generated: '2026-08-04'
method: probed
source: https://api.mitiga.cloud/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: null
description: >-
  Mitiga publishes no public developer documentation, but its product API gateway
  (api.mitiga.cloud) serves an anonymous RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata document.
  This profile is derived entirely from that document and the OIDC discovery document on
  the identity host it points at. No OpenAPI securitySchemes were available to derive from.
summary:
  types: [oauth2, openIdConnect]
  api_key_in: []
  oauth2_flows: [clientCredentials, authorizationCode, deviceCode, tokenExchange, refreshToken]
  identity_provider: Auth0 (EU tenant)
  proof_of_possession: DPoP (ES256)
  pkce: true
schemes:
- name: oauth2
  type: oauth2
  issuer: https://api.mitiga.cloud/
  sources: [well-known/mitiga-oauth-authorization-server.json]
  endpoints:
    authorization: https://api.mitiga.cloud/oauth-2/authorize
    token: https://api.mitiga.cloud/oauth-2/token
    userinfo: https://api.mitiga.cloud/oauth-2/userinfo
    registration: https://api.mitiga.cloud/oauth-2/oidc/register
    jwks: https://api.mitiga.cloud/.well-known/jwks.json
    device_authorization: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/oauth/device/code
    revocation: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/oauth/revoke
    backchannel_authentication: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/bc-authorize
    mfa_challenge: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/mfa/challenge
  grant_types:
  - client_credentials
  - authorization_code
  - refresh_token
  - password
  - implicit
  - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code
  - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
  - urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer
  - http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/password-realm
  - http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/passwordless/otp
  - http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-oob
  - http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-otp
  - http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-recovery-code
  token_endpoint_auth_methods:
  - client_secret_basic
  - client_secret_post
  - private_key_jwt
  - none
  token_endpoint_auth_signing_algs: [RS256, RS384, PS256]
  id_token_signing_algs: [HS256, RS256, PS256]
  code_challenge_methods: [S256, plain]
  response_types: [code, token, id_token, code token, code id_token, token id_token, code token id_token]
  response_modes: [query, fragment, form_post]
  dpop_signing_algs: [ES256]
  dynamic_client_registration: true
  backchannel_logout: true
  global_token_revocation: true
- name: openIdConnect
  type: openIdConnect
  issuer: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/
  openIdConnectUrl: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/.well-known/openid-configuration
  sources: [well-known/mitiga-openid-configuration.json]
notes:
- >-
  Machine-to-machine access is possible in principle — client_credentials is an advertised
  grant type — but no public documentation describes how a customer obtains a client id
  and secret, and no scope beyond the standard OIDC set is advertised anonymously.
- >-
  The customer console at https://mitiga.cloud redirects to the Auth0 universal login on
  auth.mitiga.cloud; every product route behind the Kong gateway returns
  "no Route matched with those values" to an unauthenticated caller.
x-evidence:
- url: https://api.mitiga.cloud/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200
  content_type: application/json
  fetched: '2026-08-04'
- url: https://auth.mitiga.cloud/.well-known/openid-configuration
  http_status: 200
  content_type: application/json
  fetched: '2026-08-04'