generated: '2026-09-13' method: probed source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp (tool list + both deployment modes), probed at https://mcp.withone.ai/mcp status: published description: >- One ships BOTH a hosted remote MCP server and a local-stdio server, and the provider documents them as two ways to reach the same four tools. The remote endpoint is reachable and OAuth-gated; the local server is an npm package. Tool names below are the provider's own published list from https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp and the /.well-known/agent.json `mcp.tools` block — NOT derived from the OpenAPI. Input schemas require an authenticated tools/list; see tools_note. server: name: one transport: streamable-http url: https://mcp.withone.ai/mcp deployment: mode: both endpoint: https://mcp.withone.ai/mcp install: npm install -g @withone/cli && one init package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@withone/mcp auth: oauth verified: probed checked: '2026-09-13' probe: gated probe_detail: >- POST {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"} with Accept: application/json, text/event-stream returned HTTP 401 with WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://mcp.withone.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", error="invalid_request", error_description="missing bearer token" — a correct RFC 9728 challenge. probe_why: OAuth-protected resource; anonymous introspection is refused by design. source_remote: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp — "One hosts a remote MCP server at https://mcp.withone.ai/mcp" source_local: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp — "npm install -g @withone/cli && one init" authorization: protected_resource_metadata: https://mcp.withone.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource authorization_server_metadata: https://mcp.withone.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server issuer: https://mcp.withone.ai authorization_endpoint: https://api.withone.ai/oauth/authorize token_endpoint: https://api.withone.ai/oauth/token registration_endpoint: https://mcp.withone.ai/oauth/register dynamic_client_registration: true pkce: S256 scopes_on_resource: - user:connections:read - user:connections:write scopes_on_authorization_server: 38 note: >- The authorization server metadata is served on mcp.withone.ai but its authorize/token endpoints live on api.withone.ai — a third host. Both documents are saved under well-known/. tools: - name: list_one_integrations description: >- List available platforms and active connections, each stamped with an `access` field describing exactly what the agent may run there. source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp input_schema: null - name: search_one_platform_actions description: Search for actions on a specific platform. source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp input_schema: null - name: get_one_action_knowledge description: Get detailed documentation for an action. source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp input_schema: null - name: execute_one_action description: Execute an API action on a connected platform. source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp input_schema: null tool_count: 4 tools_note: >- Names and descriptions are provider-published; input schemas are NOT captured because anonymous tools/list is OAuth-gated (401, RFC 9728 challenge). Run an authenticated introspection to fill inputSchema. The provider explicitly designs for a fixed four-tool surface — "Only 4 tools are exposed regardless of how many platforms or actions you connect. Actions are search-based, so your agent's context window stays clean." access_control: model: consent-grant, enforced server-side on the remote server policies: - full — every action on the connection - methods — only actions whose HTTP method is in the granted set - actions — only an explicitly enumerated set of actionIds knowledge_only_mode: true source: https://www.withone.ai/docs/mcp maintainers: - FN: Kin Lane email: kin@apievangelist.com