generated: '2026-09-06'
method: searched
source: https://api.aclid.bio/docs
docs: https://api.aclid.bio/docs#tag/Authentication
note: >-
  DERIVED FROM THE DOCS, NOT FROM securitySchemes. The Aclid OpenAPI 3.1.0 declares NO
  components.securitySchemes and no top-level or per-operation security[] requirement, so
  derive-authentication.py found nothing to aggregate. The auth contract is published as prose in
  the spec's own "Authentication" tag description (rendered at the ReDoc reference above) and is
  captured here verbatim in structure. This is a real contract gap on Aclid's side: a generated
  client or an agent reading only the machine-readable half would send unauthenticated requests
  and get HTTP 403.
summary:
  types: [apiKey]
  api_key_in: [header]
  oauth2_flows: []
  spec_declares_security: false
schemes:
- name: AclidApiKey
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter_name: Authorization
  scheme_prefix: none
  prefix_note: >-
    The key is sent as the RAW value of the Authorization header with no "Bearer " prefix — both
    published examples do this. The published example value is a JWT-shaped string
    (eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6...), consistent with the AWS Cognito user pool that backs the
    Aclid console.
  transport: https-only
  transport_note: All API requests must be made over HTTPS; plain HTTP calls fail.
  key_issuance: Self-service from the user profile in the Aclid Dashboard (https://dash.aclid.bio).
  documented_in: openapi tag description (not components.securitySchemes)
  sources: [openapi/aclid-openapi.yml]
modes:
  live_test_separation: true
  selector: the API key itself
  detail: >-
    "You can use the Aclid API in test mode, which doesn't affect your live data. The API key you
    use to authenticate the request determines whether the request is live mode or test mode."
    Aclid publishes no key prefix convention, so a caller cannot tell live from test by inspecting
    the key.
console_identity:
  note: >-
    Separate from API-key auth. The Aclid console (dash.aclid.bio) and the customer verification
    flow (verify.aclid.bio) authenticate END USERS through an AWS Cognito user pool operated by
    Aclid, whose region and pool id are published in the client configuration of both apps.
  provider: AWS Cognito
  region: us-east-1
  user_pool_id: us-east-1_PJ68v2vt9
  branded_domain: https://aclid.auth.us-east-1.amazoncognito.com
  issuer: https://cognito-idp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/us-east-1_PJ68v2vt9
  discovery: https://cognito-idp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/us-east-1_PJ68v2vt9/.well-known/openid-configuration
  jwks_uri: https://cognito-idp.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/us-east-1_PJ68v2vt9/.well-known/jwks.json
  oidc_scopes_supported: [openid, email, phone, profile]
  response_types_supported: [code, token]
  id_token_signing_alg: RS256
  federated_identity:
    orcid: >-
      The customer verification flow offers "Link ORCID" and states "We partnered with ORCID to
      help verify your information. Your research ID helps expedite the biosecurity review."
      An ORCID client id and https://orcid.org are present in the verify.aclid.bio app config.
  file: well-known/aclid-openid-configuration.json
  probed: '2026-09-06'
  http_status: 200
observed:
- request: GET https://api.aclid.bio/v2/screens (no Authorization header)
  status: 403
  body_fields: [auth_detail, detail, path, request_id, request_time, response_type]
  probed: '2026-09-06'
gaps:
- No components.securitySchemes in the published OpenAPI.
- No security[] requirement on any of the 18 operations.
- No documented key prefix, so live vs test mode is not inspectable by the caller.
- No documented key rotation, expiry or revocation procedure.