overlay: 1.0.0
info:
  title: API Evangelist enhancements for the Authologic Customer API
  version: 1.0.0
extends: openapi/authologic-customer-api-openapi.yml
x-provenance:
  generated: '2026-09-14'
  method: generated
  source: >-
    Derived from the verbatim spec at https://developer.authologic.com/openapi.json plus the published
    documentation at developer.authologic.com. Every value below is traceable to a provider-published
    statement; nothing is invented. The original spec is never mutated.
  maintainers:
    - FN: Kin Lane
      email: kin@apievangelist.com
actions:
  - target: $.info
    description: >-
      Record the production host and the licence/terms surface the spec omits. servers[] names only the
      sandbox, so a reader of the spec alone cannot find the production API.
    update:
      x-production-host: https://api.authologic.com
      x-production-access: >-
        IP-allowlisted. Unlisted callers receive HTTP 403 with an nginx "IP not allowed" page. The
        production address is issued to the customer at go-live.
      x-go-live: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/integration/going-live
      x-terms-of-service: https://authologic.com/terms-of-use/
      x-privacy-policy: https://authologic.com/privacy-policy/
      x-documentation: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/integration/overview
      x-llms-txt: https://developer.authologic.com/llms.txt
  - target: $.info
    description: >-
      Surface the media-type versioning contract. It is documented in prose but invisible in the spec,
      and a client that omits the header is not sending a versioned request.
    update:
      x-versioning:
        scheme: media-type
        media_type: application/vnd.authologic.v1.1+json
        headers: [Content-Type, Accept]
        policy: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/technical/implementation
        breaking_change_signal: a new media-type version number
        additive_changes_without_bump: true
  - target: $.info
    description: >-
      Record the asynchronous result channel. The spec declares no webhooks block, so the callback —
      which is how results are actually delivered — is entirely absent from the machine-readable contract.
    update:
      x-callbacks:
        declaration: callbackUrl on POST /api/conversations
        transport: HTTPS POST
        events:
          - CONVERSATION/FINISHED
          - CONVERSATION/EXPIRED
          - SUBSCRIPTION/NEW_DATA
        signature:
          headers: [X-Signature, X-Signature-Timestamp]
          algorithm: HMAC-SHA-256 over "<timestamp>:<raw body>"
          replay_window_minutes: 5
        retries: at least 20 attempts, final no sooner than 4 days
        success_statuses: [200, 201, 202, 204]
        docs: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/integration/callbacks
        artifact: asyncapi/authologic-callbacks-webhooks.yml
  - target: $.info
    description: Record the agent-relevant runtime semantics measured for this contract.
    update:
      x-agent-notes:
        idempotency: none
        idempotency_note: >-
          No Idempotency-Key and no client request key. A retried POST /api/conversations creates a
          second billable conversation.
        rate_limit_headers: none
        quota_exhaustion_status: 402
        error_format: proprietary {status, message, violations[]}; not RFC 9457
        deprecation_headers: none
        artifact: conventions/authologic-conventions.yml
  - target: $.servers
    description: >-
      Annotate the single declared server as the test environment, so a tool that defaults to servers[0]
      does not silently transact against the sandbox believing it is production.
    update:
      - url: https://sandbox.authologic.com
        description: >-
          Testing environment. This is the ONLY server the published spec declares; production is
          https://api.authologic.com and is IP-allowlisted.
        x-environment: sandbox
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations'].post
    description: >-
      Flag the one billable, non-idempotent, user-facing write in the API and point at the reversal path.
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action_class: create
        consequence: billable
        idempotent: false
        reversal_operation: deleteConversation
        reversal_modes: [EXPIRE, DELETE_DATA]
        reversal_window: not stated by the provider
        escalation: >-
          Creating a conversation causes a real person to be asked to verify their identity. Confirm with
          a human before calling on behalf of an agent.
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations/{conversationId}'].delete
    description: Mark the destructive branch of the delete operation.
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action_class: delete
        consequence: destructive
        note: >-
          mode=EXPIRE ends an unfinished conversation and is recoverable only in the sense that a new
          conversation can be started. mode=DELETE_DATA permanently removes collected data and may
          suppress pending callbacks. Subsequent reads return 410.
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations/{conversationId}/identity/metadata/media/{id}'].get
    description: Flag the personal-data egress point.
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action_class: read
        consequence: sensitive
        data_classes: [biometric, identity-document imagery]
        note: >-
          Returns identity-document scans and facial imagery of a natural person. Handle under GDPR; do
          not pass into a model context or log.
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations/{conversationId}/headless/{next}'].post
    description: Record the required header and the personal-data payload.
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action_class: update
        consequence: sensitive
        required_headers: [X-User-IP]
        note: Advances a server-held step machine with end-user personal data. No undo.
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations/{conversationId}/bankTransactions'].get
    description: Record the pagination convention, which is otherwise only discoverable per parameter.
    update:
      x-pagination:
        style: page-number
        params: [page, pageSize]
  - target: $.paths['/api/conversations/{conversationId}/aml/{list}'].get
    description: Record the pagination convention on the other paginated read.
    update:
      x-pagination:
        style: page-number
        params: [page, pageSize]
  - target: $.components.schemas.ApiError
    description: >-
      Point at the full error catalogs. The contract declares statuses but no remediation, and the
      product-level failure reasons are not in the contract at all.
    update:
      x-error-catalog: errors/authologic-problem-types.yml
      x-product-error-codes: errors/authologic-error-codes.yml
      x-note: >-
        HTTP status is only half the error surface. A 200 can carry result.<product>.status FAILED with
        result.<product>.errors[] naming a verification failure reason.
  - target: $.components.schemas.ConversationInfo
    description: Record the conversation state machine, documented in prose but not enumerated in the spec.
    update:
      x-lifecycle:
        states: [CREATED, IN_PROGRESS, FINISHED, CANCELED, EXPIRED]
        terminal: [FINISHED, CANCELED, EXPIRED]
        note: >-
          status FINISHED means the process ended, NOT that it succeeded. Success is carried by
          result.<product>.status.
        retention: >-
          Per-customer retention policy, not published. Once data is gone, reads return 410.
        docs: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/technical/conversation-statuses
  - target: $.components.securitySchemes.oauth2
    description: Point at the RFC 8414 metadata document, which carries far more than the spec declares.
    update:
      x-authorization-server-metadata: https://sandbox.authologic.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
      x-supported-beyond-spec:
        - authorization_code, refresh_token, device_code and token-exchange grants
        - PKCE S256
        - mTLS client authentication with certificate-bound access tokens (RFC 8705)
        - DPoP (RFC 9449)
      x-scopes: >-
        The clientCredentials flow declares an EMPTY scopes object and no scope taxonomy is published
        anywhere. Authorization is account- and environment-scoped, not scope-scoped.