generated: '2026-08-19'
method: searched
source: openapi/agntcy-identity-service-openapi.yaml plus the AGNTCY Directory authentication documentation
summary:
  types:
  - apiKey
  - http
  - openIdConnect
  - mutualTLS
  - none
  api_key_in:
  - header
  oauth2_flows: []
schemes:
- name: AccessToken
  type: http
  scheme: bearer
  bearerFormat: JWT
  description: An IAM JWT token issued to a user during an OIDC flow.
  sources:
  - openapi/agntcy-identity-service-openapi.yaml
- name: ApiKey
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: x-id-api-key
  description: An IAM Api key.
  sources:
  - openapi/agntcy-identity-service-openapi.yaml
docs: https://github.com/agntcy/dir/blob/main/docs/content/dir/dir-component-oidc-authentication.md
note: AGNTCY has four independent auth models, only one of which appears in an OpenAPI. The two schemes below are derived
  from the Identity Service spec; the surfaces block records the rest, which are documented in prose only. No oauth2 securityScheme
  is declared in any published spec, so no scopes/ artifact is emitted even though OIDC is used.
surfaces:
- surface: OASF Schema API
  host: https://schema.oasf.outshift.com
  auth: none
  evidence: openapi/agntcy-oasf-schema-swagger.json declares no securityDefinitions; live GET /api/versions returned 200 anonymously
    on 2026-08-19
- surface: AGNTCY Identity Service
  auth:
  - bearer-jwt
  - api-key
  schemes:
  - 'AccessToken (Authorization: Bearer <IAM JWT issued during an OIDC flow)'
  - ApiKey (x-id-api-key header)
  token_flow:
  - AuthService_Authorize
  - AuthService_Token
  key_rotation: AppService_RefreshAppApiKey
  evidence: openapi/agntcy-identity-service-openapi.yaml components.securitySchemes
- surface: AGNTCY Identity Node
  auth: none-declared
  evidence: openapi/agntcy-identity-node-openapi.yaml declares no securitySchemes; the node is self-hosted and fronted by
    the operator
- surface: Agent Directory (DIR)
  auth:
  - spiffe-x509
  - spiffe-jwt
  - spiffe-token
  - mtls
  - oidc
  - insecure
  - none
  default: auto-detect (OIDC if a cached token, issuer or client id is present; falls back to insecure for local development)
  primary_trust_model: SPIFFE/SPIRE for in-cluster workload and service-to-service identity
  external_access: optional oidc-gateway (Envoy) accepting OIDC JWT, SPIFFE JWT-SVID and SPIFFE X.509-SVID, able to expose
    OIDC/JWT and X.509-SVID mTLS on separate hostnames
  client_env:
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_AUTH_MODE
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_AUTH_TOKEN
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_OIDC_ISSUER
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_SPIFFE_SOCKET_PATH
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_JWT_AUDIENCE
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_TLS_CERT_FILE
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_TLS_KEY_FILE
  - DIRECTORY_CLIENT_TLS_CA_FILE
  interactive_login: dirctl auth login --oidc-issuer <url> --oidc-client-id dirctl (PKCE, --no-browser or --device); tokens
    cached issuer-scoped under ~/.config/dirctl/tokens/
  ci: 'GitHub Actions OIDC via --oidc-audience with job permission id-token: write; dirctl mints and renews its own tokens'
  tested_idps:
  - Zitadel
  - Keycloak
  - Auth0
  - Okta
  - Microsoft Entra ID
  - Dex
  evidence: https://github.com/agntcy/dir/blob/main/docs/content/dir/dir-component-oidc-authentication.md and dir-cli-reference.md
- surface: Agent Connect Protocol
  auth: implementation-defined
  evidence: openapi/agntcy-acp-openapi.json declares no securitySchemes and no servers[]; ACP is an interface each agent server
    implements under its own auth
well_known_jwks:
  served_by: AGNTCY Identity Node and by any domain publishing record names
  operations:
  - IssuerService_GetWellKnown (/v1alpha1/issuer/{commonName}/.well-known/jwks.json)
  - VcService_GetWellKnown (/v1alpha1/vc/{id}/.well-known/vcs.json)
  note: Directory name verification reads a claimed domain /.well-known/jwks.json to prove ownership of a URL-based record
    name. AGNTCY defines these paths but serves none of them itself.