generated: '2026-08-05'
method: searched
source: openapi/1fort-openapi-original.yml
docs: https://api.1fort.com/api-docs
note: >-
  Upgraded from the mechanical derive. The derive collapsed both declared schemes into one because
  Swagger 2.0 models them identically (apiKey / header / Authorization); the spec actually declares
  TWO distinct credential formats on the same header, plus a documented cookie alternative.

summary:
  types: [apiKey]
  api_key_in: [header]
  oauth2_flows: []
  default_security: Bearer
  public_operations: 41
  total_operations: 574

schemes:
- name: Bearer
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: Authorization
  format: "Bearer <token>  |  JWT <token>"
  credential: JWT access token
  description: JWT access token. Send as `Bearer <token>` or `JWT <token>`.
  default: true
  sources: [openapi/1fort-openapi-original.yml]
- name: ApiKey
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: Authorization
  format: "Api-Key <key>"
  credential: static API key
  description: API key. Send as `Api-Key <key>`.
  default: false
  sources: [openapi/1fort-openapi-original.yml]

cookie_alternative:
  supported: true
  attributes: HTTP-only
  source: openapi info.description ("Tokens may also be presented as an HTTP-only cookie")
  note: used by the app.1fort.com console; not a documented server-to-server option.

token_lifecycle:
  refresh_operation: openapi/1fort-openapi-original.yml#auth_token_refresh_create
  refresh_path: POST /auth/token/refresh
  issue_paths:
  - POST /otp  (one-time-password sign-in, public)
  - POST /auth/google/signin  |  POST /auth/google/signup
  - GET|POST /auth/office365/signin  |  GET|POST /auth/office365/signup
  - POST /v2/storefront-auth  (public storefront session)
  expiry_documented: false
  rotation_documented: false
  self_serve_key_issuance: false
  key_management_docs: null
  note: >-
    No documented way to mint or rotate an Api-Key without contacting 1Fort; there is no developer
    dashboard, key page or self-serve API credential flow on the public surface.

authorization:
  model: multi-tenant, object-level
  tenant_scope: path-embedded owning resource id (e.g. /apis/v2/broker/{business_pk}/applications)
  secondary_scope:
    header: X-Processing-Session
    description: Processing session token (scopes access to broker)
    required_on_operations: 23
  statement: >-
    "Resources are scoped to a tenant... a token is only authorised for the businesses its user may
    access. Object-level permissions are enforced per endpoint." (openapi info.description)
  scopes: none
  scopes_note: >-
    1Fort declares no oauth2 security scheme and no scope vocabulary, so there is no scopes/ artifact
    for this provider. Authorization is entirely server-side object permissions.

identity_federation:
  consumed: [Google Workspace / Google Sign-In, Microsoft Office 365 / Entra ID]
  provided: none
  mfa: >-
    1fort.ai/security states MFA uses phishing-resistant hardware via the Web Authentication API
    (WebAuthn). No WebAuthn/passkey endpoints appear in the public API contract.

unauthenticated_surface:
  count: 41
  categories:
  - OTP and social sign-in / sign-up
  - invite accept + validate (rate-limited 10/min)
  - checkout invoices, sessions, PDF/receipt/proposal reads
  - storefront and storefront-agency reads, storefront auth
  - inbound partner webhook receivers (Stripe, Stripe Connect, Ascend, Herald, Gmail, Office 365)
  - Google Workspace / Office 365 OAuth permission listings

x-evidence:
- url: https://api.1fort.com/api-docs/?format=openapi
  status: 200
- url: https://api.1fort.com/
  status: 401
  note: unauthenticated request to the API root is rejected, confirming the auth wall