{ "@context": { "CIP100": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#", "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm", "body": { "@id": "CIP100:body", "@context": { "references": { "@id": "CIP100:references", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "GovernanceMetadata": "CIP100:GovernanceMetadataReference", "Other": "CIP100:OtherReference", "label": "CIP100:reference-label", "uri": "CIP100:reference-uri", "referenceHash": { "@id": "CIP100:referenceHash", "@context": { "hashDigest": "CIP100:hashDigest", "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm" } } } }, "comment": "CIP100:comment", "externalUpdates": { "@id": "CIP100:externalUpdates", "@context": { "title": "CIP100:update-title", "uri": "CIP100:uri" } } } }, "authors": { "@id": "CIP100:authors", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "name": "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name", "witness": { "@id": "CIP100:witness", "@context": { "witnessAlgorithm": "CIP100:witnessAlgorithm", "publicKey": "CIP100:publicKey", "signature": "CIP100:signature" } } } } }, "authors": [], "body": { "comment": "I voted NO to reduce the Net Change Limit (NCL) to 200M ADA, which has been one of the toughest governance decisions so far. It feels like there’s no entirely good option here.\nMoreover, I myself called for a lower NCL.\n\nThe current NCL of 350M ADA has some notable drawbacks. \n\nIf high selling pressure causes ADA’s price to drop significantly—say to 0.2 USD—it could result in serious challenges. Funding the ecosystem in dollar terms would require selling a large amount of ADA from the treasury, leading to a spiral of selling pressure that could worsen the situation.\n\nCardano Whale pointed out that some projects like Tezos and Polkadot have invested heavily in their ecosystems, possess innovative technologies, yet struggle to gain substantial attention. \n\nFor blockchains, maintaining a presence in the top 10 market capitalization rankings is vital. \n\nRetail investors, institutions, and crypto enthusiasts evaluate projects not only based on technology but also on market performance. If Cardano drops out of the top 10 for an extended period, it may never regain its position, regardless of decentralization or technological progress like Ouroboros Leios. This is an important factor to consider, even if it feels unfair or subjective.\n\nOn the other hand, reducing the NCL to 200M ADA comes with its own set of concerns.\n\nCardano needs investments to advance its technology, support builders, and develop the ecosystem. Without increased user activity, Treasury revenue won't grow. Spending on maintenance and development in the next years risks exhausting the reserve, ultimately making Cardano economically unsustainable.\n\nProtocol security also hinges on attractive staking rewards and incentives. Moreover, Ouroboros Leios’s potential will remain untapped without active developers, tools, and a growing DeFi ecosystem. Investments in all these areas are crucial.\n\nIOG has made their funding requirements clear: Core Dev needs 96M ADA, Catalyst 69M ADA, and Research 27M ADA. Combined, this totals 192M ADA. The offer from IOG is simple: either approve this funding or let it be. \n\n\nDebates around fairness, IOG and Charles’s past contributions, and the definition of “completion” for Cardano have their place, but the reality is that IOG holds unmatched expertise in the protocol. No other entity can effectively take over maintenance, development, and research at the same pace or quality.\n\nIf DReps allocate 192M ADA to IOG, only 8M ADA remains for other projects. \n\nAfter reviewing budget proposals, I supported only the essentials I believe the ecosystem absolutely needs: projects like Midgard, Starstream, Hydra, ZK Rollups, Blockfrost, Lucid, Chainlink integration, and others. For the CORE category alone, this amounts to around 12M ADA. Across all categories, my total approved budget comes to 213M ADA.\n\nGiven my own estimate of required expenditures is 213M ADA, I cannot support an NCL of 200M ADA. It would contradict my stance on necessary project funding versus the cap I approve. This inconsistency guided my decision to vote NO on reducing the NCL.\n\nCardano requires effective marketing and improved governance support, as the current situation is far from ideal.\n\nInvesting in the ecosystem and advancing new technologies must go hand in hand to ensure sustainable growth.\n\nApproving the NCL of 200M ADA, in my view, would mean preserving the status quo, leaving all key responsibilities to IOG while neglecting investment in the broader ecosystem. Essentially, it would restrict funding for entities that are vital to the ecosystem, just as IOG is.\n\nAn important consideration is the expected scenarios surrounding the NCL.\n\nBoth NCLs, an NCL of 350M ADA and 200M ADA, are extremes in my view.\n\nThe current NCL, set at 350M ADA, has strong support with 76% of the voting stake participating. Nearly the entire voting stake approved it. Drastically reducing the NCL from 350M to 200M ADA would be either irresponsible or overly ambitious.\n\nWhat would happen next? Builders, Intersect, IOG, or others would likely submit a new governance action proposing an intermediate NCL, perhaps 250M or 300M ADA. Alternatively, multiple proposals could be submitted simultaneously.\n\nThis scenario would create an unstable environment that is counterproductive and difficult to support. Such instability undermines progress.\n\nMoreover, the crypto community has little interest in prolonged debates about how much the Cardano ecosystem can afford to invest. \n\nIn an unstable environment, even proposing a coherent budget becomes nearly impossible.\n\nCurrently, we have an NCL of 350M ADA. Consider this likely scenario: \n\nIntersect is expected to submit a governance action for the budget expiring in June. Meanwhile, if a new NCL of 200M ADA is approved by the end of May, the proposed budget would effectively become unconstitutional unless it is approved before the new NCL takes effect. This complicates the process and further highlights the issues with sudden, extreme changes.\n\nDebating the NCL through governance actions is both inefficient and overly time-consuming.\nIt seems likely that the community's consensus would fall somewhere between 250M–300M ADA. However, no off-chain temperature check was conducted (to which the majority of the community would respond) before the on-chain vote, which led to the current NCL being approved simply to allow the budgeting process to continue.\n\nThe concept of the NCL itself is starting to feel unnecessary, as it constantly shifts based on the majority vote. If the voting stake agrees to increase or decrease the NCL, it will inevitably happen.\n\nIt’s important to emphasize that the NCL doesn’t dictate the amount that must be spent from the treasury. Every withdrawal proposal still requires approval from the community.\n\nI would likely vote YES if the current proposal fell within the 250M–300M ADA range. If a proposal like this is submitted, I would support it, as it aligns with the budget I consider reasonable based on the proposals I have endorsed.\n\nHowever, my decision isn’t final and may change depending on future developments in governance. For instance, if governance actions combine multiple proposals that result in an excessively high total cost, or if the IOG proposal is grouped with several proposals I don’t support, or one I strongly oppose, such as the Daedalus 2025 Service Enhancement, I might reconsider my stance.\n\nIf the only way to prevent a poor budget outcome is to vote for a lower NCL, I am prepared to do so. This decision is nuanced and cannot be seen in black-and-white terms. \n\nI want to avoid a scenario where approving a lower NCL inevitably results in another GA submission. Addressing the NCL repeatedly is time-consuming and unproductive. DReps need to prioritize budget proposals instead.\n\nA higher NCL serves no purpose if it ends up funding low-quality projects within the budget. \n" }, "hashAlgorithm": "blake2b-256" }