# Security Policy

## Supported Versions

| Version | Supported |
|---------|-----------|
| 0.1.x   | Yes       |

## Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue in Grok App (for example token leakage, unsafe
agent process spawning, or local secrets exposure), please report it privately:

- Open a GitHub Security Advisory on [RongleCat/grok-app](https://github.com/RongleCat/grok-app), or
- Contact the maintainer on X: [@cgnot996](https://x.com/cgnot996)

Please include:
- A clear description of the issue
- Steps to reproduce
- Impact assessment if known

Do **not** open a public issue for sensitive vulnerabilities until a fix is available.

## Local security notes

- **API keys** (`officialApiKey`, `relayApiKey`) prefer the **OS secret store**:
  - macOS: Keychain
  - Windows: Credential Manager
  - Linux: FreeDesktop Secret Service (when available)
  - Fallback: `secrets.json` under the app data root with mode `0600` when the OS store is unavailable
- Non-secret metadata (`relayBaseUrl`, `defaultModel`) may remain in `secrets.json`. On first load after upgrade, any plaintext keys still on disk are **migrated into the OS store** and cleared from the file (logged without values).
- Custom provider keys may also be written to the independent agent home (`agent-home/config.toml`); they are **not** moved into the OS keychain by this path — do not commit them.
- Prefer official Grok login / local CLI auth over pasting long-lived keys into chats.
- Automations and YOLO permission mode can run agent actions without per-step prompts — enable only if you trust the session.
- Support zip / Doctor export / **session diagnostic package** never include `secrets.json`, OS keychain material, or raw API keys (redacted logs and chat only).
- Remote IM binding QR codes are generated locally; binding URLs are not sent to QR image services.
- X API plugin CLI arguments containing secrets are delivered through a private stdin pipe, not the OS process command line. The embedded launcher adapts legacy `process.argv` parsers in memory, and auth output is redacted.