


TORNBERG CONSULTING, LLC



SOURCE PACKET 2026-03B

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

U.S. ELECTION SECURITY

**Foreign Data Exploitation, System Vulnerabilities, Institutional
Warning, and Executive Decision Support**

*Comprehensive source lineage for the 2026-01 and 2026-02 baselines and the
expanded 2026-03 evidence corpus*

20 JULY 2026 | DRAFT 1

PACKET STATUS

This packet consolidates 159 controlled source records: 60 from Public Source Packet 2026-01, 42 incremental records from Source Packet 2026-02B, and 57 files from the expanded 2026-03 release corpus. The count is a control inventory, not a count of independent evidence streams.

REVIEW BOUNDARY

The packet supports Strategic Intelligence Estimate 2026-03, Draft 1. Inclusion does not imply acceptance of every claim. Source repetition, official summaries, revised products, duplicate files, and records from one investigation remain dependent until independence is demonstrated. Human source audit, legal review, technical review, independent challenge, approval, and release remain outstanding.

PUBLIC, DECLASSIFIED, OFFICIAL, JUDICIAL, TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND CONTROLLED OPEN-SOURCE MATERIALS

0. Document Status and Packet Guide

Field	Controlled statement
Product supported	Strategic Intelligence Estimate 2026-03, Draft 1.
Historical baselines inherited	Intelligence Baseline Assessment 2026-01 and Preliminary Intelligence Assessment 2026-02.
Controlled record count	159 records: 60 legacy public-source records, 42 incremental national election-security records, and 57 expanded-release files.
New-file integrity	57 filenames, 54 unique SHA-256 hashes, three exact duplicate groups, eight controlled evidence streams.
Access boundary	No classified, privileged, complete presidential-delivery, or complete investigative access is represented.
Use	Trace judgments, baseline effects, gaps, source dependencies, permitted use, limitations, hashes, and unresolved collection requirements.
Release status	Draft for review, coordination, and revision. Not approved or released.

How to Use This Packet

- Use Part 2 to see how the two historical baselines and the expanded corpus relate.
- Use Part 3 to trace each current key judgment to source families and material source IDs.
- Use Part 4 to trace G-01 through G-11 to source families and residual requirements.
- Use Parts 5, 6, and 7 for the complete source registers.
- Use Part 8 to identify duplicate, derivative, revised, recalled, and common-origin evidence.
- Use Part 9 to identify corrected, rejected, mixed, and quarantined claims.
- Use Part 10 to reproduce the data transformations and count controls.
- Use Part 11 to verify every expanded-release file by filename, page count, and SHA-256.
- Use Parts 12 and 13 to identify access-constrained work, AI limitations, and outstanding review.

Packet Contents

Part	Purpose
1	Governing evidence and source controls
2	Baseline lineage and source inheritance
3	Key judgment-to-source crosswalk
4	Gap-to-source crosswalk
5	Complete register A - Public Source Packet 2026-01
6	Complete register B - Incremental Source Packet 2026-02B
7	Complete register C - Expanded Release 2026-03
8	Source de-duplication, deconfliction, and dependency register
9	Corrections, rejections, mixed use, and quarantine register
10	Data and transformation record
11	Expanded-release file integrity register
12	Access-constrained review requirements
13	AI, automation, review, and audit record
Appendices	Baseline artifacts, controlled definitions, and source-audit checklist

1. Governing Evidence and Source Controls

1. Evidence precedes assessment. Every material factual proposition and judgment must trace to an identified source or clearly labeled inferential basis.
2. Fact, observation, reported information, inference, assessment, warning, and recommendation are not interchangeable.
3. Vulnerability, attempt, access or transaction, activation or acceptance, operational or count effect, certification effect, and outcome effect remain separate stages.
4. Event date, collection or reporting date, earliest demonstrated analytic availability, and public-release date remain distinct.
5. Government possession does not establish author access, product inclusion, executive delivery, or executive understanding.
6. Repetition is not corroboration. A common author, source, dataset, investigation, product family, or release narrative remains one stream unless independence is demonstrated.
7. Government action triggered by the same originating evidence is not independent corroboration.
8. Legal disposition is metadata. Weight comes from access, contemporaneous records, technical or financial evidence, admissions, corroboration, internal consistency, and alternatives.
9. Quantitative claims require numerator, denominator, unit, period, inclusion rules, de-duplication, and error treatment.
10. A source may support a narrow proposition and remain unusable for prevalence, coordination, intent, operation, or effect.
11. Unresolved leads remain visible through boundary or quarantine.
12. Confidence is proposition-specific and must reflect source quality, independence, corroboration, and gaps.
13. Later evidence may refine or correct a baseline but may not silently rewrite what was supportable at an earlier cutoff.
14. Release-selection bias is a controlling limitation. A public release is a selected evidentiary record, not proof of completeness.
15. Public reaction is not evidence that an allegation is true or false. It is relevant only when linked to observable operating effects.

1.1 Status and Disposition Vocabulary

Label	Meaning
SUPPORTED	A primary or high-quality source directly supports the bounded proposition stated.
SUPPORTED / BOUNDED	The source supports part of the proposition while later stages, scale, intent, coordination, or effect remain unresolved.
DIRECTLY OBSERVED	A source records a direct observation or technical result; generalization remains separate.
OFFICIAL ALLEGATION	A charging, complaint, investigative, or intelligence product records an allegation. Weight comes from the substrate.
CONTEXT	The source informs priors, doctrine, scale, method, or collection but does not establish the assessed proposition.
CORRECTED	The source supports a narrower formulation and contradicts or fails to support a broader claim.
RETAINED	Admitted for the stated proposition.
BOUNDARIED	Retained only for a narrow use, context, method, warning, or falsification function.
MIXED	Different claims from the same source receive different treatment.
QUARANTINED	Preserved as a lead but excluded from definitive prose and confidence until missing controls are satisfied.
REJECTED	Excluded substantively while remaining visible for audit.

2. Baseline Lineage and Source Inheritance

Source layer	Records	Scope	Control
Public Source Packet 2026-01	60	PRC election baseline, mass data, cyber and political targeting, influence access, election lead handling, land and infrastructure, agriculture, and governing methodology.	Historical source foundation; retained as a controlled baseline record.
Source Packet 2026-02B	42 incremental	National election administration, law, technical standards, threat vectors, case-discovery sources, advocacy and derivative claims, and prior analytic records.	Historical and current foundation for national election-security judgments.
Expanded Release 2026-03	57 files / 54 hashes	PRC 2020 coordination, PRC voter and PII collection, technical vulnerability, Albany recall, Michigan investigation, noncitizen summary, Venezuela capability, and derivative public summaries.	New evidence used to reinforce, refine, bound, or create current SIE judgments.
Total controlled records	159	Inventory count only.	Not equivalent to 159 independent source streams.

INHERITANCE RULE

A historical source remains part of the current audit record even when a new source changes the judgment. Earlier products and packets are retained as records of what was supportable before the expanded release. The current draft does not erase or retrospectively rewrite them.

3. Key Judgment-to-Source Crosswalk

ID	Current judgment	Material sources	Boundary
KJ-01	No reviewed public or declassified evidence establishes nationwide or outcome-changing compromise of certified vote counts.	IC-02, IC-03; NE-011, NE-037, NE-040, NE-056; EAC-01, NAS-01.	High for the public-record boundary; detectability and access remain incomplete.
KJ-02	Multiple pathways are vulnerable, attempted, or exploited at bounded stages; national prevalence and aggregate effect cannot be ranked.	EAC-01-10; DOJ-01/02; NIST-01; NAS-01; NE-011, NE-019-036, NE-056.	Pathway existence is better supported than prevalence, coordination, or effect.
KJ-03	Multiple PRC-linked or state-associated actors and streams show recurring voter and identity-data acquisition and processing.	IC-01, IC-05; DATA-01-07; NE-002, NE-004, NE-045-049, NE-054.	Unique persons, dataset overlap, integration, consumers, tasking, and effect remain unresolved.
KJ-04	Official testing demonstrates exploitable weaknesses in selected registration, election-support, enterprise, and vendor environments.	NIST-01, NAS-01; NE-011, NE-040, NE-056.	Selected testing does not establish current national prevalence, persistence, or certified-result effect.
KJ-05	Michigan records document paid registration activity, allegations and indicators of falsification, anomalies, and investigative handling.	NE-001, NE-003, NE-005/006, NE-019-036, NE-043/044, NE-055; DOJ-01.	Organizational direction, final active registrations, ballots, count, effect, and national generalization remain unresolved.
KJ-06	Uneven assurance and fragmented observability are a cross-cutting national exposure.	EAC-01-10; NIST-01; NAS-01; NE-011, NE-056.	The evidence supports minimum outcome measures, not one uniform national process or a national risk ranking.
KJ-07	The released record shows material professional disagreement and process concern but cannot establish presidential delivery or intentional concealment.	NE-012, NE-014-018, NE-035, NE-039, NE-042, NE-053; EL-01-05.	Written and oral executive-delivery evidence is access-constrained.
KJ-08	The defensible risk-reduction model is layered and function-specific: prevent, detect, contain/correct, reconstruct, and recover/learn.	EAC-01-10; NIST-01; NAS-01; NE-011, NE-056; DOJ-03/04.	Comparative superiority, cost, feasibility, and dual-error performance require implementation evidence.

4. Gap-to-Source Crosswalk

Gap	Description	Source families / IDs	Residual
G-01	Completeness and coverage	EAC, DOJ, IC, NE-001-057	Expanded; no representative national census.
G-02	Detection and observability	EAC-01/07; NIST-01; NE-011, NE-019-036, NE-056	Meaningfully narrowed; national detection probability remains unknown.
G-03	Evidence-stage bridge	IC-01-05; EL-01-05; NE-002/004/045-049/054; NE-001/019-036; NE-012/014-018/053	Still critical across PRC operation, Michigan ballot stages, and executive delivery.
G-04	Control performance and residual risk	EAC-01-10; NIST-01; NAS-01; NE-011, NE-056	Weaknesses better documented; current remediation and national performance remain incomplete.
G-05	Legal and procedural normalization	DOJ-01-04; EAC-06/08-10; NCSL-01; FVAP-01; NE-019-036	Partly narrowed; state law and procedure remain diverse.
G-06	Exposure and denominator	EAC-01; CENSUS-01; DB-01; BRAD-01; NE-002/004/045-049/054	Large totals exist; unique-person, overlap, sampling, and detection probability remain unresolved.
G-07	Attribution, intent, coordination	IC, CY, INF, EL; NE-002/004/045-049/054	Partly narrowed; integrated direction and operational intent remain unresolved.
G-08	System and vector coverage	EAC, NIST, NAS; NE-011, NE-040, NE-056; Michigan stream	Materially improved but still selective.
G-09	Warning design	FMI-01/02; IC; EL; NE-012/014-018/035/039/042/053	Partly narrowed; thresholds, escalation, and delivery remain incomplete.
G-10	Source integrity and independence	All packets; deconfliction register; NE hashes	Still critical; larger corpus increases dependency and release-selection risk.
G-11	Executive consumer clarity and delivery integrity	EL-01-05; NE-012, NE-014-018, NE-035, NE-039, NE-042, NE-053	New and access-constrained.

5. Complete Register A - Public Source Packet 2026-01

This register carries forward all 60 controlled records used in the first PRC baseline, including 56 substantive or contextual sources and four method or audit-governance references. The direct-use and limitation summaries are inherited from the original packet.

5.1 Intelligence and election baseline

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
IC-01	National Intelligence Council. "Cyber Operations Enabling Expansive Digital Authoritarianism." National Intelligence Council Assessment, 7 April 2020; declassified by the Director of National Intelligence in October 2022. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NICMDeclassified-Cyber-Operations-Enabling-Expansive-Digital-Authoritarianism20200407--2022.pdf	Direct IC evidence that Chinese intelligence officials analyzed voter-registration data from multiple U.S. states for public-opinion analysis concerning the 2020 election; broader assessment of bulk personal-data exploitation.	Establishes analysis and mission utility, not a deployed election-influence operation or material electoral effect.
IC-02	Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections." Intelligence Community Assessment, March 2021. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass16MAR21.pdf	Core coordinated IC baseline; majority and minority judgments concerning PRC election influence and interference; information cutoff through 31 December 2020.	Finished intelligence, not underlying source reporting. Later evidence cannot be imported into its contemporary evidence base without demonstrated access.
IC-03	U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Key Findings and Recommendations from the Joint Report of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security on Foreign Interference Related to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections." March 2021. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0311_key-findingsand-recommendations-related-to-2020-elections_1.pdf	Official impact assessment concerning election infrastructure, voting, registration, tabulation, and material effect.	A no-material-impact finding does not adjudicate separate questions of intelligence collection, influence, preparation, unsuccessful activity, or policy shaping.
IC-04	Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Foreign Threats to the 2022 U.S. Elections." Intelligence Community Assessment, declassified 11 December 2023 and publicly released 18 December 2023. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-DeclassifiedICA-Foreign-Threats-to-the-2022-US-Elections-Dec2023.pdf	High-confidence assessment of bounded PRC efforts to influence selected 2022 races and change in operating posture relative to earlier cycles.	Subsequent behavior; useful for baseline change and warning calibration, not proof of specific 2020 intent.
IC-05	U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Foreign Interference Targeting Election Infrastructure or Political Organization, Campaign, or Candidate Infrastructure Related to the 2022 U.S. Federal Elections." December 2023. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/202312/1_b_%20Memo%20DOJ%20and%20DHS%20Approved_508c.pdf	Official 2022 impact assessment; documents suspected PRC scanning and collection of publicly available voter information while finding no material compromise of core election processes.	Does not establish the downstream operational use of collected voter data.
IC-06	Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence. "Opening Statement as Delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for An Update on Foreign Threats to the 2024 Elections." 15 May 2024. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressionaltestimonies/congressional-testimonies-2024/3823-dni-haines-opening-statement-asdelivered-to-the-ssci-for-an-update-on-foreign-t...	Official context on foreign election threats, influence apparatus, emerging technology, and IC election-security work.	Public testimony is strategic context, not a sourcespecific adjudication of the 2020 China dispute.
IC-07	Avril Haines, Director of National Intelligence. "Opening Statement as Delivered on the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." 11 March 2024. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressionaltestimonies/congressional-testimonies-2024/3798-dni-haines-opening-statement-asdelivered-on-the-2024-annual-threat-assessment-o...	Official context on foreign malign influence and the use of generative artificial intelligence.	Broad threat context; not direct evidence of a particular PRC operation.
IC-08	Foreign Malign Influence Center. "FMI Primer: Foreign Malign Influence and Elections, Highlights, Volume 2." October 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/products/10-1824_Report_FMI-Primer-Vol-2-Public-Release.pdf	Controlled public definition and examples of subversive, undeclared, coercive, and criminal foreign malign influence.	Doctrinal and contextual; does not independently prove an operation.

