

Report
v. 1.0

Customer
Contango



Smart Contract Audit Core

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Report prepared by
ABDK
Consulting

Contents

1	Changelog	5
2	Introduction	6
3	Project scope	7
4	Methodology	8
5	Our findings	9
6	Major Issues	10
	CVF-1. INFO	10
	CVF-2. FIXED	10
	CVF-3. INFO	11
	CVF-4. FIXED	11
	CVF-5. FIXED	11
	CVF-6. FIXED	12
	CVF-7. FIXED	12
	CVF-8. INFO	12
	CVF-9. INFO	13
	CVF-10. INFO	13
	CVF-11. INFO	14
	CVF-12. INFO	14
	CVF-13. FIXED	14
	CVF-14. FIXED	15
	CVF-15. INFO	15
	CVF-16. FIXED	16
	CVF-17. FIXED	16
7	Moderate Issues	17
	CVF-18. INFO	17
	CVF-19. FIXED	17
	CVF-20. FIXED	18
	CVF-21. FIXED	18
	CVF-22. FIXED	19
	CVF-23. FIXED	19
	CVF-24. FIXED	20
	CVF-25. INFO	21
8	Minor Issues	22
	CVF-26. INFO	22
	CVF-27. FIXED	22
	CVF-28. FIXED	22
	CVF-29. INFO	23

CVF-30. INFO	23
CVF-31. INFO	23
CVF-32. FIXED	24
CVF-33. FIXED	24
CVF-34. INFO	24
CVF-35. INFO	25
CVF-36. FIXED	25
CVF-37. FIXED	25
CVF-38. FIXED	26
CVF-39. INFO	26
CVF-40. INFO	26
CVF-41. FIXED	27
CVF-42. FIXED	27
CVF-43. INFO	28
CVF-44. INFO	28
CVF-45. FIXED	29
CVF-46. INFO	29
CVF-47. INFO	29
CVF-48. FIXED	30
CVF-49. INFO	30
CVF-50. FIXED	31
CVF-51. INFO	31
CVF-52. FIXED	32
CVF-53. FIXED	32
CVF-54. FIXED	32
CVF-55. FIXED	33
CVF-56. FIXED	33
CVF-57. FIXED	33
CVF-58. FIXED	34
CVF-59. FIXED	34
CVF-60. FIXED	34
CVF-61. INFO	35
CVF-62. FIXED	35
CVF-63. INFO	35
CVF-64. INFO	36
CVF-65. FIXED	36
CVF-66. FIXED	36
CVF-67. FIXED	37
CVF-68. FIXED	37
CVF-69. FIXED	37
CVF-70. INFO	38
CVF-71. FIXED	38
CVF-72. INFO	38
CVF-73. FIXED	39
CVF-74. INFO	39
CVF-75. FIXED	40

CVF-76. INFO	40
CVF-77. FIXED	41
CVF-78. FIXED	41
CVF-79. FIXED	42
CVF-80. FIXED	42
CVF-81. FIXED	42
CVF-82. FIXED	43
CVF-83. FIXED	43
CVF-84. INFO	43

1 Changelog

#	Date	Author	Description
0.1	11.03.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Initial Draft
0.2	11.03.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Minor revision
1.0	12.03.23	A. Zveryanskaya	Release

2 Introduction

All modifications to this document are prohibited. Violators will be prosecuted to the full extent of the U.S. law.

The following document provides the result of the audit performed by ABDK Consulting (Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich) at the customer request. The audit goal is a general review of the smart contracts structure, critical/major bugs detection and issuing the general recommendations.

Contango is a unique decentralized market offering expirables, contracts to buy or sell an asset at a set price and date in the future.

3 Project scope

We were asked to review:

- [Original Code](#)
- [Code with Fixes](#)

Files:

/		
ContangoPosition NFT.sol	ExecutionProcessor Lib.sol	PoolORacle.sol
batchable/		
Batchable.sol	PermitForwarder.sol	WethHandler.sol
interfaces/		
IContango.sol	IContangoQuoter.sol	IContangoView.sol
IFeeModel.sol		
libraries/		
CodecLib.sol	IDataTypes.sol	ErrorLib.sol
MathLib.sol	PositionLib.sol	StorageLib.sol
TransferLib.sol		
liquiditysource/yield-protocol/		
ContangoYield.sol	Yield.sol	YieldUtils.sol
liquiditysource/		
ContangoBase.sol	SlippageLib.sol	UniswapV3Handler.sol
models/		
FixedFeeModel.sol		
periphery/		
CashSettler.sol		
utils/		
Balanceless.sol		

4 Methodology

The methodology is not a strict formal procedure, but rather a selection of methods and tactics combined differently and tuned for each particular project, depending on the project structure and technologies used, as well as on client expectations from the audit.


