# Verify a signed agent mandate through MCP **Check a signed authorization envelope before trusting an agent's claimed authority.** Agent Mandate's MCP tool accepts the complete `{ mandate, signature }` envelope returned by `POST /v1/mandates`. **Raw claims are not a signed envelope.** **The walkthrough:** create an envelope, verify an action through MCP, then change one signed field and verify again. You see the real verification result for each request, including the one that gets refused. **Requirements:** Node.js 20 or newer, and an Agent Mandate API key. **Getting a key:** the free tier includes **500 verified actions per month** and needs no card. Issuing mandates is free and never consumes the allowance; one unit is one action *verified*. Paid plans start at $299/month for 10,000 verified actions. This walkthrough consumes at most **two** of your free units. **Running this in production?** [When a signed mandate is and is not worth it](https://agentmandate-api.com/use-cases/ai-agent-action-authorization-api#production), with the published pricing. Short version: if the approval gate is one you control, a policy check inside your own service is simpler and cheaper. The signature earns its price when somebody other than you has to be able to verify the decision. **Just exploring?** `POST /v1/demo/verify` takes raw claims, needs no key at all, and is shown at the end. It does not replace the signed-envelope walkthrough, because it does not check a signature. --- ## Run the walkthrough ```bash git clone https://github.com/API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp.git cd agent-mandate-mcp git checkout v0.1.1 npm ci AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY=your_key node examples/verify-mandate.mjs ``` The example runner comes from this repository, but it installs `@api-disk-integrations/agent-mandate-mcp@0.1.1` **from npm into a throwaway prefix** and runs that, so it exercises the published artifact rather than your working tree. Omit `AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY` and it prompts without echoing. ### What it prints ``` === 1. Create a mandate === POST /v1/mandates -> 200 envelope keys: mandate, signature, requestId signature: v1:b63eacaa7… (67 chars) === 3. Verify the action against the signed envelope === action: payments.transfer 30000 USD, approval required above 25000 decision: requires_approval violation: Actions above 25000 minor units need a human approval token. digest: c90fd0bc104dce63… === 4. Tamper with one signed field, keep the signature === raising approvalRequiredAboveMinor 25000 -> 999999, which would turn this into an allow rejected: Agent Mandate error 400/invalid_request. The tampered mandate did not buy an allow. The signature is doing its job. ``` That is a real run against production, not illustrative output. The grant allows up to 100,000 minor units but requires approval above 25,000, and the action asks for 30,000, so `requires_approval` is the **correct** answer. A `deny` or `requires_approval` is a correct result, not a failure. **Verification reports a result; your application remains responsible for enforcing it.** ## Install the server ```bash npx --yes @api-disk-integrations/agent-mandate-mcp@0.1.1 ``` A generic stdio client configuration: ```json { "mcpServers": { "agent-mandate": { "command": "npx", "args": ["--yes", "@api-disk-integrations/agent-mandate-mcp@0.1.1"], "env": { "AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY": "${AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY}" } } } } ``` `${AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY}` denotes the host's secret reference; use your client's documented secret facility if its syntax differs. The package uses stdio and reads exactly that environment variable. It has no remote `/mcp` endpoint. **Pin the version.** `0.1.0` is still on the registry and has a first-use defect: its input schema accepted any object for `mandate`, so a call built from the keyless demo's shape returned `HTTP 400`. If you would rather verify a checksummed artifact, every release also attaches a tarball and its SHA-256: ```bash curl -fsSLO https://github.com/API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp/releases/download/v0.1.1/api-disk-integrations-agent-mandate-mcp-0.1.1.tgz shasum -a 256 api-disk-integrations-agent-mandate-mcp-0.1.1.tgz # compare with the release page npm install -g ./api-disk-integrations-agent-mandate-mcp-0.1.1.tgz ``` ## The two shapes, which is the thing that trips people up | Endpoint | Key | Takes | | --- | --- | --- | | `POST /v1/demo/verify` | none | `{mandate: {…claims…}, action: {…}}` — **raw claims** | | `POST /v1/verify` | yes | `{mandate: {mandate: {…claims…}, signature: "…"}, action: {…}}` — the **envelope** | The envelope is the entire response body of `POST /v1/mandates`: `{mandate, signature, requestId}`. Pass it through unchanged. `"mandate.mandate" must be the claims object` means bare claims were passed where the envelope belongs. Run `POST /v1/mandates` first and pass its whole response. ## The two calls by hand **Step 1 — create a mandate.