

AUGUST 5-6, 2020 BRIEFINGS

### **Breaking Samsung's Root of Trust: Exploiting Samsung S10 S-Boot**

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#BHUSA @BLACKHATEVENTS

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Focus on Mobile and IoT Vulnerabilities









### Samsung Security Framework Knox

### Knox - Root of Trust




### Knox – Trusted Boot

- Hardware PBL
  - Verify secure boot(S-Boot) & load
- S-Boot
  - Set handler for Monitor mode, drop privilege
  - Request EL3 to initial TEEOS
  - Verify & Load Hypervisor (uh.bin)
  - Verify & Load Kernel (boot.img)
- Kernel with DM-Verity
  - Verify system.img & mount
  - Verify vendor.img & mount




### Knox bit (warranty bit)

- One-time fuse, can't restore
- Blow the fuse when trying to boot a custom image and prevent further booting




### Sensitive Data Protection

- The storage (Sensitive Data) is encrypted when the device is locked
- Encrypted Keys are stored in trustzone




### Sensitive Data Protection cont

• Some critical information can only be decrypted by trustlet




### **ARM Trustzone**




### **Related Work**

## BH17 – Defeating Samsung KNOX with zero privilege by returnsme • EL0 -> EL1 (kinibi)




### BH17 EU - How Samsung Secures Your Wallet by Tencent Lab

EL0 -> Secure EL0 (kinibi)



### BH19 – Breaking Samsung's Arm Trustzone

• EL0 -> Secure-EL3 (kinibi, S8 and before)




# What if the device is turned off & we don't know the passcode?


### In this talk

f

out-side the box(locked phone) -> Non-Secure EL1



#### **S-Boot Boot Flow**



### ODIN mode

- Flash stock firmware
- Rollback prevention

#### Warning

A custom OS can cause critical problems in phone and installed applications.

If you want to download a custom OS, press the volume up key, otherwise, press the volume down key to cancel.

Volume up: Continue Volume down: Cancel (restart phone)

ODIN MODE PRODUCT NAME: SM-CURRENT BINARY: Samsung Official SYSTEM STATUS: Official



Downloading... Do not turn off target

# Vulnerability I

### Odin Request

opCode

- 0x64 Odin mode initial & settings
- 0x65 Flash PIT
- 0x66 Flag image
- subOp
  - Depends on opCode
  - Maybe initialize, set, get ...etc
- arg1 ~ arg4
  - assign size or some value


<pre>typedef structattribute((packed)) {</pre>
unsigned int opCode;
<pre>unsigned int subOp;</pre>
unsigned int arg1;
unsigned int arg2;
unsigned int arg3;
unsigned int arg4;
<pre>} odin_request;</pre>

### Odin Flash Image Command

- No check for provided size
- Integer overflow
  - Use 0xC0000000 if less then 0x1e00000
  - Otherwise use 0xB000000
- Copy to buffer
  - S8 and before at 0xC0000000
  - S9 and later at 0x880000000

```
if (\sqrt{37.0p} \& 0 \times FFFFFB) == 2
                                            // flash
  if ( dword C934618C != 5 && dword C934618C )
    return result;
  arg1 = v37.arg1;
  odin response(0x66ui64, 0i64);
  image offset = dword C93461E4;
  if ( dword C93461E4 )
    v12 = odin flash buf ptr;
  else
    if (arg1 > 0x1E00000)
                signed op; bool
      v12 = 0 \times B000000164;
      odin flash buf ptr = 0xB000000i64;
      return usb recv until(qword C93461C0, v12, arg1);
    v12 = sub C903142C();
    odin_flash_buf_ptr = v12;
    image offset = dword C93461E4;
```

### Overflow the physical memory



### Bypass MMU

- S-Boot code segment at 0xC900000 but read only
- USB devices have direct memory access
  - Ignores mmu control

### **Cache Incoherency**

• While receiving data, the CPU keeps tracking the USB event

This code is cached


```
while( eventCount-- ){
    event = usbDev->eventBuffer[usbDev->currentEventPos];
    if ( !event )
        continue
    switch( event ) {
        // event handler
        // ...
    }
}
```

• Only the heap will not be cached

### **Code Execution**


• The heap is not cached, the code accesses a pointer in the heap...

