it to another object, and tremble, as one man, for the Thebans—they are much nearer to the danger than we, and must bear its first brunt:—then, that you should march out to Eleusis, all of you that are of the age for service, as well as the Knights, and show the world that you, too, are in arms, so that your friends at Thebes may be at no disadvantage for making their protest on behalf of justice, but may know that, even as the men who are selling their country to Philip have a power hard by at Elateia to help them, so they who are ready to do battle for freedom are secure of prompt aid from you, if they are attacked. Next, I would have you elect ten ambassadors and empower them, in conjunction with the Generals, to fix the time and the strength of the expedition. The ambassadors once at Thebes, what line are they to take? Mark my words here. They must not ask the Thebans for anything—it would be discreditable at such a time— but must promise to afford aid if it should be required, since the Thebans are in extremities, and our view of what may come is less disturbed than theirs. Then, if the Thebans accept these offers and listen to us, we shall have compassed our own desires, and at the same time shall come before the world in an attitude worthy of Athens; or if, by any chance, the diplomacy should miscarry, they will have themselves to blame for any error they may commit now, and we shall stand guiltless of everything dishonourable or craven.’

‘Thus, or to this effect, I spoke, and left the platform. Everyone approved—there was not a dissentient; and what then? I did not make a speech and leave others to move a resolution. I did not move a resolution, and leave others to go on an embassy. I did not go on an embassy, and leave others to persuade the Thebans. No. I went through with the business from the beginning to the end; I gave myself to you without reservation in face of the perils that encompassed the city.—[Read me the decree that was made that day.] * * * * * * These were the first steps towards the adjustment of our relations to Thebes, at a time when enmity, hatred and distrust had been sown between our cities by yonder men.

‘The people gave their voice, and the danger that hung upon our borders went by like a cloud. Then was the time for the upright citizen to show the world if he could suggest anything better:—now, his cavils come too late. The statesman and the adventurer are alike in nothing, but there is nothing in which they differ more than in this. The statesman declares his mind before the event, and submits himself to be tested by those who have believed him, by fortune, by his own use of opportunities, by everyone and everything. The adventurer is silent when he ought to have spoken, and then, if there is a disagreeable result, he fixes an eye of malice upon that. As I have said, then was the opportunity of the man who cared for Athens and for the assertion of justice. But I am prepared to go further:—If anyone can now show a better course, or, in a word, can point out any precaution which was possible and which I did not adopt, I plead guilty. If anyone has had a new light as to something which it would have been expedient to do then, I protest that this ought not to be concealed from me. But if there neither is nor was any such thing; if no one to this very hour is in a position to name it; then what was your adviser to do? Was he not to choose the best of the visible and feasible alternatives? And this is what I did, Aeschines, when the herald asked, Who wishes to speak? His question was not, Who wishes to rake up old accusations? or, Who wishes to give pledges of the future? In those days, you sat dumb in the assemblies. I came forward and spoke. Come now—it is better late than never: point out what argument should have been discovered—what opportunity that might have served has not been used by me in the interests of Athens—what alliance, what policy was available which I might better have commended to our citizens?’

Having shown that the course taken by his party was the most advantageous open to loyal Athenians, the speaker goes on to take yet higher ground. This course failed. But it is not therefore to be regretted. By it alone could honour have been saved:—

‘As, however, he bears so hardly upon the results, I am §§ 199—209. ready to make a statement which may sound startling. I ask every man, as he fears Zeus and the gods, not to be shocked at my paradox until he has calmly considered my meaning. I say that, if the event had been manifest to the whole world beforehand, if all men had been fully aware of it, if you, Aeschines, who never opened your lips, had been ever so loud or so shrill in prophecy or in protest, not even then ought Athens to have forsaken this course, if Athens had any regard for her glory, or for her past, or for the ages to come. Now, of course, she seems to have failed; but failure is for all men when Heaven so decrees. In the other case, she, who claims the first place in Greece, would have renounced it, and would have incurred the reproach of having betrayed all Greece to Philip. If she had indeed betrayed without a blow those things for which our ancestors endured every imaginable danger, who would not have spurned, Aeschines, at you? Not at Athens—the gods forbid!—nor at me. In the name of Zeus, how could we have looked visitors in the face if, things having come to their present pass—Philip having been elected leader and lord of all—the struggle against it had been sustained by others without our help, and this, though never once in her past history our city had preferred inglorious safety to the perilous vindication of honour? What Greek, what barbarian does not know that the Thebans, and their predecessors in power, the Lacedaemonians, and the Persian King, would have been glad and thankful to let Athens take anything that she liked, besides keeping what she had got, if she would only have done what she was told, and allowed some other Power to lead Greece? Such a bargain, however, was for the Athenians of those days neither traditional nor congenial nor supportable. In the whole course of her annals, no one could ever persuade Athens to side with dishonest strength, to accept a secure slavery, or to desist, at any moment in her career, from doing battle and braving danger for preeminence, for honour and for renown.

‘You, Athenians, find these principles so worthy of veneration, so accordant with your own character, that you praise none of your ancestors so highly as those who put them into action. You are right. Who must not admire the spirit of men who were content to quit their country, and to exchange their city for their triremes, in the cause of resistance to dictation; who put Themistokles, the author of this course, at their head, while as for Kyrsilos, the man who gave his voice for accepting the enemy's terms, they stoned him to death, yes, and his wife was stoned by the women of Athens? The Athenians of those days were not in search of an orator or a general who should help them to an agreeable servitude. No. They would not hear of life itself if they were not to live free. Each one of them held that he had been born the son, not only of his father and his mother, but of his country also. And wherein is the difference? It is here. He that recognises no debt of piety save to his parents awaits his death in the course of destiny and of nature. But he that deems himself the son of his country also will be ready to die sooner than see her enslaved. In his estimate, those insults, those dishonours which must be suffered in his city when she has lost her freedom will be accounted more terrible than death.

‘If I presumed to say that it was I who thus inspired you with a spirit worthy of your ancestors, there is not a man present who might not properly rebuke me. What I do maintain is that these principles of conduct were your own; that this spirit existed in the city before my intervention, but that, in the successive chapters of events, I had my share of merit as your servant. Aeschines, on the contrary, denounces our policy as a whole, invokes your resentment against me as the author of the city's terrors and dangers, and, in his anxiety to wrest from me the distinction of the hour, robs you of glories which will be celebrated as long as time endures. For, if you condemn Ktesiphon on the ground that my public course was misdirected, then you will be adjudged guilty of error: you will no longer appear as sufferers by the perversity of fortune.

‘But never, Athenians, never can it be said that you erred when you took upon you that peril for the freedom and the safety of all! No, by our fathers who met the danger at Marathon, no, by our fathers who stood in the ranks at Plataea, no, by our fathers who did battle on the waters of Salamis and Artemision, no, by all the brave who sleep in tombs at which their country paid those last honours which she had awarded, Aeschines, to all of them alike, not alone to the successful or the victorious! And her award was just. The part of brave men had been done by all. The fortune experienced by the individual among them had been allotted by a Power above man.’

