title: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities
id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf
related:
    - id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
    This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
references:
    - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a
    - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/
    - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1
    - http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
    - https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/striking-panda-attacks-apt31-today
    - https://www.cybertriage.com/artifact/terminalservices_remoteconnectionmanager_log/
    - https://ponderthebits.com/2018/02/windows-rdp-related-event-logs-identification-tracking-and-investigation/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-09-09
modified: 2025-12-02
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1552
    - attack.t1087
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_wmi:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'Select'
            - 'Win32_NTLogEvent'
    selection_wevtutil_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wevtutil.exe'
    selection_wevtutil_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' qe '
            - ' query-events '
    selection_wmic_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
    selection_wmic_cli:
        CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent'
    selection_cmdlet:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'Get-WinEvent '
            - 'get-eventlog '
    selection_logs_name:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: Add more event log channels that are interesting for attackers
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager'
            - 'Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender'
            - 'PowerShellCore'
            - 'Security'
            - 'Windows PowerShell'
    selection_logs_eid:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # Note: We use the "?" to account for both a single and a double quote
            # Note: Please add additional interesting event IDs
            # Note: As this only focuses on EIDs and we know EIDs are not unique across providers. Rare FPs might occur with legit queries to EIDs from different providers.
            # This covers EID 4624 and 4628 from Security Log
            - '-InstanceId 462?'
            - '.eventid -eq 462?'
            - '.ID -eq 462?'
            - 'EventCode=?462?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?462?'
            - 'System[EventID=462?]'
            # This covers EID 4778 from Security Log
            - '-InstanceId 4778'
            - '.eventid -eq 4778'
            - '.ID -eq 4778'
            - 'EventCode=?4778?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?4778?'
            - 'System[EventID=4778]'
            # This covers EID 25 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 25'
            - '.eventid -eq 25'
            - '.ID -eq 25'
            - 'EventCode=?25?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?25?'
            - 'System[EventID=25]'
            # This covers EID 1149 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 1149'
            - '.eventid -eq 1149'
            - '.ID -eq 1149'
            - 'EventCode=?1149?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?1149?'
            - 'System[EventID=1149]'
            # This covers EID 21 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 21'
            - '.eventid -eq 21'
            - '.ID -eq 21'
            - 'EventCode=?21?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?21?'
            - 'System[EventID=21]'
            # This covers EID 22 from Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational log
            - '-InstanceId 22'
            - '.eventid -eq 22'
            - '.ID -eq 22'
            - 'EventCode=?22?'
            - 'EventIdentifier=?22?'
            - 'System[EventID=22]'
    condition: 1 of selection_logs_* and (selection_wmi or all of selection_wevtutil_* or all of selection_wmic_* or selection_cmdlet)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate usage of the utility by administrators to query the event log
level: medium
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_eventlog_content_recon/info.yml