Trigger data-abort as soon as we overwrite heap data with NULL



- Overwrite the error handler code with jump sled
- Put shellcode in front of the code segment

### Overflow the physical memory



#### But

- S9 and later are not exploitable
- The default buffer is changed to 0x88000000
- Spent half a year trying to exploit S10

In S9 and later, ODIN has parallel & compressed download mode

- It will boot up another 2 cpu, and set the image buffer to 0x880000000
- Fallback to normal download if boot cpu failure
  - Buffer change back to 0xC0000000

```
v2 = cd_v3_smp_register(&v3);
if ( v2 )
{
    dprintf("%s: v3_smp_register failed with error id = %d\n", "compressed_download_init", v2);
    dprintf("%s: fallback to normal download\n", "compressed_download_init");
    *v0 = 1;
}
```

#### Make CPU boot fails

```
int64 fastcall smp boot( int64 a1)
int64 v1; // x21
unsigned int *v2; // x20
void *v3; // x0
int32 v4; // w0
int64 result; // x0
v1 = a1;
dprintf("%s\n", "smp boot");
smp init();
v_2 = off C916E550;
v_3 = off C916E550;
*off C916DF30 = v1;
sub C90163A0(v3);
v4 = next_available_cpu();
if ( \sqrt{4} = -1 )
  dprintf("No secondary cpus available\n");
  sub C90163A4(v2);
  result = 0xFFFFFFFFLL;
```

```
_int32 __fastcall next_available_cpu()
```

```
__int32 result; // w0
```


```
dprintf("%s: started\n", "next_available_cpu");
result = current_cpu_id;
if ( current_cpu_id > 3 )
  return 0xFFFFFFF;
++current_cpu_id;
return result;
```

- Uart mode
  - Cmd smp\_test
    - Test Boot up a cpu core and shutdown immediately
    - But count of booted cores will not decrease
  - Cmd download
    - Enter Odin mode


- Enter Uart Mode
  - We need a debug cable to make S-Boot detect RID\_523K

```
v17 = get_jig_adc();
v18 = ccic_read_adc();
dprintf("%s: jig_adc=%02x, cc_adc=%02x\n", "board_ccic_check_uart", v17, v18);
rid = ccic_read_adc();
if ( rid == 5 )
{
    dprintf("CC UART\n");
    rid = ifconn_com_to_uart(2u);
}
```

- Tried TypeC VDM mode, accessory mode, pull-down pull-up resistor
- All failed



### We reported the bug on Aug 2019



### **Result: Duplicated**

# SEVERAL MONTHS ADER

#### Patch Note

- Samsung Security Update October 2019
  - SVE-2019-15230 Potential Integer overflow in Bootloader


#### SVE-2019-15230: Potential integer overflow in Bootloader


Severity: Critical Affected Versions: N(7.x), O(8.x), P(9.0) devices with Exynos chipsets Reported on: August 8, 2019 Disclosure status: Privately disclosed. Type mismatch between signed and unsigned integer in bootloader can lead to integer overflow. The patch prevent integer overflow by changing the type of a variable into unsigned integer.

#### The Patch

```
size = arg1;
odin_response(0x66LL, 0LL);
if ( !dword_C923A614 )
{
    dword_C93CC728 = v9;
    dword_C93CC72C = size;
    if ( size <= 0x2000000 )
    {        signed op; bool
        v21 = mmap();
        qword_C93CC710 = v21;
    }
    else
```

```
size = arg1;
if ( arg1 <= 0x10000000 )
{
    odin_response(0x66, 0);
    if ( !dword_C9249C8C )
    {
        dword_C93DBDB8 = v14;
        dword_C93DBDBC = size;
        if ( (unsigned int)size <= 0x2000000 )
        {
            v26 = mmap();
            qword_C93DBDA0 = v26;
        }
        else
```