5.2 Mass data and collection priority

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
DATA-01	U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Information Security: OPM Has Improved Controls, but Further Efforts Are Needed." GAO-17-614, 3 August 2017. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-17-614.pdf	Official scale and nature of the OPM breaches, including 21.5 million affected backgroundinvestigation records.	Does not identify a publicly confirmed downstream PRC operation produced by the data.
DATA-02	U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Information Security: OPM Has Implemented Many of GAO's 80 Recommendations, but Over One-Third Remain Open." GAO-19-143R, 13 November 2018. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-143r.pdf	Clarifies the related personnelrecord and backgroundinvestigation compromises and affected populations.	Administrative and security review; not attribution or operational-use proof.
DATA-03	Federal Bureau of Investigation. Christopher Wray, "The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States." Remarks, 7 July 2020. https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches-and-testimony/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-andnational-security-of-the-united-states	Official public attribution and strategic context connecting PRC actors to major U.S. data thefts, including OPM and health data.	Strategic speech summarizes official judgments; incident-specific technical and judicial sources are required for precise propositions.
DATA-04	U.S. Department of Justice. "Chinese Military Personnel Charged with Computer Fraud, Economic Espionage and Wire Fraud for Hacking into Credit Reporting Agency Equifax." 10 February 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/chinese-military-personnel-chargedcomputer-fraud-economic-espionage-and-wire-fraud-hacking	Direct prosecutorial attribution to four PLA officers and the theft of sensitive information concerning roughly 145 million Americans.	Charges expose evidence and allegations; they do not by themselves establish downstream voter profiling or influence use.

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
DATA-05	U.S. Department of Justice. "Member of Sophisticated China-Based Hacking Group Indicted for Series of Computer Intrusions, Including 2015 Data Breach of Health Insurer Anthem Inc. Affecting Over 78 Million People." 9 May 2019. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/member-sophisticated-china-basedhacking-group-indicted-series-computer-intrusions-including	Scale, data types, China-based operation, and exfiltration of Anthem PII.	Public charging product does not provide the same direct PLA/MSS attribution as Equifax and does not establish a voter-related purpose.
DATA-06	U.K. National Cyber Security Centre. "China State-Affiliated Actors Target UK Democratic Institutions and Parliamentarians." 25 March 2024. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/china-state-affiliated-actors-target-ukdemocratic-institutions-parliamentarians	Official U.K. attribution of compromise involving Electoral Commission email and Electoral Register data.	Direct allied parallel; does not establish use of the data to change election outcomes.
DATA-07	U.S. Department of Justice. "Justice Department Implements Critical National Security Program to Protect Americans' Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries." 11 April 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-implements-criticalnational-security-program-protect-americans-sensitive	Official statement of national-security risks from foreign access to bulk sensitive personal and government-related data.	Policy framework and risk model; not evidence that a particular stolen dataset was operationally used.

5.3 Cyber and political targeting

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
CY-01	U.S. Department of Justice. "Seven Hackers Associated with Chinese Government Charged with Computer Intrusions Targeting Perceived Critics of China and U.S. Businesses and Political Officials." 25 March 2024. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/seven-hackers-associated-chinesegovernment-charged-computer-intrusions-targeting-perceived	MSS-linked APT31 political, campaign, government, journalist, and critic targeting; technical progression and potential influence utility.	DOJ expressly distinguished charged hacking from proof that the conduct furthered a U.S. influence operation.
CY-02	United States v. Zhao Guangzong et al. Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, unsealed 25 March 2024. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/media/1345131/dl	Underlying allegations, victim categories, targeting methods, and technical records for APT31.	Unadjudicated allegations should be assessed proposition by proposition; downstream influence application remains bounded.
CY-03	Federal Bureau of Investigation and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. "Joint Statement from FBI and CISA on the People's Republic of China Targeting of Commercial Telecommunications Infrastructure." 13 November 2024. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-statement-from-fbi-and-cisaon-the-peoples-republic-of-china-targeting-of-commercial-telecommunicationsinfrastructure	Official confirmation of broad PRC telecommunications espionage, callrecord theft, access to some private communications, and lawful-intercept information.	Establishes espionage and surveillance; does not by itself establish an election-influence operation.
CY-04	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and partners. "Enhanced Visibility and Hardening Guidance for Communications Infrastructure." December 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/enhanced-visibility-andhardening-guidance-communications-infrastructure	Technical and mitigation context for PRC telecommunications compromises commonly associated with Salt Typhoon.	Defensive guidance; attribution and target-specific claims should be grounded in accompanying official statements.
CY-05	U.S. Department of Justice. "Justice Department Charges 12 Chinese Contract Hackers and Law Enforcement Officers in Global Computer Intrusion Campaigns." 5 March 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-charges-12-chinesecontract-hackers-and-law-enforcement-officers-global	Official description of a distributed hacker-for-hire ecosystem serving MSS and MPS consumers, including speculative theft, sale, and analysis.	Not every contractor intrusion was centrally tasked or part of a single campaign.
CY-06	United States v. Wu Haibo et al. Indictment, U.S. District Court, unsealed 5 March 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1391901/dl	Specific alleged data-to-consumer pathways, government bureau customers, sale of stolen information, and paid analysis.	Downstream operational action by each recipient bureau is not always publicly visible.
CY-07	Graphika Research Team. "The #Americans: Chinese State-Linked Influence Operation Spamouflage Masquerades as U.S. Voters to Push Divisive Online Narratives Ahead of 2024 Election." 3 September 2024. https://www.graphika.com/reports/the-americans	High-quality open-source documentation of deceptive U.S. voter personas and divisive political narratives attributed to a PRC statelinked network.	Open-source attribution; reported activity generally achieved limited authentic engagement and does not establish material electoral effect.
CY-08	U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. "U.S. Government Disrupts Botnet People's Republic of China Used to Conceal Hacking of Critical Infrastructure." 31 January 2024. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/us-government-disrupts-botnetpeoples-republic-of-china-used-to-conceal-hacking-of-critical-infrastructure	Official evidence of Volt Typhoon infrastructure, concealment, and targeting of U.S. critical infrastructure.	Establishes access and prepositioning concern; does not establish that destructive action was executed.
CY-09	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and international partners. "PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure." Cybersecurity Advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a	Technical evidence of persistent access, living-off-the-land tradecraft, and infrastructure sectors relevant to U.S. force projection.	Technical advisory supports capability and preparation; intent and activation require separate assessment.
CY-10	U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Justice Department, FBI Disable 13 Websites Backed by Suspected Chinese Agents That Sought Sensitive U.S. Information from Security Clearance Holders." 10 June 2026. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-fbi-disable-13-websitesbacked-suspected-chinese-agents-sought-sensitive	Official description and warrantbased allegations concerning deceptive consulting fronts, fabricated identities, and recruitment of cleared personnel.	The public record describes suspected PRC-backed recruitment; exact downstream use of every response is not publicly established.

5.4 Political access and influence

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
INF-01	U.S. Department of Justice. "Political Operative Sentenced to 48 Months in Federal Prison for Acting as Covert Agent of the People's Republic of China." 10 February 2026. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/political-operative-sentenced-48-monthsfederal-prison-acting-covert-agent-peoples-republic	Direct admissions and official account of Yaoning "Mike" Sun's tasking, campaign access, propaganda, surveillance, reporting, and work for PRC officials.	Sentence length is procedural metadata; analytic value derives from admissions, communications, tasking, and corroborating records.

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
INF-02	United States v. Yaoning Sun. Criminal Complaint and Affidavit, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, filed December 2024. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/media/1381256/dl	Underlying messages, reports, intermediary relationships, and alleged foreign tasking in the Sun matter.	Complaint allegations should be distinguished from admitted facts and independently corroborated evidence.
INF-03	U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California. "Arcadia Mayor Federally Charged with Acting as Illegal Agent of the People's Republic of China." 11 May 2026. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/arcadia-mayor-federally-chargedacting-illegal-agent-peoples-republic-china	Filed information and plea agreement in which Eileen Wang agreed to admit covert PRC direction and undisclosed propaganda activity through U.S. News Center.	As of the cited release, Wang had agreed to plead guilty; procedural status does not determine the weight of the underlying admissions and records.
INF-04	U.S. Department of Justice. "Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Act as Illegal Agent of the Chinese Government in the United States." 16 September 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-pleads-guilty-conspiring-act-illegalagent-chinese-government-united-states	Admitted MSS tasking, reporting on U.S.-based dissidents and political activity, and continued collection cycle.	Primarily demonstrates intelligence collection and transnational repression; policy-influence effect requires additional evidence.
INF-05	U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York. "Queens Man Arrested for Operating as an Illegal Agent of the Chinese Government in the United States." 21 August 2024. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/queens-man-arrested-operating-illegalagent-chinese-government-united-states	Charging record describing shared draft-email accounts, encrypted communications, tasking, and reporting in the Yuanjun Tang case.	Charging allegations; later plea supports the core agency relationship, but each factual detail should still be traced to the evidentiary record.
INF-06	U.S. Department of Justice. "Former High-Ranking New York State Government Employee Charged with Acting as an Undisclosed Agent of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party." 3 September 2024. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/former-high-ranking-new-york-stategovernment-employee-charged-acting-undisclosed	Official allegations that Linda Sun used state-government access to alter access, messaging, and assistance in response to PRC/CCP requests.	Pending or charged conduct is not established by disposition; use the underlying communications and records and preserve the allegation status.
INF-07	United States v. Linda Sun and Christopher Hu. Indictment, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, filed 3 September 2024. https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/sun_and_hu_indictment.pdf	Detailed alleged acts, concealment, benefits, and governmental-access pathways.	Unadjudicated; does not establish that all favorable policy conduct resulted from foreign direction.
INF-08	Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Zach Dorfman. "Exclusive: Suspected Chinese Spy Targeted California Politicians." Axios, 8 December 2020. https://www.axios.com/2020/12/08/china-spy-california-politicians	Year-long, multi-source investigative account of Christine Fang's suspected cultivation of local and rising political figures.	High-quality investigative reporting with anonymous intelligence sourcing; no public charge or adjudication. Targeted politicians were not thereby shown to be collaborators.
INF-09	United States Code. 50 U.S.C. § 3237, "Annual Reports on Influence Operations and Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party." Current through 17 June 2026. n%3Aprelim%29 https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A50+section%3A3237+editio	Statutory institutionalization of recurring IC reporting on CCP and UFWD influence structures, tasking, organizations, and targeting of officials and candidates.	A statutory collection and reporting requirement is evidence of an institutional problem set, not proof of every enumerated activity.
INF-10	U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. "China's Economic Espionage and Subnational Influence in the United States." Hearing, 25 June 2026. https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/about/events/hearing-advisorychina-s-economic-espionage-and-subnational-influence-in-the-united-states	Official hearing record identifying allegations, expert frameworks, and policy concerns regarding state and local influence.	Witness statements require source-by-source evaluation; the hearing itself is not independent proof of each claim.
INF-11	Alexander Bowe. "China's Overseas United Front Work: Background and Implications for the United States." U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 24 August 2018. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Overseas%20Uni	Official commission staff study of United Front structures, influence mechanisms, and overseas mission.	Affiliation, contact, funding, direction, and agency are distinct; the report does not justify treating every community organization as a controlled actor.
INF-12	Jamestown Foundation. "The United Front System: Mapping China's Global Influence Operations." Report, accessed 17 July 2026. https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/Jamestown_UF_Report.pdf	Open-source mapping and network-development context for UFWD-linked organizations.	The precise "more than 2,000 organizations" aggregate is quarantined unless counting rules, duplication controls, activity status, and affiliation thresholds are independently validated.
INF-13	U.S. Department of Justice. "Singaporean National Pleads Guilty to Acting in the United States as an Illegal Agent of Chinese Intelligence." 24 July 2020. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/singaporean-national-pleads-guiltyacting-united-states-illegal-agent-chinese-intelligence	Admitted use of a false consulting company and professional networking sites to recruit U.S. military and government personnel for MSS-directed reporting.	Demonstrates a recurring recruitment model; not direct evidence that the same operators ran the 2026 website network.

5.5 Election lead and source handling

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
EL-01	U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Chairman Charles E. Grassley. "Grassley Releases Records Showing FBI Headquarters Interfered with Alleged Chinese Election Interference Probe." 1 July 2025. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-releasesbombshell-records-showing-fbi-headquarters-interfered-with-alleged-chineseelection-interference-probe-to-shield...	Congressional release and framing of an FBI IIR, recall, source-handling correspondence, and internal process concerns.	Committee characterization is not independent corroboration of the underlying ballot-fraud allegation.
EL-02	Federal Bureau of Investigation records produced to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee concerning the 2020 China-related Intelligence Information Report, source recontact, recall, and internal communications. Released 1 July 2025. irman_grassley.pdf https://www.grassley.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fbi_iir_email_productions_t_o_cha	Primary internal correspondence documenting source-access concerns, possible open-source contamination, recall, and follow-up efforts.	The records expose handling and validation issues; they do not establish that the alleged ballot scheme occurred.

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
EL-03	Federal Bureau of Investigation. Intelligence Information Report concerning alleged PRC production/export of fraudulent U.S. driver's licenses for an election-related mail-ballot scheme, circulated in 2020 and publicly released through Senate Judiciary Committee processes in 2025. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/download/fbi-albany-iir-provided-tochairman-grassley	Raw confidential-human-source reporting alleging a specific operation.	High-consequence, low-maturity lead. Public record shows unresolved source access, corroboration, and contamination concerns. It is unsuitable as proof absent validation.
EL-04	U.S. Customs and Border Protection. "Over 19K Fraudulent IDs Seized by CBP Officers in Chicago." 27 July 2020. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/over-19k-fraudulent-idsseized-cbp-officers-chicago	Official evidence of 19,888 counterfeit driver's licenses seized, many arriving from China and Hong Kong.	Establishes a counterfeit-document stream, not a connection between those documents and voting or the FBI source allegation.
EL-05	Public claim and later-declassified references concerning PRC access to approximately 220 million U.S. voter records, 2020-2026.	Preserves a lead concerning very large-scale voter-record access and analysis.	QUARANTINED. The public record does not yet establish unique-person count, dataset overlap, acquisition method, source independence, or operational use. Do not publish as established fact.

