# No matarás (Historical narrative) — Digest

## 1. Identity & purpose

This is **Tomo 3 — *No matarás. Relato histórico del conflicto armado interno en Colombia*** ("Thou shalt not kill. Historical account of the internal armed conflict in Colombia"), one of 11 volumes (24 physical books) of the Final Report *Hay futuro si hay verdad* ("There is a future if there is truth") of Colombia's **Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición (CEV)** — the Truth Commission mandated by the 2016 Havana Peace Accord (Decreto 588 de 2017). Published in Bogotá, August 2022; ISBN 978-958-53874-6-1. Volume director: **Marta Ruiz**; research coordinator Javier Benavides Torres. The periodization framework was largely drafted by the late commissioner **Alfredo Molano Bravo**.

Its stated mission is to be **the long-arc historical narrative** of the war — to "widen the context of what occurred over the last sixty years." It is explicitly *not* a history of all violence in Colombia, but an *esclarecimiento* (clarification) of the **insurgent–counterinsurgent war between 1958 and 2016 (and its persistence)**, with 1920–1958 treated as context, never as object of clarification. The Commission used an **inductive method** built on ~14,000 interviews, conversations with 30,000+ people, and 1,000+ submitted reports. Its subtitle frames the thesis: *"No matarás. El primer mandamiento de la democracia colombiana"* ("Thou shalt not kill — the first commandment of Colombian democracy").

## 2. Central thesis — why the conflict began and lasted 60+ years

The Commission organizes everything around one **macro-question**: *"¿Por qué, a pesar de los múltiples acuerdos y procesos de paz, el conflicto armado no logra cerrarse completamente y, en cambio, se recicla?"* — Why, despite multiple peace accords, does the conflict never fully close and instead *recycle* itself?

Its answer rejects "simplistic and binary readings." The war was **not** merely a clash of armed apparatuses nor a purely ideological war; it was an **entramado** ("interwoven web") of alliances, actors and interests, in which violence has been a recurrent *resource* used by political, economic, criminal and institutional actors to settle disputes. Borrowing the CHCV's metaphor, the war grew from unresolved **"fallas geológicas"** (geological faults) in nation-building: **the agrarian question** (land), **institutional weakness / precarious State presence** ("En Colombia hay más territorio que Estado"), deep income inequality, and the chronic **simultaneous use of "las armas y las urnas"** (guns and ballots). To these the CEV adds structural violences long made invisible: **patriarchy, racism, and class/regional discrimination**.

The core engine: a **restricted democracy** (the exclusionary elite pact of the Frente Nacional) collided with **radical ideologies** advocating violent change, inside the **Cold War's "amigo–enemigo" (friend–enemy) zero-sum frame**. The State's construction of the **"enemigo interno"** (internal enemy) and the guerrillas' mirror-image **"enemigo de clase"** (class enemy) eroded the reformist democratic middle, and **narcotrafficking** later "kicked over the board" (*pateó el tablero*), supplying money that turned the war territorial and degraded it past all limits. Responsibility, therefore, extends beyond those who bore arms — it is an **ethical and political responsibility** of political sectors of all ideologies, economic, criminal, social and cultural actors, and ultimately of society itself.

## 3. Structure / periodization

The volume runs **Antecedentes históricos (1920–1958)** as context, then four clarification periods plus an epilogue, ending with six conclusion chapters (89–94):

- **Antecedentes (1920–1958):** modernization, U.S. dependency, enclave economies, frustrated reforms, anticommunism, *La Violencia*, Rojas Pinilla dictatorship.
- **Period 1 — *De la paz política a la guerra insurgente* (1958–1977):** the Frente Nacional; "incubation of the war." (The Commission takes **1958** as the watershed between bipartisan civil war and the internal armed conflict.)
- **Period 2 — *La búsqueda de la democracia y la guerra sucia* (1978–1991):** deepening discontent, consolidation of insurgency, *Estatuto de Seguridad*, narcotrafficking's entrance, MAS/paramilitarism, the UP genocide, ending with the 1991 Constituyente.
- **Period 3 — *La ilusión de un nuevo país y la guerra por el territorio* (1990/91–2002):** the 1991 Constitution's promise vs. exacerbated violence; AUC consolidation, FARC-EP military peak, Caguán, Plan Colombia.
- **Period 4 — *De la guerra total a la paz inconclusa* (2002–2016):** Uribe's *Seguridad Democrática*, false positives, AUC demobilization/parapolítica, then Santos, Havana, and the 2016 Accord.
- **Epílogo (2016–present):** an incomplete peace and a violent post-conflict.