# Vulnerability II

### Aligned Size?

```
__int64 __fastcall usb_recv_until(__int64 handle, __int64 buf, unsigned __int64 size)

__DWORD *v3; // x0

qword_C93CC468 = size;

dword_C93CC480 = 1;

qword_C93CC490 = handle;

qword_C93CC470 = 0LL;

dword_C93CC484 = 0;

qword_C93CC498 = buf;

if ( size == size / qword_C91494B0 * qword_C91494B0 )

qword_C93CC478 = size;

else

qword_C93CC478 = qword_C91494B0 + size / qword_C91494B0 * qword_C91494B0;
```

#### Odin - packet data size

• We can set packet data size with opCode 0x64, subOp 0x05

```
switch ( cmd.subOp )
{
    case 5:
    qword_C93CC6DC = arg1;
    dprintf("packet data size is changed to %d.\n", arg1);
    qword_C91494B0 = qword_C93CC6DC | (HIDWORD(qword_C93CC6DC) << 32);
    odin_response(0x64LL, 0LL);
    return;</pre>
```

#### Exploit

- Bypass the check
- The usb receive size can be larger than 0x1000000 again
- Achieve code execution in the same way as the previous vulnerability

# I reported the bug immediately

# SEVERAL MONTHS ADER

#### Patch Note


#### Samsung Security Update - Jan 2020


#### SVE-2019-15872: Improper aligned size check leads buffer overflow in secure bootloader

Severity: Critical Affected Versions: O(8.x), P(9.0), Q(10.0) devices with Exynos chipset Reported on: October 11, 2019 Disclosure status: Privately disclosed. An invalid check of usb buffer size in Secure Bootloader allows arbitrary code execution. The patch adds proper size check logic of usb buffer.

#### The Patch

```
case 5:
  packet_data_size = arg1;
  if ( arg1 <= 0xFFFFF )
  {
    sub_C90554C0("packet data size is changed to %d.\n");
    *off_C916F5A8[0] = packet_data_size | (HIDWORD(packet_data_size) << 32);
    return odin_resp(100LL, 0LL);
  }
  sub_C90554C0("USB packet size is too big!\n");
  odin_resp(0xFFFFFFFLL, 0LL);
  goto LABEL_34;
```





# Vulnerability III

#### ODIN – PIT flash command

- opCode = 0x65
- PIT is very small, odin store it to heap buffer

```
pit_recv_size = arg1;
if ( arg1 - 1 <= 0x1FFF )
{
    odin_response(0x65LL, 0LL);
    usb_recv_until(odin_state, pit_buf, pit_recv_size);
    return;
}
dprintf("Invalid Size: PIT\n");
```

With the size 0x2000

```
pit_buf = malloc(0x2000);
odin_state = malloc(8);
```

### The patch of vulnerability II

Size of packet data can be upto 0xFFFFF

```
> 0x2000 => heap overflow
```

```
case 5:
  packet_data_size = arg1;
  if ( arg1 <= 0xFFFFF )
  {
    sub_C90554C0("packet data size is changed to %d.\n");
    *off_C916F5A8[0] = packet_data_size | (HIDWORD(packet_data_size) << 32);
    return odin_resp(100LL, 0LL);
  }
  sub_C90554C0("USB packet size is too big!\n");
  odin_resp(0xFFFFFFFLL, 0LL);
  goto LABEL_34;
```

#### Pseudo code - receive data

• This is a pseudocode representation of the receive operation

```
if ( request_size < 0xffffff )</pre>
  first_recv_size = request_size
else
  first_recv_size = packet_data_size
. . .
count = 0;
count += usb_recv( buf, first_recv_size );
while ( count < request size ) \{
  usb_recv( buf+count, packet_data_size );
```

• In our test, the usb\_recv function will receive until the passed size is reached

• Even if we send data with a huge interval

# We thought this was un-exploitable, so I stuck to vulnerability I



## How About Interrupting the USB


- Remove and Re-insert the USB cable
- the usb\_recv returns with insufficient size

```
if ( request_size < 0xfffff )</pre>
  first_recv_size = request_size
else
  first_recv_size = packet_data_size
. . .
count = 0;
count += usb_recv( buf, first_recv_size );
while ( count < request_size ){</pre>
  usb_recv( buf+count, packet_data_size );
  . . .
```

