generated: '2026-09-19'
method: probed
source: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent-card.json
card:
  file: a2a/humanbrowser-cloud-agent-card.json
discovery:
  path: /.well-known/agent-card.json
  canonical: true
  host: agent.humanbrowser.cloud
  note: >-
    Served from the A2A/MCP host named in the card's own url (agent.humanbrowser.cloud) AND byte-identically
    from the website apex (https://humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent-card.json, sha256 identical, 58,101
    bytes on both). The legacy /.well-known/agent.json path returns a real JSON 404 on the agent host
    ({"error":"not-found","path":"/.well-known/agent.json"}) and the site's HTML 404 page on the apex; a
    negative-control path that cannot exist 404s on both hosts, so the 200s are served documents, not a
    catch-all. www.humanbrowser.cloud does not resolve (NXDOMAIN), so there is no www host to probe. Ownership is not in question: provider.organization is "Virix Labs" with provider.url
    https://humanbrowser.cloud; the OpenAPI at https://humanbrowser.cloud/openapi.json names contact Virix
    Labs / general@virixlabs.com and lists https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud as its second server; the Terms
    and Privacy pages name Virix Ltd, company 16325097 (confirmed Active at Companies House); the npm package
    @virixlabs/humanbrowser (maintainer virix-labs, general@virixlabs.com) hard-codes the same card URL in
    its `doctor` command.
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-09-19'
  url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent-card.json
  http_status: 200
  content_type: application/json; charset=utf-8
  body_bytes: 58101
  body_parses_as: JSON object with AgentCard shape (name, url, version, protocolVersion, preferredTransport, provider, documentationUrl, iconUrl, capabilities, defaultInputModes, defaultOutputModes, securitySchemes, security, skills, additionalInterfaces)
  corroborating_probes:
  - url: https://humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent-card.json
    http_status: 200
    note: Byte-identical copy (same sha256) served from the website apex.
  - url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent.json
    http_status: 404
    note: Legacy path; real JSON 404, 54 bytes.
  - url: https://humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/agent.json
    http_status: 404
  - url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/.well-known/humanbrowser-cloud-negative-control-4b9e1d.json
    http_status: 404
    note: Negative control — the host is not a path-echoing catch-all.
  - url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/a2a
    method: GET
    http_status: 404
    note: The JSON-RPC endpoint is POST-only; GET returns the host's generic JSON 404.
  - url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/a2a
    method: POST
    body: '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"agent/getAuthenticatedExtendedCard"}'
    http_status: 401
    response: '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":null,"error":{"code":-32001,"message":"Unauthorized","data":{"hint":"Authorization: Bearer <token>"}}}'
    note: >-
      A live JSON-RPC 2.0 responder that gates every method behind the bearer token the card declares. No
      message was sent and nothing was spent. Note the error code: -32001 is TaskNotFoundError in the A2A
      specification; this server reuses it for Unauthorized (recorded under deviations).
  - url: https://humanbrowser.cloud/a2a
    http_status: 200
    note: The card's documentationUrl — a real protocol page documenting message/send, message/stream, tasks/get and tasks/cancel with curl, Node and Python examples.
  - url: https://a2aregistry.org
    note: >-
      The card was first seen among the 415 agents listed on a2aregistry.org (fetched 2026-09-19), which is
      how this provider entered the harvest backlog. The registry listing was the lead; the card above was
      fetched directly from the provider's own hosts.
agent_card:
  name: humanbrowser
  description_bytes: 25284
  description_summary: >-
    "Stealth cloud browser-agent with residential proxies" — a plain-English goal is run by an LLM-driven
    Chromium on a residential IP and answered with text plus a live viewer URL. The 25 KB description is
    itself an operating manual for the calling agent: when to use it, how to get a key (self-service POST
    /api/buy), pricing, verbatim-payload markers, the task queue, learned site APIs, profile persistence,
    the input-required resume contract, diagnostics, screenshots, the reporting contract, and the MCP
    alternative.