5.6 Land and infrastructure access

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
LAND-01	U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Statement on the President's Decision Prohibiting the Acquisition of Certain Real Property of Cheyenne Leads by MineOne Cloud Computing Investment I L.P." 13 May 2024. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2335	Official presidential divestment action concerning PRC-majorityowned cryptocurrency mining property within one mile of F.E. Warren AFB and foreign-sourced equipment capable of facilitating surveillance or espionage.	Establishes a significant national-security risk, not publicly confirmed surveillance already conducted.
LAND-02	U.S. Department of the Air Force. Letter concerning the proposed Fufeng Group project near Grand Forks Air Force Base, 27 January 2023. https://www.hoeven.senate.gov/wpcontent/uploads/media/doc/USAIRFORC-E-FUFENG-LETTER-HOEVEN.pdf	Authoritative Air Force judgment that the proposed project presented a significant threat with near- and long-term risks to operations.	Underlying threat evidence is not public; the letter does not establish an observed espionage operation.
LAND-03	U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Foreign Investments in U.S. Agricultural Land: Enhancing Efforts to Collect, Track, and Share Key Information Could Better Identify National Security Risks." GAO-24-106337, 18 January 2024. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106337.pdf	Official review of AFIDA data, foreign agricultural land, proximity risks, data gaps, duplication, and weak verification.	Data-quality findings prevent strong clustering claims without independent cleaning, beneficial-ownership resolution, and matched-control analysis.
LAND-04	U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Treasury Issues Final Rule Expanding CFIUS Coverage of Real Estate Transactions Around More Than 60 Military Installations." 1 November 2024. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2708	Official expansion of review jurisdiction within one- and 100mile radii around listed installations.	Policy response evidences institutional risk perception and authority, not adversary intent in any individual transaction.
LAND-05	U.S. Department of the Treasury. "CFIUS Real Estate Instructions (Part 802)" and Geographic Reference Tool, current following the November 2024 final rule. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-onforeign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-real-estate-instructions-part-802	Regulatory geography and audit tool for proximity analysis.	A property location within CFIUS jurisdiction does not establish an intelligence purpose.
LAND-06	Office of U.S. Senator John Cornyn. Letter and public materials concerning the proposed Blue Hills Wind project near Laughlin Air Force Base, 2020-2024. https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Letter-reBlue-Hills-Wind-Project.pdf	Congressional concerns regarding approximately 130,000 acres, lowlevel military training routes, grid access, ownership, and mitigation.	Congressional concern is not independent proof of espionage. Publicly available material does not fully expose CFIUS evidence or mitigation terms.
LAND-07	Lara Seligman. "A Chinese Wind Farm in Texas Raises Eyebrows." Foreign Policy, 25 June 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/25/texas-chinese-wind-farm-nationalsecurity-espionage-electrical-grid/	High-quality reporting on ownership, project scale, military aviation, grid, and national-security concerns surrounding the Laughlinarea project.	Investigative context; does not establish a confirmed intelligence operation.
LAND-08	U.S. Department of Defense. "General Says Chinese Surveillance Balloon Now Over Center of U.S." 3 February 2023. https://www.defense.gov/News/NewsStories/Article/article/3288103/general-says-chinese-surveillance-balloon-now-overcenter-of-us/	Official confirmation of a maneuverable PRC surveillance platform crossing the continental United States near sensitive sites.	Later official accounts stated U.S. countermeasures prevented collection of sensitive intelligence during the transit; claims of successful collection despite mitigation are not supported here.
LAND-09	U.S. Department of Defense. "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2023." Annual report to Congress, 19 October 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-militaryand-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china.pdf	Strategic and technical context for the PLA high-altitude balloon program and global surveillance use.	Broad defense assessment; not evidence linking land purchases, cyber access, and balloons into one centrally controlled campaign.
LAND-10	U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Michigan. "United States Attorney's Office Issues 2024 Annual Report." 17 January 2025, discussion of charges against five Chinese nationals related to a 2023 visit near Camp Grayling. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/pr/united-states-attorneys-office-issues2024-annual-report	Official summary of alleged photography of military equipment and later conspiracy, false-statement, and evidence-destruction conduct.	The public record does not establish PRC government direction or an intelligence-service relationship.

5.7 Agriculture and strategic assets

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
AGR-01	Shuanghui International Holdings Limited and Smithfield Foods, Inc. "Shuanghui International and Smithfield Foods Complete Strategic Combination, Creating a Leading Global Pork Enterprise." 26 September 2013. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/shuanghui-international-and-smithfield-foods-complete-strategic-combination-creating-a-leading-global-pork-enterprise-225395622.html	Documents the Chinese acquisition of Smithfield as commercial and ownership context.	Does not establish intelligence access, precision-agriculture exploitation, or proximity-driven intent.
AGR-02	Syngenta. "ChemChina Announces the Definitive End Results of the Tender Offers for Syngenta." 2017. https://www.syngenta.com/media/media-releases/2017/chemchinaannounces-definitive-end-results-tender-offers-syngenta	Documents ChemChina's acquisition of Syngenta as agricultural-technology ownership context.	Does not independently establish U.S. precision-agriculture data transfer to PRC intelligence consumers.
AGR-03	Federal Trade Commission. "FTC Approves Final Order with China National Chemical Corporation and Syngenta AG, Preserving Competition in U.S. Markets for Three Pesticides." June 2017. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2017/06/ftc-approves-final-order-china-national-chemical-corporation-syngenta-ag-preserving-competition-us	Official U.S. regulatory confirmation of the ChemChina-Syngenta transaction and U.S. market implications.	Competition review; not evidence of intelligence use.

5.8 Method and audit governance

ID	Citation and controlled reference	Direct evidentiary or methodological use	Principal limitation
TM-01	Tornberg Consulting, LLC. TORNBURG Organizational Framework and Tradecraft Standards. Version 0.1 (Working Draft). 14 July 2026. Internal methodology document cited with owner authorization.	Organizational architecture; Discovery, Collection, Source Management, Analysis, Quality, Red Team, and Knowledge Management functions; TS-1110 through TS-1150 evidence standards; TS-1210 through TS-1230 professional judgment, confidence, and baseline standards; TS-1310 through TS-1350 intellectual integrity and auditability.	Internal working doctrine. Citation does not represent government endorsement and the full draft is not reproduced in this public packet unless separately released.
TM-02	Tornberg Consulting, LLC. TORNBURG CONSULTING Structured Analytic Products. Version 0.1 (Working Draft). 14 July 2026. Internal methodology document cited with owner authorization.	Structured analytic technique governance, independent judgment before group convergence, evidence matrices, source dependency, human review gates, update triggers, challenge, and product integration.	Internal working doctrine subject to revision.
TM-03	Tornberg Consulting, LLC. Time-Gated Evidence Deconfliction. Intelligence Tradecraft Note 2026-01. 17 July 2026. Public release.	Four-date evidence control, knowledge-availability classes, two-reading model, production-and-judgment reconstruction matrix, quarantine, and public audit checklist.	Method product; does not adjudicate the underlying political controversy.
TM-04	Tornberg Consulting, LLC. Application of the Tornberg Method to TimeGated Evidence Deconfliction. Process Summary Report 2026-01. 17 July 2026. Public release.	Framework-to-output traceability; Discovery, Collection, Analysis, Production, Review, Adaptation, challenge functions, and auditability standard.	Process description; not independent evidence concerning PRC activity or IC judgments.

