

# The Duplicity Game: or why you can trust KERI

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version 2.25

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers>

[https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI2\\_Overview\\_IIW\\_2020\\_A.pdf](https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI2_Overview_IIW_2020_A.pdf)

[https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI\\_WP\\_2.x.web.pdf](https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf)

<https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri>

<https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri/blob/master/implementation.md>


<https://hackmd.io/orhyiJkLT721v4PCPkvQiA?both>

# Inconsistency and Duplicity

Full Sequence


Establishment  
Subsequence

Non-Establishment  
Subsequence



# Inconsistency and Duplicity


## Inconsistency vs. Duplicity



# Inconsistency and Duplicity

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*inconsistency*: lacking agreement, as two or more things in relation to each other




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
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## Internal vs. External Inconsistency



# Inconsistency and Duplicity


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## Internal vs. External Inconsistency

Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable.



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
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
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
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
Duplicity detection protects against external inconsistency.



# Duplicity Game


Cate  
*Controller*  
Log

# Duplicity Game




private (one-to-one) interactions

# Duplicity Game



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


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# Duplicity Game

Cate promises to provide a  
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*Local Consistency Guarantee*




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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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# Duplicity Game

Cate  
*Controller*  
Log

# Duplicity Game



highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions

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
Cate  
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Service/Agent  
*Controlled by Cate*  
Log


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


highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide a consistent log to anyone.

*Local Consistency Guarantee*

# Duplicity Game




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
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


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
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
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
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


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
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


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
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


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
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
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

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


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


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
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
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*Global Consistency Guarantee*

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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Global consistency may only matter **after** A and B need to interact not before.



global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions


Service promises to provide exact same log to everyone.  
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How may Cate and/or service be **duplicitous** and not get caught?

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
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
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KERI = self-cert root-of-trust + certificate transparency + KA<sup>2</sup>CE + recoverable + post-quantum.

# BACKGROUND

# Certificate Transparency Problem

“The solution the computer world has relied on for many years is to introduce into the system trusted third parties (CAs) that vouch for the binding between the domain name and the private key. The problem is that we've managed to bless several hundred of these supposedly trusted parties, any of which can vouch for any domain name. Every now and then, one of them gets it wrong, sometimes spectacularly.”

Pinning inadequate

Notaries inadequate

DNSSEC inadequate

All require trust in 3rd party compute infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable

Certificate Transparency: (related EFF SSL Observatory)

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs

End-verifiable duplicity detection = Ambient verifiability of duplicity

Event log is third party infrastructure but zero trust because it is verifiable.

Sparse Merkle Trees for revocation of certificates

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


Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4