## 4. Key findings (historical turning points)

- **9 April 1948** — assassination of liberal leader **Jorge Eliécer Gaitán**, igniting *La Violencia*; the State closes Congress (1949) and democracy contracts under Ospina, Laureano Gómez, then the **Rojas Pinilla dictatorship (1953–57)**.
- **1957–58 — Frente Nacional:** Lleras–Gómez pacts (Benidorm, Sitges); plebiscite of **1 Dec 1957** (4,169,294 "sí"; >1.8M women voted for the first time). 16-year alternation of Liberals and Conservatives — modernizing but **excluding non-bipartisan forces (esp. the Communists)**.
- **Lleras's Teatro Patria speech (1958)** — delegating "orden público" to the military, the "second pact" of the Frente Nacional, making the armed forces a *cuarto poder* (fourth power).
- **1961–62 — U.S. counterinsurgency imported:** the **Yarborough mission** lays the "**doctrina de seguridad nacional**" and the *enemigo interno*; Álvaro Gómez Hurtado denounces the **"repúblicas independientes."**
- **1964 — *Plan Lazo* / attack on Marquetalia (Operación Soberanía):** the founding myth of the FARC; the strategy of *"quitarle el agua al pez."*
- **1965 — Decreto 3398 (→ Ley 48 de 1968):** legal basis for **arming civilians** — root of paramilitarism.
- **Late 1970s — Estatuto de Seguridad (Turbay, 1978)** and the **bonanza marimbera** → narcotrafficking enters.
- **1981–82 — MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores):** the *"hito fundacional del paramilitarismo."*
- **1984 — Acuerdo de La Uribe** (Betancur ceasefire with FARC) → **1985 Unión Patriótica → genocide of the UP.**
- **6 Nov 1985 — Toma del Palacio de Justicia** (M-19); >100 dead incl. 11 magistrates.
- **1991 — Constitución Política:** the strongest democratizing episode of the late 20th century; demobilization of M-19, EPL, PRT, Quintín Lame — but FARC-EP and ELN remain in arms.
- **1995–2005 — the most atrocious decade:** AUC consolidation (founded **1997**), Mapiripán (1997), FARC peak (Mitú, 1998), failed Caguán process, Plan Colombia (2000).
- **2002–2010 — guerra total:** Uribe's *Seguridad Democrática*; **falsos positivos**; Santa Fe de Ralito; AUC demobilization; *parapolítica*; **2008** the inflection point (Soacha scandal; operación Jaque; deaths of Reyes/Marulanda).
- **2016 — Acuerdo Final** signed (Cartagena, 26 Sept); **plebiscite of 2 Oct 2016: "No" wins 50.21% vs 49.79%**; renegotiated accord signed at Teatro Colón (24 Nov 2016).

## 5. Statistics & data

- ***La Violencia* (1948–58):** 134,820 deaths per *La Violencia en Colombia* (raised to ~200,000 with later deaths); a 2019 demographic re-estimate gives **39,142–57,737** for 1949–58. ~**400,000 plots** lost; ~**2 million** displaced; 20,000 exiled to Venezuela, 5,000 to Panama.
- **Homicide rate:** 49 per 100,000 (1958) vs **24 per 100,000 (2016)**.
- **ELN** combatants peaked ~160 (1968), reduced to ~36 after Operación Anorí (1973).
- **The conflict overall: more than 9,000,000 victims** (Registro Único de Víctimas), **at least half a million killed**; **nine of every ten victims were civilians**, most rural. **~88% (>8,000,000)** suffered forced displacement; 1991–2002 alone exceeded **3,000,000** displacements (peak 2002, >800,000).
- **"El 70% de las víctimas de la guerra se produjeron" in 1995–2005** — the report's signature concentration claim.
- **Falsos positivos:** the JEP has documented **6,402 civilians** killed in defenselessness; **2006–2007** the peak; Soacha (**19 youths**, 2008). The military claimed ≥13,477 combatants killed / 44,794 captured (2002–2008) — figures the CEV calls "exorbitant."
- **Parapolítica:** 87 politicians condemned (38 representatives, 34 senators, 15 governors). Narcos/paramilitaries controlled ~**4.4 million hectares** (Contraloría, 2005); last violence wave left **>6 million hectares** dispossessed. **17 strategic corridors** for licit/illicit rents.
- **2016 demobilization:** ~13,609 ex-combatants, 8,894 weapons surrendered to the UN.

