---
name: defi-mev-battletest
description: Expert knowledge for DeFi/MEV bot development including critical pitfalls, backtesting realities, AMM mechanics, MEV extraction strategies, and production failure modes
---

# DeFi/MEV Battle-Tested Expert Skill

**MANDATORY CONSULTATION**: This skill MUST be consulted for ANY DeFi bot development, MEV strategy implementation, or automated trading system. Real-world failures and lessons learned here prevent catastrophic losses.

## Trigger Keywords
- arbitrage, MEV, searcher, bot, automated trading
- backtest, simulation, paper trading
- flash loan, sandwich, frontrun
- slippage, price impact, execution
- reorg, race condition, mempool
- market making, liquidity provision

---

## 1. CRITICAL PITFALL #1: "Arbitrage is Risk-Free" MYTH

**Reality**: Theoretical 0% risk, practical tail risk = DEATH

### Hidden Risks in "Risk-Free" Arbitrage:

```
❌ Execution Risk
- Transaction reverts after gas spent
- Partial fills leave you with unwanted inventory
- Contract bugs in target protocols

❌ Reorg Risk (CRITICAL)
- Your profitable tx can be uncle'd
- 1-2 block reorgs happen DAILY on Ethereum
- Your "profit" disappears, gas cost remains

❌ Gas Spike Risk
- Base fee can 10x mid-execution
- Priority fee auctions drain profits
- Failed tx still costs full gas

❌ Latency Risk
- Block already mined before your tx lands
- State changed between simulation and execution
- Other searchers front-ran you
```

### Real Numbers:
```typescript
// What you see in backtest:
const theoreticalProfit = 0.05; // 5% clean profit

// What actually happens:
const executionCosts = {
  gasOnSuccess: 0.01,      // 1% gas
  failureRate: 0.30,       // 30% of txs fail
  gasOnFailure: 0.01,      // Still pay gas
  reorgRate: 0.02,         // 2% get reorg'd
  slippageSlip: 0.005,     // 0.5% unexpected slippage
};

// Real expected value:
// 0.70 * (0.05 - 0.01) - 0.30 * 0.01 - 0.02 * 0.04 = 0.0238
// 47% of theoretical profit GONE before MEV competition
```

---

## 2. CRITICAL PITFALL #2: Backtest Overconfidence

**80% of bots that fail in production looked great in backtests**

### Why Backtests Lie:

```
❌ Historical State ≠ Future Block State
- You're simulating against KNOWN state
- Live: state changes between blocks
- Mempool competition invisible in historical data

❌ Gas & Latency are Ex-Post Unknowable
- You backtest with actual gas prices
- Live: you must PREDICT gas prices
- Priority fee auctions are adversarial games

❌ Survivorship Bias
- You only see successful historical arbitrages
- Failed attempts not recorded on-chain
- "Found" opportunities may have been contested

❌ Market Impact Ignored
- Your own txs change the market
- Liquidity dries up when you need it most
- Large trades move price against you
```

### Correct Approach:
```typescript
// BAD: Backtest with perfect information
async function badBacktest(historicalData) {
  for (const block of historicalData) {
    const profit = simulateWithPerfectState(block);
    totalProfit += profit;
  }
  return totalProfit; // LIES
}

// GOOD: Block simulation with realistic conditions
async function realisticTest(pendingBlock) {
  // 1. Simulate against PENDING state (not confirmed)
  // 2. Add realistic latency (50-200ms)
  // 3. Assume 30% failure rate
  // 4. Assume 20% of "opportunities" are bait
  // 5. Add gas price uncertainty (±30%)

  const simResult = await simulateOnPendingState(pendingBlock);
  const adjustedProfit = simResult.profit
    * 0.70  // success rate
    * 0.80  // not bait
    - estimatedGas * 1.30; // gas uncertainty

  return adjustedProfit;
}
```

