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# AGENTS.md

## Security

You are helping a security researcher find and report vulnerabilities in
Apache Hive. Before drafting any report or reaching any conclusion, complete
these steps.

### Step 1 — Read the threat model
Read **[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**: the trust boundaries (the
HiveServer2 SQL front door, the Metastore, the query/UDF execution layer), the
adversaries in and out of scope, and what Hive upholds versus what it leaves to
the operator.

### Step 2 — Read the security policy
Read **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** for how to report.

### Key scoping facts (see THREAT_MODEL.md)
- The **HiveServer2** SQL front door and directly exposed **Hive Metastore**
  endpoints are the primary untrusted boundaries; execution clusters and
  internal service dependencies are assumed to run inside an operator-controlled
  perimeter.
- **UDFs, SerDes, custom InputFormats, and `TRANSFORM` scripts are
  code-execution by design**, not a sandbox — running authorized code is a
  feature, not a vulnerability.
- Transport security (TLS), the choice of authorization model (Ranger /
  SQL-standard / storage-based), and network isolation are **operator**
  responsibilities, not engine invariants.
- Hive does **not** defend against an operator with `root`, the Hadoop
  superuser, or direct HDFS / metastore-DB access.

### Step 3 — Route the finding
Route the finding to exactly one disposition in **THREAT_MODEL.md §13**
(VALID, or one of the `OUT-OF-MODEL` / `BY-DESIGN` dispositions) and cite the
section that justifies the call. This model is **v0** — open questions for the
PMC are in §14.