6. Complete Register B - Incremental Source Packet 2026-02B

These 42 records were added for the national election-security baseline. They are incremental to the controlled references inherited from Public Source Packet 2026-01.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
EAC-01	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report. 30 June 2025. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2024_EAVS_Report_508c.pdf	Primary official national administrative survey Status: SUPPORTED Disposition: RETAINED	National exposure measures: registrations, transactions, voting methods, workforce, technology, ballot cure/rejection, and paper-record coverage. Judgments: PJ-02, PJ-03, PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-05, TV-08, TV-09, TV-10, TV-11, TV-15.	Certified state and local submissions; definitions, completeness, and reporting capability vary by item and jurisdiction. Administrative measures are not fraud incidence. Dependency: Primary data stream; EAC news releases and one-sheets derived from the same survey are not separate corroboration.
EAC-02	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Election Audits Across the United States. https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-audits-across-united-states	Official policy and administrative synthesis Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Variation in audit types and the absence of one national post-election auditing standard. Judgments: PJ-03. Vectors: TV-12, TV-15.	Describes law and practice; does not measure audit quality or performance nationally. Dependency: Same institution as EAC-01 but a distinct policy synthesis; not independent evidence of implementation outcomes.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
EAC-03	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Draft Voluntary National Election Audit Standards and 2026 hearing materials. https://www.eac.gov/events/2026/02/18/eac-election-audit-standards-hearing	Official draft standard and public process Status: CONTEXT Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Evidence of federal movement toward common voluntary audit principles. Judgments: PJ-03. Vectors: TV-12.	Draft and voluntary; not proof of adoption or performance. Dependency: Institutional policy development; not corroboration of specific jurisdictional controls.
EAC-04	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and migration resources. https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines	Official technical standards framework Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Federal certification generations, voluntary standards, and migration context. Judgments: PJ-03, PJ-04. Vectors: TV-10, TV-15.	Voluntary unless adopted by state law; legacy systems may remain in operation. Dependency: Official standard; not evidence of universal implementation.
EAC-05	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Paper-based voting system resources and 2024 EAVS technology findings. https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/05/28/eac-commissioners-issue-policy-support-paper-based-and-auditable-voting-systems	Official technical and administrative summary Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Paper ballot or auditable paper-record coverage and policy support. Judgments: PJ-03. Vectors: TV-10, TV-12.	Coverage figures derive from EAVS; paper availability does not establish voter verification, secure custody, or meaningful audit. Dependency: Partly derivative of EAC-01; not counted as separate corroboration for EAVS figures.
EAC-06	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Voter Lists, Registration, Confidentiality, and Voter List Maintenance. https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/voter-lists-registration-confidentiality-and-voter-list-maintenance	Official administrative guidance Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Continuous list maintenance, voter-file privacy, and registration-process context. Judgments: PJ-02, PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-03, TV-04.	Guidance does not replace state law or establish misconduct prevalence. Dependency: Independent institutional synthesis relative to advocacy claims; underlying state rules may overlap with NCSL-01.
EAC-07	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Best Practices for Election Technology. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/security/Best_Practices_for_Election_Technology_508.pdf	Official technical guidance Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Software-hash validation, audit logs, unique credentials, two-person control, custody, tamper evidence, and continuity. Judgments: PJ-03, PJ-04. Vectors: TV-08, TV-09, TV-10, TV-11, TV-15.	Best-practice guidance is not evidence that jurisdictions implemented or effectively performed the controls. Dependency: Distinct guidance; overlaps conceptually with NIST-01 and NAS-01 but not the same evidentiary origin.
EAC-08	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Best Practices on Provisional Voting. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/EAC-Best-Practices-on-Provisional-Voting.pdf	Official administrative guidance Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Transparent, uniform provisional-ballot issuance, research, and resolution safeguards. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-02, TV-05.	Guidance; state law determines eligibility and counting. Does not measure implementation. Dependency: Distinct policy guidance; not evidence of actual provisional-ballot performance.
EAC-09	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Overview of Federal Election Laws. https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/clearinghouse-resources-election-law-policy/overview-federal-election-laws	Official legal orientation Status: CONTEXT Disposition: BOUNDARIED	High-level HAVA, NVRA, UOCAVA, list-maintenance, and federal election-law context. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-05.	Orientation only; not a legal opinion or jurisdiction-specific authority. Dependency: Same statutory substrate as DOJ-03 and FVAP-01; not separate corroboration of legal conclusions.
EAC-10	U.S. Election Assistance Commission. National Mail Voter Registration Form. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf	Official form and instructions Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Documents current federal form fields, attestation, and state-specific instructions. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02.	Form architecture does not itself establish verification practices or legal sufficiency in every jurisdiction. Dependency: Primary administrative artifact.
NIST-01	National Institute of Standards and Technology. VTS 200-1, Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile. January 2024. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/vts/NIST.VTS.200-1.pdf	Official consensus technical profile Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Cyber-risk management across registration, voting systems, supporting technology, and service providers. Judgments: PJ-04. Vectors: TV-08, TV-09, TV-10, TV-15.	Framework guidance; local implementation, coverage, and maturity vary. Dependency: Independent federal technical institution; conceptually overlaps with EAC guidance but is not derivative of it.
NAS-01	National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy. 2018. https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy	Authoritative consensus study Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Human-readable paper ballots, independent evidence, risk-limiting audits, and resilience logic. Judgments: PJ-03, PJ-04. Vectors: TV-05, TV-10, TV-12, TV-15.	Predates later technology and law changes; foundational analysis, not a current implementation census. Dependency: Independent consensus body; separate evidentiary origin from EAC and NIST.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
FMI-01	CISA, FBI, and ODNI. Securing Election Infrastructure Against the Tactics of Foreign Malign Influence Operations. April 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-fbi-and-odni-release-guidance-securing-election-infrastructure-against-tactics-foreign-malign	Joint official threat and mitigation guidance Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Foreign tactics, impersonation, synthetic content, information manipulation, and infrastructure mitigation. Judgments: PJ-01, PJ-04, PJ-05. Vectors: TV-09, TV-12, TV-13, TV-14.	Public warning product; underlying intelligence, source access, and full detection picture are not exposed. Dependency: Joint official stream. Agency repetition of the same coordinated product is one evidence stream.
FMI-02	Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Foreign Malign Influence Center. Primer on Foreign Malign Influence, Volume 2. October 2024. https://www.dni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/products/10-18-24_Report_FMI-Primer-Vol-2-Public-Release.pdf	Official intelligence-community public assessment Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Influence/interference distinctions, foreign tactics, domestic laundering, and post-voting targeting. Judgments: PJ-05. Vectors: TV-09, TV-12, TV-13, TV-14.	Public-level source characterization is limited; effect measurement and collection coverage remain opaque. Dependency: Same broad official threat ecosystem as FMI-01, but a distinct product; possible shared intelligence reporting prevents automatic independence assumptions.
DOJ-01	U.S. Department of Justice. Election Crimes Branch. https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-pin/election-crimes-branch	Official prosecutorial orientation Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Federal election-crime categories, jurisdiction, and enforcement orientation. Judgments: PJ-01. Vectors: TV-02, TV-05, TV-06, TV-11, TV-14.	Not a national incident, conviction, or prevalence dataset. Dependency: Official orientation; does not corroborate individual case counts.
DOJ-02	U.S. Department of Justice. California Woman Federally Charged with Paying Individuals, Including Homeless People, on Los Angeles Skid Row to Register to Vote. 18 May 2026. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-woman-federally-charged-paying-individuals-including-homeless-people-las-skid-row	Official charging and plea-agreement account Status: OFFICIAL ALLEGATION / SUPPORTED BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Corroborates paid registration and false-address conduct captured by undercover video. Judgments: PJ-01. Vectors: TV-01, TV-03, TV-06, TV-07.	Bounded case; does not establish unlawful ballot casting/counting, national scale, or every broader recorded allegation. Dependency: Legal action arose from the investigative evidence and is not wholly independent of OK-01; plea-agreement substrate materially strengthens the bounded conduct.
DOJ-03	U.S. Department of Justice. National Voter Registration Act List Maintenance Guidance. https://www.justice.gov/crt/nvra-list-maintenance-guidance	Official legal guidance Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Registration opportunity, list maintenance, timing, voter protection, and enforcement context. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-04.	Application is fact- and jurisdiction-specific; not a substitute for counsel. Dependency: Official legal interpretation; overlaps statutory substrate with EAC-09.
DOJ-04	U.S. Department of Justice. Cases Raising Claims Under the National Voter Registration Act. https://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-national-voter-registration-act	Official litigation and enforcement record Status: CONTEXT Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Examples concerning materiality, voter-registration access, list maintenance, and improper rejection/removal. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02.	Case-specific records; legal holdings and current applicability require counsel. Dependency: Official case record; not independent of the statutory/legal framework it interprets.
USCIS-01	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE). https://www.uscis.gov/save	Official system description Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Capabilities and limits of immigration-status verification available to authorized agencies. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-02.	SAVE provides status information; it does not itself determine voter eligibility. Match quality and procedures require validation. Dependency: Primary system description; related DHS summary claims may derive from the same system and are not independent.
FVAP-01	Federal Voting Assistance Program. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/uocava	Official legal and administrative guidance Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Special registration and absentee-voting pathways for military and overseas citizens. Judgments: PJ-02. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-05.	Orientation; implementation details and state procedures vary. Dependency: Primary federal program guidance.
MIT-01	MIT Election Data + Science Lab. Interstate Voter Registration Data Matching. https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/interstate-voter-registration-data-matching	Academic methodological synthesis Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	False positives, false negatives, field selection, thresholds, and ordinary causes of multiple records. Judgments: PJ-02, PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-04.	Does not validate any specific commercial or advocacy match total. Dependency: Independent academic methodology source; not an independent replication of FVF, Tilores, PILF, or Heritage counts.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
NCSL-01	National Conference of State Legislatures. Access to and Use of Voter Registration Lists. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists	State-policy synthesis Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Variation in voter-file access, fields, confidentiality, and permissible use. Judgments: PJ-05. Vectors: TV-03, TV-13.	Secondary legal synthesis; current propositions should be checked against official state law. Dependency: Independent institution but often synthesizes the same state statutes and rules as EAC-06.
CENSUS-01	U.S. Census Bureau. Voting and Registration. https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/voting.html	Primary federal statistical context Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Participation and registration denominators by demographic and geography. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-02, TV-05.	Survey estimates; not evidence of individual fraud or election interference. Dependency: Distinct survey system from EAVS; definitions and denominators are not interchangeable.
USA-01	USA.gov. Report Voter Fraud, Voter Suppression, or Other Election Crimes. https://www.usa.gov/voter-fraud	Official public orientation Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Separates fraud, campaign-finance, intimidation, and civil-rights reporting pathways. Judgments: PJ-01. Vectors: TV-02, TV-03, TV-05, TV-06, TV-13, TV-14.	Orientation and referral information; not prevalence or adjudication data. Dependency: Official orientation; does not independently corroborate incidents.
OK-01	James O'Keefe. Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 15 July 2026; underlying public video series.	Direct investigative observation and sworn testimony Status: DIRECTLY OBSERVED / SUPPORTED BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	Paid-registration, false identity, petition, voter-data access, and worker-incentive pathways. Judgments: PJ-01. Vectors: TV-01, TV-03, TV-06, TV-07.	DOJ materially corroborates the Armstrong conduct; not every recorded actor or broader claim has a public final disposition. Dependency: Testimony and videos are one investigative stream. DOJ-02 is partially dependent on the referral but adds official legal and plea evidence.
DB-01	Heritage Foundation. Election Fraud Database export reviewed 18 July 2026: 1,619 rows, 1982-2025. https://electionfraud.heritage.org	Purposive case-discovery repository and local CSV Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Examples of adjudicated or officially determined conduct and within-dataset method frequencies. Judgments: PJ-01, PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01 through TV-08, TV-11, TV-14.	Not representative, exhaustive, or denominator-compatible; mixed dispositions, repeated rows, overlapping categories, and uneven source depth. Dependency: Website and CSV are the same underlying corpus. Individual linked case records may be independent, but row-level validation was not completed.
FVF-01	Fight Voter Fraud, Inc. "FVF, Inc. Uncovers Nearly 300,000 Double Registered Voters, Exposing 3,170 Cases of Double Voting Nationwide from 2016-2022." https://www.fightvoterfraud.org/press-releases/fvf-inc-uncovers-nearly-300000-double-registered-voters-exposing-3170-cases-of-double-voting-nationwide-from-2016-2022	Advocacy organization press release Status: QUARANTINED Disposition: REJECTED for exact totals; BOUNDARIED as collection lead	Discovery lead concerning duplicate-registration matching and alleged double voting. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-04.	No reproducible data, executable matching rules, thresholds, error rates, independent replication, or complete official dispositions. Displayed category totals require reconciliation. Dependency: May overlap state voter files, NCOA, and commercial data used by other advocacy/commercial sources; exact case overlap untested.
TIL-01	Tilores / Tilo Tech. "Does the US Have a Duplicate Voter Problem?" Medium. https://medium.com/tilo-tech/does-the-us-have-a-duplicate-voter-problem-870e8cf70fd0	Commercial analysis / author publication Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED for candidate matches; QUARANTINED for fraud claims Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Candidate entity-resolution matches across seven public voter files and methodology discussion. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-04.	No source-file inventory, executable configuration, thresholds, ground truth, error rates, code, or independent validation of fraud claims. Dependency: Same author, analysis, and data stream as TIL-02; must be counted once.
TIL-02	Tilores. "US Voter Fraud Analysis." https://tilores.io/content/us-voter-fraud-analysis	Commercial company republication Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED / DERIVATIVE Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Company-hosted version/context for the Tilores analysis. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-04.	Same methodological and commercial limitations as TIL-01. Dependency: Duplicate/derivative source stream with TIL-01; not corroboration.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
PILF-01	Public Interest Legal Foundation. Critical Condition: American Voter Rolls Filled with Errors, Dead Voters, and Duplicate Registrations. https://publicinterestlegal.org/research/critical-condition-american-voter-rolls-filled-with-errors-dead-voters-and-duplicate-registrations/	Advocacy research report Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Candidate stale, deceased, duplicate, and voting-history anomalies; vulnerability discovery and collection design. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-04.	No underlying matched data, executable rules, thresholds, validation sample, measured error rates, or independent audit; voting credits do not prove ballots cast by a specific person. Dependency: Potential input overlap with other voter-file analyses; exact record-level independence not established.
BRAD-01	Patrick Neil Bradley. Voter Fraud Map. https://patrickneilbradley.com/investigations/voter-fraud-map.html	Independent case-discovery analysis Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: BOUNDARIED	Transparent case-discovery index, inclusion rules, and alternative hypothesis testing. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01 through TV-08, TV-11.	No exhaustive-search proof; “every documented case” and prevalence ratio are not established. Detection probability is unknown. Dependency: Author states cases were re-sourced, but corpus-level independence from Heritage or other case databases was not demonstrated.
GIT-01	Gitnux. Voter Fraud Statistics. https://gitnux.org/voter-fraud-statistics/	Derivative statistical aggregator Status: QUARANTINED / CORRECTED Disposition: REJECTED for substantive and quantitative use	Falsification target and example of unsupported aggregation. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: None as affirmative evidence.	Report-level rather than claim-level citations; combines allegations, referrals, matches, charges, convictions, administrative anomalies, and corrected claims. Multiple high-impact claims failed direct testing. Dependency: Derivative aggregation; model or website repetition does not create independent corroboration.
ZIP-01	Zipdo. Voter Fraud Statistics. https://zipdo.co/voter-fraud-statistics/	Derivative statistical aggregator Status: QUARANTINED Disposition: REJECTED for substantive and quantitative use	Falsification target for 82% impersonation and Texas 65% claims. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: None as affirmative evidence.	No claim-specific primary-source mapping; confidence labels use a target mix “tuned for readability,” not evidence-derived calibration. Dependency: Derivative and AI-assisted synthesis; not an independent evidence stream.
FACT-01	Factually.co references supplied without a claim-specific source item.	Unspecified derivative reference Status: QUARANTINED Disposition: REJECTED	None beyond documenting an untraceable citation pattern. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: None.	No retrievable article, dataset, court record, or claim-level citation was identified. Dependency: Cannot be assessed because the actual source item was not identified.
DHS-01	Department of Homeland Security. “Preventing Alien Voting” one-page summary, uploaded July 2026.	Purported official summary / uploaded artifact Status: QUARANTINED Disposition: REJECTED for numerical baseline; BOUNDARIED as collection lead	Discovery lead concerning SAVE processing and claimed noncitizen-registration counts. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-02.	Exact issuing authority, publication URL, definitions, match methods, false-positive controls, adjudication status, and denominators remain unresolved. Dependency: Likely derived from SAVE processing; not independent of USCIS system data. No independent case-level confirmation.
NC-01	North Carolina State Board of Elections. 2016 General Election Post-Election Audit Report (official public record reviewed during falsification pass).	Official post-election audit Status: CORRECTED Disposition: RETAINED for falsification; BOUNDARIED to the cited audit period	Direct falsification of the claim that 515 double votes were confirmed; the official audit reported 24 substantiated cases with additional review noted. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-04.	Controlled retrieval URL and archival copy require confirmation during full source audit. Dependency: Primary official audit, independent of Gitnux’s derivative claim.
MI-01	Michigan Senate Oversight Committee. Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan. 23 June 2021. https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/documents/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport.pdf	Official legislative investigation Status: CORRECTED / CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED	Tests absentee-ballot and reporting allegations; distinguishes applications, ballots, vulnerabilities, and unsupported extrapolations. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-01, TV-05, TV-12, TV-15.	Legislative report with defined scope; not a universal validation of every Michigan process. Dependency: Official investigation distinct from derivative statistical claims.

ID	Citation and reference	Class / status / disposition	Primary use and traceability	Limitation and deconfliction
MI-02	Michigan Department of State. More Than 250 Audits Confirm Accuracy and Integrity of Michigan's Election. 2 March 2021. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/Resources/News/2021/03/02/more-than-250-audits-confirm-accuracy-and-integrity-of-michigans-election	Official audit summary Status: CORRECTED Disposition: RETAINED for falsification and reporting-error context	Falsifies the claim that Antrim County software flipped 6,000 votes; supports human/configuration error and hand-tally accuracy. Judgments: PJ-06. Vectors: TV-12, TV-15.	Official summary; audit details and local records remain relevant for deeper technical review. Dependency: Primary official audit summary, independent of the derivative claim.
TB-PRC-01	Tornberg Consulting. July 2026 Trump Election Interference Intel Release: Baseline Analysis Impacts. 17 July 2026.	Prior controlled public-source synthesis Status: SUPPORTED / BOUNDED Disposition: RETAINED	PRC voter-data collection, processing, influence capability, bounded warning, and no established vote alteration. Judgments: PJ-05. Vectors: TV-03, TV-09, TV-13, TV-14.	Secondary synthesis and prior product; not independent corroboration beyond its underlying sources. Dependency: Same controlled stream as TB-SOURCE-01 and TB-METHOD-01; substantive independence lies in the underlying official/technical sources.
TB-METHOD-01	Tornberg Consulting. Time-Gated Evidence Deconfliction. 17 July 2026.	Method and source-control product Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED as method only	Evidence-stage separation, time gating, source deconfliction, quarantine, detectability, and baseline-warning architecture. Judgments: All - method only. Vectors: All - method only.	Method source; not substantive evidence of election misconduct. Dependency: Same methodology stream as TB-SOURCE-01 and TB-PROCESS-01.
TB-SOURCE-01	Tornberg Consulting. Public Source Packet 2026-01. 17 July 2026.	Prior controlled source packet Status: CONTEXT / CONTROLLED REFERENCE Disposition: RETAINED by incorporation	Subordinate PRC source records, provenance, status, deconfliction, quarantine, and source-control logic. Judgments: PJ-05. Vectors: TV-03, TV-09, TV-13, TV-14.	Supports the prior PRC assessment; not independent corroboration of its own underlying sources. Dependency: Same controlled package as TB-PRC-01; incorporated by reference rather than duplicated.
TB-PROCESS-01	Application of the Tornberg Method to Time-Gated Evidence Deconfliction. Process Summary Report 2026-01. 17 July 2026.	Prior process summary Status: CONTEXT Disposition: RETAINED as process reference	Process provenance for the time-gated PRC evidence framework. Judgments: All - method only. Vectors: All - method only.	Process evidence only; not substantive evidence of PRC or election conduct. Dependency: Same methodology/package stream.

7. Complete Register C - Expanded Release 2026-03

The 57 released files are organized by eight evidence streams. Each file remains individually identifiable even when it is an exact duplicate, revised product, derivative summary, or member of one investigation.

