# Hasta la guerra tiene límites (Violations & responsibilities) — Digest ## 1. Identity & purpose **Tomo 4** of the Colombian Truth Commission's final report *Hay Futuro Si Hay Verdad* (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y la No Repetición; Bogotá, August 2022). Full title: *Hasta la guerra tiene límites. Violaciones de los derechos humanos, infracciones al derecho internacional humanitario y responsabilidades colectivas.* Director: Alejandro Valencia Villa. External data consultants: **Patrick Ball** (HRDAG) and Oliver Estuardo Mazariegos Zetina. ISBN (digital) 978-628-7590-23-6. This is the **keystone empirical volume** — it executes mandates **one** (esclarecer grave violations of human rights and IHL, especially those reflecting patterns or of massive character — Decreto 588 de 2017, art. 11) and **two** (collective responsibilities). It is the source of the report's headline conflict statistics. Methodology is **inductive** (testimony-first): "¿quién hizo qué a quién?, ¿cuándo, dónde y cómo?" in the descriptive part; "¿por qué?, ¿para qué? y ¿quién se beneficia?" in the analytical part. Victim definition follows UN Res. 40/34 and Ley 1448 de 2011 (hechos desde el 1 enero 1985). ## 2. Central thesis ("no hay derecho a la guerra"; even war has limits) The title is the argument: **even war has limits**. The IHL principles (distinción, limitación, proporcionalidad, protección, precaución, necesidad militar) bind *all* parties — state or illegal — and "subrayan que no se puede atacar a cualquiera, no se puede atacar cualquier cosa y no se puede atacar de cualquier manera." The volume insists on **naming acts correctly** — rejecting euphemisms ("errores," "equivocaciones," "daños colaterales," "falsos positivos") because "la no repetición empieza por llamar las cosas como son." A graduated-responsibility doctrine anchors the thesis: **"A mayor poder, mayor responsabilidad."** The State, as garante of rights, "está sometida a un mayor juicio de reproche... Es mayor la responsabilidad del Estado con las personas que la responsabilidad de estas con aquel." This does **not** diminish condemnation of guerrilla atrocities. Conclusion (present tense, deliberate): the conflict **continues**; civilians are the principal victims; "no ha existido una sola generación que haya vivido en un país en paz." ## 3. Structure Five parts: (1) Introduction (mandate, method, **Las cifras**); (2) *"Esto no puede estar pasando"* — 16 violation sections (qué pasó); (3) *"Esta guerra está viva. ¿Por qué sigue pasando?"* — 6 motivational dynamics (por qué); (4) *"En pocas palabras, esa es la guerra"* — collective responsibilities (de quién); (5) Conclusions ("afirmaciones de verdad"). ~1,024 pages of body text + references/annexes. **Six motivational dynamics** identified: (1) sostenimiento/disciplina of armed actors; (2) control social of civilians; (3) reconfigure territory for economic ends; (4) physical/symbolic elimination of "enemies" (institutional, economic-model, or "enemigo de clase"); (5) obstruct political solution/peace agreements; (6) defeat/annihilate the adversary in open breach of IHL. ## 4. Typology of violations (magnitude · period · responsibility share) ### Homicidios (overall) ~**450,666** persons killed in the armed conflict, **1985–2016** (final integration, JEP-CEV-HRDAG). With estimated subregistro, the universe could be ~**800,000** (subregistro concentrated 1998–2004). Includes combatants killed in clashes (could not be disaggregated). Responsibility of the 450,666 known: **paramilitaries ~45%**, **guerrillas ~27% (FARC-EP 21%)**, **state agents ~12%**, plus "otro actor" 9%, "múltiple" 6%, ELN 4%, otras guerrillas 2% (initial unknown-responsible = 52%; RUV does not register the responsible party in 76% of homicides). ### Masacres **4,237 masacres** registered **1958–2019** (62 yrs), per CNMH (masacre = ≥4 killed, defenseless, same circumstances). Affected ~**62%** of municipalities; **24,600** dead in masacres (12% of CNMH conflict deaths). Peak year **2001 (405 masacres)**; most intense 1995–2004. Most-affected dept: **Antioquia (29%, >2,230 victims, 378 masacres)**, then Santander (968), Córdoba (375). Dominant modalities: *asalto* (peak 