generated: '2026-08-27'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://api.hevyapp.com/docs (Swagger UI; the OpenAPI document is embedded in
  /docs/swagger-ui-init.js) + https://github.com/hevyapp/hevy-gpt + live probes of
  https://api.hevyapp.com/v1/workouts and https://hevy.com/oauth/authorize on 2026-08-27.
summary: >-
  Hevy runs two distinct authenticated surfaces. The public REST API on api.hevyapp.com takes a
  per-account UUID API key in an `api-key` request header, issued to Hevy Pro subscribers from the web
  app at https://hevy.com/settings?developer. Hevy's own ChatGPT Custom GPT calls a different host,
  hevy.com/api/v1, over OAuth 2.0 — the authorization endpoint https://hevy.com/oauth/authorize is
  live (307 to /login when unauthenticated) — but Hevy publishes no OAuth client registration flow,
  token endpoint, or scope reference, so OAuth is in practice a first-party-only surface.
schemes:
- id: api-key-header
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  name: api-key
  format: uuid
  applies_to: https://api.hevyapp.com (all 22 operations)
  declared_as_security_scheme: false
  declared_note: >-
    IMPORTANT SPEC GAP — the published OpenAPI declares NO `components.securitySchemes` and no
    `security` block anywhere. The key is modelled instead as a `required: true` header PARAMETER
    named `api-key` (schema type string, format uuid) repeated on all 22 operations. Functionally
    identical for a human reader; invisible to any tool that reads securitySchemes, including
    most codegen and every scorer that checks "securitySchemes defined + applied". Our overlay
    (overlays/hevy-public-api-overlay.yaml) proposes the missing ApiKeyAuth scheme.
  issuance:
    self_serve: true
    url: https://hevy.com/settings?developer
    gate: Hevy Pro subscription required
    probed:
    - url: https://hevy.com/settings?developer
      status: 200
      note: 302/307s to /login?postLoginPath=%2Fsettings%3Fdeveloper%3D for anonymous callers.
  rotation_documented: false
  expiry_documented: false
  scopes: none
  transport: HTTPS only (TLSv1.3 observed)
  failure:
    status: 401
    body: InvalidApiKey
    media_type: text/html; charset=utf-8
    note: >-
      Observed live 2026-08-27 with a syntactically valid but unissued UUID. The body is the bare
      string `InvalidApiKey` with a text/html content type — not JSON, not RFC 9457, and not declared
      anywhere in the OpenAPI (no operation declares a 401). See errors/hevy-problem-types.yml.
- id: oauth2-gpt-action
  type: oauth2
  flow: authorization_code
  applies_to: https://hevy.com/api/v1 (6 operations, Hevy's own ChatGPT Custom GPT)
  authorization_endpoint: https://hevy.com/oauth/authorize
  token_endpoint: null
  token_endpoint_note: >-
    Not published. Probed https://hevy.com/oauth/token and https://hevy.com/api/oauth/token on
    2026-08-27 — both 404. The value lives only in the GPT's private action configuration.
  scopes_documented: false
  dynamic_client_registration: false
  discovery:
    oauth_authorization_server: 404
    oauth_protected_resource: 404
    openid_configuration: 404
    note: >-
      No RFC 8414 / RFC 9728 / OIDC discovery document on any Hevy host — see
      well-known/hevy-well-known.yml. A third-party agent cannot self-onboard to this surface.
  evidence:
  - url: https://hevy.com/oauth/authorize
    status: 307
    location: /login?postLoginPath=%2Foauth%2Fauthorize
    checked: '2026-08-27'
  - url: https://github.com/hevyapp/hevy-gpt
    status: 200
    note: 'README "#### Authentication" section for the api.hevyapp.com action reads simply: OAuth.'
    checked: '2026-08-27'
mtls: false
openid_connect: false
signed_requests: false
cors:
  allow_origin: '*'
  allow_headers: Origin, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Accept, api-key
  allow_methods: GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS
  method: probed
  note: >-
    Observed on the live 401 from api.hevyapp.com. The API key is a bearer-equivalent secret and the
    API sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin `*`, so browser-side use of a Hevy key exposes it to any
    origin; keys belong on a server.
agent_notes: >-
  For an autonomous agent the only reachable door is the api-key header, and it cannot be obtained
  programmatically — a human must hold a Hevy Pro subscription and copy the key out of the web app.
  There is no OAuth flow an arbitrary client can complete, no scopes, and no way to issue a
  reduced-privilege credential: one key grants full read AND write over the whole account.