generated: '2026-08-09'
method: searched
source: https://legal.ge/llms.txt + openapi/legal-ge-public-apis-openapi.yml
docs: https://legal.ge/llms.txt
summary:
  types: [none]
  keyless: true
  api_key_in: []
  oauth2_flows: []
  note: >-
    The OpenAPI 3.1 document declares NO components.securitySchemes and no global or per-operation
    `security` requirement. This is not a thin spec — the API is genuinely public and keyless by
    design, documented as such in llms.txt and in the MCP server README ("No keys required. The
    legal.ge Ask API is public; rate-limited per IP.").
schemes: []
access_control:
  model: anonymous-public-read
  gate: per-IP rate limiting only
  sources:
    - openapi/legal-ge-public-apis-openapi.yml
    - https://legal.ge/llms.txt
    - https://github.com/infolegalge/legal.ge-mcp
privileged_surface:
  description: >-
    The one PII-bearing operation, GET /api/specialists/{id}/contact, is not protected by a
    credential either — it is protected by CONSENT plus throttling: the field is returned only when
    the profile set info_activate=true and is in a public compliance state, and the endpoint is
    capped at 10 requests/minute per IP explicitly "to make bulk PII harvest impractical".
  operationId: revealSpecialistContact
what_requires_sign_in:
  - Sending an inquiry or message to a specialist (interactive sign-in on legal.ge; not exposed via API).
  - Dashboards (specialist, company, client, trainer, author, litigation cabinet) — all Disallowed in robots.txt.
oauth_discovery:
  '/.well-known/openid-configuration': 404
  '/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server': 404
scopes:
  applicable: false
  note: No OAuth surface, therefore no scope model. scopes/ is intentionally not emitted.
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-09'
  url: https://legal.ge/api/openapi.json
  http_status: 200