** Issuing is free and does not consume your allowance. ```sh curl -X POST https://agentmandate-api.com/v1/mandates \ -H "authorization: Bearer $AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY" \ -H 'content-type: application/json' \ -d '{ "principal": "user_8814", "agent": "agent_procurement_v3", "expiresAt": "2026-12-31T23:59:59Z", "currency": "USD", "totalSpendCapMinor": 500000, "grants": [{ "action": "payments.transfer", "resources": ["vendor.acme"], "maxAmountMinor": 100000, "approvalRequiredAboveMinor": 25000 }] }' ``` Answers `200` with `{"mandate": {…}, "signature": "…", "requestId": "…"}`. **That whole body is the envelope.** **Step 2 — verify an action against it.** Call `verify_action` with the envelope as `mandate`: ```json { "mandate": { "mandate": { "…": "…" }, "signature": "…" }, "action": { "agent": "agent_procurement_v3", "action": "payments.transfer", "resource": "vendor.acme", "amountMinor": 30000, "currency": "USD" } } ``` ### With no key at all ```sh curl -X POST https://agentmandate-api.com/v1/demo/verify \ -H 'content-type: application/json' \ -d '{"mandate":{"principal":"user_8814","agent":"a1","expiresAt":"2026-12-31T23:59:59Z","currency":"USD","totalSpendCapMinor":500000,"grants":[{"action":"payments.transfer","resources":["vendor.acme"],"maxAmountMinor":100000,"approvalRequiredAboveMinor":25000}]},"action":{"agent":"a1","action":"payments.transfer","resource":"vendor.acme","amountMinor":30000,"currency":"USD"}}' ``` This route takes **bare claims**, not the envelope, and does not check a signature. ## What this server does not do It does not issue or revoke mandates, execute an action, change an account, or call billing. It makes at most one API request per tool call and never retries automatically. - npm: `@api-disk-integrations/agent-mandate-mcp` - Official MCP Registry: `io.github.API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate` - source: `API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp` ## Tool contract There is exactly one tool, `verify_action`. Supply either one `action` or an `actions` array, never both. A batch contains 1–500 actions. Monetary amounts are non-negative integer minor units and require `currency`. Example input: ```json { "mandate": { "mandate": {"id": "mnd_example"}, "signature": "caller-supplied-signature" }, "action": { "agent": "procurement-agent", "action": "payments.transfer", "resource": "vendor.acme", "amountMinor": 2500, "currency": "USD", "at": "2026-09-05T20:00:00Z" } } ``` Representative successful structured output: ```json { "count": 1, "receipts": [ { "decision": "deny", "mandateId": "mnd_example", "violations": [{"code": "action_not_granted", "detail": "No matching grant"}] } ] } ``` Treat all three decisions literally. In particular, neither `allow` nor `requires_approval` executes the proposed action. ## Errors, limits, and safety - If `AGENT_MANDATE_API_KEY` is absent, the tool returns an MCP error before making a request. - A provider error is reduced to its numeric HTTP status and an allowlisted code. Provider-controlled message and request-ID text is never returned to the model. - One tool call produces at most one HTTPS request to the fixed `https://agentmandate-api.com/v1/verify` endpoint. There is no automatic retry; Fetch uses explicit `redirect: error`, and redirect responses are rejected without a follow-up request. - The serialized UTF-8 request and decoded response body each have a hard 1 MiB (1,048,576-byte) limit. The request is measured before Fetch. The response is counted while streaming before JSON parsing, regardless of a missing, misleading, or chunked `Content-Length` representation. - The request timeout defaults to 30 seconds. A batch is also limited to 500 actions. Provider account rate and monthly usage limits still apply; consult the current product pricing and documentation before production use. - The server is read-only with respect to mandate, account, and billing state, but an API verification consumes the caller's metered allowance. - Node.js 20 or newer is required. This release is tested for MCP protocol revision `2026-07-28` and retains the SDK's listed 2025 compatibility revisions. ## Links - [Product, pricing, privacy, and terms](https://agentmandate-api.com/) - [Developer documentation](https://agentmandate-api.com/docs) - [OpenAPI reference](https://agentmandate-api.com/openapi.json) - [Service status](https://agentmandate-api.com/status) - [Source repository](https://github.com/API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp) - [Issue support](https://github.com/API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp/issues) - [Security reporting](https://github.com/API-Disk-Integrations/agent-mandate-mcp/security/advisories/new) - [MIT license](./LICENSE) - [Threat model](./THREAT_MODEL.md) The source link is not evidence that the npm package or Registry listing is available. Those two releases require their own public readback. A clone, install, download, tool call, or listing is not evidence of customer activation or revenue.