The nobility of this great speech declares itself Tone of the Speech. not least in this, that the inevitable recital of personal services never once sinks into self-glorification. It is held above that by the speaker's proud consciousness that he has wrought, not for himself, but for Athens and Greece, not for ambition, but for sacred things, for duty and for honour, and that he can show this by proofs the most triumphant. When, at the end, he offers himself for comparison with any other counsellor, his right to do so has been so luminously established that this is felt to be no vaunt by which his dignity is lowered. On the contrary, it is a self-vindication demanded by respect alike for himself and for those by whom his counsels had been adopted. In relation to the Attic theory of eloquence, it is most instructive to compare the perorations of Aeschines and Demosthenes. The two perorations compared. Aeschines, not being a true artist, stands in awe of the art. He does not venture to be original and to stop at his real climax. He must needs conform with the artistic usage of a final harmony; and he mars all. Demosthenes, the master, can make his art obey him. With true instinct, he feels this to be the rare case which the rule does not fit. The emotions of the hearers have been stirred beyond the point of obedience to the pulses of an ordered music. His intense appeal to the memories of his countrymen ends in a storm of imprecation and of prayer:—

‘Here is the proof. Not when my extradition was §§ 322—324. demanded, not when they sought to arraign me before the Amphictyonic Council, not for all their menaces or their offers, not when they set these villains like wild beasts upon me, have I ever been untrue to the loyalty I bear you. From the outset, I chose the path of a straightforward and righteous statesmanship, to cherish the dignities, the prerogatives, the glories of my country: to exalt them: to stand by their cause. I do not go about the marketplace radiant with joy at my country's disasters, holding out my hand and telling my good news to anyone who, I think, is likely to report it in Macedon; I do not hear of my country's successes with a shudder and a groan and a head bent to earth, like the bad men who pull Athens to pieces, as if, in so doing, they were not tearing their own reputations to shreds, who turn their faces to foreign lands, and, when an alien has triumphed by the ruin of the Greeks, give their praises to that exploit, and vow that vigilance must be used to render that triumph eternal.

‘NEVER, POWERS OF HEAVEN, MAY ANY BROW OF THE IMMORTALS BE BENT IN APPROVAL OF THAT PRAYER! RATHER, IF IT MAY BE, BREATHE EVEN INTO THESE MEN A BETTER MIND AND HEART; BUT IF SO IT IS THAT TO THESE CAN COME NO HEALING, THEN GRANT THAT THESE, AND THESE ALONE, MAY PERISH UTTERLY AND EARLY ON LAND AND ON THE DEEP: AND TO US, THE REMNANT, SEND THE SWIFTEST DELIVERANCE FROM THE TERRORS GATHERED ABOVE OUR HEADS, SEND US THE SALVATION THAT STANDS FAST PERPETUALLY.’

Two thousand years have challenged a tradition which lives, and will always live, wherever there is left a sense for the grandest music which an exquisite language could yield to a sublime enthusiasm— that, when Demosthenes ceased, those who had come from all parts of Greece to hear, that day, the epitaph of the freedom which they had lost, and a defence of the honour which they could still leave to their children, had listened to the masterpiece of the old world's oratory, perhaps to the supreme achievement of human eloquence. But this wonderful speech, though the greatest, is not the most characteristic work of its author. The speech On the Crown is a retrospect: Demosthenes was a prophet. His genius as an orator takes its The enthusiasm of Demosthenes— its character peculiar stamp from the concurrence of two conditions which have seldom been united with an equal completeness, which are not likely, perhaps, to be completely united again, but which, whenever they have so met, have made an epoch of poetry or of oratory. The first is that a free and highly civilised race should be threatened with the overthrow of its civil liberties; the second, that this political disaster should have, at the same time, the aspect of a religious defilement. When the national peril is also a menaced pollution, when the cause of altars and of hearths is not only formally or nominally, but in the inmost feelings of the people, one, then the two mightiest inspirations of humanity co-operate, and they who arise to warn, to counsel or to reprove seem both to others and to themselves most like the interpreters of Heaven. The Greeks were, in their own view, something even more than a chosen people; they were, as they conceived, a race primarily and lineally distinct from all the races of men, the very children of the gods, whose holy separation was attested by that deep instinct of their nature which taught them to loathe the alien. No one can ever understand Demosthenes who does not continually keep in mind how Demosthenes regarded Philip—not as the descendant of Herakles, not as a prince of the Argive house who, in a royal exile like that of Teukros, happened to reign over foreign highlanders, but as the personal embodiment of barbarian violence, as the type and the head of those aliens whose foul swarms threatened to break the pure circle of Hellas and to obliterate, or contaminate, everything which Greeks regarded as a sacred distinction of their life. If, as has been complained, his eloquence, instead of flowing, rushes, if his intensity is found monotonous, if he is perceived to be deficient in ease and clearness, let it be remembered that, Greek and artist as he is, things stronger than blood give him his affinity with Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Once only, perhaps, in the history of the world has a man of Indo-Germanic race, with something like the same gifts, stood in something like the mental attitude of Demosthenes, and this in the city which of all cities has most resembled his own. Florence, with its active and conscious citizenship, its intelligence and curiosity, its fickleness, its patriotism for Italy, was the Athens, as steady and somewhat rigid Venice was the Sparta, of the Italian republics; and the Athens of Eubulos had more ignoble analogies with the Florence of LorenzoSee the ‘Renaissance in Italy, Age of the Despots,’ by Mr J. A. Symonds, pp. 169 f.. When invasion was threatening from the North, when political freedom was in danger, and when it seemed that the Church also must be scourged before it could be regenerated, a prophet arose whose one hope was of a resurrection for the spirit of his people and whose passionate denunciations sought to burst, while there was time, the fatal bonds of a cynical lethargy. ‘O Italy! O Rome! I give you over to the hands of a people who will wipe you out from among the nations! I see them descending like lions. Pestilence comes marching hand in hand with war. The deaths will be so many that the buriers shall go through the streets crying out: Who hath dead, who hath dead? And one will bring his father and another his son. O Rome! I cry again to you to repent! Repent, Venice! Milan, repent!’ib. p. 448. The soul of Demosthenes was among men when, in the Dome of Florence, above the sobs and wailings of a great multitude, the anguish of Savonarola went forth on words that were as flame.

Retrospect.
Two early tendencies— the Rhetorical and the Gorgian

IT will now be useful to look back on the whole development from Antiphon to Demosthenes, and to trace the main lines of its course.

The ground for an artistic Athenian oratory was prepared partly by the popular Dialectic of the eastern Sophists, partly by the Sicilian Rhetoric. Intermediate between these stood the earliest artist of oratorical prose, Gorgias; differing from the eastern Sophists in laying more stress on expression than on management of argument, and from the Sicilian Rhetoricians in cultivating his faculty empirically, not theoretically.

Two principal tendencies appear in the beginnings of Attic oratory. One of these sets out from the forensic Rhetoric of Sicily, in combination with the popular Dialectic of the Sophists, and is but slightly affected by Gorgias. It is represented by the writers of the ‘austere’ style, of whom Antiphon and Thucydides are the chief. From Thucydides to Demosthenes this manner is in abeyance, partly because it Outline of development. is in itself unsuited to forensic purposes, partly because its grave emphasis has come to seem archaic. The second tendency is purely Gorgian, and, after having had several obscure representatives, is taken up by Isokrates, who gives to it a corrected, a complete and a permanent form. From a compromise between this second tendency and the idiom of daily life arises the ‘plain’ style of Lysias. The transition from Lysias to a strenuous political oratory is marked by Isaeos. Then comes the matured political oratory, giving new combinations to types already developed, and, in its greatest representative, uniting them all.

Antiphon and Thucydides have been strongly Antiphon and Thucydides. influenced, as to arrangement and form of argument, by Dialectic and Rhetoric. In regard to expression, they have been influenced by the synonym-lore, such as that of Prodikos, but hardly at all by the oratory of Gorgias. In expression, they are essentially pioneers. Those things which they have in common are to a great extent the necessary traits of early Greek prose, before the language was a perfectly flexible material, when that prose was wrought by a vigorous and subtle mind. Such traits are, however, numerous enough and strong enough to justify us in holding that they constitute a style. The characteristics of this ‘austere’ style have been analysed in reference to Antiphon. Such a manner The ‘austere’ style not forensic. could not possibly keep its place in the forensic field. Legal controversy, growing subtle, terse and eager, would become as uncongenial to the prose of Antiphon as to the prose of Milton. A conception of the general effect will be assisted, perhaps, by a rough English parallel. In 1626 the Judges were called in to assist the House of Lords regarding a claim to the earldom of Oxford, and Chief Justice Crewe delivered an address in which this passage occurredI quote this from Mr Forsyth's Hortensius, p. 315, who selects it as an example of early forensic oratory in England, before the modern eloquence of Erskine. :—

‘This great honour, this high and noble dignity, hath continued ever since in the remarkable surnaine of De Vere, by so many ages, descents, and generations, as no other kingdom can produce a peer in one of the self-same name and title. I find in all this length of time but two attainders of this noble family, and those in stormy and tempestuous times, when the government was unsettled and the kingdom in competition. I have laboured to make a covenant with myself that affection may not press upon judgment; for I suppose there is no man that hath any apprehension of gentry and nobleness, but his affection stands to the continuance of so noble a name and house, and would take hold of a twig or a twine-thread to uphold it. And yet Time hath its revolutions; there must be a period and an end to all temporal things—finis rerum, an end of names, and dignities, and whatsoever is terrene, and why not of De Vere? For where is Bohun? where is Mowbray? where is Mortimer? Nay, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet? They are entombed in the urns and sepulchres of mortality. And yet let the name and dignity of De Vere stand so long as it pleaseth God!’

