specification: API Commons Authentication
specificationVersion: '0.1'
provider: Envoy Gateway
providerId: envoy-gateway
generated: '2026-09-07'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://gateway.envoyproxy.io/docs/tasks/security/ and the SecurityPolicy and
  ClientTrafficPolicy schemas in json-schema/envoy-gateway-crds.yaml.
  derive-authentication.py was run first and returned no profile, correctly: it reads
  OpenAPI securitySchemes and this provider publishes no OpenAPI.
description: >-
  Two different things are easy to confuse here, and conflating them would misdescribe the
  product. Envoy Gateway has no credential of its own — you authenticate to the Kubernetes
  API server and RBAC decides whether you may write its resources. What it PROVIDES is a
  rich authentication surface for the traffic passing through the gateway, configured
  through SecurityPolicy. The first is this artifact's `provider` section; the second is
  its `provided` section, and only the first describes how a consumer gets in.
provider:
  schemes:
    - type: kubernetes
      name: Kubernetes API server authentication
      description: >-
        Client certificates, bearer tokens, OIDC, or a cloud provider's IAM authenticator —
        whatever the cluster is configured for. Envoy Gateway inherits it entirely.
      authorization: >-
        Kubernetes RBAC on the gateway.envoyproxy.io API group. A Role or ClusterRole
        granting verbs on backends, backendtrafficpolicies, clienttrafficpolicies,
        envoyextensionpolicies, envoypatchpolicies, envoyproxies, httproutefilters and
        securitypolicies is what actually gates access.
      note: Nothing is issued by Envoy Gateway. There is no API key, token or console login.
    - type: mutualTLS
      name: xDS control plane to data plane
      description: >-
        The control plane serves xDS to the managed Envoy proxies over mTLS, with
        certificates provisioned by the certgen Job or by cert-manager. Operators do not
        call this channel; it is internal.
      note: >-
        v1.9.0 fixed an authentication bypass on this channel in GatewayNamespaceMode —
        see security/envoy-gateway-vulnerability-disclosure.yml.
  oauth2: false
  apiKey: false
  scopes: null
  scopesNote: >-
    No OAuth scopes artifact is written. derive-oauth-scopes.py found no oauth2
    securityScheme because there is no spec, and the real authorization model is RBAC verbs
    on Kubernetes resources, which is not a scope list.
provided:
  description: >-
    Authentication methods Envoy Gateway can enforce on traffic traversing the gateway,
    all configured on the SecurityPolicy CRD. Listed because for this product they are the
    feature a buyer is shopping for.
  crd: SecurityPolicy
  docs: https://gateway.envoyproxy.io/docs/api/extension_types/#securitypolicy
  methods:
    - field: spec.jwt
      name: JWT validation
      detail: >-
        Per-provider issuers, audiences, remote or local JWKS, claim-to-header extraction,
        failedRefetchDuration and (v1.9.0) failOpen.
    - field: spec.oidc
      name: OpenID Connect
      detail: >-
        Authorization-code flow with PKCE, discovery, refresh, logout, and forwardIDToken
        (v1.9.0). v1.9.1 removed HTTP as an acceptable issuer scheme and moved session
        cookies to AES-256-GCM.
    - field: spec.apiKeyAuth
      name: API key authentication
      detail: >-
        Keys extracted from headers, query parameters or cookies. v1.9.0 tightened
        extractFrom validation to require at least one entry naming exactly one source.
    - field: spec.basicAuth
      name: HTTP Basic authentication
      detail: Credentials from a Kubernetes Secret containing an htpasswd file.
    - field: spec.extAuth
      name: External authorization
      detail: Delegates the decision to an HTTP or gRPC external authorization service.
    - field: spec.authorization
      name: Authorization rules
      detail: >-
        Allow/deny rules on client CIDR, JWT claims, headers and (v1.9.0) CEL expressions
        and path matches.
    - field: ClientTrafficPolicy spec.tls.clientValidation
      name: Mutual TLS for downstream clients
      detail: >-
        CA certificate refs, optional insecure fallback, and (v1.9.0)
        allowExpiredCertificate.
    - field: spec.csrf
      name: CSRF protection
      detail: >-
        Added v1.9.0. Validates the Origin header of mutating requests against the
        destination and additionalOrigins, with gradual rollout via shadowFraction.
    - field: spec.cors
      name: CORS
      detail: Cross-origin request handling at the gateway.
maintainers:
  - FN: Kin Lane
    email: kin@apievangelist.com