## 6. Explanatory factors / patterns (the engines of the war)

1. **Land and territory** — the unbroken thread. Failure to dismantle the *latifundio improductivo* and redistribute land; the State pushed colonization into "tierras de nadie," seeding long-duration conflict and stateless territories where armed orders formed. Every wave of violence concentrated land further. The Chicoral pact (1972) buried the agrarian reform; FARC's first act was a *Programa Agrario*. "Resistance to agrarian change is fiercer than to political reform."
2. **Political exclusion / restricted democracy** — the Frente Nacional closed the system to non-bipartisan forces; the cycle of "abrir la democracia a tiros" (opening democracy by gunfire) and its violent sabotage recurs.
3. **The Cold War** — the *amigo-enemigo* frame, the *enemigo interno* doctrine (Yarborough, Escuela de las Américas), and the mirror *enemigo de clase*.
4. **Weak/selective State presence** — "más territorio que Estado"; sovereignty disputed with some armed actors and *conceded* to others; security delegated to private hands.
5. **The drug economy** — the "comodín" (wild card) without ideology; money that financed counterinsurgent armies, bought land (a *contrarreforma agraria*), and corrupted politics; the U.S. "war on drugs" opened a *second front* that fused with counterinsurgency.
6. **Impunity and the "todo vale" culture** — atrocities tolerated juridically, politically and socially; paramilitary leaders confessed killings readily but not land theft.

## 7. The armed actors

- **FARC-EP** — born from the **communist self-defense / *autodefensas campesinas*** of southern Tolima (Marquetalia, Riochiquito, El Pato, Guayabero), rooted in *La Violencia*'s survivors and the "repúblicas independientes." Catalyzed by the murder of **Charro Negro (1960)** and the 1964 attack on Marquetalia (the founding myth); led by **Manuel Marulanda Vélez ("Tirofijo")**. Formally constituted at the 1966 Second Guerrilla Conference of the Bloque Sur. Strategy: *combinación de todas las formas de lucha* (PCC's 9th–10th congresses). Stagnant until the late 1970s, then financed by coca and kidnapping, reaching a **guerra de movimientos** peak (Las Delicias, El Billar, Mitú) before being pushed back after 2002. Signatory of the 2016 Accord.
- **ELN** — founded **1964 (toma de Simacota, 7 Jan 1965)**, *foquista* (Cuban-inspired), built by students/workers from the **MRL juventudes**; leader **Fabio Vásquez Castaño**, joined by priest **Camilo Torres** (killed Feb 1966), which gave it a lasting *cristianismo liberacionista*. Nearly destroyed by **Operación Anorí (1973)**; reorganized in the 1980s on kidnapping and oil-pipeline rents (Caño Limón–Coveñas). Never demobilized; persists to the report's publication.
- **EPL** — founded **1967** as armed wing of the **maoist PC-ML**; *guerra popular prolongada* via *juntas patrióticas*; rooted in Córdoba/Urabá land conflicts. Nearly annihilated 1967–69; demobilized 1991, but ex-combatants (*Esperanza, Paz y Libertad*) were massacred (La Chinita, 1994).
- **M-19** — born from the **fraudulent 1970 election** that denied ANAPO/Rojas Pinilla victory (hence "19 de Abril"); public debut stealing **Bolívar's sword (1974)**; urban, nationalist (Bateman, Pizarro, Iván Marino Ospina). Landmark acts: Dominican embassy siege (1980), Cantón Norte arsenal theft (1979), and the catastrophic **Palacio de Justicia takeover (1985)**. Demobilized 1990; became a constituyente force in 1991.
- **AUC / paramilitarism** — lineage from the 1965 civilian-arming decree → **autodefensas** → **MAS (1981)** → Puerto Boyacá / Acdegam model (narcos + ganaderos + military + politicians) → **los Pepes (1993)** → **ACCU/Castaño brothers** → **CONVIVIR (1995)** → **AUC (1997)** under **Carlos Castaño**. An alliance to "evitar compartir el poder con la izquierda," responsible for the UP genocide and the worst massacres; sought *legitimation* in politics and land (parapolítica). Demobilized via **Santa Fe de Ralito / Ley de Justicia y Paz (2005)**, leaving narco-paramilitary successors.
- **State / Fuerza Pública** — molded *for war*: the *cuarto poder* born of the Teatro Patria delegation, ideologized by Cold War doctrine ("buscar y destruir"), responsible for *ejecuciones extrajudiciales* and tolerance/collusion with paramilitaries (the "Sexta División"). The CEV's image of the State: *"un orangután con sacoleva"* (an orangutan in a frock-coat) — oscillating between rule-of-law and crime.
- **Narco-actors** — *bonanza marimbera*, then the **Medellín Cartel** (Escobar, the Ochoa, Rodríguez Gacha) and the lower-profile **Cali Cartel** (Rodríguez Orejuela). Ideology-less, infinitely adaptable; financed counterinsurgent armies, bought land and politics; relationship with elites = "doble moral: condena pública y tolerancia en casa."

