generated: '2026-09-03'
method: probed
source: https://leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: https://leadping.ai/docs/api-authentication
corroborating_source: https://api.leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
summary: >-
  Leadping's OpenAPI declares NO oauth2 securityScheme — its two schemes are both HTTP bearer (a user
  JWT / organization API key, and a source key). The OAuth surface is therefore not visible in the
  contract at all; it exists only in the RFC 8414 and RFC 9728 discovery documents, which Leadping
  serves and which the MCP endpoint's 401 WWW-Authenticate header points at. This artifact records
  what those documents actually declare. It was PROBED from the live metadata, not derived from the
  spec: derive-oauth-scopes.py correctly reports "providers with oauth2: 0" for this repo.
model: >-
  OIDC-only scope surface. Leadping delegates identity to a WorkOS AuthKit tenant and publishes only
  the four standard OpenID Connect scopes. There is NO Leadping-specific resource scope vocabulary
  (nothing of the leads:read / sms:send shape) in any published discovery document.
authorization_server:
  issuer: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app
  vendor: WorkOS AuthKit
  metadata_url: https://leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200
  authorization_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/token
  jwks_uri: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/jwks
  introspection_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/introspection
  revocation_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/revoke
  device_authorization_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/device_authorization
  grant_types_supported:
    - authorization_code
    - refresh_token
    - 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code'
  code_challenge_methods_supported:
    - S256
  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:
    - none
    - client_secret_post
    - client_secret_basic
  response_types_supported:
    - code
protected_resource:
  resource: https://api.leadping.ai
  metadata_url: https://api.leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
  http_status: 200
  resource_name: Leadping API
  resource_documentation: https://leadping.ai/docs/api-reference
  bearer_methods_supported:
    - header
  token_issuers_supported:
    - https://api.workos.com/user_management/client_01KWM0YXJJ0Y4JNRC6EZJRACJT
    - https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app
scope_count: 4
scopes:
  - name: openid
    standard: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
    description: Requests an ID token and establishes the OIDC authentication flow.
    declared_in:
      - authorization_server.scopes_supported
      - protected_resource.scopes_supported
  - name: profile
    standard: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
    description: Requests the end-user's default profile claims (name, picture, updated_at and similar).
    declared_in:
      - authorization_server.scopes_supported
      - protected_resource.scopes_supported
  - name: email
    standard: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
    description: Requests the end-user's email and email_verified claims.
    declared_in:
      - authorization_server.scopes_supported
      - protected_resource.scopes_supported
  - name: offline_access
    standard: OpenID Connect Core 1.0
    description: Requests a refresh token so the client can obtain new access tokens without the user present.
    declared_in:
      - authorization_server.scopes_supported
    note: >-
      Declared by the authorization server but NOT echoed in the API's protected-resource metadata,
      whose scopes_supported lists only openid, profile and email. A client reading only the resource
      metadata would not know refresh tokens are available.
agent_identity_extension:
  note: >-
    The RFC 8414 document carries a non-standard "agent_auth" block — outside the OAuth spec and
    outside the scope vocabulary — that is the closest thing Leadping publishes to an agent
    authorization surface.
  skill: https://leadping.ai/auth.md
  identity_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/agent/identity
  claim_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/agent/identity/claim
  revocation_endpoint: https://motivated-run-93.authkit.app/oauth2/revoke
  identity_types_supported:
    - identity_assertion
  assertion_types_supported:
    - verified_email
  credential_types_supported:
    - access_token
gaps:
  - >-
    No resource-scope vocabulary. Nothing published lets a client request or a resource server
    advertise least-privilege access to a Leadping capability — an access token is scoped by the
    organization membership and role behind it, not by a requested scope. An agent cannot ask for
    read-only access to leads and be granted exactly that.
  - >-
    The A2A Agent Card names a "leads:read permission" in the PROSE of its securityScheme description
    (a2a/leadping-agent-card.json), and its skill securityRequirements carry an EMPTY scope list. So a
    permission name exists in Leadping's world but appears in no machine-readable scope registry, in
    no securityScheme in the OpenAPI, and in neither discovery document. This is the single clearest
    scope gap in the profile.
  - >-
    The two authorization documents disagree on offline_access (see the scope note above).
  - No scopes or permissions reference page is published; https://leadping.ai/docs/scopes 404s.
probes:
  - url: https://leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
    status: 200
    fetched: '2026-09-03'
  - url: https://api.leadping.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
    status: 200
    fetched: '2026-09-03'
  - url: https://leadping.ai/.well-known/openid-configuration
    status: 200
    fetched: '2026-09-03'
  - url: https://leadping.ai/docs/scopes
    status: 404
    fetched: '2026-09-03'
  - url: https://leadping.ai/docs/permissions
    status: 404
    fetched: '2026-09-03'