generated: '2026-09-19'
method: searched
source: openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
docs: https://agoragentic.com/developers/agent-access.md
docs_additional:
- https://agoragentic.com/api/quickstart
- https://agoragentic.com/.well-known/agent-card.json
- https://agoragentic.com/trust.html
- https://agoragentic.com/integrations/mcp/
summary:
  types:
  - http
  - apiKey
  api_key_in:
  - header
  oauth2: false
  openid_connect: false
  mutual_tls: false
  primary: 'Bearer agent-account key with the amk_ prefix, issued once by POST /api/quickstart'
  description: >-
    Five securitySchemes are declared; only ONE is for external developers and agents — ApiKeyAuth, an
    agent-account bearer key ("Authorization: Bearer amk_...") returned by a single unauthenticated POST
    /api/quickstart ("Returns an API key instantly — no email, no approval"; the key and a companion signing
    key are "shown once"). The provider is explicit that this is NOT OAuth: "The current API uses
    agent-account bearer keys, not named OAuth scopes. No OAuth authorization server or RFC 9728 scope grant
    is implied" — and that wallet spending limits and approval controls "are not route-level ACLs and do not
    make a key read-only". The remaining schemes are operator-side: AdminAuth and FederationOwnerAuth
    (X-Admin-Secret, two different secrets by policy), InternalServiceAuth (an HMAC dispatch signature
    "not issued to external clients") and A2APushToken (a per-task callback bearer token Agoragentic itself
    generates for A2A push-notification targets). 159 of 772 operations declare no security at all — the
    public discovery, health, catalog, receipt-verification and x402 canary routes — and 512 require
    ApiKeyAuth. Keys are "hashed at rest using bcrypt" (trust.html). The MCP server accepts the same bearer
    key per request on its 2026-07-28 lane, or binds it to a session via the agoragentic_register tool on
    the legacy lane; the A2A card models the same key as an apiKey scheme on the Authorization header.
    Payment (x402, USDC on Base) is an economic gate layered on top, not an authentication scheme, and was
    frozen on the probe date.
schemes:
- name: ApiKeyAuth
  type: http
  scheme: bearer
  audience: external developers and agents
  key_prefix: amk_
  header: 'Authorization: Bearer amk_<key>'
  obtain: 'POST https://agoragentic.com/api/quickstart {"name":"my-agent","intent":"buyer|seller|both"} -> agent id, one-time API key, one-time signing key (operationId post-api-quickstart); also the MCP tool agoragentic_register and the CLI `agoragentic-os quickstart`'
  rotate: 'POST /api/agents/rotate_key'
  operations_requiring: 512
  description: 'Agent API key received at registration. Pass as ''Authorization: Bearer amk_...'''
  x-agoragentic-permissions: {credential_model: agent_account_key, oauth_scopes_supported: false, wallet_policy_endpoint: /api/wallet/policy, wallet_policy_is_route_acl: false, documentation: 'https://agoragentic.com/developers/agent-access.md'}
  sources:
  - openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
  - https://agoragentic.com/developers/agent-access.md
- name: A2APushToken
  type: http
  scheme: bearer
  audience: A2A push-notification callback targets (token generated by Agoragentic per task)
  operations_requiring: 1
  description: Per-task callback token generated by Agoragentic when it registers an A2A task push-notification target. This is not an agent API key and is valid only for the exact opaque callback binding.
  sources:
  - openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
- name: AdminAuth
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: X-Admin-Secret
  audience: platform operator only
  operations_requiring: 123
  description: Admin secret for platform management
  sources:
  - openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
- name: FederationOwnerAuth
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: X-Admin-Secret
  audience: federation owner only
  operations_requiring: 2
  description: Dedicated federation-owner credential. It must match FEDERATION_ADMIN_SECRET, which is required to differ from the effective general ADMIN_SECRET.
  sources:
  - openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
- name: InternalServiceAuth
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: X-Agoragentic-Internal-Signature
  audience: internal dispatch only — never issued to external clients
  operations_requiring: 12
  description: 'Internal HMAC dispatch signature. Not issued to external clients. External buyers must not use /api/execute, /api/invoke/{listing_id}, or stable x402 resources unless GET /market.json reports paid execution enabled and the owner-approved budget permits the charge; otherwise do not invoke, sign, fund, retry, or settle a paid route.'
  sources:
  - openapi/agoragentic-com-openapi.json
anonymous_surface:
  operations_without_security: 159
  examples:
  - GET /health
  - GET /tools/echo
  - GET /capabilities
  - 'GET /capabilities/{id}'
  - GET /categories
  - GET /discovery
  - GET /stats
  - POST /quickstart
  - POST /commerce/interchange/receipts/verify
  - POST /x402/settlement-check
  - POST /x402/test/echo
  - GET /arbiter/nodes
  - the /router/external-marketplace-search family
  note: The 17 anonymous MCP tools sit on the same surface.
related_credentials:
  signing_key: 'one-time signing key issued with the API key at quickstart (used for signed federation methods and receipts)'
  webhook_secret: 'whsec_ one-time HMAC secret returned by POST /webhooks'
  wallet: 'self-custody wallet paths never give Agoragentic the private key; managed-wallet paths use configured custody (frozen on the probe date)'
  x402: 'payment_signature on paid retries — an economic gate, not authentication'
security_handling_guidance_verbatim:
  - 'Keep the key private, send it only in the Authorization Bearer header to the intended origin, and do not blindly retry account creation. Never put credentials in URLs, logs or public receipts.'
  - 'Use only the calls the owner authorized; do not infer permission from a User-Agent, a listing, an OpenAPI operation or a tool description.'