Thucydides

The ‘austere’ manner is, in one respect, better represented by Thucydides than by Antiphon. Its αὐθάδεια, or haughty independence, finds a larger scope in the work of the philosophical historian. We are concerned here, not with the individual genius of Thucydides, but with the rhetorical prose-writer as influenced by his age: and for us, therefore, the his speeches. speeches are most significant. These are the essays of Thucydides himself in an oratory which is dramatic as regards the sentiment, but not as regards the form. They may be taken, then, as indicating his relation both to the practice and to the theory of his day. Out of forty-one speeches (excluding the two dialogues) one is panegyrical—the Epitaphios: thirtyeight are hortatory: and two are forensic—those, namely, of the Plataeans and the Thebans before Influence on them of Sicilian Rhetoric. their Lacedaemonian judgesIII. 53—59; 61—67.. The Epitaphios, the forensic speeches, and (e.g.) the deliberative speeches of Hermokrates and Athenagoras in Book VI., all bear the impress of the Sicilian Rhetoric in their conscious partition. Proem, prothesis, narrative, proof, epilogue succeed each other—with more or less completeness according to circumstances—as distinct parts. Figures, whether of thought or of language, are avoided even more than by Antiphon. The influence of Gorgias is seen only faintly and generally in attention to parallelism or symmetry: his distinctive ornaments—parison and the like—are eschewed. Nothing is more Thucydidean than the Bent of Thucydides in expression. determination to express each idea, or part of an idea, in the way that best suits it, regardless of what has gone before or what is coming: hence his changes of construction. His freer, though rougher, handling of the periodic style, as compared with Antiphon's, arises from his effort to present a complex idea as an organic whole. He will not make his sentence a bed of Prokrustes for his thought. This alone would explain the sympathy with Thucydides Thucydides and Demosthenes. felt by the intense Demosthenes, who saw that the ‘austere’ style had something more than an antiquarian interest—that it meant a certain set of capacities in the organ which he wished to perfect; and who studied these capacities, not in Antiphon, but in Thucydides.

Kritias, Andokides, Thrasymachos

Kritias and Andokides stand together as cultivated amateurs of the phase when this earlier manner of Antiphon and Thucydides was already felt to be too rigid for practical life, but when, nevertheless, an alternative manner had not yet been artistically shaped. Kritias, like Andokides, appears to have avoided the poetical diction as well as the figures of Gorgias; and is named along with Andokides as a witness to the currency of the idiom used by LysiasDionys. de Lys. c. 2. .

Thrasymachos of Chalkedon gave a new turn to Thrasymachos. the progress of Attic prose. The modern world knows him best from the Phaedros, where he figures as a puerile pedant of the Sicilian Rhetoric. To Aristotle and Theophrastos, however, he was known less as a theorist than as an orator, and as an orator, moreover, of original and remarkable merits. These His services. merits were chiefly three. First, he was the founder of a ‘middle’ style: intermediate, not between the Gorgian and the Lysian—for the Lysian had not yet arisen—but between the Gorgian, or poetical, and the colloquial. Secondly, he matured that terse, compact period (στρογγύλη, συνεστραμμένη), fittest for real contests, which in Antiphon is still rude, but which is found in the more artistic speeches of Lysias. Thirdly, he corrected the Gorgian idea of rhythmical beauty (εὐρυθμία) in prose, by moderating the effort to frame prose in the strict rhythms of verse, and, according to Aristotle—though the fragments of Thrasymachos do not illustrate that statement—by introducing the paeonAbove, p. 61.. The His place in the history. significance of Thrasymachos is twofold. In respect to rhythm and to his conception of a middle style, he may be considered as the forerunner of Isokrates. In respect to his development of the terse period, to his training in the forensic Rhetoric, and to the practical bent of his work, he is the pioneer of Lysias and of those orators, whether forensic or deliberative, who are in contrast with the Gorgians and Isokratics.

Lysias.

Lysias now completes the reaction from the poeticism of Gorgias and the stateliness of Antiphon. He boldly takes as his material the diction of the private citizen who has had the ordinary Athenian education; and, being an artist of true genius, Lysias shapes out of this a singularly beautiful prose. The conception was fortunate; it was in essential harmony with the spirit of Attic Greek; and, if a Lysias had not arisen, the world would not have known some most delicate felicities of that idiom. It was a faculty of the language developed once for all, committed to an exquisite record, and thus secured against the possibility of being missed by anyone who hereafter should aim at mastery over all the resources of Attic speech. Nor was the lesson lost on Demosthenes and Hypereides any more than on the Augustan Atticists.

Isokrates.

It might have seemed that a finished simplicity so congenial to the Attic spirit had for ever superseded the ideal of Gorgias. But, just as the influence of that ideal was declining, a pupil of Gorgias came forward to show that his master's theory, though deformed by extravagances, was grounded in truth. Isokrates proved that, without loss of ease and fluency, prose may be artistically ornate in the general sense of Gorgias, (that is, with the aid of certain embellishments proper to poetry,) if only these are rightly chosen and are temperately used. The great difference between the work of Lysias and His work compared with that of Lysias. the work of Isokrates is this:—Lysias did perfectly what could be done to such perfection in pure Attic alone: Isokrates did excellently, though not faultlessly, a thing from which the finest instincts of Attic Greek were averse, but which, on the other hand, could be reproduced with fair success in any language that was sufficiently flexible and polished. Lysias traced the canon of Attic subtlety. Isokrates sent his influence from Greece into modern Europe He founds a Normal Prose. by founding a norm of literary prose.