---

## 3. CRITICAL PITFALL #3: AMM ≠ Order Book

**Wrong slippage model = silent bleeding**

### Uniswap V3 Specific Gotchas:

```typescript
// V3 Tick Liquidity is NON-UNIFORM
// Liquidity can be ZERO between ticks!

interface V3Reality {
  // What you expect:
  linearSlippage: false,

  // What actually happens:
  tickCrossing: 'each tick = separate fee payment',
  liquidityGaps: 'can skip ticks with 0 liquidity',
  concentratedLiquidity: 'most liquidity in narrow range',

  // Price impact is STEP FUNCTION not curve:
  // Small trade: 0.01% impact
  // Medium trade: 0.5% impact (crossed tick)
  // Large trade: 5% impact (crossed multiple ticks)
}

// Fee Tier Selection MATTERS ENORMOUSLY
const feeTiers = {
  '0.01%': 'stablecoins only, ultra-tight spread',
  '0.05%': 'correlated pairs (ETH/stETH)',
  '0.30%': 'most pairs, default choice',
  '1.00%': 'exotic pairs, low liquidity',
};

// WRONG: Using 0.3% pool for stablecoin swap
// You're paying 6x more fees than necessary

// WRONG: Using 0.05% pool for volatile pair
// Pool doesn't exist or has no liquidity
```

### Curve-Specific Gotchas:
```typescript
// Curve StableSwap has DIFFERENT math
// A-factor determines curve shape

interface CurveReality {
  amplificationFactor: number, // A = 100 typical

  // Low A: more like constant-product (Uniswap V2)
  // High A: more like constant-sum (1:1 swap)

  // Price impact is MUCH LOWER for stables
  // But MUCH HIGHER at depegs

  depegRisk: 'curve pools can trap you during depegs',
}

// USDC depeg example (March 2023):
// Expected: swap USDC→DAI at 0.99
// Reality: pool drained, 10%+ slippage
```

---

## 4. CRITICAL PITFALL #4: MEV Underestimation

**Public mempool = free alpha donation**

### The MEV Food Chain:
```
Your transaction → Public Mempool → Searchers see it
                                  ↓
              Sandwich Attack (you're the meat)
                                  ↓
                    Your "profit" becomes their profit
```

### Private Orderflow is TABLE STAKES:
```typescript
// If you're not using private submission, you have NO edge

const submissionMethods = {
  // PUBLIC (you will be extracted)
  publicRPC: 'eth_sendRawTransaction', // NEVER for arb

  // PRIVATE (minimum viable)
  flashbotsProtect: 'protect.flashbots.net', // Free, basic
  mevBlocker: 'rpc.mevblocker.io', // Free, good

  // COMPETITIVE (for serious searchers)
  flashbotsBundle: 'relay.flashbots.net', // Bundle submission
  mevShare: 'share MEV with users', // Required for some flow

  // BUILDER DIRECT (advanced)
  builderAPI: 'direct to block builders', // Lowest latency
};
```

### MEV-Share Reality:
```typescript
// New paradigm: users get kickbacks
// Searchers must share profits

interface MEVShareEconomics {
  userShare: '50-90% of MEV',
  searcherShare: '10-50% of MEV',

  // This means:
  // Your arbitrage opportunity is SMALLER
  // Competition is HIGHER
  // Only ultra-efficient searchers survive
}
```

---

## 5. MUST-READ RESOURCES (10 articles = 1 year experience)

### Tier 1: Foundational (READ FIRST)
```
📚 Paradigm Research
- "Liquidity Book" - AMM math from first principles
- "MEV... Wat Do?" - MEV taxonomy
- Every post on research.paradigm.xyz

📚 Flashbots Docs
- "MEV-Share" - orderflow auction design
- "Searching Post-Merge" - new MEV landscape
- docs.flashbots.net (entire site)
```

### Tier 2: Practical Failures (LEARN FROM OTHERS' LOSSES)
```
Search Twitter/X for:
- "post-mortem"
- "we lost money because"
- "unexpected behavior"
- "exploit" + protocol name

Real lessons come from lost money.
```

### Tier 3: Code Study (Skip star count, check content)
```
GitHub search for:
- MEV searcher bots (with reorg handling)
- Uniswap V3 math libraries
- Bundle simulation code

README keywords that indicate quality:
✅ "reorg handling"
✅ "race condition"
✅ "bundle simulation"
✅ "private mempool"

❌ "simple arbitrage"
❌ "guaranteed profit"
❌ "no risk"
```

### Tier 4: Follow These Accounts
```
@bertcmiller - MEV searcher, practical insights
@hasufl - DeFi economics, mechanism design
@samczsun - Security, exploits, real failures
@0xfoobar - Technical MEV, searcher perspective
@barnabe_monnot - PBS, MEV-Boost internals
```

