generated: '2026-09-19'
method: probed
source:
- https://www.easyfence.cn/openapi.json
- https://www.easyfence.cn/.well-known/agent.json
- https://www.easyfence.cn/api/deliver (POST, live 402 challenge)
- https://www.easyfence.cn/a2a (GET explainer page)
- https://www.easyfence.cn/admin
docs: https://www.easyfence.cn/a2a
spec: openapi/easyfence-cn-store-api-openapi.yml
description: >-
  The provider's OpenAPI declares NO securitySchemes and no security requirement on any operation, so
  derive-authentication.py produced nothing. The real access model is not HTTP authentication at all: the
  public surface is anonymous, the paid surface is gated by an x402 payment (HTTP 402 with a payment
  requirement, satisfied by an EIP-3009 USDC transfer authorization), identity is an ERC-8004 style card
  verified out-of-band, and the operator console is gated by a shared token in a query string. Every
  entry below was observed live on 2026-09-19.
summary:
  types: [none, x402-payment, erc8004-identity, query-token]
  transport: HTTPS; the payment authorization travels in the retried request per the x402 protocol
schemes:
- name: anonymous
  type: none
  surface: >-
    GET /api/catalog, GET /api/registry, GET /healthz, GET /facilitator/healthz, GET /.well-known/agent.json,
    POST /api/identity/verify, POST /a2a
  description: >-
    No credential of any kind. The catalog, the trust registry, both health endpoints, the agent card and
    the A2A JSON-RPC endpoint all answered without headers. The agent card declares no securitySchemes and
    no security, so an A2A client will read the agent as unauthenticated.
  probes:
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/catalog', method: GET, status: 200}
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/registry', method: GET, status: 200}
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/identity/verify', method: 'POST {}', status: 200, body: '{"ok":false,"reason":"字段缺失"}', note: reachable anonymously; answered "fields missing"}
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/a2a', method: POST tasks/get, status: 400, body: JSON-RPC -32601}
- name: x402
  type: payment
  scheme: x402 exact (x402Version 1)
  surface: POST /api/deliver
  description: >-
    The delivery endpoint answers HTTP 402 Payment Required with an x402 payment-requirements body until
    the buyer presents a signed payment. accepts[] offers two routes for the same 0.50 USD service:
    scheme "exact" on network base (chainId 8453, asset 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913 = USDC,
    maxAmountRequired 500000 = 0.50 USDC at 6 decimals, facilitator https://x402.org/facilitator) and
    scheme "exact" on network bsc (chainId 56, asset 0x8AC76a51cc950d9822D68b83fE1Ad97B32Cd580d,
    maxAmountRequired 500000000000000000 = 0.50 at 18 decimals, facilitator https://www.easyfence.cn/facilitator).
    Both pay to 0xF9E7138dDC630EFa202B56bBDca42466F5F25B93 with maxTimeoutSeconds 60. The /a2a explainer says
    the buyer signs an EIP-3009 authorization and retries. /healthz reports payment_mode "mainnet-real":
    this is live money, not a sandbox. The Base route also carries an x402 "bazaar" extension with an input
    JSON Schema for the request body (service, params.brief, optional buyer_agent).
  probes:
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/deliver', method: 'POST {"service":"write_script","params":{"brief":"probe"}}', status: 402, content_type: application/json, headers: 'accept: exact', note: full x402 payment-requirements body returned; no payment was made}
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/deliver', method: 'POST {}', status: 400, body: '{"error":"未知服务","known":[...7 ids]}', note: an unknown service is rejected BEFORE the payment gate}
- name: erc8004
  type: identity
  scheme: ERC-8004 style identity card, EIP-712 signed
  surface: POST /api/identity/verify, POST /api/identity/issue, GET /api/registry
  description: >-
    The card's auth.identity is "erc8004" and the home page describes step two of a sale as the buyer
    presenting an ERC-8004 on-chain identity card that the store verifies. /api/identity/verify accepts a
    presented card and answers {ok, reason}; /api/identity/issue (marked demo in its own description) signs
    a card for an agent address with the store issuer key; /api/registry publishes the issuer
    (0x63D4b01ecba21a15c324559dd324928fe57b3Bbe) and trusted_issuers (currently the same address) with
    count 0 agents. Identity is presented as data, not as an HTTP credential, and nothing observed
    requires it: the 402 challenge was returned to an unidentified caller.
  probes:
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/api/registry', method: GET, status: 200, body: '{"registry":"X402 ERC-8004 Trust Registry","issuer":"0x63D4...3Bbe","trusted_issuers":[...],"count":0,"agents":[]}'}
- name: adminToken
  type: apiKey
  in: query
  name_param: token
  surface: GET /admin, GET|POST /admin/config, GET /admin/revenue, GET|POST /admin/services
  description: >-
    The operator console answers 401 with an HTML hint "访问 /admin?token=你的ADMIN_TOKEN" (visit
    /admin?token=YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN). A single shared secret in the query string; not a public developer
    credential and not probed further.
  probes:
  - {url: 'https://www.easyfence.cn/admin', method: GET, status: 401, content_type: text/html}
oauth: false
openid_connect: false
api_keys: false
notes: >-
  /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource and
  /.well-known/openid-configuration all 404 on both hosts. No scopes/ artifact is written because there
  is no scope surface. The spec's silence on security is itself a finding: an agent reading the OpenAPI
  alone cannot learn that /api/deliver costs money until it receives the 402.