7.1 ES-05 Michigan registration investigation

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-001 0000001 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-OPEN-01 (proposed)	Primary official investigative opening record Stage: Official allegation / investigative predicate Treatment: BOUNDARIED	FBI opened a full investigation into alleged fraudulent voter-registration activity after state/local referral. Baseline effect: Strengthens observability and chronology; does not establish completed fraud or electoral effect.	Dependency: Near-duplicate of the named opening EC previously uploaded; one investigative stream, not separate corroboration. Limitation: Confirm exact relationship to prior opening-EC copy; compare serial, date, and attachments. Validate: Confirm exact relationship to prior opening-EC copy; compare serial, date, and attachments.
NE-003 196 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-196 (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported operational practice Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A former worker described paid voter-registration activity, duplicate sign-ups, and separate pro-Biden flyer activity. Baseline effect: Adds corroborative detail on operational practice; intent, direction, and scale remain unresolved.	Dependency: Same case and organization as other Michigan interviews; independent witness but not independent investigation. Limitation: Compare names, dates, work locations, payment method, and contradictions with other interview memoranda. Validate: Compare names, dates, work locations, payment method, and contradictions with other interview memoranda.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-005 233 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-233 (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported practice / suspicion Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A former worker described paid registration activity, daily goals, and suspicion that other workers forged signatures. Baseline effect: Adds context and a potential control-failure indicator; does not establish who forged which application.	Dependency: Independent witness within the same investigation; suspicion is not direct observation of every alleged act. Limitation: Cross-check against application handwriting, contracts, payroll, supervisor interviews, and database results. Validate: Cross-check against application handwriting, contracts, payroll, supervisor interviews, and database results.
NE-006 265_0000001 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-CLOSE-01 (proposed)	Primary official investigative disposition record Stage: Investigative disposition / contrary evidence Treatment: RETAINED	The investigation closed after leads were exhausted and did not identify a criminal violation or evidence of organizational intent to submit false registrations to establish voting ability. Baseline effect: Narrows broad fraud and coordination claims; preserves distinction between false forms, criminal intent, and downstream voting.	Dependency: Same case stream; disposition is metadata and contrary evidence, not independent proof that no false forms existed. Limitation: Reconcile with all witness interviews, database checks, referral records, declinations, and any final evidence inventory. Validate: Reconcile with all witness interviews, database checks, referral records, declinations, and any final evidence inventory.
NE-019 FBIMichigan 2021 Dont Want To Close Memo RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-PROC-2021-01 (proposed)	Internal investigative email / process record Stage: Investigative process / escalation Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	An investigator raised concerns about closing the case and cited federal election-offense guidance supporting further examination. Baseline effect: Strengthens process and delay analysis; does not establish the underlying offense.	Dependency: Same case stream; shows investigator concern, not proof the concern was correct. Limitation: Compare with PIN responses, declinations, later authorization, investigative results, and closure memo. Validate: Compare with PIN responses, declinations, later authorization, investigative results, and closure memo.
NE-020 FBIMichigan Fake Voter 3 Memo RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-MEMO-03 (proposed)	Primary official case memorandum Stage: Official allegation / case lead Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Records a case-specific allegation or investigative lead concerning false registration applications. Baseline effect: Adds case chronology or lead detail; no independent prevalence or effect evidence.	Dependency: Same case stream; brief derivative memoranda require comparison with the underlying applications and interviews. Limitation: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition. Validate: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition.
NE-021 FBIMichigan Fake Voter Memo 1 RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-MEMO-01 (proposed)	Primary official case memorandum Stage: Official allegation / case lead Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Records a case-specific allegation or investigative lead concerning false registration applications. Baseline effect: Adds case chronology or lead detail; no independent prevalence or effect evidence.	Dependency: Same case stream; brief derivative memoranda require comparison with the underlying applications and interviews. Limitation: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition. Validate: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition.
NE-022 FBIMichigan Fake Voter Memo 2 RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-MEMO-02 (proposed)	Primary official case memorandum Stage: Official allegation / case lead Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Records a case-specific allegation or investigative lead concerning false registration applications. Baseline effect: Adds case chronology or lead detail; no independent prevalence or effect evidence.	Dependency: Same case stream; brief derivative memoranda require comparison with the underlying applications and interviews. Limitation: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition. Validate: Identify the referenced application/person, date, source, corroboration, and disposition.
NE-023 FBIMichigan Four Year Case Timeline RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-TIMELINE-01 (proposed)	Official investigative timeline / administrative reconstruction Stage: Process chronology Treatment: RETAINED	The investigation progressed through changing authorization, database review, interviews, delay, and eventual closure over several years. Baseline effect: Materially improves timing and process visibility.	Dependency: Derivative chronology of the same case; useful for sequencing but not independent corroboration. Limitation: Validate every milestone against the underlying communication or case record. Validate: Validate every milestone against the underlying communication or case record.
NE-024 FBIMichigan Fraudulent Registration Applications 91 of 107 RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-DB-107 (proposed)	Official investigative analytical result Stage: Detection / case-level validation Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Database checks reportedly found a high proportion of problematic applications within a bounded reviewed set. Baseline effect: Strengthens evidence that false or inaccurate applications existed in the case; not national prevalence.	Dependency: Same case; bounded sample and selection method may not be random or representative. Limitation: Obtain the spreadsheet, selection rule, definitions, false-positive review, and individual dispositions. Validate: Obtain the spreadsheet, selection rule, definitions, false-positive review, and individual dispositions.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-025 FBIMichigan Fraudulent Request Memo2 RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-PIN-SCOPE-02 (proposed)	Official DOJ/PIN legal-process communication Stage: Legal/procedural control Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PIN defined which application patterns warranted full investigation and limited the authorized scope. Baseline effect: Improves understanding of legal threshold and investigative scope.	Dependency: Same case and legal chain; does not independently establish facts. Limitation: Map scope changes over time and compare excluded categories with state-law remedies. Validate: Map scope changes over time and compare excluded categories with state-law remedies.
NE-026 FBIMichigan Orginal Muskego MSP Referral RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-REFERRAL-2020 (proposed)	Primary official referral / initial investigative record Stage: Official allegation / referral Treatment: MIXED / BOUNDARIED	Local and state authorities referred packages of suspicious applications, with estimates of 8,000-10,000 submissions and an undetermined fraudulent subset. Baseline effect: Establishes the referral and scale of submitted material; fraud count and downstream effect remain unresolved.	Dependency: Originating stream for many later FBI records; later repetition is not corroboration. Limitation: Reconcile package counts, unique applications, rejection/activation status, and final disposition. Validate: Reconcile package counts, unique applications, rejection/activation status, and final disposition.
NE-027 FBIMichigan PIN2023 Delay Memo - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-PIN-DELAY-2023 (proposed)	Official DOJ/PIN process communication Stage: Legal/procedural timing / warning handling Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Election non-interference policy affected timing of overt interviews and required coordination around nearby elections. Baseline effect: Improves process explanation and creates a review question about investigative latency.	Dependency: Same case; demonstrates timing policy, not improper delay by itself. Limitation: Assess elapsed time, preservation risk, alternatives, and consistency with policy. Validate: Assess elapsed time, preservation risk, alternatives, and consistency with policy.
NE-028 FBIMichigan Voter Confirms She Did Not Register But Got Ballot RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-COMPLAINT-BALLOT-01 (proposed)	Official complaint import / reported information Stage: Registration-to-ballot issuance lead Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A complainant reported an apparently unauthorized registration and subsequent ballot mailing. Baseline effect: Provides a narrow bridge lead from registration irregularity to ballot issuance; no return, acceptance, count, or causation established.	Dependency: Separate complaint record; relation to the broader GBI stream is not established. Limitation: Verify registration record, ballot issuance record, ballot identity, return history, and linkage to any canvasser. Validate: Verify registration record, ballot issuance record, ballot identity, return history, and linkage to any canvasser.
NE-029 FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Gift Cards Suppress Trump RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-GIFTCARD (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported payment / possible intent Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A witness described payment practices and alleged efforts related to suppressing support for President Trump. Baseline effect: Adds potential motive and payment indicators; organizational direction and criminality remain unresolved.	Dependency: Same case; allegations require corroboration and may blend registration work with advocacy activity. Limitation: Corroborate payment records, instructions, campaign materials, supervisors, and legal characterization. Validate: Corroborate payment records, instructions, campaign materials, supervisors, and legal characterization.
NE-030 FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Other States RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-OTHERSTATES (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported geographic expansion Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A witness reported or recalled similar registration operations beyond Michigan. Baseline effect: Broadens collection leads; does not establish verified multi-state scale.	Dependency: Same organization/case stream; not independent proof of activity in each state. Limitation: Identify states, offices, dates, personnel, contracts, and corroborating records. Validate: Identify states, offices, dates, personnel, contracts, and corroborating records.
NE-031 FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Paid By Registration Others Falsified RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-PAID (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported incentive / alleged action Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A worker described per-registration compensation and alleged falsification by other workers. Baseline effect: Strengthens incentive-risk and falsification leads; no prevalence or downstream ballot effect.	Dependency: Same case; direct knowledge and hearsay must be separated. Limitation: Cross-check contracts, payroll, quotas, handwriting, and application-level results. Validate: Cross-check contracts, payroll, quotas, handwriting, and application-level results.
NE-032 FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Probably Forged Memos RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-PROBFORGED (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Admission / witness-reported action Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	A worker said he probably fabricated signatures at some point and believed others did so. Baseline effect: Strengthens operational exploitability of false-registration pathways.	Dependency: Same case; partial admission is probative but imprecise. Limitation: Tie witness to specific forms, dates, contracts, and database results. Validate: Tie witness to specific forms, dates, contracts, and database results.
NE-033 FBIMichigan Witness Interview Widespread Fake Registrations RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-WIDESPREAD (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported action / organizational practice Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	A former worker described a large office, quotas, fabricated applicant data, completion of blank forms, and signature practices. Baseline effect: Materially strengthens operational exploitability and possible organizational practice; effect remains unbridged.	Dependency: Strongest detailed witness account in the case, but still one witness and one investigative stream. Limitation: Validate against 22 reviewed forms, other witnesses, payroll, contracts, office records, and closure rationale. Validate: Validate against 22 reviewed forms, other witnesses, payroll, contracts, office records, and closure rationale.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-034 FBI Michigan Worker Interview Sit In Car Fake Registrations RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-WIT-CAR (proposed)	Primary official witness interview memorandum Stage: Witness-reported action / control weakness Treatment: BOUNDARIED	A worker described registration work conditions consistent with low-supervision or fabricated submissions. Baseline effect: Adds a concrete control-failure pathway; no scale or ballot effect.	Dependency: Same case; must separate direct admission from speculation or hearsay. Limitation: Identify forms, locations, dates, supervisor knowledge, and database disposition. Validate: Identify forms, locations, dates, supervisor knowledge, and database disposition.
NE-036 GBI Strategies -RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-GBI-ORG-01 (proposed)	Official investigative record Stage: Organization / investigative context Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Documents organizational structure, personnel, or investigative findings concerning the registration contractor. Baseline effect: Improves entity and actor mapping; does not independently prove organizational criminal intent.	Dependency: Same Michigan case stream; may summarize other records. Limitation: Resolve beneficial ownership, contracts, funding, supervisors, interstate operations, and linkage to specific forms. Validate: Resolve beneficial ownership, contracts, funding, supervisors, interstate operations, and linkage to specific forms.
NE-043 PIN EDM I declination - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-PIN-EDMI (proposed)	Official DOJ/PIN disposition / legal-process record Stage: Legal disposition / process Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Records PIN's legal or investigative position concerning the Eastern District component. Baseline effect: Clarifies jurisdiction and prosecutorial posture; does not prove no false applications existed.	Dependency: Same case; legal disposition is metadata and not a substitute for underlying evidence. Limitation: Reconcile with district boundaries, evidence reviewed, stated rationale, and later decisions. Validate: Reconcile with district boundaries, evidence reviewed, stated rationale, and later decisions.
NE-044 PIN GBI Declination - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-PIN-GBI (proposed)	Official DOJ/PIN disposition / legal-process record Stage: Legal disposition / process Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PIN agreed with no further federal investigation or prosecution at the stated time. Baseline effect: Narrows criminal-conduct claims and clarifies process.	Dependency: Same case; does not independently establish the absence of false forms or control failures. Limitation: Identify evidence package, legal rationale, scope, and whether state remedies remained. Validate: Identify evidence package, legal rationale, scope, and whether state remedies remained.
NE-055 Voter Fraud Spreadsheet - RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: MI-SPREADSHEET-COVER (proposed)	Official transmittal email Stage: Data-handling / analytical output reference Treatment: BOUNDARIED / QUARANTINED DATA	An FBI analyst transmitted a spreadsheet containing person checks, outcomes, and percentage breakdowns. Baseline effect: Confirms an analytical dataset existed; does not permit reproduction of calculations.	Dependency: The underlying spreadsheet is not present in this PDF; the cover email is not the dataset. Limitation: Obtain the original XLSX, schema, formulas, person-level dispositions, and hash. Validate: Obtain the original XLSX, schema, formulas, person-level dispositions, and hash.

