{ "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema", "$id": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/api-evangelist/axonflow/main/json-schema/axonflow-policy-evaluation-result-schema.json", "title": "PolicyEvaluationResult", "description": "The policy verdict carried on every orchestrator response. Its property\nSET is held equal to the Go type's JSON members by\n`TestThePublishedSchemasMatchTheTypesThePlatformMarshals`, which\ncompares the two by reflection, so a field added to one and not the\nother fails CI rather than reaching a spec-generated client (#3724).\nThe properties are also written in the Go type's declaration order as a\ncourtesy to a reader diffing the two; nothing enforces that, and order\nis not part of the contract.\n", "x-generated": "2026-10-09", "x-method": "derived", "x-generator": "derive-json-schema.py", "x-source": "openapi/axonflow-orchestrator-openapi.yml#/components/schemas/PolicyEvaluationResult", "type": "object", "properties": { "allowed": { "type": "boolean" }, "applied_policies": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } }, "risk_score": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 1 }, "severity": { "type": "string", "enum": [ "critical", "high", "medium", "low" ], "description": "Highest severity among the matched policies." }, "severity_policy_id": { "type": "string", "description": "The policy that contributed `severity`." }, "required_actions": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } }, "processing_time_ms": { "type": "integer" }, "database_accessed": { "type": "boolean" }, "evaluation_error": { "type": "boolean", "description": "Distinguishes **could not govern** from **a policy said block**,\nand is the only signal that does. True when the engine could NOT\ncomplete evaluation because governance-segment resolution failed\n(a resolver or storage error -- never \"the caller belongs to zero\nsegments\"). `allowed` is always false when this is set, because the\nengine fails CLOSED on that error, so a consumer reading only\n`allowed` still behaves safely; a consumer that audits or alerts\nMUST read this field to tell an availability failure apart from a\ngenuine policy match. Before it existed the only signal was the\nmagic string `applied_policies: [\"segment_resolution_failed\"]`.\n" }, "segments_resolved": { "type": "boolean", "description": "True only when a resolved, non-empty governance-segment set was\nactually factored into this verdict. False covers every legitimate\norganisation-only case -- no identity supplied, no resolver wired\n(community, or no SCIM), or the caller belongs to zero segments --\nas well as the `evaluation_error` case. None of those are failures:\nthe flag exists so a reader of a policy-simulation preview does not\nmistake a legitimate org-only allow for a segment-aware one.\n" }, "applied_policies_detail": { "type": "array", "description": "Structured mirror of `applied_policies` carrying each matched\npolicy's risk level and allow_override metadata, without a second\nquery. No session override is applied to a result in v11 (#4252).\n", "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/AppliedPolicyDetail" } }, "preferred_provider": { "type": "string", "description": "LLM provider a matched routing policy prefers. When more than one\napplying route row names one, the LAST applying row in evaluation\norder wins it and the routing reason: rows are walked by priority,\nhighest first, then newest first, so the winner is the\nlowest-priority applying row (#4249).\n" }, "allowed_providers": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }, "description": "Strict provider allow-list for compliance routing. Failover stays\nwithin this list. It is the intersection of every applying route\nrow's list, whatever their order; an empty intersection refuses the\nrequest (`no_compliant_provider`).\n" }, "routing_reason": { "type": "string", "description": "Why routing was changed." } }, "$defs": { "AppliedPolicyDetail": { "type": "object", "description": "One structured per-policy match inside `PolicyEvaluationResult`.\n", "properties": { "policy_id": { "type": "string" }, "policy_name": { "type": "string" }, "description": { "type": "string" }, "action": { "type": "string" }, "risk_level": { "type": "string", "enum": [ "low", "medium", "high", "critical" ] }, "allow_override": { "type": "boolean", "description": "False if and only if the policy forbids a session override." }, "matched_rule": { "type": "string" }, "segment_id": { "type": "string", "description": "The governance segment this policy is scoped to, or absent when it\nis not segment-scoped. ATTRIBUTION AND AUDIT ONLY -- it is not an\noverride-eligibility signal anywhere: a segment-scoped policy uses\nthe same `allow_override` contract as a tenant policy.\n" } } } } }