- **General Code Assessment.** The code is reviewed for clarity, consistency, style, and for whether it follows best code practices applicable to the particular programming language used. We check indentation, naming convention, commented code blocks, code duplication, confusing names, confusing, irrelevant, or missing comments etc. At this phase we also understand overall code structure.
- **Entity Usage Analysis.** Usages of various entities defined in the code are analysed. This includes both: internal usages from other parts of the code as well as potential external usages. We check that entities are defined in proper places as well as their visibility scopes and access levels are relevant. At this phase, we understand overall system architecture and how different parts of the code are related to each other.
- **Access Control Analysis.** For those entities, that could be accessed externally, access control measures are analysed. We check that access control is relevant and done properly. At this phase, we understand user roles and permissions, as well as what assets the system ought to protect.
- **Code Logic Analysis.** The code logic of particular functions is analysed for correctness and efficiency. We check if code actually does what it is supposed to do, if that algorithms are optimal and correct, and if proper data types are used. We also make sure that external libraries used in the code are up to date and relevant to the tasks they solve in the code. At this phase we also understand data structures used and the purposes they are used for.

We classify issues by the following severity levels:

- **Critical issue** directly affects the smart contract functionality and may cause a significant loss.
- **Major issue** is either a solid performance problem or a sign of misuse: a slight code modification or environment change may lead to loss of funds or data. Sometimes it is an abuse of unclear code behaviour which should be double checked.
- **Moderate issue** is not an immediate problem, but rather suboptimal performance in edge cases, an obviously bad code practice, or a situation where the code is correct only in certain business flows.
- **Minor issues** contain code style, best practices and other recommendations.

5 Our findings

We found 17 major, and a few less important issues. All identified Major issues have been fixed or otherwise addressed in collaboration with the client.



Fixed 52 out of 84 issues

6 Major Issues

CVF-1. INFO

- **Category** Flaw

- **Source** WethHandler.sol

Description This function allows anybody to steal all WETH (and all ether using the “wrapETH” function) from the contract.

Recommendation Consider limiting access to this function.

Client Comment *This is by design, wrap/unwrap are meant to be used with batched calls and the contango address should never hold any balance. It follow the same pattern of Uniswap’s Router (<https://arbiscan.io/address/0x68b3465833fb72A70ecDF485E0e4C7bD8665Fc45>)*

```
27 function unwrapWETH(address payable to) external payable returns (
    ↳ uint256 unwrapped) {
```

CVF-2. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw

- **Source** FixedFeeModel.sol

Description There is not range check for the argument.

Recommendation Consider adding appropriate checks.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
10 constructor(uint256 _fee) {
```

CVF-3. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** ContangoPositionNFT.sol

Description There is an efficient way to trim an in-memory array via assembly.

Recommendation Consider returning an array without trailing zeros.

Client Comment *Already marked for deprecation, as this data will come from the graph, so not fixing it.*

```
66  /// PositionId == 0 is always invalid, so as soon it shows up in the  
    ↪ array is safe to assume the rest of it is empty
```

CVF-4. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description Using “require” statements with side effects is a bad practice, that makes code more error-prone and harder to read.

Recommendation Consider checks from assignments.

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
57  require((periodSize = windowSize_ / granularity_) * granularity_ ==  
    ↪ windowSize_, "WINDOW_NOT_EVENLY_DIVISIBLE");
```

CVF-5. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description The expression “poolObservations[pool]” is calculated multiple times.

Recommendation Consider calculating once and reusing.

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
75  uint256 length = poolObservations[pool].length;
```

```
88      o = poolObservations[pool][oldestObservationIndex];
```

CVF-6. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description This looks like waste of gas.

Recommendation Consider refactoring to populate observation slots with real observations once they come it.

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
112 // populate the array with empty observations (only on the first  
    ↳ call ever for each pool)
```

CVF-7. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Recommendation This could be simplified as: require (price >= 0); require (amount » 192 == 0); result = (amount « 64) / uint128 (price);

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
254 result = amount.divu(WAD).div(price).mulu(WAD); // result = amount /  
    ↳ price
```