Two circumstances especially favoured his aptitude for such a task. The first was that, until after the time of Aristotle, epideictic oratory, the branch of Isokrates, had a higher dignity in general Estimation of the Epideictic branch. estimation than either the forensic or the deliberative. A forensic or a deliberative speech had served its purpose when it had been spoken; it might be published, for students or for statesmen; but it was not intrinsically a part of the national literature in the same sense as (for instance) the Panegyrikos. Aristotle, who had probably heard Demosthenes, notices him only cursorily. Theophrastos, in tracing the development of Attic prose, stopped at Isokrates. It was only later Greek critics who could see things in a more just perspective. Secondly, Isokrates is The School of Isokrates. the only considerable Attic writer who was also a popular teacher of composition. He could affirm that all the men formed in his school had the same stamp of style: and, so far as the statement can be tested, it seems to be strictly true. The Isokratic The Isokratic Prose —meant chiefly for readers. prose was meant to be read rather than to be spoken. This is the basis of its character, distinguishing it from the earlier rhetorical prose, and fitting it to influence the literary prose of the modern world. To the conservative section of the Gorgian school this seemed, of course, an error. When AlkidamasSauppe (O. A. II. 156) and others reject the περὶ τῶν τοὺς γραπτοὺς λόγους γραφόντων ἢ περὶ σοφιστῶν. Blass (Att. Ber. II. 327 f.), reviewing the arguments, pronounces—rightly, to my thinking—for its genuineness. attacked Isokrates in his essay against the composers of ‘written discourses’ (γραπτοὺς λόγους),—meaning, by that phrase, discourses composed, not to be spoken, but to be read,—he was loyal to the genuine tradition of his master. The object of Gorgias was to cultivate the faculty of oral and extemporary eloquence. But Isokrates, moved partly by his own want of voice and nerve, partly by the desire of teaching all Greece and of doing permanent work, resolved that epideictic oratory should have a literary form. For these purposes, as he saw, the composition of Gorgias and Thrasymachos, with its short clauses, was not sufficiently copious: that of Thucydides was not too rough. He sought, then, to give speech a fuller flow and a softer tone: and he moderated the use of every ornament which disturbs this flow or violates this tone. The chief Its broad characteristics. marks of Isokratic prose are,—the avoidance of poetical diction; the ampler period; evenness, obtained especially by systematic care against the collision of vowels; and the sparing admission of anything like a declamatory or passionate strain. These essential characteristics, to judge from fragments and from notices, were common to the Isokratic school. Epideictic Rhetoric, in application to its old subjects, was doomed. The first generation of Isokratics already felt that it could not last out their time, and were led, therefore, to widen their range. The application of Epideictic Rhetoric to Its influence on History-writing. History was a gain for Rhetoric, and, on the whole, a decided gain for the popular culture of that day: it was even so far a gain to History that much good work was done by men like Theopompos who, fifty years before, would have left nothing but a collection of panegyrical discourses. On the other hand, the vice of an origin from the Rhetoric of display became disastrously apparent when lesser men than Theopompos began to think that they must be accurate if they could, but brilliant at all costs. This evil tendency, however, did not fully set in until the style itself was declining: and it ought not to mislead us into underrating the value to literature of the Isokratic prose. Theopompos was a thoroughly Theopompos. Isokratic composer, but, as might be expected in the disciple who ‘needed the curb,’ had more force and passion. Ephoros, emulating the smooth copiousness Ephoros. of his master, was languid and diffuse. Such a contrast of personal temperaments and faculties is the best possible evidence to the definiteness of that common type which could still be recognised in both. The same type was equally clear in Theodektes, who Theodektes. seems to have had some dialectical training; and in Kephisodoros, who shared the orthodox hostility of Kephisodoros. his school to dialectic. In short, there was now a literary method, not to be obscured by individualities of culture or of aptitude, in virtue of which its possessor could be called Isokratic.

Isokratic prose and its influence

By 350 B. C. this method had no longer any The Isokratic Type becomes the standard of prose. serious rival in its claim to be considered as the normal prose. A writer like the so-called Antisthenes might popularise his dialectic in such a piece Its rivals. as the controversy between Ajax and Odysseus. Alkidamas might defend, and Lykophron illustrate, the principles of Gorgias. Polykrates and Zoilos might show that something of Lysian elegance could be carried into other fields than the forensic. But, for the general uses of literature, the Isokratic style had been accepted as the standard. This may be seen from the way in which its influence grew upon writers outside the school. Plato's style has no law Its influencc —how far felt by Plato but itself; it has its unique place in the border-land between poetry and prose, being, as a rule, at its highest when it is nearer to the former. For our present purpose, it would scarcely be profitable to dwell on the Menexenos. The general marks of its style are manifest; the easy, irregular structure of dialogue interferes with the management of the unwonted oratorical period; the ornament is in the immature manner of Gorgias, not at all in that of Isokrates or Lysias; the diction shows occasional redundance, and even what a modern reader can agree with ancient Greek criticism in regarding as of doubtful correctness; the habit of irony slips into a homeliness which, here, is grotesque; and a few phrases are ‘not far from dithyrambs.’ But then it might always be answered that, at worst, the Menexenos is an imperfectly elaborated joke. The influence of the new prose, in so far as it was felt by Plato, must be sought on a surer and broader ground. Two general characteristics of his later work seem to afford such ground. First: the later, as compared with the earlier, dialogues—e.g. the Laws, Timaeos, Kritias as compared with the Republic—have less of short question and answer, and more of continuous exposition. The style of oral dialogue is passing over into a finished literary prose. Secondly: the strongest single peculiarity of the new prose—avoidance of hiatus—becomes more and more marked the later down we go. The instances of hiatus in the Phaedros are not one half so numerous as in the Republic or the Symposium, and the rate of decrease is (approximately) progressive in the Laws, Philebos, Timaeos, Kritias, Sophistes, Politikos See a rough estimate of the averages in Blass, Att. Ber. II. 426 f.; suggesting that an emendation which, in these dialogues, introduces hiatus is, so far, improbable a priori.

Isokrates and Xenophon, Aristotle, modern prose

Xenophon was no trained rhetor. The natural eloquence which did good service in the Retreat was of the rough and ready kind; nor, in writing, did he consciously or systematically aim at art. If he had studied expression, he would probably have become Lysian: as it is, in his manner of neither seeking nor declining ornament, he is sometimes like Andokides. Xenophon, living away from Athens, did not come under the direct influence of the Isokratic school. But there are indications, which a sober criticism can scarcely reject, that in his later years he was strongly influenced as a writer by his fellow-demesman and early friend, whose works were then read throughout Greece. Xenophon was engaged on the Hellenika to the end of his life; and the Agesilaos, of which the genuineness seems certain, was one of his very latest writings. In both these there is a distinct dualism of style. The last five books of the Hellenika are decidedly smoother and more copious than their predecessors: they have something of the Isokratic manner which just then was coming into history. The Agesilaos is thoroughly Xenophontic in diction: the structure of the sentences is, on the whole, rather stiff and uniform: there are characteristic oddities—e.g., the frequency of γε μήν, ἀλλὰ μήν—as in the Hipparchikos and elsewhere. But the historical portion—a narrative of the hero's deeds, partly adapted from the Hellenika—is separate from the rest in its greater smoothness of flow.

Unquestionably it was more as a practical teacher Isokrates and Aristotle as theorists. than as a theorist, and more as a writer than as a teacher, that Isokrates was important for Attic prose. Earlier contributors to the Art of Rhetoric had collected materials which Isokrates worked up into something like a system. Anaximenes, who, like Isokrates, conceived political Rhetoric as a culture, drew up the best practical treatise on Rhetoric which has come down to us in Greek; it would have been the best in Greek or Latin, if the Rhetorica ad Herennium were not extant. But, if a philosophical treatment is required, neither Anaximenes nor the writer to Herennius can be accepted. Aristotle stands alone. Yet the school of Aristotle—in which Rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught—produced not a single orator of note except Demetrios Phalereus; the school of Isokrates produced a host. Why was this so? Clearly because Isokrates, though inferior in his grasp of principles, was greatly superior in the practical department of teaching. It was not mainly by his theory, τέχνη, it was rather by exercises, μελέται, for which his own writings furnished models, that he formed his pupils. At the same time, his theory, so far as it went, was definite. Aristotle's philosophy of Rhetoric proved comparatively barren, not at all because Rhetoric is incapable of profiting materially by such treatment, but because such treatment can be made fruitful only by laborious attention to the practical side of the discipline. Had Aristotle's Rhetoric been composed a century earlier, it would have been inestimable to oratory. As it was, the right thing was done too late.

In the political eloquence contemporary with The Political Oratory is eclectic: Demosthenes, earlier types are continued, combined and perfected. The Lysian tradition, which Isaeos had striven to ally with the frank strength of technical mastery, is joined by Hypereides to the Isokratic. The Isokratic manner is united, in Lykurgos, to that of the long neglected school of Antiphon. That same archaic style, studied in a greater master, Thucydides, reaches, in Demosthenes, a final harmony with both the Lysian and the Isokratic; while Aeschines, the clever and diligent amateur, shows, by his failures, how much patient science was needed to bring a faultless music out of all the tones which had now made themselves clear in Attic speech. But, among these various elements, one is dominant. but fundamentally Isokratic. The Isokratic style has become the basis of the rest. That style, in its essential characteristics of rhythm Isokrates and modern prose. and period, passed into the prose of Cicero; modern prose has been modelled on the Roman; and thus, in forming the literary rhetoric of Attica, Isokrates founded that of all literatures.

