generated: '2026-09-05'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://docs.celeryq.dev/en/stable/userguide/security.html,
  https://docs.celeryq.dev/en/stable/userguide/configuration.html
summary: >-
  Celery has no HTTP surface and therefore no API keys, bearer tokens, OAuth flows or
  securitySchemes. Authentication in Celery is two separate things: credentials on the BROKER and
  RESULT BACKEND connection URLs, and optional cryptographic signing of the task and event messages
  themselves so a worker will only execute messages it can verify.
schemes:
  - id: broker-credentials
    type: transport-credentials
    location: connection URL
    example_shape: 'amqp://<user>:<password>@<host>:5672/<vhost> or redis://:<password>@<host>:6379/0'
    tls: broker_use_ssl — end-to-end SSL encryption and authentication where the broker backend supports it
    docs: https://docs.celeryq.dev/en/stable/userguide/security.html
    note: >-
      The documentation is explicit that the broker must be firewalled and that fine-grained broker
      access control (the RabbitMQ example is given) should be enabled — the broker is the trust
      boundary, and by default "workers trust that the data they get from the broker hasn't been
      tampered with".
  - id: result-backend-credentials
    type: transport-credentials
    location: result_backend connection URL
    note: Same shape as the broker URL; credentials are carried in the DSN.
  - id: message-signing
    type: public-key-message-signing
    serializer: auth
    library: cryptography (PyPI)
    mechanism: >-
      Clients sign each message with a private key; workers verify it against a public certificate.
      Certificates may be CA-signed or self-signed. The auth serializer signs but does NOT encrypt —
      the docs state confidentiality must be arranged separately.
    settings:
      - name: task_serializer
        value: auth
      - name: event_serializer
        value: auth
        note: Additionally signs the event protocol.
      - name: accept_content
        value: "['auth']"
        note: Forces workers to accept only signed messages.
      - name: security_key
        description: Path to the private key on the filesystem (absolute paths recommended).
      - name: security_key_password
        description: Password for an encrypted private key.
      - name: security_certificate
        description: Path to this node's certificate.
      - name: security_cert_store
        description: Glob of trusted certificates, e.g. /etc/ssl/certs/*.pem.
      - name: security_digest
        description: Signing digest algorithm, e.g. sha256.
    activation: app.setup_security() — also disables all insecure serializers on the worker
    docs: https://docs.celeryq.dev/en/stable/userguide/security.html
content_type_allowlist:
  setting: accept_content
  default: "['json']"
  since: 3.0.18
  note: >-
    The primary hardening control. pickle is documented as inherently insecure and to be avoided
    whenever clients are untrusted or unauthenticated; JSON has been the default serializer since 4.0.
oauth2: false
openid_connect: false
api_keys: false
mutual_tls: partial — broker_use_ssl can carry client certificates where the transport supports it
scopes_artifact: na — no OAuth surface, so scopes/ is deliberately absent