```
284 result = amount.divu(WAD).div(price).mulu(WAD); // result = amount /  
    ↳ price
```

CVF-8. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior

- **Source** CashSettler.sol

Description This function doesn't allow transferring plain ether.

Recommendation Consider adding such ability.

Client Comment *Not necessary since only WETH is used on instruments and ETH can only be sent to this contract by unwrapping WETH.*

```
123 function _transferEquity(ERC20 token, address to) internal returns (  
    ↳ uint256 balance) {
```

CVF-9. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Batchable.sol

Description Reverting with a named error here makes it impossible to distinguish the following two situations: 1. An inner transaction reverted with no data 2. An inner transaction reverted with the “TransactionRevertedSilently” error.

Recommendation Consider reverting with empty data in case an inner transaction reverted with empty data.

Client Comment *This error is only used here so it can only mean an inner revert with no data.*

```
25 if (returnData.length == 0) revert TransactionRevertedSilently();
```

CVF-10. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** Batchable.sol

Description An error data returned here doesn’t contain the index of the failed transaction within the batch.

Recommendation Consider reverting with a named error encapsulating the index of a failed transaction plus the data returned from the failed transaction. Also consider including the data returned by all the preceding successful transactions as such data could simplify debugging.

Client Comment *Not trivial to revert the underlying data + index via assembly and keep it readable. With current tools, the dev can either get stack traces via foundry or debug the tx on tenderly, so not fixing it.*

```
28 revert(add(32, returnData), mload(returnData))
```

CVF-11. INFO

- **Category** Documentation
- **Source** Yield.sol

Description The business logic of this function is quite complicated.

Recommendation Consider describing it in a documentation comment.

Client Comment *The functions are well documented already, unclear what can be improved.*

```
192 function completeOpen(UniswapV3Handler.Callback memory callback)
    ↪ internal {
```

CVF-12. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** YieldUtils.sol

Description This looks like a piece of business logic separated from the function where it should be and hidden in an unexpected place.

Recommendation Consider moving this logic into the function that calls the “maxFYTokenOut” function.

Client Comment *This encapsulates issues on a 3rd party contract and we want to keep encapsulated here.*

```
35 } else if (f.selector == IPool.maxFYTokenOut.selector) {
```

CVF-13. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** PositionLib.sol

Description The function signature looks like the function just returned the owner for a positions, while actually the function verifies that a position is owner by the message sender, and reverts otherwise.

Recommendation Consider clearly documenting this behavior and also renaming the function.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
12 function positionOwner(PositionId positionId) internal view returns
    ↪ (address trader) {
```



CVF-14. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** IContangoQuoter.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to upgrade to newer versions. Also it makes is harder to use this interface in other projects.

Recommendation Consider specifying as “^0.8.0”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
2 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
```

CVF-15. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype

- **Source** IContangoQuoter.sol

Description These functions look like they don't modify the blockchain state.

Recommendation Consider declaring them as “view”.

Client Comment *Limited by the uniswap quoter not being view, should be fine since it's inteded for off-chain use and these can do callstatic.*

```
12 function positionStatus(PositionId positionId, uint24 uniswapFee)
    ↪ external returns (PositionStatus memory);
```

```
18 function openingCostForPosition(OpeningCostParams calldata params)
    ↪ external returns (ModifyCostResult memory);
```

```
23 function modifyCostForPosition(ModifyCostParams calldata params)
    ↪ external returns (ModifyCostResult memory);
```

```
28 function deliveryCostForPosition(PositionId positionId) external
    ↪ returns (uint256);
```

CVF-16. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** IContangoView.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to upgrade to newer versions. Also it makes is harder to use this interface in other projects.

Recommendation Consider specifying as “^0.8.0”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

2 `pragma solidity 0.8.17;`

CVF-17. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** IContango.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to upgrade to newer versions. Also it makes is harder to use this interface in other projects.

Recommendation Consider specifying as “^0.8.0”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

2 `pragma solidity 0.8.17;`

7 Moderate Issues

CVF-18. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** ContangoPositionNFT.sol

Description This allows a minter to burn other people's NFTs with out explicit approval, which is dangerous.

Recommendation Consider limiting this ability, e.g. requiring an NFT to be explicitly approved to the miner, or even owned by the miner.

Client Comment *The app needs to be able to mint and burn position NFTs, so not sure what else we can do apart from allowing it via a role, so we're safe to upgrade to a different address if need be (although not expected because it's already under a proxy).*

```
35 function burn(PositionId positionId) external onlyRole(MINTER) {
```

CVF-19. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Recommendation It should be "length" instead of "granularity". Otherwise array index out of bounds error could happen in the next statement.

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
85 uint256 oldestObservationIndex = (++observationIndex) % granularity;
```

CVF-20. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description Multiplying by “WAD” and then dividing by “RAY” significantly increases probability of phantom overflow.