The Decline and the Revival.
Loss of Political Freedom—how far a cause of the decline.

AT the moment when the theory of oratory had been raised from a technical to a scientific form, its practice began to decline: the great analyst who gave a philosophy to Rhetoric was also the master of Demetrios Phalereus. It is commonly said that the declension of Attic oratory dates from the loss of political freedom. The fact is certain: but those who have tried to see what this oratory in its essence was, will be the first to feel that the connexion between the two things is not altogether self-evident. As to Deliberative Oratory: the Deliberative branch, that, clearly, was doomed to decay when the questions which the ekklesia could discuss with a practical result came to be hardly more than municipal. A good notion of the manner in which the province of debate was now restricted may be got from a speechHypereides ὑπὲρ Εὐξενίππου. made eight years after Chaeroneia, when Alexander was in the mid-career of his Asiatic victories. An Athenian citizen of the Macedonian party had tried to damage his adversary in a law-suit by insinuating that this adversary had flattered Olympias and Alexander. Hypereides retorts that it would be more to the purpose if, instead of making such charges, Polyeuktos could muster courage to go and denounce the injurious dictation of Macedon before the Panhellenic Congress: but the very way in which this is put implies that it was more than could be expected of ordinary patriotism; and the merit claimed for Euxenippos is not that he has done anything of the kind, but simply that he has shunned association with the active Athenian agents of Alexander. As Aristotle says, no one deliberates about the impossible; and, in regard to independent action, the limits of the possible for Athens had become narrow. Nor was the Forensic branch exempt from Forensic. similar influences. Macedonian blandishments could reach jurors as well as debaters: the art of persuasion, pure and simple, would count for less and less; and the aim of the Athenian writer for the lawcourts would become more and more like that of the speaker whose first object is the display of his faculty. Granting all this, however, why, it may be asked, Fpideictic. should not Attic oratory, being essentially a fine art, have found at least one secure refuge in this very department of display; especially since the Epideictic branch had become so closely identified with the national literature? As long as there were such writers as Theopompos, or even Ephoros, a tolerably pure Attic style might surely be preserved, even though there were no longer political inspirations for the deliberative speaker, or, for the advocate, the opportunities of a real equality before the law. After all, the deliberative branch itself had developed its best types chiefly from the epideictic.

Ultimate cause of the decline.

This question might fairly be raised. And assuredly a true answer to it is not to be found merely in the political circumstances of the time when Athens had just come under the leadership of Macedon. We must go further back, and look deeper into the conditions under which the best work of Greek art was done. In the Ionian republics, and especially at Athens, while their life was still healthy, letters and the fine arts entered into the education which was received by all citizens alike. Letters and the fine arts were therefore subject to the opinion, not of a class, but of the entire city. The artist, whether sculptor or architect, painter, The great Greek Art waspopular: poet or orator, received the impress of the national mind, and reflected it from his own. He worked for all the citizens, and he knew that he would be judged, not by a few critics, but by the whole civic body. The Greek genius, in its purest and brightest form, tended of itself to fix its attention on what is essential and typical in nature, and to suppress those mere accidents of which the prominence is always disturbing and at last grotesque. Here was a further safeguard for the artistic worker who began with this inborn tendency. Mannerism and exaggeration may be made the fashion of a clique, but, where public opinion is really free, they will never be popular. The Greek artist who, in rivalry with brother artists, sought for the approbation of his fellow-citizens gathered in the theatre, or going about their daily work amid gracious forms of marble or living shapes still more beautiful, in the clear air of Attica and close to the foam and freshness of the sea, knew that no refinements of the study could save him if he was false to nature, and knew, also, that his loyalty to nature would be surely recognised just in proportion as he brought out, not the trivial or transient things, not such things as depend for their interest on an artificial situation, but those lineaments of nature which have the divine simplicity of permanence. It cannot be too often repeated, but not therefore the less ideal. it is a thoroughly vulgar misconception, more fatal than anything else to the comprehension of all Greek things, to suppose that the Athenian statesmen or cobblers who went to the theatre of Dionysos in the days of Perikles found the art of Sophocles cold because it was ideal, and would have thought the demonstrative and rhetorical pathos of Euripides more ‘human.’ Their feeling, happily, was very different, or the Parthenon would have been very different too. They felt that the immortal things of humanity are more human than its accidents; and therefore, the poorest of them, they could rise out of the mean or grievous things of daily life into a contemplation which educated the passions that it moved and resolved the anguish of pity or of terror in a musical and chastened joy. The festive disposition of the Greeks is a perpetual snare to modern writers who cannot dissociate the love of dinner-parties from a tone either mildly cynical or at all events the reverse of transcendental, and who hasten to the conclusion that an inquirer exempt from academical sentiment or pedantry will study the real Greeks in their comedians or their cooks. It was not until the moral unity of the State was broken, and men began to live a life of thought or pleasure apart from the life of the city, that the artists began to work for the few, and that the taste of the many sank below the power of appreciating the highest beauty. Philip, Alexander and their Successors were indeed the apostles of Greek language, Greek art, Greek social civilisation: but between Hellas and Hellenism there was a spiritual Gulf between Hellas and Hellenism. separation which no force of the individual mind could do away. Literature and art had been sacred energies and public delights to the citizens of free Athens: to the writers or artists of Antioch or The artists of Hellenism. Alexandria they were agreeable industries, inviting reward or awaiting correction from aristocratic patrons, whose artificial canons encouraged either an elaborate vagueness of expression or the pretence of an occult profunditySee some admirable observations on this subject in Greece under the Romans, pp. 9 f. and 229 f., by Mr George Finlay—a writer whom, it may be hoped, his countrymen will yet come to know more widely than they did while he was living.. The lapse of literature and art into the depths of affectation is only a matter of time when the judges on whom recognition depends are a capricious and absolute oligarchy. There Art depends on a judicious and candid public. is no lasting security for truth in artistic creation except an intelligent public, pronouncing with authority and not intimidated by the prescriptions of a coterie or a caste. In this sense, it may justly be said that nothing is so democratic as taste; nor could there be a better illustration than a comparison between the Athens of Perikles and the Alexandria of the Ptolemies.

Meaning of ‘Asianism.’

While, then, the loss of political independence had a certain immediate effect in deteriorating deliberative and forensic oratory, the primary cause of their decline was one which lay deeper, which had begun its slow workings before Philip had a footing in Greece, and which affected the literary form of artistic prose even more strongly than the other two forms. This cause was the same which gradually vitiated every other branch of Greek art, and which prepared the downfall of Greek independence itself —the decay of the citizen-life of the Greek republics, whereby Greek art in every kind lost that popular character which was the external safeguard of the Greek artist's instinct for truth. It is important, therefore, to get rid of the notion that, when ‘Asianism’ is opposed to ‘Atticism’, the meaning is that Attic simplicity was overlaid by the tawdry taste of the Orientals among whom Greek letters were diffused by the conquests of Alexander. It is true that, in the new Hellenic settlements of Karia, Mysia and the Hellespont, Greek nationality was less pure, and that when the Augustan Atticists wished to stigmatise their opponents they loved to call them PhrygiansA lost treatise of Caecilius— who also wrote on the question, τίνι διαφέρει ὁ Ἀττικὀς ζῆλος τοῦ Ἀσιανοῦ — was called κατὰ τῶν Φρυγῶν—being a polemical introduction to his Lexicon of Attic phrases: Suidas s. v. Καικίλιος. Cf Cic. Orat. § 25, Itaque Caria et Phrygia et Mysia, quod minime politae minimeque elegantes sunt, asciverunt opimum quoddam et tanquam adipatae diction is genus. . But the depravation began in Athens itself: it became universal, because the demoralisation of the Greeks was universal: it passed over to Asia with the literature of the emigration, and there it grew worse: but it grew worse everywhere else too. Kallisthenes of Stageiros, Timaeos of Tauromenion, had the ‘Asiatic’ tendency as distinctly as any son of Tralles or Alabanda. ‘Asiatic’, as applied to Greek oratory, is properly a geographical term only. It expresses the fact that, from about 320 to about 280 B.C., the new Greek settlements in Asia Minor were the parts of Hellas in which oratory and prose literature were most actively cultivated. The general character of this prose was the same as the general character of prose in Sicily, at Athens, and in every other part of Hellas. ‘Asianism’ versus ‘Atticism’ means the New versus the Old Oratory. The essential difference between them is this. The Old Oratory was an art, and was Essential difference between Atticism and Asianism. therefore based upon a theory. The New Oratory was a knack, τρίβη, and was founded upon practice, μελέτη. Atticism was technical and, in its highest phase, scientific. Asianism was empirical. The flourishing period of Asianism was that during which the whole training of the rhetor consisted in declamation. The revival of Atticism dates from the moment when attention was recalled to theory.

