# Security Audit Report

**Date:** 2026-02-02 (Updated)
**Version:** 0.3.3
**Status:** ✅ COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY HARDENING COMPLETE

---

## Executive Summary

| Category | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Total | Fixed |
|----------|----------|------|--------|-----|-------|-------|
| npm Dependencies | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ✅ 34/34 |
| Code Vulnerabilities | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ✅ ALL FIXED |
| **Total** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | **0** | ✅ |

**Result:** All security issues fixed. Production-ready with comprehensive hardening.

---

## 1. npm Dependency Vulnerabilities - ALL FIXED

### Fixed via npm overrides in package.json:

| Vulnerability | Severity | Original Package | Fix Applied |
|---------------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| axios CSRF/SSRF | HIGH | @orca-so/whirlpool-sdk | Override to axios ^1.7.4 |
| bigint-buffer overflow | HIGH | Solana packages | Override to @vekexasia/bigint-buffer2 ^1.0.4 |
| elliptic crypto risk | HIGH | secp256k1 | Replaced with @noble/secp256k1 ^3.0.0 |
| nanoid predictable | MODERATE | @drift-labs/sdk | Override to nanoid ^3.3.8 |
| nodemailer DoS | MODERATE | Direct dependency | Updated to ^7.0.13 |
| undici DoS | MODERATE | discord.js | Override to undici ^6.23.0 |
| @cosmjs/crypto | HIGH | @wormhole-foundation/sdk | Override to ^0.38.1 (uses @noble/curves) |

### npm audit result:
```
found 0 vulnerabilities
```

---

## 2. Code Vulnerabilities

### ✅ FIXED - HIGH Risk

#### 2.1 Command Injection - Multiple Files ✅ FIXED
- **Original:** `execSync()` with string interpolation allowing shell injection
- **Fix:** Replaced with `execFileSync()` with array arguments across all files:
  - `src/nodes/index.ts` - notifications, clipboard, say, open, commandExists
  - `src/process/index.ts` - commandExists
  - `src/permissions/index.ts` - resolveCommandPath
  - `src/hooks/index.ts` - checkRequirements
  - `src/daemon/index.ts` - launchctl commands
  - `src/macos/index.ts` - runAppleScriptSync
  - `src/agents/index.ts` - exec_python
- **Status:** ALL FIXED - 15+ injection points remediated

#### 2.2 Unsafe Sandbox - `src/security/index.ts` ✅ FIXED
- **Original:** `new Function()` sandbox is bypassable
- **Fix:** Sandbox now DISABLED by default. Requires `ALLOW_UNSAFE_SANDBOX=true` env var to enable.
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Secure by default

#### 2.3 Weak Random ID Generation ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** `Math.random().toString(36)` used for IDs across 21+ files
- **Fix:** Created `src/utils/id.ts` with `crypto.randomBytes()` based generators
- **Files Fixed:** alerts, usage, memory, media, cron, hooks, arbitrage, canvas, embeddings, agents, all extensions
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - All IDs now cryptographically secure

#### 2.4 Canvas eval() Remote Code Execution ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** Browser-side `eval()` executed arbitrary JS from WebSocket
- **Fix:** JS eval disabled by default. Requires `CANVAS_ALLOW_JS_EVAL=true` to enable.
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Secure by default

#### 2.5 Task Runner Shell Injection ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** `spawn()` with `shell: true` allowed command injection
- **Fix:** Replaced with `execFile()`, added command validation, restricted env vars
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - No shell interpretation

#### 2.6 XSS in Canvas Components ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** User input rendered via `innerHTML` without sanitization
- **Fix:** Added `escapeHtml()` and `sanitizeStyle()` to all component renderers
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - All output escaped

#### 2.7 CORS Misconfiguration ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` sent with wildcard origin
- **Fix:** Credentials only allowed with specific origin allowlist
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Proper CORS handling

#### 2.8 Missing Rate Limiting ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** No IP-based rate limiting on gateway
- **Fix:** Added sliding window rate limiter (100 req/min default, configurable)
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - `CLODDS_IP_RATE_LIMIT` env var