Recommendation Consider calculating as: $(\text{currentCumulativeRatio_} - \text{oldestObservation.ratioCumulative}) / \text{timeElapsed} / (\text{RAY} / \text{WAD})$

Client Comment Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.

```
158 twar = ((currentCumulativeRatio_ - oldestObservation.ratioCumulative
    ↪ ) * WAD) / (timeElapsed * RAY);
```

CVF-21. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow

- **Source** ExecutionProcessorLib.sol

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider using safe conversion.

Client Comment Fixed and merged.

```
99 openCost = uint256(int256(openCost) + cost);
```

```
124 positionCollateral = collateralDelta - int256(fee);
```

```
161 pnl = int256(cost) - int256(closedCost);
```

```
218 int256 pnl = int256(cost) - int256(closedCost);
```

```
242 collateral = collateral - int256(fee);
```

CVF-22. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** UniswapV3Handler.sol

Description In case the pool doesn't exist, this will call a non-contract address and silently do nothing.

Recommendation Consider reverting in such a case.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
54 IUniswapV3Pool (UNISWAP_FACTORY.computeAddress(poolKey)).swap({
```

CVF-23. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** UniswapV3Handler.sol

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider using safe conversion.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
57 amountSpecified: baseForQuote ? int256(callback.fill.hedgeSize) : -  
    ↪ int256(callback.fill.hedgeSize),
```

CVF-24. FIXED

- **Category** Overflow/Underflow
- **Source** Yield.sol

Description Overflow is possible here.

Recommendation Consider using safe conversion.

Client Comment Fixed and merged.

```
58  _open(symbol, positionId, trader, instrument, quantity, limitCost,  
    ↪ int256(collateral), payer, lendingLiquidity);  
  
183  int256(collateral),  
  
212  callback.fill.collateral = SignedMath.min(callback.fill.  
    ↪ collateral, int256(callback.fill.hedgeCost));  
  
218  uint128 amountToBorrow = (int256(callback.fill.hedgeCost) - callback  
    ↪ .fill.collateral).toUint256().toUint128();  
  
233  int128(ink), // Use the fyTokens we bought using the flash swap  
    ↪ as ink (collateral)  
    int128(art) // Amount to borrow in future value  
  
323  art = -int128(balances.art);  
  
366  art = -int128(  
  
552  -int256(art).toInt128() // We burn all the (fy)Quote we just  
    ↪ bought  
  
556  int256 cost = -int256(art - collateral);  
  
584  int256 cost = int256(art - collateral);  
  
648  uint128 maxBaseIn = uint128(lendingLiquidity);
```

CVF-25. INFO

- **Category** Flaw

- **Source** PositionLib.sol

Description This check looks very dangerous. It doesn't allow arbitrary payers, but allows to use one valid payer instead of another.

Recommendation Consider replacing with more specific checks relevant to particular use cases.

Client Comment *This is by design, we don't want people to get arbitrary wallets to pay for their position.*

```
73 if (payer != trader && payer != address(this) && payer != msg.sender  
    ↪ ) {
```



8 Minor Issues

CVF-26. INFO

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** FixedFeeModel.sol

Description Specifying a particular compiler version makes it harder to upgrade to newer versions.

Recommendation Consider specifying as “^0.8.0”. Also relevant for: ContangoPositionNFT.sol, Balanceless.sol, ContangoBase.sol, ExecutionProcessorLib.sol, SlippageLib.sol, UniswapV3Handler.sol, ErrorLib.sol, Batchable.sol, Yield.sol, YieldUtils.sol, ContangoYield.sol, TransferLib.sol, PositionLib.sol, MathLib.sol, WethHandler.sol, PermitForwarder.sol, StorageLib.sol, DataTypes.sol, IFeeModel.sol.

Client Comment *Not fixing it until we can ensure the very same compiler version is used on dev/test and deployment.*

```
2 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
```

CVF-27. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description This version requirement is inconsistent with other files. Also, it allows future major release (0.9+), while compatibility with such release cannot be guaranteed.

Recommendation Consider specifying as “^0.8.0”.