7.2 ES-02 PRC voter/PII collection and analysis

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-002 18 States Memo - clean - declass mark_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-DATA-18 (proposed)	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Collection / processing / stated intended use Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PRC elements possessed or analyzed voter-registration information from 18 states for person matching and public-opinion analysis. Baseline effect: Materially strengthens breadth and processing linkage; does not prove unique-record scale or operational deployment.	Dependency: Likely overlaps with the 200M record and related PRC reporting; treat as one family until source independence is demonstrated. Limitation: Identify state list, record counts, dates, acquisition path, source access, and overlap with other PRC datasets. Validate: Identify state list, record counts, dates, acquisition path, source access, and overlap with other PRC datasets.
NE-004 200M Voter Records Compromised - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: EL-05 / PRC-DATA-200M	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Possession / collection Treatment: MIXED / QUARANTINED SCALE	A PRC-related holder possessed lists or datasets characterized as leaked or compromised, including U.S. voter and PII records. Baseline effect: Strengthens the existence of large holdings; does not validate a unique-person aggregate or operational use.	Dependency: Potential parent or sibling stream for the 200/220M public claim; may include overlapping datasets and derivative summaries. Limitation: Obtain dataset inventory, deduplication method, overlap analysis, source independence, and acquisition classification. Validate: Obtain dataset inventory, deduplication method, overlap analysis, source independence, and acquisition classification.
NE-045 PRC Analysis on US Voter Registration Information - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: IC-01 / PRC-VOTER-ANALYSIS	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Processing / analytic use Treatment: RETAINED	PRC intelligence analyzed U.S. voter-registration data for identity matching and election-related public-opinion analysis. Baseline effect: Strongest direct collection-to-processing linkage in the election dataset.	Dependency: Core underlying stream for several later summaries; do not count summaries as independent corroboration. Limitation: Identify source access, states, fields, consumer, output, and whether analysis reached an operational element. Validate: Identify source access, states, fields, consumer, output, and whether analysis reached an operational element.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-046 PRC Collection of US VoterMilitaryData - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-DATA-MIL-01 (proposed)	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Collection / dataset linkage Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PRC actors collected or possessed voter-related and military-linked personal data with potential targeting value. Baseline effect: Broadens the target-development context; operational use remains incomplete.	Dependency: May overlap with broader compromised-data holdings; independence and unique-record counts unclear. Limitation: Map datasets, identifiers, dates, consumers, and overlap with OPM/other PII holdings. Validate: Map datasets, identifiers, dates, consumers, and overlap with OPM/other PII holdings.
NE-047 PRC Target 2024 Election 2023 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-2024-TARGET-01 (proposed)	Declassified intelligence reporting with correction Stage: Intent / preparation / later-cycle warning Treatment: BOUNDARIED	PRC actors discussed or prepared election-related targeting in the 2024 cycle. Baseline effect: Validates the direction of prior warning and recurrence risk; does not prove 2020 deployment.	Dependency: Subsequent evidence; useful for warning calibration but not retroactive proof of 2020 conduct. Limitation: Preserve correction history; separate 2023/2024 evidence from the 2020 cutoff. Validate: Preserve correction history; separate 2023/2024 evidence from the 2020 cutoff.
NE-049 PRC US Voter Data 7 States 2023 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-DATA-7ST-2023 (proposed)	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Collection / persistence Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PRC actors continued to collect or analyze voter information from multiple states after 2020. Baseline effect: Strengthens recurrence and sustained-priority judgments; not retroactive proof of 2020 action.	Dependency: Later-cycle evidence; may overlap with commercial/public downloads and related reporting. Limitation: Identify states, data fields, acquisition path, actor, and relationship to six-state report. Validate: Identify states, data fields, acquisition path, actor, and relationship to six-state report.
NE-054 US Voter Registration for 6 States - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-DATA-6ST-2022 (proposed)	Declassified network-defense notice / intelligence report Stage: Acquisition / collection Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	A PRC cyber actor downloaded full public voter-registration repositories for six states from commercial sites and attempted an Ohio download; motive was unknown. Baseline effect: Clarifies one acquisition path as public/commercial download and strengthens sustained-interest judgment.	Dependency: Distinct technical collection event; may overlap with seven-state or broader dataset reporting. Limitation: Confirm actor attribution, exact fields, dates, full repository counts, and overlap with other holdings. Validate: Confirm actor attribution, exact fields, dates, full repository counts, and overlap with other holdings.

7.3 ES-06 Noncitizen registration / SAVE

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-007 Alien Voter Registration Summary.pdf_Redacted.pdf Source ID: DHS-01 / ALIEN-01	Official public summary / policy communication Stage: Official claim / administrative matching result Treatment: MIXED / QUARANTINED NUMBERS	DHS states that SAVE and public-voter-file reviews identified large numbers of deceased and noncitizen registrants. Baseline effect: Adds official claims and scale leads; does not close methodology, false-positive, or final-disposition gaps.	Dependency: Single official summary; figures may derive from multiple state queries but methods and dispositions are not exposed. Limitation: Obtain query logic, match thresholds, naturalization timing, human adjudication, state denominators, and final dispositions. Validate: Obtain query logic, match thresholds, naturalization timing, human adjudication, state denominators, and final dispositions.

7.4 ES-07 Venezuela machine capability context

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-008 CIA Note - Venezuela Machines Intel Memo_29JUNE2026_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-01	Declassified agency note / retrospective summary Stage: Capability / foreign context Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Foreign actors may possess capabilities or plans relevant to manipulation of election technology in Venezuela. Baseline effect: Raises capability awareness; leaves U.S. 2020 exploitation and effect unchanged.	Dependency: Separate foreign-context stream; not evidence of U.S. exploitation and may summarize earlier reporting. Limitation: Separate source reporting, technical mechanism, jurisdiction, and date from any U.S. election claim. Validate: Separate source reporting, technical mechanism, jurisdiction, and date from any U.S. election claim.

7.5 ES-01 PRC 2020 assessment and coordination

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-009 CIA Wire Memo Summer 2020 DECLASS REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-02	Declassified current-intelligence article Stage: Collection / targeting Treatment: RETAINED	PRC actors targeted U.S. campaign or political information and sought election-relevant intelligence in 2020. Baseline effect: Strengthens political-intelligence collection and targeting; does not establish deployed influence or vote manipulation.	Dependency: Exact duplicate of the alternate-underscore filename; one evidence item. Limitation: Record product date, information cutoff, source access, and relationship to later NIC products. Validate: Record product date, information cutoff, source access, and relationship to later NIC products.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-010 CIA Wire Memo Summer 2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-02-DUP	Duplicate declassified current-intelligence article Stage: Duplicate only Treatment: REJECTED AS DUPLICATE	Same proposition as NE-009. Baseline effect: No baseline change.	Dependency: Byte-for-byte duplicate of NE-009; no additional corroboration. Limitation: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only. Validate: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only.
NE-012 EMAIL_Everyone's favorite topic 23DEC2021 - DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-04	Internal coordination / retrospective email Stage: Institutional process / change management Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Internal participants recognized unresolved consistency and change-management questions in later characterization of PRC election activity. Baseline effect: Strengthens concern about change management and executive clarity; does not prove improper motive.	Dependency: Exact duplicate of alternate filename; process evidence, not independent substantive intelligence. Limitation: Identify referenced products, decisions, participants, and whether corrective action followed. Validate: Identify referenced products, decisions, participants, and whether corrective action followed.
NE-013 EMAIL_Everyone's favorite topic 23DEC2021_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-04-DUP	Duplicate internal email Stage: Duplicate only Treatment: REJECTED AS DUPLICATE	Same proposition as NE-012. Baseline effect: No baseline change.	Dependency: Byte-for-byte duplicate of NE-012; no additional corroboration. Limitation: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only. Validate: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only.
NE-014 EMAIL_ICA.CommentsReMinorityView_30DEC20 20_DECLASS REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-05	Internal coordination record Stage: Coordination / dissent / product handling Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	FBI and IC participants raised objections concerning intent, source characterization, wording, and presentation of the China minority view. Baseline effect: Materially strengthens visibility into disagreement and fairness concerns; does not establish concealment.	Dependency: Process stream; objections do not independently prove either substantive judgment. Limitation: Reconstruct comment disposition, final text, dissent display, and delivery to senior consumers. Validate: Reconstruct comment disposition, final text, dissent display, and delivery to senior consumers.
NE-015 EMAIL_NSA.MassagedPDB_20NOV2020_DECLAS S_REDACT.pdf Source ID: PDB-COORD-20NOV (proposed)	Internal coordination / executive-product email Stage: Executive-product drafting / warning delivery Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Participants expressed concern that election relevance or analytic meaning might be softened in a PDB-related product. Baseline effect: Elevates executive-delivery integrity as a distinct issue; does not establish intentional withholding.	Dependency: Same coordination family as 23 Nov chain and PDB item; not separate substantive reporting. Limitation: Obtain draft/final PDB versions, edit history, briefing record, and stated rationale for wording changes. Validate: Obtain draft/final PDB versions, edit history, briefing record, and stated rationale for wording changes.
NE-016 EMAIL_NSA.MassagedPDB_23NOV2020_DECLAS S_REDACT.pdf Source ID: PDB-COORD-23NOV (proposed)	Internal coordination / executive-product email Stage: Executive-product drafting / access facilitation Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Participants questioned why a PDB was worded away from elections and discussed release of reporting needed for the 45-day assessment. Baseline effect: Strengthens concern about framing and reporting access while also showing efforts to make reporting usable.	Dependency: Related but not duplicate of NE-015; same process stream and overlapping participants. Limitation: Reconstruct referenced PDB, reporting releases, cross-posting, final ICA use, and senior-consumer delivery. Validate: Reconstruct referenced PDB, reporting releases, cross-posting, final ICA use, and senior-consumer delivery.
NE-017 EMAIL_RE For IC coord by Oct 7 2020 7OCT2020 DECLASS REDACTED.pdf Source ID: ALT-COORD-07OCT (proposed)	Internal coordination record Stage: Alternative analysis development / dissent Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	The alternative analysis received interagency coordination and reflected a serious professional disagreement over China/election interpretation. Baseline effect: Strengthens the warning-value and dissent-preservation record.	Dependency: Same evidence family as NICM alternative analysis; coordination comments are process evidence, not independent corroboration. Limitation: Map participants, comments, source references, changes, and final dissemination. Validate: Map participants, comments, source references, changes, and final dissemination.
NE-018 EMAIL_RE Please coord by COB 9.1 - 4 country election security graphic 03SEP2020_DECLASS_REDACTED .pdf Source ID: GRAPHIC-COORD-SEP20 (proposed)	Internal coordination record Stage: Coordination / framing / warning Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Analysts debated confidence, political preference, and whether caution was causing self-censorship or loss of analytic clarity. Baseline effect: Strengthens concern about analytic framing and executive clarity; no proof of intentional suppression.	Dependency: Process evidence from the same production environment; heavily redacted and not independent proof of substantive activity. Limitation: Identify the graphic, final wording, comment disposition, confidence rationale, and readership. Validate: Identify the graphic, final wording, comment disposition, confidence rationale, and readership.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-037 NICA Foreign Threats To 2020 US Election_19AUG2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-06	Coordinated declassified intelligence assessment Stage: Integrated assessment / capability / intent judgment Treatment: RETAINED	Russia, China, Iran, and nonstate actors had election-related capabilities; the product preserved a mainline China judgment and broader threat baseline. Baseline effect: Maintains the principal 2020 baseline while providing comparison against newly released dissent and reporting.	Dependency: Exact duplicate of alternate filename; coordinated product may draw on many underlying streams not publicly exposed. Limitation: Separate product judgment from underlying evidence; record information cutoff and source-access limits. Validate: Separate product judgment from underlying evidence; record information cutoff and source-access limits.
NE-038 NICA_ Foreign Threats to 2020 US election_19AUG2020 - DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-06-DUP	Duplicate coordinated assessment Stage: Duplicate only Treatment: REJECTED AS DUPLICATE	Same proposition as NE-037. Baseline effect: No baseline change.	Dependency: Byte-for-byte duplicate of NE-037. Limitation: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only. Validate: Retain hash and filename in duplicate register; cite canonical copy only.
NE-039 NICM_ChinaStepsToInfluenceElection_16OCT2020_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-07	Formal alternative analysis Stage: Alternative assessment / warning Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	NIO Cyber and D/ETA assessed that China took at least some low-level exploratory steps to influence the election, while not using its most aggressive tools. Baseline effect: Strengthens warning value and narrows the negative baseline; does not prove a comprehensive outcome campaign.	Dependency: Distinct analytic interpretation, but underlying reporting may overlap with the mainline product. Limitation: Characterize sources, independence, access, detectability, and final senior-consumer presentation. Validate: Characterize sources, independence, access, detectability, and final senior-consumer presentation.
NE-041 Note - Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018-2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: PRC-SENS-NOTE-01 (proposed)	Declassified agency note / reporting summary Stage: Reporting availability / synthesis Treatment: MIXED / BOUNDARIED	Summarizes election-relevant PRC reporting available during the 2018-2020 period. Baseline effect: Improves awareness of reporting volume and timing; source basis and author access remain incomplete.	Dependency: Likely derivative of underlying reports and heavily redacted; not independent corroboration. Limitation: Identify each underlying report, availability date, recipient, source class, and use in finished products. Validate: Identify each underlying report, availability date, recipient, source class, and use in finished products.
NE-042 PDB 25JUN2020_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: PDB-25JUN20 (proposed)	Executive intelligence product Stage: Executive product / delivery candidate Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	A PDB item framed PRC election-related activity for the senior consumer. Baseline effect: Provides a concrete executive-product artifact for G-11 reconstruction.	Dependency: Related to later PDB email chains; product existence does not by itself prove delivery or comprehension. Limitation: Confirm final version, readership, oral briefing, edits, and relation to source reporting. Validate: Confirm final version, readership, oral briefing, edits, and relation to source reporting.
NE-048 PRC U.S. Presidential Election-Related Intelligence in 2020 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf Source ID: PRC-2020-INTEL-01 (proposed)	Declassified intelligence reporting Stage: Collection / analysis / possible intent Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	PRC entities collected or generated election-related intelligence during the 2020 presidential cycle. Baseline effect: Strengthens collection and warning; operational influence and effect remain unbridged.	Dependency: Likely underlying or sibling stream to IC-01, NICA, and alternative analysis. Limitation: Determine earliest author access, source independence, product use, and consumer delivery. Validate: Determine earliest author access, source independence, product use, and consumer delivery.

7.6 ES-03 Election infrastructure technical vulnerability

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-011 CISA Election Report - FINAL.pdf Source ID: UPL-03 / CISA-2026-01	Primary official technical assessment Stage: Vulnerability / tested access / control performance observations Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	CISA testing documented recurring weaknesses in segmentation, identity, logging, patching, certification, remote access, vendor transparency, and incident response. Baseline effect: Materially strengthens the vulnerability and exploitability baseline; does not establish historical U.S. vote alteration.	Dependency: Independent technical stream, though some historical examples may overlap with other official reporting. Limitation: Extract tested population, selection method, exploit results, remediation validation, and production-versus-test distinctions. Validate: Extract tested population, selection method, exploit results, remediation validation, and production-versus-test distinctions.
NE-040 NICM_VulnerabilitiesInUS2020ElectionInfrastructure_15JAN2020_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf Source ID: UPL-08	Declassified intelligence memorandum Stage: Capability / vulnerability assessment Treatment: RETAINED	Centralized registration repositories and internet-facing election systems were vulnerable; wide-scale undetected vote manipulation was assessed as difficult. Baseline effect: Strengthens technical baseline and separation of public-facing disruption from certified results.	Dependency: Foundational official assessment; distinct from later CISA testing but conceptually overlapping. Limitation: Compare assumptions and examples with 2026 CISA findings and actual incident records. Validate: Compare assumptions and examples with 2026 CISA findings and actual incident records.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-056 Voter Registration Database Threats - FINAL.pdf Source ID: CISA-VRDB-2026 (proposed)	Official public threat and mitigation report Stage: Threat synthesis / vulnerability / mitigation Treatment: MIXED / BOUNDARIED	Voter-registration databases are attractive targets; stolen PII can enable ballot requests, record alteration, deletion, disruption, and influence, and basic cyber controls reduce risk. Baseline effect: Strengthens data-exploitation pathways and practical controls; does not prove all cited breach counts or downstream misuse.	Dependency: Synthesizes prior official and public reporting; recommendations may be independent, historical examples often derivative. Limitation: Audit each reference, distinguish breach from public download, and validate the '20 states' and downstream-use claims. Validate: Audit each reference, distinguish breach from public download, and validate the '20 states' and downstream-use claims.