#### 2.9 Missing Security Headers ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** No HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc.
- **Fix:** Added all recommended security headers + HTTPS enforcement option
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - `CLODDS_HSTS_ENABLED`, `CLODDS_FORCE_HTTPS` env vars

#### 2.10 WebSocket Message Validation ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** No validation of incoming WebSocket message structure
- **Fix:** Added `isValidWebMessage()` validator + 1MB size limit
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Type + size validation

#### 2.11 Weak Session IDs ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** Session IDs used `Math.random()`
- **Fix:** Now uses `crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex')`
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Cryptographically secure sessions

#### 2.12 Escrow Keypairs In-Memory Only ✅ FIXED (Feb 2026)
- **Original:** Escrow keypairs stored only in memory (`Map<string, Keypair>`)
- **Risk:** Server restart = lost keypairs = funds unrecoverable
- **Fix:** Keypairs now encrypted (AES-256-GCM) and stored in SQLite database
- **Encryption:** Uses `CLODDS_ESCROW_KEY` or `CLODDS_CREDENTIAL_KEY` env var
- **Status:** ✅ FIXED - Keypairs survive server restarts

### All Previously Accepted Risks - NOW FIXED

| Risk | Original Status | New Status |
|------|-----------------|------------|
| Rate limiting | Recommended | ✅ IMPLEMENTED |
| Math.random() IDs | Accepted | ✅ FIXED |
| Input validation | Accepted | ✅ IMPROVED |
| Security headers | Recommended | ✅ IMPLEMENTED |

---

## 3. Remediation Summary

### All Issues - FIXED

| # | Issue | Fix | Status |
|---|-------|-----|--------|
| 1 | nodemailer | Updated to 7.0.13 | ✅ DONE |
| 2 | Command injection | execFileSync with array args | ✅ DONE |
| 3 | Unsafe sandbox | Disabled by default | ✅ DONE |
| 4 | elliptic/secp256k1 | Replaced with @noble/secp256k1 | ✅ DONE |
| 5 | bigint-buffer | Override to @vekexasia/bigint-buffer2 | ✅ DONE |
| 6 | axios in orca-sdk | Override to axios ^1.7.4 | ✅ DONE |
| 7 | discord.js undici | Override to undici ^6.23.0 | ✅ DONE |
| 8 | nanoid | Override to nanoid ^3.3.8 | ✅ DONE |
| 9 | @cosmjs/* elliptic | Override to ^0.38.1 | ✅ DONE |
| 10 | Math.random() IDs | crypto.randomBytes() in 21 files | ✅ DONE |
| 11 | Canvas eval() | Disabled by default | ✅ DONE |
| 12 | Task runner shell injection | execFile + validation | ✅ DONE |
| 13 | XSS in canvas | HTML escaping | ✅ DONE |
| 14 | CORS misconfiguration | Proper credential handling | ✅ DONE |
| 15 | Missing rate limiting | IP-based sliding window | ✅ DONE |
| 16 | Missing security headers | HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc. | ✅ DONE |
| 17 | WebSocket validation | Type + size validation | ✅ DONE |
| 18 | Weak session IDs | crypto.randomBytes() | ✅ DONE |

### No Remaining Issues

All previously identified issues have been remediated.

---

## 4. Security Best Practices Implemented

✅ **Encrypted credentials** - AES-256-GCM at rest
✅ **No hardcoded secrets** - All from environment
✅ **HTTPS enforced** - For all API calls
✅ **Webhook signature verification** - HMAC validation
✅ **SQL injection prevention** - Parameterized queries
✅ **Audit logging** - All trades logged
✅ **Modern crypto libraries** - @noble/* instead of deprecated elliptic
✅ **Security Shield** - Code scanner (75 rules/9 categories), scam DB (70+ addresses from Etherscan/Mandiant/CertiK), multi-chain address checker, pre-trade tx validator, input sanitizer (zero-width/RTL/homoglyph/prompt injection detection)