Client Comment *Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.*

```
2 pragma solidity >=0.8.15;
```

CVF-28. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
4 import "../interfaces/IPoolOracle.sol";  
import {Exp64x64} from "../Exp64x64.sol";  
import {Math64x64} from "../Math64x64.sol";
```



CVF-29. INFO

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description This contract is not used in other files. Its role is unclear.

Client Comment *Nothing to fix here.*

```
15 contract PoolOracle is IPoolOracle {
```

CVF-30. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as “Observation”.

Client Comment *This repo has mixed use on event naming and we believe events should be actions that happened in the past, hence this naming. not fixing it.*

```
19 event ObservationRecorded(IPool indexed pool, uint256 index,  
    ↳ Observation observation);
```

CVF-31. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Recommendation Consider passing “periodSize” as an argument instead of “windowSize”, and calculating “windowSize” in the constructor. Such approach would make this check unnecessary.

Client Comment *We actually want to keep the check in case the deployment uses bad values.*

```
57 require((periodSize = windowSize_ / granularity_) * granularity_ ==  
    ↳ windowSize_, "WINDOW_NOT_EVENLY_DIVISIBLE");
```

CVF-32. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description The expression “poolObservations[pool]” is calculated twice.

Recommendation Consider calculating once and reusing.

Client Comment Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.

```
114     for (uint256 i = poolObservations[pool].length; i < granularity;  
        ↪     ) {  
122 Observation storage observation = poolObservations[pool][index];
```

CVF-33. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Recommendation The conversion to “IPool” is redundant as “pool” is already “IPool”.

Client Comment Fixed and PR'd on yield repo.

```
127 (observation.ratioCumulative, observation.timestamp) = IPool(pool).  
    ↪ currentCumulativeRatio();
```

CVF-34. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PoolOracle.sol

Description The returned values are ignored here.

Recommendation Consider returning a bit mask of “updated” flags for individual pools.

Client Comment This was a concious design choice. not fixing it.

```
137 updatePool(pools[i]);
```

CVF-35. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Balanceless.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as “BalanceCollection”.

Client Comment *Events should be named as actions that happened in the past, so we'll keep this naming convention and it is consistently used throughout the codebase, not fixing it.*

```
10 event BalanceCollected(address indexed token, address indexed to,  
    ↪ uint256 amount);
```

CVF-36. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Balanceless.sol

Recommendation The type of the “token” parameter should be “IERC20”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
10 event BalanceCollected(address indexed token, address indexed to,  
    ↪ uint256 amount);
```

CVF-37. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** Balanceless.sol

Recommendation The type of the “token” argument should be “IERC20”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
13 function _collectBalance(address token, address payable to, uint256  
    ↪ amount) internal {
```

CVF-38. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** CashSettler.sol

Description We didn't review this file.

```
8 import "../dependencies/Balancer.sol";
```

CVF-39. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming

- **Source** CashSettler.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as "Settlement".

Client Comment *Events should be named as actions that happened in the past, so we'll keep this naming convention and it is consistently used throughout the codebase, not fixing it.*

```
19 event PositionSettled(
```

CVF-40. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** CashSettler.sol

Description Hardcoding mainnet addresses is a bad practice, as it makes testing harder.

Recommendation Consider passing the balancer address as a constructor argument and storing in an immutable variable.

Client Comment *Balancer has the same address for the vault on all networks, so it has the same effect of immutable variables with the upside of being crystal clear which address it is pointing too without needing to query the deployed contract.*

```
50 IFlashLoaner public constant BALANCER = IFlashLoaner(0
    ↪ xBA1222222228d8Ba445958a75a0704d566BF2C8);
```

CVF-41. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** ContangoBase.sol

Recommendation The type of the “token” argument should be “IERC20”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
75 function setTrustedToken(address token, bool trusted) external  
    ↳ onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {  
  
83 function collectBalance(address token, address payable to, uint256  
    ↳ amount) external onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
```

CVF-42. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ContangoBase.sol

Description This function is redundant, as a contract without fallback function would revert on unknown function selectors.

Recommendation Consider removing this function.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
116 fallback() external payable {
```

CVF-43. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** ExecutionProcessorLib.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as “Position”, “PositionLiquidation”, “PositionClose” etc.

Client Comment *Events should be named as actions that happened in the past, so we'll keep this naming convention and it is consistently used throughout the codebase, not fixing it.*

```
20 event PositionUpserted(
```

```
32 event PositionLiquidated(
```

```
42 event PositionClosed(
```

```
54 event PositionDelivered(
```

CVF-44. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ExecutionProcessorLib.sol

Description These arguments are don't affect function logic and are only used when emitting event.

Recommendation Consider removing these arguments, and emitting the event from the calling code.

Client Comment *The events are under the libs because these are meant to be shared with future underlying protocol integrations, e.g. Notional, and pulling the events would break this encapsulation.*

```
70 Symbol symbol,
```

```
72 address trader,  
uint256 deliverableQuantity,  
uint256 deliveryCost,
```

```
77 address to
```

CVF-45. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** UniswapV3Handler.sol

Description We didn't review this file.