  url: https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/a2a
  version: 5.1.0
  protocol_version: 0.3.0
  preferred_transport: JSONRPC
  provider:
    organization: Virix Labs
    url: https://humanbrowser.cloud
  documentation_url: https://humanbrowser.cloud/a2a
  icon_url: https://humanbrowser.cloud/favicon.ico
  capabilities:
    streaming: true
    push_notifications: true
    state_transition_history: true
    human_in_the_loop: true
  default_input_modes: [text/plain, application/json, image/png, image/jpeg, image/webp, image/gif, application/pdf, video/mp4, application/octet-stream]
  default_output_modes: [text/plain, application/json]
  security_schemes:
    http_bearer: {type: http, scheme: bearer, description: Skill token issued by humanbrowser.cloud. Required on every /a2a call.}
  security: [{http_bearer: []}]
  additional_interfaces:
  - {url: 'https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/a2a', transport: JSONRPC}
  skill_count: 9
  skills:
  - {id: browser_task, name: Browser Task, tags: [browser, automation, scraping, navigation, stealth]}
  - {id: login_and_scrape, name: Login and Scrape, tags: [browser, login, scraping, authenticated]}
  - {id: meta_business_workflow, name: Meta Business Workflow, tags: [browser, meta, facebook, ads-manager, business-suite, multi-account, adspower], price_stated: '+$0.05/session surcharge'}
  - {id: fill_form, name: Fill Form, tags: [browser, form, submit]}
  - {id: scrape_url, name: Scrape URL, tags: [browser, scraping, url-to-json, structured-extraction]}
  - {id: relay_reverse_api, name: Relay (reverse-API), tags: [reverse-api, relay, fast-path, no-browser, cost-optimized], price_stated: '~$0.0001 per call vs $0.005-0.02 per browser task'}
  - {id: hostile_site_solver, name: Hostile Site Solver, tags: [anti-bot, cloudflare, turnstile, perimeterx, datadome, cua, hard-target], price_stated: '$0.005/solve on success; $0.13-$0.30 per successful task'}
  - {id: email_verified_signup, name: Email-Verified Signup, tags: [signup, onboarding, email-otp, turnstile, hunter, apollo, zerobounce], price_stated: '~$0.16 per successful signup'}
  - {id: network_discovery, name: Network endpoint discovery, tags: [browser, network, reverse-api, discovery, api-scout], examples: null}
  skill_invocation: >-
    Every skill is reached through the same POST /a2a endpoint with message/send or message/stream; the
    card and the /a2a page say the skill is chosen implicitly from the shape of the message parts (a
    TextPart goal, an optional DataPart with metadata.sensitive=true for credentials, an optional FilePart)
    and from message.metadata (profile, country, engine, mobile_ua, callback_url). There is no skill-id
    parameter in the protocol call.
  non_standard_top_level_keys:
    metadata: >-
      open_source flag, sdk_urls (npm, github, mcp_shim), pricing_json_url https://humanbrowser.cloud/api/plans
      (live, 200), mcp_url https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/mcp, a cdp_url_pattern
      (wss://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/cdp?token=...), viewer_url_pattern, engines_supported (patchright,
      cloak, cua, adspower, remote-cdp, relay), remote_cdp_providers (brightdata, browserbase, browseruse), and
      a `blocks` vocabulary (submit_guard, repeat_action, no_effect_click, scroll_no_progress, navigate_loop,
      captcha_unsolved, input_not_binding, account_lockdown) with retryable flags and overrides.
    extensions: >-
      Four extension URIs at the TOP LEVEL rather than under capabilities.extensions —
      https://humanbrowser.cloud/a2a-ext/input-required/v1 (the pause/resume contract, with ask_schema and two
      resume protocols), /a2a-ext/relay/v1, /a2a-ext/engine-router/v1, /a2a-ext/viewer/v1; all required:false.