---

## 6. ARCHITECTURE PRINCIPLES (Non-Negotiable)

### Separation of Concerns:
```typescript
// CRITICAL: Execution engine SEPARATE from strategy

class Architecture {
  // Strategy Layer (what to do)
  strategyEngine: {
    findOpportunities(): Opportunity[],
    evaluateRisk(): RiskAssessment,
    calculateSize(): PositionSize,
  };

  // Execution Layer (how to do it)
  executionEngine: {
    buildTransaction(): Transaction,
    simulateBundle(): SimResult,
    submitPrivate(): TxHash,
    handleReorg(): void,
  };

  // Risk Layer (when to stop)
  riskEngine: {
    killSwitch(): void,          // MUST EXIST
    capitalAtRiskLimit(): USD,   // MUST BE SET
    maxLossPerHour(): USD,       // CIRCUIT BREAKER
    maxConsecutiveLosses(): number,
  };
}
```

### Kill Switch Requirements:
```typescript
// NON-NEGOTIABLE: Every bot needs these

interface KillSwitchConfig {
  // Automatic triggers
  maxDrawdown: '5% of capital',
  maxHourlyLoss: '$100',
  maxDailyLoss: '$500',
  consecutiveLosses: 5,
  gasSpike: '10x normal',

  // Manual override
  emergencyStop: 'hardware button or separate process',

  // State preservation
  onKill: 'log state, close positions, notify',
}

// BAD: "I'll add kill switch later"
// GOOD: Kill switch is FIRST feature implemented
```

---

## 7. SIMULATION-FIRST DEVELOPMENT

### Not Paper Trading - Block Simulation:
```typescript
// Paper trading: fake orders against real market
// Block simulation: real orders against simulated state

interface SimulationApproach {
  // Level 1: Unit test math
  testAMMFormulas(): void,
  testSlippageCalc(): void,

  // Level 2: State fork simulation
  forkMainnet(): LocalFork,
  simulateTrade(fork): SimResult,

  // Level 3: Pending block simulation
  getPendingBlock(): Block,
  simulateInPending(): SimResult,

  // Level 4: Bundle simulation
  buildBundle(): Bundle,
  simulateBundle(): BundleSimResult,

  // Level 5: Competition simulation
  assumeCompetitors(): number,
  simulateAuction(): AuctionResult,
}
```

### Foundry/Anvil Fork Testing:
```bash
# Fork mainnet at specific block
anvil --fork-url $ETH_RPC --fork-block-number 18500000

# Run simulation
forge script SimulateArb --rpc-url http://localhost:8545
```

---

## 8. REAL FAILURE MODES (From Production)

### Failure Mode 1: State Staleness
```typescript
// You simulated against block N
// You submit to block N+1
// State changed → tx reverts → gas lost

// Solution:
const maxStateAge = 1; // blocks
const stateCheck = async () => {
  const currentBlock = await getBlockNumber();
  if (currentBlock > simulationBlock + maxStateAge) {
    return ABORT; // Don't submit stale tx
  }
};
```

### Failure Mode 2: Sandwich Bait
```typescript
// "Opportunity" placed by searcher
// You take it → get sandwiched → lose more than "profit"

// Solution:
const isBait = (opportunity) => {
  // Check if opportunity appeared in mempool recently
  // Check if liquidity is suspicious
  // Check if profit is "too good"
  return suspiciousScore > THRESHOLD;
};
```

### Failure Mode 3: Gas Price Prediction
```typescript
// You bid 10 gwei priority fee
// Block lands with 50 gwei minimum
// Your tx not included → opportunity gone

// Solution:
const dynamicGas = async () => {
  const pending = await getPendingBlock();
  const competitorBids = analyzeCompetitorGas(pending);
  const minViableBid = percentile(competitorBids, 80);

  if (minViableBid > profitableThreshold) {
    return SKIP; // Not worth competing
  }
  return minViableBid * 1.1; // Slight overbid
};
```

### Failure Mode 4: Partial Execution
```typescript
// Multi-leg arb: leg 1 executes, leg 2 reverts
// You're stuck with unwanted tokens

// Solution:
const atomicExecution = {
  // All legs in single transaction
  useFlashLoan: true, // Revert entire tx if unprofitable

  // Or: use smart contract that checks final state
  checkInvariant: 'finalBalance >= initialBalance + minProfit',
};
```

---

## 9. CHECKLIST BEFORE GOING LIVE

```
□ Kill switch implemented and tested
□ Capital-at-risk limits set
□ Private mempool submission configured
□ Reorg handling implemented
□ State staleness checks added
□ Gas price prediction tested
□ Failure rate factored into expected value
□ Simulation matches production (within 20%)
□ Logs capture ALL failure modes
□ Alert system for anomalies
□ Manual emergency stop accessible
□ Tested with real money (small amount) for 1 week
```