```
7 import "../dependencies/Uniswap.sol";
```

CVF-46. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** UniswapV3Handler.sol

Description Hardcoding mainnet addresses is a bad practice, as it makes it harder to test code.

Recommendation Consider passing Uniswap factory address as an argument to the functions that need it. In calling contracts, consider passing it as a constructor argument and storing in an immutable variable.

Client Comment *Uniswap has the same address on all networks, so it has the same effect of immutable variables with the upside of being crystal clear which address it is pointing too without needing to query the deployed contract. Also this is a library, so it'd have to be an extra argument.*

```
35 address internal constant UNISWAP_FACTORY = 0
    ↪ x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984;
```

CVF-47. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** UniswapV3Handler.sol

Recommendation The type of this variable should be "IUniswapV3Factory".

Client Comment *The library copied from uniswap expects an address, so we avoid the extra casting.*

```
35 address internal constant UNISWAP_FACTORY = 0
    ↪ x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984;
```

CVF-48. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** ErrorLib.sol

Description Despite the name this file doesn't contain a library.

Recommendation Consider renaming the file to "Errors.sol".

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
2 pragma solidity 0.8.17;
```

CVF-49. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** ErrorLib.sol

Recommendation The 'positionId' fields should probably be indexed.

Client Comment *Can only index event fields.*

```
18 error InvalidPayer(PositionId positionId, address payer);
```

```
20 error InvalidPosition(PositionId positionId);
```

```
22 error InvalidPositionDecrease(PositionId positionId, int256  
    ↪ decreaseQuantity, uint256 currentQuantity);
```

```
26 error NotPositionOwner(PositionId positionId, address msgSender,  
    ↪ address actualOwner);
```

```
28 error PositionActive(PositionId positionId, uint32 maturity, uint256  
    ↪ timestamp);
```

```
30 error PositionExpired(PositionId positionId, uint32 maturity,  
    ↪ uint256 timestamp);
```

CVF-50. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** Yield.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
4 import {IPool} from "@yield-protocol/yieldspace-tv/src/interfaces/
  ↳ IPool.sol";
import {ILadle} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/interfaces/
  ↳ ILadle.sol";
import {ICauldron} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/
  ↳ interfaces/ICauldron.sol";
import {IFYToken} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/
  ↳ interfaces/IFYToken.sol";
import {DataTypes} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/
  ↳ interfaces/DataTypes.sol";
import {IContangoLadle} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/
  ↳ other/contango/interfaces/IContangoLadle.sol";
```

CVF-51. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming

- **Source** Yield.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as "Trade", "AddedCollateral", or "RemovedCollateral".

Client Comment *Events should be named as actions that happened in the past, so we'll keep this naming convention and it is consistently used throughout the codebase, not fixing it.*

```
28 event ContractTraded(Symbol indexed symbol, address indexed trader,
  ↳ PositionId indexed positionId, Fill fill);
event CollateralAdded(
```

```
32 event CollateralRemoved(
```

CVF-52. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** Yield.sol

Description This syntax looks odd.

Recommendation Consider rewriting as: `PositionLib.loadActivePosition (positionId, uniswapFee)`.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
75 positionId.loadActivePosition(uniswapFee);
```

CVF-53. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** Yield.sol

Recommendation This code should be moved into the “else” branch above. This would make the first part of the condition unnecessary.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
110 if (quantity < 0 && uint256(-quantity) == openQuantity) {  
    _deletePosition(positionId);  
}
```

CVF-54. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** Yield.sol

Description Such assumptions make code much more error prone, as changes in other parts of the code could easily break them.

Recommendation Consider using safe conversion anyway.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
195 // Cast is safe as the number was previously casted as uint128
```

CVF-55. FIXED

- **Category** Bad naming
- **Source** Yield.sol

Description The function name looks like a name of a getter, while actually this function does modify the state.

