generated: '2026-08-17' method: searched probe: true source: https://uh.live/.well-known/security.txt note: >- The provider publishes a valid RFC 9116 security.txt and it is captured verbatim at well-known/allo-media-security.txt (174 bytes, HTTP 200, text/plain, fetched 2026-08-17). Both a machine-readable contact and a named policy URL are present, which is more than most providers of this size manage. Two contacts are listed — one on the new brand domain and one on the legacy Allo-Media domain — which is a useful signal that the rebrand's security intake was migrated rather than dropped. disclosure_surface: true policy: - https://uh.live/security-policy contact: - mailto:security@uh.live - mailto:security@allo-media.fr preferred_languages: - en - fr expires: '2027-05-01T00:00:00.000Z' expires_valid: true expires_note: >- Expires is 2027-05-01, comfortably in the future as of 2026-08-17, so the file is live rather than a stale artifact. RFC 9116 requires this field and a large share of published security.txt files fail it; this one passes. rfc9116_fields: contact: true expires: true policy: true preferred_languages: true encryption: false acknowledgments: false canonical: false hiring: false csaf: false rfc9116_assessment: >- Valid and minimal. Has the mandatory Contact and Expires plus Policy and Preferred-Languages. Missing the optional Encryption (no PGP key for reporters to encrypt a report with — notable for a company that documents GPG encryption for customer audio uploads), Canonical, Acknowledgments and CSAF fields. bug_bounty: program: null platform: null found: false note: >- No HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti or YesWeHack program found for allo-media or uh!ive. Disclosure is direct-to-email against a self-hosted policy page. evidence: - source: https://uh.live/.well-known/security.txt kind: security.txt (live probe) http_status: 200 content_type: text/plain bytes: 174 body_captured: true file: well-known/allo-media-security.txt checked: '2026-08-17' - source: https://uh.live/.well-known/agent-card.json kind: control probe http_status: 404 checked: '2026-08-17' note: >- Recorded as the control proving the 200 above is a real served document rather than a catch-all answering every /.well-known/ path. x-probe-conditions: >- The provider's OVH-hosted origins rate-limit aggressively: after a short burst of requests they refuse TCP 443 from the source IP for several minutes (curl exit 7). The capture above succeeded on a paced retry. Any future re-probe of this provider must space requests out or it will record false negatives.