## 8. Representative quotes

> *"No matarás. El primer mandamiento de la democracia colombiana."* (Volume thesis.)

> *"¿Por qué, a pesar de los múltiples acuerdos y procesos de paz, el conflicto armado no logra cerrarse completamente y, en cambio, se recicla?"* (The macro-question.)

> *"Este conflicto terminó sin vencedores –aunque sí con beneficiarios– y con un saldo de víctimas de proporciones bíblicas: más de 9 millones, de las cuales por lo menos medio millón perdieron la vida. Nueve de cada diez víctimas eran civiles."* (Conclusion 90.)

> *"Las estirpes condenadas a cien años de soledad no tienen una segunda oportunidad sobre la tierra. Este no es el caso de Colombia."* (Epílogo, glossing García Márquez.)

## 9. Recommendations

This volume is **narrative, not prescriptive** — formal recommendations live in Tomo 2 (*Hallazgos y recomendaciones*). Still, the conclusions (89–94) carry strong **normative findings** that function as guidance: agrarian transformation is indispensable to peace (close the gap between "regiones integradas y marginadas" via **PDET** and the 16 *curules por la paz*); the security model must complete the traumatic shift from "buscar y destruir" to "protección de la vida," with greater accountability and an end to delegating violence to private actors; peace in Colombia has been merely *negative* ("el silencio de los fusiles") and must address the political-economic-social structure; **reconciliation** — the missing leg of Betancur's *reincorporación/rehabilitación/reconciliación* triad — must finally be pursued. The overarching injunction: *"hay que conocer la historia, para no repetirla."*

## 10. Distinctive insights & coined concepts

- ***No matarás* as "the first commandment of Colombian democracy"** — sacralizing life, instituting a taboo on killing compatriots.
- **The war as an *entramado*** (interwoven web) of alliances/interests, not a clash of armies — collapsing the "ficción de que esta fue una guerra entre aparatos armados."
- **"Fallas geológicas"** (geological faults) of nation-building — land, weak State, gun-and-ballot duality.
- **"Repúblicas independientes"** — Álvaro Gómez Hurtado's 1961 framing that justified the Marquetalia attack (and cost him his life in 1995).
- **"Quitarle el agua al pez"** — the counterinsurgent logic of attacking the civilian "water" to drain the guerrilla "fish."
- **"El narcotráfico patea el tablero"** — narcotrafficking as the wildcard (*comodín*) that overturned the war's logic and made finance a *leitmotiv*.
- **"Mentalidad paramilitar"** — the Procurador's framing of MAS not as one organization but as a mindset linking mafia, security forces and elites.
- **"Enemigos agazapados de la paz"** — Otto Morales Benítez's warning about peace's hidden enemies within the establishment.
- **The State as *"un orangután con sacoleva"*** — the permanent battle between lawlessness and the rule-of-law.
- **"Soberanía selectiva"** and **"más territorio que Estado"** — selective sovereignty and the structural absence of the State as conditions of the war.
- **The reading that armed struggle *backfired***: the left's choice of arms, far from producing the hoped-for transformations, "terminó reforzando las estructuras de poder existentes" and delayed reform — while peace accords (Frente Nacional, 1991 Constitution, 2016 Accord) were the genuinely **democratizing and modernizing** leaps, always requiring a fracture *within* the elites alongside an empowered citizenry.