Course of the Decline and the Revival.

From 300 to about 250 B.C. the general course of the decline can be made out with tolerable clearness. From 250 to about 150 B.C. all is dark. When light comes again, Asianism is seen fully developed and wholly triumphant; but a reaction to Atticism is setting in. This reaction may be considered as beginning with Hermagoras of Temnos, about 110 B. C.See Blass in his book on Greek Oratory from Alexander to Augustus, p. 85. From Cic. de Invent. I. § 8 it is clear that Hermagoras the technicist had then been long dead. As Blass says, he must at least belong to the 2nd century B.C., and as completed at Rome by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, about 20 B.C.

The general character of Asianism, or the New Prose, results from the fact that it is founded on no theory of prose-writing as an art. The prose composition, whether history or oration, is not contemplated as a whole, and consequently no care is taken to preserve a symmetry of parts. Hence arises Source of the vices in style— exaggeration. Its two chief forms. exaggeration; and this exaggeration is usually in one of two principal directions. Sometimes it is an exaggerated desire of grandeur or splendour which leads the writer to say all things in a diction which should have been kept for the great things. Sometimes it is an exaggerated desire of point which makes him heedless whether the thought which he is expressing is obscured or made ridiculous by the turn which he gives to it. Asianism oscillates between bombast and importunate epigram. The fresh currents of public criticism in the Athens of Perikles would have blown such tricks to the winds: in schools or palaces their sickly growth was sheltered:—

and not the Sun-god's fire, Not heaven's pure dew comes there, nor any wind.

Orators of the period 320-250 B.C.

During the first half century or so of the decadence— These tendencies universal, 320— 250 B.C. to about 250 B.C.—we are able to see this, at least, clearly, that the new tendencies are at work in all schools alike. Not even the definite Isokratic type, or the scientific Rhetoric founded by Aristotle, is proof against them. Aristotle's pupil Demetrios of Demetrios Phalereus Phaleron is named by Cicero as the first who impaired the strength of Attic oratory, ‘preferring his own sweetness to the weight and dignity of his predecessorsCic. Brut. § 38.’. His style, like his life, was elegantly luxurious; but in becoming ornate it became nerveless; there is no longer, says Cicero, ‘sucus ille et sanguis incorruptus’, the sap, the fresh vigour, which had hitherto been in oratory; in their place there is ‘fucatus nitor’, an artificial glossCic. Orat. § 92.. In the school of Isokrates, the decline is represented by Kallisthenes of Stageiros, who accompanied Kallisthenes. Alexander to the East, and who, in a memoir, described the Pamphylian Sea as lashing its shores for joy at the hero's approach. Timaeos of Tauromenion, Timaeos. also an imitator of Isokrates, did not err on this side, but had the taste for verbal conceits in a measure which the Middle Comedy would not have tolerated. Kleitarchos, son of the historian Deinon, Kleitarchos. was more like Kallisthenes; as the author of the treatise On Sublimity observes περὶ ὕψους III. 2., ‘His pipe is small, but he blows it loud’; and the criticism is justified by a specimen of his manner which another writer has preserved. Kleitarchos, describing the habits of a bee, said, κατανέμεται τὴν ὀρεινήν,—just, the critic complains, as if he had been speaking of the Erymanthian boarDemetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας § 304.. But the new tendencies are more strongly exemplified by Hegesias of Magnesia, Hegesias. (about 270 B.C.), who has sometimes been called, in a misleading phrase, the founder of Asianism. Hegesias was deliberately opposed to everything that Isokrates had introduced and Demosthenes had perfected. In diction, he was a coarse imitator of Lysias; in composition, he adopted a style of short clauses which was his own. Dionysios De comp. verb. p. 122. pronounces him ‘finnikin’ (μικρόκομψον), ‘languid,’ and blames especially his ‘ignoble rhythms’—meaning thereby especially the trochee and the tribrach as opposed to the paeon and the dactyl. But the chief characteristic of his style must have been the curious combination of jerkiness and magniloquence, of which the following is a specimenPhot. cod. 250, pp. 446 f., who quotes it from Agatharchides, a geographer who flourished about 130 B.C.:—ὅμοιον πεποίηκας, Ἀλέξανδρε, Θήβας κατασκάψας, ὡς ἂν εἰ ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκ τη—ς κατ’ οὐρανὸν μερίδος ἐκβάλοι τὴν σελήνην. τὸν γὰρ ἥλιον ὑπολείπομαι ταῖς Ἀθήναις. δύο γὰρ αὗται πόλεις τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦσαν ὄψεις. διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀγωνιῶ νῦν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἷς αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ Θηβαίων ἐκκέκοπται πόλις. Within fifty years after the death of Demosthenes, Hegesias could be a favourite. Gorgias of Athens, Cicero's master, took his examples from Hegesias as well as from Demosthenes and Hypereides; Varro (Cic. ad Att. XII. 6.) and Strabo (p. 396) praised him; and it was reserved for Cicero and Dionysios to discover that he was an example of what is to be avoided.

Period from 250 to 150 B.C. obscure.

From 250 to 150 B.C. the history of Greek oratory is as obscure as the names which represent it. But, as appears from the sequel, such general tendencies as those represented by Timaeos on the one hand, and by Kallisthenes or Hegesias on the other, had been gaining ground. ‘There are,’ says Cicero, Cicero on the two kinds of Asianism. ‘two kinds of the Asiatic style. One is aphoristic, pointed, with turns of thought which have less weight or moral dignity than neatness and elegance. ... The other kind is not studded with such points; rather it rushes with an impetuous stream, and this is the manner now universal in Asia (50 B. C.). But it is not merely fluent; its language is also ornate and polished. This was the style used by Aeschylos of Knidos and by my contemporary, Aeschines of Miletos. They were distinguished by rushing eloquence, not by epigrammatic turns of thought.’ ( Brut. § 325)

The first of these two manners, the epigrammatic, was represented, according to Cicero, by the brothers Hierokles and Menekles of Alabanda, about 120 B.C. The second manner, that of ornate declamation, is represented by Aeschylos of Knidos and Aeschines of Miletos, about 80 B.C. It may be observed that Why one was earlier, the other later. the full development of the declamatory manner naturally came later than the other; for it was the last result of those declamatory exercises on which Asianism was foundedAeschines opencd a school at Rhodes when he left Athens in 320 B.C.: [Plut] vitt. X. oratt. This *(ποδιακὸν διδασκαλεῖον was undoubtedly a school of declamation: Aeschines did not profess to teach the art of Rhetoric.. In the progress of the decadence Hegesias was to Aeschylos of Knidos much what Antiphon was to Demosthenes.