613, 1995–2004), *retención/ejecución* (451), *ruta* (428), *incursión*. Predominantly **paramilitary** ("terror... directriz general"), used in alliance with state forces (e.g., Mapiripán 1997 — CorteIDH found Army complicity; El Salado, El Aro, El Tigre, Macayepo). Guerrillas also used masacres (La Chinita, Apartadó, 23 Jan 1994 — FARC-EP killed 35). ### Asesinatos selectivos **178,364** selective killings **1958–2019** (CNMH; high subregistro). Peak **2002** (~15× the 1982 level). Tendency tracks **paramilitary** action (peaks 1997, 2002); guerrillas exceeded paramilitaries 1984–1990; **State** exceeded both 2006–2008 (falsos-positivos surge). Most-affected: Antioquia 63,172 (35%), Santander 9,677 (5%), Norte de Santander 9,593 (5%). ### Ejecuciones extrajudiciales / "falsos positivos" Documented since the 1950s; ≥1 EJE in **56%** of municipalities. Most-affected dept Antioquia (1,308; 904 in 2002–2008). **"Falsos positivos"** (combates simulados): **at least 6,402 victims, 2002–2008** (JEP Auto 033 de 2021, Caso 03); ~78% of historical victimization concentrated 2000–2008; a ~7× increase vs the prior 7 years. **Responsibility: the State / Fuerza Pública (Ejército Nacional principally)**, sometimes with paramilitary support; all Army divisions implicated. Victims engaged with false job offers, dressed as combatants, killed, registered fraudulently as "bajas en combate." ### Atentados al derecho a la vida **2,786 victims of atentados, 1984–2011**; targets included LGBTIQ+ persons, those labelled adversary "base social," and economic/political sectors. ### Desaparición forzada ~**121,768** victims **1985–2016** (final integration; from 172,097 observed records, 71% conflict-related). Estimated universe ~**210,000** (subregistro ~90,000); estimation range 204,395–225,410. Of CNMH's 80,670 registered, only **12.5%** found (alive or dead). Responsibility: **paramilitaries ~52% (51.8%)**, **FARC-EP ~24% (24.2%)** (guerrillas total 27% incl. ELN 2.6%), "múltiple" 8.6%, **state agents 7.7–8%**, otros 4.3% (initial unknown = 54%). Illustrative imputed counts: paramilitaries ~63,029; FARC-EP ~29,410; multiple ~10,448; state agents ~9,359 (state estimation range 9,888–22,384). ### Secuestro **50,770** victims **1990–2018** (final integration; estimated universe ~**80,000**; initial unknown-responsible 29%). 78% men, 22% women. Responsibility: **FARC-EP ~40% (39.8%) — principal responsible**, **paramilitaries 24%**, **ELN ≥19% (18.8%)**, otros grupos 8.4%, múltiples 4%, **state agents 2%**. Guerrillas overall are the principal kidnappers; "el secuestro como táctica de guerra." JEP Auto 019 de 2021 (Caso 01: toma de rehenes by FARC-EP) — FARC-EP recognized these as war crimes and crimes against humanity. ### Amenazas **588,484** threat events registered in the **RUV** (evident subregistro; responsible unknown in ~63% of cases). A "país bajo amenazas, pocos responsables identificados." ### Detenciones arbitrarias Tied to "estado de sitio" / Estatuto de Seguridad era; "víctimas sin contar." Used as complement to military/police repression; civilians tried by military tribunals (1965–1987); "jueces sin rostro." ### Tortura, tratos crueles, inhumanos y degradantes RUV registers **7,571** torture victims (gross subregistro). Commission documented **3,095 torture violations against 2,365 victims** in its interviews (32 per 100 interviews — its most-registered violation). Spike during the **Estatuto de Seguridad (1978–1982)**: ≥55 EJEs and **1,322 torture victims** by state agents in that window. Practiced by **all actors** — fuerza pública (interrogation/information), paramilitaries (often before killing; descuartizamiento), guerrillas (intra-ranks, suspected enemies). ### Violencias sexuales RUV registers **32,446** victims of sexual violence (**29,958 women, 1,951 men**; 92% women — CNMH ~90%). Critical period **1998–2005**. Casa de la Mujer survey: **82.15%** of sampled victims never reported. Per Commission data, accompanied by torture (8%), threats (7%), often homicide, displacement, recruitment. Modalities profiled per actor (paramilitaries, guerrilla, fuerza pública). Massively under-registered ("histórica deuda del país"). ### Reclutamiento de NNA ~**16,238** victims **1990–2017** (≥11,314 boys, 4,924 girls); estimated universe ~**30,000**; **45% were under 15**. Responsibility: **FARC-EP 75% (principal)**, **paramilitaries 13%**, **ELN 9%**; the Fuerza Pública also recruited minors. AUC nominally set 18 as minimum, guerrillas 15 — neither respected. Most-affected: Meta, Antioquia, Caquetá, Guaviare, Cauca. Reference case: Operación Berlín (Ejército vs FARC-EP Columna Móvil Arturo Ruiz, Nov 2000–Jan 2001) — ~150 of 362 were minors. ### Trabajo forzoso Documented in 4 per 100 Commission interviews; imposed via territorial armed control; targeted vulnerable sectors; used as punishment. ### Desplazamiento forzado The **most generalized** violation. **7,752,964** persons displaced **1985–2019** (JEP-CEV-HRDAG integration); **RUV records >8 million (8.3M by end-2020, Govt/UNHCR)**. Peak year **2002: 730,904**. Still >100,000/year post-accord. During *La Violencia* (1948–1958), ~2–3 million displaced (~1/5 of population). Responsibility (RUV, with 67% unknown ≈ >5M victims): guerrillas ~17% (1,347,904), paramilitaries ~12% (947,073), otros 1.5%, **State practically absent in RUV (7,326)** — the Commission flags this as unreliable and demands better data. Afrocolombian/black/raizal/palenquero victims: 1,053,459; ~18% of displaced belong to an ethnic community. ### Despojo de tierras Tierras despojadas estimated to **exceed 8 million hectares** (Proyecto de Protección de Tierras-Acción Social, **only 1995–2004**). RUV registers just **31,863** despojo-violento victims (0.4% vs the 8M displaced) — gross undercount. Land-restitution sentences (Ley 1448) reference these actors in ~3,000 cases (ganadero, agroindustrial, extractive). "Responsabilidad difusa y oculta." ### Confinamiento OCHA monitoring (since 2013): **>351,000** victims by March 2022; peak **2013 (>74,000)**; 2020 (>73,700). Defined by the Constitutional Court (Auto 005 de 2009) as a modality of displacement where communities lose mobility/autonomy over their territory. Concentrated in Pacífico and border zones; campesina, Afro, indigenous populations. ### Minas antipersona CNMH registers **9,910** mine victims; **7,153** MAP/MUSE events (1991–2017), responsible unknown in 48%. Of identified: **FARC-EP 42.1% (47.6% of attributed)**, **ELN 7.2%**, **paramilitares 0.1%, Fuerzas Militares 0.1%**. Used predominantly by **guerrillas** (ELN first, 1974 Santander; FARC-EP from 1987). The only ataque indiscriminado with continuous increase. ### Ataques a bienes protegidos / pillaje / extorsión Bienes civiles, transport, iglesias, sanitarios, culturales, energy/electric infra, oleoductos. "Todo se robaron." Extortion ("Si no pagábamos, prendían la motosierra") used by all actors; oleoducto blowups used (usually by insurgencies) to extort economic actors. Hard to quantify (no dedicated databases). ## 5. The big statistical universe (JEP-CEV-HRDAG / Patrick Ball / 112 databases) The **Proyecto conjunto JEP-CEV-HRDAG** "Integración de datos y Estimaciones estadísticas" (corte 25 June 2022) is "uno de los proyectos más grandes... sobre violaciones de derechos humanos en el mundo." Pipeline: - **112 databases** from **42 institutions/organizations** (State, HR orgs, victim orgs, civil society — incl. RUV, CNMH, INML, Policía Nacional, JEP, Fiscalía, Defensoría, DAS, CCJ, etc.). Millions of records. - **Integración + deduplicación** (record linkage); **imputación** of missing fields (sex, age, ethnicity, responsible, municipio) via statistical models + machine learning (probability that a record belongs to the conflict; rule of "valor más probable" = la moda). - **Estimación** via **captura-recaptura** (multiple systems estimation, technique used since 1896; Manrique-Vallier Bayesian population-size) to estimate subregistro = the unknown universe. - Full ejercicio done for **4 violations** (homicidio, desaparición forzada, secuestro, reclutamiento); **desplazamiento** only integrated/deduplicated (RUV = 99% of its data). **Headline figures (preserve exactly):** | Violation | Known (integration) | Period | Estimated universe | |---|---|---|---| | Homicidios | **450,666** (range 436,747–464,585) | 1985–2016/18 | ~**800,000** | | Desaparición forzada | **121,768** (range 119,777–123,579) | 1985–2016/20 | ~**210,000** (204,395–225,410) | | Secuestro | **50,770** | 1990–2018 | ~**80,000** | | Reclutamiento NNA | **16,238** | 1990–2017 | ~**30,000** | | Desplazamiento forzado | **7,752,964** (RUV >8M) | 1985–2019 | — | Other anchors: asesinatos selectivos **178,364**; masacres **4,237** (24,600 dead); falsos positivos **6,402**; sexual violence (RUV) **32,446**; threats (RUV) **588,484**; mine victims (CNMH) **9,910**; confinement (OCHA) **>351,000**; despojo (RUV) 31,863 / **>8M hectares**. **Total conflict victims ≈ "cerca de nueve millones."