# Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) — UDAP framework The matter-neutral framework for Washington's general UDAP statute, the **Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86**. Subject bundles (`wa-consumer-debt`, `wa-commercial-disputes`, `wa-cema`, landlord-tenant, etc.) compose with this skill for their per se hooks; this file holds the elements, standards, remedies, and limits that apply to **any** CPA claim. - **Verbatim chapter text (in-repo):** `wa-law-references/references/wa-rcw-debt/RCW-19_86.md` (cite that file for current statutory text; excerpts below are a working summary). - **Canonical source:** > **NOT LEGAL ADVICE.** Drafting aid only; verify every statute and case > citation against current authority before filing (`wa-fact-check`). ## The prohibition RCW 19.86.020 declares unlawful "**[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.**" "Trade" and "commerce" are defined broadly at RCW 19.86.010(2) (includes the sale of assets or services and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of Washington). ## The five *Hangman Ridge* elements To establish a private CPA claim, a plaintiff must prove all five elements of *Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.*, 105 Wn.2d 778 (1986): 1. **An unfair OR deceptive act or practice** (the two prongs are independent — *Klem v. Washington Mutual Bank*, 176 Wn.2d 771 (2013)). 2. **Occurring in trade or commerce.** 3. **Affecting the public interest.** 4. **Injury to the plaintiff in his or her business or property.** 5. **A causal link** between the unfair/deceptive act and the injury. ### Element 1 — unfair OR deceptive *Klem* recognizes **three routes** to satisfy element 1: - **Per se (statutory):** the legislature declares that a violation of another statute is a per se unfair/deceptive act under the CPA (e.g., CEMA at RCW 19.190.030; Collection Agency Act at RCW 19.16.440). Establishing the predicate violation establishes element 1 — and the public-interest element via RCW 19.86.093(1). - **Deceptive:** an act has the **capacity to deceive a substantial portion of the public.** Intent is **not** required, and the plaintiff need not have been actually deceived — the standard is objective. *Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash.*, 166 Wn.2d 27 (2009). - **Unfair:** *Klem* adopted the FTC-style standard — an act is unfair if it **(a) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers, (b) which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves, and (c) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits.** "Unfair" is a separate theory from "deceptive"; conduct can be unfair without being deceptive. ### Element 2 — trade or commerce Broad (RCW 19.86.010(2)). For the **learned professions**, only the **entrepreneurial or commercial aspects** of the practice are covered, not claims going to competence or strategy. *Short v. Demopolis*, 103 Wn.2d 52 (1984). ### Element 3 — public interest (codified at RCW 19.86.093) The 2009 legislature codified the public-interest element. A claimant may show the act is injurious to the public interest because it: > (1) Violates a statute that incorporates [the CPA]; (2) violates a statute > that contains a specific legislative declaration of public interest impact; > or (3)(a) injured other persons; (b) had the capacity to injure other > persons; or (c) has the capacity to injure other persons. — RCW 19.86.093 - Routes (1)–(2) are the **per se** shortcut (element 3 is automatic once the predicate statute is violated). - Route (3) is the **capacity-to-injure-others** showing for non-per-se claims. Pre-2009 case-law factors still inform the analysis: the *Hangman Ridge* factors for an essentially **private dispute**, and the *Michael v. Mosquera-Lacy*, 165 Wn.2d 595 (2009) factors for a **consumer transaction** (e.g., whether the act was part of a pattern, whether others are likely to be solicited, whether it occurred in the defendant's regular course of business). ### Element 4 — injury to business or property - The injury must be to **business or property** — **personal injury and mental distress alone do not satisfy the injury element.** - But the injury need not be large or quantified: *Panag* held that costs incurred investigating or responding to a deceptive practice (e.g., consulting counsel) can be a sufficient **injury**, and that **injury is distinct from damages** — a plaintiff can prove injury (unlocking the claim and fee-shifting) even with modest provable damages. ### Element 5 — causation A **proximate ("but for") causal link** between the unfair/deceptive act and the injury is required. *Indoor Billboard/Washington, Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc.*, 162 Wn.2d 59 (2007) (rejecting a per se causation presumption from a statutory violation; the plaintiff must still prove causation). ## Remedies — RCW 19.86.090 A person injured in business or property by a violation may bring a civil action for: - **Actual damages.** - **Injunctive relief** ("to enjoin further violations"). - **Costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee** — **mandatory** to a prevailing plaintiff. *Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos*, 107 Wn.2d 735 (1987). - **Treble (enhanced) damages** — discretionary, up to three times actual damages, but the enhancement **for a § .020 violation may not exceed $25,000.** Available to pro se plaintiffs. - **District-court option:** the action may be brought in district court for actual damages up to the RCW 3.66.020 jurisdictional limit, with the same treble enhancement capped at $25,000. - **Damages content:** out-of-pocket loss, loss of use or value, investigation costs; emotional-distress damages may be recoverable **where the injury element is independently met by business/property injury** (see *Mason v. Mortgage America, Inc.*, 114 Wn.2d 842 (1990)) — verify the current contours. ## Statute of limitations — RCW 19.86.120 **Four years.** Tolled during the pendency of an Attorney General action based on the same conduct. ## Regulated-industry exemption — RCW 19.86.170 Actions or transactions **otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated** by a regulatory body acting under statutory authority are exempt. The exemption is **narrow** — it applies only where the specific challenged action is actually required or permitted by the regulator; mere general regulation of an industry does not immunize all conduct within it. ## Public (AG) enforcement + the service requirement - The **Attorney General** may sue to restrain violations, recover costs, obtain restoration of property, and seek civil penalties (RCW 19.86.080). - **Service on the AG:** when a private plaintiff requests **injunctive relief** under RCW 19.86.090, the initial pleading must be served on the Attorney General (RCW 19.86.095). Calendar this — it is easy to miss. ## Per se CPA statutes elsewhere in the marketplace Many Washington statutes declare their violation a per se CPA violation; the predicate statute supplies elements 1–3, and the plaintiff proves only injury + causation: - **CEMA** — RCW 19.190.030 (see `wa-cema`). - **Collection Agency Act** — RCW 19.16.440 (see `wa-consumer-debt`). - Insurance, residential landlord-tenant, and other regulatory statutes contain similar declarations — check the predicate statute for an express per se hook before pleading the long-form *Hangman Ridge* claim.