7.7 ES-04 Albany IIR and recall

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-035 FBI_ALBANY_IIR_PROVIDED_TO_CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY .pdf Source ID: EL-01 / ALBANY-IIR-01	Raw intelligence information report Stage: Raw lead / alleged intent Treatment: QUARANTINED	A source reported a PRC-linked counterfeit-identification scheme allegedly intended to enable mail-ballot fraud. Baseline effect: Preserves a warning lead but does not support definitive claims about a PRC ballot operation.	Dependency: Single indirect, uncorroborated source stream; report was substantively recalled for re-interview. Limitation: Use source re-interview, CBP seizure records, identity-document analysis, and ballot linkage; preserve recall status. Validate: Use source re-interview, CBP seizure records, identity-document analysis, and ballot linkage; preserve recall status.
NE-053 Tasking_3_AlbanyBriefingHandout_297E_HQ_A4 095996_NotSerialized-JET-R RELEASE MARKED.pdf Source ID: EL-02/03/04 / ALBANY-REVIEW	Official retrospective process review / briefing handout Stage: Institutional process / source control / recall Treatment: RETAINED / BOUNDARIED	Reconstructs dissemination, recall, source re-interview, policy standards, communications, and review of the Albany IIR. Baseline effect: Materially improves source-integrity and process reconstruction; allegation remains quarantined.	Dependency: Derivative process record; strong for handling chronology, not independent support for the IIR allegation. Limitation: Validate charts against source emails, recall notice, interviews, policy, and final review findings. Validate: Validate charts against source emails, recall notice, interviews, policy, and final review findings.

7.8 ES-08 White House / agency derivative summaries

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-050 Summary - clean - declass marked PART 1.pdf Source ID: PRC-SUM-1 (proposed)	Declassified agency summary Stage: Plan / capability / alleged intent Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Summarizes alleged PRC plans and capabilities to exploit U.S. societal fissures using cyber, social-media, mainstream-media, and influencer pathways, including economic recession and COVID-19 themes. Baseline effect: Strengthens the plan-and-capability warning; does not establish authorization, deployment, reach, or effect.	Dependency: Three-part single summary; likely derivative of underlying sensitive reporting and not independent corroboration. Limitation: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed. Validate: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed.
NE-051 Summary - clean - declass marked PART 2.pdf Source ID: PRC-SUM-2 (proposed)	Declassified agency summary Stage: Plan / capability / alleged intent Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Summarizes alleged PRC plans and capabilities to exploit U.S. societal fissures using cyber, social-media, mainstream-media, and influencer pathways, including racial tensions, party conflict, women's rights, South China Sea, and international propaganda themes. Baseline effect: Strengthens the plan-and-capability warning; does not establish authorization, deployment, reach, or effect.	Dependency: Three-part single summary; likely derivative of underlying sensitive reporting and not independent corroboration. Limitation: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed. Validate: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed.
NE-052 Summary - clean - declass marked PART 3.pdf Source ID: PRC-SUM-3 (proposed)	Declassified agency summary Stage: Plan / capability / alleged intent Treatment: BOUNDARIED	Summarizes alleged PRC plans and capabilities to exploit U.S. societal fissures using cyber, social-media, mainstream-media, and influencer pathways, including gun and immigration themes. Baseline effect: Strengthens the plan-and-capability warning; does not establish authorization, deployment, reach, or effect.	Dependency: Three-part single summary; likely derivative of underlying sensitive reporting and not independent corroboration. Limitation: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed. Validate: Identify underlying reports, source characterizations, dates, author access, and whether plans were approved or executed.

Evidence ID / file	Class / stage / treatment	Supported content and baseline effect	Dependency, limitation, and validation
NE-057 WHTF Government Transparency - States Statement FINAL.pdf Source ID: WH-01	Official policy statement / release narrative Stage: Policy claim / public characterization Treatment: BOUNDARIED / CLAIM MAP	The White House states that PRC actors compromised voter rolls from at least 18 states and more than 200 million voter records, and identifies named states. Baseline effect: Defines the public claims to audit; does not by itself remove scale and provenance claims from quarantine.	Dependency: Derivative public narrative based on the released records; not independent evidence of the underlying claims. Limitation: Map each sentence and state list to exact source pages, definitions, acquisition method, and deduplication evidence. Validate: Map each sentence and state list to exact source pages, definitions, acquisition method, and deduplication evidence.

8. Source De-duplication, Deconfliction, and Dependency Register

Stream	Family	Independence assessment	Controlling use rule	Known dependency
ES-01	PRC 2020 assessment and IC coordination	Mixed underlying reporting; coordinated products and process records overlap.	Use coordinated products for judgments, emails for process, underlying reports for facts. Do not count product repetition as corroboration.	Exact duplicate CIA WIRE and NICA pairs; PDB and email chains share one process family.
ES-02	PRC voter and PII collection and analysis	Possibly distinct events, but dataset overlap and source dependence remain unresolved.	Separate public/commercial downloads, compromised datasets, state repositories, and analytic products.	Do not aggregate unique persons without record-level overlap controls.
ES-03	Election infrastructure technical vulnerability	CISA testing is a distinct technical stream; later summaries may derive from earlier reporting.	Use for vulnerability, tested access, and controls. Do not infer vote alteration or national prevalence.	Validate current remediation and representative coverage.
ES-04	Albany IIR and recall	One raw allegation stream plus a retrospective handling review.	IIR remains quarantined; retrospective handout supports process reconstruction.	Recall, source re-interview, contamination, and source access are central.
ES-05	Michigan registration investigation	Multiple witnesses and artifacts within one investigation and organizational event stream.	Use independent witnesses as within-case corroboration, not national corroboration.	Reconcile allegation, application, activation, ballot, and disposition stages.
ES-06	Noncitizen registration / SAVE	One official summary drawing on state queries; underlying method unavailable.	Retain the fact of review and notification; quarantine prevalence and illegal-voting conclusions.	Need match logic, adjudication, naturalization timing, and final disposition.
ES-07	Venezuela machine capability context	Separate foreign capability context.	Use for capability and scenario context only.	No bridge to U.S. 2020 execution or result.
ES-08	White House and agency derivative summaries	Derivative public narratives based on underlying reporting and release selection.	Use as claim maps and policy characterization, not primary corroboration.	Trace every claim to the underlying source and evidence stage.

8.1 Exact and Near Duplicates

Type	Records	Subject	Control
DG-01	NE-009 / NE-010	CIA Wire Memo Summer 2020 - two filename variants	Exact duplicate; one evidentiary copy.
DG-02	NE-012 / NE-013	'Everyone's favorite topic' email - two filename variants	Exact duplicate; one process record.
DG-03	NE-037 / NE-038	NICA Foreign Threats to 2020 U.S. Election - two filename variants	Exact duplicate; one coordinated product.
Near duplicate	NE-001 and prior opening-EC copy	Michigan opening record	Confirm serial, date, and attachments; do not count separately without distinction.
Missing attachment	Michigan spreadsheet transmittal	Referenced Person Checks_2023.xlsx	Not included; form and person-check reconciliation remains incomplete.
Method aliases	TM-01-04 and TB-METHOD/TB-PRC/TB-SOURCE/TB-PROCESS	Governing and prior analytic records	Analytic and method products are not independent evidence of external events.

9. Corrections, Rejections, Mixed Use, and Quarantine Register

Claim	Disposition	Publicly supportable treatment	Resolution requirement
200/220 million U.S. voter records	MIXED / QUARANTINED SCALE	The record supports large PRC-related holdings and voter-data interest. It does not establish a unique-person total, one acquisition event, dataset overlap, acquisition method, independence, consumer delivery, or operational use.	Dataset inventory, field definitions, source origin, overlap and de-duplication, unique-person method, access, and consumer chain.
Dedicated PRC voter-data exploitation unit	QUARANTINED	Public reporting raises the possibility but does not identify a sufficiently sourced unit, authority, mission, or tasking chain.	Organizational records, tasking, authority, staffing, production, and consumer evidence.

Claim	Disposition	Publicly supportable treatment	Resolution requirement
One coordinated multidomain campaign	REJECTED	The PRC data, Michigan case, technical testing, institutional process, and public summaries share a decision problem but lack bridge evidence connecting them to one actor or campaign.	Common actors, financing, infrastructure, tasking, timing, data flow, and operational command.
PRC operational use to alter the 2020 result	REJECTED / NOT ESTABLISHED	Acquisition and processing are supported; consumer delivery, tasking, execution, count, certification, and result effect are not.	Operational tasking, target packages, execution records, and demonstrated electoral effect.
Nationwide compromise of certified vote counts	NOT ESTABLISHED	No reviewed public or declassified evidence supports the claim. The record is not complete enough to prove no undetected event occurred.	Representative incident evidence, independent reconstruction, audit and log coverage.
Michigan management-directed fraud program	BOUNDARIED / NOT ESTABLISHED	Paid activity, witness allegations, anomalies, and investigative handling are documented. Management direction and full organizational scope are unresolved.	Contracts, payroll, worker output, forms, supervisor communications, activation and ballot disposition.
Michigan ballot or outcome effect	NOT ESTABLISHED	One complaint lead suggests a possible registration-card and absentee-ballot chain; return, acceptance, count, certification, and effect are unresolved.	Form-to-registration-to-ballot reconciliation and final case disposition.
Noncitizen registration or voting prevalence	QUARANTINED	The uploaded summary lacks match logic, error treatment, denominators, naturalization timing, and final adjudication.	Record-level method, false-positive review, case resolution, unit and denominator.
Intentional withholding or concealment from the President	REJECTED AS ESTABLISHED FINDING	The public record shows disagreement and process concern but cannot reconstruct complete written or oral delivery or executive understanding.	Authorized cleared review of reporting, drafts, edits, dissemination, briefings, questions, and feedback.
Public outcry validates the allegations	REJECTED	Political intensity and media repetition do not establish truth or falsity.	Use only measurable operating effects such as burden, threats, litigation, delay, or amplification.

10. Data and Transformation Record

Input or transformation	Action	Control
Public Source Packet 2026-01 source register	PDF text and controlled register reconstructed into 60 source records.	No new evidence created. Line-wrapped text and URLs were normalized; substantive use and limitations were preserved.
Source Packet 2026-02B source register	42 Heading-3 source records parsed from the controlled DOCX.	Fields preserved: class, primary use, status, disposition, limitation, independence, traceability, provenance, and reference.
Expanded neutral manifest	57-file CSV used as the filename, stream, class, stage, page, and hash control.	Filename count is not source-independence count.
Evidence-to-Gap Matrix	Merged by Evidence ID to add gaps, treatment, baseline effect, confidence boundary, and validation.	Preliminary treatments remain subject to human source audit.
Duplicate count	57 filenames grouped by SHA-256 into 54 unique hashes.	Three duplicate pairs remain listed individually for custody and audit.
Evidence-stream count	57 files grouped into eight common-origin or reporting families.	Files within one stream are not automatically independent.
Master Source Register CSV	Normalized 159 records into a common 16-column audit structure.	Blank fields indicate information not available in the source layer; they are not zero values.
Numerical claims	No national prevalence, unique-person total, or national risk ranking was computed from the corpus.	Required denominators, overlap controls, and detection probabilities are unavailable.

11. Expanded-Release File Integrity Register

The following register permits byte-level verification of all 57 released files. Duplicate hashes are intentional and identify exact duplicate file pairs.

