generated: '2026-08-22' method: probed source: >- https://portal.hakimo.ai/assets/env.js (public runtime config, HTTP 200), https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/.well-known/openid-configuration (HTTP 200), and unauthenticated GETs against https://portal.hakimo.ai/v2/orm/* (HTTP 401), all probed 2026-08-22. status: undocumented-by-provider scored: false note: >- IMPORTANT — this artifact is NOT a claim that Hakimo documents its authentication. It does not. There is no developer portal, no API reference and no auth page anywhere on hakimo.ai. Everything below was established by probing public, unauthenticated surfaces; no credentials were used and no access control was defeated. For that reason NO `Authentication` pointer is wired into apis.yml — emitting one would credit Hakimo with published auth documentation it has not published. This file exists so the measurement is on the record, not to move a score. surfaces: - name: Hakimo customer portal (tenant application API) host: portal.hakimo.ai base: https://portal.hakimo.ai/v2/orm/ public: false documented: false observed_challenge: request: unauthenticated GET, no Authorization header status: 401 content_type: application/json body: '{"message":"Invalid token","status":401}' www_authenticate: absent note: >- Same-origin backend of the Angular portal SPA. It is a first-party application API, not a published integration API: no reference, no spec, no key issuance flow, no rate-limit or error documentation. Individual operation paths are deliberately NOT enumerated here. identity_provider: vendor: Auth0 tenant: hakimo.us.auth0.com issuer: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/ discovery: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/.well-known/openid-configuration discovery_status: 200 oauth_metadata: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server oauth_metadata_status: 200 audience: https://hakimo.ai/orm client_id_public: HDsOi2UZ7NXiERiG16p1hWeWc73yJlFf client_type: public SPA (no client secret; PKCE) authorization_endpoint: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/authorize token_endpoint: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/oauth/token revocation_endpoint: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/oauth/revoke jwks_uri: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/.well-known/jwks.json device_authorization_endpoint: https://hakimo.us.auth0.com/oauth/device/code code_challenge_methods_supported: - S256 - plain id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: - HS256 - RS256 - PS256 grant_types_supported: - client_credentials - authorization_code - refresh_token - password - implicit - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer note: >- A dedicated Auth0 tenant, i.e. OAuth 2.0 / OIDC bearer tokens carried as `Authorization: Bearer ` against the audience https://hakimo.ai/orm. The scope set advertised at the discovery endpoint is Auth0's stock OIDC set (openid, profile, email, offline_access, ...); NO Hakimo-specific API scopes are published anywhere, so no scopes/ artifact is derivable and none was written. sso: >- The portal exposes an SSO configuration surface to tenants, so enterprise customers almost certainly federate their own IdP. Hakimo publishes no documentation of that setup. absent: - api-key-issuance-flow - published-scope-reference - published-token-lifetime - published-auth-documentation - machine-readable-security-schemes