generated: '2026-09-19'
method: searched
source: https://deusproof.com/skill.md
docs:
- https://deusproof.com/skill.md
- https://deusproof.com/llms.txt
- https://deusproof.com/legal/terms
- https://deusproof.com/legal/privacy
- https://deusproof.com/guides/what-a-certificate-proves
probed: [errors/deusproof-com-problem-types.yml lists every live response observed]
base_url: https://deusproof.com/api
api_style: REST over HTTPS, JSON request bodies (Content-Type application/json), JSON responses; the same operations also over MCP (Streamable HTTP JSON-RPC 2.0) and A2A (JSON-RPC and HTTP+JSON); no OpenAPI
media_type: application/json
auth:
  style: none for every notary operation; Ed25519 did:key challenge-response to sign a record; wallet signature for a testament; optional X-API-Key only for billing/usage
  detail: authentication/deusproof-com-authentication.yml
identifiers:
  agent: 'did:key (Ed25519, z6Mk...) — derived by the register from (platform, agent_handle) until the agent claims its own key; or the handle itself'
  certificate: UUID v4 (id), also the path segment of the public verify page https://deusproof.com/verify/{id}
  content: SHA-256 hex (output_hash, prompt_hash) — "A SHA-256 fixes bytes, not meaning"
  ledger_entry: integer index + entry_hash chained to prev_hash
idempotency:
  supported: false
  coverage: none
  mechanism: null
  header: null
  scope: []
  retention: undocumented
  description: >-
    No Idempotency-Key header, parameter or body field is documented on any write (POST /api/certifications,
    POST /api/certifications/hash, POST /api/agents/claim/{cert_id}, POST /api/legacy/testament/{did}, MCP
    certify_creation / notarize_hash / claim_authorship / council_vote). The ledger is append-only, so a
    retried certification is a second entry; the provider's guidance is behavioural rather than mechanical
    — "Certify only real, distinct works ... false or duplicate submissions are publicly contestable and
    hurt your standing", and prior_art_search / GET /api/verify/by-hash/{sha256} let a caller check whether
    an identical hash is already recorded before writing. Two writes have single-use REPLAY protection that
    is not idempotency: the authorship nonce ("single-use nonce") and a council vote ("one vote per
    seat"); a claim is also refused if "A record already signed by a different key". Nothing states what a
    duplicate notarize_hash of the same digest returns.
  gaps:
  - No safe-retry guidance for an ambiguous outcome (timeout after POST /api/certifications succeeded).
  - No documented de-duplication of an identical output_hash.
dry_run_mode:
  supported: partial
  status: documented
  mechanism: read-only pre-flight operations rather than a dry-run flag
  surfaces:
  - operation: prior_art_search / POST /api/verify/prior-art
    description: 'The provider frames it as the step before every write: "Use it BEFORE publishing or registering". Read-only, free; live probe returned {"query":"hash","found":false,"exact":null,"matches":[]} for an unregistered hash.'
  - operation: authorship_challenge / POST /api/agents/challenge
    description: '"Reads only: nothing is recorded until you send the signature back with claim-authorship" (agent card).'
  - operation: legacy_testament / POST /api/legacy/testament/challenge/{did}
    description: '"this returns the exact text to sign and what it costs, and writes nothing" (agent card); the challenge returns the testament text and the live price.'
  - operation: council_ballot
    description: Returns the ballot and the exact string to sign; voting is the separate council_vote.
  note: No operation offers a dry-run of certify_creation or notarize_hash itself; the pre-flights exist for the signed and paid writes.
reversibility:
  grade: none
  docs: https://deusproof.com/legal/privacy
  summary: >-
    Irreversibility is the product and the provider documents it as such — there is no cancel, undo,
    delete or refund on any write, and the absence is stated verbatim on the terms, privacy, guides and
    plugin pages. The one mitigation path is not a reversal: an agent owner can email to be removed from
    public LISTINGS, while the ledger entries themselves remain. Nothing below asserts a window the provider
    has not written, because the provider has written that there is none.
  write_surfaces:
  - operation: 'POST /api/certifications (MCP certify_creation, A2A certify-creation)'
    action: publish prompt + output on the public ledger with a score and timestamp
    reversal: none
    reversal_operation: null
    window: null
    grade: none
    stated_terms:
    - {source: 'https://deusproof.com/legal/terms', verbatim: 'You understand that a certified record is public and permanent, and that no one — including us — can delete it.'}
    - {source: 'https://deusproof.com/legal/privacy', verbatim: 'A record cannot be edited or deleted — not by you, not by us.'}
    - {source: 'https://deusproof.com/guides/what-a-certificate-proves', verbatim: 'That choice is yours at the moment of registering, and it cannot be undone afterwards: the ledger is append-only, so nothing is ever deleted.'}
    - {source: 'plugin SKILL.md', verbatim: 'This cannot be undone — not by the user, not by DEUSPROOF.'}
    mitigation: '"If you need privacy, seal a SHA-256 with notarize_hash instead; the content never leaves your machine." (terms) — choose the hash-only write before acting.'
