generated: '2026-08-11'
method: probed
source: https://cloud.corestack.io/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
note: >-
  CoreStack's 838-operation REST contract declares NO oauth2 security scheme — it is key-and-token
  only, and authorization is role-based rather than scope-based, so there is no REST scope surface to
  derive. The only OAuth surface on the estate is the one the unified MCP server stood up, and it
  advertises exactly three OIDC-standard scopes. Those scopes carry identity, not capability: what a
  caller may actually do is decided entirely by their CoreStack RBAC role, not by the token's scope.

schemes:
- name: mcp_oauth
  surface: mcp
  source: well-known/corestack-oauth-authorization-server.json
  issuer: https://cloud.corestack.io/mcp
  protected_resource: https://cloud.corestack.io/mcp
  bearer_methods_supported:
  - header
  dynamic_client_registration: true
  registration_endpoint: https://cloud.corestack.io/mcp/oauth/register
  flows:
  - flow: authorizationCode
    authorizationUrl: https://cloud.corestack.io/mcp/oauth/authorize
    tokenUrl: https://cloud.corestack.io/mcp/oauth/token
    pkce: S256
    response_types:
    - code
    grant_types:
    - authorization_code

scopes:
- name: openid
  description: OIDC authentication — issues an ID token identifying the CoreStack user.
  spec: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
- name: email
  description: Releases the authenticated user's email address claim.
  spec: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
- name: profile
  description: Releases the authenticated user's basic profile claims.
  spec: OpenID Connect Core 1.0

scope_count: 3

authorization_note: >-
  There is no per-tool, per-domain or per-operation scope. An agent authorized against this server
  can reach every one of the 100 MCP tools its user's role permits, including the four tools the
  provider marks Destructive (submit_assessment_answer, create_workload, send_agent_query, file_bug).
  Consent at the token layer is therefore all-or-nothing: the user cannot grant read-only FinOps
  access to an agent without also granting whatever else their role allows. Narrowing this would mean
  either scoping the OAuth server by domain or issuing a reduced-privilege service account.

x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-11'
  url: https://cloud.corestack.io/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200
  content_type: application/json