Recommendation Consider renaming.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
640 function _getFYTokensToBurn(
```

CVF-56. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** YieldUtils.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
4 import {IPool} from "@yield-protocol/yieldspace-tv/src/interfaces/  
  ↳ IPool.sol";
```

CVF-57. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** YieldUtils.sol

Description This assignment should be done only if liquidity is not zero.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
28 IPool pool = IPool(f.address);
```

CVF-58. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** YieldUtils.sol

Recommendation The values used here should be named constants.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
33 if (scaleFactor == 1 && liquidity <= 1e13 || scaleFactor == 1e12 &&  
    ↪ liquidity <= 1e3) {
```

CVF-59. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** ContangoYield.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
6 import {IContangoLadle} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/  
    ↪ other/contango/interfaces/IContangoLadle.sol";  
import "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/other/contango/interfaces  
    ↪ /IContangoWitchListener.sol";
```

CVF-60. FIXED

- **Category** Unclear behavior
- **Source** TransferLib.sol

Description Including both addresses into an error, while only one of the addresses is problematic look odd.

Recommendation Consider declaring two separate errors: "ZeroPayer()" and "ZeroDestination()".

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
13 revert ZeroAddress(payer, to);
```

CVF-61. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PositionLib.sol

Recommendation The returned value is redundant, as it is always equals to “msg.sender”.

Client Comment *Convenient for the caller, not fixing it.*

```
12 function positionOwner(PositionId positionId) internal view returns  
    ↪ (address trader) {
```

CVF-62. FIXED

- **Category** Documentation

- **Source** PositionLib.sol

Description This assignment looks like a hack.

Recommendation Consider refactoring to avoid such things or at least clearly document them.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
60 instrument.uniswapFeeTransient = uniswapFee;
```

CVF-63. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** PositionLib.sol

Recommendation The “owner” returned value is redundant, as it always equals to “msg.sender”.

Client Comment *Convenient for the caller, not fixing it.*

```
66 returns (uint256 openQuantity, address owner, Symbol symbol,  
    ↪ Instrument memory instrument)
```

CVF-64. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** MathLib.sol

Recommendation This branch should be the first one for efficiency: if (fromPrecision == toPrecision) { scale = value; } else if (fromPrecision > toPrecision) { ... } else { ... }

Client Comment *This was included by mistake, it's intended to use with Notional integration where they have an internal precision of 8 decimals and most tokens are not 8 decimals, not fixing it.*

```
17 } else {  
    scaled = value;  
}
```

CVF-65. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** CodecLib.sol

Recommendation This conditions could be simplified as: if (int128 (n) != n)

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
9 if (n > type(int128).max || n < type(int128).min) {
```

CVF-66. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** CodecLib.sol

Recommendation This condition could be simplified as: if (uint128 (n) != n)

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
16 if (n > type(uint128).max) {
```

CVF-67. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** CodecLib.sol

Recommendation This could be simplified as: `encoded = a « 128 | b;`

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
23 encoded |= uint256(uint128(a)) << 128;  
encoded |= uint256(uint128(b));
```

CVF-68. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** CodecLib.sol

Recommendation This could be simplified as: `encoded = uint256(a) « 128 | uint128(int128(b))`

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
33 encoded |= uint256(uint128(int128(a))) << 128;  
encoded |= uint256(uint128(int128(b)));
```

CVF-69. FIXED

- **Category** Bad datatype

- **Source** WethHandler.sol

Recommendation The type of the “WETH” parameter should be “IWETH9”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
10 error OnlyFromWETH(address weth, address sender);
```

CVF-70. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** WethHandler.sol

Recommendation The “weth” parameter is redundant, as its value could be obtained from a public immutable variable.

Client Comment *Useful for debugging.*

```
10 error OnlyFromWETH(address weth, address sender);
```

CVF-71. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** PermitForwarder.sol

Description We didn't review this file.

```
6 import "dss-interfaces/src/dss/DaiAbstract.sol";
```

CVF-72. INFO

- **Category** Bad datatype
- **Source** PermitForwarder.sol

Recommendation The parameter type should be “IERC20”.