** Commission's own interview base: **9,621 interviews → 23,968 victims, 35,406 hechos, 47,897 violations** (qualitative, non-representative). ## 6. Collective responsibility — how attributed and to whom The Commission, being **extrajudicial**, declares **collective responsibility** — ethical and political — *not individual criminal responsibility* (which belongs to the courts; it names individuals only where there is a prior conviction). Collectives may be **small** (a battalion, a guerrilla column/front, a paramilitary front) or **broad** (brigades, divisions, the Fuerzas Militares, Policía Nacional, DAS, guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups). Terminology: state/paramilitary acts = **"violaciones de derechos humanos"**; guerrilla acts = **"abusos"** + **"infracciones al DIH."** "Sistematicidad" (qualitative — plan/política) and "generalidad" (quantitative — scale) anchor the classification of many acts as crimes against humanity / war crimes. **State responsibility.** By direct action of agents; by **omission** of constitutional duties; by **tolerance/complicity/acquiescence** toward third parties (CorteIDH *Velásquez Rodríguez*, *Mapiripán*). Quantitatively the State is **not** the top responsible for any of the four measured violations, but its **direct** responsibility peaks in **homicidios (12%)** and **desaparición forzada (8%)**. Also responsible for policy decisions that victimized civilians (glifosato aspersion 1984; Pines/land-restitution blockage 2015), and judicial criminalization of opposition/social movements. **Responsibility of the State FOR paramilitarism (key finding).** **Direct State responsibility** for the origin, formation, instruction, strengthening, and expansion of paramilitary groups — rooted in counterinsurgency policy to eliminate the "enemigo interno." Legal lineage: **Decreto 3398 de 1965 → Ley 48 de 1968** (juntas de autodefensa, arming civilians); reinforced under the Estatuto de Seguridad; declared unconstitutional (Corte Suprema, 25 May 1989), then re-legalized via **Convivir (Decretos 535/1993, 356/1994)**. Procuraduría's 1983 MAS report named **163 persons, of whom 59 were Army/Police officers**. Fuerzas Militares supported/acted jointly with paramilitaries "at least until 2005" (demobilization). "El trabajo sucio que ellos [la fuerza pública] no podían hacer legalmente." **Paramilitary responsibility + alliances.** Paramilitaries (ACCU, AUC, BCB, los Pepes) are the **principal responsible for homicides and forced disappearance.** Funded/backed by **narcotráfico, regional political/economic elites, and sectors of the Fuerzas Militares**, especially 1992–2002. Terror as deliberate strategy; masacres to clear territory and serve economic agendas (narco chains, land accumulation, state-rent capture). Inter-paramilitary wars (Bloque Metro, ACC Casanare). **Guerrilla responsibility.** "Dista de ser un asunto de errores, daños colaterales o hechos aislados" — víctimas "por miles." **FARC-EP** principal responsible for **secuestro (40%)** and **reclutamiento (75%)**; ELN secuestro ≥19%, reclutamiento 9%. Escalation driven by **VII (1982) and VIII (1993) Conferencias** of the FARC-EP (plan to become a >100,000-combatant irregular army; 80% of units to military ops; "Campaña Bolivariana"). Modalities: pescas milagrosas, mass kidnapping, tomas, attacks on public officials, confinamiento, **minas antipersona**, and even masacres. ELN/EPL responsibilities also attributed. **Third-party / economic-actor responsibility ("terceros civiles: una necesaria rendición de cuentas").