generated: '2026-08-17'
method: probed
source: live DNS/TLS/HTTP probes of apis.yml + OpenAPI hosts
hosts:
- host: www.go-electra.com
  https: true
  tls_version: TLSv1.3
  cert_expires: Feb 19 23:59:59 2027 GMT
  hsts: false
- host: ocpi.go-electra.com
  https: true
  tls_version: TLSv1.3
  cert_expires: Oct  2 18:50:05 2026 GMT
  hsts: true
  hsts_max_age: 63072000
  hsts_include_subdomains: true
  hsts_note: >-
    The probe recorded null because the host root (/) returns 404 with no HSTS
    header. A follow-up HEAD of the real API route
    https://ocpi.go-electra.com/ocpi/cpo/versions on 2026-08-17 returned 200
    with `strict-transport-security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains`, so
    HSTS is present with a two-year max-age on the API surface itself.
notes:
- >-
  www.go-electra.com is a CloudFront + S3 static site (server: CloudFront on the
  301, AmazonS3 on the 200) and serves no HSTS header, so the marketing host is
  the weaker of the two. The API host ocpi.go-electra.com is behind Cloudflare
  in front of a Rails application and does send HSTS.
- >-
  ocpi.go-electra.com also returns a restrictive Content-Security-Policy
  (default-src 'self') on JSON API responses, and the standard Rails hardening
  set (X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN, X-Content-Type-Options nosniff,
  Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin,
  X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies none).
- >-
  The observed CSP connect-src on ocpi.go-electra.com includes
  http://localhost:3004 and http://localhost:3035 — development origins left in
  a production policy header. Recorded as observed; it is a hygiene note, not a
  vulnerability finding.
domains:
- domain: go-electra.com
  dnssec: false
  caa: []
  spf: true
  dmarc: true
  dmarc_policy: quarantine