{
  "type": "FuegoIQDRepVoteRationale",
  "version": 1,
  "drepId": "drep1ytuufvd6maykgfcp20fxgpx7g6a9z2suchqehfejwdsx8cgpx80yg",
  "governanceAction": {
    "id": "gov_action19apfhh339syqd0gkrxw6zr6pghdfspckr6vagjrpwnr0hx53lxpsq637y3t",
    "title": "Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal",
    "type": "TreasuryWithdrawals",
    "lifecycle": "Live",
    "expiryEpoch": 648,
    "url": "ipfs://QmRyqT2c9tHbk9hMrYjjpJ3omRSC2HpSVCBT69kYsm7Szr"
  },
  "vote": {
    "choice": "No"
  },
  "body": {
    "rationale": "I am voting NO on the Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.\n\nI want to be clear that this is not a vote against open-source sustainability, maintainers, public goods, or the need to improve long-term support for Cardano’s open-source dependencies.\n\nThe problem this proposal is trying to solve is real. Cardano does rely on open-source software, libraries, tools and maintainers that need better continuity, succession planning, dependency awareness and long-term support.\n\nI also recognise that this revised proposal is materially improved from the earlier version. It is smaller, shorter, more focused, and more pilot-like. The proposal requests 4,094,000 ADA over 12 months and is structured around a Maintenance Fund, Maintainer Development Program, CodeForUs Bounty Program, and Ecosystem Activation Reserve.\n\nHowever, I do not believe this is the right treasury allocation at this time.\n\nMy main concern is that this remains a secondary allocation structure rather than direct funding of clearly identified critical infrastructure. The proposal creates a new programme layer that will later decide which open-source dependencies, maintainers, bounties and ecosystem activities receive funding.\n\nThat may become a useful model in future, but I believe Cardano should first agree the broader NCL and treasury framework within which this type of programme would sit.\n\nI have recently advocated for shorter NCL windows, category-level budget buckets, market-aware spending, sovereign reserves in stronger markets, and clearer rules for any treasury investment or programme-allocation function. This proposal is exactly the type of action that should be considered inside a pre-agreed open-source maintenance or ecosystem sustainability bucket, not from one long, undifferentiated NCL pot.\n\nUntil that framework exists, I am more comfortable supporting direct, specific, measurable infrastructure and tooling proposals than approving new meta-funding structures.\n\nI am also cautious about precedent. I have been reluctant to support broad secondary funding bodies where DReps delegate substantial allocation discretion to another programme or administrator. Even where the intention is good, DRep accountability over treasury spending should remain direct unless the mandate, category budget, governance controls and selection rules are exceptionally clear.\n\nA future version of this proposal could be stronger if it were submitted after NCL reform, inside an agreed open-source sustainability budget, with clearer pre-identified dependency priorities, tighter disbursement criteria, and stronger evidence that this programme structure is the best way to fund those public goods.\n\nAs submitted, I do not believe this proposal should be prioritised ahead of preserving remaining NCL capacity and improving the treasury framework first.\n\nFor these reasons, I vote NO."
  },
  "status": "published-rationale"
}