generated: '2026-09-06'
method: searched
source: https://developer.actionstreamer.com/docs/Guides/authentication
docs: https://developer.actionstreamer.com/docs/Guides/authentication
note: >-
  Authored from the provider's own authentication guide, NOT derived from the OpenAPI. The published
  specification declares no components.securitySchemes at all — the developer portal's own overview
  page states "securitySchemes declared: False" — so derive-authentication.py produced nothing for
  this provider. Everything below is read from the human-readable guide. This is the single largest
  contract-quality gap in the ActionStreamer surface: the API is authenticated, the auth is
  documented in prose, and a machine reading only the spec cannot tell.
scheme_count: 2
primary_scheme: hmac-signature
schemes:
- id: hmac-sha256
  type: signature
  http_scheme: HMAC-SHA256
  in: header
  description: >-
    HMAC-SHA256 key/secret request signing, used for headless devices and direct service
    integrations. The caller derives a hex digest over a canonical string built from the method,
    path, sorted headers, sorted parameters and body, keyed with the account secret.
  credentials:
    access_key: created in the ActionStreamer portal under Settings > API Keys
    secret_key: issued alongside the access key; never transmitted
    provisioning_url: https://portal.actionstreamer.com
    provisioning_api: POST /v1/apikey (the API can mint its own keys once authenticated)
  headers_required:
  - name: Authorization
    value: 'HMAC-SHA256 {access_key}'
  - name: X-AccessKey
    value: the access key
  - name: X-Signature
    value: hex-encoded HMAC-SHA256 digest of the canonical string
  - name: X-Timestamp
    value: Unix epoch seconds
  - name: X-Nonce
    value: a UUIDv4, unique per request
  - name: Content-Type
    value: application/json
  canonical_string:
    order:
    - METHOD
    - PATH
    - HEADER_STRING
    - PARAMETER_STRING
    - BODY
    joined_with: newline
    rules:
    - Content-Type is removed from the header set before signing.
    - Header keys are sorted and rendered as 'key: value' lines.
    - Query or form parameters are sorted and rendered the same way.
    - The path is normalized to start with '/' with no trailing slash, except for root.
    - The assembled string is trimmed before signing.
  algorithm: HMAC-SHA256, hex digest
  replay_protection:
    mechanism: X-Nonce (UUIDv4 per request) plus X-Timestamp
    note: >-
      This is anti-replay for the auth envelope. It is NOT request idempotency — a client that
      retries a write with a fresh nonce will execute the write twice. See
      conventions/actionstreamer-conventions.yml.
  reference_implementation: >-
    The guide publishes a Python get_hmac_signature(secret_key, method, path, headers, parameters,
    body) reference function; the first-party PyPI package `actionstreamer` implements it.
- id: session-token
  type: token
  in: header
  description: >-
    Session-token authentication used by the ActionStreamer web portal and browser clients, as an
    alternative to HMAC signing for interactive sessions.
  related_operations:
  - POST /v1/session
  - GET /v1/session
  - POST /v1/token/mediarouter/publish
  - POST /v1/multifactorauth
  expiry_signal: HTTP 419 Session expired
  mfa: >-
    A MultifactorAuth resource area with nine operations is published, so the platform supports MFA
    on interactive sessions.
oauth2: false
openid_connect: false
mutual_tls: false
api_key_header: false
spec_gap:
  securitySchemes_declared: false
  security_applied_to_operations: false
  operations_total: 247
  operations_with_security: 0
  impact: >-
    Every generated client, agent tool wrapper and API-explorer built from this OpenAPI will emit
    unauthenticated requests. Declaring an apiKey-in-header scheme for X-AccessKey/X-Signature (or a
    documented custom scheme) and applying it at the root `security` level would close this without
    changing a single operation.
recommendations:
- Declare components.securitySchemes in the published OpenAPI and apply a root-level security requirement.
- Publish the key rotation and revocation policy; DELETE /v1/apikey/{apiKeyID} exists but no lifecycle guidance accompanies it.
- Document the accepted clock skew for X-Timestamp so clients know how far out of sync they may drift.