---

## 10. EXPECTED VALUE CALCULATION (Realistic)

```typescript
// The formula that actually matters:

function realExpectedValue(opportunity: Opportunity): number {
  const {
    grossProfit,
    gasOnSuccess,
    failureRate,
    gasOnFailure,
    reorgRate,
    competitionRate,
    baitRate,
  } = analyzeOpportunity(opportunity);

  // Success case
  const successProfit = grossProfit - gasOnSuccess;
  const successProb = (1 - failureRate) * (1 - reorgRate) * (1 - competitionRate) * (1 - baitRate);

  // Failure cases
  const failureCost = gasOnFailure;
  const failureProb = failureRate;

  const reorgCost = gasOnSuccess; // Already paid gas
  const reorgProb = reorgRate * (1 - failureRate);

  // Expected value
  const EV = (successProb * successProfit)
           - (failureProb * failureCost)
           - (reorgProb * reorgCost);

  // If EV < 0, DO NOT EXECUTE
  // If EV < minThreshold, probably not worth the risk

  return EV;
}

// Example with realistic numbers:
// Gross profit: $100
// Gas (success): $5
// Gas (failure): $5
// Failure rate: 30%
// Reorg rate: 2%
// Competition rate: 50%
// Bait rate: 5%

// Success prob: 0.70 * 0.98 * 0.50 * 0.95 = 0.326
// EV = 0.326 * $95 - 0.30 * $5 - 0.014 * $5 = $29.27

// Your "$100 opportunity" is actually worth ~$29
// And that's BEFORE accounting for your infrastructure costs
```

---

## 11. EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE: MEV-Share Technical Deep Dive

**This knowledge is embedded - no need to fetch external docs.**

### How MEV-Share Actually Works

```typescript
// MEV-Share reveals HINTS, not full transactions
// This is the critical difference from public mempool

interface MEVShareHints {
  // What you CAN see:
  logs?: Log[],           // Event logs (partial)
  calldata?: string,      // Function selector only (first 4 bytes)
  contractAddress?: Address,
  functionSelector?: string,

  // What you CANNOT see:
  fullCalldata: 'HIDDEN', // No parameters
  value: 'HIDDEN',        // No ETH amount
  from: 'HIDDEN',         // No sender address
}

// Strategy Shift Required:
// OLD (public mempool): See full tx → calculate exact sandwich
// NEW (MEV-Share): See hints → probabilistic backrun only

const mevShareStrategy = {
  // What still works:
  backrunning: true,       // Wait for tx, backrun with your arb

  // What's harder:
  sandwiching: 'limited',  // Can't calculate exact frontrun

  // Key insight:
  // You're bidding on PARTIAL information
  // Must share profits with users (refund mechanism)
};
```

### MEV-Share Client Implementation

```typescript
import { MevShareClient } from '@flashbots/mev-share-client';

// Connect to MEV-Share SSE stream
const mevShareClient = new MevShareClient({
  authSigner: wallet,
  networkConfig: {
    streamUrl: 'https://mev-share.flashbots.net',
    bundleSubmitUrl: 'https://relay.flashbots.net',
  },
});

// Listen for pending transactions (hints only)
mevShareClient.on('transaction', async (tx) => {
  // tx.hash - the pending tx hash
  // tx.logs - partial event logs
  // tx.to - target contract
  // tx.functionSelector - first 4 bytes of calldata

  // You DON'T get: full calldata, from address, value

  const backrunTx = await buildBackrun(tx);

  // Bundle must include original tx hash
  await mevShareClient.sendBundle({
    inclusion: { block: currentBlock + 1 },
    body: [
      { hash: tx.hash },  // Original tx (by hash reference)
      { tx: backrunTx },   // Your backrun
    ],
    privacy: { hints: ['calldata', 'logs'] },
  });
});
```