Evidence ID	Original filename	Pages	SHA-256
NE-001	0000001 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	6	9dea06f5589aba90060ab2868b26b332f84bcd02abdf37e46ee320e20b297cd
NE-002	18 States Memo - clean - declass mark_Redacted.pdf	6	670b2086769369ee037067abe60a6c5ed04b0ab95a283caddb662fe6f450278a
NE-003	196 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	daa9c23956b6b94a33133fba08a9f8a6f61b391bd319d3cecdcfbdd3a1e62002
NE-004	200M Voter Records Compromised - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	24	9a5bbd6a923e4794e03edcd0403498510c55e81f0baf2bd1944c172af7c48cf6
NE-005	233 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	48c70c3f1665cb1a4a9d365d1f07ebaae43c6a0dcd429eb41caf0fa289b2d28

Evidence ID	Original filename	Pages	SHA-256
NE-006	265_0000001 - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	172a51ee135cbbbe45f3fca9c0a05a5c86d0aa825b319db95c6f8517f1762c051
NE-007	Alien Voter Registration Summary.pdf_Redacted.pdf	1	c5aa4d27eb225c35812e3e9d00093c4780383f6bfeeb88eb3fe603ecb7593f3
NE-008	CIA Note - Venezuela Machines Intel Memo_29JUNE2026_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	6	4a7be62c0901e6de3b0cfee37046ea5ece1a79a0e647d6f4cdae659705148594
NE-009	CIA Wire Memo Summer 2020 DECLASS REDACTED.pdf	2	1be94e7fa86a729a2c16266fd32ed1947793903b5fa50577c9648c697dc0c48b
NE-010	CIA Wire Memo Summer 2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	2	1be94e7fa86a729a2c16266fd32ed1947793903b5fa50577c9648c697dc0c48b
NE-011	CISA Election Report - FINAL.pdf	6	3c6db961603260a77dce4548b7e5a7f5a6fd2b964345ab4a46eb1d3c61485c22
NE-012	EMAIL_Everyone's favorite topic 23DEC2021 - DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	1	efa073c1baba2f629a41e0c29841a15acf00dc1b7c4ea62fa9e0b208a69619fe
NE-013	EMAIL_Everyone's favorite topic_23DEC2021_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	1	efa073c1baba2f629a41e0c29841a15acf00dc1b7c4ea62fa9e0b208a69619fe
NE-014	EMAIL_ICA.CommentsReMinorityView_30DEC2020_DECLASS REDACTED.pdf	2	d393d981518232384b3ca27d077ee5337876d873bd0399a07f98f8e1f5cc432b
NE-015	EMAIL_NSA.MassagedPDB_20NOV2020_DECLASS_REDACT.pdf	8	bb2b9cbb2c9833028cf1b2f32d5d009203b60690b0fcb88bb34357014aec12e
NE-016	EMAIL_NSA.MassagedPDB_23NOV2020_DECLASS_REDACT.pdf	6	3b4950eaeef104c15054ef1367abd9ac2d67438ed1e0ff286a1621db9d78965b
NE-017	EMAIL_RE For IC coord by Oct 7 2020 7OCT2020 DECLASS REDACTED.pdf	8	9422d9bac9c6ecef4125708d5b4476dae54841bad38b85af599782e82711180
NE-018	EMAIL_RE Please coord by COB 9.1 - 4 country election security graphic 03SEP2020_DECLASS_REDACTED .pdf	24	48ddc4a93e6d4283be828cb77ea7f543a47e3cee664bdcbbbc8663da1b5b816d
NE-019	FBIMichigan 2021 Dont Want To Close Memo RELEASE MARKED.pdf	3	bb7e982ddca3b8ef57f2bc1b416f49ad54cdc8aee7299baac8ac88980b107dc8
NE-020	FBIMichigan Fake Voter 3 Memo RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	710057933a7574ae671309dc9cab28b01e161eaea9ba3cb91325bf b99c3c3d20
NE-021	FBIMichigan Fake Voter Memo 1 RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	a3d644ba6d4041ee69402c8b4e024f514b01f1d06cce2cff13339594b9514a1e
NE-022	FBIMichigan Fake Voter Memo 2 RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	74a00cec7d5bf038540dbf86f436f837789cb4d3ffdad2db7b57926be089b052
NE-023	FBIMichigan Four Year Case Timeline RELEASE MARKED.pdf	3	a4f65bc58ed23b1029ee259a60348ef946deb40108a7298b1217d037d6da9ebd
NE-024	FBIMichigan Fraudulent Registration Applications 91 of 107 RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	daad2e92044301e2cccf57873b3b10185d5f12051320c407148e18dc22dabd9
NE-025	FBIMichigan Fraudulent Request Memo2 RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	c03f83fb2d54eae2a0e0d0fe58f7a58a89558f531c58e5136e1f8a934317748a
NE-026	FBIMichigan Orginal Muskego MSP Referral RELEASE MARKED.pdf	4	4ae64fd6128c48a1495cfb4006e462c77477e9331a063551fdf9e8537e1d3fd7
NE-027	FBIMichigan PIN2023 Delay Memo - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	3	2d0f60c802ac40616705c6fa949c013411f56b20b5e90884aa32030102757ab5
NE-028	FBIMichigan Voter Confirms She Did Not Register But Got Ballot RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	934137a1d72245ceefad5d58d881d1972b0bc8b9c38e5c1a2eada7e1b1b04983
NE-029	FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Gift Cards Suppress Trump RELEASE MARKED.pdf	3	fb5575e4f90ac978bb410426fd20ef84fd365fc70aed337557bcfc5993210a24
NE-030	FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Other States RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	ddf4d7c8b77664363b2439432c5cb5c9c7518c355c5acd9916c7a36bfb6982d1
NE-031	FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Paid By Registration Others Falsified RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	655091bd2462db82495e70371c8a82a11d16f3383e2885c5e3eafca0e8fca859
NE-032	FBIMichigan Witness Interview Memo Probably Forged Memos RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	53ae802c46991ee0a0a854e1554e53be233d0ff7ea3cc23c185fc81c39592cb
NE-033	FBIMichigan Witness Interview Widespread Fake Registrations RELEASE MARKED.pdf	3	16798ea6bfabe9c552b30cf5bd4726050ef03aafec079ab622a3b10d2dddf6c4c
NE-034	FBIMichigan Worker Interview Sit In Car Fake Registrations RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	8ddf39c5c1853fa1897c35d05ba43a2c314a497874103befadd22713c81c41f6
NE-035	FBI_ALBANY_IIR_PROVIDED_TO_CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY .pdf	6	a08dc2a347dd6d0b8e8c40ff5eb6204e08b2854c92acf8b2eb47309458048b7f

Evidence ID	Original filename	Pages	SHA-256
NE-036	GBI Strategies -RELEASE MARKED.pdf	2	dde90b90ae9822256d55df5e7ad7cc2a12a26aa1aeb6d2623630d3f29614b9ca
NE-037	NICA Foreign Threats To 2020 US Election_19AUG2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	8	6e22be494ee83716d2251e71c253ea6d78048694886b7006ce449a336aa9882b
NE-038	NICA_ Foreign Threats to 2020 US election_19AUG2020 - DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	8	6e22be494ee83716d2251e71c253ea6d78048694886b7006ce449a336aa9882b
NE-039	NICM_ChinaStepsToInfluenceElection_16OCT2020_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	7	a16aec843fddd6c525251ab4e4b2b2be1e5cee9aeca4b7bae6a59c9bf3bb2a6d
NE-040	NICM_VulnerabilitiesInUS2020ElectionInfrastructure_15JAN2020_DECLAS S_REDACTEDed.pdf	5	9105174603df72f1c9142b8e0bb56e1e036dc6d4f3dbaf559aada1e2b7e22d4c
NE-041	Note - Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018-2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	3	ebc8700c7d5a49df87d2002d953d9e8fd18e28b24ac6fe241944da278f485a34
NE-042	PDB 25JUN2020_DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf	2	ab523302b7e2c77b5d530b1483f668e76581accbb0eb14180ab1d1a7acfd3302
NE-043	PIN EDMI declination - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	4	c1dce1a99c75d4842c66947d53b7a6c13f691d1933c12fe2519d77e7db14ffc2
NE-044	PIN GBI Declination - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	093a4153b77feddf475a6ad9aaf3bd8e2e2f4d8c00cd516b319d0c3f18516302
NE-045	PRC Analysis on US Voter Registration Information - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	8	fc1f06c2cd5abd40c5d5c4a918ec57e5d350d54297cb33368ae49eb58d705e81
NE-046	PRC Collection of US VoterMilitaryData - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	2	0e53257bd93d7e807cd48fae2cfd92591aa47f172d33d90543c889a4526b83e
NE-047	PRC Target 2024 Election 2023 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	6	a809fb5ace7f3a5b1a9748e243fd9e5f008e55fcec93352009e5eb2ee08695e7
NE-048	PRC U.S. Presidential Election-Related Intelligence in 2020 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	4	91565055d7ed239f44d40bd990197ea1830814c48a154c6db6e8bdfb88809e5c
NE-049	PRC US Voter Data 7 States 2023 - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	4	506d61a75e258e2537bc06d369e8ecf97af68a61e581024bbc71fed3d8afe922
NE-050	Summary - clean - declass marked PART 1.pdf	1	a21760a272855ac6d1e5e53fb7c09dd1df4ebf18816e3be2d893d24344f9ffe0
NE-051	Summary - clean - declass marked PART 2.pdf	1	4130ca794f83c03726a621af7972ea60c24fd3a00a38ca466afede8c0ac05df6
NE-052	Summary - clean - declass marked PART 3.pdf	1	4e5496fc9fefbc1b25a8f153e7f928daca2690bb2a71cee89ea9ced058030628
NE-053	Tasking_3_AlbanBriefingHandout_297E_HQ_A4095996_NotSerialized-JET-R RELEASE MARKED.pdf	35	3a12fd071838ce6e90acf284a97cfff7b9a47499325d6e80f005941539e073a
NE-054	US Voter Registration for 6 States - clean - declass marked_Redacted.pdf	6	ac95b16038bc58837c9800bfc37cb3b208bf45f7ae9fdde7da811ed887ecffe1
NE-055	Voter Fraud Spreadsheet - RELEASE MARKED.pdf	1	8e4eaa72274e91134cb7c7ff7f0b8f3fea168714675e0e43677b49788ffc71f5
NE-056	Voter Registration Database Threats - FINAL.pdf	11	ef8d1d0406127f1618210004db8602d59e2c4afe534de46784932f904ef110c3
NE-057	WHTF Government Transparency - States Statement FINAL.pdf	1	62bc6f53d36ea6ce9c3ffae2a0ead43f0df21fc8d32cd99b980e84ce8c60f353

12. Access-Constrained Review Requirements

ID	Authorized review requirement
ERR-01	Reconstruct all relevant presidential written products, drafts, annexes, graphics, and briefing materials.
ERR-02	Reconstruct substantive edits, omissions, confidence changes, definitions, and approval decisions.
ERR-03	Establish what reporting was available to each team and decision authority at the relevant time.
ERR-04	Determine how dissent, uncertainty, warning, recall, and source concerns were presented or excluded.
ERR-05	Reconstruct written and oral delivery to the Chief Executive, including questions and follow-up.
ERR-06	Assess whether executive understanding was materially impaired.
ERR-07	Distinguish legitimate disagreement, source protection, scope, legal caution, negligence, improper influence, and intentional suppression.
ERR-08	Recommend corrective controls, accountability where evidence supports it, and future executive-delivery safeguards.

PUBLIC-SOURCE BOUNDARY

The packet can identify the issue, the visible record, and the evidence required. It cannot determine what the President received or understood. Resolution requires an independent entity with lawful authority, appropriate clearances, complete source and product access, conflict controls, protected dissent, and a neutral charter.

13. AI, Automation, Review, and Audit Record

Activity	Status	Control
File inventory, hash grouping, table generation, and source-field normalization	AI and automated tooling assisted.	Mechanical output; subject to human verification.
Evidence-to-Gap Matrix	AI-assisted draft; reviewer examined and concurred with construct and findings.	Human concurrence did not complete the source audit.
Cassandra Team Discovery	AI-simulated under corrected doctrine and neutral packet.	Generated hypotheses, gaps, indicators, and collection priorities; not evidence or independent human review.
Red Team challenge	AI-assisted internal challenge using a frozen packet.	Material corrections were incorporated; independent human Red Team review remains required.
SIE Draft 1 and this packet	AI-assisted drafting and production.	No approval, release, or company endorsement is represented.
Source audit	Not completed.	Verify every material source, claim, quote, number, date, dependency, and disposition.
Legal, technical, PRC, election-administration, and civil-rights review	Not completed.	Specialist validation remains required.
Independent analytical peer and Red Team review	Not completed.	Required before unqualified release.
Approval and release authorization	Not completed.	Accountable human authority must approve the exact product and packet.

Appendix A. Controlled Baseline and Analytic Artifacts

ID	Artifact	Role
IBA-2026-01	July 2026 Trump Election Interference Intel Release: Baseline Analysis Impacts	Historical PRC baseline.
SP-2026-01	Public Source Packet 2026-01	60-source controlled public packet.
PSR-2026-01	Application of the Tornberg Method to Time-Gated Evidence Deconfliction	Historical process record.
PIA-2026-02	Preliminary U.S. Election Security Risk Assessment	Historical national baseline.
SP-2026-02B	Source Packet for Preliminary U.S. Election Security Risk Assessment	42 incremental sources plus inherited controlled references.
ETG-2026-01	Evidence-to-Gap Matrix	57-file mapping, gaps, streams, dependencies, hashes, and validation.
CT-2026-01	Cassandra Team Discovery Record	AI-simulated Discovery output; not evidence.
RT-2026-01	Red Team Findings Record	AI-assisted internal challenge; not independent review.
SIE-2026-03	Strategic Intelligence Estimate 2026-03, Draft 1	Current substantive draft under human review.
PSR-2026-03A	Process Summary Report 2026-03A	Current baseline-lineage and production record.
SP-2026-03B	This Source Packet	Current comprehensive source-control record.

Appendix B. Controlled Definitions

Term	Definition
Independent source	A source whose origin, access, reporting chain, and evidentiary basis do not derive materially from the source being corroborated.
Within-case corroboration	Independent witnesses or records inside one investigation that strengthen a bounded case but do not establish national prevalence.
Derivative source	A summary, statement, graphic, article, hearing, or action that depends materially on an underlying source.

Term	Definition
Unique-person count	A deduplicated number of individuals after overlap, aliases, multiple records, multiple states, and time are controlled.
Evidence stage	The farthest demonstrated point in a pathway, kept separate from later stages.
Release-selection bias	The risk that declassification, redaction, revision, and public-release choices shape the visible record.
Access-constrained gap	A material question that cannot be resolved through available public or declassified sources and requires authorized access.
Baseline effect	Whether new evidence reinforces, refines, contradicts, or replaces the previously supportable understanding.

Appendix C. Source Audit Checklist

Audit item	Minimum check
Identity	Correct source ID, title, author or issuer, date, version, and filename.
Access and provenance	How the source was obtained, whether it was complete, and whether access is reproducible.
Date control	Event, collection or reporting, demonstrated analytic availability, and public-release dates.
Source class	Finished intelligence, raw reporting, email, technical test, administrative data, legal record, witness interview, summary, or analytic product.
Independence	Common authors, sources, datasets, investigations, products, summaries, and release chains identified.
Claim accuracy	Every quoted or paraphrased proposition matches the source and its evidence stage.
Numbers	Numerator, denominator, unit, period, inclusion rule, de-duplication, and error treatment.
Contrary evidence	Material contradiction, correction, recall, declination, remediation, and ordinary explanation preserved.
Disposition	Retained, boundaried, mixed, quarantined, rejected, or corrected treatment justified.
Confidence	Source quality, independence, corroboration, gaps, and access constraints reflected.
Traceability	Each key judgment, implication, warning, and recommendation links to the controlled source record.
File integrity	Page count and SHA-256 verified for each uploaded file.
Review record	Reviewer identity, date, findings, corrections, unresolved dissent, and approval status recorded.

FINAL STATUS

This source packet remains a draft for human review and customization. It consolidates all controlled records used to form the two historical baselines and the expanded SIE Draft 1 source base. It does not manufacture independence, close access-constrained gaps, certify the underlying evidence, or represent approval or release by Tornberg Consulting, LLC.