generated: '2026-08-13'
method: probed
source: https://app.loops.so/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: https://loops.so/docs/mcp-server
summary: >-
  Loops runs exactly one OAuth 2.0 authorization server and it exists to
  authorize the MCP server, not the REST API. The REST API has no OAuth surface
  at all — it is API-key only, and a Loops API key is unscoped. So the entire
  scope vocabulary for this provider is a single opaque scope, `mcp`, which
  grants an MCP client the same reach the signed-in user has.
authorization_server:
  issuer: https://app.loops.so
  metadata: https://app.loops.so/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  metadata_spec: RFC 8414
  http_status: 200
  authorization_endpoint: https://app.loops.so/oauth/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://app.loops.so/oauth/token
  revocation_endpoint: https://app.loops.so/oauth/revoke
  grant_types_supported:
    - authorization_code
    - refresh_token
  response_types_supported:
    - code
  response_modes_supported:
    - query
  code_challenge_methods_supported:
    - S256
  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:
    - none
  client_id_metadata_document_supported: true
  dynamic_client_registration: false
protected_resource:
  resource: https://mcp.loops.so/
  metadata: https://mcp.loops.so/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
  metadata_spec: RFC 9728
  http_status: 200
  authorization_servers:
    - https://app.loops.so
  bearer_methods_supported:
    - header
scopes:
  - name: mcp
    description: >-
      Grants an MCP client access to the Loops MCP server at
      https://mcp.loops.so. Advertised in both the authorization-server and
      protected-resource metadata and returned in the WWW-Authenticate challenge
      on an unauthenticated request.
    resource: https://mcp.loops.so/
    granularity: coarse
    read_write: both
    documented_effect: >-
      The MCP server exposes search, describe, execute and teams. `execute` can
      run any operation in the Loops REST API for any team the signed-in user
      can reach, which includes writes — creating and updating contacts,
      sending events, and sending transactional email. Loops' own FAQ asks "Can
      the MCP server change data or send email?" on its MCP page.
scope_count: 1
granularity: single-scope
observations:
  - >-
    There is no read-only scope. Consenting to `mcp` is consenting to the full
    write surface of every team the user belongs to; an agent cannot be granted
    a narrower grant.
  - >-
    Public-client posture is correct for an MCP server —
    `token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ["none"]` with PKCE S256 required —
    but client identity comes from Client ID Metadata Documents or
    pre-registration rather than RFC 7591 dynamic registration, so an arbitrary
    new client cannot self-register.
  - Refresh tokens and a revocation endpoint are both supported.
  - >-
    The REST API declares one securityScheme (`apiKey`, http bearer) applied to
    all 64 operations, with no scopes. See
    authentication/loops-authentication.yml.
maintainers:
  - FN: Kin Lane
    email: kin@apievangelist.com