Client Comment *This would cause too many castings and make the code less readable on the PermitForwarder, not fixing it.*

```
12 error UnknownToken(address token);
```

CVF-73. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
7 import {DataTypes} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/  
  ↳ interfaces/DataTypes.sol";  
import {IContangoLadle} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/  
  ↳ other/contango/interfaces/IContangoLadle.sol";  
import {ICauldron} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/  
  ↳ interfaces/ICauldron.sol";
```

CVF-74. INFO

- **Category** Bad naming

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Recommendation Events are usually named via nouns, such as "FeeModel" or "ClosingOnlyStatus".

Client Comment *Events should be named as actions that happened in the past, so we'll keep this naming convention and it is consistently used throughout the codebase, not fixing it.*

```
19 event FeeModelUpdated(Symbol indexed symbol, IFeeModel feeModel);  
20 event ClosingOnlySet(Symbol symbol, bool closingOnly);
```

```
138 event YieldInstrumentCreated(Instrument instrument, YieldInstrument  
  ↳ yieldInstrument);  
event LadleSet(IContangoLadle ladle);  
140 event CauldronSet(ICauldron cauldron);
```

```
263 event TreasurySet(address treasury);  
event PositionNFTSet(address positionNFT);  
event ClosingOnlySet(bool closingOnly);  
event TokenTrusted(address indexed token, bool trusted);  
event ProxyHashSet(bytes32 proxyHash);
```

CVF-75. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Recommendation The “symbol” parameter should be indexed.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
20 event ClosingOnlySet(Symbol symbol, bool closingOnly);
```

CVF-76. INFO

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Recommendation Consider defining these values as hashes of library names for uniqueness.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged - not fully replaced because it'd need a re-deployment.*

```
24 uint256 private constant STORAGE_SLOT_BASE = 1_000_000;
```

```
120 uint256 private constant YIELD_STORAGE_SLOT_BASE = 2_000_000;
```

CVF-77. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Description It is uncommon for a library to emit events.

Recommendation Consider emitting from contracts, that use this library.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
88 emit FeeModelUpdated(symbol, feeModel);
93 emit ClosingOnlySet(symbol, closingOnly);
148 emit LadleSet(ladle);
157 emit CauldronSet(cauldron);
187 emit YieldInstrumentCreated(instrument, yieldInstrument);
275 emit TreasurySet(address(treasury));
284 emit PositionNFTSet(address(nft));
293 emit ClosingOnlySet(closingOnly);
302 emit TokenTrusted(token, trusted);
311 emit ProxyHashSet(proxyHash);
```

CVF-78. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Recommendation This library should be defined in a separate file named “YieldStorageLib”.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
115 library YieldStorageLib {
```

CVF-79. FIXED

- **Category** Suboptimal

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Description These functions contain more business logic, that it usually expected from a storage library.

Recommendation Consider moving them into a higher-level contract or library.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
168 function createInstrument(Symbol symbol, bytes6 baseId, bytes6  
    ↪ quoteId, IFeeModel feeModel)
```

```
190 function _createInstrument(
```

```
229 function _validInstrumentData(ICauldron cauldron, Symbol symbol,  
    ↪ bytes6 baseId, bytes6 quoteId)
```

CVF-80. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** StorageLib.sol

Recommendation This library should be defined in a separate file named "ConfigStorageLib".

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
256 library ConfigStorageLib {
```

CVF-81. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural

- **Source** DataTypes.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
6 import {IFYToken} from "@yield-protocol/vault-v2/contracts/  
    ↪ interfaces/IFYToken.sol";  
import {IPool} from "@yield-protocol/yieldspace-tv/src/interfaces/  
    ↪ IPool.sol";
```

CVF-82. FIXED

- **Category** Flaw
- **Source** DataTypes.sol

Recommendation This calculation is incorrect. The actual number of bits occupied in the first slot is 224, so only 32 bits left.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged.*

```
33 //>slot0: 216bits used - 40bits left
```

CVF-83. FIXED

- **Category** Procedural
- **Source** IContangoQuoter.sol

Description We didn't review these files.

```
4 import "../libraries/QuoterDataTypes.sol";
```

CVF-84. INFO

- **Category** Suboptimal
- **Source** IContango.sol

Recommendation These functions should emit some events and these events should be declared in this interface.

Client Comment *Fixed and merged - events only duplicated on interface for doc purposes, can't re-use them because everything is in libraries and uni callback does not allow for returning data, therefore we don't the values to emit events afterwards.*

```
18 function createPosition(
```

```
37 function modifyPosition(
```

```
53 function modifyCollateral(
```

```
65 function deliver(PositionId positionId, address payer, address to)
    ↪ external payable;
```



ABDK

Consulting

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Established in 2016, is a leading service provider in the space of blockchain development and audit. It has contributed to numerous blockchain projects, and co-authored some widely known blockchain primitives like Poseidon hash function.

The ABDK Audit Team, led by Mikhail Vladimirov and Dmitry Khovratovich, has conducted over 40 audits of blockchain projects in Solidity, Rust, Circom, C++, JavaScript, and other languages.

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