generated: '2026-08-16' method: searched source: >- https://developer.furiosa.ai/latest/en/furiosa_llm/furiosa-llm-serve.html, https://developer.furiosa.ai/latest/en/overview/roadmap.html, https://github.com/furiosa-ai/furiosa-sdk/blob/main/python/furiosa-server/README.md docs: https://developer.furiosa.ai/latest/en/furiosa_llm/furiosa-llm-serve.html summary: >- FuriosaAI operates no hosted API, so there is no FuriosaAI-issued credential anywhere in this profile. Both HTTP surfaces are software the customer runs on their own machines, and each one authenticates (or does not) on the customer's terms. That is the honest shape of the auth story here, and it is why no OAuth scopes artifact exists. surfaces: - api: furiosa-llm-openai-server name: Furiosa-LLM OpenAI-Compatible Server schemes: - type: http scheme: bearer name: OpenAI-style API key header: 'Authorization: Bearer ' required: false issued_by: the operator of the server, not FuriosaAI evidence: >- The roadmap records "✅ API Key based authentication support" delivered in the 2025 Q3-Q4 train. Every code example in the serving docs sends `api_key = os.getenv("OPENAI_API_KEY", "EMPTY")`, and the raw curl example sends no Authorization header at all - i.e. the server runs unauthenticated by default and the key is opt-in, set by whoever launches `furiosa-llm serve`. note: >- The docs do not publish the server flag that enables it or the failure status code. Establishing those requires reading `furiosa-llm serve --help` on an installed build. model_value_ignored: >- Worth recording as an auth-adjacent quirk: the `model` field is required by OpenAI clients but IGNORED by the server, because one `furiosa-llm serve` process hosts exactly one model. Callers should read the real id from GET /v1/models rather than assume routing by name. - api: furiosa-server-predict-v2 name: Furiosa Model Server (KServe v2 Predict + Triton Model Repository) schemes: [] security_schemes_in_spec: false evidence: >- Neither openapi/furiosa-predict-v2.yaml nor openapi/furiosa-model-repository-v2.yaml declares a `securitySchemes` block or any `security` requirement, and the furiosa-server README lists "Authentication support" as an UNCHECKED roadmap item. The server is designed to sit behind the customer's own ingress/mesh. note: >- This is a real finding, not an omission on our side: the model-repository surface exposes unauthenticated load/unload of arbitrary models from the repository root, so it must never be exposed outside a trusted network. oauth: false oauth_note: >- No OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect anywhere - no authorization server, no scopes, no /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (probed 404 on all hosts, see well-known/). scopes/ is therefore intentionally absent rather than empty. mtls: false scheme_count: 1