{
  "type": "FuegoIQDRepVoteRationale",
  "version": 1,
  "drepId": "drep1ytuufvd6maykgfcp20fxgpx7g6a9z2suchqehfejwdsx8cgpx80yg",
  "governanceAction": {
    "id": "gov_action1fdatlfcdnzzcw5x9pnt9r42v992nqw65zze57s8tyk0jll78eyusqccn9gc",
    "title": "Cardano Builder DAO",
    "type": "TreasuryWithdrawals",
    "lifecycle": "Live",
    "expiryEpoch": 646,
    "url": "ipfs://QmT8VE8KBqPUYRpev2jybiMENhPrDh9gwjoNW9Pmgw4ffj"
  },
  "vote": {
    "choice": "No"
  },
  "body": {
    "rationale": "I am voting NO on the Cardano Builder DAO proposal.\n\nI want to be clear that this is not a vote against builders, dApps, ecosystem growth, or the idea that Cardano needs better outcome-based funding. I recognise that the Cardano Builder DAO has already operated funding rounds, distributed capital to projects, built a community of builders, and returned unused ADA to the treasury.\n\nHowever, I do not believe this proposal is the right allocation of treasury funds in the current environment.\n\nThe request is very large at 20,000,000 ADA, and it effectively asks DReps to allocate a significant amount of treasury capacity to a secondary funding body. In my view, that creates accountability, prioritisation and delegation concerns.\n\nCardano is now in an environment where the Net Change Limit is under significant pressure and many live proposals are competing for limited remaining capacity. Under those conditions, I believe DReps should prioritise direct, clearly scoped, critical infrastructure and public-good maintenance before large meta-funding mechanisms.\n\nMy concern is not that Builder DAO has done nothing. My concern is that allocating such a large amount to another funding layer weakens direct DRep accountability over treasury spending. DReps were elected and delegated to make difficult prioritisation decisions, not to pass a major portion of that responsibility to another committee or DAO unless the mandate, limits, governance protections, conflict controls and measurable return profile are exceptionally strong.\n\nI also have concerns around potential conflicts of interest in builder-led funding structures. Even where processes are transparent and well-intentioned, a DAO composed of ecosystem participants allocating funds to ecosystem participants needs an extremely high governance bar. In this case, I do not believe the structure justifies the size of the ask while the treasury budget is so constrained.\n\nI support targeted funding for builders when proposals are direct, specific, measurable and proportionate. I am not comfortable supporting a 20M ADA treasury withdrawal into a broad secondary allocation mechanism at this time.\n\nFor these reasons, I vote NO."
  },
  "status": "published-rationale"
}