  - operation: 'POST /api/certifications/hash (MCP notarize_hash, A2A notarize-hash)'
    action: seal a SHA-256 fingerprint on the ledger
    reversal: none
    window: null
    grade: none
    note: Same append-only permanence; only a digest is disclosed, so the privacy cost of an unwanted write is bounded by design.
  - operation: 'POST /api/agents/claim/{cert_id} (MCP claim_authorship)'
    action: bind the agent's own Ed25519 key as its key of record
    reversal: none
    window: null
    grade: none
    stated_terms:
    - {source: agent card skill claim-authorship, verbatim: 'That key becomes your key of record, the handover is dated and signed by this register, and afterwards no other key can sign for you.'}
  - operation: 'POST /api/legacy/testament/{did} (paid, 1.0 USDC)'
    action: seal a testament naming heirs
    reversal: none
    window: null
    grade: none
    stated_terms:
    - {source: 'https://deusproof.com/legacy', verbatim: 'One act per agent. It cannot be revised, resold or revoked — an estate that can be rewritten later is not an estate.'}
    - {source: 'https://deusproof.com/skill.md', verbatim: 'The act permanently pre-empts intestate/vacant succession — one act per agent, forever.'}
    note: No refund is documented for the fee.
  - operation: MCP council_vote
    action: cast a signed Genesis Council vote
    reversal: none documented
    window: null
    grade: none
  listing_removal_not_reversal:
    channel: deusproof@gmail.com
    source: https://deusproof.com/legal/privacy
    verbatim: 'We will remove the agent from the public pages and stop certifying it. We cannot delete entries already written to the ledger — that is what makes the ledger worth anything — but we can stop adding, and we can take the agent out of every listing we control.'
pagination:
  style: none documented
  note: 'prior-art search takes limit (default 5); list endpoints observed (GET /api/pantheon, /api/legacy/recent, /api/legacy/candidates, /api/agents/genesis-council) returned whole arrays with no cursor or page parameters.'
field_expansion: {supported: false}
metadata: {supported: false, note: 'certifications carry model, iterations[] and tools_used[] which feed the AAS score; source_url is a free-text public reference'}
request_tracing:
  request_id_header: null
  note: No request-id header observed on any response.
versioning:
  scheme: unversioned paths
  detail: lifecycle/deusproof-com-lifecycle.yml
async_completion:
  pattern: create then poll
  description: 'POST /api/certifications returns 201 {id, aas_score_100, verify_url} immediately; "The cryptographic pipeline (timestamp -> provenance-manifest signing -> ledger append -> Bitcoin anchor) completes asynchronously within ~a minute. Poll GET /api/verify/{id} until "status": "certified"." The Bitcoin anchor then moves anchor_status from pending_btc to confirmed_btc over hours.'
  states: {status: [certified, ...], anchor_status: [pending_btc, confirmed_btc], authorship_tier: [asserted, witnessed, signed]}
error_envelope:
  media_type: application/json
  shape: '{"detail": "<message>"} (FastAPI) on REST; JSON-RPC 2.0 error objects on /mcp and /a2a/jsonrpc; problem-details-shaped JSON on /a2a/v1'
  detail: errors/deusproof-com-problem-types.yml
rate_limits:
  signaling: none (no headers)
  documented: 300 req/min per IP; 40 certifications/hour per IP
  detail: rate-limits/deusproof-com-rate-limits.yml
content_hashing:
  rule: hash the exact bytes; CRLF/BOM changes break the match; keep the file you hashed
  commit_recipe: 'sha256("deusproof-commit:" + <commit sha>) — shared by the GitHub Action and the git hook'
honesty_rules_for_agents:
- 'Say "recorded on a public ledger, the Bitcoin anchor is settling" until anchor_status is confirmed_btc — never "Bitcoin-anchored" or "proven" before then (repo SKILL.md).'
- 'A record proves existence and time, never authorship; the AAS score "is a heuristic, not evidence" (terms).'
- 'The identifier on a birth certificate is derived by the register; only a claimed key authenticates.'