---

## 5. Security Headers - IMPLEMENTED

The following headers are now automatically added by the gateway:

```typescript
// Always added:
'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff'
'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY'
'X-XSS-Protection': '1; mode=block'

// When CLODDS_HSTS_ENABLED=true or connection is HTTPS:
'Strict-Transport-Security': 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains'
```

### Configuration

```bash
# Enable HSTS header
CLODDS_HSTS_ENABLED=true

# Force HTTP to HTTPS redirect
CLODDS_FORCE_HTTPS=true

# IP rate limiting (requests per minute)
CLODDS_IP_RATE_LIMIT=100
```

### MCP Server Security

The MCP stdio server includes 5 security layers, all opt-in via environment variables:

| Layer | Env Var | Default | Description |
|-------|---------|---------|-------------|
| Tool allowlist | `CLODDS_MCP_ALLOWED_TOOLS` | _(all)_ | Comma-separated list of allowed tool names |
| Tool blocklist | `CLODDS_MCP_BLOCKED_TOOLS` | _(none)_ | Comma-separated list of blocked tool names |
| Tool profiles | `CLODDS_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE` | `full` | Predefined access: `read-only`, `trading`, `full` |
| Rate limiting | `CLODDS_MCP_RATE_LIMIT` | `60` | Max calls per minute per client |
| Audit logging | `CLODDS_MCP_AUDIT` | `true` | Structured JSON audit logs to stderr |

Input sanitization runs automatically on all tool calls — string arguments are scanned for SQL injection, command injection, XSS, and path traversal patterns using the existing `detectInjection()` function.

```bash
# Example: restrict MCP to read-only tools with audit logging
CLODDS_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE=read-only
CLODDS_MCP_RATE_LIMIT=30
CLODDS_MCP_AUDIT=true
```

---

## 6. Publishing Checklist ✅

- [x] Fix nodemailer vulnerability
- [x] Fix command injection in nodes/index.ts
- [x] Add sandbox warning
- [x] Fix all npm audit vulnerabilities (34 → 0)
- [x] Replace elliptic with @noble/secp256k1
- [x] Override bigint-buffer with secure fork
- [x] Test all trading functions work after updates
- [x] Run `npm audit` - shows 0 vulnerabilities

---

## 7. Disclosure Policy

Security issues should be reported to: security@clodds.dev (or GitHub Security Advisories)

Do NOT create public issues for security vulnerabilities.

---

*Security audit completed on 2026-01-30*
*All 34 npm vulnerabilities fixed*
*Ready for npm publish*

---

## 8. Server Hardening CLI

Clodds includes a built-in server hardening command for production deployments.

### Usage

```bash
# Apply all hardening with interactive prompts
clodds secure

# Preview changes without modifying
clodds secure --dry-run

# Run security audit only
clodds secure audit

# Non-interactive mode (skip prompts)
clodds secure --yes

# Custom SSH port
clodds secure --ssh-port=2222

# Skip specific components
clodds secure --skip-firewall --skip-fail2ban
```

### What it hardens

| Component | Changes Applied |
|-----------|-----------------|
| **SSH** | Disable password auth, root login, MaxAuthTries=3 |
| **Firewall (ufw)** | Allow SSH + custom ports, deny incoming by default |
| **fail2ban** | Protect against brute force (5 failures = 1hr ban) |
| **Auto-updates** | Enable unattended-upgrades for security patches |
| **Kernel** | sysctl hardening (SYN cookies, ICMP redirects, etc.) |

### Security Audit Output

```
$ clodds secure audit

🔒 Clodds Server Security Hardening

ℹ === Security Audit ===

✔ SSH Password Auth: Disabled
✔ SSH Root Login: Disabled
⚠ SSH Port: Port 22 (consider changing from default)
✔ Firewall (ufw): Active
✔ fail2ban: Active (1 jail)
✔ Auto-updates: Configured

5 passed, 1 warnings, 0 failed
```

### Post-Hardening Checklist

1. **Test SSH access** in a new terminal before closing current session
2. **Verify firewall rules** don't block required ports
3. **Monitor fail2ban** logs for legitimate users being blocked
4. **Keep SSH key** backed up securely