Revival of Atticism and of rhetorical theory

At the time when Asianism of the sententious Atticism prepared by Hermagoras kind was prevalent, the first step towards the revival of Atticism was taken by Hermagoras of Temnos. Revival of a Theory The art of Rhetoric, which now for a century and a half had exercised little influence on oratory, had passed at Athens through two phases. Phases of Rhetoric -- the Practical: First, the Practical Rhetoric founded in Sicily by Korax had been perfected by Anaximenes and Isokrates. This could not exist without a practical object; it perished before Athens had become what Athens was in the days of Polybios. 'The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills; Athênê still stands spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city; Dêmos still sits in Pnyx; he still choose Archons by the lot and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishounored old age; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings; its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities.'Freeman, History of Federal Government, vol. 1, p. 221. But, just as the Practical Rhetoric was about to perish because its occupation was gone, Aristotle claimed Rhetoric for philosophy. The Philosophical: The Philosophical Rhetoric necessarily aimed, of course, at forming practical orators; but, unlike its predecessor, it had a reason for existing independently of results. In the schools of the philosophers accordingly, and chiefly in the Peripatetic school, it had lived on. Hermagoras now worked up the treatises both of the Practical and of the Philosophical Rhetoric into a new system. His object was practical; but he followed the philosophers in giving his chief care to the province of Invention. Erring on the side of too much subtlety, he founded a Rhetoric which, as distinguished from the Practical and the Philosophical, may be called the ScholasticFor the system of Hermagoras, see Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer: esp §§ 3— 4, pp. 20—30.. For Greek oratory this could do little directly. But The Scholastic for Roman oratory Hermagoras and his followers did Its uses to Greece and to Rome very much what the school of Isokrates had done for Athens. And both to Greece and to Rome they did good service by reviving the conception of oratory not as a knack but as an art, and so preparing men once more to discern between the true artists and the false. It is not a mere coincidence, it is one Revival of Sculpture contemporary with Atticism. illustration more of the close bond between oratory and the other arts that, just about the time when the Atticist revival was beginning, there are traces of a renascence in Greek sculpture. From about 300 Reaction from and School of Lysippos. to 150 B.C. the school of Lysippos had prevailed—a school which substituted the real for the ideal, selecting the basest subjects if in these a frigid technical skill could be shown forth. In sculpture, as in oratory, ingenuity or pretension had marred simplicity, dignity and beauty; and the generation that began to revolt from Hegesias began also to revolt from Lysippos.

It may have been Cicero who paid a compliment So-called Rhodian School: a mere compromise in favour of Atticism. to his teacher Molon by setting the fashion of distinguishing a Rhodian School from the Attic and the Asiatic. Such a school is unknown to Dionysios, Caecilius or Strabo. It is, in fact, confusing to treat it as separate. The Rhodian orators, so far as they had a common stamp, were eclectics, borrowing from the epigrammatic Asianism, but, on the whole, inclined to Atticism of the type represented by Hypereides. Under the Successors of Alexander, Rhodes under the Diadochi. Rhodes had become important, first, politically, and then, as a result of this, in a literary and scientific sense. The oratorical school does not seem to have been famous before 100 B.C. Apollonios and Molon Fame for oratory— from circ. 100 B C. were both Karians of Alabanda, who, like many other men whose names illustrated Rhodes, migrated thither for a career. Cicero is no impartial Estimate of the Rhodian merits. panegyrist of a school to which he probably owed many faults; and, in the judgment of Dionysios, the Atticism of the Rhodians was perverse. Yet, in its degree, it must have done good service at a time when florid declamation was almost universally popular; and, through Cicero, it brought the better of two rival influences into the mighty stream of Roman life.

Roman view of Oratory

Before Roman oratory could be even indirectly influenced by Greek, there was an obstacle to be removed. The Roman mind, unlike the Greek, did not instinctively conceive the public speaker as an artist. It conceived him strictly as a citizen, weighty by piety, years, or office, who has something to say for the good of the other citizens, and whose dignity, hardly less than the value of his hearer's time, enjoins a pregnant and severe conciseness. Cato Progress of the Greek view at Rome. detested Greek rhetoric. The Gracchi, on the other hand, were more Hellenic in their tastes; and before 100 B.C. the florid Asianism had admirers and perhaps imitators at Rome. Declamations in Greek on Declamations. abstract questions ( θέσεις, quaestiones) were first introduced: then, about Cicero's time, came exercises on definite cases founded in fact (ὑποθέσεις , caussae), either forensic or deliberative—the latter being suasoriae. In Cicero's time, or a little later, there were also controversiae—dealing with special situations, but not with special persons; e.g., what a brave man is to do in such or such circumstances; and these at once recall the nature of the exercises which Aeschines is said to have founded at Rhodes. Lastly, under the Empire, we have declamations on poetical or fancy themes. Now, all these favourable to Asianism. declamatory exercises were in the interest of Asianism. What was necessary to give Atticism a future at Rome was that the theory of Rhetoric should have a place there. It was a great step gained when, about 92 B.C., L. Plotius and others opened schools Roman schools of Rhetoric. for the teaching of Rhetoric in Latin. The censors, as might have been expected, opposed this: in the last days of the Republic, Rome was rather scandalised by the first instance of a Knight teaching Rhetoric; but learners were numerous from the first.

Asianism versus Atticism.

As early as 90 B.C., then, the Greek conception of oratory was established at Rome. Roman oratory was to be, in some way, artistic. The question remained, Was this way to be the ‘Asiatic’ or the ‘Attic’?

Hortensius and Asianism

About 95 B.C. Hortensius began to be the Latin representative of Asianism. It was his distinction that he combined its two manners, sententious point and florid declamation. His vivacity was probably his best quality: it is characteristic of the man that he studied all aids to theatrical effect, and also that, when he had reached the consulship, his oratorical ambitions were fulfilled.

Cicero the eclectic

Cicero now comes forward as the representative of the Rhodian eclecticism. His success, though not exactly a victory for the Attic school, was, at least, a sure sign that the Atticists would finally prevail. Cicero, like his Rhodian masters, is by no means emancipated from Asianism; and, in a comparison with Demosthenes, his faults of form are made more conspicuous by the usual absence of great thoughts and of really noble feeling. The force of the recent and surely extravagant reaction against Cicero comes from the habit of regarding him as the great Roman orator, not as the great Roman master of literary rhetorical prose. His proper Greek analogue is not Demosthenes but Isokrates. As a practical orator, Cicero can scarcely be placed in the second rank by those who know the Attic models. As a stylist in the epideictic kind, though he has not consummate art, he joins versatile strength to brilliancy and abundance in a degree which has never been equalled.

Calvus and Messalla Corvinus: pure Atticism

The pure Atticism of Rome may be dated from about 60 B.C. Its best representative was the poet and forensic orator, Gaius Licinius Calvus (82—48 B.C.), who imitated Lysias in a field of work as limited as the Greek writer's own, but who, like Lysias, was not untouched by a generous sympathy with the great political interests of his day. Next to Calvus probably came Messalla Corvinus, who Messalla Corvinus. translated the defence of Phryne by Hypereides, and who is said to have been not unsuccessful in reproducing something of the master's eloquence. Atticism was the return, not to a school, but to a phase of the Greek mind: and, as the men who represented this phase were most various, it was inevitable that the revival should have factions. One sect of the earlier Roman Atticists worshipped The sects of Roman Atticism; Xenophon; another, Thucydides; another, Lysias and Hypereides. To adopt Xenophon as an Xenophontics: oratorical standard was a mere mistake: in style, he is an unpractical Andokides: and for the advocate, at least, no model could be less suitable A forensi strepitu remotissimus: Cic. Orat. § 32 .. Thucydideans: Thucydides, again, is at once transitional and unique: to imitate him in another language was therefore a twofold error. The Lysians and Hypereideans Lysians and Hypereideans. could have shown far better reason for their choice, if only the distinctive excellence of Lysias and Hypereides, their χάρις or grace, had not been the very thing which no Greek had succeeded in reproducing, and which manifestly could not be translated into an idiom which was not its own. At last Dionysios came forward to maintain that Demosthenics. the excellences of Thucydides, of Isokrates, of Lysias, and if these, then the excellences of Xenophon and Hypereides too, meet in Demosthenes.