      The URIs are identifiers, not documents: GET on each returns the site's HTML 404.
    customActions: >-
      Twelve provider-specific JSON-RPC methods invoked as "actions/<name>" on the same endpoint —
      switch_proxy_country, get_cost_snapshot, list_engines, list_countries, get_page_diagnostics,
      get_screenshots, list_models, list_learned_apis, call_site_api, upload_file, actions/discover_endpoints,
      list_remote_providers — each with a JSON-Schema params block. These are outside the A2A method set.
conformance:
  spec: A2A 1.0.0
  grade: conformant
  protocol_version: '0.3.0'
  preferred_transport: JSONRPC
  hard_checks:
    capabilities_is_object: true
    protocol_version_present: true
    skills_is_array: true
  optional_fields:
    default_input_modes: true
    default_output_modes: true
    preferred_transport: true
  grade_basis: >-
    Graded against the A2A 1.0.0 hard checks. capabilities is an OBJECT (pass) carrying streaming,
    pushNotifications and stateTransitionHistory; protocolVersion is present at the top level (pass),
    declared "0.3.0"; skills is an ARRAY (pass) of nine skills, each with id, name, description, tags,
    inputModes and outputModes. All three optional discriminators are present (preferredTransport JSONRPC,
    defaultInputModes, defaultOutputModes). This is a 0.3.0-shaped card — top-level url + preferredTransport +
    protocolVersion plus additionalInterfaces[] — and it is internally consistent with that revision. The
    provider's prose ("A2A 1.0" on every page, in llms.txt and in the OpenAPI) claims a newer revision than
    the card declares.
  deviations:
  - field: protocolVersion vs prose
    observed: card declares 0.3.0; the website, llms.txt, npm README and OpenAPI all say "A2A 1.0"
    note: Valid for 0.3.0. A reader written against 1.0.0 looks for supportedInterfaces[].protocolBinding and will not find it; recorded because both card shapes coexist in the catalog and because the provider's own description over-states the revision.
  - field: capabilities.humanInTheLoop
    observed: 'true'
    note: Not an A2A capability key. The human-takeover behaviour it names is real (viewer URL + input-required pause), but a conformant reader ignores the key.
  - field: extensions / customActions / metadata
    observed: present at the top level of the card; capabilities.extensions is absent
    note: A2A places extension declarations under capabilities.extensions[]; the card's four extension URIs sit at the root, where a spec reader will not look, alongside two entirely non-standard blocks (customActions, metadata). The information is useful and the card is richer for it, but none of it is discoverable through the standard shape.
  - field: skills[8].examples (network_discovery)
    observed: 'null'
    note: Every other skill carries examples[]; this one carries an explicit null.
  - field: error code on unauthorized calls
    observed: JSON-RPC error -32001 "Unauthorized"
    note: -32001 is TaskNotFoundError in the A2A error registry; an A2A client that maps codes will misread an auth failure as a missing task. HTTP 401 is also returned, so a transport-level reader gets it right.
  - field: version
    observed: 5.1.0 on the card; 5.0.3 on npm (latest, 2026-06-17); 1.0.0 in the OpenAPI info.version
    note: Three surfaces, three version numbers.
  - field: additionalInterfaces
    observed: one entry identical to the primary url + transport
    note: Redundant rather than wrong.
  - field: signatures
    observed: absent
    note: No JWS signature block; the card's authenticity rests on TLS to the two hosts that serve it.
surface_relationship:
  note: >-
    Four agent surfaces, one runtime. A2A (POST https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/a2a, message/send |
    message/stream | tasks/get | tasks/cancel plus twelve actions/* methods) is what the provider calls the
    canonical surface. MCP (https://agent.humanbrowser.cloud/mcp, Streamable HTTP, same hb_live_ token, and a
    stdio server in the npm package) wraps the same task loop in three tools — see mcp/humanbrowser-cloud-mcp.yml.
    REST (https://humanbrowser.cloud/api/*) is the account side only: trial token, balance, top-up, plans,
    usage; the OpenAPI's sixth operation, runA2ATask, is the A2A endpoint itself described as a POST. A
    ChatGPT Custom GPT and an OpenAI-style /.well-known/ai-plugin.json point at the same /a2a and openapi.json.
    See mcp/humanbrowser-cloud-tool-crosswalk.yml for the binding.