# Real AWS compatibility proof On 2026-10-14, the original parent (`aa42e2f38`) created two deployments through its actual CLI and standalone manager. The current standalone manager (sources committed as `1e7888c0c`) then opened the same encrypted databases with their parent-written controller state. No database or stored resource JSON was edited. - **Real resource update:** parent-created Storage started with versioning disabled. After replacing the manager binary, the parent CLI deployed a release enabling versioning. The CLI exited 0; the deployment returned to Running; `currentReleaseId` changed; the stored previous config equals the parent's config; bucket outputs stayed identical. AWS `GetBucketVersioning` changed from an unset result to `{"Status":"Enabled"}`. - **Retained infrastructure:** the current manager read the parent-created Network controller JSON exactly unchanged. The parent CLI completed a new-release update with that network retained, exit 0 / Running. - **Mixed versions:** the feature CLI built in session 74 read JSON status and completed a no-op deploy against the parent manager, both exit 0. The parent CLI performed both updates against the current manager. The feature CLI was reused rather than rebuilt; this does not certify every latest CLI change or every possible version pair. - **Expected setup boundary:** adding Storage to the network-only installation requires new management permissions. Its update was rejected with the existing setup-repair instruction; an unchanged-resource release subsequently succeeded. No permission-check bypass was used. The accompanying terminal image contains the actual CLI output (deployment identifiers redacted). `alien` in the transcript denotes the parent or feature binary stated above each command. All commands used the E2E target credentials in eu-west-1; tokens were read from private files or passed only by the private cleanup harness. No quota override or increase was requested. The first network inventory was taken after the parent manager had already created the owned VPC. It is an in-flight snapshot, not a pre-create baseline. Cleanup compares all unrelated recorded IDs after excluding only the owned VPC and its dependent default route table/security group. The raw snapshots and encrypted database copy remain private. Limits: this proves existing durable state can be read and an actual resource can update across the manager change. It does not prove missing quota-read permissions during a capacity-increasing update, old GCP live updates, or Lambda workload/race completion. Those gates remain open. No product code, schema, permissions or generated artifacts changed in this proof. Cleanup: both normal destroys exited 0, all ten provider inventory classes show owned0, and the owned bucket returns 404. All unrelated network, local managed-policy and bucket IDs match the first snapshot after the stated owned-ID exclusions. Two unrelated IAM role IDs disappeared externally during the run; they were not recreated or modified. The Storage deployment API returns 404; the network-only record remains in terminal Deleted state after cleanup with the reused feature CLI. No live cloud resources remain.