Fruits of Atticism for Rome and for Greece.

It must be borne in mind that the practical benefits to be derived from Atticism by Rome were of a different order from those which could be derived from it by Greece. Rome was only developing her artistic literature: Greece had seen hers pass through maturity to decay. The sapling might be trained to lines of growth in which it should bear fruit hereafter; the withered tree could blossom no more. The Atticist Revival gave Rome true canons for living work. It gave Greece, not this, but the only thing now possible, a standard for the appreciation of the past. The representative of the revival, as it affected Rome, is Cicero. The representative of the revival, as it affected both Rome Dionysios and Greece, is Dionysios of Halikarnassos, the greatest critic of the ancient world who was not a philosopher. Philosophical criticism began with Aristotle; and, for antiquity, may be said to have ended with him. But the literary criticism of the the literary critic of antiquity. ancient world was never so thorough as in Dionysios. He and his friend Caecilius, those two men who, Scope of work chosen by him and by Caecilius. in the reign of Augustus, gave a complete expression to all the tendencies and energies of the reaction which had been growing for nearly a century, had this for a common characteristic,—they were determined not to lose themselves in the subtleties of the new Scholastic Rhetoric: they saw that there was better work to be done. They Technical Rhetoric not their field. did not try to strike out a new path through these technical mazes, like Apollodoros of Pergamos or his antagonist Theodoros of Gadara just before them, or like Hermogenes after them. On technical points, Dionysios generally goes back to Aristotle or Theophrastos. He and his friend saw that the revival of theory had performed its part, by recalling attention to those works of true art by which the theory was illustrated. What was now needed was not a Aesthetic criticism now needed. more minute analysis but a better aesthetic criticism. For Cicero's teacher at Athens, Demosthenes and Hegesias were alike classical. This must not be. Men must be taught to feel, and not merely to recognise by a mechanical test, that Hegesias and Demosthenes are of different orders. This desire of clearer insight into the things which make the Attic excellences was necessarily connected with the task of separating genuine from spurious works. In the Discrimination of true and spurious writings. catalogues of the orators (ῥητορικοὶ πίνακες) at Pergamos or Alexandria the librarian had merely to register the traditional authorship. He could not enter upon critical inquiries. Such inquiries were undertaken by Dionysios and Caecilius. The paper of Dionysios on Deinarchos exemplifies his method. The evidence used is external as well as internal: the rhetor's life is sketched; his models are indicated; the tradition is tried by its warranty, by that conception of the writer's style which the critic has formed for himself, and by the subject-matter. Dionysios was, however, preeminently the literary Special work of Dionysios, critic, Caecilius was preeminently the scholar and grammarian. The treatment of the Attic orators by the two men respectively suggests the greater independence and greater subtlety of Dionysios in this field. On the other hand, Caecilius was the first to and of Caecilius. cultivate a province on which Dionysios does not seem to have entered. The register of Attic phrases compiled by Caecilius—who probably wrote a rhetorical lexicon also—stood, as the first of its kind, between the glossaries of Alexandria and such later lexicons as those of Harpokration.

Asianism as viewed by Cicero and by Greek Atticists.

The spirit which animated all this various work came from a certain way of looking at the whole development of Greek prose since Alexander. Cicero, the Roman, conceives Atticism as an unbroken tradition, which was merely adulterated and debased by those influences which are called Asiatic. In one sense this is most true. Athens made once for all the conquest of Hellenic prose. The forms of the Attic dialect became once for all the standard forms of Greek literature, and are so in the newspapers of today. From Polybios to Trikoupes the literary supremacy of Athens has been acknowledged by men who have written in a dialect which they did not speak. It has been truly said that the latest Byzantine was, in language, nearer to Xenophon than Xenophon was to Herodotos Freeman, Unity of History .. On the other hand, just as a Roman could scarcely comprehend the feeling with which Demosthenes regarded Philip, so a Roman could scarcely comprehend the feeling with which Dionysios and Caecilius regarded Hegesias. To those Greek scholars living in Augustan Rome, Asianism, when they looked back on it and compared it with the art of better days, seemed not merely a debasement, but an extinction, of the soul by which that art had lived. Attic forms might be retained; but without the Attic spirit they were dead. The continuity had been merely outward. Let us hear Dionysios on the Dectine and the Revival. Dionysios say this in his own vivid words. ‘Great thanks might justly be given to our days, most excellent Ammaeus, as well for an improvement in other branches of culture, as particularly for the signal advance that has been made by the study of Civil Oratory. For, in the times before ours, the old scientific Rhetoric was threatened with abolition by the contumelies and outrages that it suffered. From the death of Alexander of Macedon it began to yield up its spirit and gradually to fade; and in our own generation it was all but totally extinguished. A stranger crept into the other's place—immodest, theatrical, ill-bred, intolerable, imbued neither with philosophy nor with any other liberal discipline; stealthily she imposed on the ignorance of the multitude; and, besides living in greater wealth, luxury, splendour than her predecessor, drew into her own hands all those threads of political power and influence which should have been held by her wiser sister. Utterly vulgar and meddlesome, the usurper at last made Greece like to the households of misguided profligates. For, even as in such houses the true wife, freeborn and virtuous, sits powerless over all that is her own, while a giddy paramour, a presence fatal to the home, claims to govern its fortunes, heaping scorns and threats on their rightful queen; even so in every city—aye, and worst of all, in the seats of culture no less than elsewhere—the Attic Muse, daughter of the land and of its memories, had been disinherited and made a mockery, while the abuse that had come but yesterday from some barbarians of Asia, an outlandish baggage from Phrygia or Karia, presumed to rule the cities of Greece, when, by her, the other had been driven from their councils—the wise damsel by the foolish, the modest by the madDionys. περὶ τῶν ἀρχ. ῥητόρων, proem. .’

Permanent results of the revival.

Atticism could not quicken the dead things of Greece, nor could it permanently guard Rome against the intrusions of a false taste. Two things, however, it did, and for these it deserves the gratitude of mankind. It set correct models before those great Roman writers who, in their turn, have been examples to the modern world. It founded a Greek criticism of Greek literature in which the perspective was just, and recorded the reasons of men, whose qualifications and opportunities were complete, for comparative estimates which the sense of posterity has approved, but to which posterity alone could not have given so authoritative a sanction. Greek lived on, to be the tongue in which Marcus and Julian, by the Danube or the Rhine, asserted the late supremacy of a wisdom that carried the seeds of death, to bring the message of a hope beyond the grave and to bear on a strenuous tide the voices of men whom that promise made sublime, to be the record of empire in the city of Constantine, to write its legends on the stones of Ravenna or to blazon them on the apses of Venice and Torcello, even to keep bright the memories of civil freedom where, in a northern isolation, in the Tauric land washed by the harbourless sea, the fire once taken from Megara burned for centuries on the last altar of the hearth that had a Greek commonwealth for its shrine, and at last, in our own age, after a second deliverance from the barbarian, most happily to be come once more the language of a free Greek people; but never under any sky to recover that balance of its native qualities which had been so perfect and so transient. Yet the writers and speakers who had moulded Attic speech were to have an influence which should be world-wide and perpetual even when it was unfelt. After that long night for Greek art which began with the death of Alexander, when the cold dawn of a new day was breaking on the earth silent under the dominion of Augustus, men of Greek race rekindled an instinct for the best things that Greece had done in the half-forgotten morning of her gladness, her glorious strength, her beauty made musical by intelligent and gracious self-mastery. As the little band of Xenophon's comrades, hemmed in by barbarians and fighting their way back to Hellas out of the heart of Asia, burst into a cry of joy as they saw from the hill-top the first light of the waves of the Euxine, so these loyal workers were rejoiced afar off by a gleam from the sunlit surface of that clear sea which ripples at the feet of a pure and an immortal Aphrodite. They strove on, and won their way to their goal: for they brought the Athenian spirit once more into the central current of human life by communicating it to the genius of Rome.