---

## 12. EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE: AMM Price Impact Mathematics

**Constant Product Formula (Uniswap V2 style):**

```typescript
// The fundamental invariant: x * y = k
// x = token0 reserves
// y = token1 reserves
// k = constant (increases with fees)

// Price Impact Formula (MEMORIZE THIS):
// For a trade of size Δx:
// Price Impact ≈ 2 * Δx / x
//
// Example: Trade 1 ETH in a pool with 100 ETH
// Impact ≈ 2 * 1 / 100 = 2%

function calculatePriceImpact(
  tradeSize: bigint,
  reserveIn: bigint
): number {
  // Rule of thumb: impact = 2x your order relative to pool
  return (2 * Number(tradeSize)) / Number(reserveIn);
}

// CRITICAL: Why 2x?
// Because you're moving the price FROM spot TO execution
// The average execution price is between start and end
// This creates ~2x the "naive" calculation

// Exact formula for amount out:
function getAmountOut(
  amountIn: bigint,
  reserveIn: bigint,
  reserveOut: bigint,
  feeBps: number = 30  // 0.3% = 30 bps
): bigint {
  const amountInWithFee = amountIn * BigInt(10000 - feeBps);
  const numerator = amountInWithFee * reserveOut;
  const denominator = reserveIn * 10000n + amountInWithFee;
  return numerator / denominator;
}
```

### Slippage vs Price Impact (Common Confusion)

```typescript
// PRICE IMPACT: Deterministic, based on your trade size
// SLIPPAGE: Non-deterministic, price moves between quote and execution

interface TradeExecution {
  // At quote time:
  spotPrice: number,
  expectedOutput: bigint,

  // Your settings:
  maxSlippageBps: 50,  // 0.5% allowed slippage

  // At execution time:
  priceImpact: 'your trade moving the pool',
  slippage: 'other trades moved pool since quote',

  // Total cost = priceImpact + slippage
  // If total > maxSlippageBps → tx reverts
}

// BEST PRACTICE:
// 1. Estimate price impact from pool math
// 2. Add buffer for slippage (depends on volatility)
// 3. Never set slippage > 1% unless you KNOW why
// 4. Monitor for sandwich attacks if slippage is high
```

---

## 13. EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE: Uniswap V3 Tick Mechanics

**Why 1.0001? The Basis Point Standard:**

```typescript
// Each tick represents 1 basis point (0.01%) price change
// tick_spacing determines which ticks are usable

const TICK_BASE = 1.0001;  // Price multiplier per tick

// Price at tick i:
// price(i) = 1.0001^i

// Example:
// tick 0: price = 1.0001^0 = 1.000
// tick 100: price = 1.0001^100 ≈ 1.0101 (1.01% higher)
// tick 1000: price = 1.0001^1000 ≈ 1.1052 (10.52% higher)

function tickToPrice(tick: number): number {
  return Math.pow(1.0001, tick);
}

function priceToTick(price: number): number {
  return Math.floor(Math.log(price) / Math.log(1.0001));
}
```

### Fee Tiers and Tick Spacing

```typescript
// CRITICAL: Tick spacing varies by fee tier
// This affects liquidity granularity

const V3_FEE_TIERS = {
  100: {    // 0.01% fee
    tickSpacing: 1,
    useCase: 'Stablecoins (USDC/USDT)',
    typicalSpread: '0.01-0.02%',
  },
  500: {    // 0.05% fee
    tickSpacing: 10,
    useCase: 'Correlated pairs (ETH/stETH, WBTC/renBTC)',
    typicalSpread: '0.05-0.10%',
  },
  3000: {   // 0.30% fee
    tickSpacing: 60,
    useCase: 'Most pairs (ETH/USDC, etc)',
    typicalSpread: '0.20-0.50%',
  },
  10000: {  // 1.00% fee
    tickSpacing: 200,
    useCase: 'Exotic/low liquidity pairs',
    typicalSpread: '0.50-2.00%',
  },
};

// Why this matters for MEV:
// 1. Concentrated liquidity means DISCONTINUOUS price impact
// 2. Crossing a tick boundary = paying fee on that tick's liquidity
// 3. Large trades can "blow through" low-liquidity ticks
```

### Reading V3 Pool State

```typescript
// The slot0 call gives you current state
interface Slot0 {
  sqrtPriceX96: bigint,   // sqrt(price) * 2^96
  tick: number,           // Current tick
  observationIndex: number,
  observationCardinality: number,
  observationCardinalityNext: number,
  feeProtocol: number,
  unlocked: boolean,
}

// Convert sqrtPriceX96 to human-readable price:
function sqrtPriceToPrice(
  sqrtPriceX96: bigint,
  decimals0: number,
  decimals1: number
): number {
  const Q96 = 2n ** 96n;
  const price = (sqrtPriceX96 * sqrtPriceX96) / (Q96 * Q96);
  const decimalAdjustment = 10 ** (decimals0 - decimals1);
  return Number(price) * decimalAdjustment;
}

// Liquidity at specific ticks:
// Use ticks(tickIndex) to get liquidityNet
// liquidityNet = change in liquidity when crossing this tick
// Positive = liquidity added when price moves up
// Negative = liquidity removed when price moves up
```

