generated: '2026-08-06'
method: searched
probe: true
source: https://www.airtm.com/.well-known/security.txt
contact:
- mailto:orlando@150porciento.com
evidence:
- source: https://www.airtm.com/.well-known/security.txt
  kind: security.txt (live probe)
expires: '2025-06-30T15:00:00Z'
expired: true
policy: []
security_txt_fields_present: [Contact, Expires]
security_txt_fields_missing: [Policy, Encryption, Acknowledgments, Preferred-Languages, Canonical, Hiring]
bug_bounty:
  program: null
  platforms_checked: [hackerone, bugcrowd, intigriti]
  found: false
notes: >-
  Airtm serves an RFC 9116 security.txt at https://www.airtm.com/.well-known/security.txt (HTTP 200),
  but it is a two-line file whose own Expires date passed on 2025-06-30 — per RFC 9116 a researcher
  should treat the contents as stale. The single Contact is mailto:orlando@150porciento.com, a
  third-party (150 Porciento) rather than an @airtm.com security address, and there is no Policy URL,
  so a researcher has no published disclosure terms or safe-harbour statement. No bug bounty program
  was found on HackerOne, Bugcrowd or Intigriti. This is the clearest, cheapest fix on Airtm's
  operational-transparency surface: refresh the Expires date, add a Policy URL and an @airtm.com
  Contact.