generated: '2026-08-17' method: searched source: https://learn.elium.com/en/api/getting_started/authentication docs: - https://learn.elium.com/en/api/getting_started/authentication - https://learn.elium.com/en/api/getting_started/quick_start - https://help.elium.com/en/articles/12767574-mcp note: >- Derived nothing from OpenAPI - Elium publishes no OpenAPI. This profile is read from the provider's own authentication guide. Every URL is per-tenant: Elium runs one platform per subdomain, so the authorization, token and revocation endpoints live on the customer's own {platform}.elium.com host. summary: types: [oauth2] api_key_in: [] oauth2_flows: [authorizationCode, password, refreshToken] scopes: [apiv1] token_type: Bearer api_key_alternative: none api_key_note: >- Elium publishes no API-key or personal-access-token path. Every call is OAuth 2.0 on behalf of a user; server-to-server integrations are documented as a password grant against a dedicated service user account. schemes: - name: OAuth2 type: oauth2 source: https://learn.elium.com/en/api/getting_started/authentication applies_to: - GraphQL API (https://{platform}.elium.com/graphql) - MCP server (https://{platform}.elium.com/services/mcp) flows: - flow: authorizationCode authorizationUrl: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/authorize tokenUrl: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/token refreshUrl: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/token scopes: {apiv1: Full access to the Elium API on behalf of the authenticated user} use: Server-side applications acting for an interactive Elium user. - flow: password tokenUrl: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/token scopes: {apiv1: Full access to the Elium API on behalf of the authenticated user} use: >- Backend / unattended operations. The provider's guide directs integrators to create a dedicated user account for this grant rather than reusing a human account. - flow: refreshToken tokenUrl: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/token use: Renews the access token; a new access token AND a new refresh token are issued on each renewal. tokens: type: Bearer header: 'Authorization: Bearer ' expires_in: 3600 expires_in_unit: seconds refresh: supported revocation: endpoint: https://{platform}.elium.com/oauth/revoke method: POST parameters: [token, client_id, client_secret] effect: Revokes the access token and its refresh token immediately. client_registration: mechanism: Connected App where: Security tab of the Elium administration panel requires_role: administrator (system role) fields: [name, redirect URL, trusted flag] trusted_flag_effect: >- A Connected App marked "trusted" skips the end-user approval screen, for pre-approved corporate applications. dynamic_client_registration: available on request (documented for the MCP surface) docs: https://help.elium.com/en/articles/12767574-mcp authorization_model: enforcement: per-user detail: >- Access is always evaluated against the authenticated user's own permissions. For MCP the provider states it plainly: "Every tool runs with the permissions of the authenticated user, so an assistant can only ever access content that user is already allowed to see in Elium." sso: supported: true protocols: [SAML 2.0, OpenID Connect] note: >- Enterprise directory SSO (including ADFS/Microsoft) is documented as a platform control, separate from API authentication. Source https://elium.com/trust/controls. mfa: supported: true graphql_operations: [meActivateTwoFactor, meRemoveTwoFactor] gaps: - No RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata and no OIDC discovery document are served (see well-known/elium-well-known.yml) - a client cannot discover the endpoints programmatically. - A single coarse scope (apiv1) grants the whole API; there is no read/write or per-resource scoping. - No client-credentials grant is documented, so genuine machine-to-machine access is modelled as a password grant against a service user.