---

## 14. EMBEDDED KNOWLEDGE: Flashbots Bundle Submission

**Bundle = Atomic sequence of transactions**

```typescript
import { FlashbotsBundleProvider } from '@flashbots/ethers-provider-bundle';

// Bundle submission flow:
// 1. Build transactions
// 2. Simulate against pending state
// 3. Submit to Flashbots relay
// 4. Wait for inclusion or rejection

const flashbotsProvider = await FlashbotsBundleProvider.create(
  provider,
  authSigner,
  'https://relay.flashbots.net'
);

// Build bundle
const bundle = [
  {
    signer: wallet,
    transaction: {
      to: targetContract,
      data: calldata,
      gasLimit: 500000,
      maxFeePerGas: parseGwei('50'),
      maxPriorityFeePerGas: parseGwei('3'),
      type: 2,
    },
  },
];

// Simulate BEFORE submitting
const simulation = await flashbotsProvider.simulate(
  bundle,
  targetBlock
);

if (simulation.firstRevert) {
  console.log('Bundle would revert:', simulation.firstRevert);
  return; // Don't submit failing bundle
}

// Calculate profitability
const profit = simulation.results[0].value - simulation.totalGasUsed * gasPrice;
if (profit <= 0) {
  return; // Not profitable after gas
}

// Submit bundle
const bundleSubmission = await flashbotsProvider.sendBundle(
  bundle,
  targetBlock
);

// Wait for resolution
const resolution = await bundleSubmission.wait();
if (resolution === FlashbotsBundleResolution.BundleIncluded) {
  console.log('Bundle included!');
} else if (resolution === FlashbotsBundleResolution.BlockPassedWithoutInclusion) {
  console.log('Bundle not included - outbid or block full');
} else {
  console.log('Bundle rejected by relay');
}
```

### Bundle Priority Fee Auction

```typescript
// Flashbots uses EFFECTIVE PRIORITY FEE for ordering
// effectiveGasPrice = min(maxFeePerGas, baseFee + maxPriorityFeePerGas)

// Coinbase transfer trick:
// Instead of high priority fee, pay builder directly
// This hides your bid from competitors

const bundleWithCoinbasePayment = [
  // Your profitable transaction
  {
    signer: wallet,
    transaction: arbTx,
  },
  // Pay the block builder
  {
    signer: wallet,
    transaction: {
      to: 'builder.coinbase', // Special: goes to block builder
      value: parseEther('0.01'), // Your "bid"
    },
  },
];

// Why coinbase payment?
// 1. Priority fee is visible in mempool simulations
// 2. Competitors can see and outbid
// 3. Coinbase payment is private until block lands
```

---

## 15. QUICK REFERENCE CHEAT SHEET

```typescript
// === PRICE IMPACT ===
// V2-style: impact ≈ 2 * tradeSize / poolReserve
// V3-style: depends on liquidity distribution, check each tick

// === MEV-SHARE ===
// You see: logs, function selector, target contract
// You don't see: calldata params, value, sender
// Strategy: backrun only, share profits

// === GAS ESTIMATION ===
// Simple swap: 100-150k gas
// V3 multi-hop: 200-400k gas
// Flash loan + arb: 400-800k gas
// Always add 20% buffer

// === TICK MATH ===
// price(tick) = 1.0001^tick
// tick(price) = log(price) / log(1.0001)
// Fee tier → tick spacing: 0.01%→1, 0.05%→10, 0.3%→60, 1%→200

// === BUNDLE SUBMISSION ===
// 1. Simulate first
// 2. Check profitability after gas
// 3. Use coinbase payment for competitive bids
// 4. Handle BlockPassedWithoutInclusion gracefully

// === RED FLAGS (ABORT) ===
// - Price impact > 1% on "small" trade
// - Opportunity profit < 2x gas cost
// - Unknown token without verification
// - Pool created < 24 hours ago
// - Single-sided liquidity (rug setup)
```

---

**REMEMBER**: The graveyard of DeFi bots is full of developers who thought they found an edge but didn't account for these realities. Read the post-mortems. Learn from others' losses. The market is adversarial - assume everyone is trying to extract value from you.