generated: '2026-08-17' method: probed status: published source: https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp server: name: deepip transport: http url: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp deployment: mode: remote endpoint: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp auth: oauth verified: probed authorization: spec: RFC 9728 (protected resource metadata) + RFC 8414 (authorization server metadata) resource: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp authorization_servers: - https://app.deepip.ai/ authorization_endpoint: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/authorize token_endpoint: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/token revocation_endpoint: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp/revoke grant_types_supported: - authorization_code - refresh_token code_challenge_methods_supported: - S256 token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: - client_secret_post - none client_id_metadata_document_supported: true dynamic_client_registration: false note: >- No registration_endpoint is advertised; the server instead declares client_id_metadata_document_supported, so clients identify themselves with a client-ID metadata document URL rather than by dynamic registration. tools: [] tools_note: >- UNKNOWN — not fabricated. tools/list and initialize both return HTTP 401 {"code":"MISSING_CREDENTIALS"} without a bearer token, so the live tool set and its inputSchemas require an authenticated OAuth introspection against a DeepIP customer tenant. DeepIP publishes no llms.txt and no public tool catalogue, and its API reference (docs.deepip.ai) is behind a ReadMe login, so there is no second-hand list to fall back on. Recording zero tools is the honest result; any tool names here would be invented. x-evidence: - fetched: '2026-08-17' url: https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp http_status: 200 content_type: application/json body: '{"resource":"https://app.deepip.ai/mcp","authorization_servers":["https://app.deepip.ai/"]}' - fetched: '2026-08-17' url: https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server http_status: 200 content_type: application/json - fetched: '2026-08-17' url: https://app.deepip.ai/mcp method: POST request: '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}' http_status: 401 www_authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp" - fetched: '2026-08-17' url: https://app.deepip.ai/.well-known/agent-card.json http_status: 401 note: >- The same bearer challenge answers every unmapped /.well-known/* path on this host. It is the MCP auth middleware, not an A2A agent card — no a2a/ artifact is written. notes: >- This is an undocumented-but-live agent surface. DeepIP's public security page says "Build custom integrations with a comprehensive, well-documented API" but publishes no URL for it, and nothing on deepip.ai, in its GitHub organization, or in the public record mentions MCP. The endpoint was found by probing the application host: the 401 on app.deepip.ai carried an RFC 9728 WWW-Authenticate resource_metadata pointer, and that metadata document resolves anonymously to the MCP resource and its authorization server. The server is reachable by any MCP client that can complete the OAuth authorization-code + PKCE flow with a DeepIP account — it is a remote endpoint, not a stdio package.