generated: '2026-09-05'
method: searched
source: https://ubuntu.com/security/disclosure-policy
provider: Canonical
providerId: canonical
description: 'Canonical publishes a named, dated vulnerability disclosure and embargo policy covering
  Ubuntu, Canonical-authored software (LXD, MAAS, Juju, snapd, Snapcraft, Landscape, Launchpad, Mir) and
  Canonical-owned and -managed infrastructure. It is one of the more complete disclosure programs in the
  catalog: it names the reporting channels, publishes a PGP key for encrypted submissions, and states
  the embargo expectations on both sides.'
program:
  published: true
  url: https://ubuntu.com/security/disclosure-policy
  http_status: 200
  probed: '2026-09-05'
  valid_since: 2020-10
  last_updated: 2023-10
  owner: Ubuntu Security Team, Canonical
  scope: '"Canonical''s Ubuntu Security Team tends to the security needs of the Ubuntu operating system
    and serves as a point of contact for Canonical-authored software, both proprietary and open-source,
    as well as Canonical-owned and -managed infrastructure."'
  posture: responsible / coordinated disclosure
contacts:
- channel: email
  value: security@ubuntu.com
  note: Primary reporting address named in the policy.
- channel: email
  value: security@canonical.com
  note: Contact published in the security.txt served at landscape.canonical.com.
- channel: bug tracker
  value: https://launchpad.net/
  note: Reports may be filed through the Launchpad bug reporting interface (or `ubuntu-bug <packagename>`).
    Canonical warns in the policy that Launchpad sends plaintext email in response.
encryption:
  pgp_key_id: 75E1 451E 529B 51E1 9006 CD5E 91EC 85F1 DA9A 776D
  keyserver: https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x75e1451e529b51e19006cd5e91ec85f1da9a776d
  note: Reports may optionally be encrypted to this OpenPGP key.
security_txt:
  served: true
  hosts:
  - host: landscape.canonical.com
    url: https://landscape.canonical.com/.well-known/security.txt
    http_status: 200
    file: ../well-known/canonical-security.txt
  fields:
    Contact: mailto:security@canonical.com
    Expires: '2024-01-01T02:59:00.000Z'
    Hiring: https://canonical.com/careers/all?search=Security
  gap: THE ONE REAL DEFECT HERE. The security.txt is EXPIRED — its own Expires field reads 2024-01-01,
    more than two and a half years before this probe — and it is served on exactly one host (landscape.canonical.com).
    canonical.com, ubuntu.com, snapcraft.io, charmhub.io, launchpad.net and every API host returned 404
    for /.well-known/security.txt on 2026-09-05. A company that runs a mature disclosure program is not
    advertising it at the machine-readable path an automated scanner looks at. Refreshing Expires and
    serving the file from canonical.com and ubuntu.com would be a small change with disproportionate effect.
bug_bounty:
  published: false
  note: No paid bounty program was found. The disclosure policy does not mention a bounty, and platform
    probes on 2026-09-05 did not confirm one.
  probes:
  - url: https://hackerone.com/canonical
    status: 404
  - url: https://bugcrowd.com/canonical
    status: 404
  - url: https://hackerone.com/ubuntu
    status: 200
    note: 200 but the body is a 2.3KB SPA shell with a generic <title>HackerOne</title> and no program
      content, so it does not confirm a program exists.
advisories:
  ubuntu_security_notices:
    url: https://ubuntu.com/security/notices
    machine_readable: https://ubuntu.com/security/notices.json
    api: canonical:ubuntu-security-api
    note: Canonical publishes its advisory stream as a real, open, unauthenticated API — USNs and CVEs
      queryable as JSON, with an OpenAPI (Swagger 2.0) at https://ubuntu.com/security/api/spec.json. Very
      few providers in the catalog publish their own vulnerability feed as a contract.
  cve_tracker: https://ubuntu.com/security/cves