** "Una guerra donde no hay finanzas no es guerra." The Commission built a database of **258 economic actors** (persons and firms, national/foreign) presumed involved by sponsoring, tolerating, facilitating, instigating, or determining violations for profit. Most-cited sectors: **petróleo (19.6%), palma de aceite, agroindustria, minero-energético, ganadería.** Sources: **439 business actors sanctioned across 35 Justicia y Paz sentences (2011–2015)**; references to such actors in **~3,000** land-restitution cases; **~30,000 compulsas de copias** from paramilitary versiones libres ordering investigation of third parties (politicians, business). Commission received ≥103 civil-society reports and documented **945 hechos with a tercero civil as responsible**; regional elites + politics + armed actors are framed as co-responsible. ## 7. Patterns & mechanisms (how violations were systematized) - **Chains of violence**: most events combined ≥1 violation (sexual violence + torture + displacement + homicide; disappearance to erase evidence). - **Stigmatization → "enemigo interno"**: equating social movements (sindical, estudiantil, campesino, UP, defensores) with subversion (e.g., Reglamento de combate de contraguerrilla EJC-3-10, 1987) — basis for selective killings and EJEs. - **Listas + guías encapuchados** to select masacre victims; **incursión/ruta/asalto** modalities. - **Falsos positivos**: bureaucratic incentive ("llenar un tablero," body-count as success metric) industrializing extrajudicial killing. - **Combinación de todas las formas de lucha**; **deshumanización del enemigo** to enable atrocity; **control social** of civilian life by all actors. - **Economic logic**: violence to reconfigure territory, capture narco/extractive/land rents — "desalojo por razones políticas, pero con fines económicos" (Molano). ## 8. Representative quotes > "A mayor poder, mayor responsabilidad... Es mayor la responsabilidad del Estado con las personas que la responsabilidad de estas con aquel." > "Parecíamos depredadores, unos y otros acabando con la vida de seres humanos, simplemente porque otro los señalaba, porque instituciones constituidas del Estado entregaban información o listas." — Jorge Iván Laverde, *el Iguano*, ex-AUC. > "[El general decía] que nosotros teníamos que hacer el trabajo sucio que ellos [la fuerza pública] no podían hacer legalmente; en pocas palabras, esa es la guerra." — ex-paramilitar. > "Una guerra donde no hay finanzas no es guerra." — ex-AUC, on economic-gremio complicity. ## 9. Recommendations This volume carries **"afirmaciones de verdad"** rather than the formal recommendation set (Tomo 2: *Hallazgos y recomendaciones*). Implicit calls: deepen investigation/identification/sanction of responsibles (especially state agents in disappearance, given the 9,888–22,384 estimation gap); correct the gross subregistro of responsibility data (esp. displacement, where RUV shows the State as "prácticamente inexistente"); a "necesaria rendición de cuentas" of third-party economic/political actors. Final exhortation: reject belicismo; "Queremos soñar un nuevo futuro. **Hay futuro si hay verdad.**" ## 10. Distinctive insights & coined concepts - **"Hasta la guerra tiene límites"** — IHL principles bind all parties; "no se puede atacar a cualquiera, ni cualquier cosa, ni de cualquier manera." - **Graduated responsibility** — "A mayor poder, mayor responsabilidad"; the State as garante carries a heavier juicio de reproche than the citizens it failed. - **Anti-euphemism doctrine** — "La no repetición empieza por llamar las cosas como son" (rejecting "falsos positivos," "errores," "daños colaterales"). - **Collective (ethical-political), not individual-criminal, responsibility** — naming collectives (front to institution) without usurping the courts. - **"Terceros civiles" / economic-actor accountability** as a fourth responsibility axis alongside State, paramilitaries, guerrillas. - **AI + captura-recaptura on 112 databases** — treating subregistro itself as a measurable object; "presentar las cifras es más una forma de visibilizar el subregistro." - **"Esta guerra está viva"** — present-tense framing: the conflict persists; the same actors remain the principal responsibles across every estimation pass.