## Heap overflow

- We can overwrite the metadata of heap chunk
- House of Spirit

chunk {		
unsigned	lint	size;
unsigned	lint	inused;
chunk *	prev;	
chunk *	next;	
}		




#### Fake Chunk

No check for double linked list

faked chunk					
		size	unused		
		prev			
		next			
size unused		data			
prev					
next					
data					
		size	unused		
		р	rev		
		n	ext		
		d	ata		


## Limited Overwrite Data

- \*prev + 4 = 1
- It aarch64, integer 64 bit
  - Code at 0xC9000000
  - We can not point to
    - Got
    - Function pointer



## Overwrite RIP in stack

- The only chance is to overwrite a return address on stack
- Only 3 function calls
- Fortunately
  - Odin cmd buf is the first local variable




Stack	Stack
SP	SP
PC	PC
local variable	local variable
SP	SP
PC	PC
local variable Odin cmd buf	local variable
	size unused
SP	prev
PC	next
local variable	data

## After Code Execution in S-boot

#### Boot the phone

- We smashed the stack & heap
- Hard to recover
- Call the boot functions one by one



#### Skip Trustzone related call

- We only have EL1 privilege
- Some smc call to trustzone can not call twice
- Skip the smc call and set the related parameter


#### Load Custom Kernel

- After loading kernel to memory (the function cmd\_load\_kernel)
- Replace the image with custom one
- Booting the kernel (call the function cmd\_boot)


#### Exploit

- Set the size of packet data to a big number
- Send Odin PIT flash command
- Send payload after Interrupt the usb\_recv(), leads to heap overflow
- Send Another Odin command to trigger malloc & free the buffer
- Overwrite RIP on stack, jump to shellcode
  - Re-init heap and stack
  - Continue booting
  - Before boot into kernel, replace the boot image

#### We got el1 in normal world



#### But the phone is still locked




#### Can not read sensitive data

- Storage is still encrypted if we didn't provide the screen passcode
  - Encryption key can only be decrypted in the gatekeeper trustlet
- Some data in trustlet can not be reached

#### Man in the Non-secure EL1

- Wait for the user to unlock the phone
- Hijack / Sniff everything between non-secure world and secure world




#### **Exposed Attacking surface**

- Attacking secure world trustlet
  - Gatekeeper trustlet
  - Samsung Pay trustlet
  - Keystore trustlet

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. . .

Many vulnerabilities in the past



#### Attack the gatekeeper trustlet to decrypt storage


#### • SVE-2019-14575

SVE-2019-14575: Brute force attack on screen lock password

Severity: High Affected Versions: O(8.x), P(9.0), Q(10.0) devices with Exynos7885, Exynos8895, Exynos9810 chipsets Reported on: May 17, 2019 Disclosure status: Privately disclosed A vulnerable design in Gatekeeper trustlet allows brute force attack on screen lock password. And previous patch caused unexpected side effects that required a fix. The patch adds exception handling to prevent unexpected close of Gatekeeper trustlet.

#### • With this vulnerability, we can try all the possible pattern codes in a few hours.

#### Sensitive Data unlocked



#### Conclusion

- Even if the data is stored in secure world, it doesn't mean it's 100% secure
- But it's made exploiting complex, multiple actions are needed to retrieve the data
  - Landing RCE / Local USB Exploit / Social Engineering
  - Privilege escalation to non-secure EL1
  - Vulnerabilities in trustlet to get into secure-world EL0
  - Privilege escalation from secure-world EL0 to secure-world EL1 or EL3
- Without all of this, especially the points in red, the data in the phone is still safe

#### **Disclosure Timeline**

- 2019-10-02 Report Vulnerability I
- 2019-10-08 Informed Vulnerability I duplicated
- 2019-10-11 Report Vulnerability II
- 2020-01-06 Samsung Patched, SVE-2019-15872
- 2020-01-21 Report Vulnerability III
- 2020-05-06 Samsung Patched, SVE-2020-16712

## **THANK YOU!**

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Persistent Cyber Threat Hunters