generated: '2026-08-19'
method: searched
source: https://docs.abloatai.com/api-keys
docs: https://docs.abloatai.com/api-keys
derived_from: openapi/abloatai-api-openapi.yml
note: >-
  The OpenAPI declares a single scheme — HTTP bearer — which understates the model considerably.
  Ablo's real credential system is a prefix-typed capability class carried in the bearer token,
  plus an optional scope set, plus an immutable server-side branch binding. All three are
  authority boundaries and only the first is visible in the spec. There is no OAuth 2.0 and no
  OIDC surface: /.well-known/openid-configuration and /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  both 404 on the API host, so scopes/ is deliberately not emitted (the scope strings below are
  key grants, not OAuth scopes).
summary:
  types: [http]
  http_schemes: [bearer]
  api_key_in: [header]
  oauth2_flows: []
  openid_connect: false
  mtls: false
schemes:
  - name: bearerAuth
    type: http
    scheme: bearer
    header: 'Authorization: Bearer <key>'
    description: Your Ablo API key (sk_… / rk_…).
    applied: global (every operation in the spec)
    sources: [openapi/abloatai-api-openapi.yml]
credential_classes:
  - prefix: sk_
    name: trusted runtime secret
    use: server, worker or agent that can hold a secret; default env var ABLO_API_KEY
    browser_safe: false
    note: 'With an empty scope set an sk_ key carries full org authority. Blocked client-side — using one from a browser raises browser_apikey_blocked.'
  - prefix: rk_
    name: restricted / delegated runtime
    use: another runtime that needs only a delegated scope
    browser_safe: false
  - prefix: pk_
    name: publishable browser key
    use: browser bundle; read-only access to the org data plane
    browser_safe: true
    write: false
  - prefix: ek_
    name: ephemeral user session
    use: short-lived, minted server-side and held in browser memory
    browser_safe: true
    minted_by: 'POST /v1/ephemeral_keys (mintEphemeralKey) or server.sessions.create()'
  - prefix: mk_
    name: project and branch management
    use: CLI / CI management credential; the only class that can carry management scopes
    browser_safe: false
legacy_spellings:
  - 'sk_live_… / sk_test_… / rk_live_… continue to authenticate during migration'
  - "The live/test segment is a legacy hint only, not the source of truth; the persisted branch binding controls the key."
scopes:
  model: key-grant scopes (NOT OAuth scopes) — least privilege; an empty scope set on an sk_ key means full org authority
  docs: https://docs.abloatai.com/api-keys#scopes
  grants:
    - {scope: 'schema:push', description: 'Author the schema artifact on the key''s bound plane (ablo push, ablo dev).'}
    - {scope: 'project:manage', description: 'List, create and rename projects.', classes: [mk_]}
    - {scope: 'branch:manage', description: 'List, create and delete child branches and mint their temporary credentials.', classes: [mk_]}
    - {scope: 'organization:act-as', description: 'Cross-organization authority to mint a short-lived user session into a customer organization. Follows the Stripe Connect shape; the resulting session is still bounded by its can grant and expiry.'}
  session_grants:
    model: 'Per-session typed can grant, e.g. can: { records: [read, update] } — model/verb scoped, applied when minting an ek_ or rk_.'
authority_axes:
  - axis: capability class
    carried_by: key prefix
  - axis: scope set
    carried_by: server-side key row
  - axis: branch binding
    carried_by: immutable server-side binding
    note: 'A temporary child-branch key can act only inside that child; it cannot manage siblings or gain root authority even with no scope strings.'
jwt:
  supported: true
  note: >-
    The error registry documents a full third-party JWT path (jwt_issuer_untrusted,
    jwt_audience_mismatch, jwt_missing_organization, jwt_org_membership_denied, issuer_register_forbidden),
    so a customer's own IdP can be registered as a trusted issuer. This is not declared in the OpenAPI.
  source: https://docs.abloatai.com/errors
credential_hygiene:
  - 'A mint returns plaintext exactly once; only a hash is retained, so no API or MCP tool can hand a key back later.'
  - 'Rotation: POST /v1/capabilities/{id}/rotate (rotateCapability) mints a replacement keeping the grant.'
  - 'Revocation: DELETE /v1/capabilities/{id} (revokeCapability).'
failure_signalling:
  header: X-Auth-Failure
  cors_exposed: true
  note: 'The specific auth failure code is echoed on a CORS-exposed response header, so a browser client can distinguish apikey_invalid from auth_no_credentials without reading the body.'
  observed:
    - {probe: 'GET https://api.abloatai.com/api/v1/schema (no credential)', http_status: 401, x_auth_failure: auth_no_credentials}
    - {probe: 'GET https://api.abloatai.com/api/v1/schema (bogus bearer)', http_status: 401, x_auth_failure: apikey_invalid}
x-evidence:
  - {url: 'https://docs.abloatai.com/api-keys', http_status: 200}
  - {url: 'https://api.abloatai.com/.well-known/openid-configuration', http_status: 404}
  - {url: 'https://api.abloatai.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', http_status: 404}