generated: '2026-08-17' method: probed source: >- https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp, https://auth.deepip.ai/.well-known/openid-configuration note: >- DERIVED FROM DISCOVERY METADATA, NOT FROM AN OPENAPI. DeepIP publishes no machine-readable REST contract, so there are no OpenAPI securitySchemes to aggregate. Both profiles below were read verbatim from discovery documents the provider serves anonymously. summary: types: [oauth2, openIdConnect] api_key_in: [] oauth2_flows: [authorizationCode] pkce_required: true bearer_token: true schemes: - name: mcp-oauth2 type: oauth2 applies_to: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp source: well-known/deepip-app-oauth-authorization-server.json issuer: https://app.deepip.ai/ flows: - flow: authorizationCode authorizationUrl: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/authorize tokenUrl: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/token revocationUrl: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/revoke scopes: {} scopes_note: >- The authorization-server metadata advertises no scopes_supported array, so the MCP scope vocabulary is not publicly declared. pkce: required: true code_challenge_methods_supported: [S256] token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [client_secret_post, none] client_registration: dynamic_client_registration: false client_id_metadata_document_supported: true presentation: header: Authorization scheme: Bearer challenge: >- WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp" unauthenticated_response: >- 401 {"code":"MISSING_CREDENTIALS","message":"Bearer authentication token is required","requestId":"...","status":"error","timestamp":"..."} - name: deepip-auth0-oidc type: openIdConnect applies_to: https://app.deepip.ai (end-user application sign-in) openIdConnectUrl: https://auth.deepip.ai/.well-known/openid-configuration source: well-known/deepip-auth-openid-configuration.json provider: Auth0 tenant on auth.deepip.ai issuer: https://auth.deepip.ai/ endpoints: authorization: https://auth.deepip.ai/authorize token: https://auth.deepip.ai/oauth/token userinfo: https://auth.deepip.ai/userinfo jwks: https://auth.deepip.ai/.well-known/jwks.json registration: https://auth.deepip.ai/oidc/register revocation: https://auth.deepip.ai/oauth/revoke end_session: https://auth.deepip.ai/oidc/logout device_authorization: https://auth.deepip.ai/oauth/device/code mfa_challenge: https://auth.deepip.ai/mfa/challenge grant_types_supported: - client_credentials - authorization_code - refresh_token - password - implicit - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer code_challenge_methods_supported: [S256, plain] id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [HS256, RS256, PS256] backchannel_logout_supported: true mfa: >- An mfa_challenge endpoint and MFA grant types (mfa-oob, mfa-otp, mfa-recovery-code) are advertised, so multi-factor is available on the tenant. gaps: - >- No API-key mechanism is documented publicly. DeepIP's security page advertises "a comprehensive, well-documented API" for custom integrations, but the reference lives at docs.deepip.ai behind a ReadMe login (redirects to dash.readme.com/to/getdavinci), so its credential model could not be read. - >- The MCP authorization server declares no scopes_supported, so the permission granularity an agent is consenting to is not knowable before the consent screen.